

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VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT PROGRAM

FEBRUARY 17, 18, 19, AND 20, AND MARCH 3, 14, 17, AND 19, 1970

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m. in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, McGee, Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Javits.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Two weeks ago the committee heard testimony on a number of legislative proposals concerning the war in Vietnam and related questions of American foreign policy. Today we initiate a new phase of these hearings in which primary attention will be given to American operations in Vietnam connected with pacification, the military advisory effort, the aid program, and the activities of USIA. Later we expect to hear testimony on the political and economic effects of the war within the United States.

All three phases of these hearings are oriented to a single set of objectives. Their immediate purpose is to provide information which will assist the committee in acting on the legislative proposals that have been placed before it. The more general purpose of these hearings is to help inform American public opinion and to assist the President in his efforts to bring the war to an early, satisfactory conclusion.

For the next 4 days—3 in open session and the last in executive session—the committee will hear testimony on the civil operations and rural development support program in Vietnam. This program—usually referred to by its initials as "CORDS"—encompasses most of the nonmilitary activities of the United States in Vietnam. Although it is under overall military command, CORDS is executed at all levels by civilian as well as military personnel. The programs under its general jurisdiction deal with pacification, refugees, enemy defectors, the South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces and the Phoenix program for the "neutralization" of key Vietcong personnel.

In addition to Ambassador William Colby, the director of CORDS, the committee will hear testimony by representative CORDS personnel who work at the Corps, province and district levels, helping

the South Vietnamese to perform more effectively in the political sphere. Because of the pertinence of these field activities to the Administration's overall policy of Vietnamization, the committee has departed from normal practice by inviting the testimony of operative personnel as well as that of the official in overall charge of the program under study. We greatly appreciate the cooperation of these able and dedicated officials who have taken time from their difficult jobs in the field in Vietnam to assist the committee in meeting its responsibility to advise and assist the President in his efforts to end this war.

By participating in these hearings, and by giving the committee the benefit of their detailed knowledge and candid judgments of American political activities in Vietnam, the witnesses will perform a valuable service to the Senate and to the American people. At the same time, the committee is aware of the special sense of responsibility which operative officials quite naturally feel toward their own programs and agencies.

SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES

In order to protect the witnesses from the understandable ambivalence they may feel with respect to their responsibilities to the agencies they work for, on the one hand, and to this committee and the Senate on the other, we are asking them to be sworn in before giving their testimony. This practice has been found useful in other committee inquiries including the examination of security agreements and commitments abroad currently being conducted by the subcommittee of which Senator Symington is chairman.

The witnesses at the table this morning I believe are Ambassador William E. Colby; Mr. William K. Hitchcock, the Director of Refugee Directorate; Mr. John Vann, Deputy for CORDS, IV Corps; Mr. Hawthorne Mills, Province Senior Advisor, Tuyen Duc; Mr. Clayton McManaway, Director, Plans, Policy and Programs; and also appearing this week the military people will be Major James F. Arthur, the District Senior Advisor of Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province; Captain Armand Murphy, the Advisor of the Long An Province; Captain Richard T. Geck, Mobile Advisory Team Advisor for Kien Giang Province; and Sergeant Richard D. Wallace, Combined Action Platoon Team Leader, Quang Nam Province.

We, therefore, ask you, Ambassador Colby, and all of your colleagues whom I mentioned will appear to testify, to rise if you will.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. COLBY. I do.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I do.

Mr. VANN. I do.

Mr. MILLS. I do.

Mr. MCMANAWAY. I do.

Major ARTHUR. I do.

Captain MURPHY. I do.

Captain GECK. I do.

Sergeant WALLACE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Recognizing that, despite differing functions and responsibilities, we are all committed to the same objective—which is

to bring the war to an early and satisfactory conclusion—we now invite the witnesses to proceed.

We will start with Ambassador Colby.

Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. COLBY. I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DEPUTY TO GENERAL ABRAMS, COMMANDER OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS); ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK, DIRECTOR, REFUGEE DIRECTORATE; JOHN VANN, DEPUTY FOR CORDS, IV CORPS; HAWTHORNE MILLS, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISER, TUYEN DUC; CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY, DIRECTOR, PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman the leaders of North Vietnam call the conflict in Vietnam a People's War. They saw it as a new technique of war, one which would enable them to win despite greater military power on the side of the government and its allies. They believed they could seize control of the population and pull it from under the government structure, causing its collapse. For a time it looked as though they might be correct. Their power steadily built up during the organizational phase of their effort during the late 1950's through the guerrilla period of the early 1960's to the stage in late 1964 when they sent North Vietnamese units to prepare a final assault on the centers of government authority. The scenario was interrupted, however, when American combat forces entered in mid-1965 to keep final victory from their grasp.

EFFORTS TO FIGHT "PEOPLE'S WAR"

Since 1965, the Vietnamese and American Governments have been increasing their understanding of and forging the tools necessary to fight on the several levels of a people's war. The organizational tools were developed, the personnel were indoctrinated and the strategy outlined by which such a war must be conducted. This was a gradual process to which many Vietnamese, Americans and other nationals contributed. The process is by no means complete.

Even more important, much of the execution of the program on the ground still lies ahead and setbacks will occur. However, the fundamentals have been identified and the program is well launched. As a result, the war called a People's War by the Communists is being increasingly waged by the Vietnamese people, defending themselves against Communist attack, terror and subversion and at the same time building a better future of their own choosing.

PRESIDENT'S POLICY FOR REDUCING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR

What I will describe is only a part of our effort to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. President Nixon has clearly set the policy which the program I will describe supports. The President has stated three ways by which our participation in the war can be reduced: nego-

tiations, a reduction of violence by Hanoi, and a strengthening of the Vietnamese Government and the people, which we call Vietnamization. The program which I will describe falls under the last. Its objective is an increase in South Vietnam's capacity to defend itself, thereby permitting a reduction of American participation in the war. The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to defend itself.

PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The program is called pacification and development by the Government of Vietnam. It operates behind the shield furnished by another aspect of our efforts in Vietnam, the military operations of the Vietnamese and allied armies. However bold, however well conceived, however logical this program, it has been amply proven that it cannot be effective unless hostile regiments and divisions are kept away.

At the same time, however, we have found that their absence does not thereby produce pea e nor offer political fulfillment to the people. While armies can repel armies, and can assist in the consolidation of security, the very power, organization and procedures which are essential in large-scale combat make it difficult for them to fight on all the levels of the people's war. Thus, additional tactics and techniques had to be developed to fight on these other levels. Pacification and development is this necessary counterpart to the military efforts of our forces in this new kind of war.

TERRITORIAL SECURITY

Security is a part of pacification, too, at these other levels. One level is territorial security, the ability of the farmer to sleep in his home at night without fear of guerrillas foraging, conscripting or taxing. This security is provided by local forces and militia, permanently protecting the community while the regular troops operate against larger regular enemy units.

To provide this protection, the Vietnamese regional forces operate within the provinces, normally in company strength. The popular forces operate within the village area, normally in platoon strength. Both of these forces are made up of full-time soldiers, uniformed, armed with modern weapons, and trained to conduct patrols and ambushes in the outskirts of the villages. Both have been substantially increased since 1968, so they now total approximately 475,000 men. Their effectiveness has also been improved under a program which was instituted between our Military Assistance Command and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff in October 1967.

As a result, these forces now have M–16 rifles, special advisory teams of Americans to train and assist them, and effective systems of communications and fire support. They made a major contribution to the key 1969 strategy of expansion of the government's protection to hamlets and villages which had been deserted or abandoned to enemy control for several years, establishing islands of local security around which the population could cluster.

Territorial security, however, is not left only to fulltime soldiers. In mid-1968, the Vietnamese Government launched a program to enlist all citizens in the Nation's defense. The General Mobilization

Law was passed by the National Assembly, requiring that all men from 16 to 50 help defend their country. Under this law, any man not in the expanded armed forces is required to be a member of the People's Self Defense Force, an unpaid militia, to defend his home community. To these are added volunteers from the elderly, young people from 12 to 15, and women.

The government has distributed arms and trained these people. Initially, there were some faint hearts among Vietnamese officialdom over this distribution of weapons, as they looked back on the former war lords, the political factions, the possibility of arming the Viet Cong and the chance the people might choose to act against the government itself.

The President and the Prime Minister, however, took the position that it was only by showing this kind of trust in the people that a people's war could be properly fought. Today, some 400,000 weapons have been made available to the People's Self Defense Force, over a million Vietnamese have been trained to use them or otherwise assist, and some 3 million are claimed to have been enrolled. It is no fearsome military force, to be sure, and the number enrolled is a very soft statistic, but the Communists have identified it clearly as a major threat, a start toward a true people's army and a locally based political force for the future. As a result, they have attacked it and tried to destroy it, but it has stood its ground in many, not all, fights, and fully validated the government's confidence.

USE OF PHOENIX PROGRAM TO COMBAT VC INFRASTRUCTURE

There is another level of security at which this new kind of war must be fought. In Vietnam, there is a secret Communist network within the society which tries to impose its authority on the people through terrorism and threat. This network, or as it is called in Vietnam, the VC infrastructure, provides the political direction and control of the enemy's war within the villages and hamlets.

It lays down the caches for the troops coming from the border sanctuaries; it provides the guides and intelligence for the North Vietnamese strangers; it conscripts, taxes, and terrorizes. Protection against the North Vietnamese battalion or even the Vietcong guerrilla group does not give real freedom if the elected village chief is assassinated, the grenade explodes in the market place, or the traitor shoots the self-defender in the back.

During 1969, for example, over 6,000 people were killed in such terrorist incidents, over 1,200 in selective assassinations, and 15,000 wounded. Among the dead were some 90 village chiefs and officials, 240 hamlet chiefs and officials, 229 refugees, and 4,350 of the general populace.

One of the major lessons about the people's war has been the key role the infrastructure plays in it. This Communist apparatus has been operating in Vietnam for many years and is well practiced in covert techniques. To fight the war on this level, the government developed a special program called Phung Hoang or Phoenix. The government has publicized the need for this effort to protect the people against terrorism and has called upon all the citizens to assist by providing information and they are doing so.

Since this is a sophisticated and experienced enemy, experts are also needed to combat it. Thus, the Phoenix program started in mid-1968 to bring together the police, and military, and the other government organizations to contribute knowledge and act against this enemy infrastructure. It secures information about the enemy organization, identifies the individuals who make it up, and conducts operations against them.

These operations might consist of two policemen walking down the street to arrest an individual revealed as a member of the enemy apparatus or they might involve a three-battalion attack on a jungle hideout of a district or province committee.

As a result of this program, members of this apparatus are captured, turn themselves in as ralliers or are killed in fire fights. More needs to be done for this program to be fully effective, but the government has a high priority on it. Our own government provides advisory assistance and support to this internal security program through the police, the administration, the information services and the intelligence services. This is similar to our support of the military effort against the North Vietnamese battalions and Viet Cong guerrilla groups through the Vietnamese military forces.

PURPOSE OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

But another of the major lessons learned over the years about the people's war is that security is not enough alone. Security in a people's war cannot be provided to the people, they must participate in the effort. For Vietnamese to do so, after the years of troubles they have seen, they must be convinced that one side offers and will deliver a better life for themselves and their families, that it has a chance of succeeding in the contest and that they will have a voice in the common effort.

To convince them, and thus to engage the people in the endeavor, the government must develop a program to satisfy these three requirements. Pacification and development is this policy, giving full weight to the people's security, their betterment and their voice in decisionmaking. The combination of all three enlists the people on their government's side, the critical step in a people's war.

NEW APPROACH TO VILLAGE COMMUNITIES

Thus as an integral element of its pacification and development plan in 1969, the Government of Vietnam took a new approach to the village community in Vietnam. Rather than considering it the lowest of a series of bureaucratic levels through which authority descends from the Palace to the people, it became the first assemblage of the population to conduct its own affairs.

Over the past year, elections have been held in 961 villages and 5,344 hamlets, elections which were held in the light of the day and with general popular participation. As a result, 95 percent of the 2,151 villages and 94 percent of the 10,522 hamlets today have elected local governments. These elections have been a clear contrast to the alleged elections held in Vietcong base areas or by individual armed VC poll takers sneaking into isolated farmhouses at night to require

a single vote of approval of the People's Revolutionary Party candidate.

These officials need training to become effective. Thus, 1,862 village chiefs and 8,532 hamlet chiefs from every part of the nation, plus a variety of other government workers at the village and hamlet level, to a total of over 30,000, have attended a special 5-week course at a national training center. There they were told by President Thieu that they had full authority over affairs in their communities and that they were to consider themselves as the leaders of their people. Further to make this clear, the black pajama clad Rural Development Cadre, a national corps of 42,000 hamlet level political organizers, were divided into smaller teams and made subject to the elected village chief's directions.

In addition, in a reversal of previous practices, wherein the bureaucracy decided what was good for the villagers, development funds were passed directly to the village level for decision by the locally elected village council as to what kinds of development projects the local people desired. They chose a vast variety from schools to pig raising to irrigation to hand tractors; but even more importantly they reacted with enthusiasm to this indication that they, not faraway officials, were determining their future. This same process of stimulating local responsibility and participation is being applied to urban neighborhoods in the form of improved walkways through the slums, rebuilt homes, and firefighting teams.

INVITATION TO ENEMY TO REJOIN NATIONAL CAUSE

The development of the Vietnamese community also includes inviting members of the enemy camp to rejoin the national cause, where they are decently received and resettled. Some 47,000 people during the past year took this road to a new life with the GVN, almost one-third of the total of 140,000 since 1963. Many of these former enemies are now serving the Government forces as guides, as members of the local defense forces, and as members of teams inviting more of their ex-colleagues to join them.

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND OTHER WAR VICTIMS

In addition, the program to provide assistance to refugees and other war victims has been an element of the pacification effort. It, too, is aimed at the people, to assist them to reestablish their disrupted lives and to return to the villages where security now permits them to reenter. Some 488,000 people during the past year have received financial and commodity assistance as they returned to their villages. Another 586,000 have been paid benefits at their new locations. Mr. William K. Hitchcock, of our Refugee Directorate, is here to testify in detail on this important part of the effort to bind the nation together.

INFORMATION PROGRAM

To strengthen the national community, an information program is an element of pacification and development to inform the people of their rights and privileges and the Government's role in this program. Mr. Edward J. Nickel, our senior USIA officer in Vietnam and Director

of our joint military-civilian U.S. Public Affairs Office, will give you the details of this program.

DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS

The development of a better economy for the farmers in the countryside has also been an element of this total effort, opening lines of communication to markets, providing a new and more productive strain of rice and resuming the distribution of land to tenants which had been stalled during the war years. A variety of other developmental improvements such as new schools, new health stations, et cetera, also support the overall program. Mr. Donald G. MacDonald, Director of our USAID Mission in Vietnam, will testify separately on the details of those activities, but I would like to point out that they are being integrated fully into the one national pacification and development program.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ROLE IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

If this is the program then how does it work? What is the American role? How much does it cost? How many people are involved in it?

The first reply is that it is fundamentally a Vietnamese program. The territorial security forces are Vietnamese. The police are Vietnamese. The local hamlet and village officials are Vietnamese. Those who receive and resettle former members of the enemy camp are Vietnamese. Those who register and pay benefits to the refugees are Vietnamese. Those who sow the new rice, those who explain the government policies are all Vietnamese. In a people's war in Vietnam the people engaged in it will be Vietnamese.

Thus the Vietnamese play the major role in the program. The government has been organized to prosecute this program as a highest priority effort. The President, the Prime Minister and the government have established a Central Pacification and Development Council at the national level, with its own staff to draw together the diverse strands of this program into one effort.

It developed a national pacification and development plan for 1969 and has just completed one for 1970. This structure at the national level has counterparts at the regional and the province levels, where there are similar councils of all the different officials engaged in this multifaceted program. Each province had a provincial plan for 1969 and now has one for 1970, in which it draws together the threads of the different programs to make one overall effort in the province.

Using this planning process, and some of the statistical reporting systems developed to support the program, goals are set, reports are required, and inspections conducted. The province chiefs and their deputies have had a week-long seminar at a national center at which each of the Ministers in turn described his Ministry's contribution to the national plan and answered probing questions from the province chiefs. Detailed comments were sent by the national staff to each province on the province plan, calling for correction or modification of any aspects which did not follow the overall guidelines. As a result, the province chiefs and the corps commanders are fully aware of their program for pacification and development in their area in specific

terms, which hamlets are being reentered, how the struggle to identify the Vietcong infrastructure is going in the various parts of the province, when the next elections are scheduled in the hamlets and villages, and where the irrigation ditch is being dug and how well it is progressing.

The President and Prime Minister have removed 25 province chiefs and 162 district chiefs in 1968 and 23 province chiefs and 110 district chiefs in 1969 and 1970 to date—excluding shifts—many for failing to measure up.

Even down to the village level, the plan has been pushed. In December, village chiefs in most provinces joined in meetings at the province capitals at which a Minister and a staff from the various other Ministries of the National Government explained the total program to them. The President and many of the Ministers frequently visit the Corps and the provinces and have many times gone to individual villages for detailed question and answer discussions with the village chief and village council of the situation in their village and the impact of the pacification and development plan there.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

But I do not pretend that this is a totally Vietnamese effort. It obviously benefits from the shield produced by American forces as well as the Vietnamese Army divisions. The M–16 rifles carried by the Territorial Forces were made in America. Many of the funds used for the support of the refugees or for the village development programs come from counterpart generated by American imports. American advisers at all levels from national to district and even in some cases to the village or platoon discuss the program with their counterparts, come up with recommendations and ideas, go to the meetings where the program is discussed in Vietnamese with simultaneous English translation and help evaluate how well it is really going in the field.

CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS)

The American contribution to this program is provided by an organization which in Vietnam is known as CORDS an integral part of the U.S. Military Assistance Command MACV. The word CORDS is an acronym which in itself symbolizes the learning process we have been through in Vietnam. In the early 1960's, each American agency in Vietnam had its separate structure and responsibilities, all of course under the overall control of the Ambassador.

With the military buildup in 1965 and 1966 the U.S. civil agencies also expanded their activities and particularly moved into the provinces each with its own chain of command. As a result, many of the American programs, however good in themselves, were uncoordinated and Vietnamese officials in the provinces might be dealing with as many as four or five separate Americans, each giving him different advice.

In early 1966 the Deputy U.S. Ambassador was named coordinator of field programs with a small staff. This authority, however, proved inadequate and in December 1966 an Office of Civil Operations was established which had full command authority over the civilian agencies in the field. Province chiefs then had only two advisors, one

military and one civilian. In May 1967 the final step was taken of bringing the entire U.S. field effort under one chain of command and one manager.

Since security is so much a part of pacification, it was decided to place overall responsibility for pacification on the Commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, General Westmoreland, and to establish my predecessor, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, as his Deputy for CORDS—Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. CORDS in the field took responsibility for the local military aspects of pacification, the Territorial Security Forces, and the civilian aspect of pacification, for example, the programs of the USAID Mission and the Information Agency or Joint U.S. Public Affairs office—JUSPAO. At the Saigon level, these two civilian agencies maintain their independence for certain national programs, but their field operations are now under the single chain of command of the Commander U.S. Military Assistance as a part of CORDS.

Thus today CORDS has teams at the national, regional, provincial and district levels. It is a part of the military command structure, in Saigon fully under General Abrams, and in each of the corps zones it is under the senior U.S. military commander.

PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURE OF CORDS

It consists of 6,361 military personnel, 2,395 officers and 3,966 enlisted, and 948 civilians—authorized. Added to these are 188 third country personnel and 7,600 local Vietnamese nationals. There is complete military and civilian integration at all levels of CORDS. The staffs in Saigon are partly military and partly civilian.

At the corps level, there also are civilians and military working together on the staffs. In 25 provinces a military officer, a colonel or lieutenant colonel, is the province senior adviser, and in 19 provinces and four independent cities, a civilian, a Foreign Service officer or a Foreign Service Reserve officer, is the province senior adviser. The civilian province senior advisers have military deputies. The military province senior advisers have civilian deputies. In 190 districts, the district senior adviser is a major, but in 33 he is a civilian, and at the district level there are 96 civilians serving in all. The normal district level team has about eight members; the teams at province level vary from 30 to 70; the staffs at region number about 150 and the staff in Saigon numbers about 600, all levels including civilian as well as military personnel.

In addition to these advisory teams, there are two special groups of personnel who participate in the pacification mission. Some of these are in mobile advisory teams, or MAT's. These are Army teams of two officers and three NCO's whose job is to live, work with, and assist in the improvement of Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons. Another type of team involved in similar work is the U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Platoon or CAP.

This consists of a squad of U.S. Marines led by their squad leader, assigned to work with a Vietnamese Popular Force platoon, living in the same area, patrolling and generally helping them with their job and to improve their performance. There are 353 MAT teams which include 1,985 U.S. Army personnel. There are 114 CAP teams which include approximately 2,000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen.

Both of these teams are used in certain areas for a period, with a special emphasis on upgrading the local regional or popular force units with which they are working. When they reach a satisfactory position, the team is moved to another area to repeat the process with another unit. The planning, of course, is that they will gradually complete this job of upgrading and that the program will then be phased out, leaving the Vietnamese local force unit to continue without direct American involvement.

OTHER U.S. PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

These are the American personnel who work directly in the pacification program and with CORDS. In addition, of course, many American units conduct pacification activities in their assigned areas. You have recently heard of the activities of the 173d Airborne Brigade in Binh Dinh Province. This is matched by a number of other American units which collaborate directly with regional and popular force units to increase the effectiveness of these units and improve the territorial security of the area.

The pacification program also profits from the many projects carried out by U.S. units in the form of civic action. Many doctors from the Army, Navy, and Air Force serve on special teams in province hospitals, and the Navy Seabees carry out many programs which both support pacification and train Vietnamese in skills for the future.

FUNDING OF CORDS

The funding of the CORDS operation comes from four sources, DOD's and AID's appropriations, AID's counterpart funds generated by imports, and the GVN's own budget from taxes, customs and deficit financing. The greater portion of the expenditures by both the United States and the GVN is used for the territorial forces and the police, with AID supporting development and refugee programs.

Both the United States and GVN have substantially increased their investments in pacification over the past several years, which is certainly a major reason for its improvement. The 1970 contributions are: DOD, $729 million; AID, $48 million; Counterpart, $114 million (equivalent); and GVN, $627 million (equivalent).

As can be seen, in funding as in personnel, CORDS is an integration of the programs of several agencies. It was designed to meet a new situation on the ground and it cuts across many of our familiar civil-military or departmental distinctions. It has been called a Rube Goldberg creation and I suppose in many respects it is. The key point, however, is that it is working and that it works with the Vietnamese.

CORDS: SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. RELATIONSHIP

Because it is the relationship with the Vietnamese which will decide whether the program will work or fail, it cannot be American. Americans can assist the Vietnamese temporarily and can help them take over the full program. Our resources are important. Our imagination and our energy are also important. But we must address these to helping Vietnamese to do the job themselves.

This process will be described in detail by the officers who are accompanying me: Mr. John Vann of Colorado, the senior CORDS officer for IV Corps in the Delta; Mr. Hawthorne Mills of California, a foreign service officer, the province senior advisor in Tuyen Duc Province; Maj. James Arthur of North Carolina, the district senior advisor in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province; Capt. Armand J. Murphy of Florida, RF/PF Advisor, Long An Province; Capt. Richard T. Geck of New Jersey, who is the leader of a Mobile Advisory Team presently located at My Lam Village, Kien Thanh District, Kien Giang Province; and U.S. Marine Sgt. E5 Richard E. Wallace of California, the leader of Marine Combined Action Platoon 2–1–5 whose present assignment is at Phu Son Hamlet in Hoa Luong Village in Hieu Duc District of Quang Nam Province.

At each of these levels the Americans work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts. They discuss problems; they visit the field together; they approach the job as a joint effort. At the same time, each has his own responsibilities to his own government. The Vietnamese chain of command has complete authority over the subordinate levels. No commands can be given through American channels to Vietnamese. The relationship must be one of mutual exchange, trust, and respect.

At the same time, the Americans have responsibilities to their own Government to report difficulties, to criticize where weaknesses exist and cannot be overcome locally, and to submit reports on their view of the situation in the area. These reports are in many cases made available to the Vietnamese counterpart, so he can see how he looks to his companion, and in some cases are made available to their superiors.

CHANGES PRODUCED IN VIETNAM SINCE 1968

The combination of the Vietnamese Pacification and Development Program and American assistance to it have produced the change in Vietnam since 1968. This change did not occur in 1 year; rather it culminated the changes which had been occurring over several years.

In 1967 a constitution was promulgated and a national assembly and a president were elected. This was a beginning of political stability in Vietnam after years of turbulence. In 1968, it can now be said in retrospect, the enemy made a major military effort to crack the shield which was gradually being built by the Vietnamese and Americans learning how to fight the people's war.

In his attacks at Tet in May and in August, he threw his battalions, regiments and divisions into a major effort to shatter the Vietnamese army, seize the centers of government power and spark a general uprising. Despite the real psychological impact of his attacks, the fact is that he did not achieve any of these three goals.

On the government side a new resolution and drive showed itself in such developments as the General Mobilization Law, the increase of the regular and territorial forces and the beginning of the People's Self Defense Program. By autumn it had become clear that the enemy's massive military assault had not succeeded and new strategies began to be applied.

In November 1968 President Thieu launched the accelerated pacification program the first integrated civil-military program to move into the country, establish security, attack the Vietcong ap-

paratus and begin the process of national mobilization under a comprehensive and integrated pacification plan.

Its critical feature was the movement of territorial forces into the areas from which they had been driven during the Tet attacks. This actually occurred without substantial enemy opposition. This 3-month campaign was followed by the 1969 pacification and development plan. The key development of 1969 was further expansion in the new areas throughout the countryside. The government set very venturesome goals in early 1969, goals which gave many of its advisors doubts that it could meet them. In fact, it met most of them although not all. As a result of these developments, the nature of the war has changed. The enemy began a People's War of insurgency and ended by conducting primarily a North Vietnamese Army invasion. The government and its allies first tried to meet the attack with conventional forces and tactics but are now utilizing all the techniques and programs of a People's War.

As a result of this long process, in early 1970 the change in the countryside is there to be seen. Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms.

We have statistical measures of all of these changes, imperfect but the best we could develop. But the real difference can only be experienced by driving on the roads, by visiting the markets, and by talking to a 12-year-old school girl who informs you that she is again attending school in her village after a 3-year period in which none existed. A friend once complained that the pacification program does not produce dramatic results. From day to day it does not, but the difference in Vietnam from Tet of 1968 is certainly dramatic to the Vietnamese peasant.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

There is more work to be done. At night there are still guerrillas in Vietnam, and the roads open in the day are deserted and dark, occasionally criss-crossed by contending local forces. The grenades still go off in the theaters or tea shops as the terrorist demonstrates his continued presence. Some officials have by no means caught the spirit of the village community and endeavor to assert their Mandarinal privileges of dictation from above. There are still refugees and others whose lives have been blighted by the war who must be helped to a decent place in society. Most of all, North Vietnamese divisions are over the border or in jungle redoubts, and prepare for other sallies against South Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1970, however, there is a vast difference in the situation. The government is organized to conduct a people's war and is showing the leadership and drive to create a better and a safer society for its citizens. Its 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is in many respects more venturesome and ambitious than the 1969 plan. Its key also lies in consolidation of the admittedly thin layer of security established in many areas. It also sets high goals in political, economic and social development, not all of which may be reachable.

In response to its leadership and its policies, however, its citizens are beginning to participate in self-defense, self-government and self-development. And the army has repelled North Vietnamese assaults at Bu Prang and Ben Het. It is by no means inevitable that this process must continue, as several developments could arrest or even reverse it.

The enemy is still in the field, and while we may have determined some of the tactics and techniques of this people's war, the lessons must be reflected in new kinds of action in every hamlet and village in the land. This process has begun, but the future will include some dark days and even some local disasters. I believe, however, that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved so the Vietnamese people will have a free choice as to their future.

The outcome will depend more and more upon Vietnamese leadership, upon Vietnamese commitment and even upon Vietnamese resources. We Americans have played a substantial role in learning about this new kind of war, but one of the lessons is that it must be waged by the people and not merely the Government of Vietnam.

The American contribution in personnel and in resources will gradually reduce, to be replaced by full mobilization of people willing to sacrifice to remain free and to carry out the programs to make these sacrifices meaningful.

The Vietnamese people and Government are shouldering more of the load today than they did last year, and their plans and programs envisage a greater effort tomorrow. This is true in the military field; it is also true in the field of pacification and development.

The lessons learned and applied about this new form of war are making the Vietnamese effort pay greater dividends in terms of local security, political support, and hopes for peace. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of this program and of Vietnam, nor do I offer any pat solutions to difficult situations. I prefer to rely upon the determination of the Vietnamese people and Government and of the Americans who are now assisting them to take over this job.

I am privileged to present to you today several representative Americans with this determination, and I invite you to hear from them what we have learned about the people's war and how it must be fought.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

MR. COLBY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Your last paragraph puzzled me a bit. You said you were neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Up to that point I thought you were very optimistic.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. I know there are going to be a lot of bad moments ahead from time to time, but I am determined.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you have in mind? What bad moments?

Mr. COLBY. There will be local defeats, Mr. Chairman. There will be local incidents which will occur in which things won't go right.

The CHAIRMAN. They would not be very significant in view of the overall resurgence of democracy in the country. We have all our local defeats. That is no reason to be pessimistic.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. I am not pessimistic.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you are not either one. I thought you were optimistic up to that moment. It is not important. It sort of struck me.

U.S. OVERALL OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

There are one or two things you said that I would like to put in perspective. You are so familiar with the subject. Yours is an extremely well-prepared and very thoughtful statement. What would you say is the overall objective of our effort in Vietnam? Could you state it a little differently than you did in your statement?

Mr. COLBY. Of our national effort or of this program, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any difference? Aren't they consistent?

Mr. COLBY. Very much so. This program's objective is to build up the strength of the people there, to participate in their defense and development.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the justification? Why should we be so especially concerned about the welfare of these particular people in South Vietnam as opposed to the people in any African or South American country? What is the special reason that we are devoting this extraordinary effort, using some of our ablest men, such as yourself and your colleagues?

Mr. COLBY. Well, this is an overall national decision that has been made over several years, Mr. Chairman, to send us out there to do what we can for this——

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you yourself have any feeling of purpose there other than that you are ordered to do it? What is your own feeling? I know of no one better to enlighten us. There is some uncertainty.

We had a remarkable witness before the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs the other day. I read the testimony and it said that one of the things bothering a number of our young men who do the actual fighting and, particularly, those who suffer the loss of their arms and legs, is "what is this about?". What is it for and what is the objective? It was on this I thought you might enlighten us a bit. We are far away from the scene and do not have the advantages you have. What do you feel is the real objective that justifies the effort not only that you put in but that the Army and the young men put in?

U.S. SECURITY INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. COLBY. Well, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is related to the security of our own country, the future security of our own country.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered about that. This is what I wish you would make clear to us and to the public.

Mr. COLBY. This is not a missionary effort, Mr. Chairman, but rather a program which must be conducted in this particular manner because it is faced with a particular challenge that can only be met by a program which involves the people.

The CHAIRMAN. You said the security of this country is involved. Did you not?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you elaborate a little more. This is a rather elusive concept. Make it a little more clear to us how the security of this country is involved. I assume you mean physical security?

Mr. COLBY. The overall political and physical security of the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. How is it involved in this particular area known as South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. I think over the years, Mr. Chairman, our Presidents have reviewed the situation and felt that the outcome in Vietnam was related to the security of our country.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not wish to downgrade our Presidents, but I did not ask you what our Presidents thought. We all know about that. What do you think? You are the Ambassador there. Don't you have your own views? Presidents come and go. It is not surely because President Johnson said our security is involved. Is that the best reason you have?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

We all come from our upbringing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite right.

Mr. COLBY. And I recall a period during my early years when Manchuria was very, very far away.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. At another period a little later in my youth the Sudetanland was very, very far away. Both of these later turned out to be very closely related to the security of our country. I am not citing this as a precise example.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall. Did we do in Manchuria or in Sudetanland what you are doing in South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. No, we did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the relevance of mentioning those two places?

Mr. COLBY. Well, those things were far away in the early, and even in the late 1930's, and by not joining with our allies and facing up to some threats at that time, I think we paid a terrible price.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are suggesting that we would have been better off if we had done in Manchuria what we are now doing in South Vietnam. Is that what you are suggesting?

Mr. COLBY. A great number of my classmates would still be alive, I believe, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If we had done that?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And also in the Sudetanland?

Mr. COLBY. I think it is generally accepted that some action, if it had been taken at that time, might have avoided a very large conflagration later.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think this country is capable of carrying on in Manchuria and Sudetanland and elsewhere the kind of program we are financing and carrying out in South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. Given the things we have learned over the years, Mr. Chairman I think we can carry on a much more modest program and an effective program than if we wait for the situation to become so bad that it can only be met by very serious investments.

JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I would not want to pursue that too long. I thought perhaps you could clarify, if only for my own purposes, some purpose which would justify the extent of this involvement and the extent of the expenditures, not only of money but the efforts of such people as yourself and your colleagues, who are obviously extremely capable people, whose efforts might be directed even at conditions here at home.

At the end of your statement you remarked what a great change there was between the past and today in Vietnam. I only wish you could say that about the United States.

I wish we had made the remarkable progress in the last 2 or 3 years that you have made with CORDS in South Vietnam.

COUNTERPART FUNDS

In reference to the financing of CORDS, you mentioned some of the basic figures, for instance, the U.S. contribution of $891 million, including counterpart funds.

I wonder if you would be very precise in explaining the counterpart funds. Are they what some of my colleagues call funny money or do they represent dollars?

Mr. COLBY. They represent, in origin, dollars. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no difference in cost to the taxpayer.

Mr. COLBY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a term that leads some people to believe this does not cost us anything.

Mr. COLBY. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not so.

Mr. COLBY. This costs the taxpayers money. The program sends property over to Vietnam through commercial channels to importers who pay for it in piasters which are put in a special fund and handled in a special way. But the origin of it is certainly money from the United States.

U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us what percentage of the South Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance?

Mr. COLBY. I cannot give you that answer directly Mr. Chairman. I can find the answer to that and give it to you, perhaps tomorrow.

(The information referred to follows.)

Twenty-three percent of the Vietnamese budget for pacification is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance.

U.S. PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. Relevant to that, perhaps you could tell us what percentage of the budget of the Government of South Vietnam is derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance.

Mr. COLBY. It is a very complicated subject, Mr. Chairman.

I believe that the current percentages are something in the neighborhood of 15 percent of the Government's military budget is provided

directly by the United States. The remainder is provided by the Government of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Government of South Vietnam tax any of the activities of the Government of the United States in Vietnam? Is there a tax on the imports or any of our activities?

Mr. COLBY. There is a tax on the imports that is paid by the importer, the Vietnamese importer. It is not paid by the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. But the tax on that import is paid into the Government of Vietnam. All I am trying to get is some perspective for the benefit of the committee and the country as to whether this is relatively an American effort or are we a minor partner in this effort. Are the Vietnamese doing most of it and we are helping them out a little bit?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you suggesting that only 15 percent of the overall effort is ours?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; by no means.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give us some idea of what we do?

Mr. COLBY. We provide a very substantial amount of the equipment, rifles and so forth, and a very substantial amount of money.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. But in any particular program, Mr. Chairman, the Vietnamese do by far the greatest amount in terms of the people involved in the program.

COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. How does this commodity import program, which you referred to in your statement, fit into the budget picture of South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. This is held in a special fund, Mr. Chairman. The piasters collected from the importers who pay for the imports are held in a special fund which is only spent by joint agreement by the United States and the Government of Vietnam.

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator COOPER. May I ask if this kind of transaction is similar to those which occur in other countries? Is this correct: The United States exports to South Vietnam commodities of various types. South Vietnam pays the United States in its currency; is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. Yes; I believe that is correct.

Senator COOPER. The currency is then placed in a trust fund and it is used according to agreement between South Vietnam and the United States. So actually the local currency is the product of our dollars, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

I was trying to get some idea of the proportionate costs to the two countries of the overall effort and of pacification.

U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Would you say the pacification program itself is supported primarily by the Americans?

Mr. Colby. Over the past 3 or 4 years, Mr. Chairman, the division between the American and the Vietnamese Governments' contribution to pacification programs has been about 50–50. The sum has, however, more than doubled over the past 3 years. As a result of this, both the American contribution and the Vietnamese Government contribution have increased.

The Chairman. Can you say from your statement how much will be spent per capita on the pacification program, including all the military programs?

Mr. Colby. Per capita Vietnamese or per capita American?

The Chairman. Per capita Vietnamese.

Mr. Colby. I cannot answer that directly, sir. I can tell you the costs of various of the programs.

A popular force soldier, for instance, costs about $2,000 for his first year of service. A national policeman costs the United States about $120 and costs the Vietnamese Government about $1,000 a year.

A regional force soldier costs about $4,500 for his first year and about $2,000 a year thereafter.

The Chairman. The staff says it is about $90 per capita on the basis of the amounts in your statement.

DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. ADVISERS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Could you give a little further detail about the advisers and how they are distributed. In what government ministries and offices are there U. S. advisers? Are they in all of them or most of them?

Mr. Colby. In most of them there are some advisers at various levels. Some of them specialize in limited programs; others have a limited relationship.

The Chairman. Are there any advisers in the office of Prime Minister?

Mr. Colby. A couple of my junior officers have a small liaison office down there. They do not advise the Prime Minister in that sense, but they have an office there which we can exchange papers through.

The Chairman. How many U.S. advisers work in the ministry primarily responsible for the pacification program?

Mr. Colby. Well, our total Saigon staff, Mr. Chairman, is 600.

Of that, I would say not more than 100 or so would be involved in the different ministries, 100 to 200.

The Chairman. Is there a ministry of the Saigon Government primarily responsible for the pacification program?

Mr. Colby. There is not one ministry, Mr. Chairman. There is a council which includes all of the ministries, the President is the chairman of it, and the Prime Minister is the secretary general.

It does have a small staff of about 20-odd people. We have an officer, Mr. McManaway, here who meets frequently with the head of that staff, and we have other officers who work with the other officers in that staff.

The Chairman. Are there any ministries where you do not have any U.S. advisers?

Mr. Colby. Well, certainly Mr. Chairman, there are several of them in which we do not have any advisers who come under my direction. I would say that there are probably a couple of ministries

without U.S. advisers. For instance, I do not believe that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has one.

The CHAIRMAN. It has no American advisers.

Mr. COLBY. I do not believe so. I would not be sure of that, but I just do not believe so.

HOW LONG WILL U.S. ADVISERS BE NEEDED?

The CHAIRMAN. Could you make a guess as to how long you think U.S. advisers will be needed in the pacification program?

Mr. COLBY. Mr Chairman, we are planning to reduce various advisers at various places and levels gradually, as we think the situation permits it. I do not have a specific timetable that I would offer at this time.

COST OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM OVER NEXT 5 YEARS

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to guess how much it will cost over the next 5 years?

Mr. COLBY. I think our costs will go down in the next year or so because a substantial percentage of our costs in the past couple of years have been in hardware for the increased size of the territorial forces, M–16's, M–79 grenade launchers, mortars, and so forth. These were pretty much one-time expenditures and so, consequently, I would believe that the overall costs will go down for the next few years.

RETIRED MILITARY MEN ACTING AS U.S. CIVILIAN ADVISERS

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement, you said there were 6,361 military personnel, and 948 civilians. You said there are a total of 215 military men as senior province and district advisers and 52 civilians. Do you know how many of the 948 civilians are retired military men?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know the exact figure, sir, but about 25 percent of the province and district senior advisers who are civilians are retired military.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be out of line to say that of the 948 civilians you mentioned, about 25 percent are military men?

Mr. COLBY. I think that would be a little high, Mr. Chairman. I think that would be a little high.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say?

Mr. COLBY. If I may correct this figure later, I can give you a very precise answer, but I would guess in the neighborhood of 100, 150, something like that.

(The following information was later submitted.)

The precise answer is a total of 180 retired military against 1,190 civilian spaces authorized.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to describe this program as a quasi-military government?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; I don't think so because it has no authority. It is an advisory effort. The decisions are made by the Vietnamese Government. The President of the Republic makes the critical policy decisions about this program.

NEW ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I was struck by your mentioning two or three different times that this is a new kind of war. We have always heard there is nothing new under the sun. I wondered in what respect, for example, does this war differ from our Revolutionary War or our Civil War? What is new about this war that has never occurred in other wars?

Mr. COLBY. Some of the various elements are familiar to us from our background. But the way the doctrine developed by Mao, Lenin, and Ho Chi Minh, and some of the others had been put together is a new technique, a strategy of combining various factors together to make a new attack on the problem.

I think that they looked at the power facing them in several of the nations of the world. They felt they could not go through the power, could not go around it, could not go over it, but they thought they could go under it, grab hold of the people and pull them out from under.

They tried this in China during the early days there. They tried it during the first Indochina war against the French and worked it out to a fairly good system. Now this, I think, was a new technique. This is not a novel situation——

The CHAIRMAN. I should have warned you in the beginning that I am not as fully aware and knowledgeable about the background of all this as you probably assumed I am.

When you say they applied it against the French, who applied what against the French? Would you make it plain.

Mr. COLBY. Ho Chi Min, Giap, and some others.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they apply against the French that was new? What is new about this as opposed to other wars that have occurred? We have had many different kinds of wars.

Mr. COLBY. One new factor, for instance, is a new military tactic which we have to face in Vietnam. We are familiar in our country with what we call a logistical tail of an army, the logistics support.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not familiar with it. Frankly, I do not know what you are talking about.

Mr. COLBY. That a soldier goes out and faces the enemy and is pretty much alone as he goes. Behind him, come various things to help him do his job. There are supporting arms, the ordnance, the quartermaster, the food, and all the rest.

HOW DOES VIETNAM WAR DIFFER FROM OTHER WARS?

The CHAIRMAN. I was not thinking so much about military tactics in the field. The French really, for practical purposes, were driven out of Vietnam and Indochina by the Japanese. Were they or weren't they?

Mr. COLBY. They came back in after World War II.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the war began between the Vietnamese and the French.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was new about that and different from other wars?

Mr. COLBY. The organization of the population, the conduct of a mass political effort among the population to support the effort, the

combination of organizers, terrorists, the guerrilla and the main force units.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there had never been guerrillas before? Was this the first war in which the guerrillas operated?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. I have been a guerrilla, but there are other levels of this war.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't Tito have guerrillas against the Germans in Yugoslavia?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

But his was an experiment which led toward this final technique which they have developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't the Maquis have a war against the Germans in France? It was a very effective war. What is new about that?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I participated in that particular effort, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. In France?

Mr. COLBY. I did, sir, and it was not as effective as this one because we did not not have the same techniques.

The CHAIRMAN. It succeeded in the end; didn't it? I thought the Germans were defeated.

Mr. COLBY. They were defeated with the help of the resistance, but not through the technique that has been developed in the Far East, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I am too limited in my background to follow this, but I do not see anything particularly new or different between this war and other wars of a colony seeking its independence of its colonial master. There are new guns. It is true George Washington did not have M–16s, but his army had squirrel rifles and they made the same use of them. I do not see the difference. The difference between the military hardware and a few other things does not seem to me a significant difference.

Mr. COLBY. No. The military hardware is not the difference, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference?

Mr. COLBY. The real difference is the involvement of the people in the war.

During the first Indochina war, the Viet Minh aimed at organizing the people to participate fully in the war as a part of the war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Against the French.

Mr. COLBY. Against the French.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was that very different? Didn't George Washington and Benjamin Franklin and the rest try to do the same thing here with great difficulty. They had many people who did not think much of it, but they finally succeeded; didn't they?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We had Tories who did not agree.

Mr. COLBY. But there was a different style of organization.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference?

Mr. COLBY. The organization of these people, the indoctrination of the people, mobilization in the Communist sense of the word of the people, which means regimented participation in an organized manner in the effort and then supplementing this with guerrilla efforts, and supplementing this again with main force efforts.

DOES U.S. POSITION MAKE VIETNAM WAR DIFFERENT?

The CHAIRMAN. Could it be the only difference between this and Yugoslavia and France, the guerrillas who helped George Washington against those dreadful Hessians and others, is that this is one time we are not on the side of the guerrillas? We are on the other side with the guerrillas against us. Is that the new kind of war that you had in mind?

Mr. COLBY. I think the lesson we have learned out there, Mr. Chairman, is that we cannot fight it by Hessians; that we have to involve the people of the nation in the effort.

The CHAIRMAN. We have tried to fight it with Hessians; haven't we?

Mr. COLBY. I don't think with Hessians, Mr. Chairman, but we have tried——

The CHAIRMAN. What does Hessians mean to you?

Mr. COLBY. Foreign elements, mercenary elements.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. You don't think we have had any mercenaries?

Mr. COLBY. We have had a few, a very few, but I would not characterize the American Army as mercenaries, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, not the American Army. It is a conscripted army. It is far from being mercenary. It is the opposite.

Mr. COLBY. I would not characterize the American Army as Hessians.

The CHAIRMAN. I never have. No one else has. However, there are more than Americans there. There are some that are called allies. They are not Americans.

I do not see the great difference in this war that you seem to see other than that this is the only time I know of in our history that we have tried to help a colonial power in trying to maintain control of a colony. Do you know of any other instances?

Mr. COLBY. We have participated in that kind of an effort in other times.

The CHAIRMAN. What is another example?

Mr. COLBY. The Philippine insurrection in which the United States helped put down that insurrection.

The CHAIRMAN. We helped Spain keep control of the Philippines?

Mr. COLBY. No, we helped suppress an insurrection.

The CHAIRMAN. Against us?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is odd that you would give this as an example.

My impression was that we had told the Philippines we were there to deliver them from the colonial power then known as Spain. Is that not right?

Mr. COLBY. I believe the explanation was a little more imperialist at that time of the turn of the century, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the origin of the war? Was it not to deliver both Cuba and the Philippines from Spanish domination?

Mr. COLBY. Some people said that and some people said other things like "manifest destiny", Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't that come a little later? Manifest destiny developed after we changed our objective, didn't it? I do not want to pursue this too long, but I think it is really very odd that you would

use the Philippines experiment as a precedent for our actions in helping the French maintain their power over the Vietnamese.

Mr. Colby. No. I think you have turned the question slightly, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I wish you would clarify it.

Mr. Colby. I think you asked me whether there was any occasion in which the United States had helped to put down a rebellion and the answer was yes, there had been.

The Chairman. I do not believe I put that question. I said it was the only case I knew of in which the United States tried to help a colonial power maintain control of a colony. I think it is perfectly logical, having been a colony ourselves, that we have always helped the colony achieve its independence of the colonial power until Vietnam. In the case of the Philippines it seems to me we began to deliver the Philippines from Spain, but after we became acquainted with the Philippines, Mr. McKinley said the Lord had directed him to Christianize and civilize the Philippines. So we took them by brute force. Is that correct?

Mr. Colby. I think that association——

The Chairman. That is right and we killed a great many of them in the process.

LENGTH OF TIME UNITED STATES INTENDS TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM

Do you think there is any possibility that we might decide to stay in Vietnam for quite a while?

Mr. Colby. I think our policy is fairly clear. We are trying to end our participation there and remove ourselves from Vietnam.

The Chairman. That is the announced policy. The announced policy in the Philippines was to free them from the domination of Spain.

I only ask you that as sort of an historical byline. It has occurred to some people that things change in the course of doing good to people. We fall in love with them; don't we?

Mr. Colby. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Vietnamese would not fall in love with us if they thought we were going to stay.

One of the factors of this particular effort today is that the Vietnamese are convinced that we are intending to move out, that we do not intend to stay there and retain authority there, and that they are fighting a truly nationalist effort and not a colonial effort.

The Vietnamese leadership, the Vietnamese people who participate in the self-defense program, the Vietnamese who vote in their local communities for their own leadership, are looking to a day in which Vietnam is theirs.

PHOENIX PROGRAM

The Chairman. Are you familiar with a man named Robert G. Kaiser, Jr.?

Mr. Colby. I have met him from time to time, yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Did you see this article appearing in this morning's Washington Post?

Mr. Colby. I did, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you consider it reasonably accurate?

Mr. COLBY. I would have a few problems with minor aspects of it, but I think, in general, it states the fact that we have a difficult problem of making the Phoenix program work, and that we are working at it. It has been no great success, but we are working at it.

It is not the kind of a program that it has sometimes been thought to be, by misunderstanding of some of the terms used.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask to put it in the record for reference and I will yield to my colleagues for questions at this time.

(The information referred to follows.)

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1970]

U.S. AIDES IN VIETNAM SCORN PHOENIX PROJECT

(By Robert G. Kaiser, Jr.)

SAIGON, February 16.—The program to neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure in South Vietnam is called Phoenix, and it is a bird of several feathers.

Some war critics in the United States have attacked Phoenix as an instrument of mass political murder. Such sinister descriptions are not heard in Vietnam, where Phoenix has the reputation of a poorly plotted farce, sometimes with tragic overtones.

The contradiction between Phoenix's lurid reputation as a sort of Vietnamese Murder, Inc., and the scorn with which it is widely regarded here typifies one of the most popular grievances of American officials in Vietnam: "They don't understand at home what's going on out here."

The gulf between homefront and battlefront is likely to appear Tuesday in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing room, when American pacification officials are expected to be questioned closely about the Phoenix program.

Because Phoenix is an offspring of the CIA and because its operations have always been obscured by the cloak of official secrecy, the Foreign Relations Committee may discuss the program in a closed session. But Phoenix's secrets are not well kept in Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese-run program does involve killing. American statistics on Phoenix results (which are radically more conservative than the Vietnamese figures) show 19,534 members of the so-called Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) "neutralized" during 1969—6,187 of them killed.

The rest were captured (8,515) or rallied to the government cause (4,832).

But several officials involved in the program, including some who are sharply critical of Phoenix, note a fact that is not tabulated in official statistics: A small fraction, probably one tenth to one fifth, of the VCI neutralized are captured or killed on purpose. The overwhelming majority are rounded up in military operations, killed in battles, ambushes or other military action, and described afterward as infrastructure. Only a handful are targeted, diligently pursued and captured or killed.

PHOENIX NOT WORKING

"The most important point about Phoenix," said one official who had access to all the program's statistics and records, "is that it isn't working."

That view is repeated by official and confidential U.S. establishments here, and official and confidential studies, including recent reports by the CIA and the deputy under secretary of the Army, James V. Siena. Phoenix has failed to neutralize a significant number of important Vietcong officials.

"We are not bothering them now, that's for damn sure," one of the senior Americans in Vietnam said not long ago.

A common description of Phoenix one hears from officials in Vietnam is of a program without substance. A share of the killing and capturing that goes on in the war is attributed statistically to Phoenix, but—many officials say—most of Phoenix's share could easily be attributed to something or somebody else.

Phoenix's unsavory reputation apparently stems from its clandestine nature, its connections with some deliberate assassinations, and accusations made by several public figures and army veterans about its activities.

AN IDEA OF THE CIA

Phoenix was the idea of the CIA, and until last July it was run by the agency. Phoenix operations conducted by Provincial Reconnaissance Units have in-

volved assassinations. These units, another CIA organization composed of Vietnamese troops and U.S. advisers, were organized primarily as a counter-terror group to operate behind enemy lines. Assassination of Vietcong officials was one of their assignments.

But the units are now under local Vietnamese control, and have lost much of their ferocious reputation. "They've lost 50 per cent of their effectiveness," according to one U.S. official.

"There's some killing, but this is a war. There are no organized bump-off squads," one official with no brief for Phoenix insisted recently. Efforts to find contrary evidence were unsuccessful. Many of the accusations against Phoenix cannot be verified here. Some seem to be based on misunderstandings of Phoenix terminology and statistics.

Officials in Vietnam are critical of Phoenix on many other counts. In recent interviews with several officials involved in the program, a reporter heard these points:

Phoenix is potentially dangerous, for it could be used against political opponents of the regime, whether they were Vietcong or not. However, there is no evidence that this has happened yet.

Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption. Some local officials demand payoffs with threats of arrests under the Phoenix program, or release genuine Vietcong for cash.

Phoenix is helping the Vietcong more than hurting it. By throwing people in prison who are often only low-level operatives—sometimes people forced to cooperate with the Vietcong when they lived in VC territory—the government is alienating a large slice of the population. "We should not jail people," said Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of the rural development committee of the Vietnamese House. "That makes them enemies of the government."

A CAMPAIGN IS NECESSARY

All the officials interviewed were persuaded that a concerted campaign against the Vietcong organization is necessary if South Vietnam is to have any chance of independent survival in the long run, but all also agreed that the Phoenix program had failed to hurt the VC organization so far.

Phoenix was adopted by the Vietnamese government, at American urging (or perhaps insistence), in December 1967. It is supposed to unify the fragmented intelligence agencies in Vietnam, and share the best information among all operating units. Provincial security committees, part of the Phoenix structure, also have the power to try and sentence suspects to prison for up to two years.

There are 441 Americans attached to Phoenix, all as advisers. Americans play no direct role in Phoenix operations.

Phoenix offices in the 44 provinces and most of the 242 districts of South Vietnam (all with U.S. advisers) are supposed to maintain dossiers on Vietcong officials in their area and a "blacklist" of wanted men and women.

Ideally, Special Branch Police (an intelligence unit of the National Police, advised and financed by the CIA), local troops and Provincial Reconnaissance Units are supposed to conduct operations to arrest these wanted persons. Arrested individuals are interrogated. When there is some evidence of a Vietcong connection, they are brought to trial before the provincial security team. High-level suspects are supposed to be bound over to a military field court.

REALITY DIFFERS FROM MODEL

As so often in Vietnam, reality bears small resemblance to this ideal model. Interviews with officials and observations in the countryside reveal deviations from the ideal.

The main problem is that Vietnamese don't seem interested in really prosecuting the program.

"They just aren't interested," said one official. "They don't want to be caught trying to get the VCI if they think maybe next year the VCI will be in control."

Some local officials have made private accommodations with the Vietcong, U.S. and Vietnamese officials say. They are unwilling to upset these arrangements by chasing VCI.

Only in the last few months has the central government put strong emphasis on Phoenix. Some officials think this new pressure may improve performance.

Largely because of Vietnamese disinterest, the local Phoenix offices simply do not work. Many keep no records. Others mount no operations. Phoenix is often run by poor-quality personnel, chosen for their jobs by local officials who

don't want to waste their good people on the program. Most district offices are run by junior army officers who have little sense of the sophisticated political problems of hunting down Vietcong officials.

NEUTRALIZATION QUOTAS

Perhaps to prod recalcitrant local officials, the central government assigns Phoenix quotas to the provinces. Thus a province chief has to report neutralization of a certain number of VCI every month to stay in good. "They will meet every quota that's established for them," one American adviser noted.

But meeting the quotas often means disregarding any standards. Officials often count every man arrested, even if he is released immediately for lack of evidence. American advisers refuse to confirm many of these alleged neutralizations, accounting for much of the difference of almost 100 per cent between U.S. and South Vietnamese Phoenix statistics.

Quota-conscious district and province chiefs also pad their Phoenix figures with any number of citizens captured or killed in military operations, whether genuine VCI or not.

"Vietnamization" of Phoenix has, in a sense, already been completed—the only Americans involved are advisers. But some officials think most of the advisers should now be withdrawn.

"We've done all we can," one official said. "If they want to get the VCI, they can do it. We can't do anything more."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Colby, it is good to see you, sir.

Mr. COLBY. It is nice to see you again, Senator.

MR. COLBY'S EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. In my opinion, you are one of the outstanding public servants that I have known, and I have always gotten a lot of information from you when we have discussed matters.

When did you first go to Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. In February 1959, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what capacity?

Mr. COLBY. I was the deputy to the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, American Embassy.

Senator SYMINGTON. You were a CIA representative at that time?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And when did you leave?

Mr. COLBY. I left there in the summer of 1962, Senator, and came back to the United States where I became the Chief of the Far East Division of the CIA.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you go back?

Mr. COLBY. I visited Vietnam once or twice a year in those years when I was in that job.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you leave the CIA to take this job?

Mr. COLBY. I left the CIA at the end of January 1968, and went out to Vietnam, first to take a job as assistant chief of staff of CORDS and later to succeed to the position of deputy to the commander for CORDS.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Robert Komer had this job once, didn't he?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir; he left in early November 1968.

Senator SYMINGTON. And he was sent out by the President?

Mr. COLBY. By the President; yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who sent you out?

Mr. COLBY. Well, my assignment came up in the course of a discussion between Mr. Helms and the President, I believe.

Senator SYMINGTON. President Johnson?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And, as a result of that, you went out in the early part of 1968?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you have been on this job ever since?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

LESSONS LEARNED IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. In your statement, you say—

> The lessons we have learned in Vietnam can increase Vietnam's ability to defend itself.

Would you enlarge on your thinking on that?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

I think the lesson we have learned is that we must involve the people in a war and that they will not support or assist an effort unless it is something that they believe in, that they have a part of. This lesson—that it must trust its people—is one which, I believe, the Vietnamese Government has learned also. The best example of that, I think, was the distribution of weapons to the Self Defense forces which are composed of ordinary citizens in local communities.

It is also represented by the Vietnamese Government's decision to make the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program a public program, to expose it so that the whole public could know about it, and participate in it to protect themselves against terrorists. The foundation of the effort has to be a mass, popular effort.

Senator SYMINGTON. With great respect, when I was out there in early 1967 and late 1967 there was the same amount of optimism about the program, but it did not work out that way, and I imagine that is one of the reasons they sent you.

Mr. COLBY. I would not say that, Senator, by any means. But I think the point that my statement makes is that we have not found any solution at the end of the trail. We have been gradually learning more and more about this.

REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES

Senator SYMINGTON. In your statement you say:

> Both of these forces are made up of full-time soldiers—

Et cetera, et cetera, and then you say—

> both have been substantially increased since 1968.

Mr. COLBY. Since early 1968, that is.

Senator SYMINGTON. So they now total approximately 475,000 men. What did they total before then?

Mr. COLBY. They were about 30,000, a little over. They have been increased about 150,000 in the past couple of years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then you say the Communists have identified it clearly as a major threat, a start toward a true people's army.

Mr. COLBY. This is a people's self-defense force. In their resolution No. 9 of the central office, South Vietnam, for instance, the Commu-

nists singled this out as a very dangerous program that could be a threat to them in the future.

Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the Ky government, now the Thieu-Ky government, was fighting for its life all during these years, why do you think it took them so long to understand that this should be done in order to handle the problem?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think it began to be learned in 1967, Senator. Some of the programs began to be put together in 1968. Prior to 1967, of course, things were pretty confused out there, with the changes in governments and that sort of thing.

POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. During my visit out there in 1966, there were three people who were highly talked about by our people. One was a general, one was a village chief south of Danang, and the other was a Major Mai. Did you know him?

Mr. COLBY. I did; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I went back there a year later and the general and Major Mai had been removed for political purposes, and the village chief had been killed. Has that type and character of opposition stopped?

Mr. COLBY. I think we have not had similar problems of that nature in recent times. I am not saying that political difference might not arise in the future between some of them, It could happen.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I remember, Major Mai was in charge, in effect, of Vung Tau.

Mr. COLBY. He was; yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And he was removed by General Ky and ended up as an interpreter with us for the Korean Army.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is he still there?

Mr. COLBY. He is still there.

Senator SYMINGTON. If a man has that obvious ability, why don't they use him, instead of keeping him, in effect, in exile?

Mr. COLBY. I don't know the basis for it, but I think they thought that he was developing a political apparatus of his own with the cadre there. His successor, Lieutenant Colonel Be, has been there since. He has been a very forceful speaker against corruption and against many other things in the national government. He has been the leader of a very strong policy for those people.

He is trusted by the Government despite the kinds of remarks he makes, which do not sound like just praise for the Government, by any means. He has been fully supported in the position by the President and by the Prime Minister. He was given full authority to run the training program of village chiefs.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he replace Mai?

Mr. COLBY. He replaced Mai.

Senator SYMINGTON. And is Colonel Be still there?

Mr. COLBY. He is still there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

SELECTIVE ASSASSINATION, 1967 AND 1968

You say in your statement that during 1969, for example, over 6,000 were killed in terrorist incidents, and over 1,200 in selective assassination. What were the figures in 1968 and 1967 of selective assassinations?

Mr. COLBY. I cannot answer the questions right offhand. I think I might be able to find it for you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you please supply it for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

Selective assassinations for 1967 are only available from 1 Oct. to 31 Dec. The total for this three-month period is 624. For 1968 there were 1,743; however, no figures were available during February.

Mr. COLBY. The 1968 figures are incomplete because we do not include the period of Tet, the February figure. There is 1 month for which the figure was just not obtainable.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are those the times when they went into a village, and picked people and killed them? Is that what selective assassination means?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, a directed assassination against a specific official rather than a grenade going off in a marketplace.

ABILITY TO DEFEAT GUERRILLA WARFARE

Senator SYMINGTON. In the fall of 1966, General Dayan went out to Vietnam for some weeks, and then wrote several articles, one of which I read in the paper here. In it he said if the North Vietnamese and Vietcong turned to guerrilla warfare it would not be possible for us to defeat them—this from one of the most experienced and able guerrilla fighters in the world today, based on the record.

Why do you think he felt that way about it?

Mr. COLBY. I think he was referring at that time to the fact that most of our efforts were in the conventional warfare field, and he was making the usual criticism that a guerrilla force is very difficult for regular forces to stop.

I think that is one of the real changes in the situation. The government is developing its own guerrilla force with mass popular participation in the effort by the self-defense and other groups in the country and strong advocacy of local government, letting people elect their own leadership.

TRAN NGOC CHAU

Senator SYMINGTON. Didn't Tran Ngoc Chau replace Mai?

Mr. COLBY. Tran Ngoc Chau replaced Mai. He did for a time, yes. He had the overall charge of the cadre program.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned that Be did.

Mr. COLBY. Be is now the chief. He came in very shortly thereafter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Chau now?

Mr. COLBY. He is somewhere in Saigon, I believe. I do not know. He, as you know, was elected to the National Assembly; he was removed from his other position. He was not only the leader of the Vung Tau Center, Senator, he was head of the RD Cadre Directorate in the Ministry of RD.

CAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE WIN WAR WITHOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE?

Senator SYMINGTON. The American taxpayer has put over $100 billion into South Vietnam, and in the beginning we laid down rules which apparently have made it impossible to achieve a military victory, if that ever was possible. In addition, according to an article I read in the press not too long ago, we have had around 700,000 Americans—that would, of course, count the top figure we had in Vietnam, plus the Seventh Fleet, plus Thailand.

Then if you added to that number the people we have in Japan directly connected with the war, the people in the Philippines at such bases as Subic Bay and Clark, the people we have in Okinawa and Guam directly connected with the war in Southeast Asia, the total is well over 700,000, closer to 800,000.

What this article asks is, if the United States cannot do it with 800,000 of its best youth, backed by our industrial capacity, how can we expect the South Vietnamese to do it when American military personnel are withdrawn?

That disturbs me a great deal. Could you comment?

Mr. COLBY. Well, part of the lessons we have learned, Senator, is that it is very difficult indeed to do it with Americans, that it can only really be done with Vietnamese, and not only with Vietnamese officials but with the Vietnamese people.

It is only by engaging the active participation of the population itself that they can retain their own freedom, that they can continue an effort of this nature. Therefore, some of the critical aspects of the war lie in the formation of the political base for the Government, a base formed on local governments locally elected.

WHEN CAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE HANDLE VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ALONE?

Senator SYMINGTON. How soon do you think it will be before the South Vietnamese can handle the Vietcong by themselves and the North Vietnamese also, if the North Vietnamese continue hostilities?

Mr. COLBY. Those are two slightly different questions, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, you develop the answer any way you like.

Mr. COLBY. How soon they can handle the Vietcong by themselves? I think that if you removed the North Vietnamese entirely from the picture they would be very close to that today. But if you continue the infusion of North Vietnamese units, then it is a gradual process, and I do not know. I cannot give you a precise figure.

I am confident that the 17 million Vietnamese in South Vietnam can be strengthened and developed into a national cohesion to protect themselves against the North Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby, I have great respect for your opinion, and I would like to ask you to help us out in this situation. There are a lot of issues involved, and one is the economic issue. As you know, we have real problems now with respect to our economy.

If the U.S. troops and support left, after giving all that is needed, in your opinion do you believe that the Thieu-Ky government, provided the North Vietnamese retreated, could control the country as

against the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front without any Americans there?

Mr. COLBY. I believe so.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do believe that?

Mr. COLBY. Without the North Vietnamese, I believe so.

Senator SYMINGTON. And if the North Vietnamese stayed interested after all of this training that you are doing and all the material that we have given them, how long do you think it will be before we can get out?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think this has to be a gradual process, Senator, and I frankly cannot give you a date on it. Our first priority is to get our combat forces out of there and we certainly are in the process of doing that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I realize that. I have not set any timetable about it, and I am not one of those who says we must get them all out this year. I am asking because you are out there and I respect your thinking.

Would you say in 5 years we could get out entirely?

Mr. COLBY. I really don't have a number that I could give you, Senator. It depends on a lot of things that can develop during those 5 years. But I think that the basic thrust of the policy—that they will be able to take care of their own affairs—is valid. Just when that is going to happen, I really cannot say.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about 10 years?

Do you think we can get out in 10 years?

Mr. COLBY I think certainly——

Senator SYMINGTON. It is not an unfair question.

Mr. COLBY. No, it is a fair question.

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was in the executive branch, they promised us the troops in Germany would stay a maximum of 18 months, and they have been there for a quarter of a century.

Moreover our troops have been in Korea 20 years next June, so I am not being facetious, but very sincere.

Mr. COLBY. I know.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you don't think they can get out in 5 years entirely, do you think they can get out in 10 years?

Mr. COLBY. I think they could if nothing else arose during those 10 years that caused a revision of that estimate, if no new situation arose.

Senator SYMINGTON. Like what?

Mr. COLBY. Like a change in the overall situation in the Far East. I could not think of anything in particular, but new factors come to bear on things that seem to be set in one direction and change does occur.

Senator SYMINGTON. You were not sure about 5, but you are pretty sure about 10. How about 7?

Mr. COLBY. I don't think I can really fix a time for you, Senator.

I think that the thrust is a staged reduction of our forces, taking our combat forces out of the front lines first, taking our support forces out second, and leaving economic support and advisory support as the last item going out.

COMPARISON OF 1968 AND 1969 SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOSSES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby, weren't there more Vietnamese killed, wounded, and abducted by the North Vietnamese in 1969 than in 1968?

Mr. COLBY. There were, if you leave out February, Senator, yes. The total is higher in 1969 than 1968, if you leave out February. But February, of course, was the time of the Tet attack, and a lot of people were killed and wounded and abducted during that period.

Senator SYMINGTON. But that was 1968.

Mr. COLBY. That was 1968; that is what I mean. If you leave February out of 1968, and we just don't have figures for 1968 for that month——

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say leave out, do you mean the fact that there was the Tet offensive is the reason that the 1968 figures exceed the 1969?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. The 1968 figures we have do not include those killed, wounded, and abducted during February and, therefore, they are very short of what really happened during 1968.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why aren't those included?

Mr. COLBY. We just don't know what they are, Senator. Things were a little confused and we don't have figures.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then your supposition——

Mr. COLBY. My supposition is there were more killed in 1968 than in 1969.

SIZE OF VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the size of the Vietcong infrastructure now?

Mr. COLBY. Our current estimate is about 75,000, but that is a very fuzzy figure, Senator. We are doing some fairly good homework trying to harden that up. I am not at all confident of that figure.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was it 2 years ago?

Mr. COLBY. Two years ago, I don't think we even had a good estimate. One year ago it was about 80,000.

But that is not a good estimate either.

POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUCCESS WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT

Senator SYMINGTON. There are more questions I would like to ask, but I want to yield to my colleagues. But I would put the question to you again.

We have, counting everybody, pretty close to 800,000 people working every day to win whatever our objective is in Vietnam. That counts Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Guam, and other places that I am sure you know.

These Americans are backed over here by tens upon tens of thousands of people who are producing items for the Vietnamization program—the idea being that we are going to give them so many billions of dollars of equipment in the belief that at a certain point they will be able to handle this problem by themselves.

Would you supply for the record a statement as to why you believe that without these 800,000 Americans they can be successful, which

means we can be successful, when we haven't been able to be so after many years and great expenditure of lives and treasure.

Mr. COLBY. All right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to follows.)

During the period 1965 to 1968, Communist military strength in Viet-Nam was at a high level; its regular troops rested upon active guerrilla forces and a politically organized base. The Communist regular forces were set back by U.S. regular forces. The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. support, then strengthened its Regional and Popular Forces, the People's Self Defense, Phoenix and police operations, and developed a more actively engaged population. By 1970, the nature of the war thus changed; what was formerly a Communist war conducted on three levels became a government-led people's war facing an increasingly North Vietnamese military force. The territorial forces, the police, and the People's Self Defense make the enemy military forces much less effective since they pre-empt the caches, the recruits, and the information. In this circumstance, the enemy regular military force becomes less difficult to handle than the earlier combined guerrilla and regular enemy forces and infrastructure. A weaker enemy thus faces a GVN stronger in the political as well as the military field. This process has already begun in the Delta where smaller total military forces are handling a situation which formerly required the assistance of regular U.S. forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Would you ask Senator Cooper?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Senator Case.

Ambassador Colby, I would like to congratulate you on a very comprehensive statement, which is a record of your able service and the services of those associated with you, both on the military and civilian side.

IS CORDS PROGRAM PART OF VIETNAMIZATION?

The chairman asked you a question which, I think, was directed toward your view of what the objective of your program was.

Would you say it is an auxiliary or is it a part of the total Vietnamization program which has been announced as the policy of the Administration?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think the program we are putting through here is very much a part of the total Vietnamization effort; yes, Senator.

IS ADMINISTRATION WITHDRAWAL POLICY IRREVERSIBLE?

Senator COOPER. Secretary Rogers said in several speeches and statements that the policy of the United States, of this Administration, was irreversible which, I believe means that our forces will be continuously withdrawn. Do you believe that?

Mr. COLBY. I think that is our intention, Senator. As I said to Senator Symington, new things might certainly come up in the future, but, as we see things today, it is certainly our intention to reduce our participation in Vietnam.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDS PROGRAM

Senator COOPER. There has been a pacification of some sort since 1959. When would you say that the present program, the one that you have outlined, came into effect?

Mr. COLBY. It has been a gradual thing. Some of it was developed in 1967, some in 1968, and some in 1969, Senator. Each point was added to it as it went along.

Senator COOPER. You described your organization. Was that organization established after the new administration came in or was it established under the preceding administration?

Mr. COLBY. It was established in May of 1967, Senator.

EFFECT OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS ON CORDS PROGRAM

Senator COOPER. Assuming troop withdrawals continue, would you say that the success of your program would be diminished in any way by the withdrawal of the troops? Can it be sustained in the way that you have described it if the troops are withdrawn?

Mr. COLBY. Assuming that the troop withdrawals go according to the ideas outlined by our President and by the Secretary in relationship to the three criteria, I think this program should continue, Senator.

I think that a precipitate withdrawal of a large number might set it back, but with a steady reduction of American forces in response to the situation, this program will continue in about its current state.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY

Senator COOPER. We expect to hear members of your group who deal with the Vietnamese people directly. I assume you do and the group here that will be testifying. What is the attitude of the people of South Vietnam toward the overall policy of this Administration and particularly the withdrawal of troops?

Mr. COLBY. Public opinion polling in Vietnam is not a very advanced art, Senator. But, nonetheless, when this first came out I think there was a little concern that Americans might be withdrawing precipitously. But there was great reassurance when our President indicated that we would apply the Vietnamization policy in a sober and steady manner. There is also a certain sense of pride and self-reliance that is developing in many of the Vietnamese military units, and among the people there, a feeling that "We can do this ourselves." I believe that this has been a positive result of our reduction.

INVOLVEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator COOPER. The Washington Post, I believe, in Sunday's issue, had a statement by a Mr. Gerald C. Hickey who, among other observations about Vietnam made this statement. I will quote from the article.

In the struggle between the Saigon Government and the Vietcong, Hickey says, most of the population had not identified with either side. "They have learned through experience that noninvolvement is their best means for survival."

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Colby. I think that was a correct statement, Senator. I believe that is one of the things that is changing. I think it is one of the most critical things that is changing.

Over the years there is very little doubt that the great mass of Vietnamese people just did not engage on either side.

It is, I must confess, a source of some bafflement to me why the Communists did not apply their Marxism-Leninism a little bit better in trying to engage the people on their side. The only explanation that has come to my mind is that maybe the leadership of the Communist movement there were Mandarins, too.

On the other hand, on the Government's side over the years there was a similar disdain for full participation by the population. The French Colonial rulers ran the people; authority was centered in the palace. This continued during the authoritarian governments and the military governments. It is really only in the past 2 or 3 years that a new theme has come to bear, that the people do have a participation in the war. The war cannot be won unless the people do participate. This has been brought about by local elections, by the self-defense program, by bringing the local leaders in and assuring them that they have authority over what is happening in their localities, by sharing power with the people. This is a new situation, because the people are responding to this in a considerable degree.

Therefore, I think, Mr. Hickey's comment that the Vietnamese peasant will not engage is, perhaps, a little out of date in that respect. I think the peasant is beginning to participate in the national effort.

Now, it isn't all there yet, Senator. There is more to do, but I think a beginning has been made.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOCAL ELECTIONS

Senator Cooper. You spoke about recent elections in a number of villages.

Do you have any estimates or any figures or totals of the participation of the South Vietnamese in these village elections?

Mr. Colby. I don't have numbers for you, Senator.

Senator Cooper. Percentages. Do you have any idea about what the proportions would be?

Mr. Colby. Our newsmen and others went out to see these elections as they took place. They saw them as a general participation by the citizens. There is a fairly high percentage of the people who actually do go to the polls and participate in the votes in those local affairs.

Senator Cooper. How were the elections carried out? Were there any prohibitions against certain groups or individuals voting, or any one faction? Were these local elections dominated by the national administration? What kind of freedom was there in the election of the local officials?

Mr. Colby. Well, there is no question but that an announced Communist was not allowed to be a candidate nor to participate in the voting. The elections were not held in what were called insecure areas. That is why only something less than half of the villages and hamlets had their local elections in 1967, the year when they should have taken place.

The expansion of security during 1969 permitted the holding of these elections in additional areas.

This is an automatic elimination of the Communists from participating in it or running it.

However, families with members who are with the Viet Cong do participate in the elections. As I say, the general reaction of our press who looked at these elections, including some good, critical press members, was that they were reasonable elections in that kind of a structure.

Senator COOPER. Are they dominated, ordered, or directed by the national administration?

Mr. COLBY. The national administration directed the elections, but the candidates were local candidates, local people from that neighborhood. Candidates were generally local farmers, local leaders, varied people.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES

Senator COOPER. Now, I would like to turn to the question of local security. I'm not going into the larger military questions. To what extent have the local security forces been enlarged during the last 2 years?

Mr. COLBY. In early 1968, the local security forces, the regional and Popular Forces were in the neighborhood of 300,000 men. Today they are about 475,000 men. So that is about 150,000 or 175,000 men that have been added.

Senator COOPER. Have you had many defectors from the local security forces?

Mr. COLBY. I am sure there are some defections to the enemy's side, but it is not a major problem. There is a problem of desertion in some of the forces. A man is categorized as a deserter when he has been 15 days AWOL. In our army we do not call him a deserter at that time; he has to be away for 30 days. But desertion is a problem in the forces; primarily in the regular forces, to some extent in the regional forces, and to a very little degree in the popular forces. As they become closer to their localities, the problem becomes less.

Senator COOPER. What about the defectors——

Mr. COLBY. In very few cases do these deserters go over to the other side, Senator. These people go home. Sometimes they join another unit, this sort of thing. We are going to stop that shortly because we now have a fingerprint situation so that we can follow a fellow when he quits one unit and tries to join another.

VIETCONG DEFECTORS

Senator COOPER. What about defectors from the Vietcong. Do you. have figures on that?

Mr. COLBY. Defectors from the Vietcong?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, Senator, we have a very active program. I expect to testify on that fully later in the week. This program of inviting people to come back to the government's side has been in progress since 1963, and about 140,000 people since that time have come back.

Forty-seven thousand of them came back during 1969. This does not mean that all of these fellows were the world's greatest fighters on the enemy side. A lot of them were local people who were quite content to join the government's side when the government's side came into some of the villages and hamlets that they had been excluded from.

ASSASSINATIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE, 1968 AND 1969

Senator COOPER. Perhaps you have answered this question, but is there a record of the assassinations of local South Vietnamese officials or people for 1969 and 1968?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. For 1969 there were a little over 6,000 people who were killed, of those about 1,200 were selective assassinations. There were about 15,000 wounded, and about 6,000 abducted, as I recall.

Senator COOPER. Are you including in those figures people killed in the war—in actual fighting—or are you giving those figures as persons killed by the Vietcong in their program of terrorism?

Mr. COLBY. These are the results of a terrorism, Senator. These are not people killed or wounded in the course of military action by the enemy or by our side. They do not include those at all.

Senator CASE. You asked for 1968, I think.

Senator COOPER. Well, those figures were for 1968 or 1969?

Mr. COLBY. Those were 1969, Senator. I have it here for 1968, Senator. The number killed was 6,338. But that is only 11 months of 1968, because the month of February we do not have any figures on.

There were about 15,918 wounded and about 10,000 abducted during 1968.

Senator COOPER. What were the figures for 1969?

Mr. COLBY. Killed, 6,086; wounded, 15,052; and abducted, 6,095. That is the entire 12 months; that is the whole year.

Senator COOPER. I will pass on quickly.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield for just one question on that point? Do you have a figure for 1968 comparable to the 1,200 killed in 1969 in selective assassinations?

Mr. COLBY. I do not have that, Senator.

Senator CASE. Do you have any figure at all?

Mr. COLBY. I would have to get one.

Senator CASE. Would you get one?

Mr. COLBY. I will try to get one and present it for the record.

(The information referred to appears on p. 30.)

Senator COOPER. You would say these casualties are the result of a planned program of terrorism by the Viet Cong?

Mr. COLBY. They come from all sorts of things, Senator. They come from a mortaring of a refugee camp; they come from an explosion in the marketplace. I stood in a schoolhouse about 3 weeks ago not far from Danang. A couple of Marines had come over to this schoolhouse and were handing out some candy to the kids, when a couple of people threw a couple of grenades into the schoolhouse. Five of the children were killed. Luckily one of the grenades, which fell in a schoolroom where there were 20 children, didn't go off. That is the kind of thing that these figures come from.

RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, 1969

Senator COOPER. What about the refugees? How many refugees have been brought back from refugee camps to villages, say, in 1969?

Mr. COLBY. During this past year, Senator, about 488,000 people went back to their home villages with some government support. There are others who went back who were not registered or somehow we didn't get a record of. We estimate them as something in the neighborhood of 100,000.

Senator COOPER. What is the population in the refugee camps, say, as of 1969 as compared to the beginning of 1969? Do you have some figures?

Mr. COLBY. The population of the camps at the end of 1969 was about 150,000. At the beginning of 1969 there were 699,645. That is in the camps.

EFFECT OF CORDS PROGRAM ON AGRICULTURE

Senator COOPER. Was there any betterment of the agricultural programs in Vietnam under the program that you have been heading up?

Mr. COLBY. Mr. MacDonald, our Director of USAID, will testify fully, Senator, but there are several things.

The new rice that was developed in the Philippines was brought over to Vietnam in 1967. They set a goal of planting 44,000 hectares of this particular rice in Vietnam during 1968. Of course, when the Tet attacks came they thought, "I guess we won't be able to do it." They actually did it.

They then set a goal of 200,000 hectares for the year 1969. We have estimated that about 240,000 hectares were planted in the year of 1969.

This rice is really quite fantastic; it increases your average yield per hectare from about two tons to about 6 to 8 tons, so that the farmer gets a considerably greater return from it.

The total amount of rice production for the whole country for 1968 was 4,300,000 odd tons. For 1969 they forecast a million-ton rise. They did not reach that goal. They reached only 5,094,000, which is very close and very good.

In rice production, the main crop of the nation, they are looking forward to actually being self-sufficient by the end of this year or next year.

During the war years rice has been imported in Vietnam.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN VIETNAM

Senator COOPER. I will not take more time from my colleagues, but would you place in the record a statement showing what has been done in all of these fields: agriculture, building, construction of roads, building of schoolhouses, enrollment of schoolchildren, the number of villages which have held political elections, and facts like that?

Mr. COLBY. We will, indeed, Senator, both in my own testimony and some of the papers that I hope, with the chairman's permission, to incorporate in the record. And also Mr. MacDonald, when he comes will testify fully on those programs for which he is responsible.

Senator COOPER. From your experience in Vietnam over many years, do you say now, do you believe that in the last 2 or 3 years there has been a marked betterment of the people, opportunity in agriculture, in the social field, than there was before? Is that your belief?

Mr. COLBY. I think I can testify that the normal farmer lives a lot better than he did.

Now, there are very serious economic problems in Vietnam which stem from the degree of American presence there, the large amount of money that we brought in, the large efforts that we are undertaking there. This is creating an inflationary problem and danger of some magnitude.

Steps are being taken to control this. I think the normal citizen is better off than he used to be in the years 1965–66 by a considerable degree.

Senator COOPER. You were going to give figures which, in your view would provide a favorable description of the progress of the program.

IMPACT OF WAR ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Would you also supply to the committee, if the information is available: One, the number of refugees generated because of the war.

Mr. COLBY. During the past year about 114,000, Senator, have been generated.

Senator COOPER. Two, civilians killed and wounded. I do not mean from acts of terrorism, but because of the war.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, civilian war casualties; yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

Statistics are not available which would permit an estimate to be made of civilian casualties in Viet-Nam caused by US/ARVN/FWMAF/VC/NVA in the course of military operations.

Senator COOPER. The number of orphans, homes destroyed, and the cropland taken out of cultivation.

I think you would have to agree that the impact of the war in its total sense has been adverse to the civilian population.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir; certainly.

Senator COOPER. Would you say the attitude of the civilians is that they would just like to see the war ended?

Mr. COLBY. A substantial portion of the population in Vietnam would like peace without any further definition. There is no question about that.

There is a substantial portion of the population which would like peace with security, and there is a very small portion of the population which would like Communist control and Communist peace.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT AFTER U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator COOPER. Could you answer this question? Assuming that the United States does withdraw its combat troops within 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, do you believe that the impetus which your program and other programs have given to the development or reconstruction of South Vietnam would be sustained—could be sustained—by the people of Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. I think that you are in the course of seeing a nation develop another basis for its existence than it had before.

The decentralization of authority to the local authorities and the gradual building of a national political base in the local communities will be matched this year by an effort to develop provincial communities. They are having some elections later this year for the provincial councils, and the provincial councils will be given some authority so that these become attractive jobs. The government is trying to make this a meaningful level of government structure. I think that building the country from the bottom up can develop a totally new popular approach toward their responsibilities, toward their participation in the life of their nation in the future.

U.S. POSTWAR ASSISTANCE

Senator COOPER. Do you know whether any planning is being done about U.S. assistance on postwar relief or resettlement problems?

Mr. COLBY. There has been some thinking done about that; yes, Senator. There have been some general studies made, projecting on into the future. Of course, there are longer term development plans for Asia that contemplate this kind of thing. I don't think they are in very formal or fixed form.

Senator COOPER. Are you qualified to speak of those plans or does that come——

Mr. COLBY. I really think that is more Mr. MacDonald's subject to discuss. I have a fairly short focus for my program, Senator.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES FOR VC PRISONERS

Senator COOPER. I have one other question now. I have a number, but I think I will submit them to be answered for the record so that my colleagues may question the witnesses.

There has been a great deal of comment in the newspapers about the arrest and confinement of political leaders. Perhaps this might be a subject for another day in these hearings, but is there any kind of judicial process—and I am not talking about our judicial process—but a judicial process for the Vietcong adherents who are captured or arrested; or are they summarily confined?

Mr. COLBY. There are several different procedures here, Senator. If the Vietcong is captured with a gun in hand, as a member of a military unit, he is considered as a prisoner of war, and is held as a prisoner of war.

There are a number of South Vietnamese who have been captured, and there are a number of North Vietnamese who have been captured who are held as prisoners of war.

If a Vietcong is captured he can be tried under normal judicial procedures. There is a military court for crimes against the state. They hold hearings, they investigate witnesses, and so forth. It is not our legal system; it is a different style of legal system, as you know. It stems from the civil code more than from ours.

There is a third possible legal action—administrative detention. The Government can detain them under emergency powers which are somewhat similar to those of other countries during an insurrection. There are a substantial number of people detained under this program.

The Government is in the course of improving some of these procedures which have not been totally satisfactory in the past.

Senator Cooper. I am sure you will say more about that later.
Mr. Colby. There is more to do on that, too, Senator.
Senator Cooper. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

U.S. PROCEDURES CONCERNING PRISONERS

The Chairman. Would you allow me to inquire concerning that last question whether the Americans turn over their prisoners to the Vietnamese for disposition or do the Americans themselves try these prisoners?

Mr. Colby. The American forces turn over the prisoner of war for detention by the Vietnamese. We have advisers who watch to see what has happened, to make sure——

The Chairman. What does the Phoenix program do with their prisoners? Do they turn them over to the Vietnamese?

Mr. Colby. Americans do not capture people under that program, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Oh.

The Senator from Wyoming.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Senator McGee. I want to commend the Ambassador for his forthright testimony this morning.

Did I hear you say, in response to Senator Symington's question, that you have been in Vietnam since 1959?

Mr. Colby. I have been associated with the country since 1959.

Senator McGee. But in various capacities?

Mr. Colby. I was here for about 6 years during that period.

Senator McGee. It seems to me that the very nature of your assignments has endowed you with a little bit of the sense of continuity about where we have come from in this very tortuous participation in Vietnam. From the testimony that you have submitted, you seem to have acquired a real sense of perspective about it too. You have a tendency to relate to what happened yesterday, not just what is happening today. I think this has enriched your testimony on other occasions when I have had the opportunity to examine you.

UNIQUENESS OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM

I wanted to pursue a line of questioning here in regard to the uniqueness of the situation in Vietnam, the elements of difference there that would seem to legitimatize that phrase. It is, indeed, a unique setting.

Was there a Vietnam before the French?

Mr. Colby. There has been a Vietnam for well over 2,000 years, Senator.

Senator McGee. Vietnam has also been separated into different pieces during separate portions of those two millenniums. They have had their civil wars; they have had their foreign occupations. Would a nationalistic concept of a Vietnam be definable from the history, such as you might associate with France, Britain or, in a very young sense, our own country?

Mr. COLBY. I would say less nationalist than ethnic. There is a very strong ethnic sense among the Vietnamese. They are very proud of their Vietnamese identity. They have a very strong sense of it.

They also have a nation in that sense, but nation as a political state is a later experience.

Senator MCGEE. You differentiate between the ethnic sense and, let us say, the political sense?

Mr. COLBY. Yes; yes.

Senator MCGEE. Does this factor in itself complicate in any way the problems of witnessing an emerging independence?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think it makes it essential that the entire effort be a Vietnamese effort. The Communists, of course, for years have attacked the government as a puppet government, and the government, in contrast, for a number of years, has insisted upon its own status as a Vietnamese National Government, a national movement.

There are a number of Vietnamese in high places, as ministers of government actually, who were participants in the Viet Minh revolt against the French. This Viet Minh revolt went through some of the sad experience of the Spanish Republican effort where the Communists gradually took it over and ate it up; and this is what happened to a great extent in North Vietnam.

Senator MCGEE. Would it be fair to say if there was any unifying, if this is the right word, political consciousness at all, it might have been anti-French at the time of the colonial break?

Mr. COLBY. Very much so. This was a very popular program at that time.

Senator MCGEE. Once the French were out, was that binding factor strong enough to hold these various groups together?

Mr. COLBY. Well, even before the French left, Senator, the Communists managed to turn in the names of a few of the prominent non-Communist nationalist leaders to be arrested and killed by the colonial government. There are a number of persons well-known in Vietnamese history to whom this has happened.

Second, the Communists immediately upon the departure of the French began to call the new Government a puppet of the Americans, as distinct from the French. The phrase during the Diem period was the My Diem government, the American Diem government. They always used that phrase, and they always today try to portray the Government as nothing but a puppet of the United States.

So, it becomes very important to the entire effort for the Government to stand on its own and to make its own decisions, and for us, correspondingly, to take an advisory position, but not a command position. That is a tricky job sometimes.

1954 DIVISION OF VIETNAM

Senator MCGEE. At the time two Vietnams became a diplomatic or political fact of life as a result of the Geneva Conferences of 1954, did that division in any way reflect the differences that were emerging after the French left, or was an arbitrary division imposed?

Mr. COLBY. This was a division of the country. It happens to be very close to a previous division of the country between two royal houses which were fighting for control during a period of Vietnamese history. But the difference was very much a political difference which

arose in the 1954 period. It was best exemplified, of course, by the movement of some 900,000 people from North Vietman down to South Vietnam. Most of those were Catholics. Many of them were simple farm people, who now live in village communities in South Vietnam. But a substantial number of them were also people who had been educated under the French regime in French-led schools.

Part of the problem of finding a national soul, if you will, was the impact of the French on the society for 100 years. They took the elite and trained them away from their own philosophical bases. This has created a problem that they are still suffering with, they are still wrestling with.

I think they are in the course of discovering again this national consciousness through this program of reaching out to their own village bases to establish a true South Vietnamese base for their political future.

Senator McGee. Didn't the Geneva agreements permit that to be a two-way street? Wasn't the option open for those in the south to go north if they so chose?

Mr. Colby. It was, and about 70,000—the figure is a little open—about 70,000 to 80,000 people went north. It is our information that most of those who went north were male members of the Viet Minh military units.

We do know a number of them went up north, remained in military units, were trained for reinsertion back into South Vietnam, and actually did that during the late 1950's, starting in about 1957. They began to infiltrate back to establish the guerrilla bases, networks, and so forth.

Senator McGee. Would the direction of the flow both ways and the dimensions of the flow reflect in any kind of direct ratio the acuteness of the differences with the French?

Mr. Colby. That was why I compared it with the Spanish situation. The movement south included almost all the non-Communist members of the Viet Minh who looked ahead to a future under Communist control of North Vietnam as being hopeless. That is why there are a number of ex-Viet Minh who are now in positions of importance in South Vietnam.

They are still nationalists; they still wish to support their own country, but they realized they could not do it under a Communist regime.

Senator McGee. This would suggest at least some measure of the quest for political definition of two Vietnams, as we know it at the present time. Would that not be correct, generally speaking?

Mr. Colby. There is a regionalism to Vietnam, but it actually divides into three, rather than two parts. Those who live in the southern portion of Vietnam, in central Vietnam and in North Vietnam have very strong regional differences—different accents, different customs, and so forth.

RIVALRIES DURING POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

Senator McGee. How sharp were the rivalries in this formative, post-colonial period among the traditional military types who, as I understand it, had had their own areas?

Mr. COLBY. The immediate post-1954 situation was a period of warlords, entirely separate states almost, in different portions of South Vietnam.

Senator MCGEE. This was not unique to South Vietnam, necessarily?

Mr. COLBY. No, it happened to other countries, too. The then government, the Diem government, in its first two years actually did quite a fantastic job of pulling the country together and making one national state out of it.

There was only one major failing that it had at that time. That was a refusal to build a real political base in the people. They were accustomed to using power and buying power rather than sharing power. This proved later to be one of their great Achilles' heels.

Senator MCGEE. Their own experience and their own history traditionally had been along that line anyway, had it not? The French didn't help it.

Mr. COLBY. Yes. The country had been run on Mandarinal principles for many years, of course, under the various emperors and under the French. It was not a great change.

Senator MCGEE. At the very least, then, it would seem to me from what you have said, any new independent undertaking would be a very delicate, fragile and tender operation.

Mr. COLBY. Except that it is not totally an imposed change. There are other changes going on that are similar to what is happening elsewhere in the world.

The transistor radio, the TV, the Honda, the public press, the magazines, the education of the children, are all creating a changed society. The political structure must change to reflect this very real change that is occurring.

COMPARISON OF GUERRILLA WARS

Senator MCGEE. In connection with an earlier line of questioning, drawing parallels between South Vietnam and the guerrilla activities in Yugoslavia and in France at another time, would the fact that, particularly in the case of France, there was a long-running tradition of governmental institutions, experience, and participation alter the parallel in any significant way?

Mr. COLBY. The resistance effort was a national effort against a foreign enemy. The Petain government had been pretty well discredited by the time the resistance really became active. There was very little appreciation of that.

In Yugoslavia you had a fairly energetic and vigorous leadership of a national movement against a foreign invader, the Germans, with no pretention of imposing anything other than complete serfdom in the future.

I think the problem in Vietnam is different. While the Communists may claim to be the heirs of the national revolution, there are people with equally good credentials on the government's side who can assert the cause of nationalism and of a change to a modern society as well. This makes it by no means as clear cut as it was in the European situation.

Senator MCGEE. Isn't that a critically important point in our attempt——

Mr. COLBY. It is a big difference.

Senator McGee (continuing) to be realistic about the Vietnam question?

Mr. Colby. It is a big difference between Vietnam and the other ones. This is a group of people who really do want to have an independent Vietnam.

One of the things that they have been encouraged by is our own assurance that Vietnam will be independent, not an American colony.

They do not want to see the troops move away too fast, of course, but, on the other hand, they do look forward to the troops leaving. This is a big difference from previous situations.

The Communists, of course, are endeavoring to picture it as the same situation, claiming that the Americans are just Frenchmen in new clothes. It is up to us, I believe, to really show there is a difference.

Senator McGee. Would it be fair to say that the Vietnamese in their own expressions have at least exhibited their belief that it makes a difference?

Mr. Colby. Yes. In general, I think the reaction in the countryside, among the population, to some of the programs of this government in the past year or two, and even to some extent before that, is real pride in having a little blue patch of the self-defense force on one's sleeve. This is quite a feeling of exhilaration when that old M–1 carbine is handed to the fellow to keep in his house. Just to take it home and keep it there with the ammunition, gives him a lot of power. It shows he is trusted by his government; it is really his government that is doing it.

VULNERABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO GUERRILLA TECHNIQUE

Senator McGee. The burden of my next inquiry derives from the guerrilla technique itself, its impact on any new governing endeavor in an independency.

Does the lack of experience, deep traditions or national identity make the South Vietnamese more vulnerable to the guerrilla technique than otherwise might be the case?

Mr. Colby. In two respects, I think, Senator. First there are the 10,500-odd hamlets in the country.

Now, any one of those hamlets can be attacked any night. Therefore, you have to have a unit in each one of those hamlets every night ready to fend off an attack. If you have an effective government, one which is very efficient, you can perhaps do that from a central place. If you have a weak government that is just struggling to assert itself and get itself going, it is hard for it to react, to employ the additional fire support, to send some help, and to get the communications and so forth to work that well. So that the guerrilla has a very substantial advantage. Out of those 10,000 targets he can say, "Well, I will attack these three tonight and another three tomorrow night and another three the following night." It is his option, and the only defense is to build up the defense of all of those hamlets, to develop a local self-defense force and information services that tell you what is going on.

I think the second sense in which it is difficult is that when a country has not developed a strong national identity, someone who comes around singing a song of a slightly different national identity can attract the people to his cause. He can recruit the guerrilla or the terrorists more easily.

It is certainly true that a lot of the guerrillas and a lot of the members of the enemy forces have shown great dedication and great commitment. There is no question about it. Some of these are doing it in order to prevent the American colonialists from taking over the country.

As long as your situation is a little ambiguous and it is not clear that you are 100 percent nationalist, it is easier to recruit people to participate in that kind of a program.

IMMEDIATE GOAL OF GUERRILLA

Senator McGee. What is the immediate goal of the guerrilla? Is it to destroy or bring down a regime to move in and set up a new regime.

Mr. Colby. No, the role of the guerrilla is to erode the presence of the government in the countryside.

Senator McGee. It is to seize the total initiative to the guerrilla. Where and what time to attack are his to choose?

Mr. Colby. He can make his attack where he wishes to.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS OF GUERRILLAS AND SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator McGee. Does this have any relevance to the amount of manpower required in both circumstances?

Mr. Colby. The degree to which the government can recruit the people into self-defense programs and the degree of success of the program of inviting the guerrilla to return to the national cause by giving him good treatment have great relevance. This becomes a manpower problem for the enemy, it becomes a question of "Well, I don't really have the forces to attack more than one hamlet a night and I don't have enough to gather together a company strength, only a couple of platoons." This has happened, especially in the Delta, about which Mr. Vann will tell you tomorrow. They have had a very serious problem of maintaining their forces and, as a result, they are beginning to send some North Vietnamese down to participate in that guerrilla role. This is a very difficult role for an outsider to fill.

Senator McGee. What about the manpower requirements of the Saigon government to cope with the guerrilla tactic? Would they be in any measurable proportion that you could describe for us? I remember in the days of the Malaysian difficulties there used to be talk of about 11 or 12 to 1. Is there any relevant comparison that you could make about our experience in Vietnam?

Mr. Colby. I don't think I have any sharp rules of thumb in that sense. I think you have to have enough regular forces to meet the enemy regular forces. You have to have enough local defense forces to meet the enemy guerrilla forces, and you have to have enough popular support and popular participation to eliminate the enemy's subversive terrorist and guerrilla effort. You have to have different levels of participation on the government side just as the enemy has the different styles of operations that he runs, the terrorist or the guerrilla or the main force unit. The government has to have a mix of the three to participate.

Now, they currently have, as I say, about almost 500,000 territorial forces whose major function is to stop the guerrilla. They have 400,000 armed people's self-defense supported by another million or so (The

figures are very fuzzy on the total membership of the self-defense forces, but a large number of people are certainly involved). They support this effort for security in the hamlets and they participate in the identification of the enemy apparatus in the hamlets. You also need a regular army to face the North Vietnamese units that come down. What is being tried today is to develop this proper mix of forces to meet the kind of threat it presents.

I don't have any neat formula on that, Senator, I am sorry.

Senator McGee. Would it be fair enough as a generalization to say it is greatly disproportionate?

Mr. Colby. In total numbers.

Senator McGee. It takes a great many more men to run the establishment that is trying to stay there and build, than it does to knock it apart by hit-and-run attack.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Well, in the defense of those 10,000 hamlets, each one requires a platoon or so, a platoon or a company.

Senator McGee. Those platoons are not available to be moved north or south?

Mr. Colby. They are tied up doing that. They can't be used to fight a platoon or company.

The Government has in its program this coming year the strengthening of special self-defense units, which could be called tougher, harder units. This will include additional training to teach them to use their arms and so forth. These special units will replace a few of the Popular Forces; these in turn will replace some Regional Forces; these in turn can replace regular forces. For instance, in a large number of provinces, the President wants to get into a situation where there are no more regular forces, but the whole security problem is handled by these territorial forces, so that his regular forces can go over to the border and replace the Americans who are going to leave.

UNIQUENESS OF VIETNAM WAR

Senator McGee. Would it be fair to say that this comes now as one of the lessons that we learned along the way? Our concept predominantly was contending for the deployment of regular forces in the old military context.

Mr. Colby. Very much so, Senator. In 1960–61, the problem was to increase the Vietnamese army from, I believe, 150,000 to 200,000. The local forces at that time were a total of around 100,000 only. Now when you are thinking in terms of the self-defense plus the local forces you are talking of almost a million armed men supporting a regular establishment of about a half million. So you have got a very much different proportion.

Senator McGee. All of that endeavor might have worked if the other side had played fair.

Mr. Colby. You have got to assume he isn't going to play fair. That is what I was trying to get at when talking with the chairman, that the enemy did develop a new technique of war here, to use——

Senator McGee. That is what is unique about this situation?

Mr. Colby. To use different levels in order to go around——

Senator McGee. We are imprisoned a bit by our experience in Korea. We had a penchant to practice our next test of crisis by the last one and that was embarrassing.

Mr. Colby. I am afraid that is a burden that peaceful people have to take, Senator. When the democratic powers entered World War I they entered with cavalry and plumed helmets and sabres. They had to learn about dirty gray uniforms and machine guns and things like that during the war.

In World War II we had to learn during the war about blitzkrieg and close air support and even strategic bombing. The Germans had developed all these before the war started, and they did very well for a while.

To return to Vietnam again, the enemy did develop a new technique, which he was quite successful with for quite a few years. I think the burden of my story is that I think we have learned some of these lessons, not all of them. We haven't applied them all yet either. We are in the course of applying them, but I think we will be able to apply them and meet this new challenge that the enemy has developed for us.

Senator McGee. That becomes really the guts of pacification?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator McGee. That is what we are talking about in a pacification program?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Senator McGee. It is an attempt to fill this gap, which is the change and the unique attribute of the war in Vietnam in contrast to the conventional experiences of the past?

Mr. Colby. That is right. It all must be founded on an actively participating people. That is the real key to it. These people must be supported and assisted by a variety of forces and a variety of programs. These must all be integrated into one overall national effort or national planning. The key to it is the active involvement and participation of the people.

COMPARATIVE COSTS OF WAR TO GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT

Senator McGee. In terms of resources and the availability of resources, is it possible to keep a guerrilla tactical group in the field at far lower cost than to try to preserve order from the establishment's point of view?

Mr. Colby. Well, I couldn't give you an absolutely clear answer on that, Senator. It is obviously cheaper to maintain that single guerrilla unit, which can attack any one of 10 or 15 hamlets than it is to provide the security in all those 10 or 15 hamlets. But by a real national effort you can provide the security for most of those hamlets on an unpaid basis by providing the weapons to the people who live in them, training them to take care of their own defense in great part, and then reinforcing them by a mobile reaction force which can come to their help if they get into more trouble than they can handle. In that way you can work out a way in which you don't have to put your entire national effort into defense expenditures but can do a few things other than just defending yourself.

This, I think, is more a matter of sustaining a security situation than achieving it.

Achieving security will require considerable investment initially. But once achieved it can be sustained by these other ways.

TURNING POINT OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR

Senator McGee. It turns out in hindsight that we arrived at a very wise decision.

I remember one of the trips I made over there in about 1966. We had some of our Marine units out in Da Nang with General Walt who were doing a really impressive job with pacification. They were undertaking it on their own initiative, and it was extremely effective.

The judgment about which we raised questions at the time was whether this could last? Did we have the kind of manpower that ought to be doing that sort of thing or whether the Vietnamese should be doing it, allowing us in that transitional process to assume the more conventional burdens of security.

Would that be a fair turning point year or did it come a little later than that?

Mr. Colby. I think 1966–1967 is about when we really began to work on the business of developing local security in the Vietnamese side. The American effort became one of training and assisting them to do this job, not merely doing the big force war alone.

EFFECT OF TET OFFENSIVE ON PACIFICATION EFFORT

Senator McGee. Did your task become any easier or any more difficult after Tet?

Mr. Colby. Of 1968?

Senator McGee. February, 1968.

Mr. Colby. Well, of course, I arrived after Tet so I don't have that in mind.

Senator McGee. You succeeded Robert Komer?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

I think obviously there were several very difficult months there in which there was a tendency on the part of many of the forces to huddle in around the towns, and be very defensive.

But I think as you look back on it, the Tet attacks did generate a considerable national effort, a national will, a national resolution to have done with that sort of nonsense, and to participate in the program.

I think it also galvanized the Government to develop some newer programs. It was not a government which was all that old, so I am not saying that they had been sitting doing nothing. They had only been inaugurated in the fall of 1967. But they did launch a number of new programs, general mobilization, self-defense, the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program and some others. As you look back on Tet you see that, despite the real disaster, in a psychological sense it did have a certain impact on the national effort, the national will.

EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON PACIFIED RURAL AREAS

Senator McGee. The task of holding a remote rural area together, a pacified area as you might call it in some circumstances, multiplies

as the incidence of assassination increases. As that incidence goes down it decreases. Would that be a fair——

Mr. COLBY. It is a tricky figure, Senator, because if the enemy has full control of the area then you don't have much terrorism. In essence they would be running the place so there would be no need to sneak in and throw a bomb and so forth.

On the other hand, generally, as you get better security, the terrorism and so forth will reduce, but, like most of our statistics out there, it is not an absolute.

IMPATIENCE OVER PROGRESS IN VIETNAM QUESTIONED

Senator MCGEE. I mentioned this before, and it seems rather relevant here. At one time I crossed a river up north at Da Nang on a raft because the local bridge was lying in the water. It had been blown up earlier that week. The young fellow who was pushing us across made the point that there was the real illustration of the problem in South Vietnam. He said it took somebody a half hour or an hour to train a man to blow up a bridge, but it took us two, three or four years to educate a man to build a bridge. Doesn't this frame rather sharply the contrast between the guerrillas' opportunities and the government's responsibilities?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

It obviously takes a considerable greater investment of time and energy to produce a decent society than it does to tear it down.

Senator MCGEE. That is why it seems to me we are often very guilty of being unwisely impatient about the course of events in Vietnam. I personally think that the headway is measurable. It is painfully slow and we wish it would go as fast as we might be able to do it here with our own kind or as fast as it went in France once it was under way

I think the circumstances and the history and almost the contradictions of events give us no other choice than to expect a much slower evolution of this new process that seems to be genuinely underway in very large sections at least of South Vietnam. I am one of those who applauds those of you who have to sit through all of our bombast from time to time and our impatience and wondering why you didn't do it last Tuesday instead of a year from Tuesday.

Mr. COLBY. Sometimes, Senator, we wonder why we didn't think of it last Tuesday, too.

Senator MCGEE. It is a thankless responsibility that you have. I think it is one that has some lasting, sustaining qualities to it that will be there long after a lot of the other jazzy things that Mr. Cronkite or anyone else runs on the 6:00 o'clock news. It doesn't get very much play, but I think this is the real muscle and sustaining fiber of any new social, economic or political grouping. That is why it is so urgent and so important.

Mr. Chairman, that is all the time I want to take for questions.

I do think it ought to give us all pause as members of the Senate in trying to pin timetables on either you, Mr. Colby, or the President or the Saigon Government or anyone else. Surely we have learned 20 times over that in that part of the world the convenience of a Republican and Democratic calendar doesn't carry any weight.

Mr. Colby. I think my timetable, Senator, is to do it as fast as it can be done.

Senator McGee. I think our concern rightfully is one of making sure there is no reckless or needless lagging, just because people might become tired or a little frustrated. It has to be pressed with all responsible haste.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator McGee. I would not think beyond the tempo of responsibility.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESSES

I want to commend you and those who work with you for what I think is a real selfless undertaking in this enterprise.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

I hope that nothing has been said by me which would in any way criticize the job that the director of this program is doing. He is, if I understood him correctly, following orders. He didn't make the policy, nor did he originate the idea of going into Vietnam. He formerly, as he testified to the Senator from Missouri, was an agent with the CIA. Is that correct?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I assume he is now under the orders of the present Administration, as he was of the previous one.

Mr. Colby. I am a member of the Department of State now, Mr. Chairman. And my immediate superior is General Abrams.

The Chairman. I certainly commend the Ambassador because I think he has an extremely difficult job. I would commend him and all his associates.

OBJECT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM

It is such a difficult job that I am prompted again by the Senator from Wyoming's remarks to ask a question which is perhaps very unnecessary to others but still bothers me. I think you said, and it has been said before, that this is an interesting experiment in nation-building. You are building a new kind of nation in South Vietnam and that is the object of the pacification program. Is that an unfair or accurate statement?

Mr. Colby. It is a contribution to the building of a nation now, Mr. Chairman. It doesn't do it all by itself.

The Chairman. Yes, granted that. I didn't mean to imply you were doing it all by yourself or that your organization was. But it bears the major part of the financial cost, technical direction and knowledge. You are building a new nation, different from that which was historically there, with different ideas about how it should be run, if I understand it correctly. You are not recreating a feudal system that was characteristic, as you mentioned, in the ancient days of either Annam or Cochin China.

As I understood what you said before, the present South Vietnam includes most of old Vietnam other than Tonkin. Is that correct?

Mr. Colby. Mostly, yes.

The Chairman. The two southern provinces?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

QUESTION IS ONE OF U.S. PRIORITIES

The CHAIRMAN. The question keeps coming back to me. Granted that you are doing an effective job and accepting your testimony, it would appear to be quite effective, the question still returns as it does when I see the magnificent things we have done in space. It comes back to the question that recurs on the floor of the Senate: Fine, it was successful, but is it as necessary and essential to the security and safety of the country as pacifying the internal dissension in this country that results in riots, civil disturbances, in some cases the virtual breakdown of our judicial system, as recently exhibited in some of our big cities or the necessity for building schools to educate our populace, the necessity for clean air to breathe and clear water? This comes back to the same continually recurring question.

Granted it is an interesting experiment to go abroad, to take the remnants of a feudal colonial community and to build a nice, shining democratic community. It is an interesting thing to do, as I am sure it was to Mr. Teller when he solved the problem of hydrogen explosion. That is fascinating to a physicist.

I have to raise the question again, not for you, because you are not the policy maker, but really for the Senate and the Committee and the country. Is this of the highest priority that we must defer doing all of the things that we continually admit should be done and need to be done in the United States now in order to cure what I call the very serious social and political afflictions of our own communities. It all comes back to that question.

I am not at all sure it is a proper question to ask you because you are doing the job you are asked to do. If I drifted into that question a moment ago, I will say I probably was improper in doing it simply because of my constant pre-occupation with this problem for four or five years. I think perhaps it is wrong to ask you to make a judgment on that question because you are not a policy maker. You are doing the best job you can do. Everyone says, given your assignment, you are doing as good a job as one could possibly expect. I have heard no criticism of the way you discharge your responsibilities. So I don't want to pursue it.

I was trying to make my own position clear. There is no need of my pressing you to make a decision upon a highest policy, which is the matter of what kind of a country does this country want to be. Do we think it is most important to use our major efforts to create or help create a new society in an Asian country. I often think when I see people like you with obvious talents, energy and intelligence, how much we could benefit by having some of your talents applied to the problems here at home, in my State or in Chicago, Watts or Harlem. There are lots of places where we have a use for your talents.

That is the question and I don't think I will ask you to answer it. I was really only trying to state my own position correctly.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF U.S. BOMBING, ARTILLERY AND GUN SHIPS

Certain questions of fact that need to be explored occur to me. You have given the numbers of victims of Vietcong terrorism. Could you give the number of civilians who have been killed by American bombing, artillery and gun ships? Do you have such figures?

Mr. COLBY. I don't think I have them right here. I do have them available and can get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those figures kept by anyone during the past several years?

Mr. COLBY. They were imperfectly kept, I believe. It is a very difficult figure to get.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I recall having asked questions before and being told the Pentagon did not keep such figures.

Mr. COLBY. They do not have a precise figure. We do have a figure of the civilian casualties admitted to province hospitals. That is the only kind of a figure we have.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you supply whatever figures you have available?

Mr. COLBY. I certainly will. I don't have them available here, but we will supply them.

(The information referred to follows.)

The number of civilian war casualties admitted to province and military hospitals during the period of Jan. 1967 to Dec. 1969 totals 200,950.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we killed substantial numbers of civilians with bombing, artillery or gun ships?

Mr. COLBY. It is not kept in that fashion, Senator. What it shows is the number of admissions of people with war wounds into province hospitals. There is no showing as to just where those wounds came from. It isn't ascribed to either a Vietcong or a Government bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there figures on those who die who don't appear in the hospital?

Mr. COLBY. They probably do not appear.

The CHAIRMAN. They just disappear into the——

Mr. COLBY. They are buried.

The CHAIRMAN. And they disappear. So there really are no figures about that?

SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE FOR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND PEACE

You were speaking of the national cause. Do you think that a searching for a national identity exists as a major motive or is there just a wish for peace in South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. I think there is a very strong desire for nationhood in the South, Mr. Chairman—there is a wish for peace as well—particularly with your leadership elements, and by that I mean the leadership in the villages as well as the others. Each village, you see, has a little temple in it. This is not necessarily a religious temple, it is the temple of the village and there is a very strong community sense in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that the life centered around the village is traditional. Has this grown to a point where they have a feeling of nationhood of all of the villages that now constitute the old Annam and old Cochin China?

Mr. COLBY. During the past six months, Senator, most of the village chiefs and most of the hamlet chiefs have attended this course at Vung Tau. At Vung Tau they went through this five-week course during which they studied the program of the government and the effort of the government to form a new country and so forth. During each one of these courses the president came down and spent the afternoon or the evening with them and talked with them.

If you go up to that village chief or that hamlet chief in the far north or the far south of the country and ask him about his experience at Vung Tau, he recalls it. He may still be wearing the black pajamas he was issued there.

He may recall the fact that the president spoke to them and what he said to them. So that in that sense I think there is a development of a sense of national identity among these village chiefs and hamlet chiefs, who were elected by the people in their villages and hamlets. They are part of something bigger than themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. This is new.

Mr. COLBY. This is in the last 6 months. This program has gone on, and I think it has had a substantial effect in these hamlets.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only is it new in your activity, it is new in the experience of Vietnam because they didn't have much of a feeling, as I think you have already testified, of a political nationhood.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was some degree of ethnic pride with regard to what I guess you would call their culture. I think that was true to a great extent in China too in some of its periods.

Mr. COLBY. Oh, yes, very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. They were proud of being Chinese, but didn't think much of the central government.

Mr. COLBY. That is right.

There are a lot of Chinese living elsewhere in Southeast Asia who have a feeling of being Chinese.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking of the idea that they really have a hankering for a nation in the sense that the nationalists have had in Europe and in other areas during the last 100 years. Nationalism really is a rather modern growth.

Mr. COLBY. The Viet Minh movement was a strong movement. It was a desire for an independent Vietnamese nation.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had already testified, I thought quite correctly, that this was motivated by their hatred of the French domination.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, and a desire to have their own nation, their own Vietnamese nation.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought most importantly to get rid of the French, and secondarily—I don't know about that. That is an academic question that we can't do anything about now.

SIZE OF VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

You said in the beginning, I believe, the estimated infrastructure of the Vietcong was 70,000. We have a letter from the Army, which I will put in the record. All I am trying to do is clarify this as best I can. It says:

> With regard to paragraph 6 of fact sheet, a better perspective of the operation can be gained when consideration is given to the current military intelligence estimate that Vietcong Infrastructure strength approximates 80,000.

Have there been any changes in that? The letter is from William Becker, Major General, Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of the Army.

(The information referred to follows.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D.C., January 9, 1970.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary of the Army has asked me to respond to your letter concerning the Phoenix Program.

Attached you will find an unclassified fact sheet, originally prepared at the request of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which discusses in some detail the essential elements of this Government of Vietnam Program and U.S. assistance to the program.

With regard to paragraph 6 of the fact sheet, a better perspective of the operation can be gained when consideration is given to the current military intelligence estimate that Viet Cong Infrastructure strength approximates 80,000.

I trust this information will be helpful.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM A. BECKER,
Major General, GS,
Chief of Legislative Liaison.

FACT SHEET

Subject: Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program In Vietnam.

Purpose: To provide information on the above subject for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

1. Phung Hoang is a Government of Vietnam (GVN) Plan with the objective of centralizing and coordinating the efforts of all military and civilian agencies engaged in the neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Open announcement of the heretofore classified program was made by President Thieu on 1 October 1969. This announcement pointed out to the people that Phung Hoang is a policy aimed at protection of the people against terrorism. For example, during 1968 Viet Cong terrorism wounded some 12,000 and killed 5,400 South Vietnamese; so far during 1969 there have been some 14,000 wounded and 5,500 killed. The VCI is defined as that political organization by which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the people of South Vietnam. A more detailed explanation is at inclosure 1. The basic essence of the program is a fully coordinated intelligence effort of all existing GVN and United States agencies targeted specifically on the VCI with the express purpose of neutralizing its effectiveness and control over the people. The word Phung Hoang is derived from the Vietnamese word meaning coordination.

2. To coordinate and manage United States assistance and support to the GVN Phung Hoang Program, the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) has developed an advisory structure known as the Phoenix Program. This advisory and assistance program is under the staff supervision of the Deputy to COMUSMACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), Ambassador Colby. There are some 450 United States military advisory personnel involved in the Phoenix Program. Of this number, 262 serve at district and city levels, which are the key operational elements, with the remainder of the personnel serving at the national, regional, and provincial levels.

3. The coordinated intelligence effort against the VCI had its beginning in July 1967, when COMUSMACV established a joint civilian/military advisory activity entitled "Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX)" with the specific mission of assisting and supporting the GVN in a coordinated attack on the VCI. Initially this program received little official GVN attention and support. However, in December 1967, recognizing the need for a coordinated intelligence effort against the VCI, the GVN initiated the Phung Hoang Program with the mission of neutralizing the VCI. Accordingly, COMUSMACV changed the name of its advisory activity from ICEX to its current name, Phoenix. With the issuance of a Presidential decree in July 1968, which established formal GVN functions and organizations to implement the Phung Hoang Program, the GVN officially committed itself to the program.

4. To control the overall program and ensure the coordination and cooperation among all elements capable of contributing, the GVN has established a structure of committees from national to province levels. The Chairman of the Central

Committee is the Minister of Interior; the Vice-Chairman is the Director General of the National Police.

5. It is at the district level that the concerted intelligence effort against the VCI becomes most concentrated. At this level, the GVN have organized District Intelligence and Operating Coordination Centers (DIOCCs). The DIOCC is the facility where representatives of existing units and agencies are brought together for a coordinated effort of intelligence collection, processing, dissemination, and timely, positive exploitation operations specifically targeted against the VCI. The Vietnamese District Chief is the DIOCC Chief; however, he normally delegates responsibility for daily operations of the DIOCC to his deputy or Chief of Police. The District Senior Advisor (usually a United States Army Major) is the District Phoenix Coordinator. Also assigned to the advisory team is an intelligence trained officer who serves as the full time Phoenix advisor to the DIOCC. This officer advises and assists the District Chief on DIOCC operations primarily in the area of organizational and management techniques and procedures of intelligence collection and files (i.e., Name Index Files, Dossiers, Area Files), first-level analysis and dissemination of intelligence.

6. Ways in which the GVN attempts to neutralize and exploit intelligence on the VCI within the concept of the Phung Hoang Program are, in order of priority, defection, capture and exploitation, and discreditation or compromise. It must be recognized that some VCI are killed unavoidably during the normal course of combative reaction operations; however, the overall percentage is quite low. For example during 1968 when some 15,000 VCI were neutralized, 72 percent were captured, 13 percent defected and only 15 percent were killed. Defection and capture are the preferred methods of neutralization as the individuals often provide highly useful information which leads to additional neutralizations and to locating of arms and supply caches.

7. The Phung Hoang Program has evolved from many regional programs, some initiated as early as 1962. In July 1968 these programs were pulled together into a single, integrated national program which was indorsed by the GVN leadership and given a high priority in the overall pacification effort. Basic organizational and operational techniques are constantly being refined to improve the overall effectiveness of the program.

Mr. Colby. That is a recent letter?

The Chairman. It is fairly recent. The date is January 9.

Mr. Colby. There has been no recent change. We have been holding it at about 75,000, as I said, Mr. Chairman, but we have very little confidence in that overall figure.

The Chairman. They seem to think it is 80,000. Is it in that neighborhood?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

I think that that figure was around earlier and that we have updated that a bit. I can't testify as to why he sent that particular letter.

ACTIVITIES OF OPERATION PHOENIX

The Chairman. I have another sheet here. Did your program or the CIA supervise the organization of Operation Phoenix?

Mr. Colby. In the earliest origins of it, CIA was associated with it. In its earliest stages it preceded my organization.

The Chairman. That was before you——

Mr. Colby. Before the CORDS.

The Chairman. This pamphlet is from the Department of State Media Services of last year and it says as follows:

> Nobody knows yet exactly how many VCI are running this shadow government behind the bamboo curtain but in December 1967 when Operation Phoenix was launched it was estimated by intelligence sources that about 80,000 were in VCI jobs. In its first year despite the Communist offensive in February and May 1968 Phoenix resulted in nearly 16,000 of these cadres being rooted out of their underground position.

That uses the word "cadres" which has a certain military implication. I thought this program was directed primarily at civilians.

Mr. COLBY. I think they mean political cadres, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Political, not military?

Mr. COLBY. No.

The infrastructure are the political cadre; the Vietnamese word is "can bo" which is a cadre man, political leader.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to clear that up because the use of that word in other reports I have seen left the impression it was military whereas as a matter of fact it is civilian.

Mr. COLBY. This is the political control structure under the Communist movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a quota each year under the Phoenix program?

Mr. COLBY. There is a quota system for the national goal. There is a certain amount of this that is subdivided into various other areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us what the quota was for last year?

Mr. COLBY. The quota for last year was 1,800 a month. This can be filed by individuals who are captured, individuals who rally or individuals who are killed in the course of operations.

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Chieu Hoi people those you call ralliers?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly what does rally mean, simply surrender?

Mr. COLBY. Returnee is another word, Mr. Chairman. It is a surrender. It is coming to the government side saying "I was on the enemy side. I want to join your side." I expect to testify a little more fully on that program a little later, Mr. Chairman, but——

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever you wish. Do you feel you shouldn't now?

Mr. COLBY. I would be glad to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the material I am using is in published accounts.

Mr. COLBY. There is nothing confidential about the Chieu Hoi program, but I do have a more extensive presentation on it later for you. I might just add that this program to invite people to come over from the other side has been going on since 1963.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Chieu Hoi?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

ORIGIN OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. As distinguished from the Phoenix?

Mr. COLBY. The Phoenix program had a few precursors which were launched by CIA to try to get the different intelligence services there to work together to identify the political apparatus or infrastructure and begin to see who they were. This was formalized in December of 1967, in a decree by the Prime Minister. It was then made more official in June of 1968 by a decree by the President.

This set up the structure of coordination and collation of information about the Vietcong infrastructure.

FIGURES ON SIZE OF VCI AND PHOENIX PROGRAM QUOTAS

The CHAIRMAN. One curious question arises from these figures. As you mentioned there have been quotas. One article in the Army paper, I think, says the quota in 1968 was 15,000. A story in The Washington Evening Star, cited 19,534 in 1969, making a total of 34,534. Yet the estimated number in the Vietcong infrastructure at present is approximately the same as it was in the beginning.

This leaves a very interesting question. Do they regenerate the Viet Cong infrastructure as fast as you eliminate it?

Mr. COLBY. Well, again I prefaced my remarks, Mr. Chairman, by saying that it has been very difficult to get any kind of statistics that are worth anything on the size of the Vietcong infrastructure. We started with some estimates saying, a typical village would have a certain number in its structure and then multiplying that by the number of villages. We then refined it slightly by saying that hamlets of different levels of security would probably have bigger or smaller numbers. During the past year we have gone out and asked for identified VCI. We have made the thrust of it one of local collection of specific information on individuals who are members of the VCI in different areas.

This whole process has improved our figures somewhat, but we are still concerned that some of these numbers have in them people who are really followers rather than leaders, and that the total number, which would include the followers, is a bit higher than it should be.

Now, this is being clarified. The Government has issued several decrees defining very carefully what kind of people are VCI and at what levels and what sentences they can receive depending on their level of importance.

There has been a general improvement of the performance, but, as Mr. Kaiser said in that article you noted we still have quite a way to go, Mr. Chairman. We are working at it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the statistics in this area any more difficult than in the other areas of the war?

Mr. COLBY. They are a little worse in this area, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. A little worse?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Some of the other statistics I think are very good, For instance, I mentioned the statistics in the people's self-defense. I find the membership figures a little soft. On the other hand, I am very confident of the accuracy of the 400,000 weapons which have been distrubuted because we have gone around and looked and counted. So some statistics are good and some statistics aren't so good. We try to use them with that in mind.

INCENTIVES TO FILL PHOENIX PROGRAM QUOTAS

The CHAIRMAN. In the quota system of the Phoenix program, are any cash incentives offered to the Vietnamese who operate that program for filling their quota?

Mr. COLBY. Not to the Vietnamese who operate it. There are certain rewards offered in public statements that certain individuals are wanted. There have been posters and leaflets put out that a certain man is wanted because he is a member of the infrastructure and par-

ticipated in a certain terrorist act and that if he is produced or information is produced which will lead to his arrest than a certain reward will be paid.

The CHAIRMAN. It is like putting a price on Jesse James.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, except I would say that the Vietnamese Government has made a considerable effort to indoctrinate all the way down the line that a live captive is better than a dead one, because the live one carries information in his head, which can do you a great deal of good for future efforts. It has, I think, become generally accepted that what we want is either ralliers or captives, and we are really not so anxious to get the others.

INTERROGATION METHODS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have effective ways of eliciting information from the captives?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I used to be in the intelligence business, Mr. Chairman, and, if you want bad intelligence, use bad interrogation methods. If you want good intelligence, use good intelligence interrogation methods, because you will get bad intelligence if you use the wrong methods. And that again is a message that we put out. We endeavor to train people in proper and useful and sensible methods of interrogation because they are just more productive than others.

TRAINING OF PHOENIX PROGRAM ADVISERS AT FORT HOLABIRD

The CHAIRMAN. I don't remember whether the two men in Holabird—Is Holabird the place where they train people to be advisers and supervisors or whatever they call it?

Mr. COLBY. Holabird is a military intelligence school, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. They do train some of the officers who come over and join our Phoenix program as advisers there. All I can say about the allegations of these two gentlemen that you referred to as to what they were trained for is that they were not in Vietnam and we have some rather direct instructions to our people as to their behavior in Vietnam.

Some of our younger officers were somewhat concerned about their role in the Phoenix after the Green Beret case came up and so we sent them an explanation of what their role was. We clarified very clearly to them that they are under the same rules of war that they would be if they were a member of a regular unit. If they see anything that does not meet these standards, they are not only not to associate with it, they are to positively protest against it and are to report to us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you tell them in Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. That is what we tell them in Vietnam, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean that you question what they allege they were taught at Holabird?

Mr. COLBY. I am not qualified to discuss that.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to make it clear. You are not saying that what they said they were taught in Holabird is not true?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, I just don't know that, sir.

The Chairman. That is all I wanted for the record, to be clear as to how far your testimony goes because, as you know, there has been a great deal in the press about this matter.

Mr. Colby. Yes, certainly.

The Chairman. I think it is a very proper thing to at least get what you know about it.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PHOENIX ADVISERS

The Chairman. I think you made a very proper statement with regard to what you tell them. Since this has come up in this fashion, would it be appropriate for you to provide for the record the explanation that you have given in detail to the Phoenix advisers?

Mr. Colby. I would be delighted to do so.

The Chairman. I think it would be a healthy and proper thing to do.

Mr. Colby. We have it right here, I think.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Colby. No, we will bring it in.

The Chairman. All right.

You can provide examples of a critical report of U.S. advisers. I think this would be a very useful thing to do for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

Instructions to U.S. Personnel Concerning Phoenix Activities

The PHOENIX program is one of advice, support and assistance to the GVN Phung Hoang program, aimed at reducing the influence and effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong Infrastructure is an inherent part of the war effort being waged against the GVN by the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese Allies. The unlawful status of members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (as defined in the Green Book and in GVN official decrees) is well established in GVN law and is in full accord with the laws of land warfare followed by the United States Army.

Operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure include the collection of intelligence identifying these members, inducing them to abandon their allegiance to the Viet Cong and rally to the government, capturing or arresting them in order to bring them before Province Security Committees for lawful sentencing, and, as a final resort, the use of military or police force against them if no other way of preventing them from carrying on their unlawful activities is possible. Our training emphasizes the desirability of obtaining these target individuals alive and of using intelligent and lawful methods of interrogation to obtain the truth of what they know about other aspects of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. U.S. personnel are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations of a Phoenix character as they are with respect to regular military operations against enemy units in the field. Thus, they are specifically not authorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare, but they are entitled to use such reasonable military force, as is necessary to obtain the goals of rallying, capturing, or eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the Republic of Viet-Nam.

If U.S. personnel come in contact with activities conducted by Vietnamese which do not meet the standards of the rules of land warfare, they are certainly not to participate further in the activity. They are also expected to make their objections to this kind of behavior known to the Vietnamese conducting them and they are expected to report the circumstances to next higher U.S. authority for decision as to action to be taken with the GVN.

There are individuals who find normal police or even military operations repugnant to them personally, despite the overall legality and morality of these activities. Arrangements exist whereby individuals having this feeling about military affairs can, according to law, receive specialized assignments or even exemptions from military service. There is no similar legislation with respect to police type activities of the U.S. military, but if an individual finds the police

type activities of the PHOENIX program repugnant to him, on his application, he can be reassigned from the program without prejudice.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, I promised the distinguished Senator from New Jersey——

Senator CASE. No hurry, Mr. Chairman. You follow along those lines because I have finished with my obligation on the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. I am willing to yield.

I don't wish to exaggerate the significance of this matter. In itself it is not perhaps nearly as dramatic as the Mylai incidents or the Daniel Lang story in the New Yorker or others, but being related to it, it is very healthy and very wise for you or your colleagues to clarify this as far as you possibly can.

CONVICTION AND RELEASE OF VCI

How many of these VCI, identified and apprehended, are actually convicted and how many are released of those who are tried?

Mr. COLBY. Our information on that is not all that accurate yet. There is a considerable improvement in the past two or three months in the information on that, but I can't give you a statistic, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you no estimate?

Mr. COLBY. But we do know that the province security committees have actually been tightening up on the handling of these people over the past six months.

EFFECT OF REPEATED ARREST AND QUESTIONING ON VILLAGERS

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think is the psychological effect upon villagers who are arrested and questioned and then released and then arrested and questioned again about their allegiance? Does this have any effect upon them?

Mr. COLBY. I think so. One of the provisions of the pacification plan of the government for 1970 is that the village chief will be informed when any man is arrested within his village, so that he can come up and make representations to the appropriate authorities about that individual if it is a man known in the community for his probity or something else. This just opens it up, to try again to make more of this program public so that people can understand it and participate in it and have greater confidence in it.

PHOENIX PROGRAM QUOTAS: CAPTURED AND KILLED

The CHAIRMAN. You say the quota was 1,800 men a month?

Mr. COLBY. 1,800 people.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of that quota was captured and how many were killed?

Mr. COLBY. Over the year 1969, the number captured was 8,515, rallied 4,832 and killed 6,187, to a total of 19,534. About 30 percent were killed.

That killed figure also includes a number of people who were discovered to be VCI after they were killed. For instance, various people may be killed in an ambush outside the village at night when some armed men come along and a firefight takes place, or in an attack on

an enemy guerrilla unit. By looking at the papers that they carried and their identification it can be discovered that those killed were actually members of the VCI. Thus, even though that particular operation was not aimed to get them, it may develop later they were members of the VC infrastructure and they consequently do count against that quota.

PURPOSE OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Has this program any precedent that you know of in our history? Have we done this before?

Mr. COLBY. The identification and arrest of subversives?

The CHAIRMAN. No, a program for the assassination of civilian leaders.

Mr. COLBY. I question whether that is an appropriate title for it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You rephrase it. I was trying to shorten it.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think that is the appropriate title. I think it is an internal security program.

The CHAIRMAN. Neutralization is the word. I couldn't think of it for a moment—neutralization of civilian leaders.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; my title for it and actually the Vietnamese government's title for this program this year is a program to protect the people against terrorism. Now, I think you could call it an internal security program, one aimed at identifying the members of the enemy infrastructure, to get them either to rally or to capture them. In cases of firefights they do get killed.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call a firefight? I didn't get the significance of that.

Mr. COLBY. A firefight is when two units run into each other out in the country and shoot.

The CHAIRMAN. They are military people, aren't they?

Mr. COLBY. Or police.

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn't thinking of them.

Mr. COLBY. Or self-defense, Senator. That is what happens in Vietnam. In each of these hamlets in Vietnam at night there is a curfew, and there is a small defense unit outside the hamlet. They lay ambushes to stop enemy guerrilla units from coming into the hamlet. When they see some armed men coming along they shoot at them.

The CHAIRMAN. I am familiar with that. I thought that would be classified as part of the military operation. I didn't know that was considered part of the Phoenix operation.

Mr. COLBY. I say that certain of those people who are killed in that kind of an incident are later revealed as members of the enemy infrastructure.

PROCEDURES CONCERNING PHOENIX PROGRAM PRISONERS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your information that those who are captured under the Phoenix program are not executed but put in prison? Are they ever executed?

Mr. COLBY. Well, let me say they are not legally executed, no. What is done to them is that they are detained under this emergency

detention procedure. Now, I would not want to say here that none has ever actually been executed, but certainly the program, the government's policy and its directives are that these people when captured are placed in detention centers and held for the appropriate period, and the government has taken steps to insure that. But you have not had convictions of membership in the enemy apparatus followed by an execution. That has not happened in the past several years.

The CHAIRMAN. In most of the newspaper stories the implication, if not the direct assertion, is that those who are neutralized or taken into custody are usually disposed of physically. Whether you want to use the word executed, assassinated or electrocuted, the implication is that they are killed.

Mr. COLBY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you read.

Mr. COLBY. That is a very unfortunate term. It came from the difficulty of developing a term which would generalize the number captured, rallied and killed. Various terms were tried to explain what the combination of those three meant. I myself have always gone back to using the terms captured, rallied or killed as the only possible way to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish one thought. This is a Vietnamese program. We only advise them and teach them how. Is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. We advise them and support them to some extent.

The CHAIRMAN. We support them. We have an adviser with every how many men, 20 men?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, no.

We have an adviser, a young officer, who sits in each district office of this organization.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, our statistics are fairly accurate on how many are in a quota, but we do not follow up, I take it, about what is done with them. Is that why there are no statistics on what happens to them?

Mr. COLBY. No, we are beginning to follow up on that, Mr. Chairman. We did not follow up in the past to a great degree, but the government wishes to follow it up more closely, and they have begun to share certain of their information with us. However, I don't have enough of an experience factor here to give you any statistics with any degree of reliability.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, pardon me; I don't want to interrupt.

Mr. COLBY. I just wanted to add one point, if I may. The VCI we are talking about, Mr. Chairman, are members of this enemy apparatus. It is not at all unusual that these people operate in a guerrilla base and participate in guerrilla operations and carry weapons and so forth, and frequently, in the course of those fights that take place as a result, these people are killed.

Now, there is one problem area that Mr. Kaiser mentions in his article which is a real problem that we are worried about. It is that there is too little of the careful casework which identifies an individual and then goes out to capture him. Rather too often the quotas may be met by individuals who are actually caught in an ambush by chance. So that really it wasn't the result of good intelligence and good police work but rather just by chance.

Excuse me.

PHOENIX PROGRAM IS NOT A COUNTER-TERROR OPERATION

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, the reason that I asked that I might intervene momentarily is again because we are after facts; we are not taking positions at all.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator CASE. This is not properly then defined in fact as a counter-terror operation?

Mr. COLBY. No, it is not, Senator.

Senator CASE. You swear to that by everything holy. You have already taken your oath?

Mr. COLBY. I have taken my oath. There was a period, Senator, some years ago when an organization was called a counter terror organization.

Senator CASE. I am not arguing we shouldn't have one. I am just trying to find out what this is.

Mr. COLBY. That was some time ago. There was an organization formed there which was given the words counter terror. There were a certain amount of fairy stories about what it actually did but it has long ago been discarded as a concept, as any kind of an organization.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COLBY. The organization itself later became what are called the provincial reconnaissance units. These are small units of Vietnamese who work on the infrastructure program. They work under the government, under the province chiefs' control. They are supported by the United States. We support this like we support a lot of other things. They do operate under the same kinds of rules as to who they are going out to capture and what their rules are as the normal police services.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND REPUTABLE REPORTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, this is what puzzles us so much. I have before me an article by Mr. Peter Kann. Are you familiar with him? He is a reporter.

Mr. COLBY. I met him.

The CHAIRMAN. This is from a staff reporter of the Wall Street Journal, which is generally considered a reasonably conservative newspaper. I mean it isn't given to flights of fancy.

Mr. COLBY. He is a very good reporter, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not given to flights of fancy particularly in social or political affairs. This is less than a year ago. It was last spring and he makes some very positive statements. If it were the only case it wouldn't disturb me very much. But every time we see the discrepancy between the more reputable newspaper reporters and the government's position it always reminds us of the early days of the war when the government was denouncing people like Halberstam for being either ignorant or prejudiced. But events proved that he told the truth and the government lied about it. This bothers us. I certainly am not suggesting you are misrepresenting.

Mr. COLBY. I remember that article, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. There were a number of articles.

Mr. COLBY. This one——

The CHAIRMAN. Is it wrong, in your opinion?

Mr. COLBY. No, I have full confidence Mr. Kann told the right story. That is why I stated that, while the policy of the government is definite, I would not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly or executed in this kind of a program. I think it has probably happened, unfortunately. But I also point out that Mr. Kaiser in the article in this morning's paper stated that after a considerable effort to identify cases of abuse of this nature he had been unable to find one. Maybe it is a difference in time. We have put considerable emphasis on trying to tighten this up and make sure that it does follow a disciplined approach. But the fact is that in Vietnam various unfortunate things have happened in the past. The question is what is our policy, and what are we doing to make sure that our policy is followed. And I can assure you our policy is very clear on this and we are going to enforce it.

REPORTED INCIDENTS UNDER U.S. POLICIES

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It is the latter question that bothers me. I am not and have never been bothered that the policy is to go out and assassinate civilians or that the policy is to do what happened, or is alleged to have happened, or was apparently proved to have happened in Mylai by Mr. Lang. His article was based upon the official courts-martial. I can't imagine there is any doubt whatever that that incident took place. That is the thing that bothers us. This is no reflection upon the intentions or purposes of the government officials or their policy. There is a great question that arises under the circumstances in Vietnam with the greatest exertion and the best of will to carry out those policies in a reasonably humane manner, that I think is a serious question. This article which, I think, must be in the record along with the other one bears directly on it. The reason it is so important is that I don't believe the American people wish to be a party to such inhumanity no matter what the objective, even to build a new society in Vietnam. I don't believe they would agree that the objective, the end, justifies the means used. I don't, and I don't believe they do.

Mr. COLBY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, and I think the officers with me agree with me.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean for a minute to suggest that you or anyone else, certainly not you, has declared a policy of the kind of things that have been reported. Yet they keep being reported, and I think this can well have gone beyond our capacity to control. This is a very chaotic situation in Vietnam, I think, and I don't think the responsibility lies with anyone like yourself or even the soldiers—and I don't mind saying it here, and I have said before that I personally have the greatest sympathy for Lieutenant Calley who has been charged. I think he was put under conditions and circumstances that were intolerable and it wasn't his fault that he got there. He got there because he was ordered by his government. If I am going to blame anybody, it is the people who do make the policy at the highest levels, not you or for that matter Lt. Calley either. There are certain personal things that perhaps could be used and if that was the only incident I knew about and I thought he was in some way person-

ally unique in this, it would be a different story. But it has become such a common occurrence, at least as reported, that there is something beyond just the individual. That bothers me about it.

I am not really trying to criticize you or say you are not doing a good job or you didn't give them the right instructions. It just doesn't turn out that way.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think so, Mr. Chairman. We could say that not only is the policy not to go in this direction but there is considerable effort being made to insure that the policy is followed. There are aberrations which do occur once in a while. There is no question about that. But it is our experience from running the program that these are few and far between. They are not a common occurrence. We are taking steps to reduce and eliminate those that do occur.

(The articles referred to follow.)

[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 25, 1969]

THE HIDDEN WAR: ELITE PHOENIX FORCES HUNT VIETCONG CHIEFS IN AN ISOLATED VILLAGE—RAID PROMPTED BY INFORMERS FINDS MOST OF FOE GONE AND NATIVES TIGHT-LIPPED—DEMOLISHING A VC MONUMENT

(By Peter R. Kann)

DON NHON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Was it a trap? There was reason for suspicion. But the risk had to be taken. An unsolicited bit of information offered an opportunity to strike at a local unit of the Vietcong "infrastructure" (VCI), the clandestine political and administrative apparatus through which the enemy lays claim to control much of the Vietnamese countryside.

The affair began like this:

Two ragged Vietnamese, one short and squat, the other tall and thin, recently walked into Don Nhon, a village about 50 miles southwest of Saigon that is the capital of Don Nhon District. The pair told American officials that they wanted to talk about the VCI in their home village of Vinh Hoa, a nearby community of about 2,000 persons nestled deep in Vietcong territory along a Mekong River tributary. A Vietcong-sponsored "Liberation Committee" had been elected to govern Vinh Hoa five months previously, the informers said.

The U.S. advisers were dubious about taking military action on the basis of this intelligence. An ambush might be in the offing. Vinh Hoa was dangerous territory, several miles from the nearest government-controlled village. And the informers said they were refugees, rather than Vietcong defectors, who normally could be expected to be more eager to talk. But the two stuck to their story of overt Vietcong control in their village, and their information checked out with that in allied files.

HIGH PRIORITY

Vinh Hoa clearly was a target for "Operation Phoenix," the high-priority allied effort to root out the VCI across South Vietnam. The year-old Phoenix campaign obviously is related to the Paris negotiations. When peace comes, South Vietnam's claims to control the countryside will be strongest where the VCI cadre are fewest.

The Vietcong claim that about 1,800 governing bodies have been freely elected in "liberated areas" of South Vietnam. The U.S. dismisses most of the committees as fictions existing only on paper and claims VCI cadre are being wiped out at a rate of better than 2,300 a month. Total VCI strength is estimated at about 70,000.

Although conceived largely by CIA men and other American planners, Operation Phoenix is executed primarily by Vietnamese troops. Its methods range from after-dark assassination strikes by small killer squads to battalion-sized cordon and search efforts. A small strike clearly wasn't indicated for Vinh Hoa. The village might be heavily defended. U.S. officials finally settled on a plan for a daylight assault with helicopter transportation. The U.S. 9th Division would provide support.

HUNTING THE ENEMY

Phoenix operations are reputed to be highly sophisticated and productive affairs. The Vinh Hoa effort proved to be neither. It involved intricate—and apparently flawed—planning, largely fruitless interrogation of fearful, tight-lipped villagers, calculated brutality applied to suspected Vietcong, the execution of one suspect, looting of homes by Vietnamese troops, systematic destruction of village installations and a largely unproductive hunt for Vietcong officials who apparently had fled by sampan long before the allies arrived.

The operation highlighted agonizing questions about Phoenix and the allied methods for waging war in Vietnam. Because the Vietcong torture and assassinate, should the allies? Is there value to an operation that "sweeps" a Vietcong area and then departs, leaving no permanent allied presence? Who should be considered Vietcong? Does the VC include a farmer who happens to own ancestral rice land in a Vietcong-controlled village and pays taxes to the enemy?

The counter-infrastructure experts are the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, called "PRUs." Along with the Vietnamese, they include Cambodian and Chinese Nung mercenaries. All are recruited, trained and paid by the CIA. In two days of planning the Vinh Hoa force grew to include about 49 PRUs, about 30 Vietnamese special combat police and a handful of interrogators from the Police Special Branch, Census-Grievance men and psychological warfare cadre. The Americans taking part in the operation were two civilian PRU advisers, two civilian advisers to the special police, two young Army officers working in Don Nhon District and several radio operators. Two companies of the 9th Division, about 110 men, were to form a cordon around the village to prevent Vietcong escapes.

THE LAST MEETING

Final plans were coordinated at the Tactical Operations Center of Kien Hoa province (which includes Don Nhon) the night before the strike, with more than a dozen Americans and Vietnamese attending or within earshot. The size of the meeting troubled CIA men. They worried, justifiably as it turned out, that confusion and intelligence leaks would follow.

At 7 a.m. the next morning, the operation force is waiting for its helicopter transport at the airfield at Ben Tre, the Kien Hoa provincial capital. And waiting. It turns out that the 9th Division is having difficulty arranging its "air assets." An outpost under siege in a neighboring province has to be aided.

The civilian U.S. advisers begin to get restless and irritable; "The U.S. Army is more trouble than it's worth . . . all their maps and charts and crap . . . goddamned army must have schools that teach delay and confusion . . . never seen a 9th Division operation go off on time. . . ."

One adviser spots a plane to the west circling roughly over the area of the target village. Fluttering from it are thousands of propaganda leaflets. He explodes: "Great. Just great. The army is really good at this crap. Pick up a paper and read all about it. Read about the operation that's coming in to get you."

The PRUs and Vietnamese special combat police are wearing a wild variety of jungle fatigues, flak jackets, bush hats, berets, combat boots, tennis shoes and sandals. Some are barefoot. Initially they are sitting in orderly rows along the runway. Soon they begin dispersing about the airfield.

The PRU invent a game. As a big C130 cargo plane comes in to land, they sit on the runway, then duck their heads as the plane's wings whip past just above them. "They're the toughest men in this war," says one adviser. "They join this outfit because they want action."

The American points to a small Vietnamese half-dozing on the grass. "That man used to be a VC. He got disillusioned with them, so they killed his family. He lit out for the bush. Spent two years out there alone, conducting a private vendetta against Charlie. God knows how many VC he killed. Finally he came in and joined up with PRUs. He wants to kill more VCs."

HOVERING CLOSE

Shortly after 9 a.m., two hours late, 10 helicopters arrive. The Phoenix force piles aboard and is flown for 15 minutes across flat rice land and coconut groves to the landing zone, a rice paddy less than a mile from the center of Vinh Hoa. The helicopters hover close to the ground, and the troops leap out, wading cautiously through thigh-deep mud and water toward a treeline from which they expect enemy fire.

There is no firing. At the treeline the troops are joined by the Don Nhon District U.S. advisers and the two Vietnamese informants who prompted the operation. They have been separately helicoptered to the scene. The informers, garbed in baggy U.S. Army fatigues, are to remain mystery men, for their own protection. Their heads are covered with brown cloth bags with eye and mouth holes. The two present a part comic, part frightening spectacle.

The local advisers have bad news. They say the 9th Division cordon along the southern fringe of the village didn't get into place until about 9 a.m., two hours late, leaving the Vietcong an escape route. (The 9th Division later denies any delay.) Now the informers claim not to recognize the approach being taken to the village. One American sharply questions them. Another is cursing the Vietnamese "psywar" operatives tramping along with the troops: "All we need are these goddamned guys with their leaflets. And they're wearing black pajamas. Beautiful. Now the army (the 9th Division troops) will zap 'em as VC."

LOOKING AROUND

Several of the Vietnamese special police have found an empty farmhouse, recently deserted judging by damp betel-nut stains on the floor. They are passing the time knocking holes in a water barrel. In another farmhouse, the occupant, an old lady, stares at a wall while two carefree PRUs boil eggs on her wood stove.

A lone PRU wanders along the treeline shaking his head and muttering, "VC di di, VC di di . . . (VC gone, VC gone)." The troops presently advance toward a cluster of houses nearer the village center. Spaced along the mud trails at intervals of about 10 yards are thick mud bunkers, each large enough for several men. The houses also have bunkers, inside or out Vinh Hoa, being within an allied "free strike zone," is subject to air and artillery pounding.

No booby traps materialize. The troops arrive at a substantial farmhouse with flower beds in the front yard, a manicured hedge and pillars flanking the front entrance. It is one of many prosperous homes in Vinh Hoa—surprising, since Vietcong villages usually are poorer than government-controlled towns. Isolation from major markets, high Vietcong taxes and allied bombing are among the reasons.

Behind the house some leaf wrappings are found. "The VC must have been here," an American says. "That's what they wrap field rations in." (Leaves are used by most rural Vietnamese, VC or not, to wrap food.) The occupant of the house an old man who stares at the interlopers through wire-rim spectacles, is shaking, through age, or fear, or both.

The aged Vietnamese is questioned briefly. "Bring him along," an American says sharply. "Let's move." Another adviser says. "That old man could be the top dog VC in this village. You never know." The old man totters along with the troops. He is released in mid-afternoon when one of the two informers claims him as an uncle.

INTERROGATION

At about 11 a.m., an American adviser and two special police turn up with three captives. "Found them hiding in a house," the American says. The informers inspect the captives and whisper, through an interpreter, that one is a Vietcong village guerrilla, the second a Vietcong "security section chief" and the third a non-Vietcong, perhaps a deserter from the South Vietnamese army.

The two identified as Vietcong are bound, and one of them, a narrow-shouldered bent young man with protruding teeth, is leaned against a tree trunk. Several police interrogators and PRUs gather around him and fire questions. They want to know where Vietcong weapons and ammunition are hidden.

The suspect doesn't know or won't say. Soon the questions are interspersed with yanks at his hair and sharp kicks to his head, face and groin. The prisoner sags against the tree, face bloodied.

"Americans don't want to be here for any more of this," says one U.S. adviser, moving away. "It's a nasty goddamned business." He adds, "You know, it's a whole cycle of this stuff. Last week in another village near Don Nhon the VC marched five government sympathizers into the marketplace and beat their head in with hammers. So we return it on this guy. It goes on and on."

By now the informers have gotten their bearings. They lead most of the troops along a trail to a hospital building behind a hedge of blue flowers. It is a straw-thatch structure containing eight wide plank beds separated by white plastic curtains. In one corner is a mud bunker, in another a crude case of glassware and medicine bottles, some with French and American labels. There are no patients or traces of them.

The Americans decide it is a Vietcong hospital for wounded enemy troops. "Burn it," an American adviser directs. Ignited with cigaret lighters, the hut burns readily.

In single file, the troops wind along a trail toward the center of Vinh Hoa. Since there hasn't been any firing, the possibility of an ambush is discounted. Some of the PRUs and special police are carrying food and household articles taken from the outlying farmhouses. The "psywarriors" are strewing the trail with propaganda leaflets carried in plastic bags. Some of the PRUs have ringed their helmets with garlands of flowers. The procession takes on a festive air.

Ten minutes later the column reaches the center of the village, a small cluster of houses and shops facing a square that previously contained a covered marketplace. The marketplace has been bombed out. In the center of the square is a concrete obelisk about 10 feet high—a Vietcong memorial, say the Americans, dedicated to the enemy dead. It is one target of the Phoenix strike.

The PRUs and Vietnamese special police begin searching—and sacking—the homes. They are bored, and restless, because there has been no "action." The psywarriors' plastic bags, emptied of propaganda, are commandeered for loot ranging from clothing to chickens. "Trick or treat," says an American, not really amused. In one house, some of the Vietnamese troops are having a small celebration. They have unearthed a bottle of rice wine.

A few village residents, women, children and old men, are assembled along one side of the square. They squat on their haunches in the dust. Several male captives are bound a few yards away. Against a wall, the narrow-shouldered prisoner is rocking back and forth, a trickle of blood running down his head.

Amid whirling dust, a 9th Division helicopter lands in the square. A lean U.S. lieutenant colonel in polished boots and trim uniform steps out with aides in tow. Displaying a map marked with red grease pencil, he reports the kill totals of the support troops: "Charlie Company got three KIAs (Killed in Action), Delta Company two, we got one from my chopper. . . ." All the fatalities, he says, were armed Vietcong, carrying packs. They were shot trying to flee through the cordon. "They had low-level documents on them," the colonel reports. Presently the chopper leaves.

In the middle of the square, two Americans are strapping demolition charges around the Vietcong monument. A one-minute warning is sounded. Everyone takes cover. As the charge explodes, the monument disintegrates into chunks of brick and concrete. It is exactly noon.

THE VILLAGE CHURCH

The explosion seems to galvanize the foraging troops into action. "Don't they have anything to do but loot those houses?" an American PRU adviser shouts to a Vietnamese lieutenant. "Get the men out combing the rest of this village." Two search parties move out. A third group, mostly Americans, crosses a narrow footbridge spanning a canal to investigate a church.

Crossing the bridge, the Americans spot fresh footprints on both sides of the river connected with the canal. For the moment, they pose a mystery.

The church, a Roman Catholic structure, is bolted shut at front and rear. Just as two Americans warily advance to smash a lock, the front door opens and an elderly man in white pajamas appears, smiling as though to welcome parishioners to services. The inside of the little church is newly painted and neatly scrubbed. A row of angled bullet holes along the metal-sheet roof attests to a visit from a helicopter gunship.

In the rear are a large drum and a brass gong. An American points to them and questions the elderly church attendant.

"What are they for?"

"To call the faithful to worship."

"Did you see any people leaving the village this morning?"

"No. . . ."

"We have information on how much this church pays to the VC in taxes. How much do you say it pays?"

"Maybe the people pay 100 or 200 piasters (80 cents to $1.60)."

"The church, how much does it pay?"

"The church does not pay taxes. The church never pays taxes."

"The hell it doesn't pay," the American says. "This may be a Catholic church, but it's Charlie's Catholic church."

A TACITURN LADY

The Americans follow a path past the church to a cluster of solidly built homes. Most are empty. In one, two candles burn before a postcard picture of Christ. In another, a picture of Pope Paul sits on a small altar beside a mud bunker. One house is occupied by a woman with six children. She is interrogated.

"Did you see people crossing the river this morning?"

"No, I was in my bunker."

"Where is your husband?"

"He went to the market at Cai Mang."

"Why?"

"He always goes when the soldiers come here. . . ."

"Do you know who are the VC in this village?"

"No. We don't know VC. We are Catholic. Catholics don't know VC."

"We know that a Liberation Committee was elected here. When?"

"I just heard about it recently."

"Who is the Vietcong village chief here?"

"I don't know. . . ."

"How much tax do you pay to the VC?"

"More than 1,000 piasters." (About $8.)

"How often do Vietcong song and dance (propaganda) teams come and visit?"

"Not often."

"What do they say?"

"They say the Americans will go home soon."

"How often does your husband stand guard for the VC?"

"Every five or six days."

"How often do the women here have to make punji stakes (poisoned stakes) for the VC?"

"Once or twice a year."

"That's pretty typical," says the American, heading back across the footbridge to the village square.

DISAPPEARING ENEMY

An American adviser has figured out the footprints on both sides of the river. There are no sampans around the village. Adult males, except for old men, seem almost nonexistent. The village population is estimated at 2,000, but no more than 200 persons have been seen on this day.

The American finds a youngster hiding in a farmhouse. He poses a few perfunctory questions, then suddenly demands: "At what time this morning did all the people leave here by boat?" Perhaps startled by the suddenness of the query, the boy replies, "At four o'clock."

The conclusion: Most of the village's Vietcong guerrillas, VCI cadre and Liberation Committee members have eluded the Phoenix troops. "They just had to have that big meeting last night," fumes an American adviser, recalling the last planning session for the operation. "Everyone had to get in on this goddamned operation. The VC must have known all about it by midnight last night. So they blew the place. Just sailed down the river on their sampans."

But there may be something to salvage from the operation. In the square, the the group of squatting villagers has grown to 50 or 60. Census-Grievance operatives examine their identification cards. Few have them; in Vietcong controlled areas, the enemy forbids the people to carry government ID cards and often punishes those who do.

The two informers, still with bags on their heads, stand behind a nearby wall, peering at the villagers. Occasionally they point to a resident and whisper to a PRU. Those put under suspicion are pulled to their feet, bound and taken aside to the prisoner group. The others remain on their haunches staring silently into the dust.

THE MOVING FINGER

One villager "fingered" by the informers is a bowlegged woman clutching a baby. She is identified as a member of the village "women-farmer association," a Vietcong citizen-involvement organization not normally considered important enough to classify as Vietcong cadre. ("No point picking them up," a U.S. official says later in Saigon. "They're more trouble than they're worth to process and hold.")

But the woman is moved to the prisoner group, clutching the baby. Her two other children, a boy about six and a girl about 10 years old, begin to cry loudly.

A PRU raises a rifle butt over their heads menacingly, and the wails subside into muffled sobs.

From behind a nearby house two shots are heard. The narrow-shouldered prisoner has been executed. His body is dumped into a bunker.

One of the psywar operatives lectures the villagers on the perils of supporting the Vietcong and outlines the benefits of backing the Saigon government. Propaganda sheets bearing a smiling portrait of President Nguyen Van Thieu are handed out.

At one side of the square an American adviser muses about the operation and what it has to do with the war: "There are 30 people sitting around a table in Paris, and they just aren't going to hack it. How can they solve this thing? The people in this village have been VC for 10 years, maybe 20. How are you going to change that? We come here on an operation, and what does it prove? We've got some crook sitting in Don Nhon picking up a salary every month because he claims to be the government village chief here. He hasn't dared to visit this village for seven years. The district chief was too chicken to come on this operation. So we come in, pick up a few Charlies and leave. The VC will be back in control here tonight. . . ."

HEADING BACK

At 3 p.m., with five prisoners in tow, the troops start hiking back to the landing zone in the rice paddy for transportation home. Near the paddy they meet two U.S. soldiers from the 9th Division cordon, leading two prisoners. Each of the captives wears a neatly printed "Detainee Card."

The taller and more talkative of the two informers is brought forward to examine the new prisoners. One is identified as a deputy Vietcong village chief, the other as a non-Vietcong. Both are placed with the other prisoners.

A deputy Vietcong village chief would be the most important captive of the day by far, the others being low-level cadre at best. "Hey, we got us a big one," says an elated American adviser, who then cautions nearby PRUs: "You keep this one alive, you hear. We want him alive."

Half an hour later the troops have been helicoptered back to their compound in Ben Tre, and the prisoners are on their way to the Police Special Branch interrogation center. Results of the operation: Eight kills, one after torture. Seven prisoners taken for interrogation. One war memorial dynamited. One hospital burned. No friendly casualties.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1968]

THE INVISIBLE FOE: NEW INTELLIGENCE PUSH ATTEMPTS TO WIPE OUT VIETCONG UNDERGROUND—ELITE FORCES WORK TO BREAK THE ENEMY "INFRASTRUCTURE" BY ELIMINATING LEADERS—NIGHT RAIDS SET UP BY CIA

(By Peter R. Kann)

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SAIGON.—An American official boasts that he duped a rural Vietcong group into assassinating one of its own key agents by elaborately sowing rumors in VC circles that the man was a double agent working for the allies.

In a province near the Cambodian border, allied intelligence discloses the planned time and location of a VC district finance committee meeting. Sweeping into the gathering, a special combat police unit captures six VC tax officials.

In a Mekong Delta province, U.S. officials learn that funeral rites are planned for a senior VC official. An allied "counter-terror" team raids the funeral and kills many of the VC agents present.

Can the visible and legal government of South Vietnam root out the "invisible" government, the clandestine, 80,000-member Vietcong "infrastructure"? A new effort is under way to do so. There is general agreement here that the outcome of the struggle will be crucial to the future of the nation.

WORKING QUIETLY

Officially described by U.S. authorities as the "political and administrative organization through which the Vietcong control or seek control over the South Vietnamese people," the infrastructure, or VCI, is an efficient, largely covert organization with decades of experience in moving among the people. Taking

advantage of family relationships and the weak grip of the established government in remote areas, it conducts espionage, wields terror, infiltrates allied organizations, collects taxes, disseminates propaganda and recruits natives for its cause.

For years allied agencies and programs have sought to root out the VCI, with meager success. Now the U.S. and the Vietnamese government are mounting another high-priority program to coordinate their agencies and accomplish that task. Called Phung Hoang (All-Seeing Bird) in Vietnamese, the program is known to Americans as Phoenix.

After an abortive beginning, Phoenix is beginning to register some successes, despite disinterest among some Vietnamese officials, political infighting and skepticism among U.S. aides. "It's a good program," says one informed source, "but we should have started it six years ago." One observer compares the program to "trying to root the Republican party out of Kansas."

The effort is imperative, however. If the Paris peace talks produce a cease-fire, it is unlikely that VCI activities could be turned off with the same ease as conventional military action. The VCI might continue as a covert political apparatus, even if the Vietcong won a role in a new government.

GETTING TOGETHER

U.S. intelligence officials define Phoenix as "a systematic effort at intelligence coordination and exploitation." Before Phoenix, they found that in one district 11 networks of allied intelligence agents were operating independently. Some observers suggested that the district contained more paid informers and agents for the allied side than there were VC regulars to spy on.

The Vietnamese government's three major intelligence agencies—Police Special Branch, Military Security Service and Army Intelligence—all were at work in the district, and not productively. Competing agencies regularly arrested one another's agents, accidentally or because of political rivalries.

Phoenix works to pool the resources and information of the various agencies, with joint intelligence committees at the province level and also down at the district level. American advisers, including Central Intelligence Agency men, participate in the effort to sift information from agents, informers, prisoners and other sources. "Exploitation" is accomplished by military or paramilitary units that make secret, small-unit missions into contested or Vietcong-controlled areas, usually at night.

These units prefer to capture an identified VCI agent, since he may yield further information, but if that is impractical, the target is assassinated, sometimes brutally as an object lesson to others. "It's a systematic, sophisticated application of force," says one American adviser in the field. In big cities and other government-controlled areas, however, the program may involve a simple arrest rather than a kidnapping or assassination.

What happened to previous "counter-infrastructure" programs? Combined with various "pacification" efforts, they were pushed into the background as the overt military conflict escalated and the "other war" effort languished. Moreover, pacification is a catchall program; the complex task of tracking down VCI cadre didn't mesh well with agricultural aid and school-building.

A U.S. field official (who belatedly discovered that his cook was a VC agent) points out a perennial problem. "Face it," he says, "we really can't tell who is VCI and who isn't. The GVN (Government of Vietnam) has to do this job." Some U.S. officials believe that Vietnamese leaders still don't realize the importance of coming to grips with the VCI—or that they despair of destroying it.

THE YANKS ARE FOR IT

The Phoenix program seems to have stirred much less enthusiasm among the Vietnamese than the Americans. It apparently has had top priority with U.S. aides since last fall, but only two months ago did the Vietnamese government give it similar priority. "For months we were sending plans, advisers, filing cabinets, safes—you name it—out to the provinces and districts," recalls one U.S. field source. "It was an American program, not a GVN effort."

Even with top-level Vietnamese backing, the program still faces political, tactical and technical problems. But some successes are being reported. In one province near Saigon, pooling of intelligence in the past two months has produced the capture or assassination of six members of the VC province committee, three VC district chiefs, nine other VC district officials and 31 village or hamlet cadre. Trained cadre, particularly senior ones at the province level, are difficult for the VC to replace.

In a province north of Saigon, Phoenix is credited with 145 VCI captives and casualties in June. Earlier this year, when the program hadn't gained momentum, the usual toll was about 20 a month.

In one province near the Demilitarized Zone, Phoenix is reported to have been so successful that the enemy has had to replace local VCI cadre with North Vietnamese; the agents from the North necessarily would have less rapport with the natives than their native-born predecessors. In another northern province of South Vietnam, the VC are said to have formed a special committee to try to rebuild their shattered apparatus.

Nationally, some 6,000 VCI cadre have been captured or killed since the Tet holiday in February, according to allied sources. Still, says one informed source, "We're kidding ourselves if we think we've hurt them much yet."

Indeed, in many provinces Phoenix remains largely a paper project. In one central highlands province, there are two provincial intelligence committees, neither one of them functioning. The program is paralyzed by competition between the province chief, and the province police chief.

At the district level in the same province, the situation is no better. "We have three DIOCs (District Intelligence and Operations Centers) in the province," says one source. "One shows signs of promise. One is headed by an incompetent. The third is headed by a suspected VC."

Mutual distrust among intelligence agencies remains a problem. "Partly it's endemic among intelligence agencies in any country," says one American source. "Intelligence agencies are by nature exclusive. They don't want to reveal their sources. We have the problem, too." In Vietnam, the problem is compounded by personal, political rivalries and the conspiratorial nature of Vietnamese.

KEEPING IT FROM THE ENEMY

Also, the Vietcong have been skillful at permeating many of the government's intelligence agencies. Thus, while American agencies seek to have the government share its secrets, it is questionable if the Americans share their own best information.

Another difficulty: Vietnamese intelligence agencies traditionally have been instruments of internal military and political intrigue, particularly in the days when the late President Diem's brother-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu, headed the police apparatus. But Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the national police until he was wounded a few months ago, also was a master intriguer. Political involvements don't make for efficient intelligence work.

Because of incompetence or indifference among many regular Vietnamese military units in carrying out "exploitation" missions, U.S. advisers recently have been relying on "PRUs" (Provincial Reconnaissance Units) of 18 men each to make strikes on VCI targets.

The PRUs are more American than Vietnamese. Chosen, trained, paid and operated by the CIA, they are highly trained mercenaries, often selected from Vietnam's minority groups, such as Chinese Nungs and Cambodians, or from Vietcong agents who have defected. Their operations often are led by elite U.S. Navy "Seal" commandos assigned to the CIA.

The PRUs have been an effective strike force, but the most logical exploitation force would be native units such as Popular Force troops—platoon-sized groups recruited and employed at the village level. These troops know their localities and often know the identities of VCI agents. But the PF troops long have been the most poorly trained, equipped and led Vietnamese units. And many district officials, envisaging harsh VC reprisals to exploitation strikes, would just as soon have the strikes made by outside forces like the PRUs.

Indeed, some veteran U.S. officals fault the American effort for naively failing to take local complexities into account. Many U.S. advisers are youthful Army lieutenants or captains, and others also lack experience. One arriving colonel, having received a long briefing on the "counter-infrastructure program," is said to have asked, "Where is this structure, anyway?"

Some officials in the field complain of demands from Saigon for numerical results ("How many VCI did you kill this month?"). They argue that the pressure for "results" leads to strikes against low-level VCI rather than the key, elusive officials in the enemy apparatus. However, a senior official in Saigon says, "We are interested in quality, not quantity. We want the hard-core cadre."

A few veteran officials complain that the counter-infrastructure effort isn't being pursued with enough subtlety. Rather than capturing or killing VCI cadre, they say, Phoenix should focus on the use of secret agents to infiltrate VCI cells and turn them against one another. Some success has been reported in such enterprises.

Another source suggests that to root out the VCI the allies will have to develop their own clandestine "counter-infrastructure"—a permanent presence rivaling and eventually overcoming that of the VC in contested and VC-controlled areas.

EFFECT OF CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM ON SOLDIERS

The CHAIRMAN. I won't pursue it. I am going to have to yield now. But there was an extremely interesting case the other day of a young man, very obviously a very fine soldier and a highly regarded psychiatrist, discussing this in a completely different context, which was: What can be done for the soldiers who go through these experiences, who are exposed to these indescribable conditions of provocation? What can be done to help them? The discussion occurred before a veterans committee and in a different context, but it was very impressive. It raises extremely serious questions about our being able to cope with the conditions, our being able to build a good society using these means because I don't believe you can build a good society and an exemplary one using means such as have been described in article after article.

Mr. COLBY. I hasten to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am referring to the Phoenix program. I am not extending my comments to all the other programs that exist out there.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

It is just part of it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, I have other questions but I have to yield to you. I feel ashamed to delay you so long because you paid a compliment to the committee and the witness to come back especially to ask some questions.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are most generous and I feel that I should let you go on indefinitely because of your infinite superiority in interrogation in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I was not invited to do that.

EDUCATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator CASE. There are two or three things I would like to ask you about. I too apologize for keeping you so late.

On the overall question of our objective, of how we are getting along, what is the situation in education, which I take it is part of your interest?

Mr. COLBY. It is only a small degree. That really is Mr. MacDonald's primary responsibility, Senator.

Senator CASE. All right.

Then I will not press you too hard here.

Mr. COLBY. I can give you a few general answers.

Senator CASE. I would like to have perhaps your general overview of what a young Vietnamese, a peasant or a city boy, or girl, can expect? Will he get a grade school education as a matter of course? Is he likely to get in fact, as opposed to what the official program may be, a high school education? What are his chances of getting into a university, if he comes from humble parents? How much is class rigidity still existing? Can he get into the Army as an officer, as an officer candidate?

Mr. Colby. I can give you a few general answers to that, Senator.

In the first place, the Vietnamese have a high respect for education and a high desire to benefit from it. This comes in part perhaps from their Confucian tradition. As a result there are a vast number of elementary schools in this country. Some of them were built under our programs and some built by local people. There is a considerable effort made to produce teachers for those elementary schools. In addition there are many cases in which local military or the RD cadre, the political organizers, actually teach in the schools.

As a result, I believe the current statistic, and Mr. MacDonald can confirm this, I believe, is that something like 90 percent of the young people go to elementary schools, the first few years of school. Then it gets a little harder.

Senator Case. When you say first few years, you mean up to the fourth grade?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Case. Eighty percent of all people.

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, of the children.

Senator Case. Eighty percent in the country or in the city?

Mr. Colby. Well, a lot of them are in the city actually, where things are crowded and they don't have adequate schools. Saigon for instance, has a lower ratio than some of the other areas. On the secondary level it gets a little harder.

Now, the current program is to put a secondary school in each district. Ten, 15 years ago there was probably a secondary school only in the province capital. This has been increasingly developed in many areas. Many of the local areas used their local funds in this development program this past year to develop secondary schools. So that you have a fairly significant percentage, I don't know the specifics of it.

Senator Case. Secondary schools would be anything over the third grade?

Mr. Colby. Yes. Over the fifth grade.

Senator Case. Up to where?

Mr. Colby. The first 5 years is primary, but you don't get the 80 percent through all 5 of the years.

Senator Case. All 5 of the first years?

Mr. Colby. Just 80 percent of the first 2 or 3.

Senator Case. Some drop out?

Mr. Colby. It is a little country school, a one room school, just teaching a little reading, writing, arithmetic.

Senator Case. Do the first 5 years give them reading, writing and——

Mr. Colby. Yes, there is a very high degree of literacy in the country.

There are an additional number of secondary schools being built and staffed in many of the districts. As a matter of fact, a very substantial number of the secondary schools in existence are private schools. Some of these are religous oriented, some of them are ethnic oriented. The Chinese, for instance, will frequently have secondary schools. There are five universities in the country. Two new ones have been established in the past few years: Can Tho and the Buddhist University in Saigon.

CLASS ORIGIN IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE UNIVERSITIES

There are about 25,000 to 30,000 students in the University of Saigon. Here it is true, I think, Senator, that the class origin is still with us. It is only on very rare occasions that a country boy unless he is a member of the notables of the community, will go on to the University.

Senator CASE. Who decides that?

Mr. COLBY. He won't be able to maintain the educational effort. This is a problem. The new Minister of Education is particularly concerned about making some reforms in the structure so that it works.

Senator CASE. This has been a long while now. We have been at this for 12, 15 years and there hasn't been any change yet.

Mr. COLBY. Well, there has been some change made but not enough. It is still a problem, let's face it.

Senator CASE. Why hasn't it been changed?

Mr. COLBY. Your schools fill up with qualified students who come from other areas, and in competition the fellow from the country school doesn't get in.

Senator CASE. But it isn't just because he is not qualified.

Mr. COLBY. Or trained. I think I had better not go any further.

Senator CASE. I really want facts.

CLASS STRUCTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY

Mr. COLBY. I know it. I really should not go any further in this, Senator, because I am really not your best witness. One thing I would like to add though, is that the military—you spoke about the officers in the army——

Senator CASE. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. The major requirement for an officer is that he have what is called a second "bac," that he be a graduate from a junior college.

Senator CASE. That is——

Mr. COLBY. That is what it amounts to in our country.

Senator CASE. And that limits it?

Mr. COLBY. It effectively limits it, except that there are provisions for the promotion of people from the ranks. There is a provision for the possible promotion of a qualified NCO to officer status even if he does not pass the literacy test, the educational test.

Senator CASE. Have we any statistics as to how often those provisions have been exercised?

Mr. COLBY. I think there were something like 300 last year, as I remember it.

(The following information was later supplied.)

There were 293 NCOs promoted to officers last year in the Regular Forces. However, if Regional Forces are added in, the figure is increased by 156 to a total of 449.

Senator CASE. 300 who in effect became officers, NCO's who otherwise would not?

Mr. COLBY. That is right.

Senator CASE. Is that a change over the previous situation?

Mr. COLBY. It is some change, not a great change.

Senator CASE. Actually, their need for officers in the military establishments totaling some million is what?

Mr. COLBY. It is a very great need. They have been sending a great number through the officer candidate school but with the educational qualifications.

Senator CASE. With the educational qualifications, so that by and large it is still very strongly a very rigid class structure.

Mr. COLBY. Yes; it is still a great problem. It is opening up a bit but not wide.

Senator CASE. How about NCO's?

Mr. COLBY. NCO's, no. They are pretty open as to who becomes an NCO. That is a quality situation.

Senator CASE. What about job opportunities?

Mr. COLBY. Pardon me.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION

Senator CASE. Perhaps before we get into the question of job opportunities you might give me a little picture of what Vietnam consists of. There are how many people, 18 million?

Mr. COLBY. 17 million people, Senator. Almost 40 percent live in cities now. That is a 100 percent change. There were about 20 percent 10 years ago.

Senator CASE. Let's take the 60 percent first.

Mr. COLBY. Sixty percent are primarily rice growing. There are a total of six million people living in the Delta, for instance.

Senator CASE. That is men, women and children?

Mr. COLBY. Men, women and children. Your average age is quite low, I can't give you the number.

Senator CASE. You mean the death rate, you mean death occurs earlier?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, there are diseases and various things.

Senator CASE. What is the average. I have seen some very old people but they are undoubtedly the exception.

Mr. COLBY. Not very many. You are respected for you age in your 50s.

Senator CASE. Sixty percent of the people are rural?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator CASE. And this means really rural, doesn't it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator CASE. They are farmers?

Mr. COLBY. Farmers and fishermen.

Senator CASE. Workers in the field, farmers, fishermen. Timber?

Mr. COLBY. Some, not very much nowadays, because the forests are pretty dangerous. There used to be rubber plantations to some extent.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURE

Senator CASE. Most of these people in agriculture work for themselves?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, the ownership of land over the years has gone through some changes. Under the French times there were some big plantations. These were eliminated at the end of the French time and the land was divided up. During the war years it was further divided

up. A lot of the rural land today is still deserted. Some of it is being reentered as people go back out into the countryside.

Some of the people in the countryside are turning to new kinds of crops. Vegetable crops, proteins, pigs, chickens, that sort of thing are coming up very substantially in the past few years.

Senator CASE. But for the most part, the Vietnamese farmer or peasant——

Mr. COLBY. Is a rice farmer.

Senator CASE. Is an entrepreneur, he works for himself?

Mr. COLBY. Or he is a tenant of someone who owns the land who may live in the village.

Senator CASE. Even as a tenant, though, he works for himself still and pays, either divides his produce or pays a money rent of some sort?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator CASE. How does he get his stuff to market?

Mr. COLBY. There are rice merchants and rice mills in many villages. Most villages in the Delta have a rice mill or two. Frequently this rice mill is owned by a gentleman of Chinese extraction and he operates as the local bank and credit source. He buys the crop and mills it and arranges to have it shipped to a center where it is gathered and then it all goes up to Saigon. This goes up to Saigon either by road, by trucks or by——

Senator CASE. Does he take the loss then when taxes are levied by the Vietcong? Does he take the loss or the farmer?

Mr. COLBY. Well, the farmer takes the loss and the merchant takes a loss, both, and the consumer. Of course the price goes up.

Senator CASE. Because the prices are higher?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

PROGRESS TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN AGRICULTURE

Senator CASE. Is Vietnam sufficiently self-sufficient in basic agricultural requirements?

Mr. COLBY. It should be. It isn't now, Senator. It used to be a net exporter.

Senator CASE. What is it now?

Mr. COLBY. It used to be a substantial net exporter. This year they expect to be 150,000 or 200,000 tons short.

Senator CASE. Of what?

Mr. COLBY. Of self-sufficiency.

Senator CASE. Of what requirements?

Mr. COLBY. Of a little over 5 million tons.

Senator CASE. You mean about 25 percent short?

Mr. COLBY. They expect to reach self-sufficiency by the end of this calendar year in rice.

Senator CASE. In rice. Is there any other basic or staple that is a measure of self-sufficiency?

Mr. COLBY. Not particularly. Rubber used to be one of their major exports.

Senator CASE. That is an export? I am talking about things they consume themselves.

Mr. COLBY. Well, there is considerable fishing. There are local proteins like ducks and chickens and pigs.

Senator CASE. They don't have to import; at least your expectation at the end of this year that they will not be importing a substantial amount of food.

Mr. COLBY. They will be importing some food, but they will be self-sufficient in rice.

Senator CASE. What foods will they have to import?

Mr. COLBY. Well, milk. Condensed milk is a great import. We actually export a considerable amount of milk over there.

Senator CASE. Is this different from the old days? Did they always import milk?

Mr. COLBY. They always imported milk, but they used to do it from France.

Senator CASE. This is not a change, I am sorry.

Mr. COLBY. They used to do it from France. Now, they import from the United States.

Senator CASE. So that the country is getting to be self-sufficient so far as its agriculture is concerned?

OFFSHORE FISHING

Mr. COLBY. Yes, there is a great drive on for it. The new potential is in fishing. There is apparently a considerable potential in fishing offshore, sea fishing. It is warm water and the fish——

Senator CASE. Is this something new?

Mr. COLBY. It has been there for years but the normal fishing has been very limited in the first place because the boats have been very small—it is just sort of offshore fishing—and, secondly, during the war years they have been restricted from going out. The Government has been opening up the fishing restrictions to allow people to fish in areas where this hadn't been allowed. But the next stage is to develop enough refrigeration and similar preservation capabilities so that the fishing boats can go out further, stay longer, get a bigger catch and come back in. They are beginning to do this.

MILITARY SERVICE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FARMERS

Senator CASE. Now, a lot of the people who are in your 60 percent in agriculture are in the military or paramilitary forces, aren't they?

Mr. COLBY. Their families certainly are, it has to be. As a matter of fact, driving around the Delta the other day I really did notice there are not very many men in the fields. The women are doing most of the reaping of rice this fall.

Senator CASE. And the men are just——

Mr. COLBY. The men are out in the service some place.

Senator CASE. Standing around or sitting around?

Mr. COLBY. Well, they are off some place.

Senator CASE. Is this different from old days?

Mr. COLBY. In the military.

Senator CASE. Did the men used to work?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

When you had a smaller army they lived on the farms. Their families still live there.

Senator CASE. Yes. But did the men do the work or the women?

Mr. COLBY. Well, both, the men did work also.

Senator Case. Not only the women?

Mr. Colby. In other words, it isn't a change of custom. The men are off in the services.

Senator Case. Yes.

Mr. Colby. And consequently the women are doing the reaping, not entirely but some.

Senator Case. Do the men like this?

Mr. Colby. No, the men would like to go home.

Senator Case. How much do they get paid in the popular forces?

Mr. Colby. In the popular forces they get about $40 a month.

EARNINGS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FARMER

Senator Case. That is ten times more than they ever made on the farm, isn't it?

Mr. Colby. Oh, no, some of these farms do pretty well, Senator.

Senator Case. Give me some figures.

Mr. Colby. A Vietnamese farm, is quite productive down in the Delta. This is not true of the northern part of South Vietnam. It is very crowded and it is a little tough there.

Senator Case. You don't mean crowded.

Mr. Colby. Yes, crowded, in the four or five provinces along the sea—Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam and so forth—you can get fairly high population densities.

Senator Case. Living in very poor soil relatively?

Mr. Colby. Not very good soil, that is right.

Senator Case. But still in agriculture?

Mr. Colby. Still in agriculture, yes, and now going back to agriculture.

There are a lot of those areas where there was heavy fighting and now the people are going back to resume life in their old fields.

Senator Case. You will give me a figure of how much the farmer did make?

Mr. Colby. Pay and allowance for a year for a popular forces soldier is $480; it is $40 a month more or less.

Senator Case. What would he make as a farmer?

Mr. Colby. It depends, of course, but a bare-footed farmer down in Mr. Vann's area can sometimes pull out of his back pocket a big roll and buy a new tractor or a new rototiller, a new gadget for the farm.

Senator Case. Which would cost several thousand dollars?

Mr. Colby. Well, at least several hundred dollars. Let's say several hundreds of dollars.

The Delta is quite a rich area and, as they get irrigation under control, get their fertilizer moving, they are beginning to get two crops in some areas. This doubles the income.

REDUCTION IN PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO FARM

Senator Case. Now, 60 percent of the people still farm. This is changing, I take it.

Mr. Colby. This has been a change. It used to be 80 percent.

Senator Case. This necessarily might not have changed if we had not been there. But is it changing to a smaller percentage of the people?

Mr. Colby. Yes, that has been the change. It used to be 80 percent. Now it is 60 percent and it probably will go down. It won't go down as fast in the future, but it will go down. Recently you have had these 480,000 people move back to their villages, back into areas that were empty.

Senator Case. But mechanization and things like that have happened?

Mr. Colby. Yes, the natural urban trend.

Senator Case. The same things that have happened everywhere are reducing the number of percentage of people on the farms?

Mr. Colby. Right.

The Chairman. Defoliation reduced the number too; didn't it?

Senator Case. Perhaps he can answer.

Mr. Colby. No, not effectively, Mr. Chairman. The defoliation is fairly carefully utilized and I don't think the defoliation has reduced the population in the farms particularly. It is given some problems here and there put in terms of net impact on population I would say no.

Senator Case. Now, so they come to the cities, and——

Mr. Colby. This is a problem, Senator.

Senator Case. It is a problem, of course. It would be a problem whether we were there or not or whether there was a war there or not.

Mr. Colby. But even a greater problem because we are there.

Senator Case. But an even greater problem because there is a war.

Mr. Colby. Right.

Senator Case. I suppose many of the things that have happened over there have made irreversible changes in Vietnam, customs and aspirations, family life?

Mr. Colby. Sure.

Senator Case. And society and everything.

Mr. Colby. Well, some of them we haven't caused; they have just happened. I mean the Honda, for instance. The farmer used to live in his village and never went anywhere else. Now his son—not the farmer but his son—goes up to the province capital on the Honda. Maybe he goes to high school up there, that sort of thing. There are a lot of changes happening in that sense.

He has a television set in a little village out in the Delta.

OCCUPATION OF CITY POPULATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Case. They come to the city and then how many people in the cities, of the 40 percent, how are they occupied?

Mr. Colby. Mostly commerce of some sort: buying and selling, exchanging things. There is very little basic industry or heavy industry. It is services and that sort of thing.

Senator Case. What percentage are in private employment and what percentage are not, roughly?

Mr. Colby. I don't think I can give you an answer to that offhand, Senator. Wait a minute, I do have it. Three and a half million out of 14 million are laborers in trade, manufacturing or service industries.

Senator Case. Three and a half million out of 14 million are in labor or services?

Mr. Colby. I am not sure of this figure because it says military service 248,000; I know that is wrong.

Senator CASE. That isn't meant to include those in the military, I suppose. Is it, or is it just people in the service industries for the military?

Mr. COLBY. I would rather not use this.

Senator CASE. What I am trying to get at really is just a very general picture of what——

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EMPLOYED BY GOVERNMENT

Mr. COLBY. Well, a certain number of your people work for the government. You have your million in the armed forces, call it.

Senator CASE. How many others are on the civil list?

Mr. COLBY. There are a couple of hundred thousand. If you add up the bureaucrats, the teachers and that sort of thing you have a couple of hundred thousand.

Senator CASE. That is in the whole country?

Mr. COLBY. Whole country.

Senator CASE. And local level?

Mr. COLBY. Local elected officials would be in addition to that but I am talking about the people who work in the bureaucracy.

Senator CASE. But civil service.

Mr. COLBY. Something of that nature.

Senator CASE. A couple of hundred thousand.

Mr. COLBY. I think so, yes, sir. It is a figure that we have been using.

Senator CASE. And most of the rest who are not in agriculture are in one or another form of service job, is that a fair statement?

Mr. COLBY. Service jobs, yes. We are dealing with a total population of 18 million. You have within that those under 18 that would not be included. Almost half of the population are under 18 —maybe not quite that.

Senator CASE. Yes, and the figure 200,000 in the government, I suppose, represents families in which there may be five times that number of people who are dependents.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, they have large families.

Senator CASE. So that maybe a million of the 40 percent are involved or supported by the government in civil jobs.

Mr. COLBY. Right.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES

Senator CASE. Now, the service industries, I suppose, take in both those of white collar and those of blue collar? You have banks and insurance; you have a government lottery, I suppose?

Mr. COLBY. You have a lot of markets. There is a government lottery. You have markets; you have market places; you have small commerce. There is a great entrepreneurial sense among the Vietnamese.

Senator CASE. They are not really making anything.

Mr. COLBY. They are not making very much.

Senator CASE. They are not making anything; they are not producing anything.

Mr. COLBY. They are not making very much. It is just service.

Senator CASE. They are just passing the money around among the city people. It is a fair statement.

Mr. COLBY. There are light industries, light businesses.

Senator CASE. Yes, but not large.

Mr. COLBY. There are some, but they are not producing for export.

Senator CASE. And not making much that raises the standard of living to any substantial degree?

Mr. COLBY. Not a great deal, no.

Senator CASE. Now, we are getting to the point——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator yields, unfortunately I didn't realize how long we would go on. I wouldn't mind his going ahead if he would excuse me. We are going to have these gentlemen back all this week. This isn't the only meeting.

Senator CASE. I agree completely and I think I ought to stop. It is just when you have people who are altogether——

The CHAIRMAN. They will be here tomorrow. You can go ahead. I didn't anticipate we would run so late. I have to leave.

Senator CASE. I think I should like not to, I certainly don't want to keep you hungry any longer.

The CHAIRMAN. You can go ahead.

Senator CASE. Would it be fair enough in 5 minutes I will knock it off?

The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to make a short announcement before I leave. I have to leave at 2 o'clock.

Senator CASE. I just want to lead into this question, Mr. Chairman, and then maybe I can pick it up at whatever time is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know, they will be here tomorrow and the next day and we go into the matter of aid and those programs there are different; they will be coming up, too.

SOCIETY DEVELOPING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator CASE. What I am trying to get at is a kind of a picture of the society that is developing there and the extent to which anything useful is being done by the Vietnamese Government in education and in training for jobs, in improving the standard of living over there and the rest of it which can give any kind of affirmative appeal to this or any other government that they might have to the people as a whole. That is all I wanted.

Mr. COLBY. There is a considerable increase in skills coming out of this war, Senator, in terms of what the people learn in the military services, what they learn from our contractors, what they learn from various services that they have been involved in.

For instance the returnees are offered a chance to learn a trade. This kind of thing does exist. There is considerable increase of this kind of skill that is developing.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I think it is only proper that my part of this should be put over until tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. You may pursue anything you would like.

Mr. COLBY. I would be glad to answer your questions.

Senator CASE. I understand.

Mr. COLBY. I would like to note this is really mostly in Mr. MacDonald's field of expertise rather than in my own; in our USAID director's field rather than in mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Colby; you have been very patient.

WITNESS SCHEDULE FOR NEXT HEARING

The committee will meet again at 10 o'clock tomorrow to hear testimony from CORDS representatives of the CORDS province and district level. It is anticipated that Mr. John Vann who is the deputy for CORDS, who has been there for a very long time, with whom the staff is well acquainted and who is spoken of very highly, Mr. Hawthorne Mills, and Major James Arthur will be the principal witnesses. Of course, questions may arise involving others, but that is the plan for tomorrow.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I am sorry to have imposed on you for so long.

(Whereupon at 2 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene, Wednesday, February 18, 1970, at 10 a.m.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Javits.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations is continuing today its hearings on the CORDS program. Our first witness scheduled today was Mr. John Paul Vann, Deputy for CORDS to the Commanding General of the Delta Military Assistance Command, but Mr. Colby, who was our main witness yesterday, would like to say a few preliminary words, so we actually will start with him. Then, following Mr. Vann, we will hear testimony by Mr. Hawthorne Mills, a Foreign Service officer now serving as a province senior adviser in Vietnam, and by Maj. James F. Arthur of the U.S. Army now serving as a district senior adviser.

Mr. Colby, I believe you wish to make some preliminary remarks.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, DEPUTY TO GENERAL ABRAMS, COMMANDER OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS)—Resumed

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to point out to the committee, if I may, sir, the locations of the three gentlemen who will be speaking today. Mr. John Vann will speak for the whole delta area of the country, IV Corps. Mr. Hawthorne Mills will be speaking for the Province of Tuyen Duc, a mountain province in the center of South Vietnam; and Maj. James Arthur will be speaking for Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province.

Mr. Chairman, I thought I would show you an organizational chart showing how the Vietnamese Government and American advisory group work together at the various levels since this will be the focus of today's discussions.

I have a statement for the record on the organizational aspects of the CORDS program, which has been provided to your staff,

Mr. Chairman. I also have another statement for the record on the development aspect of pacification and development which has been provided to your staff.

(The statements appear at pp. 701 and 708.)

STAFF STRUCTURE OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Central Pacification and Development Council of the Vietnamese Government is the central national staff and program. The chairman of it is the President. Its membership includes all of the ministers and the chiefs of a number of the services—the Chairman of the Joint General Staff, the Director General of Police, and so forth. The Central Council has a staff of its own.

On the American side you have the Military Assistance Command of which CORDS is a part. The red lines here show the contact made at different levels with the Vietnamese Government.

The various other ministries also have contact with our American staff.

If you go down the Vietnamese chain of command, you go through the Joint General Staff to the corps level for the military. For the pacification program there is a regional pacification and development council, which constitutes the regional representatives of all the different ministries which are members of the national council.

At the corps level we have a single command structure. The commander is the senior American military officer on the American side. He has a deputy for pacification called a deputy for CORDS, who is in all cases a civilian. Mr. Vann is the representative from the corps level here today.

Below the field force commander, who is at the same time the senior adviser to that corps area, there are three subdivisions of responsibilities: The direct command of American units, the advisory relationship with the Vietnamese regular armed forces and the CORDS pacification advisory structure, which exists in the various provinces.

At the province level down below the corps there is a senior adviser. As I indicated yesterday, about half of these are civilians and about half of them are military.

Mr. Mills is our representative of this level today.

On the Vietnamese side the province chief wears two hats: the chief of his province in a civil sense and also the commander of that section in the military sense.

At the next level down, the district, we have a district senior adviser who works with the district chief and subsector commander on the Vietnamese side. Maj. James Arthur is the representative on that level.

I think, Mr. Chairman, you would be most interested in listening to Mr. Vann describe the activities of the program at the corps level.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Colby. It would appear to be a very thorough organization. I can't see any level you have left out.

Mr. COLBY. Well, it does go a little bit below the district. We will get into that another day, sir, when we discuss our mobile advisory teams. They work down to the village in some cases.

The CHAIRMAN. You prompt me to comment that I had the idea this was a very primitive country made up of villages and Buddhist monks who went about doing good. It seems to have become very

complicated. You wouldn't say that we are Americanizing it, would you?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; most of this structure existed under the French. They have some ability to create bureaucratic structures also.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. We are not the only one.

Mr. Vann, we are very pleased to have you. I believe you have been in Vietnam a very long time and I have been told by members of the staff that you probably are the best known American official in the country.

For the record, would you mind verifying that and saying a little bit about yourself and your experience before you testify?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN PAUL VANN, DEPUTY FOR CORDS, IV CORPS (DELTA REGION)

Mr. VANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BACKGROUND OF MR. VANN

With the exception of 1964, I have been in Vietnam since 1962 working as an adviser in the field.

I was over there as a military senior adviser at the corps level and then as a military senior adviser for more than a year to the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Seventh Division. In that capacity I had the responsibility for about half of the same area I now have pacification responsibility for in the advisory sense.

I returned there in 1965 as a civilian. I have been there since that time as a member of the Agency for International Development, working in the field of civilian advisory effort until 1967 and then in the combined military-civilian effort from that date until now.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you come from, Mr. Vann? Where were you born?

Mr. VANN. Sir, my home is Virginia, but after I retired from the Army in 1963, I settled in Colorado.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you attend the Academy?

Mr. VANN. No, sir; I was an enlisted man in the Army. I went through flight training in the Army Air Corps and became commissioned, and stayed in the Army from then until I retired.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. VANN. Yes, I do have one, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed with that, please.

Mr. VANN. Would you like for me to read, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please.

Mr. VANN. I am John Paul Vann, the Deputy for CORDS to the Commanding General, Delta Military Assistance Command, a subordinate organization of the Military Assistance Command/Vietnam (MACV), and one with responsibility for the U.S. advisory effort in the IV Corp Tactical Zone (CTZ).

DESCRIPTION OF IV CORP TACTICAL ZONE (DELTA)

The IV Corp Tactical Zone, also known as the delta, encompasses an area of 14,240 square miles extending south and west of Saigon, a

distance of approximately 180 miles to the Camau Peninsula, and being approximately 185 miles at its widest point on the east-west axis. The 16 provinces are politically subdivided into 96 districts and these districts in turn into 725 villages and 4,205 hamlets. The major industry is farming and the delta produces about 80 percent of all rice grown in South Vietnam. Additionally, it is the major producer of fresh water fish, exporting over 30,000 tons to Saigon annually, and pork, the principal meat consumed in Vietnam. To a large extent, the 3 million people living in the Saigon/Cholon area are dependent on the delta for their food.

Although the road network in the delta is not extensive, it is one that has secure roads to all 16 of the provincial capitals and to the majority of the district capitals. I might add that since July 1969, for the first time since 1961, all provincial capitals can be reached by road with unescorted single vehicle traffic during daylight hours. The principal routes of communication in the delta, however, are the canals and waterways. There are over 2,400 miles of major waterways in the delta with the majority being secure during daylight hours.

In addition, there are approximately 23,000 miles of minor waterways.

MOST OF DELTA CIVILIAN POPULATION LIVE IN PEACE

An interesting fact about the delta is that although the GVN has a lower percentage of control of the population than in the other three corps, most of the civilian population in the delta lives in peace. I recently had an opportunity to demonstrate this to Senator Javits when he accompanied Ambassador Colby and me on a visit to refugee returnee areas, which only 6 months ago had been under Vietcong control and devoid of population. For the past 4 months there had not been a single Vietcong initiated incident in the several hamlets we visited. When looking at the delta in its entirety, we have an average of 25 enemy initiated attacks during each 24-hour period against the more than 4,000 hamlets, 3,000 outposts, and 5,000 Government installations. This means that the average target for VC activity within the delta will be hit only once in a year and a half and I might add that the majority of these attacks are just harassing in nature. Actually, of course, there are many places which have never been attacked and there are a few which may be attacked four or five times a week. An example of the latter is the Tri Ton District area of Chau Doc Province. This is an area known as the Seven Mountains area.

SECURITY SITUATION IN THE DELTA

With the move into this area last spring of two of the five North Vietnamese regiments which have been deployed south to the delta, the security has deteriorated in over 30 of the hamlets around the mountains now occupied by these North Vietnamese units. Overall, however, there has been a rather tremendous improvement in security in the delta during 1969. Well over a million additional people have been brought under Government protection during this period with progress being made in all provinces. Of interest, I believe, is the fact that pacification progress continued in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and

Go Cong Provinces, even after the departure of the U.S. 9th Division in August 1969, although the rate of progress was slower than when the U.S. division was present. Of really great significance regarding our operations in the delta is the fact that all the ground fighting there is now being done by Vietnamese forces and they have generally proved able to meet and defeat the enemy. It is to be noted, of course, that even after the departure of the U.S. ground forces, the Vietnamese forces in the delta have continued to have U.S. air, naval and advisory support. With that background on the delta, let me describe to you the CORDS mission in the CTZ level.

CORDS MISSION AT CTZ LEVEL

It is very similar to that at the MACV level from the standpoint of the functional responsibilities. At the CTZ level we have personnel providing advisory assistance to the Government of Vietnam in the fields of territorial security forces (RF/PF), People's Self Defense Forces, National Police and National Police Field Forces, the Open Arms or Chieu Hoi program, the Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) program, public health, public works, refugees, economic and social development (to include agriculture and education), public administration (to include advising on the training of village and hamlet officials), and Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre.

I directly supervise the 16 province senior advisers and prepare their efficiency reports. Within the IV CTZ, nine of my 16 province advisory teams are headed up by U.S. Army colonels or lieutenant colonels with civilian Foreign Service Officers assigned as their deputies. In the remaining seven provinces, the province senior advisor is a senior Foreign Service Officer with a colonel or lieutenant colonel serving as his deputy.

At the CTZ level, my counterpart is the Vietnamese corps commander when functioning in his role as chairman of the Corps Pacification and Development Council. As a practical matter, the majority of my advisory responsibilities are involved with advising the deputy for territorial security, a Vietnamese brigadier general who represents the commanding general, IV CTZ, on all matters involving provincial military forces and who also functions as the de facto chairman of the Corps Pacification and Development Council. This officer, Brig. Gen. Nguyen Huu Hanh, and I and our respective staffs meet formally each Monday morning for a 3-hour review of the previous week's activities and a projection of the forthcoming week. In attendance at these meetings are approximately 20 Vietnamese military and civilian officials and 10 U.S. military and civilian officials. The officials on the Vietnamese side are the regional representatives of the central ministries in Saigon and the principal staff officers in the IV CTZ military headquarters. The Americans represented are the senior advisers to these officials. The meeting is used as a problem-solving session wherein all of the briefings and most of the discussions are by and among the Vietnamese officials—with simultaneous translation for the U.S. personnel. Prior to the meeting U.S. advisers have provided their recommendations as to discussion topics and each adviser, operating under my direction, has recommended to his Vietnamese counterpart the problem areas that should be brought

up and solutions that should be proposed. I might add here that the Vietnamese naturally do not adopt all of these.

In addition to this formal 3-hour session, I meet with General Hanh approximately 10 or 12 times a week and also correspond with him frequently, often reducing to writing the subjects that we have discussed orally. We frequently travel together to areas where there are problems to be solved and we usually see each other at one or two social functions a week. These social functions usually involve a dinner in honor of a departing adviser or a visitor to the corps, either Vietnamese or American. Although General Hanh is fluent in the English language, most of my correspondence to him is prepared in both English and Vietnamese so as to insure the maximum comprehension.

MILITARY ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITY OF CORDS

I have noticed that most visitors in Vietnam are surprised to learn that CORDS has military as well as civilian advisory responsibilities. Actually, CORDS has a considerable military advisory responsibility. For example, in the Delta Military Assistance Command, IV CTZ, the regular MACV military advisory organization numbers less than 1,000 and has advisory responsibility for 78,000 ARVN soldiers. The IV CTZ MACCORDS organization—with 234 civilian and 2,123 military advisers—has advisory responsibility for 184,000 members of the regional and popular forces, 19,000 national and combat police, and 16,000 armed RD cadre. In addition to advising these full-time military and paramilitary personnel, CORDS has advisory responsibility for a people's self defense force armed with 104,000 rifles. Thus, you can see that the total rifle strength advised by CORDS in IV CTZ is well over 300,000 compared to the regular force strength of 78, 000. The significance of this, of course, is the overwhelming importance of providing security to the population. Without security, it is doubtful that the remaining pacification objectives can be achieved.

PROGRESS IN SECURITY AND OTHER OBJECTIVE AREAS

As I indicated earlier, we have been making progress in security, and also in our other objective areas. In 1969, over 1,260,000 of the 6 million population were added to the secure category—leaving less than 800,000 in a contested or VC-controlled status. The GVN held elections in 275 villages and in 1,700 hamlets, thus resulting in about 90 percent of all population centers having elected governments. Approximately 30,000 people came over to the government side under the Chieu Hoi program, nearly three times as many as the previous record year. We reduced the number of people in refugee status from over 220,000 to less than 35,000. Significantly, not only for the Delta but for all Vietnam, the production of rice went up nearly 25 percent, from 3.2 million metric tons to 4 million metric tons. Finally, the Government of Vietnam increased the armed strength of the people's self defense force from 23,000 to nearly 105,000.

GVN PACIFICATION PROCESS IN THE DELTA

I would like to describe the pacification process now followed by the GVN in the delta. Determination is made approximately 6 months

in advance as to the location and extent that pacification efforts will be made. This is normally done on the basis of population density, lines of communications, economic attractiveness, availability of friendly resources, and size and strength of the enemy forces. Initially, the regular forces of ARVN operate in the area, breaking up the main forces of the enemy and scattering them. Next, still under a regular force shield, an RF company will come in and build a platoon-size outpost; in a really tough, long-held area, it might be a company-sized outpost. Eventually the regular force departs, usually a company at a time. Meanwhile, operating under an appointed hamlet or village government, attempts are made to recruit and send for 13 weeks of training a 35-man PF platoon.

I would like to depart from my statement for a moment to say this is an attempt to recruit locally people who already live in the hamlet, who become members of this Popular Force platoon.

Concurrently, National Police Field Forces are brought in and efforts are made to neutralize the infrastructure—the so-called hidden government of the enemy. I'd like to emphasize here that we stress neutralization of the enemy infrastructure through capture or inducement to rally under the Chieu Hoi program. A live VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) is of infinitely greater value than a dead one, since his capture or defection imperils the entire enemy organization in the area.

When adequate security exists, an election is held. This may or may not be before the recruited PF have returned. Some elections are quite good, some quite bad. Even a bad one—that is, not enough candidates to really make it a contest—is worthwhile, since it is a learning process and usually assures that the next one will be more valid—and that the elected official will be more responsive to the voters.

All during this time—depending both on the resources available and the real security—efforts are being made to encourage economic progress through group endeavors with some GVN assistance. Part of the organization effort is also diverted toward security, with significant numbers of the population becoming members of the People's Self Defense Forces. This program, as you know, is not entirely voluntary, but a real attempt is made to make it popular through demonstration of the fact that improved security is nearly always followed by economic improvement.

Eventually, as these various objectives are achieved at the village or hamlet level, and as adjacent areas are brought under government control, law and order becomes a function of uniformed police with assistance from the PSDF. Some areas, such as those having a contiguous boundary with Cambodia, cannot improve their security to this extent since enemy forces lurk nearby in the safe haven afforded and always pose a threat. For example, there are approximately three North Vietnamese regiments just across the border from our IV zone now.

This process I have just decribed occurred in over a thousand hamlets in the delta in 1969. Most hamlets targeted achieved their minimum objectives; some surpassed them; others are still trying.

Gentlemen, I will attempt to answer any questions you may have that deal with my area of responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank, you Mr. Vann.

Senator Aiken, do you have any questions?

Senator AIKEN. No, Mr. Chairman, not of this witness, but I know Ambassador Colby is here. I was involved in meetings here on the Hill and downtown yesterday and I could not spend much time with this committee. I wonder if I might ask him two or three questions which I would have asked him yesterday had I been attending strictly to the business of this committee. Is that all right with you?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly it is all right with me.

EFFECT OF ARMING SOUTH VIETNAMESE VILLAGERS ON PRESIDENT THIEU'S STRENGTH

Senator AIKEN. We waited quite a long time to arm the villagers in South Vietnam. Do you think that President Thieu is stronger for our having taken this step or does it constitute possibly a threat to him because of his political opposition there?

Mr. COLBY. I think he is considerably stronger for having taken it, Senator. There was some question, not so much in his mind as in the minds of some of the subordinate officials, that it might be a dangerous thing to arm the people in this fashion, but the President and Prime Minister have particularly supported this idea very strongly and have even forced it on some of the middle level officials, insisting that they go ahead and do it.

Senator AIKEN. They don't think that it weakens their position at all?

Mr. COLBY. I think the result has been that it strengthens it.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN SAIGON AND COUNTRYSIDE

Senator AIKEN. Going over your remarks yesterday, I noticed you spoke of the new attitudes in the countryside, which the witness this morning has also covered. What about the political atmosphere in Saigon? Do the politicians there reflect a similar will to take responsibility for their own future that you indicated that the countryside people would take?

Mr. COLBY. This has not yet happened, Senator. The fact of the matter is the political picture in Vietnam has to be looked at in two different levels. One level is the elite, more or less French educated, traditional higher class. These people for the hundred years of French occupation were educated away from their own national basis. They were taught French ideas, French philosophies, French thoughts, and so forth, and in the course of it they also picked up some of the concepts of French democratic government structure and political activity.

The governments, however, over that time were authoritarian. Therefore, the only form of political life for many, many years was conspiratorial. There was a premium on small groups gathering together and dividing up into very small elements the political pie that was available.

The countryside had been pretty well left out of that process. The countryside was the other class level of Vietnam which had continued on its rural ways and was pretty well left alone. It was not a substantial political factor until the more recent years when it became obvious that the people were a major element of the whole war effort that is being waged there.

I believe the effect of President Thieu's policies, of the policies that the government is conducting today, is to reach around that upper class at the Saigon political level to try to establish a political base out in the countryside and to build up from that political base a new foundation for the state and for the constitutional government. This is consistent with what the constitution says and it is also a very definite program that the President has started. He started with the village level this past year. During this coming year they have planned to have some provincial council elections, to step from the village level to the province level in this building of the structure from the base.

The Saigon political scene is not all that different from what it has been over the years though, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. In applying the progressive program to the whole country, he is facing more or less the same situation that we are here with the legislation now before the Senate where some people think the law applying to integration of schools ought to cover all the country instead of part of the country. You don't mind that; do you?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

LAND REFORM

Senator AIKEN. Has the South Vietnamese legislative body taken any action yet on land reform, which has been promised and postponed from time to time? I believe the last promise was that action would be taken this month, about the first of February.

Mr. COLBY. The legislature has passed a version of land reform through one of the Houses. It is still in the Senate today. I don't believe they have actually passed it. The Government has urged a certain land reform which would be a very advanced one.

There are some questions as to the degree to which the legislature will accept the Government's law.

Senator AIKEN. Do you mean whether the Senate will accept it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. Well, there were some modifications made by the lower House as well, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. This is a matter for the calendar. I would not want to venture a prediction as to exactly when they will pass it, but I believe that there is an intention to do it in the reasonably near future, this spring.

POLICY CONTROL IN WASHINGTON

Senator AIKEN. You explained why it was necessary to centralize control of the pacification program under the military in Saigon and you did a very good job. Do you think that here in Washington policy control should also be centralized and if so, where? If you don't want to answer that question you don't have to.

Mr. COLBY. I think that is a little out of my line, Senator. I have a problem of putting together out there the different sources of finance, the different sources of personnel and so forth, but it is a normal kind of a bureaucratic problem, and I can adjust to the way Washington decides to do its business.

PHASING OUT OF U.S. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Senator AIKEN. We have armed the villagers and they are now in a position to have some say over their own future. Will the time come when we should begin to phase out our civilian personnel as well as our military personnel in South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. That time will come. It has already begun, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. It has begun.

Mr. COLBY. We have cut our civilian staff somewhat during this past year. We have in mind to reduce gradually the civilian participation as well as the military participation in the advisory effort. But frankly, the advisory effort I consider less of a priority for reduction than I do the combat forces. Any way in which we can assist the early relief of combat forces by a little more advisory effort I think is well worth it.

Senator AIKEN. As I say, I went over the statement of yesterday, I thought the statement was good as was the manner in which you answered questions from the dais. I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

I was glad to get the questioning in because I have two other committee meetings going on now, but I am going to stay awhile.

COST OF PACIFICATION EFFORT

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. COLBY, while we are on that, I believe we requested yesterday that you be prepared to put into the record the cost of the program for which you are responsible in Vietnam.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir. I have some general figures. I am prepared to fill these out for the record if you wish. But, as I said in my opening statement, the appropriation from the Department of Defense consitututes $729 million for 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. 1970.

Mr. COLBY. The appropriation to the Agency for International Development, which includes both the direct dollar contributions and the financing of counterpart, amounts to a total of $162 million for 1970. Thus there is a total U.S. contribution to this program of $891 million.

On the Government of Vietnam side of this program, the programs associated with the pacification effort cost the Piaster equivalent of $627 million.

Most of that total on both the Vietnamese and on the American side are military expenditures, sir. These constitute the arms for the popular and regional forces and also the salaries of the American advisers on the military side. They also constitute on the Vietnamese side the salaries for the Vietnamese Regional and Popular forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Department of Defense figure of $729 million include all their civic action programs in Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. No, I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There are some others under the Marines and other divisions.

Mr. COLBY. It is not that so much, sir. It is programs conducted by a unit in some area. It might be supported by some local funds or it might be supported from central level funds.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember Secretary McNamara told the committee once that on their off hours most of the soldiers built Sunday schools.

Mr. COLBY. Well, they do lots of things.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he said. That would cost a lot of money, of course. That would cost some money that is not included in this.

Mr. COLBY. A considerable amount of it is included, Senator. I wouldn't say it was all Sunday schools, but they do a certain amount of civic action work around the bases, the airbase areas and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not only an interest in knowing about this program, but by coincidence I have four constituents here in the room this morning who are architects and engineers. Having you and Mr. Vann describe the program there, gives them a much more persuasive reason as to why they can't get any money for building in Arkansas than I can give them. I was very pleased to have you prepared to give it this morning so I won't have to burden them now with my own story as to why there is so little money for construction of houses or for Government operations or for anything else, for that matter, because here in 1 year there is $891 million, almost $900 million. It is a very dramatic figure if you could translate it into what they do in these smaller communities of this country.

PURPOSE OF CORDS

Coming back to you, Mr. Vann, I can see you have a very great interest in this work. You have been there since 1962.

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you like this work.

Mr. VANN. I consider the work very important, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very interesting to you; isn't it?

Mr. VANN. I also find it very interesting; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I detected that from your manner and the way you spoke. I would assume that you have requested a continued tour of duty in Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. VANN. I am scheduled to stay there until February of next year, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By that I mean you do it willingly and voluntarily.

Mr. VANN. All civilians in Vietnam are there voluntarily, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that you are creating a bastion of strength for our country in Southeast Asia?

Mr. VANN. A bastion of what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Strength.

Mr. VANN. I don't look upon it in that manner, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you look upon it?

Mr. VANN. I look upon it as one of helping, as an agent of my Government, to fulfill an obligation that my Government considers important.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you clarify that a bit. Of what obligation are you speaking?

Mr. VANN. I believe, sir, that based upon previous decisions made by several administrations the United States has deemed that it has an interest in that area of the world, an interest in preventing that area of the world from being involuntarily absorbed by other political ideologies.

The CHAIRMAN. What other political ideologies?

Mr. VANN. Specifically communism.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that most of the people in the delta are very strongly motivated by ideological considerations?

Mr. VANN. I do not, sir. But I feel that the leaders of the enemy are very strongly motivated by Communist ideology.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the attitude of the people who are under your charge?

Mr. VANN. Sir, the only people who are under my charge are the American advisers and I think most of them share my views as to our commitment there.

MR. VANN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. There was a recent article in the Chicago Tribune that said that you were once quite pessimistic—I believe it uses the words "a confirmed pessimist"—but that you are now an optimist. Is that correct? Were you ever a pessimist about this area?

Mr. VANN. I prefer to think, sir, that I have been realistic about Vietnam, that I was not pessimistic from 1962 until 1968 and that I have not been optimistic from 1968 until now. Up until 1968 I was highly dissatisfied with the manner in which the war was being conducted in Vietnam, and I did not anticipate that it was going to be successful.

Since 1968 I have become increasingly convinced that, with the changes that have been made not only by our side but by the enemy side, our objectives in Vietnam and, coincidentally, the objectives of the majority of the Vietnamese people, will be achieved.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. You come back again to the objectives. I don't like to belabor this matter, but you bring it up. What are these objectives that are going to be achieved?

Mr. VANN. The objectives, as I understand them, sir, exist first of all because of our past involvement in not only our SEATO organization there in Southeast Asia, but all over the world. In many parts of the world we have to some extent been committed to assist people who are now free to remain free from Communist aggression or aggression of any other sort that is externally imposed on their country.

I realize that these commitments may have been made at a time when the environment of the world was much different than it is now.

I am quite aware that as time goes on the justification that once may have existed may have to some extent evaporated.

I consider that we did go to Vietnam for two purposes: First, to help the people there in response to their plea not to be overrun by communism. And, secondly—and this is my own interpretation,

nothing I have been told—to prevent further Communist expansion into Southeast Asia.

CHANGES CONTRIBUTING TO SUCCESS OF PRESENT PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. And the way to prevent that is the program that you are now following, and it is successful.

Mr. VANN. I think, sir, that the program we have been following for the last 18 months has been the most successful that we have had in Vietnam. I think it has been successful through a combination of a change on our part and, quite possibly more significantly, a change in the nature of the war and in the nature of the enemy.

This was a war, sir, which at one time, in my judgment, was an insurgency, a civil war. That has largely gone by the board. It is largely now a war of invasion. It was originally a very difficult war for us to become involved in or to assist because at one time, certainly in 1965, a goodly percentage, possibly even a majority, of the rural population was supporting the National Liberation Front.

Today, not only in my judgment but in the judgment of people I have often relied upon—missionaries and long-term residents in Vietnam, Vietnamese, ex-Vietminh, people not now in the Government—the National Liberation Front enjoys the support of less than 10 percent of the population of South Vietnam.

This doesn't mean that 30 to 40 percent switched sides. It merely means that 30 to 40 percent that did support the other side no longer support them. It means that they are much more susceptible to the Government's approach than they had been in the past.

However, I don't think we deceive ourselves into thinking that there is going to be any enthusiastic following of the Government, just as there never was really an enthusiastic following of the NLF. People want a better government. That is why the majority of them joined the other side. It is not that they believed in communism. They wanted better government.

Since 1965, through a series of steps, they have been gradually getting better government from the Government of Vietnam and less of a basis for thinking they would get it from the NLF. From Tet of 1968 on—because Tet was very definitely a turning point in this war—it became very obvious to the majority of the population that they had no opportunity at all to get the type of things that they wanted—which, as I understand them, are peace and prosperity—from the Communists. They did in large numbers, from Tet of 1968, reject the enemy. They rejected him because of something that had been changing since 1965, when he decided to escalate the war. They rejected him because he had changed from being a South Vietnamese ofttimes a relative, to being a North Vietnamese invader. That happened in I, II and III Corps, like a red flag coming down the peninsula. I could watch the change because I was there.

It started happening in 1969 in IV Corps. It has made our job infinitely easier. It is just so much easier now to fight a North Vietnamese enemy who doesn't have support of the population, who is totally relying upon a line of supply and communications, who is an alien in the area, who does not have intelligence penetrations and who fights in a conventional manner. This is infinitely easier than it

is to fight a population supporting a soldier who is a farmer by day and an enemy by night.

That part of the war is largely behind us. We are now involved primarily in a conventional war on the other side and conversely we have essentially stolen the enemy's thunder by engaging in a people's war on our side. This is what has made such a difference in Vietnam. That is why for the last 18 months I have been called an optimist in Washington.

RESULTS OF TET ATTACK

I came back here in July of 1968 and said I recognized that a lot of bad things happened as a result of Tet. I know the tremendous psychological defeat, the traumatic shock it was to the American people. But a lot of good has come out of it. It has made the war much more black and white. It has caused the Government of Vietnam to consider much more seriously that its very survival is at stake. It has caused them to have mobilization. It has gotten them to take the programs and the actions and the steps that we have been advocating for years. Suddenly I began to see the prospect of a really tremendous breakthrough.

I might say, sir that officials in our Government were almost incredulous that between December of 1967, when I was back here and was considered quite pessimistic, and July of 1968, after the Tet attack, I had suddenly changed and said there was an opportunity to achieve our objectives. But it was quite sincerely the first time that I saw that opportunity during the more than 7 years I have been involved in it.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CONCERNING MR. VANN'S VIEWS

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is very encouraging.

Do you think it would be useful to insert in the record an article about you in the Chicago Tribune of November 10, by Samuel Jameson, simply enlarging upon your views as to why you are more optimistic? Are you familiar with that article?

Mr. VANN. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have read it, but I don't remember the details; I am certainly agreeable if the chairman says it is all right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It really, I think, confirms and enlarges upon what you said; so we will insert it. The basis for my questions was that you had changed your views, which you confirmed in a very eloquent manner.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1969]

PACIFICATION HEAD IN VIET SEES HOPE

Samuel Jameson, chief of the Tokyo bureau of THE TRIBUNE, has traveled to South Viet Nam to assess the situation there at a time when momentous steps affecting that country's future are being discussed and taken. Here he reports on the pacification program in the Mekong delta.

(By Samuel Jameson)

CAN THO, Viet Nam, Nov. 9—John Paul Vann, who heads the 3,400-man pacification advisory team in the Mekong delta, once was a confirmed pessimist concerning the progress of the war in Viet Nam.

In 1963, Vann, then a lieutenant colonel serving as chief adviser to Vietnamese troops in the delta, resigned from the army to criticize the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's conduct of the war.

In 1965, Vann, who returned to Viet Nam as an American aid adviser in Hau Nghia province west of Saigon, told this reporter that the Vietnamese government's efforts to extend its control and promote economic progress in the countryside were a total failure. He estimated at the time that less than 5 per cent of Hau Nghia province had been pacified.

"There is such a credibility gap that many of us are gun shy about saying anything optimistic," he said in an interview here. "Nonetheless, there has been quite a change."

Vann's title is deputy director of the fourth corps Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support [C. O. R. D. S.] team, which is headed by an army major general. Vann bears primary responsibility for directing 94 American pacification advisory teams, while the general devotes most of his time to advising Vietnamese army troops. No American combat troops are stationed in the delta.

"In 1965 it was a safe bet that as many people supported the Communists as supported the government," Vann said.

"If an election had been held at that time, the Viet Cong probably could have won more than 35 per cent of the votes and become the dominant group in South Viet Nam."

Tells of Change

In an election today, the Communists would not get more than 15 per cent of the vote, he asserted.

Vann qualified his optimism by saying that the change represented only a marginal upturn for the government after years of sliding downhill. The big difference came from a drastic decline in the popularity of the Communists, he said.

"Despite the obvious international propaganda victory the Communists won with their 1968 Tet offensive, they suffered a defeat in South Viet Nam," he said.

Not only did they violate a religious holiday, thus alienating a majority of the population, but they also lost about half of their combat leadership, he said.

"All of the critics who yell 'doomsday' talk about the government abandoning the countryside to defend itself in the cities. That is true," Vann said. "But the enemy also abandoned the countryside to attack the cities."

Vann said he wanted to see the government move its forces back into the countryside as early as the summer of 1968. Even tho Saigon failed to act until November, 1968, it found communist forces far below expectations. As a result, government control of the countryside was shot up in unprecedented way," he said.

The pacification expert admitted the claim that the government controlled 90.5 per cent of the population was misleading.

"It is absolutely wrong to look at the statistics in that way," he said, Favorable biases built into the American conducted hamlet evaluation survey make it impossible to look at the statistical findings as absolutes, he said.

"In the delta, you can say accurately that the government now controls 2 million more people, or 38 per cent more of the population, than it did in February, 1968."

Nationwide, control has gone up 20 per cent in the last year, he added.

Vann said he relied on the accuracy of the trends shown in the evaluation system because "for the first time the Vietnamese can't write their own report card."

"In all of the other programs since 1961, it was possible for the Vietnamese province chief to certify that he had completed his objectives by just going thru the motions. Nothing really substantial had to be done," he said.

Vann said the upswing in the delta—where 5 million people, or 35 per cent of South Viet Nam's population, live—has produced these results:

1. For the first time in this decade road travel to every provincial capital is possible without a military escort.

2. A still classified action, which will be announced eventually, has set a milestone in terms of nation-wide defense.

3. The Vietnamese 21st division is now engaging the Communists in the U Minh forest in the southernmost portion of the delta, which has been a communist stronghold for 25 years.

4. The numbers of people from whose ranks the Viet Cong can recruit guerrillas and seek support has diminished by about three-fourths, from 2½ million to 700,000. "Since May the Communists have been importing North Vietnamese into the delta, whereas they used to be able to export guerrillas from the delta to other areas of South Viet Nam," Vann said.

5. A village development program, unknown in previous years, has trained 17,000 village officials in the delta since the beginning of 1969—more than all village level training ever conducted thruout South Viet Nam in all previous years.

As an example of the increased security, Vann pointed to a trip made on Nov. 2—by Ambassador William Colby, director of the nation-wide C.O.R.D.S. program. The ambassador drove from Saigon, then joined Vann in a road canal river trip to My Tho, and returned to Saigon by automobile. The trip lasted five hours, Vann said.

Vann's opinions on the efficiency of the Vietnamese bureaucracy have changed less drastically than his outlook on the progress of the war in general.

"All of the things they do are still going wrong, but they are going wrong by American standards," he said.

Vann said the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu has proved itself more capable than any of its predecessors since at least 1959. It has survived.

REASONS FOR PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Then the objective of preventing the NLF or the Communists from prevailing is being achieved and you attribute it largely I assume, to the pacification program and the change in our strategy. Did you mean the stopping of the bombing in the north or what did you mean by the change we went through that was significant?

Mr. VANN. Two things, sir; if I might refer to the first part of your question. One of the reasons that we have had the opportunity to achieve progress is because the bulk of the NLF, although headed by Communists and serving Communist purposes, by very great good fortune are not Communists. They are followers. In other words, the NLF Communist leadership enlisted in the countryside for their soldiers a large number of people who were simply unhappy with the government and used this as a way to express it. So right there was the base which we could always tap. About 95 percent of the people in South Vietnam we have recognized since 1962 were potentially our friends and allies if they could get what they were fighting for, which was better government.

CHANGE IN STRATEGY

If I may, I will address myself to the second portion of your question as to change in our strategy. The change essentially has come about by the recognition that to provide security for a population you have to do it 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 31 days a month.

In all pacification programs in which I participated from 1962 up until Tet of 1968, we would start off every year with about 4,500 hamlets under government control. Each year we would program, depending on how optimistic we were, a thousand to 2,000 additional hamlets to be brought under government control. Each year we would go out and would achieve 59 to 75 percent of that objective, but amazingly at the end of each year we would still have only 4,500 hamlets. The reason for that was quite obvious. The reason for it can be compared to the air in the balloon. If you expand a balloon in one direction you do it only at the cost of contracting it in another. The reason that we were not being successful on pacification is that we were going out and occupying a hamlet for 2 or 3 months, going through the routine of pacifying it, but then moving on to another hamlet and leaving the first one empty.

In 1968 that fact was brought home very startlingly by Tet. From that time on as we began our pacification, we did so with the recognition that you had to leave permanent security in the hamlet.

For example, in the Delta in 1969 we pacified 1,000 additional hamlets in a 12-months period. Coincidentally, we recruited and trained 1,000 additional RF and PF platoons and put them in those hamlets. They are still there. That also, sir, is why, unlike any other pacification program, this one cannot be rolled back by sudden political reversal. This is one in which the enemy, if and when he begins to react to it—I don't really think he can, but if and when he does—can't come in and overrun two or three hamlets and then have the whole province or whole series of provinces collapse. He is going to have to eat those hamlets up platoon by platoon and this is going to be awfully costly to him.

This is the great difference now. We occupy those hamlets; the government has control there. We are there 24 hours a day. We are staying there and we intend to stay there.

On all other pacification programs, sir, we went in there for 3 months and then we left it, ofttimes with nothing more than a string of barbed wire around it.

Senator CASE. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me to ask the Colonel to say whom he meant by, "we."

Mr. VANN. Sir, I apologize.

Senator CASE. This is not——

Mr. VANN. I have been an adviser to the Government of Vietnam so long that when I say, we, I am talking about the Government of Vietnam with American advice.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish to take too long. There is one line of questioning I would like to get into and then I will yield to you.

Senator CASE. Please go on.

TIME REQUIRED UNTIL GVN CAN TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL

The CHAIRMAN. In your capacity as adviser how long do you think we will have to stay before they can be allowed to take complete control of the situation? Do you have any estimate of it?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am sure that all of us have our private estimates. As you are well aware, our Government's official policy is to stay in accordance with the situation in Vietnam and the United States.

I would answer your question in this way, sir. There is definitely some time limit on our involvement. If you make the assumption that progress continues as it has been, I can see in the next several years this Government of Vietnam largely gaining enough strength to go it alone. However, when we are talking, say, over the next 5-year time period—and I just use that for lack of anything more definite—the quicker you go out the less the chance that they are going to be successful. The longer you stay the greater the chance they will be successful and that they will remain non-Communist.

I would say that if we went out on a very accelerated basis, there is still better than a 50-50 chance that the Government would make it. If we go out on a gradual basis under the criteria that the President of the United States has laid down, I would consider it a very high

probability, a three sigma probability, that the objectives in Vietnam will be achieved.

MR. VANN'S CONTACT WITH TRAN NGOC CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vann, did you read an article in this morning's Washington Post by Mr. Robert Kaiser about Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau?

Mr. VANN. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He quotes Mr. Chau as saying you were among the first Americans whom Mr. Chau told about contacts with his brother, who was a North Vietnamese intelligence agent. He also quotes Chau as saying you went to see either Ambassador Lodge or Ambassador Locke about Chau's contacts with his brother and then told Chau to continue those contacts and that throughout 1968 Chau continued to keep Americans and especially you informed of his talks with his brother.

I don't know whether you have seen the statement on the story of Mr. Chau, which I made on February 5.

Mr. VANN. I have seen it, Mr. Chairman.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND TRAN NGOC CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. Have you?

Since then I have received a letter from Mr. Chau, which I have before me, saying that he had heard press reports which said that I had called him a CIA agent in my statement.

I am writing Mr. Chau to point out that I said in my statement that he had been nominated by the CIA to be head of a cadre retraining program in 1966 and has worked closely with the CIA in that capacity. I also said in that statement that I knew that he had reported his contacts with his brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers with whom he had daily contact. I will put Mr. Chau's letter and my reply in the record just for clarification, together with Mr. Kaiser's article.

(The letters and article referred to follow:)

[Telegram]

To: H. E. U.S. Senator Fulbright, Washington, D.C.
From: Congressman Tran Ngoc Chau, Member of Special Court, Vietnam.

Text: Please accept my thankful regards for your most valuable statement on my case as of a political persecution in Vietnam. I would rectify only one point in your statement as released by UPI here. Which makes very harmful to my nationalist reputation. For a CIA agent has been considered in Vietnam as the most detested enemy much more than a Communist or any type of criminals. It is true that I had cooperated with CIA for many years in developing foundation of present Pacification and Revolutionary Development in capacity of Province Chief and Director RD cadres. But I have never been a CIA agent. I strongly ask your consideration for a U.S. Senate Investigation on American officials and CIA operations in Vietnam which have been destroying both Vietnamese Nationalist Ideology and Patriots and American image.

Present political persecution on me is consequence of combined action taken by US officials and CIA and Vietnamese officials. In an attempt to sabotage Vietnamese and Communist direct talks for Peace Settlement. I did have contacts with my communist brother with agreement of U.S. Ambassador through Mr. John Paul Vann. Complete dossier on my case on the way to your office. Many notable Vietnamese has expressed their comment on my case. Witnesses and persons to testify my accusation are Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, Colby. Misters

John Vann, Baumgartner, O'Donnell, Robert Moellen, Jacobson, State Department. Georgesen, Thomas Donahue, Stuart Methven, O'Reilly, CIA; General Wyand, Lt. Col. Scoles, Major Sauvage of Defense Department. Drs. Ellsberg, Hickey, Rank, and others I would name later if you agree. My highest consideration.

TRAN NGOC CHAU.

February 17, 1970.

Congressman TRAN NGOC CHAU,
The National Assembly,
Saigon, Vietnam.

DEAR MR. CHAU: Thank you for your letter which I received through the good offices of a third party.

I am sorry that UPI has reported that I called you a CIA agent. I am enclosing a copy of the statement I made on February 5 at a hearing of the Committee which I later that day inserted in the *Congressional Record*. I think that you will see from reading the statement that I never alleged that you had been a CIA agent. I simply stated that you had worked closely with the CIA in connection with the cadre training program and that you had reported your contacts with your brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers, with whom you had daily contact.

I found your letter most interesting and appreciated your taking the trouble to write.

I assure you that I will continue to follow your case with sympathetic interest.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT, *Chairman.*

Enclosure.

STATEMENT BY J. W. FULBRIGHT

THE STORY OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

In this morning's *Washington Post*, Joseph Kraft tells us the story of Tran Ngoc Chau. It is a story that does not reflect credit on the United States or on the South Vietnamese regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu. I have known about the story for several months, and I know that the facts that Mr. Kraft recites are accurate. There are, of course, many other facts that have not been reported in the press.

To set the story in context, as Mr. Kraft writes Chau is an old friend of President Thieu and once shared quarters with him when both were junior officers. From 1960 to 1966 he was Province Chief in Kien Hoa and Mayor of Danang. In both positions, he had an outstanding record. In 1966 he was nominated by CIA to be head of the cadre training program at the Vungtau Training Center where he obviously worked closely with the CIA as that agency had the responsibility for the Center. In the 1967 National Assembly elections, he was elected a deputy from Kien Hoa with the second highest plurality in the country. He then became head of the opposition bloc and was elected Secretary-General of the Assembly.

In 1965, Chau contacted by his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, a North Vietnamese intelligence agent. By Chau's own admission, he did not report these contacts to the South Vietnamese government. Kraft says that whether he reported these contacts to the CIA is in dispute. Chau says that he did, as Keyes Beech reported in the *Washington Evening Star* on February 2. I know for a fact, from private sources, that he did report his contacts with his brother to a number of U.S. officials in Vietnam, including CIA officers with whom he had daily contact. I should add that I also know for a fact that he had, and still has, many close friends in the American official community.

At any rate, to return to the story told by Mr. Kraft, Chau began last year to advocate a cease-fire and direct negotiations between the South Vietnamese government and the NLF. He also began to attack Nguyen Cao Thang, a rich Saigon pharmacist and member of President Thieu inner clique, who is described by Kraft as President Thieu's "political bag man."

Chau's brother was arrested in April and interrogated in July. No charges were lodged against Chau at the time of his brother's arrest and interrogation. I am told, in fact, that relations between Chau and Thieu were not broken until some weeks or months thereafter. It appears that Thieu's open attacks on Chau began only after Chau denounced the pharmacist Thang.

Thus it appears that the real reason for Thieu's attack on Chau was not his contact with the communists but rather Chau's growing power as an opposition

figure and as a critic of Thieu's attempts to pressure and corrupt the Assembly as evidenced by the activities of Thang.

Thieu began his campaign against Chau by denouncing him publicly on a number of occasions. According to the Saigon press, in a speech on December 10 at the Vungtau Training Center, Thieu said that if the Assembly would not see justice done to Chau, and to two other accused deputies, "the people in the armed forces will cut off the heads of these deputies" and he added: "Our duty is to beat such dogs to death." Thieu organized demonstrations, including a march on Parliament, in connection with his efforts to lift Chau's parliamentary immunity. Failing to secure the votes of three-quarters of the members of the Assembly necessary to lift Chau's immunity, Thieu resorted to the legally questionably tactic of having a petition lifting Chau's immunity circulated among Assembly members. According to a report in this morning's *Washington Post* by Robert Kaiser from Saigon, the 102 necessary signatures on the petition have now been obtained, and President Thieu is free to prosecute Chau.

I know that the U.S. Mission in Saigon did not expect Thieu to obtain the necessary number of votes to lift Chau's immunity. But they obviously underestimated Thieu's determination and his ability to obtain the result he desires through threats and bribery. I have very persuasive evidence on this point. Mr. Kraft tells us that Ambassador Bunker was directed to intervene with President Thieu on Chau's behalf but that "the Embassy has not bestirred itself." Given the attitude of certain high Mission officials toward Chau, and their unwillingness to incur President Thieu's displeasure, I am not surprised. Nor am I surprised that Chau is disenchanted with Americans because of their refusal to intervene, as Keyes Beach reported after his interview with Chau.

Chau is now in hiding. I hope for his sake that he will be able to escape Thieu's persecution. But even if he does, the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will not have a happy ending. The South Vietnamese Assembly has been intimidated, while the U.S. Government has shrugged its shoulders. And those in Vietnam who favor negotiation and compromise, or who dispute President Thieu, will speak at their peril from now on. Perhaps the story of Tran Ngoc Chau will prove to be the last chapter in the history of representative government in Vietnam.

[From The Washington Post, Feb. 18, 1970]

Accused Saigon Deputy Blames U.S.

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

Saigon, Feb. 17—Tran Ngoc Chau, the outspoken House deputy, today blamed American pressure for President Thieu's decision to prosecute him for "activities helpful to the Communists."

Chau claimed the United States feared that Thieu would use him to initiate direct talks with the Communists and bypass the Americans. Now, he charged, Thieu is prosecuting him in order to impress the Americans that this was never Thieu's intention.

Chau has long been a favorite of U.S. officials in Vietnam, and has many American friends. In an interview in his Saigon "hideout" today, however, Chau spoke bitterly of the U.S. government, which he said was trying to "clean their hands" of him.

Chau, whose American friends have been unable to protect him from the wrath of Thieu, said that he has "lost all faith" in U.S. policy. He warned other Vietnamese who have cooperated with the Americans to prepare for betrayal like the one he claims to have suffered.

The Chau case is the main attraction in Saigon's center ring these days. It combines—in one unruly package—three of the issues that concern this capital most: the American role in Vietnam, Thieu's feuds with his opponents and the status of Vietnamese democracy. This case may have important and lasting effects on the last two issues.

And the Chau case is resplendant with the little touches of Vietnam that boggle the Western mind. For example, the political gossips have been saying that Chau is sleeping in a different house every night, stealthily dodging Thieu's police. In fact, as this reporter discovered when he visited Chau this morning, he is living quite openly in a house that is elaborately staked out by some quite unsubtle plainclothesmen.

Very briefly, this is the story of Tran Ngoc Chau:

Now 46, he fought for the Vietminh until 1949, when he left the revolutionary movement to join the forces of the Emperor Bao Dai. He became an officer, rose quickly through the ranks and was soon immersed in a distinguished career.

He went to infantry school at Ft. Benning, Ga., in 1955–56, where he learned English, and also American ways. Thereafter Chau seemed always to get along well with Americans in Vietnam. His success as chief of Kienhoa Province in the early 1960s brought him to the attention of high American officials, who saw to it that he was promoted to important administrative jobs.

In 1967 he ran for the National Assembly from Kienhoa, and won an impressive victory. He was elected an officer of the House of Representatives, and began to establish a name for himself.

MEETS WITH BROTHER

From 1965 onward, Chau was also leading a secret life—a life he shared only with a few Americans. In 1965 his brother and former Vietminh comrade, Tran Ngoc Hien, came secretly to Chau and announced he was a high-ranking North Vietnamese agent.

From then until early 1969, Chau and Hien met quite regularly. According to the testimony of both, each tried to convert the other. At the same time, they discussed possible approaches to a settlement of the war. According to Chau, he was trying to arrange talks among the warring Vietnamese factions, excluding the Americans, that might lead to a political settlement. He admits he pursued this idea without informing the Vietnamese government.

Hien was arrested last April. He confessed his intelligence activities in the South, and gave a detailed account of his talks with Chau. (The Washington Post published excerpts from Hien's confession on Jan. 5.)

Chau, meanwhile, began to speak critically of the Thieu government's policies. He called publicly for direct negotiations with the Viet-cong before Thieu had accepted that idea. He also proposed a form of coalition government that would have given the Communists a share of power in the provinces and the National Assembly, but not in the executive branch.

Last July, Thieu told a group of legislators that Chau had had illegal contacts with the enemy. That began a complicated series of events—dominated by an emotional anti-Chau campaign conducted by Thieu himself—that has now ended with Chau formally accused of "activities helpful to the Communists."

He was protected by the Vietnamese equivalent of congressional immunity, but the government overcame this obstacle by promoting a petition in the House to withdraw the immunity in this case. The petition was allegedly signed by 102 members—exactly the three-fourths required by law—and a trial is expected soon.

CALLS CHARGES RIDICULOUS

Today the accused man contended that the charges against him were ridiculous. Chau admitted that he talked to his brother, showed him some courtesies and failed to betray him to the government. But he denied giving him any significant help, and insisted that his contacts with Hien were intended only to try to convert his brother, and to bring an end to the war.

Chau admits that he did not inform any Vietnamese officials that he was talking secretely with his brother, a Communist spy. He defended this today on the ground that when his talks with Hien began, the South Vietnamese government was chaotic, run by generals whose "war sentiment was very strong." In recent times, Chau said, he thought he had the right to conduct independent talks as a member of the National Assembly.

But, he added, he did think he should tell some Americans about his brother. Chau gave these details of his dealings with U.S. officials:

"Among those I informed after this first contact with Hien [in late 1965] were John Vann [an adviser in Vietnam since the early 1960s, now in charge of pacification in the Mekong Delta], Stuart Methven [described by Chau as a CIA employe], Thomas Donohue [another CIA man, Chau said], and . . . the CIA station chief at the time."

U.S. OFFICIALS INFORMED

According to all the rules of diplomatic or military practice, contacts of this sort would have to be reported by such men to higher authority. If men as prominent as John Vann and a CIA station chief were involved, it seems certain all top U.S.

officials in Vietnam must have been informed. Chau said as much in today's interview:

"Methven and Donohue told me they would inform the appropriate Vietnamese officials; Vann went to see the U.S. ambassador—I don't know which, [Eugene] Locke or [Henry Cabot] Lodge—and the ambassador said it was okay for me to continue my contacts" with Hien, Locke was then deputy U.S. ambassador.

Chau said two U.S. officials—Col. Mike Dunn, now a White House military aide who worked for Lodge, and a Mr. Adam, described by Chau as a CIA man—came to see him to find out what he was hearing from his brother.

During mid-1967, Chau related, his conversations with Hien and other factors persuaded him that the Vietcong would try to create uprisings in populated areas. In August 1967, he said, he gave a three-hour briefing on his theory to Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Locke and several military officials, including Lt. Gen. Frederick Weyand.

Five months later the Communists launched the Tet offensive.

Throughout 1968, Chau said, he continued to keep Americans—especially Vann—informed of his talks with Hien. The Americans "seemed pleased just to get more of the Communist assessment," Chau said today.

VANN INTERVENES

After Hien was arrested last April, Chau said, he went to see Vann at his headquarters in Cantho, the largest city in the Delta. According to Chau, "At the time, Ambassador [William] Colby [currently head of the U.S. pacification program] was in Sadec Province. Vann called him and got approval on the phone to see [Minister of the Interior Tran Thien] Khiem. The next day Vann saw Khiem." Vann's intervention on Chau's behalf, he added, "seemed to delay the whole affair for some time."

According to Chau, this was the last overt cooperation he got from his American friends. Ambassador Bunker refused to meet him, Chau claimed. Then, he added, the ambassador ordered all American officials to cease dealing with Chau.

"Bunker and the CIA believed Thieu would use me and my brother to make a secret arrangement for direct talks between the Vietnamese, without letting the Americans know about it," Chau claimed.

He noted that he and Thieu had been friends since the time both were young lieutenants. But now, Chau said, Thieu responds primarily to Bunker. Chau said he believes he is being prosecuted to demonstrate to Bunker that Thieu has no plans for a secret deal.

NEW AMERICAN POLICY

Chau charged that there is a new American policy in Vietnam, intended to impose a minority government on the country that will be utterly dependent on U.S. aid, and therefore unable to negotiate its own end to the war.

The U.S. mission here is familiar with most of Chau's claims that he was betrayed by the American government and abandoned in time of need. But the embassy has made no comment on Chau's accusations, the first of which were published ten days ago. This unusual silence suggests orders from Washington not to talk.

Well before Chau's accusations began, however, many embassy officials privately expressed displeasure with Thieu's attempt to prosecute Chau and two other members of the House. The degree of displeasure these Americans have expressed has been unprecedented in the friendly American relationship with Thieu.

It was learned today that Bunker has told Thieu that the U.S. expects a variety of unfavorable consequences if Chau is sentenced to prision. Some of Bunker's staff believe much damage has already been done by Thieu's public campaign against the House.

If the Chau case opened a door on interesting aspects of the U.S. role in Vietnam, it has also provided an intriguing glimpse of Vietnamese democracy under pressure.

The legal issues in the case are complicated, though the basic facts of the alleged crime are simple and apparently agreed by all parties: It is against the law to give any help to Communists, and by Chau's own admission he gave his brother some assistance—though he claims it was insignificant. For this reason, hawks among Saigon's politicians are prepared to condemn Chau.

SYMBOLIC CASE

But there is some question as to whether this technical violation of the law is the real issue. An authoritative source in the presidential palace, for instance,

said today that although Chau's transgressions were not serious, the case against him would be pressed because "it symbolizes the anti-Communist spirit of the government."

Phan Thong, a House member who chaired a committee that investigated the charges against Chau and found them justified, said in an interview today that he too saw more than legal issues behind the prosecution. Thong said the chief of the Special (intelligence) Police told his investigating committee that Chau was "too ambitious in politics." Thong suggested that Chau would have been left alone if he had not made his proposal for a coalition government.

Another complication involves the petition that the government says stripped Chau of his immunity. Many lawyers and legislators have challenged the theory that the House can substitute a petition for actual floor action. It is widely assumed that the government could not win a three-fourths vote on the floor, if only because attendance at the House is so poor.

Some politicians think Thieu's petition ploy will do permanent damage to the procedures of the Assembly.

Deputy Thong said he thought the petition might not have been completely fair. But then, he added, Chau had ignored one article of the constitution by helping a Communist, so how could he expect protection from other articles of the constitution that stipulate proper parliamentary procedures?

It is hard to find a Vietnamese who really expects the government to follow strictly any prearranged set of laws and regulations. That is a Western notion.

TALK OF POLITICS

So the talk among politicians about the Chau case tends to center more on politics and personalities than legalities. Some, including Chau himself, think Thieu is trying to intimidate all his opposition by his crackdown on Chau and the other two House deputies.

Those who subscribe to this theory deplore the president's high-handedness and warn of more repression of the opposition, but the theory is hardly universal. Many of the most outspoken opponents of Thieu don't accept it.

Another school theorizes that Thieu is damaging himself more than Chau or any other opponent by making such a big issue out of a small incident.

"It is like with Sen. Tran Van Don," said an articulate member of the House, referring to another Thieu critic who has lately incurred presidential ire. "Thieu is building up Chau and other opponents by attacking them fiercely."

Chau himself is the issue with some politicians. His critics call him vain, a self-promoter with an exaggerated sense of his own importance. Others say he just isn't worth all the fuss.

Chau's connection with the CIA has become an issue—several papers have attacked him as an American lackey. "Many Vietnamese think if Chau is so close to the CIA, he deserves some punishment," a thoughtful editor said tonight.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not the only public official Mr. Chau has publicly identified as a contact. The Washington Post article has many other names and so does Mr. Chau's letter to me, but since you happen to be testifying here today, I did want to ask you a few questions relating to this rather complicated and apparently now a significant case according to the papers.

RELATION OF CIA TO CHAU'S NOMINATION AND VUNG TAU CENTER

Did Mr. Chau develop many of the concepts of the current pacification program?

Mr. VANN. Sir, let me go back for a moment just in the interest of the letter that you are sending to Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau. I would interpret that your statement saying that the CIA nominated him is where he got the impression that you were calling him an employee of the CIA. Actually, sir, the CIA has not been in a position in Vietnam to nominate a GVN official from one job to another.

The job that Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau was nominated to take was Director of the RD Cadre Directorate. That was a nomination by the Government of Vietnam and approved by the Minister of RD.

That would be the one area in which he might have interpreted your having suggested he was in the CIA employ.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Then it was an error to say that the CIA had anything to do with that Vung Tau center.

Mr. VANN. It would be an error, sir, to say that they nominated Colonel Chau for the position as the Director of the RD cadre program.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the CIA have anything to do with that center?

Mr. VANN. The CIA, sir, was in an advisory capacity to the Vung Tau training center.

Mr. COLBY. And it also supported it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VANN. It also supported it financially.

The CHAIRMAN. But, of course, it had no authority to pass upon any of the personnel.

Mr. VANN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. COLBY. The job that Colonel Chau was nominated to was not just of that center, Mr. Chairman. It was also that of overall responsibility for the cadre effort of that particular ministry throughout the nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it the usual practice of the CIA when they pay the expenses and organize the advisers not to have anything to do with the personnel problems of their activity? Is this a common occurrence?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am not qualified to answer that because I have never worked for that agency.

The CHAIRMAN. I had heard that the CIA has on occasion taken a hand in some of these matters. I don't know about that. I was relying upon my staff's advice as to that statement and they believed that to be correct at the time. "Nominated" is perhaps an unfortunate word. Would "approved" or "confirmed" be a better or more accurate word or would you say they had nothing whatsoever to do with them?

Mr. COLBY. I think they worked with him.

The CHAIRMAN. What's that?

Mr. COLBY. I think they worked with him on that job. This was a job in the Vietnamese Government. The Vietnamese Government accepted and named this officer as the director of this directorate. They worked with him.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the CIA given an opportunity to disapprove an appointment of this kind?

Mr. VANN. I don't believe so, sir. I would certainly say from the standpoint of the way things happened in Vietnam that of times the Government of Vietnam discusses appointments with the advisory officials for any program in which we are heavily involved financially. I frequently had a Vietnamese official discuss with me whether or not a district chief should be continued in office because he knows I have an adviser there who observes him on a daily basis and they would like to have our opinion on it.

Mr. COLBY. I think if the CIA had real objection to him in that job, that could have been made very clear and would have had the effect of having him not take that job.

IS TRAN NGOC CHAU REGARDED AS NATIONALIST OR COMMUNIST?

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vann, is Mr. Chau regarded by his colleagues in the National Assembly and by knowledgeable American officials as

a Nationalist or as a Communist? How would you characterize him?

Mr. VANN. Sir, first of all, he has so many acquaintances with whom I have not had personal contact that I wouldn't be qualified to answer that.

I would say, sir, that it is quite probable, in satisfying what I detect to be your desire for information on Tran Ngoc Chau, that we will get into some areas which could possibly prejudice one way or the other the outcome of a court case that is currently being planned in Saigon by the Government of Vietnam involving Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau.

On the basis, sir, I would be happy to provide all the information that I have on this subject to the committee, but I would much prefer to do it in an executive session so as not to jeopardize either pro or con the judicial action that is underway in Saigon.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I would certainly respect that. Although this story goes very far in discussing the matter, you simply don't wish yourself to confirm or not to confirm. Is that correct?

Mr. VANN. That is correct, sir. As I interpreted it, that story represents Mr. Kaiser's interview with Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau, and——

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chau seems to be in no way reluctant to talk to the press about this matter. Of course, I would gather that he believes he is about to be, in the parlance of the old days, railroaded [laughter] because his immunity has been lifted, not by a vote in the assembly, but by a petition with 102 names. It is a very odd situation, but if you do not wish to discuss it in open session, I will not pursue the matter.

The Senator from New Jersey.

Senator CASE. It is nice to see you again.

Mr. VANN. Thank you, sir.

Senator CASE. It is also very pleasant to see the change in the attitude you now have from that which I saw in 1967 in May and June.

Mr. VANN. The situation has changed, sir.

Senator CASE. Well, it is very clear that you feel this strongly.

REASONS FOR CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF AVERAGE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

You mentioned, I think, as one of the chief reasons for the change, the change in the attitude of the average South Vietnamese toward the Government, and you said that his willingness to join the Liberation Front or follow its leadership was based upon his dissatisfaction with his Government.

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Could you elaborate a little bit on that and also upon the change? Specifically, for example, when you say "government," is he thinking about who is sitting in power in Saigon or is he thinking about his province chief or commander or his district or his village government or just what? In what respect has this improved? Would you develop this a little?

Mr. VANN. I think, sir, that the peasant about whom we are talking, the man who either is or is not in revolt, considers the government to be the village and hamlet officials with whom he must have contact in his daily work. It might extend on occasion to the district chief. Although he seldom has contact with the district chief, he would become aware as to whether there is a good district chief or a

bad district chief, good and bad in terms of his own future, and his own opportunity to pursue what he wishes to in his life.

As you may be aware, I was convinced in 1962 and 1963 that there was no way for the Government of Vietnam, with Ngo Dinh Diem pursing the course he was following, to win the war. I felt it was inevitable that the National Liberation Front was going to win. I felt strongly enough about that to retire from the Army so as to be able to publicly express my disagreement with the policies we were then following by supporting President Diem.

Over the years a series of different governments came in. I think that between November 1 of 1963 and the beginning of constitutional government in 1967, we had approximately 14 different heads of government in Vietnam. There was a game of real musical chairs. And there was so much instability that there was little impact down in the countryside, little change in the life of the average peasant other than a great deal more unpleasantness than he had ever had before.

In 1967, when a Constituent Assembly was held, when an election was conducted to elect, not by a majority, but by the most votes in a field of 10 candidates, a president and a vice president, when an assembly, upper and lower house, were elected, there began what has been since then a stability of government at the upper level. This stability was severely shaken by the Tet attack, an attack which was obviously well-designed and which was very nearly successful.

Some of the assumptions the enemy made proved to be erroneous and fortunately he was not successful. But once the elected Government of Vietnam, which was then a very new government overcame this, they could address their time and attention to the long-standing and long-ignored needs of the peasant. Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight became first a year of recovering from Tet, getting the enemy back from the cities, and then addressing the problem of how do you respond to the peasant.

Nineteen hundred and sixty-nine became a year of execution. We conducted a large number of elections, with the number going from less than 50 percent to well over 90 percent of the villages and hamlets in the country having elected government.

We conducted training for these village and hamlet officials. Literally for the first time in the history of Vietnam we gave a budget to the village and a procedure wherein the people participated on how that budget was spent. This was something very novel to these people.

In 1969 there was more participation by peasants in the government that most affected them, the village and hamlet government, than, to my knowledge, at any time in the last 100 years history in Vietnam.

CHANGE IN ENEMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND TET

We have gotten a tremendous response. We were aided and abetted during this period by the enemy changing the nature of his force structure from being primarily South Vietnamese to being primarily North Vietnamese. We were also aided by the fact that in the military attacks at Tet, which were largely by South Vietnamese units, the casualties were absolutely enormous. These casualties were not very meaningful from the standpoint of the numbers of bodies involved because the enemy has long shown an ability to remove bodies out of a

rice paddy with no regard to whether he was killed or not. But there was the matter of the leadership that was lost. In my judgment, more than half, possibly two-thirds of the leadership, particularly the field combat leadership, that the enemy had developed for his South Vietnamese forces over a period of two decades was lost in 1968.

You can't produce leaders in a year or even 5 years. It takes a long time to produce this kind of leadership.

This provided the enemy with a difficulty of continuing combat actions from which he has not yet recovered. I am not only a civilian there. I was for 21 years a professional soldier, with a total of 14 years in combat in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. My hobby is analyzing military operations. As an analyst, I have become acutely aware that the leadership of the enemy today is a far cry from, far less qualified than the leadership that he had prior to Tet of 1968.

A combination of this drop in leadership, the change of the enemy from being a South Vietnamese to being a North Vietnamese, the beginnings of village and hamlet government, the participation of the population, the stability at the central level, getting enough Americans with long-term experience in Vietnam not to go down any more dead end alleys——

Senator CASE. Excuse me, I didn't hear what you said, to not go down——

CHANGE IN EXPERIENCE OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Mr. VANN. Not to go down one-way streets that end in a deadend. In other words, one of our big problems in Vietnam up until people like Ambassador Colby, who had had long-term experience, or Clay McManaway who has been there 5 years, were assigned and a lot of people got into positions of determining advisory policy in Vietnam who knew something about Vietnam, has been people who have had just 1 year in Vietnam. When this changed, we were able to prevent the pitfalls. Year after year I had known programs were going to fail, because I knew we had tried that sort of thing before and I knew the deficiencies that existed.

Finally when enough people with that type of experience got into positions of leadership, then the advisory assistance too became very constructive. Up to that time it sometimes was counterproductive.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

It is impressive, and I think the most impressive thing is the change in your view, if I may put it in that fashion and not overstate the matter.

PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE SOLUTION IN VIETNAM

Our concern here, for the most part, has been with a situation that seemed constantly to deteriorate while we didn't have the firsthand evidence that you did because of your daily contact with it and your long knowledge of what was really going on. All of us sensed that things were going constantly from bad to worse and that unless there was a change there would be no end to a bad situation except a disastrous one, and to many people this more and more indicated that the quicker we put an end to the whole thing, the better.

Your own judgment, I take it now, and you have already said this, is that as things are going now they are on the upgrade and a reasonable solution is possible and the one that we ought to continue to try to pursue.

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have become so confident that we are going in the right direction now that since July of 1968, I have within my own organization been advocating a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam consistent exactly with the three criteria which the President enunciated in July of 1969 as official U.S. policy. In other words, for a year prior to the time it became our official policy I had the utmost confidence that that was the right direction to go in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I think most of the rest of the questions I have would better be asked in executive session and I shall defer for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Mr. Vann, I certainly appreciate your very forthright and, I think, precise statement. I respect you too for your statement of your views of our objectives there. Some may disagree, but as I recall at least until about 1966 that was the generally accepted view of what our objectives in Vietnam had been since our first intervention there.

You brought a side of testimony to the committee we don't often hear and I think whatever the views of anyone as to whatever the war may be that it is good to have testimony like that. I must say I haven't heard that side since I have been on this committee.

MR. VANN'S COMMANDING GENERAL AND PRIOR SERVICE

Who is the commanding general under whom you serve?

Mr. VANN. Maj. Gen. Hal McCown, sir, who formerly served as the II Corps adviser in Vietnam 1962 and 1963.

Senator COOPER. You have stated that your prior service had been with the military. Is that correct?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir; I was a military officer and enlisted man for 21 years.

Senator COOPER. You were in World War II?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir; I flew B–29's in World War II in the Army Air Corps and I went back to the infantry as a paratrooper after World War II.

Senator COOPER. As you said, your experience has made you very interested in the military policy in South Vietnam.

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir; I served in that type of warfare. I was commander of a Ranger unit in Korea in 1950 and 1951. Then of course in 1962 and 1963 I served as a senior adviser to ARVN 7th Division with advisory responsibility for the area from Saigon to Can Tho.

Senator COOPER. Where did you serve in World War II?

Mr. VANN. In the Southwest Pacific in World War II, sir, with the 485 Bomb Group on Guam.

CORDS AND WORLD WAR II MILITARY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Senator Cooper. Listening to your explanation of the organization and also to this chart, it would seem to me it is quite similar to the military government organization that the United States had along with its armies in World War II. Is that correct?

Mr. Vann. Not exactly, sir.

The thing that makes this——

Senator Cooper. Similar, I said.

Mr. Vann (continuing). The thing that makes this so different is the tremendous involvement we have in things such as social and economic development, whereas the military government organizations were largely related to control of the population.

Senator Cooper. And to gradually transfer responsibility to the civilian government.

Mr. Vann. Yes, sir.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, would the Senator yield to me for 30 seconds. I must go to the floor because the morning hour is over. I didn't want to ask any questions. I wanted to express my pleasure at seeing Colonel Vann here and Ambassador Colby, both of whom were so generous and cooperative at that time in Vietnam. As Senator Cooper said, many of us may think about the overall nature of American policy, but one can only be glad the United States has such servants as yourself in such a difficult atmosphere and such a difficult problem abroad.

Thank you.

Senator Cooper. I certainly join in what you said, Senator Javits.

FACTORS INFLUENCING INCREASED SECURITY

You have testified about the development of the local forces. In your statement you say this: "The significance of this, of course, is the overwhelming importance of providing security of the population. Without security, it is doubtful that the remaining pacification objectives can be achieved."

How would you compare the security which has been improved because of the strengthening of the local forces by arms? How would you relate that to the fact that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have withdrawn from the area? Which is the greatest influence on the providing of security?

Mr. Vann. The Government's having a physical presence. I would like to point out, sir, that the withdrawing only refers to North Vietnamese units. Most of the North Vietnamese units are now along the Cambodian or Laotian boundaries or in these adjacent countries. The Vietcong, the South Vietnamese enemy forces, have not withdrawn per se from the general area. However, there is a significant difference in the guerrilla operations of today as compared to, say, pre-Tet 1968. The great difference is this: Most of the guerrillas, prior to Tet of 1968, lived in the hamlet and did their farming during the daytime. Most of the guerrillas today must live in a base area outside of the hamlet. They have no traffic with the hamlet except

on those very rare occasions when they run the risk of coming in clandestinely, quite possibly at night, particularly if it is in an area where the Government forces are not really alert. There is a vast difference in the way guerrillas operate today from the way guerrillas operated before.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SECURITY AS UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS

Senator COOPER. As you said, major North Vietnamese forces are along the Cambodian border. Now assume that the program, which you have described so well, continues in a successful manner and the United States gradually withdraws its forces. What would you say then about the possibility of the North Vietnamese coming in from the Cambodian border and renewed activity on the part of the Vietcong? Would the South Vietnamese apparatus which you have described be able to maintain the security which you say is imperative for pacification?

Mr. VANN. First of all, sir, let me disqualify myself from answering as Deputy CORDS IV Corp and just go to a role in Vietnam as a military analyst.

I consider that the North Vietnamese represent far less of a threat and one which is far more easily handled than the threat we had before from the National Liberation Front which was primarily a political guerrilla type threat.

The reason I believe this is that in nearly every given set battle that I have reviewed in Vietnam wherein a conventional ARVN force met a conventional North Vietnamese force or a conventional U.S. force met a conventional North Vietnamese force, the winner was always our side. The reason was that our side had air and artillery and the other side did not.

These are the most decisive factors in a conventional battle.

It is expected that the Vietnamese regular forces will continue to have air and artillery support. They now provide all their artillery support and they are increasing the amount of air support that they are providing. On this basis, I look forward to the day when all of the fighting can be done by South Vietnamese even if there continues to be a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.

Senator COOPER. Well, your answer is directed chiefly, I think, to military aspects of Vietnamization. You consider the pacification program as a necessary element of the Vietnamization program, don't you?

Mr. VANN. I do, sir. I see a very low probability of the enemy being able to substantially roll back the pacification program that has been achieved. The reason is that, although on any given night at any given area he masses forces and has a local success, to do it on a widespread basis would mean he would have to pay at least a hundred men dead for every hamlet that he wants to reestablish control. He does not have anywhere near the men to even make a dent in pacification.

Senator COOPER. I will pose this question: If the Administration's plan for withdrawal continues, and I believe it will, and U.S. forces are withdrawn from Vietnam in 2 or 3 years, will the Vietnamese be

able to maintain the security which you say is essential for the pacification program in the absence of U.S. military forces?

Mr. VANN. Sir, that again depends upon factors such as the political stability within the country. If things continue as they have gone for the last 18 months, the answer quite clearly is "Yes." If for some reason there gets to be some internal fighting among our friendly Vietnamese, if the political struggle within Vietnam goes in such a way as to affect the stability of the government and all of the attention of the Vietnamese gets diverted toward a struggle among themselves, that could put an entirely different light on the situation 2 or 3 years hence. Right now all expectations are that the current stability will continue.

NECESSITY OF U.S. PRESENCE FOR SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION

Senator COOPER. Well, in your view is the American presence necessary for the success of the Vietnamization program?

Mr. VANN. The American presence today is necessary. How long it will be necessary is obviously the question that the Administration debates on a continuing basis. On a continuing basis we are examining it ourselves. As one example, I have 95 district advisory teams in the Delta. I have determined that pacification has proceeded so well in 18 of these districts that I have reduced the advisory effort to less than 30 percent of what it was. In one province we have achieved such a high level of security that the military advisory efforts have been reduced to about 25 percent of what it was just about a year ago. I would see no reason for that trend not to continue, assuming that progress continues the way it has been going.

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator COOPER. There have been a number of these pacification programs, as you know so well, and bearing a number of different names—revolutionary program, national building program. But I gather from what you say that you believe there has been a change in the attitude of the people of South Vietnam, that the present program marks a distinct success in its objectives, compared to the prior programs.

Mr. VANN. I think the biggest difference, the biggest asset we have is the changed attitude of the population of South Vietnam. But certainly complementing that is what, is, in my judgment, the first well-organized pacification effort that we have had in Vietnam.

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator COOPER. I will go to the political side for just a moment. You said just a moment ago that you thought the success was conditioned also on stability of the government. I assume you mean to be successful a government must have the support, general support, of the people. Is that correct?

Mr. VANN. Yes, Senator, I believe so.

Senator COOPER. In your wide range of activities in South Vietnam do you consider that the present government has the support or the

acceptance—any way you want to put it—of the people of South Vietnam?

Mr. VANN. I consider, sir, that the present government is the most efficient government that I have seen in Vietnam since 1962, has more real de facto support today than any government since 1961 and, third, is taking the steps through the village development program and through the people's self-defense force organization to achieve a much wider popular following and popular base than any other government has either achieved or even sought to achieve.

Senator COOPER. It has been said many times that, both in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh was considered the leader because of his long record of opposition to the intervention and colonialism of other countries. I don't know whether that is correct or not, but assuming it is, is there any leader in North Vietnam or the Vietcong who attracts the people of South Vietnam, in your judgement?

Mr. VANN. Sir, we certainly have reviewed that, those of us who are students of that history. There appears not to be one now. As I think all members of this committee are aware, the previous leader, Mr. Ho Chi Minh, did represent a father image to a large number of South Vietnamese as well as North Vietnamese. To some extent his death indirectly facilitated the government of Vietnam winning more support among the peasant population than before, because Mr. Ho Chi Minh's image there in Vietnam was primarily as a nationalist, as opposed to being primarily as a Communist.

I go back a little bit. Even though I personally felt that the Ngo Dinh Diem government was not on a road that could lead to success, I personally deplored the passing of Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem himself because he represented another father image, a man whose image was as a nationalist and as a longtime fighter for freedom in his country.

Now that both of those gentlemen have passed from the scene it is a kind of an open field as to who can achieve that sort of an image in the future on both sides.

WHAT TYPE ORGANIZATION IS PHOENIX?

Senator COOPER. I will ask two questions in another field. I left yesterday just before the hearing ended, but I read in the newspapers questions about the organization called Phoenix. With your wide range of activity there, you must be familiar with this organization. Aren't you?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am responsible for supervising the advisory support of the Phung-Hoang operation, in IV Corps tactical zone and those 16 provinces.

Senator COOPER. Yesterday in response to my questions to Ambassador Colby, I placed in the record a statement of the assassination, wounding, and the abductions or kidnapings of South Vietnamese people by the Vietcong. Is the Phoenix organization a counterterrorist organization or is it an organization designed for use in a war for war action against enemies. What is it?

Mr. VANN. I would like to comment on this, sir, because I have been quite familiar with the organization of Phoenix and the various types of organizations that preceded Phoenix, none of which were anywhere near as extensive and none of which had the overall central corps,

province, and district support that the Phung Hoang or Phoenix program has.

First of all, there was at one time in Vietnam an organization, very small, that was called a counterterrorist organization. As Ambassador Colby mentioned, any time you have a secret type organization you get a lot of fairy tales.

Now, all of my service in Vietnam, with the exception of 9 months, has been spent outside of Saigon essentially as a field adviser.

First of all, regrettably from my standpoint, the counterterrorist organization was never as effective as people thought it was or as the fairy tales about it said it was.

Secondly, it bore and bears no resemblance at all to the organization that we began in 1967, which now bears the name of Phung Hoang or Phoenix.

FORMATION OF PHOENIX ORGANIZATION

In 1967, on an experimental basis, first of all we brought all of the civilian advisory agencies together. At that time we had in each Province two American organizations, a civilian advisory organization and a military one. When we got these organizations together, and began comparing all of our notes and—this doesn't mean that some people did not do this before, but originally it wasn't done—we became somewhat distressed at the redundancy, at the overlapping responsibilities, and the very great gaps of coverage on the part of the various intelligence organizations.

On that basis we started on an experimental basis in III Corps five centers called District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers. We took all agencies responsible for intelligence, put them in one location, that is, had their input come to one location, and had representatives for those agencies there. At the same location we had an array of responsive units that could go out and react to the intelligence.

Now, our civilian side of this civilian-military mix was primarily concerned with the infrastructure, the enemy's governmental members. We were concerned that most of the intelligence before had related only to tactical intelligence, that is, the enemy's combat units.

So when we formed these five DIOCC's, we emphasized the important role of getting the intelligence on the enemy's governmental or secret governmental apparatus which was actually controlling and calling the shots for the enemy's tactical units.

When we put these people together it worked so well on the experimental basis that we began expanding it. Starting at the district level we began expanding it and doing the same thing at several other levels, at corps, province, and central. Formally, then, an organization called Phung Hoang came into being by government decree in 1968.

ESTABLISHMENT OF QUOTAS

Now, this whole question of quotas is one we have been in on from the very start. One of the problems in Vietnam has been motivation of various governmental forces to do things. We debated the wisdom of having quotas and the value of not having quotas. This was largely a Vietnamese determination in which we advisers were responding to

their knowledge of their own people to the effect that if we don't establish a quota we don't get a real push against the infrastructure.

IS UNITED STATES INVOLVED IN "TERRORIST" ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM?

Senator COOPER. Excuse me a minute. I don't want to interrupt you, but I know at a later date this subject will be examined. The question I direct to you, because it is fair and should be answered, is the following: Is the United States involved in any way in carrying out what can be called a "terrorist" activity? Is this a normal intelligence operation of the kind which has been carried on in the past in wartime?

Mr. VANN. Well, the answer very shortly, sir, is no, we do not. We specifically prohibit it. Ever since I have been aware of it it has been prohibited. Ambassador Colby said so yesterday under oath and I say so today under oath.

NEUTRALIZATION OF ENEMY INFRASTRUCTURE

I did want to set a background so I could get to one point, and that is the point wherein people misinterpret that there are people targeted for killing. This is not done. The reason that approximately 31 percent of the enemy infrastructure which is reported as neutralized is shown as people who are killed is not because we have gone out searching for them and then killed them on the spot. The bulk of them, the overwhelming majority of them, are people who in the course of the normal conduct of the war become killed and after being killed, they are identified as having been a member of the enemy's government apparatus.

Senator GORE. What do you call normal?

Mr. VANN. A normal operation, sir, might be a regional force company, a popular force platoon, going in response to an agent report that there is a VC platoon in a certain hamlet. When they get there, they find a VC armed force, they become involved in a firefight; the enemy possibly will attempt to escape; they will be chased down. They may be killed by an aircraft or they may be killed by ground fire.

The Vietnamese officer in charge goes through the documents on a body. There is an ammunition belt around his waist; there is a rifle in his hands and he turns to you with a triumphant smile and says, "This man was head of the tax collection unit of the district committee."

Now, in many cases I personally feel that our Vietnamese friends may be in error as to what the man's job was. He may just be a guerilla soldier and they may well be saying something else simply to meet their quota.

Now, I wanted to get this on the record because, as they are identified as having been killed, there is the supposition on the part of many people that we go out and deliberately assassinate them. This is not the object of the program.

It is much preferable to capture a member of the enemy structure. When you capture him the entire structure will crumble because you can then interrogate him and find out what the structure is. The

moment he is captured every member of his organization becomes apprehensive as to his future security.

COMBAT AREA AND FREE FIRE ZONES

Senator COOPER. Is all of South Vietnam considered "a terror area," as we designated areas in World War II as "a combat zone?"

Mr. VANN. No, sir. In most places in the Delta the helicopter gun ships that are flown by the Americans are instructed that, if they are fired at from a populated area, they are not allowed to return the fire. They are to fly away and report it.

Senator COOPER. My question is——

Mr. VANN. There are other areas that are designated as free fire zones.

Senator COOPER. Does the Army designate specific areas as combat areas as they did in World War II?

Mr. VANN. No, sir, because the enemy does have a capability to go everywhere.

Senator COOPER. All of Vietnam is a combat area.

Mr. VANN. All of South Vietnam is a combat area, sir, and at times the streets of Saigon have been.

Senator COOPER. I have not asked these questions to approve actions of United States or South Vietnamese forces which would not be in accordance with the accepted rules of warfare. I recall that in the United States during World War II the whole Japanese population was moved from the west coast and it was a doubtful operation.

Mr. VANN. There are some areas designated as free fire zones. These are areas which we feel are totally inhabited by enemy soldiers and void of civilian population.

PACIFICATION PROGRAM IF U.S. WITHDRAWS FORCES

Senator COOPER. I will ask this question. You are not able to say whether the pacification program and the success you attribute to it is such a program that it could be sustained if the United States should withdraw its forces, say, in 2 years, by the South Vietnamese people?

Mr. VANN. Sir, with my area of responsibility being the IV Corps and with no U.S. combat forces now in the IV Corps, it would not be wise of me to speculate as to how long for the rest of the country.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to ask questions?

POLITICAL STABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator CASE. I just have one question that was suggested by the Senator from Kentucky and developed somewhat and that is on the question of your statement that success of this program depends, among other things, upon continued stability, political stability, in South Vietnam. And I again will go further into this on my own time on the next round of questioning, but this is terribly important, it seems to me. We have been getting from many people the suggestion that Thieu's government becomes more and more narrowly based and

unrepresentative and the inference or the implication of this to many people is that it is becoming more fragile and less acceptable.

I gather from you a feeling that you have somewhat a different view about the strength and stability of this regime in the minds of the great mass of the people, as opposed to various political factions that exist in the capital city. Am I correct in sensing this?

Mr. VANN. I wholeheartedly subscribe to the answer that Ambassador Colby gave on that, sir. You look at it on two levels: one is the level of the intellectuals and urban oriented French trained group that makes up most of these political parties in the Saigon area and the other is the peasant in the countryside.

I am well qualified on the second one. On the second one the base is broadening, and broadening rapidly. On the first one I will have to defer to someone who has responsibilities for the political activity in the Saigon area.

Senator CASE. Then I take it you regard the important level, from the standpoint of the kind of stability you regard as essential to our success there, as the support of the countryside.

Mr. VANN. That, sir, plus continuation of constitutional government in Saigon. I don't think that whether President Thieu is reelected or not bears upon political stability. The fact is that an election will take place in 1971, and that someone representing a majority of the vote will then be elected because a change in procedures, a runoff between the two leading groups will assure that. This is what I interpret as being political stability at that level.

Sentor CASE. That isn't quite my question and you know it isn't.

Mr. VANN. I consider it——

Senator CASE. I don't want to press you beyond——

Mr. VANN. I consider the countryside to be far more significant, yes, than the Saigon area.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

U.S. ADVISERS' RECOMMENDATIONS TO VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS

Senator GORE. I find interesting the part of your statement where you describe a meeting with so-called Vietnamese leaders. You say that this kind of a meeting is held once a week and that there are usually in attendance approximately 20 Vietnamese and about 10 U.S. senior advisers to these Vietnamese.

Then I find these two very interesting sentences which describe an unusual type of democracy or an unusual type of self-government or an unusual type of guided performance. Let me read the sentences to you:

> The meeting is used as a problem-solving session wherein all of the briefings and most of the discussions are by and among the Vietnamese officials. . . . Prior to the meeting, U.S. advisers have provided their recommendations as to discussion topics and each adviser, operating under my direction, has recommended to his Vietnamese counterpart the problem areas that should be brought up and solutions that should be proposed.

Mr. VANN. I think I might clarify for you, Senator, by adding that these are by no means always accepted nor do they always govern. But the reason we go through that procedure is this—I am a firm believer when there is a U.S. community that they sing from the same

song sheet. I want to be sure that the advisory effort is doing things that are consistent with the U.S. policy in Vietnam, and that we are trying to influence the Vietnamese to do things that we feel are important.

Now, please keep this in mind. The recommendations are made by the adviser to his counterpart. The counterpart makes a decision to accept or reject. I don't think that it is relevant to have an adviser who does not advise.

Senator CASE. So, the picture here, as I see it, I mean as you described it, is that you have these kinds of meetings once a week and prior to the meetings the U.S. advisers have told them what subjects to talk about and the solutions they should suggest, and then the U.S. advisers stay in the meeting and listen most of the time, I believe you indicate.

Well, this seems a pretty strong hand of the United States. It reminds me of an observation that a member of our staff recently made after a trip to Vietnam, and that is that the United States is far more involved in the life of the Vietnamese now than the French ever were.

Mr. VANN. The only way I could agree with that is to say we are far more favorably involved from the standpoint of a better future of the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. From what standpoint?

Mr. VANN. From the standpoint of the future of the Vietnamese. Our involvement is one that is positive as opposed to exploitation.

Senator GORE. Do you think they have liked it since we have been there?

Mr. VANN. I think they would prefer that to what would have happened to them if we had not been there.

Senator GORE. Do you think those who are gone have any regrets?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am afraid I could not answer that question.

Senator GORE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BREAKDOWN OF ACTIVITIES OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE DELTA

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two catch-up questions. It has been stated that there are 23,000 Americans in the Delta. There are no U.S. combat forces in the IV Corps and there are 2,357 people in the CORDS organization. What are the others doing in the Delta?

Mr. VANN. First of all, sir, there are approximately 6,000 who fly helicopters and maintain them. There are approximately 400 helicopters and, as you know, helicopters require an awful lot of maintenance, so the helicopter group there numbers 6,000 men.

We do provide about 90 percent of the helicopter support to the Government of Vietnam in the Delta.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 6,000 out of 20,000. What are the other 14,000?

Mr. VANN. We have 5,400 engineers there.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they doing?

Mr. VANN. They are building roads, sir. They are working on National Highway 4. They are doing it because all of the Vietnamese engineering and public works capacity is utilized as much as it can and still is not enough.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 11,000. What are the other 9,000?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

We have approximately 5,000 U.S. Navy personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they doing?

Mr. VANN. U.S. Navy personnel have a combination of several operations screening the coasts. This includes the forces off the coast of South Vietnam, the maritime operation, the patrolling of waterways. They also have the mission of advising the Vietnamese. I think more than possibly any other program in Vietnam, because it lends itself to it, they are rapidly turning over to the Vietnamese.

They have a very interesting way of doing it. When a Swift boat, for example, with a crew of 7 Americans, initially goes there, they add one Vietnamese to the crew. They train him to replace one American. The American leaves and they add a second Vietnamese to the crew.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we had better reserve that for secret session.

Mr. VANN. All right, sir.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE METHODS OF MEETING PHOENIX QUOTAS

The CHAIRMAN. I have a few other questions. There is an article this morning in the New York Times, I believe, by Mr. Sterba, relating to the Phoenix program it says and I quote, " 'One thing about the Vietnamese—they will meet every quota that's established for them,' said one critic of the program. 'That's what makes the head count so deceptive. How do you know they are not assigning names and titles to dead bodies?' "

Would you comment on that statement?

Mr. VANN. I believe I actually did, sir, possibly while you were out.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you?

Mr. VANN. I feel that that does take place at some levels, at some times, and I think that the purpose of doing it is to introduce a sludge factor to come up to their quota.

DESTRUCTION BY PRIMITIVE AND SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. Last in discussing the terrorists, you said there was once a small ineffective counterterrorist program, which had been discontinued. Then in discussion with the Senator from Kentucky, a good deal was said about the fact that we do not assassinate people.

You raise a question: In your mind is there any significant difference between wiping out a village with B–52 bombs and napalm and wiping it out with M–16's and hand grenades?

Mr. VANN. I would say from my experience, if such things have occurred—and I am aware that hamlets have been wiped out in both fashions—in the case of B–52's it is always an accident so that I would say there would be a difference.

I know of no time that a B–52 has ever been directed against a populated target, and I was the senior civilian adviser for 4 years in the III Corps area that had over 90 percent of the B–52 strikes.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean to cast any reflections upon B–52's as such. May I correct it to say helicopters or any other kind of modern sophisticated weapons. Is there any distinction in your mind? I

don't wish to raise any questions about the efficiency of the bombers or the B-52's. Is there a difference in your mind between killing people with a primitive weapon and a sophisticated weapon?

Mr. VANN. First of all, sir; let me say that I don't believe in killing civilians under any circumstances. For that reason, I have instituted procedures in the IV Corps wherein if our helicopters are fired at from a civilian occupied area they don't even return fire. This is a significant change in the rules of engagement.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that we have not killed any civilians or very few civilians in Vietnam?

Mr. VANN. No, sir; what I am saying is that we have killed very few deliberately. I am sure that too many—and it would be too many if it was one—have been killed accidentally.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you don't subscribe to these reports of incidents or engagements such as Mylai?

Mr. VANN. Sir, Mylai is outside of the area which I am familiar with. But I would again say I was the senior civilian official from 1966 to 1969 in the III Corps area of South Vietnam, which had the largest contingents of U.S. Forces. I am personally aware that no such incident was ever reported in that Corps area during the time I was there. I would be the official most likely to receive such a report.

I also had a mechanism using Vietnamese reporters who were trained to go out and survey the civilian population in the enemy controlled and the contested areas to find out what they were saying about the war. I have compiled over 600 indepth reports of that nature. I have never had a complaint of the sort of thing that is alleged at Song Mai and Mylai.

CIVILIANS KILLED

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea how many civilians in South Vietnam have been killed in the last 5 years?

Mr. VANN. Sir; there have been a large number of what could only be estimates made as to how many civilians have been killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say why the army keeps statistics on body counts, which we have had daily, and why they do not keep any statistics upon civilian deaths?

Mr. VANN. First of all some statistics are kept, but most civilian deaths would probably occur in an area where there was conflict going on and one in which we might or might not occupy the ground after the conflict was over. If we did not occupy it, we would have no way of knowing how many were dead.

SOLATIUM PAYMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. How much do you pay in compensation to the survivor of a civilian who is killed by accident?

Mr. VANN. Sir, when it is determined that someone was responsible, the Government of Vietman or United States aircraft, there is a solatium payment made.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. How much is it?

Mr. VANN. Most recently it was 8,000 piasters if it was an adult who was killed.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is that in dollars?

Mr. VANN. That is approximately $70, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. $70.

Mr. VANN. That is not in payment for the act, but to assist the family in burying the dead. There are other claims that they can then make against the Government of Vietnam for loss of livelihood and et cetera.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many such payments were made?

Mr. VANN. I would not have the figures for all of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody have it?

Mr. VANN. I believe they could be compiled with respect to U.S. units.

Mr. COLBY. I think I can get a figure for you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have it right here.

(The information referred to follows:)

The solatium payment for those over 15 years of age that are killed is 4,000 piasters. Those under 15 years old is 2,000 piasters. They do not keep figures on the number of payments that have been made. However, the total payments made last year amounted to 114,713,440 piasters or $972,000.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE DELTA

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you account for all those 23,000 people? I thought you did. The staff says you did not. Was there any other item?

Mr. VANN. Yes, there were, sir. The chairman changed the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't particularly want to have you reveal how you changed the staff of each boat. All I wanted to know was the number of people.

Mr. VANN. Right, sir. I gave you 6,000 who were helicopters, the 5,400 engineers, and approximately 5,000 who are Navy. Now in addition to that we have a large number of support forces who provide signal communication, ordnance and transportation maintenance capability to back up some of the equipment that the Vietnamese have, and then the total advisory organization in the Delta, military and civilian, numbers approximately 3,800.

Now in addition to these Americans, sir, there is also an Air Force Advisory organization that exists down in the Delta.

FRENCH AND U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to be even more than the 23,000. I didn't quite understand your answer to the question of the Senator from Tennessee about the French. It seems to me you are more involved than the French ever were. I understood from the paper the other day that the French only had about 27,000 civil servants in all of Vietnam in the Colonial days administering the entire country, and you have 23,000 in your Corps alone.

Mr. VANN. Sir, the French were there in the role of province chiefs and deputy province chiefs and commanders of the military forces, not as advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Why should there be so many more advisers than there are commanders?

Mr. VANN. I don't know that there should be or that there are, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure I read within the last week that in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, all of Indo-China, the French had approxi-

mately 27,000 civil servants to administer that quite sizable colony. We have now 23,000 in the Delta.

Mr. VANN. Sir, we are comparing two different things.

The CHAIRMAN. I know we are. It seems to me extraordinary.

Mr. VANN. You are speaking of civil servants and you are comparing them with military personnel. The French also had a rather large French contingent and a rather large Algerian contingent and a rather large——

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say all combat troops are out and these are not soldiers?

Mr. VANN. That is combat support, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. VANN. The 6,000 helicopter people are combat support. The engineers are support personnel. They are not combat personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many advisers then who are not running either a machine or firing a gun?

Mr. VANN. Sir, in all of Vietnam we have less than 10,000 advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. All of Vietnam?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is approximately what I assume the French had, if these other figures are right. How many enemies in the delta do you consider you have?

Mr. VANN. We have an enemy order of battle, this is armed units and guerilla strength, of 35,500. That is backed up by a considerable support force, and it is also backed up by estimates that go as high as 35,000 infrastructure members.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

PHOENIX PROGRAM AND GVN POLITICS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the reporter to put in the record here the article I referred to by Mr. Sterba and the article by Mr. Arthur Dommen on the same subject.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Feb. 18, 1970]

THE CONTROVERSIAL OPERATION PHOENIX: HOW IT ROOTS OUT VIETCONG SUSPECTS

(By James P. Sterba)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, February 17.—As a controversial operation known as Phoenix moves into its third year and to center stage today at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in Washington, American officials here privately continue to call it one of the most important and least successful programs in South Vietnam.

Designed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency to weed out an estimated 75,000 Vietcong political leaders and agents from the civilian population, the program is not the sinister, cloak-and-dagger, terror operation that some critics, including the Vietcong, have portrayed it to be, these officials insist.

"That's nonsense," one of them said. "Phoenix is just not a killing organization. The kinds of things they [Foreign Relations Committee members] are probably looking for are not happening that much—which is not to say they are not happening at all."

SENTENCE WITHOUT TRIAL

Briefly, Phoenix works this way: When local officials feel they have enough evidence against a person suspected of being connected with the Viet-cong, they

arrest him. If he is not released quickly—suspects often vanish out the back doors of police station within two hours of their arrest—he is taken to a province interrogation center.

A dossier on the suspect is then given to the Provincial Security Council, whose powers are those of a ruling body, not a judicial one. The council may, however, free the suspect or order him jailed for as long as two years without trial.

Once the suspect has served a term in jail he is considered to have been rehabilitated.

Some officials concede that many abuses have occurred under Phoenix and that the program has potential for serious harm if it were used, for example, to harass legitimate political opposition. Yet in the over-all portrait of Phoenix painted here, the program appears more notorious for inefficiency, corruption and bungling than for terror.

Like many other programs in Vietnam, Phoenix looks best on paper. Officials here argue that its controversial reputation has been built more on its secrecy than on its actions.

If someone decided to make a movie about Phoenix, one critic joked, the lead would be more a Gomer Pyle than a John Wayne.

DIFFERING VIEWS

While both American and South Vietnamese officials in Saigon believe the program to be vital, some local officials are less than enthusiastic. Saigon officials contend that unless the Vietcong's highly skilled political apparatus is destroyed, the Communist movement will continue to prosper regardless of how many guerrillas and enemy soldiers are killed. In many contested areas, however, the local people appear hesitant to upset any informal accommodations made for the sake of survival.

"The local officials are perfectly capable of carrying out this program if they thought they were winning," one American said.

The Phoenix program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, was established with the money and organizational talents of the C.I.A. in late 1967. It was officially sanctioned by President Nguyen Van Thieu July 1, 1968.

Under the Ministry of the Interior, administrative committees and intelligence-gathering centers were set up in the 44 province capitals and most of the country's 242 districts.

About 450 Americans were sprinkled among these groups to serve as advisers and paymasters. A large number were C.I.A. agents or military intelligence officers borrowed by the agency.

MILITARY NOW IN CHARGE

Gradually, the C.I.A.'s role was taken over by United States military men so that at this moment according to officials, of the 441 Americans involved in Phoenix, all six are military men. Last July 1, overall authority for American adsorbed by U.S. military headquarters here.

The program was set up to operate at the local level, where the problems begin.

At each "district intelligence coordinating and operations center," as they are called, teams usually consisting of a South Vietnamese military intelligence officer, an American intelligence adviser—usually a lieutenant—special police agents and local pacification officials are supposed to pool intelligence data and compile dossiers on suspected Vietcong agents within the surrounding communities.

When they feel they have enough evidence, they attempt to find and arrest the suspect.

"The trouble is that in many cases, there is a complete lack of dossiers," said one civilian official. "You might have a single sentence in a dossier saying that so and so heard the suspect talking about such and such."

FINDING THE SUSPECTS

Sometimes the arrest may involve a single local policeman. Other times, it may take a combined police-military operation to go into a hamlet and find a suspect.

In the course of normal military operations, some suspected Vietcong agents may defect, or be killed or captured. When reports of these operations filter back to the Phoenix district headquarters, officials simply call out the numbers and add them to their scores. This helps them meet quotas set by higher headquarters.

"One thing about the Vietnamese—they will meet every quota that's established for them," said one critic of the program. "That's what makes the head count so

deceptive. How do you know they are not assigning names and titles to dead bodies?"

In 1969, according to official figures, 19,534 Vietcong were "neutralized." That number included 8,515 reportedly captured, 6,187 killed and 4,832 who defected.

Once a suspect is captured, he automatically becomes a "neutralized" Vietcong and part of the official tallies for the year. This is true despite the fact that many suspects are released an hour or two later through the back doors of local police stations. Starting this year, officials say, suspects will have to be sentenced before they will be counted as "neutralized."

If the suspect is not released at the local level, he is taken to a province interrogation center for questioning and then confined until his dossier comes before the Province Security Council, composed of the province chief, his deputy for intelligence, the top national policemen in the province, and usually two or three other provincial officials. This may take months.

The provincial council is a ruling body, not a judicial body. The evidence is examined, and the suspect is either released or sentenced. Of the suspects who make it this far, an estimated 30 percent are released for lack of evidence.

"I've never heard of anyone having a defense," said an official familiar with the procedure. "Generally these guys are pretty good and if the district people haven't turned up enough evidence, the suspect will be released."

20 PER CENT JAILED

If the council determines that the suspect is a Vietcong agent, he can be "detained" without trial for up to two years. But he usually isn't.

The program's American advisers estimated recently that about 20 per cent of the suspects in 1969 were sentenced, and that only a fraction of those were imprisoned for the maximum two years. Most sentences were from three to six months.

Theoretically, those given the maximum sentence are to be sent to federal prisons, such as the one on Conson Island. Some provincial officials are reluctant to do this, however, because by imprisoning a man in their own jails they receive a prisoner-food allotment from the Saigon Government.

After having served a jail sentence, the suspect is given a Government identification card and released on parole. He is supposed to check in from time to time with local police officials.

Having to arrest or capture the same suspect two or three times is frustrating, according to some local advisers in the program, and may have some effect on the statistics in the column relating to slain suspects.

Probably the most controversial arm of the Phoenix program in each province is a group called the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit. It consists of a dozen or more South Vietnamese mercenaries, originally recruited and paid handsomely by the C.I.A. to serve under the province chief as the major "action arm" of the program.

The members of these units, usually an assortment of local hoodlums, soldiers of fortune, and draft-dodgers, receive 15,000 piasters a month. An ordinary soldier gets 4,000 piasters.

Some Saigon officials concede that these units have been employed in extortion and terror. But the officials insist that the units' foul reputations have been exaggerated.

In October, after second thoughts about the program's secrecy, Premier Tran Thien Khiem appealed in a speech to the people for aid in identifying Communist agents among them. In many areas, "wanted" posters were distributed.

In one Mekong Delta town, an American official said, Phoenix operatives had worked for months trying to find a Vietcong agent. Within an hour after his "wanted" poster was displayed, a woman appeared at the police station and said the agent lived next door.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Jan 4, 1970]

Gloomy, if Familiar, Picture—Infighting Could Destroy South Vietnamese Democracy

(By Arthur J. Dommen)

Saigon.—Hardly anyone is joking about the long, bruising fight between President Nguyen Van Thieu and the South Vietnamese National Assembly which conceivably could destroy the present democratic regime.

Essentially, it is a power struggle between Thieu and the assembly, with the president attempting to force the ouster of three members of the lower house who are accused of being pro-Communist.

One of the accused, Rep. Tran Ngoc Chau, even hinted he would commit suicide if found guilty.

Thus far, the struggle has been a draw. Thieu's efforts to have the three House of Representatives members ousted began last November. It dragged on until Wednesday, when the house voted to support Thieu's accusations against the three legislators, but refused to expel them.

The president's chief agent in the assembly declared immediately after the vote that Thieu still intends to nail the deputies to the wall. In turn, the accused deputies threaten to create considerable chaos if they are arrested unconstitutionally.

No one knows how the president actually feels. Since his Dec. 10 outburst comparing the three allegedly pro-Communist deputies to barking dogs, he has said nothing. That may change this week, when he has promised to hold a press conference.

But the fact remains that he has chosen a bad moment for the fight.

The Viet Cong have been telling the people in their midnight propaganda lectures that they are going to announce a broadening of their clandestine Provisional Revolutionary Government. It is generally expected that they will make a deliberately dramatic move in their campaign for a coalition government at about the time of Tet, the Vietnamese New Year, which occurs at the beginning of February.

In this context, the drawn-out fight with the National Assembly, with its overtones of illegal mob action and resort to unconstitutional means to achieve his end, has not done anything to improve Thieu's political image.

The Saigon government's argument is that everything is negotiable except the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong's argument is that the Saigon government is stifling that right.

But the lower house of the National Assembly, though far from being perfectly representative, is the closest thing in the country today to being the voice of the people. Its members are elected by a highest vote count by individual constituencies.

The fact that Thieu—with all the machinery of coercion, enticement and outright vote-buying available to his government—could barely get a majority to support his position against the three deputies has demonstrated once again that he is a minority president.

Furthermore, when one might have expected him to wish to demonstrate the fact that constitutionally he is the president of all the people, whether they agree with him or not, he has instead deliberately embarked on an opposite course. He has proceeded to arrest a number of student leaders and opposition politicians and to close down some of the more intelligently edited of Saigon's vocal and nationalist newspapers.

Lastly, although Thieu suggested Dec. 10 that the "army and people" might have to take matters into their own hands unless the house acted to expel Chau and the others, it seems now that not all the army agreed with him.

Reliable sources say at least 10 army officers, mostly of lower rank but one a lieutenant colonel, have been placed under arrest in recent days simultaneously with the crackdown on students and politicians.

For Americans, all this makes for a gloomy picture, but a familiar one, unfortunately. Plotting against the exerciser of power is an age-old tradition of the Vietnamese. It is a phenomenon intimately bound up with their concept of the mandate of heaven, which implies public acceptance of abrupt changes of power rather than Western-style evolution and transition.

Doubly unfortunately, the slow but steady progress that the Saigon government has made in the last year with American support in undercutting the Viet Cong power base in the countryside—uncontestably real and genuine progress—counts for little in the event the regime lands itself in a first-rate internal political crisis.

The issue Thieu has chosen as the cause celebre in the assembly fight is the alleged existence of secret dealings with the other side. In doing so, Thieu has compelled Chau and others to publicly defend the legitimacy of contacts between relatives separated by the war.

Some of Thieu's closest advisers are ex-Viet Minh, or have relatives currently working for either Hanoi or the Viet Cong. This is a fact of life in Vietnam. Furthermore, many South Vietnamese officers have relatives on the other side.

Therefore, involving the army in a political campaign to persecute men who have publicly admitted having contacts with the other side holds a certain amount of danger.

So far, there is no firm evidence that this is Thieu's intention, although the illegal invasion of the lower house premises on Dec. 20 by Thieu supporters searching for the three accused legislators was an ominous sign.

There is nothing the leaders in Hanoi would like to see more than the American forces in South Vietnam becoming embroiled in a highly political confrontation leading to a state of total anarchy. The danger at the moment is that the United States appears to be more bound to the maintenance of a constitutional regime in Saigon than do the leaders of that regime themselves.

DEATH PAYMENTS IN DELTA

Senator GORE. You asked the witness a moment ago about the number of death payments. He said he did not have the statistics for all of Vietnam. I wonder if you have it for the area for which you have been responsible?

Mr. VANN. No, sir; because mine is an advisory responsibility. U.S. units within the area would keep their own and report it through their own command channel, sir, which does not involve my advisory organization. However, I can secure for you both the Government of Vietnam solatium payments made within my area of responsibility and the U.S. unit solatium payment made within my area of responsibility. I just don't happen to have it with me.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN DELTA

Senator GORE. Would you also give an estimate of the civilian casualties in your area?

Mr. VANN. I can give you, sir; the only thing that can be documented, which is the civilian war casualty admissions into the 16 province hospitals in the Delta. That was approximately 28,000 in 1968, and 23,000 in 1969.

Senator GORE. A person who was killed in the village——

Mr. VANN. He would not be admitted, sir, but this would be the only basis we would have for giving any firm figure on civilian casualties.

Senator GORE. I didn't ask for any firm figure. I asked for your estimate.

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am really not qualified to go into that in detail, but I will give you my judgment. My judgment is that for every person who is admitted to a hospital there is probably a person killed and there are probably two other people who are wounded, but for one reason or another did not get to a hospital. That is a judgment that I have made in the past based upon the information available to me.

Senator GORE. This would mean more than 100,000 civilian casualties in your area?

Mr. VANN. That would mean approximately that figure, sir. But keep this in mind, too: That is casualties from all forms of action. That involves the mortaring of our district and province capitals that is done by the enemy. It involves the number of buses blown up on the highway by the enemy with mines that are not discriminate. It involves firing into a village and a hamlet.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I have one other question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS

Senator GORE. You draw a distinction between combat troops and combat support troops which raises an interesting question of termi-

nology. It is said that a Vietnamization goal is the withdrawal of all ground combat troops from South Vietnam, but when I inquired into that I found that the so-called support forces would still include infantry, still include artillery, still include bazooka units and mortar units. I couldn't find any elements of a U.S. Army that wouldn't be included in the so-called support troops.

I wonder what is the real difference between a helicopter crew that is in combat and a helicopter crew that is not in combat? Can you explain the difference between combat support and combat helicopter troops?

Mr. VANN. First of all, sir, specifically in answer to your question on the difference between these two type crews: a large amount of helicopter operations in the delta involve the transporting of troops from one area to another. It involves the hauling of Vietnamese and U.S. officials from one area to another and the hauling of supplies from one area to another.

A much lesser part of the helicopter effort in the delta is devoted to the gun ship support that is provided. So there is a distinct difference, just in answer to that specific question.

Senator GORE. Do the men in the helicopter crews engage in combat?

Mr. VANN. Those who fly gun ships do, but that is called combat support.

Senator GORE. So when I read in the paper that we have no combat troops in the delta——

Mr. VANN. Ground combat troops.

Senator GORE. Ground combat troops.

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. But we do have helicopter gun ships?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. With American soldiers fighting and shooting and killing and dying?

Mr. VANN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. COLBY. If I might, Senator, the difference, I believe, is largely a question of command and control.

Senator GORE. A difference of what?

Mr. COLBY. Of command and control. When you are talking about a ground——

Senator GORE. I think it is also a problem of military terminology and words of military art that give one impression to a military man and something else to the American people who read them.

Mr. COLBY. Well, there is a distinction between them as used in the military art.

Senator GORE. Quite a distinction.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator GORE. I don't know exactly how the American people draw the distinction between a helicopter guncrew that is engaged in combat in battle, killing and being killed, but yet they read there are no combat troops in the Delta.

Mr. COLBY. No ground combat troops.

Senator GORE. Ground combat troops.

U.S. ENGINEERS IN VIETNAM

What about the engineers?

Mr. COLBY. They are not a combat force in that sense.

Senator GORE. Do they do any fighting?

Mr. COLBY. They do not do any fighting. They do not seek out the enemy to attack them.

Senator GORE. Are they all engineers?

Mr. COLBY. They are members of engineer units. They are not all graduate engineers, sir.

Senator GORE. Are they soldiers?

Mr. COLBY. They are soldiers and they carry weapons to protect themselves.

Senator GORE. They carry weapons. Are they organized into military units?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir, they are.

Senator GORE. What kind of units?

Mr. COLBY. Companies.

Mr. VANN. Construction battalions.

Mr. COLBY. Construction battalions.

Mr. VANN. It is the 34th Engineer Construction group. Its principal mission is to construct roads and also some vertical construction. It is primarily involved on roads, however, in the delta.

Senator GORE. To what extent do they engage in combat?

Mr. VANN. Practically none. On occasion, very rare occasion, one of the engineer crews working on the road will be ambushed or attacked. They will then defend themselves. They do not go out as part of a combat operation. And they normally work on roads that are considered secure.

TOTAL COST OF ADVISORY PROGRAMS IN THE DELTA

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection what is your budget for this year, Mr. Vann?

Mr. VANN. Sir, we don't have a budget, as so many people furnish us support. However, I have compiled an estimate of the total cost of the programs for which we have advisory responsibilities in the delta. That is at best only an estimate in which we have to make a lot of judgments. I would not submit it to any auditor at all.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

Mr. VANN. It comes to $339 million, sir. That includes the pay of the RF and PF soldiers, which is the largest element of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it include the cost of building the roads?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that roadbuilding in the pacification?

Mr. VANN. It includes, sir, every single bit of U.S. resource that we could put a dollar sign on, including the pay of the soldiers, the pay of the advisers, the cost of the cement, the cost of the rock, the cost of the Public Law 480 commodities, everything that I could compile that in any way was a U.S. cost.

CASUALTIES IN DELTA SINCE REMOVAL OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS

Senator GORE. What casualties have these combat support forces in the delta suffered since the ground combat troops have been withdrawn?

Mr. VANN. Sir, over the last 5 months we average, including advisers and members of these various support elements, an average of 15 Americans a month being killed in the delta.

CIVILIAN POPULATION OF DELTA

Senator GORE. What is the civilian population of the delta?

Mr. VANN. 5 million, 5.9 million. It represents over a third of the population of South Vietnam.

PERCENTAGE OF ENEMY DEATHS DUE TO U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT

Senator GORE. When we read the number of enemy troops killed by the South Vietnamese Army in a given engagement in the delta, for instance, should we assume that many of these were killed by U.S. gun ships and air support or combat support troops? What percentage of the enemy killed is the result of U.S. combat support troops?

Mr. VANN. We have inquired into that ourselves, sir; and for the last 3 months our estimate is that something less than 30 percent are killed as a result of airpower, that is the aircraft strikes and the helicopter gun ships and the Navy support. We have naval gunfire support.

VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO FRONT

Senator GORE. I was interested to read that our distinguished Vice President was a visitor in Saigon. He took the helicopter trip to visit with U.S. troops at the front. Were you in Saigon at the time?

Mr. VANN. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. COLBY. I was, Senator.

Senator GORE. Do you know how great a distance he traveled?

Mr. COLBY. I would estimate that he went about 50 miles roughly west of Saigon to a couple of firebases up near the Cambodian border.

Senator GORE. So the front is not very far from Saigon?

Mr. COLBY. The front is not very far. The Cambodian border at its nearest point is 35 miles from Saigon, Senator.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The next gentleman we were to have this morning is Mr. Mills

BOMBING AND FORCE REDUCTION

Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question? You have answered in great detail many of these questions. Some of them go to the operation of the military side of Vietnam. You have been to war, and unhappy as these circumstances are, they occur in war; don't they? Civilians are killed. That is correct; is it not? You know that in World War II the allies bombed populations of Germany.

You say we are now trying not to bomb population centers; so there has been a change.

Let me ask you this: You served there during a period when you saw the continued buildup of our forces in Vietnam; did you?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Would you say that you know there is a reduction in forces now?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Do you consider that a change in policy?

Mr. VANN. I consider it to be a very distinct change in our national policy in Vietnam, sir.

Senator COOPER. That is all I wanted to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mills, do you have a statement to make?

Mr. MILLS. Yes; I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HAWTHORNE MILLS, PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISER, TUYEN DUC PROVINCE

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Chairman, I am Hawthorne Mills from California. I am a Foreign Service officer, class 3, on loan to AID for the past 2½ years and now serving as Province Senior Adviser in Tuyen Duc Province in the south central highlands, almost exactly in the geographic center of South Vietnam. My assignment also includes advisory responsibility for the autonomous city of Dalat, the former French summer capital of Indochina, which is now the provincial capital.

TUYEN DUC PROVINCE, DALAT AND INHABITANTS

In area, the province is about 1,815 square miles, a little smaller than the State of Delaware, consisting mainly of rugged, heavily forested mountains with a few broad river valleys and high plateaus.

Until the early 1950's most of the inhabitants were Montagnard tribesmen. After the Geneva agreement in 1954, however, Vietnamese and ethnic minority refugees from North and Central Vietnam were resettled in fairly homogeneous communities in the arable valleys and along the highways of the province. Today the total population, not counting Dalat City, is about 111,000, of whom roughly 34 percent are indigenous Montagnards, 12 percent refugee minority peoples from the north, and 54 percent are ethnic Vietnamese. Most of Dalat's 82,000 people have also moved there from other parts of the country in the past 20 years, because until 1950 the French kept the city off limits to all Vietnamese except those working for them.

Today Dalat is an important intellectual, cultural, and economic center which contains a university, the Vietnamese National Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and numerous other academic and technical institutions. In addition to its urban center, Dalat's 27-square-mile area contains dozens of rural hamlets and the chief source of livelihood for the city's inhabitants is vegetable growing. In the rest of the province, as well, most of the people make their living farming, logging, or raising livestock, although there is some light industry in some of the larger towns.

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN DALAT AND TUYEN DUC

Until 1967, Dalat and Tuyen Duc Province had been relatively untroubled by the war; some observers considered the area to be the

rest and recuperation area for both sides. In December 1967, however, the Communists sent several battalions of troops into the two southern districts, south of Dalat City overran several hamlets and outposts, forced thousands of mountain people to take refuge in more secure areas, interrupted the flow of traffic along the highways, and during Tet of 1968, actually occupied portions of Dalat for more than 2 weeks. Since that time, the Vietcong have continued to make night raids from their base camps in the mountains into the populated areas to get supplies, impress recruits, set up ambushes along the roads, and disrupt the programs of the Vietnamese Government by assassinating officials, blowing up rural health stations, schools and administrative offices, and in general intimidating the people.

GVN EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY

The resources of the Government of Vietnam in the province have been stretched to the limit in trying to provide adequate security to the people while at the same time bringing them improved public and social services and helping them to attain a higher living standard. There is only a small number of regular ARVN troops in the province and there are no United States or other free world combat forces, although we do have U.S. engineering, signal, and artillery support units. Therefore, the burden of providing security has fallen upon the regional and popular forces and, to an increasing extent, upon the police and people's self defense units. In the past 2 years the GVN has succeeded in bringing conditions of relative security to more than 100,000 people of this province who for a time lived under heavy Vietcong influence.

In command of the regional and popular forces, as well as all other Government personnel and activities in the province and city, is a Vietnamese Army lieutenant colonel who serves as both province chief and mayor. His staff at the province, city and district levels is composed of both military and civilian officials. All village and hamlet leaders throughout the province, however, are elected civilians.

COMPOSITION OF U.S. ADVISORY TEAM

Like the province chief's staff, the advisory team I head is composed of both military and civilian members, each of whom has an advisory relationship with the appropriate official on the Vietnamese side. My deputy is a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and throughout the rest of the team we have civilians and military personnel working side by side, sometimes with an army man in charge, sometimes with a civilian.

At present, the team is composed of nine U.S. civilians, 85 Army officers and senior noncommissioned officers, and seven Filipino and Korean and Australian technicians, as well as a number of Vietnamese development specialists and clerical personnel. Most of the team members are serving outside of Dalat on district advisory teams at each of the district capitals or on mobile advisory teams attached to and living with regional and popular force units in the field.

At the province level, the team has advisers working with Vietnamese counterparts in the following fields: development operations which include agriculture, public health, education, refugees and social welfare, village self-development, public administration and

many of the other traditional AID areas; public safety, including the national police and the police field forces or gendarmerie; regional and popular forces; engineering; supply and administration; psychological operations and Chieu Hoi; rural development and Montagnard cadre teams which assist villagers in development activities and defense; and traditional military staff sections of S–1 (personnel), S–2 (intelligence), S–3 (operations), S–4 (logistics), and S–5 (civil affairs).

The CHAIRMAN. That is more complicated than the poverty program; isn't it? How do you keep track of all of it?

Mr. MILLS. Very capable staff.

The Chairman. It must be. Go ahead.

ACTIVITIES OF ADVISERS AND COUNTERPARTS

Mr. MILLS. In addition to advising our Vietnamese counterparts, we on the province level team provide support services and guidance to those serving on our district and mobile advisory teams in the field. Our offices are located as close as possible to those of our counterparts; several of our advisers share offices with the Vietnamese they advise. My office is, for instance, just across the hall from the province chief's so we can discuss our problems and programs whenever necessary, usually several times a day. I also accompany the province chief to meetings with other pacification officials, on inspection trips to approve completed projects where U.S. commodities have been used, and on his frequent field trips to give guidance to village and hamlet officials and military units throughout the province. About once a week we go with his technical service chiefs to spend the night in an outlying hamlet. On these visits he talks with the people in the marketplace, distributes relief commodities, settles problems on the spot, usually sleeps on an air mattress in the local schoolhouse or administrative office, and generally tries to make the national government seem real and important to the population.

The relationships which have been established between the advisers on our team and their counterparts are, in almost all cases, friendly, frank and productive. Our main emphasis is on helping the Vietnamese to make their own system work more efficiently, not substituting our system for theirs. In the 14 months I have been in Dalat, I have seen very real improvements in security, in economic and social conditions, in the willingness of the people to defend themselves, and in the competence and effectiveness of Vietnamese Government officials. Now I would be glad to answer any questions you have.

The CHAIRMAN. In that last paragraph you said our main emphasis is to make their system work. You mean their system involved all those different bureaus to which you referred?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds more like our system to me.

Mr. MILLS. Sir, that is an inheritance from the French as the ambassador mentioned. While we don't have an individual adviser for every technical agency or every operational outfit that they have, we do have someone who follows those affairs on our staff. In many cases it is one individual following eight or 12 different functions.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you state how many people in——

Mr. Mills. Yes, I did; sir. We have roughly 85 military people and about nine U.S. civilians.

APPOINTMENT AND AUTHORITY OF PROVINCE CHIEF

The Chairman. You said a Vietnamese Army Lieutenant colonel, who serves as both province chief and mayor, is in command of the regional and popular forces as well as all other government personnel and activities of the province. He is not elected; he is appointed.

Mr. Mills. He is appointed; yes, sir.

The Chairman. That is true of all provinces.

Mr. Mills. Yes, it is.

Mr. Colby. The Vietnamese constitution, Mr. Chairman, states that the province chiefs will be elected, but during the President's first term of office they may be appointed.

The Chairman. Since he is in command of all of the personnel and activities, what is all this talk about elections? What difference does it make if there are elections if they don't have any authority?

Mr. Mills. But they do have, sir.

The elections are at the local level at the hamlet and village level. The rural population has elected its own representatives who in turn go to the district officials and the province officials with suggestions for development of the village and with the problems of the people.

The Chairman. But the final word is the province chief's; isn't it. Perhaps I am reading something into this. You say he is in command of all Government personnel. Does Government personnel include the local officials?

Mr. Mills. In a sense, but not in the sense I meant it in this statement, sir. I was speaking of his staff, both military and civilian. I was trying to indicate he was both the military commander and the province chief on the civil side as well. The local officials, the elected officials at the village and hamlet level are responsible to the people who elect them and not to the province chief, although, of course, they must follow the guidelines and the rules laid down for them.

The Chairman. You say he is in control of all Government personnel and activities in the province and the city? That is very all-inclusive language and what I was trying to determine is how extensive is his responsibility. He would seem to have very extensive powers.

Mr. Mills. He does.

The Chairman. And you are his adviser?

Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISER AND PROVINCE CHIEF

The Chairman. How does that particular relationship work? Does he ask your advice, or do you volunteer it? How does this operate? Do you have an office across the hall? What happens? Describe it as best you can to the uninitiated.

Mr. Mills. I think it would be easier if we talk about a specific case.

The Chairman. All right, do it any way you like.

Mr. Mills. Right.

In our development operations section, for instance, his staff will be working on the public works program for the coming year. People

on my staff who follow the engineering and the public works section will get together with his staff and discuss how much money will be available, and what the priorities ought to be in using this money. My staff will discuss it with me, and the province chief's staff will discuss it with the province chief. Before we have our weekly pacification and development council meetings, the province chief and I will talk about it. We will bring our best judgment to bear on what the best way would be of using the resources available. This happens in all other areas. I am advised by the people on my staff who handle the technical aspects. I also am his adviser in the military sense as well, but, of course, I rely very heavily on the military officers on my staff for that kind of advice. It is a very informal relationship. He doesn't come to me and say, "I would like to have your advice on this particular subject," but in the course of our inspection trips, in our planning for new projects, in a manner of conversational discussion of the issues, my ideas on what ought to be done are brought out. He may or may not decide that this is the advice he wants to take. It would make my job much easier, of course, if he would take all the American advice that we think would contribute to the development of his province. This is in no case true. He is his own man.

The CHAIRMAN. Has he ever declined to take your advice?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is an example of that?

Mr. MILLS. Well, in one case, to continue the example that I started of the pacification plan for 1970, we felt that too much of the rather limited amount of money which he had available for development purposes was going into roads and that there ought to be a higher proportion devoted to secondary schools, which is a large need. We have pretty much completed the requirements for primary schools in our area, but there still is not an adequate secondary school plan.

We advised that more schoolrooms be built at the secondary level and that more secondary teachers be trained. Partly because he had more capability for doing a roadbuilding project, he elected to spend a larger proportion on roads and bridges than we thought was a good balance.

FUNDING OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The CHAIRMAN. Who supplied the money?

Mr. MILLS. It comes from the national Government. A group from the central pacification and development council came down later after the province chief's plan was submitted, discussed the various elements of the plan, and approved these projects on the spot.

The CHAIRMAN. So it wasn't American money?

Mr. MILLS. It is not American money directly.

Mr. COLBY. There is American counterpart money in it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Lets not get confused over language. There is no difference between counterpart. We agreed on that yesterday.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, as far as Mr. Mills is concerned he feels that it is part of the Vietnamese Government budget, but at the national level we realize that there is American counterpart money involved which comes from American taxpayers' dollars.

BUDGET FOR TUYEN DUC PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. How much is the budget for your operation in your area?

Mr. MILLS. Do you mean to run the advisory effort or for the Vietnamese development scheme?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the operation which you advise.

Mr. MILLS. This is a little difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the budget of the operation to which you give advice? I don't know how to describe it, but similar to Mr. Vann having the whole delta area. He described that in some detail. He has $330 million or $339. What do you have—$200 million or $100 or what?

Mr. MILLS. No, sir, not by any means.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you have?

Mr. VANN. Let me qualify that; that is not a budget control; that is just my estimate of the total involved.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you estimated it. I am not going to hold you to the dollar. You gave us some idea of the magnitude. This is very significant, Mr. Vann. I am not saying it critically of you, but it is interesting that very few Americans have the slightest idea what this operation costs. It is usually presented in terms of statistics, which mean nothing to them. Even that amount is so large that it leaves most of them without any particular impression. If it can be translated into something about which they know, why it means more. All I am trying to do is to find out the magnitude of the operation in your area. You don't have to be precise. I know you don't know to the penny. Is it quite large or what is it?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, there is quite a bit of money being spent for development activities in my province.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant. How much?

Mr. MILLS. I have to do it bit by bit because we don't have any overall allocation. These come from different parts of the Vietnamese Government. To take an example of the self-development funds for next year, we have been allocated 17 million piasters, when I say we, the Vietnamese Government, in carrying on its public works. Its education and health programs amount to roughly 17 million piasters for the province and another 14 million for developmental programs in the city of Dalat, for a total of 31 million, which is roughly $270,000.

In addition to that, of course, there are very large amounts of money spent for the payment of RF and PF soldiers. We have roughly 5,000 of those in the province. They draw approximately, well, I would average it out 5,000 or 6,000 piasters per month per man. This runs up to a considerable amount of money.

Payment to the province chief's staff costs money. We are now engaged in a program of improving the electrical facilities of the city of Dalat. Some of the normal urban problems have been laid aside because of the war, and now we are in a position to go ahead and do some of those. Those will cost a good deal of money.

ROAD BUILDING ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say building roads?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir, most of the roads in the province have been

built. We have a U.S. engineering unit which has been upgrading these.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you pay for those or did they come out of the Department of Defense?

Mr. MILLS. No, sir, we don't have any control over the U.S. engineering unit at all, and we don't include their expenses in our provincial accounts at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Department of Defense pays that?

Mr. MILLS. I can't really say.

The CHAIRMAN. Or AID, one or the other.

Mr. COLBY. The Department of Defense would pay those.

The CHAIRMAN. They are the ones who have the money. They are the ones who ought to pay for it.

DECISIONMAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

When it comes to a question of whether you spend the money for roads or for schools, the province chief makes the decision?

Mr. MILLS. Not entirely, sir. The province chief is more and more looking to the villages, for instance, They have, in 1969, for the first time, a great deal of decisionmaking responsibility as to how these local funds are spent. The village people get together in council and decide. They know a certain amount of money based upon their population will be allocated for a development project. The people themselves can decide whether they want to improve the marketplace in the town, whether they want to set up a profitmaking organization such as a Lambretta service to take people to the nearest district town, or whether they want to build a social or community center for the young people. They make the decisions. They have the final decisions on projects up to a certain amount of money. Beyond a certain point their projects must be approved by the province chief but in general he follows the recommendations of the people at the village level who themselves have decided.

U.S. ADVISERS AT VILLAGE LEVEL

The CHAIRMAN. Do the village authorities have advisers, too?

Mr. MILLS. No, sir, we have no CORDS advisers to the village authorities. The village chiefs now have authority over the PF platoons and the PSDF Peoples Self-Defense Units, Security. We do have advisory teams which operate sometimes at the village levels in advising these elements. We have no direct advisers to the village level civil officials.

The CHAIRMAN. Not permanently, but there are mobile ones.

Mr. MILLS. Well, these are strictly advising on military and security tactics and the pacification aspects of military affairs.

PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICT CHIEFS

The CHAIRMAN. Does the province chief dominate the district chiefs?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir; well, actually these are nominated by the President, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. On the recommendation of the province chiefs.

Mr. Mills. I am not sure whether he even recommends.

Mr. Colby. No, the Prime Minister appoints district chiefs, Mr. Chairman. The President appoints province chiefs.

The recommendations come from a variety of places, and frequently they are new people to that province.

The Chairman. How long does a province chief serve?

Mr. Mills. At the pleasure of the President.

The Chairman. At the pleasure of the President.

Mr. Mills. Some of them have been there for a number of years. Some of them have had fairly short tours.

The Chairman. Senator Cooper.

PROGRESS OF PACIFICATION

Senator Cooper. I am sorry. I am going to have to go. But I would like to ask this general question. Do you share the optimism of Colonel Vann about the pacification progress and do you believe that the local people will be able to carry on this program successfully without American presence?

Mr. Mills. Of course, I don't have the perspective that Mr. Vann has. I have been dealing with Vietnamese affairs only since the summer of 1967. But certainly in the time I have been there I have seen a number of changes which lead me to believe that we are working our way out of a job in Vietnam and that is, of course, what we are trying to do.

On my team, for instance, since I have been there, we have felt it was no longer necessary to have an adviser to the Vietnamese supply system. The Vietnamese have achieved such good standards of war housing and supply control that we could pull out our logistics adviser.

Since I have been there we have pulled out the refugee and social welfare adviser because the Vietnamese on their side are doing a much better job of supervising the welfare setup that they have. We have removed one of our police advisers from the province because the police are beginning to do the kind of things we have been advising them for some time to do. Based on this experience, I really believe that there will come a time when the Vietnamese will be perfectly capable of doing this by themselves.

I believe with Mr. Vann and Mr. Colby and others that as we withdraw Americans troops to be replaced by Vietnamese, this may create a bigger burden on the Vietnamese in the sort of peacetime activities that we in the CORDS program are concerned with to some extent. So I am not sure that the CORDS advisers or the traditional Agency for International Development advisers will be in a position to leave quite as soon as the combat units. But eventually we will certainly come to that point.

Senator Cooper. Thank you. I have no further questions.

DECREASE IN NUMBER OF U.S. ADVISERS

The Chairman. I have forgotten now, but you said that there were how many, 84 in your team?

Mr. Mills. Well, roughly 100, sir.

The Chairman. A hundred?

Mr. Mills. Not quite.

The Chairman. You think they will be decreasing because of the efficiency of the operation now; is that correct?

Mr. Mills. Yes, sir. I think we have cut the team down by about 20 altogether.

The Chairman. Was it 20 more than that a year ago?

Mr. Mills. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And a year from now you hope it will go further down?

Mr. Mills. I hope so.

PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION

The Chairman. As I understood you, the problem of corruption has been controlled; there is no longer any corruption.

Mr. Mills. I don't believe I said that.

The Chairman. Didn't you? Maybe it was Mr. Vann. I am sorry; I have it mixed up.

Mr. Vann. No, sir, I did not get involved in that.

The Chairman. You didn't?

Mr. Vann. But I will if you wish. There is still a problem of corruption.

VIETNAMIZATION AND PACIFICATION QUESTIONED

The Chairman. I will come back to it. I wanted to read you a comment called "Letter from Saigon" by a rather well known observer. This is Mr. Shaplen. Do you know Mr. Shaplen?

Mr. Mills. I know some of his books.

The Chairman. This is from the New Yorker magazine of January 31, 1970. I didn't read it all, but he says:

> Technology and bureaucracy are surely not enough when Communists are still far from defeated—when, as one veteran American economic development worker commented, "Two Vietcong in a hamlet can still undo most of what we've accomplished."

That is a quote. Then he says:

> The Americans, after fighting the war themselves for too long, without equipping and training a mobile Vietnamese army are now, as they hastily try to put American-style social-welfare and economic-improvement programs into effect, again doing the job themselves instead of letting the Vietnamese learn the hard way.

The Chairman. Do you think that is an accurate statement?

Mr. Mills. No, sir, I don't. Certainly not at Tuyen Duc Province which is all I can speak for.

(The article follows:)

[From the *New Yorker*, Jan. 31, 1970]

LETTER FROM SAIGON, JANUARY 20

On February 6th, another Tet holiday will usher in the Year of the Dog, and while there are as many opinions about what will happen in Vietnam in 1970 as there are breeds of dog, there is universal agreement that it will be the most critical year since this misbegotten war began a decade ago. If President Nixon, backed by his silent majority, sticks to his tentative timetable, it will almost surely be the last year of major American combat involvement. This does not mean that a year from now American troops of all sorts will not be engaged in some fighting, or that

the American death toll of just over forty thousand could not eventually rise to fifty thousand or more. Under the present withdrawal plan, between twenty and forty thousand American military advisers and technicians will be left here as late as the end of 1972, and the lower figure will still be about three times the number that were in the country in 1962. Those Americans who are known here as "the new optimists"—people who believe that the process of Vietnamization is really beginning to work—acclaim the Nixon program as the only sensible course. Others who are more skeptical believe that if Vietnamization is to have any success five years or more will be needed. And still others are convinced that no amount of time will enable our allies to master the complex weapons systems that the Americans themselves have had only limited success in using conventionally in this unconventional war.

Apart from the military arguments, even those Americans here who are most strongly opposed to the war and want to get out quickly are forced to admit that a further acceleration of the American withdrawal, in the absence of sudden concessions by Hanoi, would endanger the vulnerable social and economic reconstruction programs and perhaps provoke the collapse of the present Saigon government. However, more and more people are beginning to wonder whether another government might not be able to end the war sooner and still preserve an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam, and perhaps a stronger and sounder one as well. The constitutional "legality" of the present Administration, which was elected for a four-year term that will end in the fall of 1971, is still acknowledged, but such legality is not held to be as sacrosanct as it was a few months ago. The doubts that are arising about both the intentions and the political efficacy of the Thieu regime could therefore prove to be more important than all the complicated technical and administrative machinery of Vietnamization, and their consequences could unhinge Nixon's whole scheme.

However justified or unjustified the skepticism may be concerning Nixon's silent majority in the United States, a silent majority unquestionably exists among the seventeen million South Vietnamese, and although this majority opposes the Communists, only a relatively small portion of it is really behind Thieu. This much is admitted by Thieu's most enthusiastic American supporters, who have nursed him along through uncertainty and self-doubt to his current euphoric overconfidence, which bears a growing resemblance to the overweening, self-destructive assurance shown by the late President Ngo Dinh Diem at the end of the nineteen-fifties. Nixon and Thieu, who are alike in many ways, will most likely do their best not to upset each other's plans, which are carefully calculated to bring about their respective reelections. Whatever Nixon may privately think of Thieu—and it is hard to imagine that he could actually believe the Vietnamese President to be, as he has called him, "one of the four or five best political leaders in the world"—he will almost surely go to any lengths to avoid an upheaval in Saigon that might affect his twofold aim of getting out of Vietnam as gracefully and quickly as possible and keeping himself in the White House until 1976. Like pilot and co-pilot on a takeoff, they have reached a point of no return, and now they must fly on together toward their common destination. It will be ironic for Nixon if the flight is hijacked by some of Thieu's more fractious passengers.

Obviously, this is one of the eventualities the Communists are hoping for; in fact, their present strategy and tactics are geared to it. Last year and the year before, Hanoi's plan was to keep American casualties at a high enough level to stir up strong sentiment against the war in the United States, as a way of achieving its ultimate aim of American withdrawal and a favorable political solution through the forced establishment of a coalition government. Their 1970 plan is apparently designed to achieve the same aim by subtler means; namely, by attacking the Vietnamization program on all levels through increased terrorism, and by further denigrating and dividing the by no means popular Thieu Administration. Naturally, the Communists' official line is that Vietnamization cannot work, but at the same time they appear to worry that it might; at least, this would account for what seems to be a strong difference of opinion in Hanoi about how the war in the South should now be fought. Some observers, citing manpower and production problems that the North Vietnamese themselves have admitted to, believe that a power struggle is beginning. After the death of Ho Chi Minh last September 3rd, the triumvirate of Premier Pham Van Dong; Le Duan, the First Secretary of the Laodong (Workers') Party; and Truong Chinh, the chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, seemed to be taking over smoothly and swiftly. Now, however, there are some signs that Dong, who might be said to occupy the driver's seat, is being subjected to more and more back-seat driving from Chinh and Duan, who differ with him and each other about priorities at

home, especially in the vital areas of agricultural production and Party reorganization and discipline. While Duan, as the chief Party leader, is working closely with Dong to keep the government running properly and to maintain a balance between Moscow and Peking, he appears to believe that Hanoi can win the war in the South, or at least achieve a stalemate, in a relatively short time, and will then be in a position to pay more attention to domestic difficulties. China, the chief Party ideologist, who has recently been appearing in public almost weekly and who follows a more pro-Peking line, wants to shore up the North's economy first, and accepts the inevitability of a protracted challenge in the South. In a succession of statements and speeches, which have covered everything from the effects of floods and droughts on food production to revisionist trends in art and the need to revitalize "mass leadership," Chinh has sounded increasingly like a scolding leader of the Cultural Revolution in China. Duan, on the other hand, appears in public only rarely, and, when he did so late in October, declared pragmatically, "The collective system must be firmly maintained. It is inadvisable to adopt the opinion of one person and force all others to follow it."

Even if the differences of opinion and of approach in North Vietnam are not yet serious enough to amount to a power struggle, and I don't think they are, they do convey some idea of the complicated situation in that country. The statements being made by both sides in this long and brutal war are, in fact, increasingly shrill and confused. The Vietnamese opponents have come to seem like two punch-drunk prizefighters in an old-time bareknuckle brawl that has lasted more rounds than either can remember. Both are wobbly and can hardly stand but are kept going by their seconds, who between rounds clean them up, fix their cuts, and give them smelling salts, then send them out again when the bell rings. Sooner or later, one of the weary battlers may simply collapse and drop to the canvas. Or the fight may go on and on, with the spectators helpless. It is easy to say that if the seconds would just pack up and go home it would all be over, but the seconds can't; neither the American moral predicament nor Communist revolutionary dialectics and objectives will permit it.

The most important Communist statements made recently on the military and political direction of the war are contained in a seven-part article by General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's Defense Minister, that appeared in two Hanoi newspapers in mid-December, and in copies of a number of directives that were captured in South Vietnam—notably a pair called "COSVN Resolution Nine" and "COSVN Resolution Ten." Through the veracity of captured documents has often been questioned, I have seen the Vietnamese originals of the ones I am referring to, and am sure that they are authentic. "COSVN" stands for Central Office for South Vietnam, which is the headquarters that, under Hanoi's direction, runs the war in the South, and which is at present situated in Cambodia, just across the western border of Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon, and has a forward headquarters in Tay Ninh itself. There have been ten resolutions since COSNV was established, at the end of 1961, or about a year after the creation of the National Liberation Front in the South. These resolutions are, in effect, orders and interpretations of orders for Party workers and followers in South Vietnam, and are based on prior Laodong resolutions, handed down from Hanoi. For example, Resolution Nine, which was issued last July, was based on a Laodong resolution issued by the Politburo in Hanoi in April. Resolution Nine was captured here when a Communist courier was ambushed and killed by members of an American brigade north of Saigon in October. It was the first complete resolution ever obtained, and it is considered especially significant because it contains a lengthy and detailed analysis of the war. It was presumably written by Pham Hung, the fourth-ranking member of the Hanoi Politburo and the highest-ranking Communist in the South, who directs both the military and the political war effort, and one sign of its importance is that Party workers are ordered to study it for "fifty hours." It charts a complicated, sometimes seemingly contradictory, course for "achieving a decisive victory within a relatively short period of time" while "firmly grasping the precept of protractedness" in order to "defeat the enemy in case they try to prolong the war." Hopes for rapid American deescalation and for the failure of Vietnamization are repeatedly expressed, as is the hope that the Americans will be "forced to seek an early end to the war through a political solution that they cannot refuse;" namely, a cease-fire followed by the establishment of a coalition government. While accepting the fact that "the Saigon area is our major battlefield for the whole of South Vietnam," Resolution Nine appears to acknowledge the difficulty of again laying siege to Saigon and other major cities in the manner of the 1968 Tet offensive. One phrase that is constantly reiterated is "especially in the Delta," and it is there in particular—the rich

rice region south of Saigon—that Communist troops are supposed to grab the initiative and "liberate and control the major part of the rural area . . . and build the liberated areas into perfect revolutionary bases to serve as the firm, direct rear of the resistance." It is in the Mekong Delta, however, where guerrilla activity back in 1959 touched off the present war, that the South Vietnamese government has made the most progress in the last year. Largely on the basis of advances in this area, President Thieu has claimed that his government now "controls" ninety-five per cent of the total population of South Vietnam—a claim that even optimistic Americans privately acknowledge to be exaggerated by at least fifteen per cent.

There is no doubt that improvements have taken place. Many roads that had been closed to traffic for years are open again. Rice and other produce are moving, a number of former contested areas have now been brought under either partial or nearly complete government control, and thousands of the people who had been living in Communist villages and hamlets have crossed over into safer zones. It is in the Delta, too, that the biggest improvement has been made in the use of Regional and Popular Forces—the provincial and local troops—which together now number almost half a million men and are being supplied with more and more American M–16 rifles. With American help—and our air and artillery support particularly are still vital—the South Vietnamese have managed to set up outposts in the two long-established Vietcong base areas in the Delta—the U Minh Forest and Base Area 470—close to the Cambodian border. That the Communists are now feverishly concerned about the Delta is therefore no surprise.

Late last year, the North Vietnamese 273rd Regiment moved into the area—the first time that Hanoi elements had come that far south. With the announced withdrawal of the American 9th Division—a unit that established a tremendously high, and quite possibly exaggerated, ratio of combat losses to enemy casualties, and left as many enemies as friends among the South Vietnamese—the North Vietnamese shifted more forces south. Today, there are elements of four additional North Vietnamese regiments in the Delta, and also countless North Vietnamese sent in as replacements to fill out depleted main-force Vietcong units, some of which are now eighty per cent North Vietnamese. All in all, there are probably ten thousand North Vietnamese soldiers in the area, and, counting political workers, main-force Vietcong, local guerrillas, and men, women, and children handling supplies and acting as communications and liaison personnel, a total of between fifty and sixty thousand Communists are active there. Although the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam at any given time is extremely difficult to determine until months later, when certain elements in the South may be identified, the best available intelligence indicates that four or five thousand North Vietnamese came South during November and somewhat fewer in December. These figures, if they are right, are in keeping with the overall Hanoi plan to fight the war in the South in 1970 by using highly trained, fast-striking small units to attack larger American and South Vietnamese units whenever an opportunity arises and continuing to attack such important targets as government administrative centers.

What the Communists have been doing in the Delta in the past few weeks admittedly has American military and intelligence experts baffled. For example, Hanoi has put parts of two regiments into the U Minh Forest, where they can be bottled up and subjected to artillery and air attack. Obviously, the Communists are getting ready for something, but no one knows what. The best guess is that, in conjunction with forces that they are maintaining in the Central Highlands to the north, and also still farther north, adjacent to Laos, they are doing two things: slowly establishing a new system of linked base areas reaching all the way from North Vietnam to the tip of the Delta, and getting ready to sweep eastward from these bases to attack district capitals, and perhaps some provincial capitals as well—one of which, either in the Highlands or in a remote section of the Delta, is likely to be proclaimed the capital of the Provisional Revolutionary Government that COSVN and Hanoi established last June. Such a widespread campaign, aimed at seizing specific places and simultaneously disrupting the pacification and Vietnamization programs, could pave the way for a cease-fire and political talks. What Hanoi may have in mind is the consolidation of a wide belt of territory embracing all of western Vietnam and all of eastern Laos, including, in Laos, part of the Plane des Jarres, which the Communists lost last fall. Together, these areas would constitute a "liberated" system of interlocking zones, which, except for some of the Delta regions, are largely, uninhabited. What would follow if this happens might lead, according to what is called by American officials the "leopard-spot theory," to regional ceasefires accompanied by political accommodation and followed by local and regional elections, the end result being the division of both Vietnam and

Laos into Communist and non-Communist areas. Although such a partition could become a permanent or semi-permanent solution in Laos, it probably couldn't in Vietnam, for political and guerrilla warfare would undoubtedly continue regardless of ceasefires. There is no doubt that in Hanoi's eyes "ultimate victory" still means unification of Vietnam, and Hanoi is likely to persist in this aim even if it takes five, ten, or twenty years longer.

A number of references in Resolution Nine to completing Party organizational work by "June, 1970." indicate both that the task is urgent and that if a "decisive victory" can be attained by that date a cease-fire may end the major fighting, at least temporarily, and the political struggle may be stepped up. Portions of Resolution Ten and other documents exploit the cease-fire theme further. There are frequent references to "the situation developing quickly." According to a notebook taken from the body of a high-ranking officer killed southeast of Saigon in November, the Communists in order to expedite American withdrawal and "frustrate de-Americanization," can create "an unfavorable situation for the Americans and the Saigon government when a cease-fire is stipulated" if "we capitalize on the opportunity by planting our personnel in government-controlled areas to take advantage of any changes"—possibly a reference to an anti-Thieu coup. This notebook adds, "In the immediate future, we will accept a cease-fire. Whenever the cease-fire is promulgated by us, our troops will continue to attack and overrun government Army posts. We will not make prisoners of puppet soldiers. Rather, we will educate them and release them on the spot. But we have to capture as many [enemy] soldiers as possible in preparation for a political settlement." Another document, believed to be a section of Resolution Ten, speaks of an increase in military proselytizing among both government and allied forces and of supporting "a fifth column in place" within allied units to erode morale, instead of simply encouraging deserters.

There has been considerable discussion of whether the Communists, if they took over South Vietnam, would kill their political enemies, as they did in North Vietnam in 1945–46, and again in the mid-fifties, when there was a peasant rebellion against enforced collectivization; between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand people were killed during each period. Predictions about such matters are hazardous, but although the Communists have joined the rest of the world in condemning the American massacre at My Lai—or, to give it its correct Vietnamese geographical designation, Tu Cong—in March, 1968, they have also, according to scores of documents I have just read, given orders to "kill tyrants and traitors" throughout the country now and also when uprisings take place just before and just after a cease-fire is declared. The rate of terrorism, including the assassination of village and hamlet officials, especially those engaged in pacification and self-defense, rose at the end of 1969 quit sharply, having averaged slightly less per month during the rest of the year than in 1968, when during the Tet offensive in Hue the Communists appear, on the evidence of mass graves still being uncovered, to have murdered close to five thousand people—government functionaries, anti-Communist politicians, pro-government intellectuals, religious leaders, and so on. The documents captured during 1969 also included orders to "annihilate" opposition elements by categories, much as was initially done in Hue. Several of the documents gave orders for the "annihilation" of a specific number of people in each of various villages in central Vietnam; for one province, the number ranged from five to forty per village. Instructions issued in mid-1969 to Party committees of two Delta provinces ordered rosters to be prepared of "wicked village delegates, policemen, hamlet chiefs and assistant hamlet chiefs, intelligence agents, spies, and betrayers who have committed a blood debt against our people." One document advocated careful procedures, saying, "We should not take advantage of the situation to terrorize, assassinate, and torture indiscriminately. We should fully understand the policy of using violence and implement it correctly and democratically." Another document was more blunt. "Each comrade must kill one reactionary," it said.

A distinction should be made between captured enemy documents, usually sent out for official Communist guidance, and public speeches or articles, such as the seven-part article by General Giap. The importance of Giap's article lies in the imprimatur it gives to the earlier COSVN resolutions and documents and in the corroboration it offers of the kind of war the Communists are now preparing to fight—one emphasizing "the art of using a small force to fight a big force." In his current article, Giap, sounding far less positive and confident than he did when he wrote his famous guerrilla textbook "People's War, People's Army," in the fifties, speaks of "the great imbalance of numerical strength and population, and also a great imbalance of technical equipment," and of the need for enough time

"to gradually exterminate and weaken the enemy's forces, to restrict their strength and aggravate their weaknesses, to gradually strengthen and develop our forces and overcome our deficiencies." The theme throughout is to make economical use of the forces that the Communists have at their command, which are now estimated to include a hundred and thirty thousand North Vietnamese fighting men in the South (or in rest camps in Cambodia), in a total combined force—among which are Vietcong main-force units, guerrillas, political workers, supply troops, and so on—of three hundred and thirty thousand.

A recent study, based partly on interviews with some of the six thousand North Vietnamese battlefield prisoners being held in South Vietnam, reaches the conclusion that the North Vietnamese are still deeply dedicated to their cause of the "liberation" of the South and hold a continuing staunch belief in the advantages of Communism in the North. This belief, which, it has been found, is held even by sons of some former landowners who were killed in the mid-fifties' purge, entails acceptance of the harsh regimen and strict security measures imposed on the North by the war, and a conviction that the war in the South has been a legitimate drive for "national salvation"—a natural and logical sequel to the struggle against the French that began in 1945. Anti-Americanism is the basis of this belief—an extension of the violent anti-colonial feelings that led to the victory over the French in 1954. Thus, although the North Vietnamese soldiers regard their three-to-six-month trip to the South as a painful experience, and although many of them acknowledge, with a kind of Buddhist or Taoist fatalism, that they may never return to their homes and families again, they tend to accept their role as a totally unavoidable commitment, a responsibility from which there is no escape. The attitude of these North Vietnamese soldiers is in considerable contrast to the feelings of many South Vietnamese Vietcong *hoi chanh* (returnees), who have averaged twenty-five thousand a year over the last four years, compared to a total of less than two hundred North Vietnamese who have defected without being forced to surrender on the battlefield since the war began. There are many dedicated Vietcong soldiers, but there are just as many who, after joining the Communists either voluntarily or by impressment—and in the last two years the latter has been the case more and more often—have revealed a negative attitude. A large number of the *hoi chanh* who volunteered have said that they did so because they were against the government for one reason or another—lack of faith in the successive Saigon regimes, anger over specific cruel or discriminatory actions by local officials. Those who had fought the hardest for the Vietcong did so because they related their actions directly to what they felt for the South Vietnamese "homeland," and they showed no strong convictions about reunification with the North.

Until recently—and even now, to a lesser extent—they were also motivated by the belief that they were fighting on the winning side. Something that is new in the past year, according to the study, is a decline in morale, owing to physical and economic hardship—the result, in large part, of the devastating B–52 raids (These raids are to be continued, at reduced strength, during the coming period of Vietnamization.) The drop in morale has also been due in part to the diminishing number of zealous and well-trained political workers. Today, there is less expounding of revolutionary ideology, less careful indoctrination, and more direct preaching about anti-Americanism and survival, together with vague allusions to promotion and status once the war is won. The great losses that the Communists suffered during Tet in 1968 and the decline in morale after the death of Ho Chi Minh (on the whole, oddly, this has been greater in the South than in the North) also have made recruitment in the South more difficult. The Communists are still taking people on, at a rate of at least five thousand a month, but most of the new recruits are boys of eleven or twelve, women, and old men, and most of them have been impressed into service. Despite all this, and despite growing friction between the dedicated Northerners and the Southerners who dream more simply of peace, interrogations indicate that the average Communist political worker in the South still has stronger motivation than his counterpart on the government side.

Because what is now South Vietnam has, historically, been more often divided than united, and because it has been subject to more divisive foreign influences than the North, the South Vietnamese inevitably lack the solidarity and the sustained revolutionary ardor of their Northern brethren, and are today bewildered and uncertain about their own capacity to hold together and to restore their broken nationalist roots under the harsh imperatives of time and of such essentially artificial programs as "Vietnamization" and "pacification." To be "Vietnamized" or "pacified" or "reconstructed"—words that Aldous Huxley or George Orwell would have relished—without being given time or opportunity to rediscover a

Southern consciousness, which exists but lies deeply submerged, is apt to be meaningless. This is the fundamental problem in South Vietnam today, and nothing makes this fact clearer than a trip, such as one I made last month, through the provinces of the seething Delta. In certain respects, the journey is comparable to a tour of New York City that includes the ugly, violent slums of Harlem and Williamsburg, the bland middle-class sections of Queens and the Bronx, and the insulated wealthy blocks of upper Fifth and Park Avenues. It may be no accident that the two terms one hears used most often by the Americans in Vietnam these days are "social mobility" and "decentralization." The first has to do with the involvement of many more people in the Revolutionary Development programs and in the complex bureaucratic social structure of the provinces. There are now hundreds of new "experts."

Seventeen different types, including village chiefs, are being trained at Vung Tau, on the coast near Saigon, for rural-development work of one sort or another; district and province chiefs are being specially trained elsewhere. Ordinary villagers are getting short courses designed to encourage building up useful relationships among themselves and among neighboring communities. The Americans hope that when elections are held for provincial councils, sometime this spring or summer (the forty-four province chiefs will continue to be appointed), social mobility will increase, especially if, as is anticipated, each candidate is required to run from the district in which he lives. As for decentralization, it is a concomitant of social mobility. It refers to the reestablishment of traditional local autonomy through the election of hamlet and village chiefs and councils. On the average, four to six hamlets make up a village, and, according to the latest American figures, there are 2,157 villages and 10,731 hamlets in South Vietnam. Ninety-two per cent of the villages have chiefs, assistant chiefs, and councils, most of them locally elected, and the fact of their having been elected entitles them to government funds of a million piastres (about eight thousand dollars at the official rate, but less than three thousand at the current black-market rate) for development projects of their own choosing; villages whose officials are still appointed, because they are not secure enough to hold elections, get only four hundred thousand piastres. When the provincial councils are set up, they will also have their own development funds, and it is hoped that these councils will encourage social mobility further by dealing directly with their village counterparts in promoting development projects.

It might work, but, given the subtle, often intractable ways of the Orient, it is too pat, too "Western" a concept. There has always been a tendency among the statistics-minded, reform-minded Americans here to play numbers games, and by now the Vietnamese have caught the habit. Thus, when President Thieu claims to have ninety-five per cent of the population of the country under control, he is taking cognizance of the fact that about forty per cent of the people now live in or around cities, in contrast to just fifteen per cent before the war. In the Delta region, which has more than half the country's total population, the number of hamlets under Vietcong control, the Americans say, has been more than halved since a year ago—fourteen per cent of the population compared to thirty-five per cent. There is no doubt that many people have moved out of Communist areas in the Delta in the last year, whether because of food shortages or higher Communist taxes or for such reasons as one chief in a Vietcong village gave after crossing over: "It was just getting too hard to see my wife." Undoubtedly, the government has improved its position a great deal by denying resources to the Communist area through military pressure. There are five hundred thousand more guns on the government side today than there were a year ago—about a hundred and fifty thousand of them new M-16 rifles that have been distributed to the Regional and Popular Forces, and the rest mostly carbines that have been given out to the Popular Self-Defense Forces—volunteer groups that patrol communities at night. As for economic improvements in the Delta, today one can see there thousands more Hondas, sewing machines, television and radio sets, and the like, than one could a year or so ago, and the current rice crop, amounting to more than five million tons, in the highest in several years.

In 1969, what was called the Accelerated Pacification Program was supposed to get as many people as possible into as many secure villages as possible before the Communists got there. It was an effort to trade space for time, and by and large the government did not do badly. The 1970 program is emphasizing consolidation—building up the new village governments and stimulating more information campaigns and development projects (bridges, schoolhouses, pig-raising centers, social halls, and so on). Two of the worst weak spots are the local police forces, which have been a problem ever since the time of Diem, and the Phoenix program,

a provincially coordinated plan for collecting intelligence on important local Communists and then arresting them. Another, over-all, weakness is a tendency to emphasize quantity at the expense of quality, and this is something that pervades the whole Vietnamization program, including the recruitment of paramilitary elements. But the greatest weakness of all, as I see it, remains the lack of political motivation from the bottom up. This is something that only the Vietnamese can ultimately provide, but the Americans have all along failed to stimulate such efforts, and the new heavy emphasis on rapid Vietnamization, with its manifold technical aspects, scarcely helps to focus attention on useful political developments. "Village democracy," beginning with the election of a chief—there often is only one candidate, frequently a reluctant one—continuing with a group decision whether to build a schoolhouse or a pig farm, and facilitated by an increase in administrative efficiency, may stimulate an emerging political consciousness. But these are all material measures, and neither such efforts alone nor an improvement in military security—important as that is—nor a combination of the two will save Vietnam if more substantial political institutions are not established. Technology and bureaucracy are surely not enough when the Communists are still far from defeated—when, as one veteran American economic-development worker commented, "two Vietcong in a hamlet can still undo most of what we've accomplished." The Americans, after fighting the war themselves for too long, without equipping and training a mobile Vietnamese army, are now, as they hastily try to put American-style social-welfare and economic-improvement programs into effect, again doing the job themselves instead of letting the Vietnamese learn the hard way.

Most Americans consider Kien Hoa, a coastal province southeast of Saigon that has traditionally been a Communist stronghold and major recruitment center for the Vietcong, possibly the worst province in the country. Today, things there are not as bad as they once were. Some roads can now be driven over by day, and some long-closed markets and schools are open again. But more than two thousand Communists, or about twice as many as there were a year ago, are currently active in the province, and in the past few months the number of Vietcong incidents has increased four or five fold—to about a hundred and fifty a month. Most of these are acts of terrorism against and attacks on the Regional and Popular Forces, whose members still tend to hole up in outposts, or, if they do patrol, to take the same routes over and over—an open invitation to attack. The Vietnamese 10th Regiment, which replaced the American 9th Division, has failed to establish good relations with provincial officials, and the result has been reduced pressure on the Vietcong. In one recent five-day peroid, the Vietcong killed three hamlet chiefs and seriously wounded a village chief and a schoolteacher. The new government workers more often than not lack direction, whether because the district chiefs, who are usually Army captains, don't know how to assign them or because the village chiefs, who are now supposed to be in charge of the incoming Revolutionary Development workers and other specialists, are afraid to exercise their new authority or are harassed by their jealous district and provincial superiors. The situation is not made easier by the fact that some of the more experienced technical cadremen, with academic degrees from Saigon, are paid more than most provincial officials and twice as much as the village chiefs. Moreover, the province chief in Kien Hoa, Colonel Tran Thien Nhien, has additional political problems of his own, connected with profiteering scandals that reach all the way up to the House of Representatives in Saigon, and these have further divided political loyalties in the province. Five-man Mobile Advisory Teams of Americans, who either work with the Regional Force companies or work on village development schemes, put in only thirty- or forty-day stints, in which they can seldom accomplish enough to make a lasting impression. The teams are much in demand, however, both in Kien Hoa and elsewhere—one more indication of the continuing overdependence on the Americans.

Neighboring Vinh Binh Province is another Communist backwater, with between two or three thousand main-force Vietcong and local guerrillas still active, but there the government has established some degree of control over twice as many hamlets as it could claim a year ago. Nevertheless, the Vietcong still hold several important areas—most notably Cang Long District, which has been an enemy base for many years. The American senior adviser told me that the Vietnamese Army commander in the Delta was willing to put two regular regiments into Cang Long for one month but that it would take six months to clear out the Vietcong. "Generally, we've put too much responsibility on little men in the villages who can't handle it, and at the same time we've let those who should be taking over make excuses for not doing their job," the adviser said. Police work there is poor,

too, and there is a lack of coördination within the local Phoenix program. Though some roads are now passable even at night, the Communists are still able to move between Vinh Binh and the neighboring provinces almost at will after dark, using an intricate system of canals and rivers as well as many of the roads. In Ba Xuyen Province, south of Vinh Binh, the situation has improved more substantially, with the estimated total of armed Vieteong and guerrillas having dropped in the past year from nearly four thousand to slightly more than two thousand. The Regional and Popular Forces there have done particularly well, the local senior adviser said. The province has a population of three hundred and eighty thousand, and of this number fifty-six thousand are still considered to be under Vieteong control; on the other hand, all but sixty thousand of two hundred and eighty thousand hectares of riceland are under government cultivation. As I moved in south to Thoi Binh District, in An Xyuen Province, at the far end of the Delta, which is another contender for the designation of the worst area in the country, I was given the latest evaluations on its hamlets, which, according to the Hamlet Evaluation Systems—an American system of rating hamlets from A down to E on the basis of their security and development, with V used to designate a hamlet still completely in Vietcong hands—had no A's four B's, four C's five D's, and seven V's. Here, the American advisers agreed, the Communists, if they choose to, can hit hard in the coming months.

I had now been in four bad provinces in a row. The next two were a sharp contrast. In Kien Giang, on the southwest coast, eighty-eight per cent of the population is living in hamlets rated A, B, or C, and territory that was abandoned to the Communists is being rapidly reoccupied. The people of Kien Giang are not yet altogether pro-government, but they are becoming more openly anti-Communist; though they still retain their fear of reprisals, they are now willing to give information about Vietcong agents, possibly because they get paid for it. In Chau Thanh District of An Giang Province, just to the north, the situation is even better. A majority of the district's population are members of the Hoa Hao, one of the two major religious sects in the South, and its leaders in this region for years maintained a successful truce with the Communists.

In the Delta, as elsewhere in South Vietnam, many of the improvements are bound to prove transitory if they do not keep pace with the ability of the Communists to retaliate—and Hanoi still has the ability to do so. One high-ranking American civilian official with many years of experience here told me, "The Vietnamese are never going to be able to live happily ever after. A lot depends on their sticking to what they're doing right now. There are three curves—the curve of increasing Vietnamization, the curve of our declining direct support, and the curve of Communist action. If we can keep the first two curves ahead of the last, we'll be all right." Many Americans complain privately about the "thin veneer" of ability among Vietnamese officers, though they praise some individuals highly. More are now being trained in the United States and elsewhere abroad, and the training period in Vietnam is longer, too, but the question of quantity versus quality remains a vital one. Another problem is improving officers' chances for promotion—an area in which the Vietnamese, having been caught up so long in French traditionalism, have lagged. A forthcoming reorganization of the four military corps areas into six or seven more realistically divided regions should help increase promotional mobility and perhaps galvanize some of the atrophied administrative apparatus.

There remain all sorts of other military difficulties, having to do with logistics and with strategy and tactics. For example, the job of training helicopter pilots and mechanics, which takes three years and should have been started long ago, was only recently begun. The tasks of running depot and maintenance facilities and of keeping proper inventories were carried on almost exclusively by the Americans for years, and when the Vietnamese—along with some Koreans—took parts of them over, pervasive laxity led to corruption. One lucrative source of corruption among Vietnamese officials today is scrap metal—steel, copper, and brass—which is secretly being shipped to Singapore and other places for high profits: I was shown a copy of a contract involving the wife of a Vietnamese general, who had received official permission to ship more than half a million dollars' worth of scrap, including shell casings, to Singapore. Corruption and inflation go together, and Vietnam today, despite recently introduced austerity taxes—or, rather, partly because of them, since they caused immediate price increases—is undergoing a new period of inflation so severe that it may ultimately force devaluation of the piastre. An Army private with five children makes seven thousand piastres a month, but he cannot possibly get along on less than twice that amount. Officers and civil servants are similarly situated, and the obvious result is moonlighting, or corruption, or both.

There is also the tripartite question of military equipment—what the Vietnamese want, what they can use, and what the United States feels they should have. One Vietnamese general told me, "We're really three years behind now, because you've always been afraid of moving faster. Things would have been a lot different if you had started sooner, not only with your M–16 rifles but with other equipment, including jet fighters. Maybe we didn't know how to use all these things, and maybe we'd have had trouble learning quickly, but the effort at least should have been made. Suppose we lost a hundred thousand M–16s to the enemy in battle, or through smuggling or corruption. Look at the Russians and the way they supply the Egyptians. They don't like to see materiel and planes being lost to the Israelis, but that hasn't stopped them from giving more, has it?"

It may be true, as General William C. Westmoreland, the former commander-in-chief in Vietnam, is known to believe, that if the North had been more thoroughly bombed, or if we had invaded Laos and Cambodia to hit at the Communist sanctuaries, the war could have been "won." Such actions might have turned the tide significantly, yet it is doubtful whether the war would have been won permanently that way; in any case, it wouldn't have affected the complaint of the Vietnamese about why it took us so long to help them defend themselves adequately, which is what every President from Eisenhower through Nixon has professed our policy to be. The truth is that we were always more interested in doing the job *for* the Vietnamese. Whatever the initial opposition of the military to our getting involved in a major war on the Asian mainland, once we were in, the American military-industrial complex wanted to run the show, and it did.

That shortsighted policy also helps explain our poor political performance in Vietnam, which may yet undo Vietnamization and all that it seeks to accomplish. For four years after the Americans helped engineer the overthrow of President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu in 1963, we did little or nothing to create new political institutions in Vietnam, and when we did interfere in Vietnamese politics it was with remarkable maladroitness. Having fostered the new constitutional government of the Second Republic, which led to the elections in the fall of 1967, we devoted inordinate care and attention to building up President Thieu as a national figure capable of leading the South Vietnamese from war to peace and of instituting a form of guided democracy that would combine a degree of benevolent authoritarianism with a system of decentralized government gradually established. The theory was a plausible one, but it hasn't worked. Thieu has turned out to be a military mandarin, and though decentralization has begun to take place, and could in time become politically productive, it was administratively imposed from the top, and has therefore become a factor in a possibly dangerous new polarization of political forces. This polarization is largely the result of the other Vietnamese leaders' mistrust of Thieu, owing to his devious methods, his mixture of pride, caution, and suspicion, his growing isolation, and his essential lack of popular appeal, and also owing to the natural tendency of Vietnamese politicians to mistrust each other and to pursue selfish ambitions, and to the general confusion and fear over what sort of compromise will ultimately be made with the Communists and who will then survive and who will fall.

It would be virtually impossible to take a public-opinion poll in Vietnam today, but if one could be taken I think it would show something like the following results: twenty per cent pro-Communist, twenty per cent pro-Thieu, twenty per cent anti-Thieu and anti-Communist and aligned with one of the dozen-odd political or religious parties or groups of some significance, and forty per cent undecided and confused but deeply desirous of peace and some form of new, preferably more locally representative self-expression. No American correspondent can visit the Communist areas in South Vietnam, so it is impossible to obtain a clear picture of what the popular feeling there is. But then it is also impossible to ascertain how many of the people living in government or contested areas are privately willing or prepared to go along with the Communists if a coalition is created. As for Thieu, he continues to rule the country from Independence Palace with an entourage that is small and tight but, even so, divided into several factions. Its two most important members are Nguyen Cao Thang, a wealthy businessman, who dispenses funds and patronage for Thieu among members of the National Assembly and has made some trips abroad in Thieu's behalf, during which he is said to have established exploratory contacts with the Communists, and Lieutenant General Dang Van Quang, a former commander in the Delta, who once made accommodations there with the Vietcong and who now holds a tight rein on all security matters.

Thieu has continued to give formal support to the group known as the National Social Democratic Front—now a five-party rather than a six-party group, since

one of its original component parties, representing the Hoa Hao element, quit. He created this group last year, but it has gained little popular prestige or support. While its more opportunistic members vie for his attention and patronage, Thieu, in turn, uses them for his own protection and as a convenient sounding board, and that is about all. However, he has privately drawn closer to two of the parties in the Front—the Dai Doan-Ket, or Greater Solidarity Force, composed chiefly of Northern Catholic refugees, and the Nhan Xa, or Revolutionary Social Humanist Party, which is primarily a central-Vietnamese Catholic organization. Thieu, himself a Catholic, has also encouraged the reestablishment of the Can Lao, a quasi-secret Catholic party from the Diem period, of which Nguyen Cao Thang, for one, was a member, but so far it has gained little vitality. More important, Thieu is trying to create a national organization of his own based on his continuing control of the Army and the whole military bureaucracy, and of the national network of civilian workers involved in pacification and other administrative duties. It is upon this still loose and amorphous group, unofficially called the Cadre-Khaki Party, that he is basing his hopes for reelection in 1971, and some people believe that if his hopes are realized he may try to make some sort of accommodation with the Communists, despite his present disclaimers about ever accepting a coalition government. A number of experienced Vietnamese politicians, including some whom Thieu fears or mistrusts deeply but who are willing to help him now in order to strengthen the still fragile Second Republic, are convinced that if he wins the Presidency in 1971 by a minority vote, as he did last time, it will mean that he has failed to create a strong enough organization to withstand the Communists and their potential allies among the opposition groups in the country.

These opposition groups are now compartmented, quarrelsome, and ineffectual. Thieu has helped keep them this way through divide-and-conquer tactics, at which he is adept, but this has not slowed the growing polarization of forces—pro-Thieu and anti-Thieu. His own increasing Diemist tendencies came to general notice last November 3rd, when he permitted the Catholic Nhan Xa members of his Cabinet—who control the Information Ministry and its eighty thousand workers, on whom he is depending to build up the Cadre-Khaki Party—to commemorate the murders of Diem and Nhu. A ceremony at their unmarked graves in Saigon—the first to take place since their deaths—was attended by three thousand people, including Mme. Thieu and several members of the Administration. That same week, two of the former generals who were leaders of the coup against Diem—Duong Van Minh and Tran Van Don—gave parties at their homes, and each of these gatherings, in typical Vietnamese fashion, began at a significant hour, Don's shortly after noon on October 30th, when, in 1963, the junta that plotted the coup held its final secret meeting, and Minh's at 1:30 p.m. on November 1st, the exact time the coup began six years before. The avowed purpose of these two gatherings was to "reinstill the spirit of the revolution of 1963," in which Thieu took part, somewhat reluctantly, as a division commander outranked by both Minh and Don. Resentment against Thieu had already been mounting, because harsh austerity taxes had been imposed a week before, and also because Thieu had pushed the taxes through by decree instead of obtaining a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives, as the constitution prescribes. For several weeks after the tax decree was issued, a flurry of coup rumors circulated in Saigon. President Nixon's speech of November 3rd helped quiet them, but the opposition to Thieu has continued to grow.

Don, following a trip to the United States, during which he was impressed by the anti-war sentiment, made an effort to start a Third Force Movement, and, having failed to do this, he last week formally placed himself in opposition to Thieu by creating a new People's Bloc. Publicly, Don has taken a strong stand against Thieu on numerous issues, including that of the American massacre at Tu Cong, which he and some of his fellow-senators investigated on their own after the government had hastily declared that there had been no massacre. The Don group concluded that a massacre had indeed taken place, in which at least eighty persons, mostly women and children, were murdered in cold blood—a conclusion that the investigators arrived at after speaking with a number of survivors and with two Vietnamese interpreters who had accompanied the American platoon charged with the massacre. The Don investigation also uncovered evidence that other massacres have taken place around the country, mostly in the northern section but also in the Delta, and have involved Korean troops as well as Americans, and that at least four or five hundred Vietnamese lost their lives in these "incidents," which mostly grew out of abuses of the so-called "free-fire-zone" regulations, which permit allied attacks on Communist areas by air,

artillery, or direct assault without sufficient prior clearance from the Vietnamese, or without the government's knowledge. Though the Tu Cong massacre has aroused far less emotion here in Vietnam than in the United States and elsewhere, it has added to both the growing anti-Americanism and to the mounting anti-war sentiment.

Don, who is one of twenty-nine senators who have to run for reelection next September, will undoubtedly take his case to the people and speak out even more strongly against Thieu. Unfortunately, though he is popular, he lacks political experience and astuteness, and tries to go off in several directions at once. As for former General Minh, who was Chief of State after the fall of Diem, he has reverted to silence after issuing a call early in November for a national referendum, which he never clearly defined, but which was designed to obtain approval or disapproval of the government's policies. Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky, who is supposed to be still "supervising" the dormant Paris talks but hasn't attended them in many months, is in the position of an astronaut between space flights, waiting for the next countdown. He is currently testing his political strength by taking private surveys to see whether he has a chance to win the Presidency in 1971 as a staunch anti-Communist hawk. Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, who gets along with Thieu on the surface but has his own designs on the Presidency, might, if a showdown occurred, side with Don and Minh, and perhaps with Ky.

The "loyal opposition" is represented by two parties of some potential strength. One is the Progressive National Movement, headed jointly by Nguyen Van Bong, of the National Institute of Administration, and Nguyen Ngoc Huy, a member of the Paris delegation and a leader of the old Dai Viet nationalist party. The other is the new Farmers-Workers Party headed by Tran Quoc Buu, the nation's top labor leader, who has had a lifelong tendency to hover in the background as a political mastermind but may now finally be ready to come out into the open and lead a party personally. If he does so, it could be an important development, for he controls several hundred worker and peasant groups around the country. Various other parties are still trying to pull themselves together, and a number of senators are once more attempting to form blocs—an activity that up to now has been futile.

As for the religious factions, the militant Buddhists, headed by the An Quang Pagoda group, of which Thich Tri Quang remains the dominant leader, are speaking out more loudly for peace, and are also taking soundings to determine if they should start a formal political party. Tri Quang himself is more moderate and less virulently anti-American than he once was, and has expressed himself in favor of a neutral South Vietnam that would be independent and apart from the North indefinitely. The Catholics remain strongly anti-Communist, but they are more sharply divided than they once were. One faction is willing to accept anything Thieu wants, a Northern refugee element is in favor of peace but against Thieu on personal grounds, and a basically conservative Southern element is beginning to think in terms of accommodation with both sides. The Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects have recently made some efforts to heal internal factionalism, but both remain divided.

And so it goes—a kind of compulsive mutual-vivisection society, in which everyone wants to cut everyone else up to determine the cause of the national disease, which may be incurable. Vietnamization may prove unworkable because the weak body politic may not be able to withstand the treatment. Nevertheless, in due time Vietnamization will get the United States out of this desperate war, though I doubt if it will happen as smoothly as President Nixon hopes. In all likelihood, the war will go on indefinitely between the Vietnamese themselves. It will end sometime, of course, as all wars do, and by then most of the Americans will have gone home, leaving behind what we started with—a handful of advisers assisting in an enterprise that very few of them will ever understand.

CAUSE OF SKEPTICISM OVER PROGRESS OF WAR

The Chairman. This is what troubles many of us. Over the years reporters of the character of Mr. Shaplen beginning in 1962 or 1963, have almost consistently made statements, we will say, of this character, which are rather critical of the operations. They are always denied at the time by the Government officials and almost invariably the reporters have been proved to be correct. I don't wish to be skeptical of you specifically or any of you specifically. We are made

skeptical by past events not by any of you gentlemen, by any means. It isn't because of any suspicion of your motives or anything else. I think you are familiar with incidents I am speaking of. It is simply that in the past some of the more notable ones were Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and ex-Chairman of Joint Chiefs, who would go out and look the situation over, and come back and tell this committee almost the same thing we have been told this morning. Each year we are very hopeful that we are getting the truth this time. I am very hopeful that we are this time. We are very hopeful that you and Mr. Vann and Mr. Colby are more accurate observers than your predecessors were, but this prompts me to ask these questions to give you an opportunity to further support your much more optimistic views. Goodness knows I hope you are correct about it, all of you for that matter.

No one wants this horrible bloodletting to continue. It is so completely contrary to what I think are the traditional values of this society, of which I happen to be a member, that it is really very repulsive to have to even ask you to contemplate it.

It has been my lot to think about this war much more than many other chairmen, some of us can talk about roads and schools and so on, and not about the war, but unfortunately I have to talk about the war, so I hope you will forgive me if I exhibit a certain degree of skepticism.

SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF U.S. OFFICERS TODAY SPEAK VIETNAMESE

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, there is one factor that you might be interested in.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like any factor that fortifies, Mr. Colby.

Mr. COLBY. And that is that a very substantial number of our officers today speak Vietnamese, which was not true 5 and 10 years ago.

Mr. Mills, for instance, speaks Vietnamese, and several of our other officers here speak Vietnamese. This enables them not just to talk to the few officials through an interpreter, but it does allow them to go out to the villagers and get a feel of what they are saying. Mr. Mills may want to talk to you about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I welcome anything that will make more persuasive the conclusions which you have given.

Tell us a little more, Mr. Mills. I didn't realize you were so accomplished in this particular area.

VC ABILITY TO DESTROY GVN EFFORTS

Mr. MILLS. I would like to comment a little about the quote that you gave a moment ago about two VC being able to upset and destroy what the Government spends a lot of time and effort doing. I think in some ways we are being hit from both sides. The Government of Vietnam is being charged with not meeting the needs of the people, with not having the kinds of social welfare programs that people have been led to expect of their government. And it is, of course, very much easier for the VC to come in and blow up an administrative house or school house, which has taken a long time and a lot of organization and a lot of money to build. So to that extent I think I would agree with that article.

EXTENT AND PURPOSE OF U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT

Where I disagreed was the implication that we were imposing a social welfare system that the Vietnamese didn't want or weren't capable of doing and that we were doing the work ourselves. When I said I did not agree with the article, this is what I meant.

The CHAIRMAN. Considering the extent of our personnel there, of course, how effective or how far you go in advising your counterpart is a matter of judgment. I mean we have heard many stories in the past about the Americans and knowing Americans even in Washington, there is a tendency for some American bureaucrats to be a little bossy you know. Haven't you ever observed that? [Laughter.]

We are taking Americans out to a rather underdeveloped country, although it has an ancient culture. In other instances we have seen this same thing happen, where Americans do impose their will upon other countries, other peoples. That is said without any particular invidious comparisons. I think the British were accused of doing that when they were running China, weren't they? Do you remember some of the stories about China?

Mr. MILLS. I think that what was true of the French in Vietnam and perhaps the British in China is not true of us. We are not commanding. We are not in a position of authority. We are in advisory positions, and I think the basis of a good advisory relationship in what we are trying to achieve in Tuyen Duc is a kind of friendly confidence between the adviser and his Vietnamese counterpart, so that the Vietnamese realize that we are working toward the same independence and that our purpose in offering the advice is not to run the country, but to help them to achieve something that is in their own interest.

PURPOSE OF QUESTIONING

The CHAIRMAN. I most certainly hope that you are correct and I am not on my own authority saying that you are not. I am rather trying to give you an opportunity to express from every angle that you can from your experience every item that would support it so that we can have as sound a judgment as possible about what to do about this situation, which apparently will be with us for quite a while.

The significance of it, it seems to me, is that the country has to make a decision. At the present time the President's view about Vietnamization have been accepted and that is that. Even the President, I would think, would want his assumptions tested by the best people we have and among them are you gentlemen. That is why we are trying to ask you these questions. I would hope you don't think I am trying to question your veracity at all. I am only trying to approach it from different ways to enable you to support it or not as best you can.

"CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM" OF SIR ROBERT THOMPSON CONCERNING STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM

Recently we have had an example that interested me. The President has recently sought the advice of Sir Robert Thompson. His

record on Vietnam and this recent report by Sir Robert, after he was given a special mission to look into the thing in the President's words, was cautiously optimistic. But Sir Robert has had a background on this and I would read for your information, in case you do not know it, to illustrate a bit the point I am making. In the book "To Move a Nation" on page 461 there was this passage of quotation from that book written by Mr. Hilsman:

> Thompson, who a year earlier when I had seen him had been rather gloomy, was not the most optimistic of them all. What he told us and what he showed us in a tour of the Delta—hopping from one little airfield to another and flying low over roads and hamlets—offered the most solid basis we had yet seen for believing that at least a beginning was being made. I had expected Thompson to be worried over too rapid proliferation of strategic hamlets. He was. Many were being established in exposed areas, in violation of the "oil blot" principle, and many more were nothing but a shell, a strand of barbed wire with nothing inside—no police work to eliminate Viet Cong agents, no defenses worthy of the name, no positive benefits to win the allegiance of the people. But he showed us a nucleus of hamlets that were good, and he felt that if our luck held this nucleus could be expanded to cover the bulk of the population in the delta. There were a lot of "ifs" in this judgment—if the Viet Cong reaction to the strategic hamlets did not get any more violent than it was, if the military would keep the Viet Cong off balance by "clear and hold" operations that would permit the nucleus area to be expanded, and if nothing else happened to put the program off stride. But in spite of the "ifs" Thompson's judgment was optimistic.

I suspect it is the nature of all military leaders and nearly everyone else to be optimistic. I suppose they would have to be optimistic or they wouldn't be there. So I don't wish to downgrade it at all. I only raise the question.

Mr. Vann. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment upon the reading of Sir Robert Thompson?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Vann. Sir, during 1962 and 1963 I discussed the strategic hamlet program on numerous occasions with Sir Robert Thompson and, as Sir Robert pointed out then and as I think he would point out in discussion now, the plan as devised by him working as an adviser to the Government of Vietnam envisaged an implementation over a period of 5 to 7 years. The decision as made by Mr. Nguyen, the brother of President Diem, was to implement the 5 to 7 year program in a period of 1 year. It was clearly foreseeable that it could not be successfully implemented in that period of time. I think Sir Robert Thompson himself saw that, but he like many of us at that time was trying to make the best of a bad situation.

The Chairman. But you don't think he was overly optimistic at that time? Do you think his judgment was accurate?

Mr. Vann. Sir, his judgment was that it was not going to work unless done over the period of time that had been programed. His nature and his enthusiasm was such that once a decision had been made to try to do it he was going to try to do all he could to get it accomplished.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Navarre's optimism about Vietnam war in 1950

I think it is really a much happier personality though that is always optimistic. People who are pessimistic must be an awful bore to their colleagues. I remember the first meeting when a Frenchman came to

this committee. I was a freshman Senator or maybe I was still in the House. I forget what his name was. One of the leading French generals came over, Navarre, and he thought in 6 months it would all be over. He thought that they had everything under control. There was a Navarre plan; wasn't there? Do you know about that, Mr. Colby?

Mr. Colby. Yes, it was General Navarre. I did not happen to meet him.

The Chairman. I think he was the one who came. He was a very imposing looking, big Frenchman and he said that if we sent another hundred shiploads of something over it would be over in 6 months. I am not stretching it very much. He came over and visited with us. That was in 1943.

Mr. Colby. 1948.

The Chairman. 1948 I guess.

Mr. Colby. 1950.

The Chairman. 1950. So it is a long history. It is not just General Taylor, General this and that; it is even the French generals. It is a long story. So I hope you will forgive me for being a tiny bit skeptical.

Mr. Mills. My optimism, if it is optimism, is not based on any long perspective or this kind of thing.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mills. But it seems to me it is based on seeing changes which I think are necessarily more and more taking place on the ground.

The Chairman. I hope they are.

AMOUNT OF MONEY SPENT ON WAR AND HUMANE ACTIVITIES

I will ask you one last question. I must ask Major Arthur some questions.

Mr. Vann, you spent $339 million roughly. I am not holding you to it precisely. In the context of Vietnam where we have spent an estimated $100 billion in the war, this is a relatively small amount. But what always impresses those of us who are from the other side of the table is that this is a very substantial amount. That is approximately the total U.S. military assistance budget for 1969. That is three times as much as the Peace Corps for worldwide operations. It is 10 times as much as the budget for the international exchange program, which some people believe is significant or could be significant for a more civilized world.

I mean there are people who still do have an interest in humane activities, rather than the killing of people, and in the money that is spent in those activities, which is tiny. This is approximately 10 times as much as this Government will spend worldwide this year on the AID program. In academic circles and even in religious circles—we will call them biophilic circles—that is very much money. Yet in one province here we think nothing of spending $339 million.

Mr. Mills. That was not the province.

Mr. Vann. That is one-third of the country's population.

The Chairman. One region.

Mr. Vann. Let me also qualify, sir, that the largest bulk of that, $198 million, is the pay of the RF and PF. Now, let me also qualify that this is my estimate of the cost of converting piasters into dollars, of all of the programs for which we have advisory responsibility, all of the support costs, and all of the contract costs. The source of all

these funds gets very jumbled up. For example, quite clearly included in the RF and PF funds are funds that are provided by the Government of Vietnam. The reason we can't straighten them out down at our level is that commercial import program funds, counterpart funds, and taxes at the top level get juggled around to where we down at the corps level are not aware as to exactly which agency is funding which program, and whether it is GVN or U.S. But $339 million is our best estimate of the cost of the programs that we advise.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly didn't by any means wish to question the figure. What I am trying to raise is an entirely different point, which is one of perspective, accepting the amount. By the way is that amount conversion at the official rate or black market rate?

Mr. VANN. Official rate, sir.

BLACK MARKET CONVERSION RATE ON DOLLARS

The CHAIRMAN. What would it be at the black market rate? Do you know?

Mr. VANN. Sir——

The CHAIRMAN. There is some difference.

Mr. VANN. The last figure we had before I left, and this is not applicable to our costs at all, was that the black market rate on dollars was running between VN $260 and VN $330. That was the conversion rate over a month's period of time of piasters to a dollar.

SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE DURING WARTIME

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, I wasn't trying to make the point about whether you are extravagant or not. That was beside the point. It was the sense of perspective that arises during wartime and that we can look at this with equanimity apparently and contemplate it as going on for many years, even though it is so outrageously excessive compared to many activities. I shouldn't say many because we are not engaged in many, but a few activities designed to improve the quality of life here at home or our relations with some of our allies.

Again that may not be your responsibility.

Major Arthur, do you have some contribution to make to this discussion?

Major ARTHUR. I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, please, sir.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. JAMES F. ARTHUR, U.S. ARMY DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISER, BINH CHANH DISTRICT, GIA DINH PROVINCE

Major ARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, I am Maj. James F. Arthur from North Carolina. I am currently the District Senior Adviser of Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province, Republic of South Vietnam.

MAJOR ARTHUR'S MISSION AND DISTRICT TEAM

My mission is to advise and assist LTC Nguyen Ba Di, the District Chief and concurrently the Binh Chanh Special Zone Commander on both military and civil aspects of the counterinsurgency program. To accomplish this mission, I am assisted by my district team, key

members of which are as follows: A Deputy Senior Adviser, who is a Foreign Service officer from the State Department; an Operations Section composed of a captain, first lieutenant, and three noncommissioned officers; a military police first lieutenant who is the People's Self Defense Force Adviser; a military intelligence first lieutenant who advises the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center and a Community Development Adviser. This team is slightly larger than the normal district team due to the location of the district in relation to Saigon and the active civil development program under way. In addition, I have operational control of five mobile advisory teams which are assigned to advise Regional Force Companies.

BINH CHANH DISTRICT

Binh Chanh is one of the six major districts surrounding Saigon and borders the city on the south and southwest. It has an area of 20,177 hectares (77.9 square miles) and includes 15 villages and 60 hamlets with a population of 59,863. Binh Chanh is a lowland area consisting of rich rice fields, swampy areas in the extreme eastern and northwestern portion of the district and numerous streams and canals most of which are densely vegetated with nipa palm. Since the district is a delta area, most of the population live along the three principal hard surface roads and the larger canals. Approximately 75 percent of the population makes its living by farming. Rice is the principal crop with 14,700 hectares under cultivation. Cattle, poultry and swine are raised also, but only for the needs of the individual farmers. The remainder of the population is engaged in either cottage industry and small businesses or military service.

The major religions of Vietnam are represented in the district with 54 percent of the population being Buddhist, 24 percent Cao Dai and 18 percent Catholic. Religious political parties are not particularly active in the district, however, the religious leaders do play an important role in an opinion forming function among their parishioners.

The district has one high school which is located in Binh Chanh village and 45 primary and elementary schools operating throughout the district. In addition there are 10 maternity dispensaries located within the district.

VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOCAL GUERRILLAS

Binh Chanh sits astride the major routes of infiltration into the city of Saigon from the south and was used as a staging area during the 1968 Tet offensive. The primary targets of the District's Territorial Forces are the Vietcong infrastructure and the local guerrillas which ideally would number approximately 30 per village and 12 per hamlet. These Vietcong are prime targets because they are the ones who have the mission of terrorism, assassination, tax collection, propaganda, and providing intelligence and guides for the main force units. At the present time the Vietcong infrastructure and local guerrillas have been reduced to squad and half squad size units per village and there is very little organization left at hamlet level. However, there are three under strength main force battalions whose areas of operation include Binh Chanh District. These units are normally based outside the district boundaries and send in small units to assist the local guerrillas in accomplishing their mission.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. FORCES

The District Chief has 17 Regional Force Companies and 25 Popular Force Platoons under his command and in addition, there are three Ranger Battalions operating in the district. In the past, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade was based in the district. However, there are no U.S. combat forces in the district now and the defense of Binh Chanh rests solely on the Vietnamese. The primary mission of the territorial forces is that of providing security for the population while the Ranger Battalions have the mission of eliminating the Vietcong main force units. The 1970 plan calls for the Regional Forces to assume the mission of offensive operation and Popular Forces, assisted by the People's Self Defense Force, to assume the responsibility for protecting the population, thereby enabling the Rangers to be released for duty elsewhere. At the present there are eight Regional Force Companies ready to assume offensive operations missions and the changeover should begin in March or April. The Regional Forces are rapidly improving and a number of the companies are able to handle sophisticated airmobile, cordon and search, and raid operations. Since September the territorial forces have captured 36 Vietcong and killed 23, including two district level party committee members. During the past month, the territorial forces made contact with the Vietcong 11 times with only two of those contacts being Vietcong initiated.

People's Self Defense Forces continue to be a problem area. According to Vietnamese figures they have organized 20,700, trained 5,800 and armed 1,782. As yet the PSDF adviser has been unable to get a physical count of the members; however, he has been able to monitor some of the training which is marginal at best. The only firm figure is the number of weapons issued and the adviser has been able to verify that the persons issued these weapons are actually performing security duties at night in the hamlets.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Major, I apologize, but they have rung a vote. You heard that bell. I have been informed this is one of those controversial votes that we have on the floor involving civil rights. I am going to have to leave you. I wonder if you would mind taking this up in the morning? Since it is so late and there are others who are not here, I think it would be more satisfactory if we take this up in the morning. I have to go. I can't afford to miss this vote. I hope you understand that.

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Coming from North Carolina, you understand it, even if the others don't. We will adjourn until 10 o'clock in the morning. I will ask that the staff confer with you on some questions perhaps to shorten these procedures. I apologize for the time we seem to take and there is a good deal of repetition that we can't seem to avoid.

Tomorrow at the beginning, Senator McCarthy has requested an opportunity to be heard. Following that we will take up where we left off with you, Major, if that is all right.

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry we have to adjourn at this time, but we are going to be faced with this. We are very lucky that we got through this part.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene, Thursday, February 19, 1970, at 10 a.m.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Gore, Church, Symington, Case, Cooper, and Williams.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to hear Senator McCarthy, who was unable to testify during the recent hearings on the Vietnam policy proposals which we started last week. Following his testimony we will resume the hearings on the operation of the CORDS program in Vietnam. The witnesses this morning will be Maj. James F. Arthur, who will testify on the CORDS program at the district level; Mr. William K. Hitchcock, who will testify on the refugee program, and again Ambassador William E. Colby, who will testify on the Chieu Hoi program and be available for general questions on CORDS operations.

Senator McCarthy, we are very pleased you could find the time to meet with us this morning. Having been a former member of this committee, you know how useful it is for us to have information from a man who has been as thoughtful as you on this subject over many years. We are very pleased indeed to have you this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE J. McCARTHY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee and speak to you about what I consider the possibility of negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam.

In defending his Vietnam policies, the President has attempted to confine the discussion to two possible courses of action: One, the immediate withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam, in what he describes as a precipitate action, and his policy of Vietnamization, which contemplates a reduction of U.S. presence and a building up of

the military strength of South Vietnam under the control of the present government.

The immediate and total withdrawal of American forces is not the only alternative to the Administration's program. The choice has never been as limited as the Administration statements indicate and is not so limited today. A third very real possibility is a negotiated political settlement, followed or accompanied by withdrawal of American military power.

COST OF VIETNAM WAR

The massive American intervention in Vietnam in 1965 and in the years following created difficult military, political, and moral problems for us. They will not be easily solved. As chairman of this committee, you have heard testimony and know what the war has cost, so many million dead, approximately a million and a half refugees, increased corruption of the cities and of the population of Vietnam, desolation of the countryside, so well described in the Vietnamese training pamphlet which was quoted in this committee's recent staff report

I would ask that the section of this be included in my remarks. (The information referred to follows.)

Rural Vietnam today is desolate, bleak and in many areas deserted. Gardens are plowed by either bombs and shells or by men digging not furrows for seed but shelters and trenches. Houses appear in irregular patterns, some curiously unscathed by the ravages of war, but many are destroyed or knocked askew and lean drunkenly, adding to the mournful loneliness which is the hallmark of abandoned areas. Previously lush rice fields are overgrown with weeds, the silence unbroken by the peasant's songs from generation to generation, the abandoned land devoid of even the herds of cattle and buffalo that formerly roamed. Many villages have become ghost towns, their inhabitants having fled to the cities as war refugees or to the mountains or forests to escape ever-impending death.

To these losses in Vietnam we must add the more than 40,000 American dead and quarter of a million wounded, many of whom survive more heavily impaired than the survivors of previous wars because of advanced medical and surgical techniques and improved field evacuation procedures. And remember also that the heaviest toll of American dead and wounded is among those of 19 to 21 years of age. The cost of the war, so far as we can discover, is something between 20 and 30 billion dollars a year.

We must ask what have we achieved. The only clear answer is the continuation of a government in Vietnam of questionable integrity and little real stability.

WHAT WILL BE GAINED FROM CONTINUING VIETNAM WAR?

The President speaks often of the necessity for an "honorable settlement" or a "just peace;" he does not define either. One must, therefore, ask what, if any, honor has been gained by the death and destruction and social chaos that has gone along with our overwhelming military power and our massive physical presence in Vietnam over the past 5 years, and ask what will be gained from the continuation of the war.

It is unlikely that the Vietnamese will be able to take over the fighting effectively and to control the country. Rather, the course

the Administration is pursuing is likely to require an indefinite continuation of American involvement in Vietnam, although at a reduced level. We still have over 50,000 men in Korea 17 years after the end of the fighting there.

Some of the claims made by the Administration must recall to the committee the optimistic statements issued by spokesmen for the last Administration, particularly by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara at that time, on his return from his numerous visits to Vietnam. The record of the past suggests that Vietnamization will not work. It has been tried repeatedly over the past 20 years—first by the French and later by us. It was, after all, the inability of the South Vietnamese Army to fight effectively even after more than 10 years of training and equipment by the United States that prompted the dispatch of American combat troops to that country in 1965.

Even if through a resurgence of morale and reduction of corruption, the South Vietnamese Army could be made into an effective military force, there would still be the question of whether Vietnamization is itself desirable.

Asians would be killing Asians with American arms. Defoliation and destruction of crops would continue; villages be destroyed; refugees be "generated;" casualties be continued.

The United States would still have a great share of moral responsibility for the war, for continuing it and sustaining it. We will have made of the Vietnamese Army, if the Nixon policy is "successful," essentially a mercenary army fighting its own people for an unrepresentative government, and beyond that, if we are to accept the statements of Dean Rusk and President Nixon, to attempt to protect the interests of the free world.

PUBLIC HAS BEEN DISTRACTED FROM JUDGING VIETNAM POLICY

Mr. Chairman, I believe the American people were prepared to make a public judgment on American policy in 1968, but they were distracted.

They were distracted first by the withdrawal of President Johnson from the campaign of 1968.

Second, they were distracted by the meeting of negotiators in Paris on May 13, 1968.

More recently, they have been distracted by limited troop withdrawals, which have demonstrated so far only that there were too many troops in Vietnam in the first place. These troop withdrawals do not at this point indicate any change of policy.

And fourth, they have been distracted by the talk of Vietnamization.

Public examination or reexamination of our involvement in Vietnam is essential.

I believe that the Nation is being misled over the issues at stake in Vietnam now as it was in 1966 and 1967 when your committee took upon itself the responsibility of educating and informing the people and called the Johnson administration to a public accounting.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Mr. Chairman, I believe that a negotiated settlement of the war is possible and that the time to seek such a settlement is now.

The first reason for this opinion is an immediate and practical one, which is that I am not convinced that—leaving out the U.S. presence—there has been any major shift in the basically unfavorable balance of political and military power in Vietnam or that such a shift is likely to take place. It is in order, therefore, to ask what will happen if the level of our involvement becomes insufficient to avoid defeat. Will we escalate our efforts or will we then negotiate from weakness?

The second point arises from my belief that there have been no serious negotiations since the first meeting in Paris in May of 1968 or since the joint meetings began in Paris in January 1969.

We are today proposing, principally, free elections. This proposal has very little to offer to the other side. In 1956, we supported the Diem government in its refusal to hold the elections called for in the Geneva Accords. As former Ambassador Harriman has stated, it has never been envisaged that the political settlement could be brought about by a "winner take all" election in the Western tradition. The war has not been fought for free elections. I am not aware of any case in recent history where divisions and disagreements strong enough to have led to 25 years of civil war were settled immediately by elections—free or unfree.

There is no good reason to believe that we can bring about serious negotiations in Paris until the United States is willing to make a basic change in policy. Serious negotiations cannot proceed unless we are willing to support a coalition or a fusion or a new government to control the process of transition, at least. The task of the interim government would be to arrange a cease-fire and to assure the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces. It would prepare the way for the eventual selection of a permanent government. We should be prepared to support with other nations such a hope and, I would hope with the concurrence of the United Nations, such a negotiated settlement could be sustained.

There are risks and dangers in such a policy. I do not believe they are as great as some have declared them to be.

My conversations with the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris lead me to believe that a political settlement of this kind is possible and lead me also to these conclusions.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES

First, that the North Vietnamese are not counting on winning the war in Washington, as some advocates of the war in this country say. They point out that the war with the French, for example, was not won in Paris and that they were involved in this war long before the United States became involved.

Second, they point out that historical evidence does not support a presumption that massive executions would follow a negotiated settlement and they say that such executions would not occur.

Third, they anticipate that North Vietnam would not take over South Vietnam and that for a long period of time—meaning years—some division would exist between North and South Vietnam.

Fourth, they feel very strongly about our having bombed North Vietnam—their country—a feeling which is reflected in their attitude toward captured fliers.

Fifth, they do not believe that Vietnamization will work.

Sixth, they seek a commitment on troop withdrawal, a commitment which would be accompanied by an agreement on a provisional government and along with this there could be immediate negotiations with reference to prisoners of war and the manner in which South Vietnam might be governed until a permanent and settled government could be established there.

Mr. Chairman, those are the conclusions I have come to, not just from the conversations in Paris, but in my years on this committee and through the thought and reflection and study I have given to this problem over the last 5 years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WHAT IS TO BE GAINED BY CONTINUING VIETNAM WAR?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator McCarthy. I think it is quite obvious that you have thought very deeply about the war. You have raised questions in which I find myself very interested and with which I am deeply sympathetic. I am very deeply sympathetic to your point of view. It comes back to this question of what is to be gained by a continuation of the war.

I have asked this of some of the witnesses who have been telling us about the actual conditions as they see them in Vietnam. Usually they answer that they are not policymakers and that whether or not we should be there is someone else's business. All they are concerned with is the best possible administration of their immediate duty.

You raised what I consider the fundamental question of what is to be gained by a continuation of the war. If I understand you properly, you can see nothing to be gained of any great value, of any great importance or significance to this country, by a continuation of the war, nothing that could not be obtained as well or better by a negotiated peace. Is that correct?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, that is my position, Mr. Chairman.

I think we have known all along that we could somehow win a victory in Vietnam if we were prepared to put enough power into it and enough men and enough equipment, enough force.

The question is: What comes with that kind of victory? Do we wish to establish a puppet state of some kind in Vietnam and sustain it as a kind of military government for 10 or 15 or 20 years? Is this what's meant by a just settlement and an honorable peace in South Vietnam? Or do we wish to work out some other kind of political life for the people of that country?

If we take into account the fact that we have roughly a half million military and police personnel there, and we don't know just what the number is in the South Vietnamese Army, but they are roughly a million, that is a million and a half military personnel to control a population of approximately 15 million people or one military person for every 10 nonmilitary people. And add to that the force that we have there, artillery and airplanes, helicopters and firepower, you would have to say at some point we could dominate the country.

But the question is what comes of domination and that has never been satisfactorily answered by any spokesman for this Administration or the last one.

MEANING OF ADMINISTRATION'S "HONORABLE PEACE"

The CHAIRMAN. What do you feel the Administration means by an "honorable peace"? What are the conditions of an honorable peace?

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I don't know. When President Johnson spoke, at least in his conversation from the Cronkite report, his first telecast, it became a little bit, at least I thought, clearer to me when he said that in his judgment and in the judgment of the Secretary of State that the Tet offensive was a great military failure for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. I think we acknowledge that it didn't accomplish their objectives and that that was a turning point. If this was his judgment, it became a little clearer to me why the negotiations in Paris never did go any place, because it seemed that we went there not to negotiate but really to accept some kind of surrender. So you had two parties there, the spokesmen for North Vietnam and the enemy, believing that we were going to negotiate some kind of settlement and, so far as I can see, our people were there to accept surrender. So there was nothing that was negotiable. I say this becomes clear in light of what President Johnson says his interpretation of the Tet offensive was in early 1968, that we really have not gone there to negotiate. So I don't know what settlement the Administration would accept other than the acceptance of the Ky-Thieu government of South Vietnam and whatever would follow from that.

PRESENT PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy, do you not detect, however, that the mood of this country is that the war is for all practical purposes over? The shift in emphasis has been dramatic, it seems to me, in the public discussions, in the press, and in the television. There is a shift from discussion of the war, its significance and aftermath to interest rates, to revival of interest in segregation, racial matters. The war has taken very much of a backseat, so to speak. Do you see it that way, and that the public generally is not really interested in the war on the assumption that it is about over or is on its way to being liquidated?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think part of it is an expression of a kind of hope that the war is going to end. I think also it is a kind of desperate feeling there is not much that can be done about it in this particular period of time.

COST OF VIETNAM WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I would gather from what you say you don't think it is about to end.

Senator MCCARTHY. I don't, no.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going on at a very high cost. Thursday being the reporting day, I heard on the radio coming in this morning that there were, I think, 96 dead and about 350 wounded this past week, which is a very substantial number. The cost in dollars is still very great. The effect of the drain of the war on our resources, not only material but mental resources in the sense that it preoccupies the minds of some of our most important leaders, seems to me to indicate that we are not dealing and coming to grips with the fundamental

causes of the social and economic disruption here at home. Do you agree?

Senator McCarthy. Yes; I agree.

The Chairman. It worries me very much, but I don't know what to do about it.

Senator McCarthy. I hope your hearings may again stir interest. As I said, it was the hearings this committee held back in 1965 and 1966 that called the attention of the country to what was happening by way of escalation of the war and I know of no better way than the way you are following now of again trying to stir the country to a concern over the war and of trying to lay before the Senate and the Congress the facts. Not just the facts of the situation but what we seem to be accepting as a kind of way of life for America, continuation of the war, a military position in Southeastern Asia, despite the fact that spokesmen for this Administration and the last repeatedly said we don't intend to maintain any bases there.

WHAT PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM NEGOTIATING?

The Secretary of State some time ago said that the decision to withdraw troops was irreversible. It is difficult for me to understand why we can't negotiate a withdrawal of troops if what has been said reflects their real position. If they were going to take the troops out, why not negotiate? But we can't negotiate that because that would give away our position, they say. But it seems to me if they believe what they said and are sincere about the troop withdrawal, they have already given away their position, and that the better part of wisdom would be to talk about the conditions under which the withdrawal would take place and see what could be negotiated by way of a response to that withdrawal.

The Chairman. I want the other members to have an opportunity to discuss this with you. I am not sure this is really a question that can easily be answered, but is there any one single consideration, as you see it, in the minds of the Administration that stands in the way of a negotiated peace such as you suggest? Can you isolate it? Can you identify a single consideration that people can understand and that this committee can understand as to why we do not do whatever it takes to get a negotiated peace? The Vice President, if I may say so, has accused me of saying that all we want to do is to surrender and to turn everything over to the Communists. This is, of course, a very pejorative statement on the part of the Vice President. It is not the way to characterize either what you said or what I said. That is one of the obstacles of course to giving rational consideration to this kind of problem.

In view of your long thought about it, what it is that stands in the way of a negotiated settlement to conclude this war, which seems to me to be so eminently in our national interest.

All kinds of programs of a domestic nature in which the Congress and the people are interested, all the way from pollution to inflation controls, are very much influenced by this enormous military expenditure. If that is true and if it is standing in the way, what do you think prevents us from negotiating?

Senator McCarthy. I think that the practical decision that has to be made is one of a willingness to accept a new government in South

Vietnam and there never really has been any indication of a willingness to accept that.

CONTINUING THRUST OF PAST POLICIES

The action in Vietnam is not very different from what was urged upon President Truman at the end of World War II when there were those who said we had to go into China. And that policy was turned down. A similar policy was urged upon President Eisenhower at the time the French failed, but he said "no" to it. But the thrust was there and the pressure for it, I think, is built into the State Department and built into the Defense Department and built, in a way, into the thinking of this country. It is not rational any more to accept China as a great threat to the United States or to have an idea of putting Chiang Kai-shek in power on the mainland. But we are still carrying on a program which is unrelated to any basic belief or policy of Asia; it is a kind of madness. There ought to be some relation between a program and what we believe and what our objectives are. But in this case we have a program which really has become a policy and it ought to be the other way—the policy determining the program.

The ideological base, if we can call it that, or the historical judgments that were made and accepted, I think, in the State Department by John Foster Dulles, in World War II and at the end of it—these are no longer accepted, but the momentum of the State Department and of the Defense Department is such that we are carrying on a program which is unrelated to a policy or which relates to a policy which we no longer accept.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. You know you have a way of being very provocative in the way you put things. You immediately raise, intentionally or otherwise, a revival of the concept of Manifest Destiny as Breckenridge and others used to talk about it at the turn of the century. I don't want to go into it right now, but I refer to what you say about this continuing thrust. Even though a policy is turned down, still it comes back again.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCarthy has given a very full statement and you have certainly quizzed him at such point that there is not much left for me. But I will ask one or two things.

CEASE-FIRE AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

For instance, in your statement you say the task of the interim government would be to arrange a cease-fire and to assure the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces. Haven't the North Vietnamease repeatedly stated that they would not negotiate for a cease-fire or anything else until all of the American troops were gone?

Senator MCCARTHY. I don't think that is their position, as I gather. They would want an agreement about withdrawal of troops, but they are prepared to negotiate, I am quite satisfied, following such an agreement but before they are withdrawn.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why should not the cease-fire be negotiated at the conference table before the setting up of an interim government?

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, you get into a question of military tactics at that point, Senator Sparkman, and the question is not very

different from what happened in Korea. There was fighting going on even while they were negotiating. I think that rather than talk about an incidental thing like stopping the bombing, for example, that you have to go beyond that and I think the first step should be a significant one rather than one that is incidental.

I don't mind, I think, if we can get an agreement on a cease-fire first, but I think an agreement on a cease-fire is much less important than an agreement on troop withdrawals and the establishment of a new government.

STEPS UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if you could state in a sentence or two what steps you advocate the United States should take.

I believe actually you enumerated them in your statement.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, pretty much those two points, I think.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator MCCARTHY. One, as Administration spokesmen—both President Johnson and spokesmen in his Administration and spokesmen in this Administration—have said, we don't want a permanent base in Southeast Asia and Secretary Rogers has said that the decision to withdraw troops is irreversible, that we could be prepared to negotiate conditions under which we would withdraw troops. We could be prepared to talk about them. But I don't believe we are. We have to talk at the same time, I think, about a new government in South Vietnam which would be reasonably representative of the factions that were there before Ky and Thieu came in and which I think are still there.

COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not completely clear on this because it seems to me there have been several statements made on both sides that indicate to me a kind of indecision. It seems to me that the suggestion has been made, whether at the conference table or elsewhere, that an agreement could be made on some kind of coalition government and that from time to time President Thieu has indicated that he would be willing to see such a coalition government. It may be that the difference was that he felt that that coalition government should come about as a result of free elections. Is that right?

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, I don't know that he has ever—I am sure he has never made any serious proposition about a government to replace him. I think early in this Administration someone did use the word "coalition," but only once and they never have come back to it again. There is no indication in Paris that coalition is being very seriously talked about or proposed at the discussions there. At present, elections are the big offer that we are making and that offer is entirely unacceptable.

EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION IN VIETNAM

Senator SPARKMAN. In your paper you quote a part of the report from the staff of this committee, from which you point out that "Rural Vietnam today * * *"—"Gardens are plowed by either bombs * * *" I don't believe you read this.

Senator McCarthy. I didn't read it into the record. I assumed the committee had heard it in other testimony.

Senator Sparkman. I wanted to ask you a question about it. "Gardens are plowed by either bombs and shells or by men digging not furrows for seed but shelters and trenches. Houses appear in irregular patterns, some curiously unscathed by the ravages of war, but many are destroyed or knocked askew and lean drunkenly, adding to the mournful loneliness which is the hallmark of abandoned areas. Previously lush rice fields are overgrown with weeds, the silence unbroken by the peasant's songs passed from generation to generation, the abandoned land devoid of even the herds of cattle and buffalo that formerly roamed. Many villages have become ghost towns, their inhabitants having fled to the cities as war refugees or to the mountains or forests to escape ever-impending death."

In the testimony by Ambassador Colby, he stated: "Except in one or two areas, the large enemy battalions, regiments, and divisions are in the border sanctuaries. The roads are open to many markets and, from the air, tin roofs sparkle throughout the countryside where families are once again tilling their long-abandoned farms."

Can you explain the difference between the two statements?

Senator McCarthy. I think the report of the committee said there were some areas that were not devastated. This was not a total description of Vietnam but a description of some part of Vietnam and I took it on the authority of the committee staff who made that report to include it in mine, not saying it was my observation at all, but I think it is generally agreed there are areas that have been devastated seriously and there are others which people say appear to be unmarked. But you have to believe that if we have dropped as many bombs with such destructive weight on the country as we are reported to have, it has to have some effect.

Senator Sparkman. I am sorry that in neither statement do I find any estimate as to how much of the country may be subject to the conditions described in each statement.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION

The Chairman. I have seen recently figures about the extent, but I don't recall them. For example, the defoliation is many thousands of acres. I have forgotten just how many, whether it was 10 percent of the arable land or not.

Let me read it. I knew I had seen it somewhere. Since you have brought it up, I think the record should be complete. This is from a reporter-at-large on defoliation. It is written by a reporter for the New Yorker, Thomas Whiteside. He says:

> In 1968, 1,267,110 acres were sprayed, and in 1969, perhaps a million acres. Since 1962, the defoliation operations have covered almost 5 million acres, an area equivalent to about 12 percent of the entire territory of South Vietnam, and about the size of the State of Massachusetts.

I thought Massachusetts was larger than that. It seems to loom larger.

Senator McCarthy. It is a rather small State.

The Chairman. It seems to loom larger. That is a very substantial area and would be, I am sure, much of the land where people live.

I think that would be interesting to include in the record.

PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR

If the Senator will allow me on another question, the staff has handed me an article from the Star of last September, and I quote the pertinent language to the question that the Senator just raised.

The President of South Vietnam took indirect issue with President Nixon today over conditions for ending the war and for withdrawing American troops. President Thieu said his country will not stop short of victory no matter what happens in Washington. He defined victory as "no Communist domination and no coalition with the Communists." Nixon told a news conference yesterday that the United States favors internationally supervised elections in South Vietnam. "We will accept the result of those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well even if it is a Communist government," Nixon said.

I think the whole article ought to go in. But here President Thieu directly contradicts the idea.

Senator SPARKMAN. I said it has been an on-and-off proposition. He also has been quoted at times, I believe, saying he would accept it. I don't think there is anything on which we can rely. I am not urging that.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think his condition is pretty consistent. He may have slipped once, but that is what he said.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 27, 1969]

THIEU CONTRADICTS NIXON'S STATEMENT ON VIET ELECTIONS

The president of South Vietnam took indirect issue with President Nixon today over conditions for ending the war and for withdrawing American troops.

President Nguyen Van Thieu said his country "will not stop short of victory, no matter what happens in Washington." He defined victory as "no Communist domination and no coalition with the Communists."

Nixon told a news conference yesterday that the United States favors internationally supervised elections in South Vietnam. "We will accept the result of those elections and the South Vietnamese will as well, even if it is a Communist government," Nixon said.

Thieu's apparent denial of this was quoted by United Press International from a news conference he held at Vung Tau, a coastal resort where he spoke to village official trainees.

WITHDRAWAL PLANS

Thieu said he was "promoting national reconciliation (with the Communists) through free elections." But his remarks indicated that he was not prepared to accept a pre-election coalition with the Communists or an election result favoring them.

The South Vietnamese president also outlined what he expects from the United States as it withdraws troops.

If Washington tells him how many troops it wants to withdraw in 1970, he will submit a plan saying what he needs to cover that, Thieu said.

"It's very reasonable to replace the bulk of your infantry if you provide us equipment, enough funds, and material to achieve the strengthening and modernization of Vietnamese troops, at the same rate and same speed," he went on.

"If you help me adequately, all right," he added.

The discussion involves only U.S. infantrymen. Both Thieu and the Nixon administration seem to assume that American soldiers will remain in Vietnam to provide logistical, artillery and air power support for South Vietnamese foot soldiers.

In Washington yesterday, high South Vietnamese sources said that Saigon planning is based on the assumption that these U.S. support forces will remain at least through the end of 1972, should the war last that long.

At his news conference today, Thieu did not specify figures. His vice president, Nguyen Cao Ky, said last week that 150,000 to 200,000 American troops could be withdrawn by the end of 1970.

After the currently planned reduction of 35,000 men by Dec. 15, there will be 484,000 American troops authorized for Vietnam. Ky's figures suggested some 300,000 might still be there at the end of next year, and Thieu's comments seemed to support this.

Thieu said he "has no wish" to replace all American forces in 1970. "What we're asking for is a reasonable time for us to provide training and leadership," he said.

NIXON'S HOPE

Nixon has said he hopes to beat the timetable set by former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford, who has urged that all American ground combat troops be pulled out of Vietnam by the end of 1970.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has said that an all-volunteer force to serve in Vietnam would not be possible until the American troop level had dropped to no more than 250,000. He has denied, however, that the administration plans to create such a force and to go on fighting indefinitely.

South Vietnamese sources here echoed Nixon's belief that the only way now to end the war is to convince Hanoi that it has nothing to gain by waiting for further concessions from the allied side.

The South Vietnamese now have a military force of about 863,000 men. This includes army, navy, marine, air force and airborne units as well as regional and popular forces. It does not include about 182,500 in the national police and other paramilitary units nor more than a million villagers organized in self-defense units.

Present plans call for raising the 863,000 figure by 90,000—to 953,000—by the end of 1972, the sources said.

SIGNIFICANCE OF TIN ROOFS

The CHAIRMAN. I have one other comment. Whenever you see a tin roof there, that is an indication that the house had been destroyed, because most of them didn't have tin roofs. These are roofs the Americans have come along and replaced. I think that is the significance of the tin roof. We had a big argument, you remember, by the Senator from Indiana, whether Indiana or Korea should supply the tin roofs and at what price, in our discussion of the aid bill.

SOURCE OF EXCERPT FROM COMMITTEE STAFF REPORT

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I add this. Regarding the excerpt from your statement, Senator McCarthy, which is from this committee's staff report, my attention has been called to the fact that it was not their own observation that the staff members were giving.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is a quote from a pamphlet that had been previously published there. I see nothing that would show to what time it relates.

Senator MCCARTHY. I say that in my paper. It was out of a handbook or guide.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am told a pamphlet was published in 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

Senator SPARKMAN. It was used at the Vietnamese training center.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. At Vung Tau?

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Where Revolutionary Development Cadre, village and hamlet officials, People's Self Defense Force personnel and others are trained.

Senator McCarthy. It was supposed to be reasonably official from our point of view, I understand.

The Chairman. Senator Case.

Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

I, on this side of the table, welcome you back to the committee. We have missed you, but you have been engaged in important work elsewhere. I think the contribution that you have made in this regard in 1968 was a tremendous one.

Senator McCarthy. I think the committee has done well without me.

Senator Case. The committee has limped along under the disability that it suffered at that time, but seriously, the committee and you were engaged in the same general process, and the role which you assumed at that time, I think, was peculiarly adapted to your qualifications.

MAINTENANCE OF WORLD PEACE AND U.S. ROLE

I wonder if I may, leaving aside the immediate suggestion that you make here—and I hope your optimism is right; I have not, myself, seen any signs of negotiation as likely to produce anything better than we have now—ask you to give me for our general guidance your conception of the role of the United States broadly in international affairs now? I was very much struck by the article that foreign affairs carried a few months ago by John Patton Davies, the thrust of which was we had gotten away from the only real possible principle on which peace can be based on this world—the balance of power. Is this a conception on which broadly you agree? What is the basic thrust of your view as to the way peace can be maintained in the world and the role of the United States in it?

Senator McCarthy. Senator, I am not pessimistic about the overall possibility of some order in the world among the great powers. I think there is a kind of balanced power relationship now as between the United States and Russia, with the Chinese not really a power but simply a force or a presence, and that the war in Vietnam is really not part of any great power struggle. If it were, one might say in some kind of great historical judgment you could justify what we were doing. But I don't think that is the case.

Therefore, it is unrelated and you have to judge it really in itself. And, in that case, I don't think it is defensible on any grounds, and certainly to the extent that it might cause some kind of confrontation with the great powers. It is dangerous even apart from whatever judgment you might pass on it as a separate problem.

It is my opinion that we can maintain this relationship between Russia and the United States if we are reasonably careful. The two nations, I see as probably being the most positive force for order in what they do and how they develop are the Japanese in the Far East and Germany in Europe. They seem to have accepted their responsibility to be restrained and to avoid military buildups and to avoid confrontation. If that relationship, if this status, can be maintained in Europe and the Japanese develop as they are developing in Asia,

then the only uncertainty would become that of China and I don't think anyone can make a judgment as to how that nation will go. You asked me a rash question and it is a rash judgment, more or less.

Senator CASE. You have generally accepted the idea of a balance of power in being?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it does exist.

Senator CASE. And what is your view as to the relevance of Vietnam?

Senator MCCARTHY. It is a different kind of balance, a different kind of power and a different kind of politics from the day of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It would seem to be the language in which some people talk about the language of power today.

Senator CASE. The world is different, of course. There are two powers now of great consequence and the others have various subsidiary roles, and more minor ones. But the general concept is one which you accept as perhaps the only, so far as there can be a rationale, the only basic rationale, for international relations, and our role in this is an important one, I take it, and has to be in some degree an active one; is that correct?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, I quite agree. I am not an isolationist.

Senator CASE. I think this is terribly important because your views on these matters are followed with avidity by a large number of people.

RUSSIAN VIEWS

Have you any revelations to bring us from Moscow; you have been there as well as Paris?

Senator MCCARTHY. No, I don't think that I really learned anything particularly there that hasn't been said publicly. They expressed deep concern over developments in the Middle East, but they have said more since I left than they said at the time that I was there. They had nothing in particular to say about Vietnam, the particular problem that we are dealing with here today.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all that I would like to say now. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Senator CHURCH. Senator MCCARTHY, I want to say that no one man in American politics had more to do with changing our war policy in Southeast Asia than you by your activities in 1968. I think you rendered the Nation a great service.

DIFFERENCE IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AT PARIS PEACE TALKS

You have just recently returned from Paris where you had discussions with representatives of the North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. What fundamental difference between the two sides would you ascribe as the basic reason for the stalemate at the conference table.

Senator MCCARTHY. Senator Church, our position there, so far as our spokesman, Mr. Habib, presents one, is that we are for elections. And this is totally unacceptable to the other side. Their position is,

it gets a little bit confused, but the two points are, as I understood their position: an agreement about withdrawal of troops, which should be acceptable, because, as I said earlier in response to a question by another Senator, both the Johnson and the Nixon administration (spokesmen for them) said they had in mind to withdraw troops and not to establish any permanent bases. So it would seem to me that the proposition should be open. And the other point is a new government in South Vietnam. In my opinion, both of these should be subject and are subject to negotiation. But we don't respond to either of these.

Generally, we reject their 10-point program saying this is all or nothing and it is not all or nothing. I am sure that these two propositions are subject to very serious negotiations if we are really prepared to begin to talk about them.

U.S. PROPOSAL OF ELECTIONS AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT

Senator CHURCH. Isn't it curious at this late stage that we now stress elections as the basis for a settlement, even though there is little evidence that either Saigon or Hanoi want elections? The present laws and constitution of South Vietnam prevent free elections, as we Americans would define them, and there is no indication that Hanoi is interested in free elections. Is it not the case that we have put forward a proposition that has little appeal to either side?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think practically no appeal.

Senator CHURCH. Then why have we pursued that course?

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, I don't—I can give a general judgment that we more or less believe in free elections in this country and it sounds like a fair proposition. Most people would say that is a good offer.

It was difficult to hold free elections in some places in this country, to say nothing of what might happen in South Vietnam, but it is just not a viable proposition for negotiation. After a war has been going on for 25 years to say: "Look, we have been fighting for 25 years for free elections." They don't respond very actively to that proposal.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIETCONG VIEW OF ADMINISTRATION POLICIES

Senator CHURCH. Based upon your conversations with the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong's representatives in Paris, how does, in their eyes, the policy of the Nixon administration differ from the policy of the closing days of the Johnson administration?

Senator MCCARTHY. They didn't talk about it, particularly in terms of that kind of contrast, but it was obvious that they thought it was a continuation of the same policy.

Senator CHURCH. Basically the same policy.

Senator MCCARTHY. Basically the same policy. Nothing new had been offered for negotiation with the change of Administration, and if anything they felt, I think, that the failure to replace Ambassador Lodge was a further indication that possibilities of these negotiations were very slight.

Senator CHURCH. Do they view their own situation as growing stronger, growing weaker, or simply stalemating?

Senator McCarthy. I couldn't speculate as to what they really think in terms of the trends. The only indication I received was that they were not on the verge of surrender certainly, and that they were not moved to believe that Vietnamization was going to be a significant success.

Senator Church. Do they view Vietnamization with alarm?

Senator McCarthy. I didn't get that impression; no.

U.S. NEGOTIATION FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT

Senator Church. I visualize the withdrawal of American troops creating a situation whereby it becomes necessary for all Vietnamese factions to begin to negotiate a Vietnamese settlement. How would you envision the United States undertaking to negotiate directly for this coalition government in Paris? In regard to your position of a coalition government, how can we proceed to negotiate on any basis that would of necessity dispose of or replace the present government in Saigon?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think it is a difficult test of statesmanship, but I think we must acknowledge that, unless things have changed significantly, we have a great deal of control in South Vietnam at the present time and control over the South Vietnamese Government. Certainly, before the Ky-Thieu administration was established, we were effective in changing governments reasonably often in South Vietnam. In my judgment that is still an open possibility and it ought to be tried. We really haven't tried it. You say it is difficult and I think it is difficult. If you suggest it could not take place, I think that must be taken to be on the side of pessimism. The alternative is simply just pull our troops out and see what happens or else the only way to settle any kind of international disagreement is by the application of more force. I hope we would not reach the point where we would accept those as the only two possibilities in Vietnam or any other part of the world.

ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL SUGGESTED

Senator Church. I deeply believe we lack the capacity to be the principal architect for a new political structure in South Vietnam. We have given the present government everything that can be given them in the way of military and material support. The only sensible course now is to proceed with an orderly withdrawal. This may very well result in the formation, ironically, of a much more broadly based South Vietnam Government, due to the negotiations among the Vietnamese themselves. The end of the road would, thus, be the same as the start.

Senator McCarthy. I would be prepared to accept that as an alternative to the war in any case, take a chance on what might happen.

Senator Church. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. The Senator from Kentucky.

Senator Cooper. I wish to join with all the members in saying we are glad to welcome you. You have been complimented, and correctly, for your leadership in the past, but I would say, too, I do not assume that denies your leadership in the future.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

LACK OF PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator COOPER. I would be happy, too, if we could find some way to quickly end this war and stop the killing and the wounding. You know we have sought negotiations and I agree with you that it would be much better if the war could be settled by negotiation, and the future of the entire area could be settled at least for a time by negotiation.

You remember that you and many of us advocated the cessation of bombing in the belief that it would lead to negotiations. I know you will recall it was intimated by Mr. Kosygin and other leaders of the Soviet Union that it would bring negotiations. I think you will agree with me that there have been no substantive negotiations to settle any of the issues in Paris. Is that your view?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, of course, that is right. The proposition, at the time the bombing halt was under consideration, is they said they wouldn't even sit down and talk unless we stopped bombing North Vietnam. It was a precondition really to their even coming to the negotiating table.

Senator COOPER. Don't you agree, we thought, you thought, every one of us thought, if there could be a cessation of bombing, the results would be more than sitting down and talking, but substantive negotiations.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, I certainly hoped for it.

Senator COOPER. I have talked with Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Lodge, as I am sure you have.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Senator COOPER. And they told that nothing of substance was ever discussed.

Senator MCCARTHY. No.

VIETNAMIZATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

Senator COOPER. I believe this lack of substantive progress in negotiations is one of the reasons that led the Administration to try this policy of Vietnamization. Some have stated that they do not think it is a change in policy, that it is essentially the same policy that was followed under the administration of President Johnson. I disagree, and I must challenge this viewpoint. All of us remember that for years the United States had become more and more involved in Vietnam: economically and militarily. You will remember that in 4 or 5 years our forces were increased from 17,000 to about 550,000. Would you consider that the withdrawal of troops and the promised withdrawal of an additional hundred thousand is a change?

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, Senator, I think if the numbers withdrawn reach a point where it necessarily sets in motion a policy of change in government in South Vietnam, a shifting of degree of responsibility for that government to South Vietnam itself, at that point the quantitative change would result in a policy change. I don't think we have reached that point yet and I don't think the withdrawal of another hundred thousand troops is necessarily going to do it. First, because there are more troops there than we need even now; and secondly, as you will recall when we were criticizing the escalation, the protest against sending in troops arose long before there were

300,000 American troops in South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, when it got to 50,000 and 60,000 and it looked as though it was going to a hundred thousand, it was protested. At that time General Gavin talked about the enclave theory, which he was never really allowed to explain, and I think we have come back to something closer to that if it is not necessary to control the whole countryside. But I don't see a policy change yet reflected in the prospective and the present and past withdrawals of troops. The basic policy is still military domination and continued support of the military government of South Vietnam.

Senator Cooper. Many have talked about the government in Saigon, and it is correct that anything the United States does in Vietnam is in a sense in support of the government. As in this country, if good is done under a Democratic or Republican administration, it supports that administration.

SEARCH AND DESTROY STRATEGY AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS

But I go back to my point of a change in policy. On the military side there has been a change in the search and destroy strategy.

Second, the President is withdrawing troops, and Secretary of State Rogers has said this is irreversible. I assume it means a continuing removal of troops. I think it is irreversible because once you start on a program of withdrawal there would be no way to secure the support of the Congress and the American people to increase troops in Vietnam. Do you think I am correct?

Senator McCarthy. Well, you describe what has happened. I just say it is a question of how far it goes. I mean there are not as many search and destroy missions as there were, and we are not bombing in quite the same places, but they are bombing Laos, so that it is more at this point, as I see it, a question of some changes in tactics rather than a change of policy.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S STATEMENT AT GUAM

Senator Cooper. You have said you thought our programs dictated policy rather than having the programs applicable to a policy.

Do you not think the statement of President Nixon at Guam that, as I consider its substance, we would not become involved again in the land mass of Asia, but leave the burden of protection to those countries, a policy?

Senator McCarthy. There are hardly any countries for us to get into except China.

Senator Cooper. The United States is in Southeast Asia.

Senator McCarthy. Laos.

Senator Cooper. We are in Southeast Asia, and I believe that the President's policy is a change. It means getting our forces out of Southeast Asia.

Senator McCarthy. Well, President Johnson said that, too.

Senator Cooper. I know, but President Johnson was increasing troops all the time, and bombing North Vietnam. It seems so long ago, but I remember the bombing of Hanoi, and when we went to the White House and heard the President describe it in great detail. Our policy is changing. I would agree if we could negotiate with the North Viet-

namese it would be a better means, but I assume our present course is taken because we haven't been able to negotiate.

NEGOTIATION AND TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator McCarthy. I would say all the changes you have described have not encouraged negotiations. It would seem to me it would make it easier to negotiate, because we are doing this thing or the Administration is, they should not negotiate. It seems to me that that doesn't follow. That they could negotiate and continue, in fact; the fact that withdrawals were taking place it would seem to me would make it easy to negotiate.

Senator Cooper. I think you said that the North Vietnamese always insisted on the withdrawal of our troops before any substantive——

Senator McCarthy. On an agreement. I don't think they were insistent upon withdrawals of troops before there was a settlement. That would be preposterous.

U.S. ALTERNATIVES

Senator Cooper. You have said, and many of us have said, that if we can negotiate a cease-fire and orderly withdrawal of troops it would be best. I assume that the substance of your statement, and it is a good statement, is that we should make a choice between the present policy of Vietnamization or an immediate withdrawal of troops. Would you say that is its substance?

Senator McCarthy. I didn't hear you.

Senator Cooper. I would assume that the substance of your proposal is we should make a choice between the present policy of Vietnamization or immediate withdrawal of troops.

Senator McCarthy. No, I say that is not the choice. That is what is proposed to us. But I think there is a place between that for a negotiated settlement now; that the alternatives are not simply Vietnamization as described by the Administration or the withdrawal of troops. We can negotiate.

COALITION GOVERNMENT AND TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Senator Cooper. You couple with it, then, the installation of a coalition government?

Senator McCarthy. I think that is the critical point of difference between my position and the Administration's.

Senator Cooper. Senator Church asked this: Do you think the United States should force or coerce the South Vietnamese to establish a coalition government?

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think Senator Church indicated if we continued to withdraw troops it will have the same effect. It will create a vacuum in which they will have to work out something. Maybe that is the only way we can do it, but I think we ought to try to do it in any kind of a rational or orderly way to see if we can arrange it. If we can't, then to let the policy—let it happen.

It seems to me I am somewhat more optimistic that reasonable order could be agreed upon than simply create conditions out of chaos in the hope that some good may come.

Senator COOPER. Withdrawal of troops, then, in your view is the essential element to achieve a coalition government.

Senator MCCARTHY. Agreement upon withdrawal of troops, not necessarily the withdrawal, is the beginning of negotiation. I think the two come together—an effort to set up a new government and an agreement on withdrawal of troops. I think they can be worked out almost simultaneously.

COULD COALITION GOVERNMENT RESULT IN MINORITY TAKEOVER?

Senator COOPER. We have talked about self-determination and free elections and all that, but practically, it seems to me, the people of South Vietnam have, the majority have not wanted to be under the domination of a minority. Do you believe that a coalition government would result in a minority in South Vietnam taking over against the will, whatever that will is, of the majority? This has happened in many coalition governments.

Senator MCCARTHY. I know. I don't think you are going to be able to determine quite what the majority wants. The cult of the silent majority is taking over in this country, so I don't know as I could read it in South Vietnam. I haven't been able to read it here. But I think you deal with the forces that you can identify in South Vietnam without trying to claim for them either majority support or lack of that support, as we have attempted to do before we supported the Thieu-Ky government.

DESIRABILITY OF REAL NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. I certainly am glad to hear you. I agree if there is any possible way of getting real negotiations, we should try. But I must say that I do disagree with you that there has been no change in policy.

Senator MCCARTHY. It would be almost better to break off negotiations than to pretend we are negotiating as we have been for nearly 2 years.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Senator through?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

Senator WILLIAMS. Just a brief question first. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you back to the committee.

FORMATION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

I notice that you do not believe that free elections are the answer. You are suggesting that we abandon that recommendation. Assuming that we withdraw our support for free elections today and express a willingness to enter into an agreement for withdrawal of the troops as you recommend, how would you form this coalition government? That is who would make the appointments for the respective sides? I ask that question because I know here in this country we have many coalition commissions between the Republican and Democratic Parties, but usually the man who makes the appointments makes all the appointments that would coincide with his views.

In the forming of a coalition government, if we enforce such a proposal today, how would we form that coalition? Who would make the designations of the respective positions and where would the balance of power lay and how would it be worded?

Senator McCarthy. I don't know how that could be worked out. That is what we should determine in Paris. We are supposed to have people there who are supposed to be talking about the four principal parties involved in the war and it would be a discussion among them out of which an agreement on a new government could come.

Senator Williams. What would be your views if you were a negotiator and making the recommendation? What recommendation would you make as to the forming a coalition government? Just how would we go about it? I asked you for your views because you have given it a lot of study.

Senator McCarthy. I think everyone has thought about it a great deal and there is no set formula. You are not going to pull them out of a hat, but sit down as they have done before in setting up coalition governments and done in other cases where we negotiated. We did something like this in Laos where we settled. So it is a question of reasonable people sitting down saying, "We will take a chance on this kind of government as an alternative to a continuation of the war." And you pick your people and name them and it is generally agreed that there are people in South Vietnam, some of them in the Ky-Thieu government, who would be acceptable. But there is no magic formula for it. It is like working out the leadership of the Democratic Party.

Senator Williams. As you state, there are some in the present government that would be acceptable. Acceptable to whom—the present government? Or would you let each one of the various opposing forces select their own representatives?

Senator McCarthy. It would be negotiated. You know how these things are done, John. It is not a formula. You are not going to take 2 percent proportionate representation. We are not going to take that. We know what the forces are running in South Vietnam. At least we should know by now. We have been there roughly 10 years. And I hope we would be expert enough to know what the various groups are and forces and how some kind of reconciliation could be worked out. The alternative is just to withdraw troops, either do it themselves or continue support of a kind of military dictatorship; these are the choices we have.

Senator Williams. This is one solution and I was wondering what your views are as to how we should form such a coalition government. That is all.

EXCERPTS FROM VUNG TAU TRAINING CENTER PAMPHLET: CONDITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman. Previously there was reference made to the excerpt from the document which was cited by you. Senator Sparkman read the part which you cited. I have been handed the document. It is entitled "Revolutionary Development Cadre Program, Contribution to the Vietnamese People's Struggle or Solution to the Vietnam War." It is apparently used in Vung Tau Training Center which was set up by American funds and advisers, but, as I understand it, is actually run by Vietnamese now with the advice of Americans. There

has been called to my attention the following language, following the part that you cited, which seems to me to be interesting enough to read into the record. It is very short. The very next sentence following your excerpt reads:

> * * * Of course there are those villages which are fortunate enough to lie within those areas under government control. But, cruel irony, in these areas we run into man's inhumanity to man in other forms. We find the exploitation of the people by the petty tyrants, the shakedown-artists and the con men. In short, the corrupt officials who look upon the people as being so many vegetables, so much garbage, with whom they can do as they please, indulge their capricious whims no matter how perverted. Is it any wonder that life in these areas is full of complaints springing from an outraged sense of justice.
>
> This then is life in Vietnam as it really is. On the one hand, the cities are troubled with moral and material crises. On the other hand, the countryside is destitute, deserted, racked with disease and hunger and the people feel that life has cheated them. With the cauldron boiling as it is, dissension rampant, the ranks of the nationalists divided and scattered, all who care about their country's future must feel heartbroken. * * *
>
> We must not hide from the facts, or camouflage the wretched conditions in our homeland under a screen of hypocrisy.

It was such a colorful statement, that I asked the staff why they didn't put it all in their report. They said they thought it would be so extreme it might be offensive to members of the committee and to the public; so they stopped just short of putting that in.

U.S. PURPOSE IN VIETNAM

I want to ask one last question of you if I may. In the hearings that have been going on and in previous hearings, it seems to me, if there is any recurring reason given as the purpose of this war, it is to prevent the spread of the Communist social and political system. This goes back to the days of Secretary Rusk. Is that your impression? Would you agree that, although other reasons have been given, this is the recurring and most central one?

Senator McCarthy. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, as the American commitment for troops and power increased there was a kind of escalation of the stated objectives as it went along, simply protecting the South Vietnamese from Communist domination, then the larger question of the national honor and the credibility of the American commitment, and Secretary Rusk finally began to talk about the potential danger of a billion Chinese in the year 2000. So the rather limited objective which I think was first set has been greatly expanded as time has passed and as the American presence has increased in South Vietnam.

You see, with reference to the reported description of conditions in Vietnam, in the manner in which you did, I don't know as you really can look at it from outside and make a very positive judgment. If you tried to judge it simply within the terms of the policies that have been announced and the reports that have come out from those making the policies at least since 1965, the members of this committee know that it won't stand the test of internal criticism. We could hope that what's being said now will turn out to be the right judgment and things may work out as the Administration spokesmen say they are working out. But the record of the past is such that I think we have to be most skeptical. There is the further consideration that there is very little said about what things are going to be like after victory,

and it seems to me that should always be the first question that one should raise and attempt to answer before he becomes involved in military action.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that I gathered your answer to this. I realize that in the days of Secretary Rusk there did occur this escalation. However within the last 2 days one of the witnesses of the present Administration, who is working in Vietnam, in response to the question of what we really expect to achieve and what is the purpose, if I understood it correctly, said it was to prevent the spread of the Communist system by force. I have found no other central theme from the beginning, although there have been variations, as you pointed out. Occasionally, it is said our purpose is to give them the right to free elections, but when I ask why we are so interested in free elections in Vietnam as opposed to free elections in Panama or Spain or Greece or Brazil, I find no answer. We don't seem to be the least concerned about the fact that there are no elections in Greece. We give them assistance and encouragement; we give it to many others and I have never understood. So it seems to come back to this matter of containing communism.

CENTRAL MOTIVATING FORCE FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

I wondered if you would agree that that has been the central motivating force unless you assume the manifest destiny urge that, somewhat like the lemmings, forces us on regardless of what our reason tells us.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, I think that was the primary motivation of those who first advocated our becoming involved in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Aren't they still recurring to that if they are pressed?

Senator MCCARTHY. We have two points, I think: One, President Nixon has said if you have free elections and it turned out to elect Communists that we would accept that. So the question then that must be asked is: Are we there because we object to the process, the spreading of communism by force, and not to communism itself? It would seem to me that this is the position that they hold. If it is then the question you raised, if it is the process, then we ought to be opposed to the establishment of military dictatorships or military democracies by force also. If it is the process that is our concern and not the consequence, that should be our general concern in Greece and in Latin American countries too.

But as you know, Mr. Chairman, contradictions are present in so many areas that it would be better to just try to work on negotiating a settlement in South Vietnam today.

EFFECT OF CONDUCT OF WAR ON U.S. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, what interests me as the result of this question is the last question which grows out of this. Is the war, the way we have conducted it, actually promoting the strength of the democratic system as we conceive of it, either political or the private enterprise system in the economic sense, or is it weakening it? In other words, is this policy and what we have done actually strengthening those concepts in which we say we believe and undertake to put into

effect here or does it weaken them? In view of the attitude of so many people around the world in many advanced societies who so thoroughly disagree with this policy, I have the terrible feeling that we are undoing our own house, you see, by this misguided policy. It simply is not strengthening those very things we think we are strengthening by this enormous extravagance in a monetary way and loss of lives. There is a rather haunting feeling that we are our own undoing in this kind of policy, that the objective is not at all being accomplished.

Senator McCarthy. Well, I think we are weaker at home because of the war and I think we have less influence in the world because of the involvement in Vietnam than we would have if we were not involved.

The Chairman. Today we have the declining interest rates, the decline in business, the layoff of workers in the automobile and construction business. What is this doing to the economy and to the system which we say we support? The continuation of a military influence far greater than any other influence always leads to the decline of the democratic processes in any country; doesn't it? Hasn't that been so? You are a great student of history.

Senator McCarthy. Generally so.

The Chairman. Generally so.

Thank you very much. Do you have anything further to say?

Senator McCarthy. No, I think not; thank you.

Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, may I say one thing?

The Chairman. Oh, yes.

BASIS OF PRESENT ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY

Senator Cooper. It is obvious that conditions which you described in Vietnam are the result of the war. We wouldn't have the material, human situation there if we hadn't had a war. It seems to me that the inquiry we are making is to see how we get out of the war the best possible way. Whatever these policies, purposes were in the past, and we have used all kinds of words, such as "defense against Communism," "self-determination," and other such terms, but whatever those reasons were, I do not believe the policy of this Administration is based on the policies of the past. I think it is saying it is getting out, and that is the basis of their policy. I think the process of withdrawal is irreversible.

Senator McCarthy. All right, we will let that judgment stand.

Senator Cooper. And we will talk later.

Senator McCarthy. We will talk later.

QUESTION OF URGENCY AND INFLUENCES ON PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES

The Chairman. I would say to the Senator I agree with that. The question is one of urgency and also the influence of some who have a more powerful Messianic spirit than others. When I read a speech by Admiral Sharp or General Ciccolella, it gives me the impression they have no idea of getting out at all. Their idea is to Christianize and civilize. Their speeches read almost like McKinley's when he took on Aguinaldo in the Philippines. That is what it sounds like. I will leave it up to you to read the speeches. I grant it is not the Administration. These are important military leaders and these are influences in our

system. I am very pleased that the President has made no such speech. I personally only would like to urge him to carry on, as the Senator from Kentucky has so well said on many occasions, to the irreversible conclusion of complete withdrawal. But there is always a little bit of reservation. I have never heard him say complete withdrawal; nor have I heard the Secretary of Defense, say complete withdrawal. It is withdrawal of combat ground troops and in yesterday's hearing the witnesses went into some detail, explaining that a gunship, a helicopter with powerful weapons, is not combat ground troops. There is a question whether there is any intention of withdrawing in this sense at all. These are the questions I raise simply in an effort to try to create, insofar as I can, a feeling of urgency that it is against the interests of the people of the United States to continue this war and simply to urge the President to follow what he has announced as his policy and not to allow other influences to divert him.

When we read about the previous Administration, it is quite obvious that that President followed what I think was a disastrous policy. There were elements, influences, some pushing him one way and some another, and he finally, in my view, took the wrong turn because of the power of persuasion of certain of his advisers. There were others, such as yourself and others, who gave him different advice, but he didn't follow that.

All Presidents are human beings. These two both happen to have been Members of the Senate. We know how we are pushed and pulled on all kinds of issues from day to day and I think that is the way this is.

QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTING POLICY STILL REMAINS

I agree with the Senator from Kentucky. I am not trying to say that the President has not said any of the things he has said. There still remains the question of implementing the policy of getting the job done, of getting the war over and then getting down to trying to attack the problems that are threatening to undermine the stability of our own country. That is all this is about.

QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, leaving out all questions of principle, purely in self-interest, I think one can argue that we should get out.

The Chairman. I am not leaving it out—only in the sense that it doesn't seem to have much appeal to many people. They respond more to the practical effects than principle. The principal argument has been made by you and others very persuasively and I haven't seen much effect.

Senator Case. May I say just a word on this question of principle. I am not sure just what you mean, because if you mean a course of action, and I don't think you do, which because of some divine revelation requires us to get out of there and leave to their fate millions of people, then I don't think that principle is worth following, and I don't think there is any such principle that guides us or should guide us. It is a practical problem of getting out with the least damage and the best chance for this country and for that part of the world to rehabilitate itself, and that is what we are all for.

Senator McCarthy. Yes.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

That last statement brings up a very interesting subject. I had thought this country was based upon certain principles beginning with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but I think that goes too far. I personally think we have far departed from our basic principles, as enunciated in certain of those basic documents.

Senator Case. Mr. Chairman, we are in a different age and this is a different country. A little struggling 2 or 3 million people on the fringe of a wilderness outside the main world is a different country, with different responsibilities, from a country which is the most powerful Nation in the world.

The Chairman. Are you suggesting, then, that the Declaration of Independence is obsolete as Mr. Katzenbach did with the Constitution?

Senator Case. I don't think I want to——

The Chairman. I don't think you are. I don't want to argue with my colleague here or get into this at this time. Maybe we ought to do that on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Case. I agree with you.

The Chairman. I don't think the principles there are obsolete at all. The basic principle, I would say, in Southeast Asia is that those people have a right to work out their own destiny without the intrusion of the United States with arms. That is what I am saying in effect. I don't think we have any mission there.

Senator Case. We are not engaged de novo with a situation and, of course, we would agree with this. We are where we are and we have to work out of it; that is the point we are talking about.

Senator McCarthy. That is right.

The Chairman. I think the Senator has given us some good suggestions this morning.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

The Chairman. Major Arthur. Will you come forward, please, sir. You didn't get to finish your statement yesterday. Please carry on.

May we have order please.

Major Arthur, will you continue please.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN VANN, HAWTHORNE MILLS, AND CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY—Resumed

Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for me, perhaps, to offer a little clarification of one matter that came up during Senator McCarthy's testimony.

The Chairman. Yes, Ambassador Colby is recognized, certainly.

EXCERPT FROM VUNG TAU TRAINING CENTER PAMPHLET: CONDITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. Colby. The quotation from the Vietnamese document that was read during the past session also caught my eye when it was first put in the report of your staff members. When I found this in Saigon I looked around for the origin of that statement and I discovered it. I believe it was in the same book you were looking at and which you extended.

I think, if you will look about two or three pages, or four or five pages ahead of that quotation you will see the date of October 1967 on that statement. I think that is the point. My reference to the tin roofs, and my statement about the extension of the security throughout the countryside do indicate that there has been a change in Vietnam in the past 2 years.

I think that this is obvious to most observers who have been there. It is obvious to the gentlemen who have come here with me. I think Senator Javits can indicate that he has seen it. Senator Harrison Williams was out there and I think he may report something about this. I suggest that the key difference here between our two reports really lies in the dates of the two reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have the staff check that and insert this as a footnote or an explanation. The date on the outside of the overall document is 1969.

Mr. COLBY. Right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not read the part about which you are speaking, but that can be checked and will be corrected to reflect that.

Mr. COLBY. The author of that particular document, Mr. Chairman, is an old friend of mine. He gave me a copy of that particular document earlier. He is the gentleman who is today running the Vung Tau Training Center. He is the gentlemen who, on one occasion, criticized publicly to our then Vice President Humphrey the corruption in the elite structure of Vietnam.

He is also the gentleman whom President Thieu has publicly endorsed and emphasized that he wished to continue this kind of teaching in that camp to all village and hamlet chiefs to try to inspire in them this new spirit to change the situation in Vietnam. I think this has been the thrust of the pacification program over the past year or so.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

APPOINTMENT OF DISTRICT CHIEFS

Since we started this, I have one question with regard to yesterday's testimony in order to keep the record straight. I believe you said that the district chiefs are not nominated by province chiefs. The background paper put out by the Embassy in Saigon and entitled, "Background Data on South Vietnam" states on page 4 as follows, and I quote:

"Directly below the province, districts are headed by a Chief appointed by the Minister of Interior upon the nomination of the province chief."

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. COLBY. I think that may be somewhat mistaken, Mr. Chairman. I have talked to a class of about 100 prospective district chiefs who were selected by the national Government and sent to a special course in their new duties before they were appointed, and certainly before they were even known to the province chiefs involved.

They then were assigned as district chiefs out around the country. I think that may be a slight mistake as to the formal way in which these people become district chiefs. They are finally appointed, in any case, by the Prime Minister.

The CHAIRMAN. Not by the Minister of Interior?

Mr. COLBY. By the Prime Minister today. He is the same man now.

The CHAIRMAN. When you go back, you can have them correct their bulletin.

Mr. COLBY. We will do so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Major Arthur, will you proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. JAMES F. ARTHUR, DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISER, BINH CHANH DISTRICT, GIA DINH PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM—Resumed

Major ARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of the other Senators, I would like to introduce myself and tell what I do and then continue approximately where I left off with the statement yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major ARTHUR. I am Maj. James F. Arthur from North Carolina. I am currently the district senior adviser from Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province, Vietnam.

Senator CASE. Which corps area is that in?

Major ARTHUR. That is in III Corps.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Major ARTHUR. I continue approximately where I left off yesterday.

SCHOOLS AND MATERNITY DISPENSARIES

The district has one high school which is located in Binh Chanh Village and 45 primary and elementary schools operating throughout the district. In addition, there are 10 maternity dispensaries located within the district.

VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOCAL GUERRILLAS

Binh Chanh sits astride the major routes of infiltration into the city of Saigon from the south and was used as a staging area during the 1968 Tet offensive. The primary targets of the district's territorial forces are the Vietcong infrastructure and the local guerrillas which ideally would number approximately 30 per village and 12 per hamlet.

These Vietcong are prime targets because they are the ones who have the mission of terrorism, assassination, tax collection, propaganda and providing intelligence and guides for the main force units.

At the present time, the Vietcong infrastructure and local guerrillas have been reduced to squad and half squad size units per village and there is very little organization left at hamlet level. However, there are three under strength main force battalions whose areas of operation include Binh Chanh district. These units are normally based outside the district boundaries and send in small units to assist the local guerrillas in accomplishing their mission.

U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

The district chief has 17 regional force companies and 25 popular force platoons under his command and in addition, there are three

ranger battalions, ARVN type, operating in the district. In the past, the 199th light infantry brigade was based in the district. However, there are no U.S. combat forces in the district now and the defense of Binh Chanh rests solely on the Vietnamese.

The primary mission of the territorial forces is that of providing security for the population while the ranger battalions have the mission of eliminating the Vietcong main force units. The 1970 plan calls for the regional forces to assume the mission of offensive operations and popular forces, assisted by the people's self-defense force to assume the responsibility for protecting the population, thereby enabling the rangers to be released for duty elsewhere.

At the present there are eight regional force companies ready to assume offensive operations missions and the changeover should begin in March or April. The regional forces are rapidly improving and a number of the companies are able to handle sophisticated airmobile, cordon and search and raid operations.

Since September, the territorial forces have captured 36 Vietcong and killed 23, including two district level party committee members. During the past month, the territorial forces made contact with the Vietcong 11 times with only two of those contacts being Vietcong initiated.

People's self-defense forces continue to be a problem area. According to Vietnamese figures they have organized 20,700, trained 5,800 and armed 1,782. As yet the PSDF advisor has been unable to get a physical count of the members; however, he has been able to monitor some of the training which is marginal at best. The only firm figure is the number of weapons issued and the adviser has been able to verify that the persons issued these weapons are actually performing security duties at night in the hamlets. I plan to place increased emphasis on this program during 1970 since a success in this area will increase identity with the Government and also free regional force companies for offensive operations.

VILLAGE AND HAMLET PROGRAMS

The program to improve village and hamlet government got off to a slow start, but by the close of 1969 all the staff positions at both village and hamlet level had been filled and the personnel trained by either the National Training Center at Vung Tau or the Gia Dinh Province Training Committee.

Village self development programs were slow starting due to the lack of trained village officials to handle them. However, once the program started it was well received by the rural populace. Small projects, 193, each costing 50,000 piastres ($423) or less, were approved by the village councils and 142 were completed.

Seven of ten projects in the 50,000 piastre to 150,000 piastre price range were completed. Four projects, each costing over 150,000 piastres, were approved by the Province Chief, but none were completed because the cost of materials rose before the projects could be started. The remaining projects will be completed during the first quarter of 1970, and the paperwork for the 1970 program will be initiated concurrently.

CHIEU HOI AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS

The Chieu Hoi and Information programs did not do well during 1969 and special emphasis will be placed in these areas during 1970.

INTRODUCTION OF IR–8 RICE

IR–8 rice, which is a new miracle rice, was introduced into the district in June 1969 and results were outstanding. The program was well publicized and all indications are that the people have accepted the new rice and will plant more of it next season.

PROGRESS AGAINST VIETCONG

Progress has been made. When Lieutenant Colonel Di assumed command of the Binh Chanh Special Zone on May 8, 1968, there were 15 Vietcong hamlets and the majority of the rest were in the "D" and "E" category as reflected by the hamlet evaluation system (survey).

Today there are four "D" hamlets, 38 "C" hamlets and 18 "B" hamlets in Binh Chanh district. This is not an inflation of a rating system, but reflects the untiring efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Di, his staff and the advisers assigned to his district.

The Vietcong main force units have been reduced to one-quarter strength and local guerrillas are seriously under strength. The security situation has improved remarkably and every effort will be made to continue to improve it and give additional emphasis to rural development in 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Major Arthur.

CONDUCT OF HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM

You mentioned the hamlet evaluation system. How much of your time do you spend on the hamlet evaluation system?

Major ARTHUR. I spend about 60 percent of my time during the month in conducting the hamlet evaluation system survey. This is part of my job. I have to get out and visit every hamlet that I possibly can, and I manage to make most of them every month, and in doing so I look for the factors that are included on the HES worksheet to see what progress or what the actual situation in the village or hamlet is, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. How many hamlets are there in your district?

Major ARTHUR. There are 60, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you visit each one each month?

Major ARTHUR. I try to make it every month, sir. Sometimes I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems like an awful lot of hamlets to visit in 30 days. That is an average of two a day.

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How soon after you became a district adviser did you begin filing the HES reports?

Major ARTHUR. I filed it the first month after I became the district adviser, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long do you spend in each hamlet?

Major ARTHUR. Sometimes as little as 15 or 20 minutes, sir; sometimes as much as a couple of hours.

The CHAIRMAN. How much lower would the percentage of A, B, and C hamlets be if the hamlets were surveyed at night?

Major ARTHUR. The HES report includes activities that happen 24 hours a day. In preparing the hamlet evaluation I have a report of all the contacts that occurred during the month, where they occurred, what the results were, both night and day, both for operational contacts and ambushes.

Also included in the report are all the VC propaganda attempts and attempts at taxation or completion of propaganda missions and taxation. This includes nighttime figures also.

I think the HES as it stands now, sir, is a valid system which is correct in my district. I cannot speak for any of the other districts.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know what goes on in the C hamlets at night?

Major ARTHUR. We have popular force platoons, some revolutionary development cadre, village and hamlet officials that are staying there who can give the reports to the district chief.

Also they bring up matters for my people who visit the hamlets to talk to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever downgraded any hamlets in your district?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

Major ARTHUR. I have downgraded three since I have been there, sir; and I have made numerous downgrade changes per month. Some go up, some go down, depending on the level of VC activity.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of reports do you have to submit when a hamlet is downgraded?

Major ARTHUR. On the HES report, sir, is a section for comment of why it is being downgraded. I downgraded Da Phouc 4 for excessive taxation. I had five reported incidents occurring somewhere in the neighborhood of that hamlet during the month and this is a specific instance.

HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM REPORT

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know how to put it in the record, but I think this sheet I hold in my hand indicating the type of information that you report on each hamlet each month, ought to be put in.

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with it?

I will ask the reporter to do the best he can to put it in, but it is an enormous thing. There must be 50 or 60 questions. This seems like an impossible job.

(The information referred to is in the Committee files.)

PREPARATION OF HES MONTHLY REPORT

Do you speak Vietnamese?

Major ARTHUR. I speak a little Vietnamese, sir. My deputy speaks fluent Vietnamese, and he is responsible for handling questions 4, 5 and 6 on this report, which deal with the civil development and administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he go along with you on these visits?

Major ARTHUR. He conducts his visits independently most of the time, sir. Sometimes we do go together.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he an American or Vietnamese?

Major ARTHUR. He is an American, sir—a Foreign Service officer, FSO–6.

The CHAIRMAN. I was wondering what you could do with this kind of a program with a form to be filled in in 15 minutes in any kind of a village, no matter what language you spoke, because you can see it is enormously complicated.

Major ARTHUR. I have a district team of 14 members that assist me, and I task them with various points to assist in preparing the HES.

The CHAIRMAN. When you go into a village for 15 minutes, do you take them with you?

Major ARTHUR. No, sir, they operate on their own during the day going around on the various programs that they work with, and they are looking at this also.

The CHAIRMAN. Are all these questions given equal importance and then averaged out or how do you accomplish this?

Major ARTHUR. There are letter grades assigned to it, sir, and I assume they are all of equal importance.

The CHAIRMAN. All are of equal importance? After you fill them all do you average it up?

Major ARTHUR. I fill it all in and send it to Province. They send it to III Corps and it is put into a computer and it comes back with a rating.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of these questions would be very difficult to answer. They are matters of opinion about what happens to whoever you talked to, such as "No reason to doubt whole party apparatus eliminated or neutralized."

PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything to do with the Phoenix program?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do about that?

Major ARTHUR. The district chief is concurrently the head of the Phoenix program and as his adviser I head the Phoenix program. I have a military intelligence first lieutenant who is the adviser, District Operations and Coordinating Center (DIOCC). He does the day-to-day nuts and bolts work there in the DIOCC.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the incident that occurred in Baltimore not too long ago involving the two men who had been trained at Fort Holabird? Was that brought to your attention?

Major ARTHUR. Only what I heard about it in this committee a couple of days ago.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anthing about it?

Major ARTHUR. I don't know anything else about it, sir.

USE OF HES STATISTICS IN CLAIM OF POPULATION CONTROL

The CHAIRMAN. It was called to my attention that the Chicago Tribune article of Mr. Samuel Jameson, to which I referred yesterday,

quoted you, Mr. Vann, claiming that the statement that the Government controlled 94 or 95 percent of the population was misleading. Could you explain that or why were the HES statistics misleading?

Mr. Vann. It is misleading when it is used in that fashion, sir.

The Chairman. What fashion?

Mr. Vann. Trying to measure absolute values. We use it as a management tool to indicate trends and to reflect changes in control of the population.

We feel that when you are asking questions of the nature of the HES questions there is a limit as to how much information you can get and as to the accuracy of the answers of each one. For this reason I personally, since I am a graduate statistician and helped originally to develop this report in 1967, feel that there are certain built-in biases in this report and that they are favorable.

But I also feel that the biases are constant. I have long deplored using this to claim that we controlled an absolute percentage of population, and instead have long used it to reflect that we controlled x percentage more of population now than at some other given period.

SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman. Could you, before you sit down, tell us what you think is the real security situation in the country, understanding as you do this bias?

Mr. Vann. I think generally, sir, that, first of all, in terms of relevancy, it is a much improved situation over what it has been at any time since I have been there in 1962.

Secondly, the trend line, which was going down in early 1968, has since March of 1968 been up. It has not been completely steady—sometimes it has been slightly erratic—but the trend has been generally up in security. The reason the trend has been up in security is that there has been a large increase in the number of Vietnamese troops; and, secondly, these troops have moved out from Province and district towns and into hamlets that previously were not occupied.

HES AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL

I am quite satisfied that as a management tool the HES is very worthwhile.

I would point out that before we had the HES, when you wanted to know what the status was in a hamlet you had to rely upon the judgment of whatever American or Vietnamese had been around in the local area the longest. It was a very subjective judgment at that time.

The Chairman. It is an attempt to make it much more statistical and objective than formerly is I guess what you said?

Mr. Vann. I think, sir, any management system has to work on certain basic data. I would point out that that HES report is not used just to measure security; it also provided for the first time in Vietnam a data bank on which hamlets had schools, which had wells, which had a hamlet chief who was sleeping in his hamlet at night, and many other factors that before we could only speculate about.

The Chairman. Yes.

U.S. CIVILIANS AND MILITARY IN BIENH CHANH DISTRICT

Major Arthur, did you say how many Americans are in your district, civilian and military?

Major ARTHUR. I said 14.

The CHAIRMAN. Fourteen civilians.

Major ARTHUR. No, 14 people on my district team.

The CHAIRMAN. Fourteen military; how many civilians?

Major ARTHUR. The whole team is a combined organization. We have 14 people on the district team. In addition, I have five mobile advisory teams operating in the district which are under my operational control. They have five men each.

OPERATION OF PHOENIX PROGRAM AT DISTRICT LEVEL

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further you could add with regard to the way the Phoenix program operates at the district level that has not been covered?

Major ARTHUR. I support Mr. Vann's point that the Phoenix program is a coordinated intelligence support. We have a wide variety of responses to take toward Vietcong units. Phoenix is not, as has been brought out before, an assassination tool. It is not used that way in any district that I know of, and certainly not in mine. It has a message section, a situation section, and an operations section, like any other military organization that I know of.

WHAT HAPPENS TO VIETCONG PICKED UP BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what happens to a Vietcong who is picked up and turned over to the Vietnamese?

Major ARTHUR. Well, in our district they are picked up by the Vietnamese, so they are not turned over to the Vietnamese. They are doing all the picking up. We accompany some operations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Do you know what happens to them after they are picked up?

Major ARTHUR. He is interrogated normally at district from anywhere up to 24 hours, held there, and then sent to the S–2 at province level.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any means of knowing what happens to him?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir. We get a report back down through intelligence channels of what the readout was on his interrogation, whether he was released at that level, whether he was held for further interrogation and what information was obtained.

METHODS OF EXTRACTING INFORMATION FROM CAPTURED VIETCONG

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that you can answer this. If you cannot I will understand. Do you have any reason to know, one way or the other, about the stories which have been reported from time to time about the methods used in extracting information from a captured Vietcong? Are you familiar with any methods that are used in that connection?

Major ARTHUR. I have seen some interrogations. I have seen one instance in which there was some force used and I mentioned it to my

counterpart. I have not seen it since and I have been around in interrogations. There has not been any more of this type of activity.

The CHAIRMAN. You have never seen them utilize helicopters in that connection?

Major ARTHUR. No, sir.

IS PHOENIX PROGRAM MISUSED?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever heard of any cases of Phoenix being misused for purposes of extortion or intimidation by Vietnamese or district officials?

Major ARTHUR. I have no knowledge of it and have never heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

NEUTRALIZATION UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator GORE. I wish you would give me a definition of neutralized.

As I understand from what I have heard and read, the purpose of the Phoenix program is to neutralize the political infrastructure of the NLF; is this correct?

Major ARTHUR. To answer your first question, the word "neutralize" means to me to capture, rally or to kill the Vietcong infrastructure of the Vietcong units. Phoenix operates both against the Vietcong infrastructure and against conventional and local guerrilla forces.

Senator GORE. I wanted to leave out of my question military operations. I am referring to the counter terror phase of the Phoenix program, as it has been described to me.

I understand it has been testified here that it is no longer a counter terror program. You say then that the definition of neutralize is to capture, rally or kill.

Major ARTHUR. That is my impression of the definition of neutralize, yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you give to the Phoenix director a goal within your district for neutralization of the political infrastructure?

Major ARTHUR. Well, there is a goal established by province. This is entirely a Vietnamese show. U.S. people are involved in an advisory capacity.

I might note for just a moment, sir, that Phoenix and the DIOCC is only one of the many programs I have going at all times in the district.

Senator GORE. Do you have any more programs going with the goal of capturing, rallying or killing civilians?

Major ARTHUR. No, sir.

Senator GORE. This is the total program of neutralization then?

Major ARTHUR. I think civilians is a bad word there. These Vietcong infrastructure are civilian members of the Vietcong, the political leaders and the brains, if you will, behind the organization.

They often, more often than not, have been found to carry weapons and are armed. There is a goal established, sir, and it comes down from the province level by the Vietnamese to the district. It is established for neutralization.

Senator GORE. I think if I were in Vietnam, from what I know about it, I would want to carry a weapon of some sort, but I do not know that that is a test of whether a man is a member of the military or whether he is a member of the political infrastructure. Policemen carry weapons even in Washington, sometimes even in our high schools.

Major ARTHUR. These people are classified as guerrillas, sir.

Senator GORE. Who classifies them?

Major ARTHUR. I would have to defer just a monent, if I may, to Ambassador Colby. There is a green book.

Mr. COLBY. I think, Senator, we are talking about one of the complications of this war, that it goes all the way from a North Vietnamese uniformed soldier down to a local member of a political association.

Now, all of those are part of the enemy structure, and in between there are various levels of armaments, various kinds of organizations. This whole thing is part of the fight that is going on in Vietnam.

Senator GORE. True, it is a part of a civil war and we have taken sides. We have organized a counter terror program which we call Phoenix and the purpose of it is to neutralize either by capturing, rallying or killing the political infrastructure of the opposition to the Thieu regime.

Mr. COLBY. I think, Senator, if I may, I would have to take some issue with certain of the ways you express this.

Senator GORE. I wish you would.

ENEMY FIGHTS ON A SERIES OF LEVELS

Mr. COLBY. I think that one of the things we have learned out in Vietnam is that the war has been fought by the enemy on a series of levels: on a level of organizational effort, on a level of guerrilla effort, on a level of military effort, on a level of South Vietnamese effort, and on a level of North Vietnamese effort.

Now, for a long time we concentrated on assisting the Government of Vietnam to fight on the last two of those levels, the regular force actions.

Over the past——

Senator GORE. Of both the North Vietnamese——

Mr. COLBY. North Vietnamese.

Senator GORE (continuing). And the Vietcong.

Mr. COLBY. And the southern main force units; yes, sir, Senator.

NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERCENTAGE OF ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH

Senator GORE. And the southern main force units were the larger of the two?

Mr. COLBY. It was; it is no longer, sir. In 1965, the balance of combat forces was something like a little less than 25 percent North Vietnamese, and about 75 percent South Vietnamese. Our intelligence analysis of the combat strength that we are facing today, and by this I mean the main and local forces—the full-time soldiers on the other side—now indicates through interrogations and through what we have learned of their organization, that the total enemy combat strength today is something like 72 percent North Vietnamese and only about 26 or 28 percent South Vietnamese.

NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator GORE. The largest estimate which has been given to this committee throughout the war of the number of organized North Vietnamese military in South Vietnam has been 85,000. Can you give us an estimate of what it is now?

Mr. COLBY. I am not at liberty to give it in the open, the exact figure, but it is higher than that today, sir.

Senator GORE. When you say higher, are you taking into your estimate the North Vietnamese troops that are stationed outside the borders of South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. I am taking into account the ones who are in the immediate vicinity of the South Vietnamese border.

Senator GORE. That was not the question I asked you. I said within South Vietnam the highest estimates ever given to this committee were 85,000.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Frankly, we do not separate them out in that fashion because these troops are very mobile in the border area. In the area of the Cambodian border or the Lao border, the presence of units 1 or 2 kilometers one side or the other does not change the military situation that our people are faced with. They have to face that total force. For intelligence purposes, they consider it as one total force.

Senator GORE. Of course, they have to be——

Mr. COLBY. This does not include the units which are quite a ways away, however, and are not an immediate military problem. It does not include the ones who are far up into the panhandle of North Vietnam or the logistic elements in the Lao corridor.

Senator GORE. I realize this is a question that will need to be examined in executive session, but this is the first evidence I have yet heard from anyone that the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam exceeded the Vietcong units in South Vietnam.

Mr. COLBY. They exceed the combat strength, Senator. It is important, unfortunately, to deal in these terms of art and I would not want to mislead you. I am talking about the combat units, the main and local forces. This does not include the guerrilla force. The guerrilla is another figure, and it is not in that proportion. But the full-time soldiers that you are dealing with are included in what I said.

Senator GORE. These terms of military art frequently remind me of Alice in Wonderland. I believe there was a character there who was going to declare her own terms and choose words with her own meaning.

The Communists have done that for a long time and we seemed to have learned the trick.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir, it is not a trick, Senator.

Senator GORE. The formula then.

Mr. COLBY. It is a formula we use because this is the way we use the information. You must, in order to fight the war, have in categories the different types of forces you are fighting so that you can identify clearly how much of your effort to put against the different forces. Therefore, you must break them down into these different elements.

EXTENSION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM TO FIGHT NLF

Senator GORE. You were saying before we got into this question of the size of forces that the United States had long assisted the South Vietnamese Government in resisting and fighting people from North Vietnam and also the indigenous opposition called the Vietcong.

In the Phoenix program, as I understand you to say and you correct me if I am misstating your position, we moved to assist the South Vietnamese Government in fighting the political infrastructure of the indigenous political opposition in South Vietnam, which has been identified as the National Liberation Front.

Do I correctly state your position?

Mr. COLBY. You are correct, Senator. We have extended our assistance over the past 2 or 3 years, from assistance merely on the purely military contest to assistance to the South Vietnamese to strengthen their local territorial forces which protect the hamlets and villages against the guerrillas. We have also extended our assistance and our advisory effort to include the police and internal security effort against the enemy terrorists, against the enemy's command and control structure for the entire effort. It is the political structure that is the command element which gives the direction to the terrorists, to the guerrillas, and to the main force elements and, therefore, they are a very definite part of the total war effort.

COUNTER TERROR PROGRAM

Senator GORE. Would you mind explaining the difference between the Vietcong terror efforts against the political infrastructure of the Saigon Government, on the one hand, and the counter terror program of the South Vietnamese Government against the political infrastructure of their opposition, the NLF.

Mr. COLBY. As I testified the other day, Senator, there is no longer a counterterror effort. Several years ago there was a short period in which that kind of an idea got loose.

Senator GORE. How short a period?

Mr. COLBY. I would say a maximum of 6 months, between 6 months to a year.

Senator GORE. What was the goal of the counter terror program?

Mr. COLBY. This was a period at which very little effort was being made against the political apparatus, the control structure, the terrorist structure of the enemy. It was determined at that time, with the Vietnamese Government, to organize some special groups to try to begin to work on this side of the total problem.

Now, they were given a very unfortunate name, and they also did some unfortunate things.

This was stopped, and I might confess that I had something to do with stopping it, because I just do not believe that this is going to be productive. There has been a change——

Senator GORE. You had no other reason, no conscience against organized assassination?

Mr. COLBY. Sir, I have a conscience, Senator.

Senator GORE. Was that part of your reason is what I am asking?

Mr. COLBY. That was part of my reasoning, but it is also unproductive in the larger sense. It is not productive to do unconscionable things, I do not believe.

Senator GORE. Of course, I do not know how you would measure an estimate of productivity of a program and your reluctance conscientiously to engage in it. Do you have a measurement?

OBJECT OF TOTAL OPERATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. COLBY. Senator, the object of this total operation in Vietnam was to strengthen the Vietnamese people and government against the challenge being made to it.

Senator GORE. By neutralizing their opposition?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. First, by strengthening their own cohesion and their own engagement and commitment in the effort, to change it from an effort conducted by officials and by soldiers to an effort which includes such organizations as the People's Self-Defense, in which the ordinary citizen is given a weapon to help defend his home; and also by including in the effort a program of identifying clearly who are the key members of the enemy apparatus as distinct from the individual who is merely a member of a local farmer's association.

PAST AND PRESENT GOALS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator GORE. This brings us back to the question I asked you some moments ago, to which I did not receive an answer. What were the goals of the Phoenix program when it was, by your terms, a counterterror program?

Mr. COLBY. The goals at that time were to begin to capture, rally, or kill members of the enemy apparatus.

Senator GORE. Those are still the goals now except you have begun. You are well into it now.

Mr. COLBY. The difference today is that this is more integrated into the normal government and police and judicial structure of the Vietnamese Government.

At that time there was not a constitutional government. There was military rule. Since that time a constitution has been adopted, a government has been established, and a beginning has been made to establishing the kind of law and order that you would expect a government to produce.

Senator GORE. As I understand your answer, the goals are the same. You used identically the same words—capture, rally, or kill. I do not quite get either a distinction or a difference in what it was when you called it and described it as a counter terror program and the Phoenix program now with the same goals.

Would you mind enlightening me?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

I think the difference, Senator, as I indicated, was that at that time there were these special groups which were not included in the normal government structure. They were essentially guerrilla forces on the government side, organized to help conduct the fight against this aspect of the enemy.

Since that time, this has been more and more integrated into the normal government structure, and correspondingly conducted under the government's rules of behavior.

Senator GORE. What particular virtue does interrogation contribute to murder?

Mr. COLBY. Senator, this is not murder. We are not talking of that.

Senator GORE. Or killing. I will use your terms.

Mr. COLBY. We are talking of a fire fight that develops when a team of police, a group of soldiers, or a group of self-defenders goes out to attack and to capture, if possible, a leading member of the enemy command structure.

Now, they realize——

Senator GORE. When you say command structure, is this a word of art? Is this a village chief in an area in which the NLF has the predominant influence?

Mr. COLBY. This is the chairman of the People's Revolutionary Party for that village, for example.

Senator GORE. In other words, this is the community or village political leadership.

Mr. COLBY. He has not been elected. There is another village chief in that village, Senator.

Senator GORE. I did not inquire about how he became a leader, whether he was elected under the constitution or otherwise. He is the local village political leader and the purpose of the Phoenix program is to neutralize him either by capture, rally, or kill.

Mr. COLBY. He is an individual contending for power in that village. On his side. He is contending for power from the Communist side.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, but I have overtrespassed my time.

Senator COOPER. I was not leaving because you asked questions. I have to go to the floor, but I will be brief.

IS UNITED STATES INVOLVED IN ASSASSINATION OR TERROR PROGRAM?

I have seen the newspaper article and the implication of the articles and also our questioning may suggest and wrongfully that the United States may be a part of, either by act or by advice, a program of assassination, the same type of program that the Vietcong directed against the South Vietnamese.

Now, does the United States, through your operations, have any program or one which is supported by our country, or a U.S. supported program of the South Vietnamese which directs assassination or acts of terrorism?

Mr. COLBY. No, Senator, I do not.

If I might continue a bit with the same point, the Vietnamese Government has developed this program first of all to identify the members of the enemy political structure, to get their names clearly, to go through these seven or eight aliases, and then to try to capture them or to try to get them to rally.

Now, in the course of those actions, just as happened to John Dillinger, he may shoot back and he may end up dead.

The second area in which these figures show people being killed is that in the normal hamlet or village of Vietnam there are several ambushes around the outside of the village at night to keep marauding guerrilla bands away.

When an armed band approaches that particular area, the ambushers do not stop to inquire too deeply as to who is there. They know that no one should be moving in that area, and they are aware of any friendly troops that are moving in that area.

At that point, a fire fight begins, and in the morning it is clear that several people have been killed.

By looking at the documents on the bodies, it can be discovered frequently that an individual was the head of a district committee or the local security officer for the village committee, or whatever. In that fashion, he is reported as killed.

But in direct answer to your question, Senator, the United States is not a party to a program to assassinate people in Vietnam.

Senator COOPER. I wanted the answer and I appreciate it very much.

U.S. ACTIONS IN EVENT OF ASSASSINATIONS BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE

We are all aware that in war situations things occur that do not occur in peacetime. Assume that you know or find out that there are assassinations by the South Vietnamese. Do you take any position? Do you advise against it, or is the United States just neutral about it?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir, we have issued a directive to all members of the American community there, the members of the CORDS, the military, and the civilian advisers, that if they see a situation which does not meet the rules of land warfare, they are not only to refuse any participation, they are to make their objections known, and they are to report the fact that this happened to higher authority.

Major Arthur just mentioned the fact that there was an unfortunate interrogation that took place in his area, and that he objected to it, and it has since ceased. I think those are very clear directives to our forces and to our civilian advisers in Vietnam. I have a copy of that directive.

PROSECUTION, SENTENCING AND DETENTION OF VIETCONG

Senator COOPER. In the United States in time of war, in a combat zone, a writ of habeas corpus is not available. That is the law in our country, and also military trial is applicable in a combat zone in the United States. The Supreme Court decided that in the case of the Germans who were captured on the eastern seacoast.

But when the leaders of the Vietcong are apprehended and taken into custody and are held in detention, is there any kind of legal process—I do not mean due process as we would expect in our country—but is there any kind of a process to determine whether or not those detained are in the command or political structure, whether or not they have been engaged in acts of terrorism or acts of assassination?

Mr. COLBY. A Vietcong member who is captured, Senator, after being interrogated at the district level, as the major mentioned, is then sent to the province.

At the province level it is decided whether there is a case against him for criminal prosecution under security legislation. If so, he is sent to a military tribunal where he can be convicted of this particular crime.

This tribunal is authorized to give a variety of sentences which are convictions.

There is a separate proceeding which he might be subjected to. This is called administrative detention. The Vietnamese word is An Tri.

If under the circumstances there is evidence to satisfy the executive that this man should be held because he is a danger to the State, then he may be held in detention for a period up to 2 years. This would then be extended thereafter by a review of his case.

Over the past year the Government has defined very clearly the different levels of participation in the Vietcong political effort. They have issued a detailed description of this which, I believe, we have provided to the committee staff. This identifies three levels of participation, called A, B, and C.

(The information referred to follows:)

VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI)

1. *Definition:* The Viet Cong infrastructure is defined as the political organization through which the Viet Cong control or seek to control the South Vietnamese people. It consists of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) structure (which includes a command/control and administrative apparatus—Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).—at the national level), and the leadership and administration of a parallel front organization, The National Front for the Liberation of SVN (NFLSVN), both of which extend from the national through the hamlet level. The PRP is the southern arm of the Lao Dong or worker's party the official Communist Party of North Vietnam. Several high ranking personnel in key positions at the COSVN level hold positions on the Lao Dong Central Committee which interlocks leaders of the PRP and Hanoi.

2. *Not considered to be in the VCI category:* (*a*) Rank and file guerrillas; (*b*) Rank and file members of front organizations; (*c*) Soldiers and members of organized VC/NVA military units; (*d*) Persons who pay taxes to the VC; (*e*) Persons who perform miscellaneous tasks for the VC; and (*f*) Members of the populace in VC-controlled areas.

The A level receives a 2-year sentence. The B level receives a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 2, because that is all that is authorized. The C level, or general follower, cannot receive more than a 1-year sentence.

Now, in actual fact, most of the C level are let go very quickly. The quotas, for instance, that we were discussing apply only to A and B levels. They do not apply to C levels.

U.S. IS NOT INVOLVED IN SYSTEM OF ASSASSINATION OF VIETCONG

Senator COOPER. In substance, you do say that the United States has not initiated, does not participate in, does not advise or condone a system of assassination of the Vietcong.

Mr. COLBY. I do say that, Senator. I do submit that unfortunate things happen on occasion in Vietnam, and I would not pretend to say that no one has been wrongfully killed there; that I would not pretend to say.

But I think I frankly was quite heartened in the past few days by the appearance of two articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times. These articles were written by very serious reporters who were obviously told to go out and look carefully into this Phoenix program in preparation for these hearings.

They have come up with some well-stated criticisms of the program. We are aware of these weaknesses in the program and the difficulties

of getting this program done. This is not novel in Vietnam, unfortunately.

But in the course of their stories they do not mention any of the kinds of abuses that have been suggested here. In fact, I believe the Washington Post story by Mr. Kaiser states that he was unable to find any evidence of that kind of an incident.

Now, several years ago I think he would have been able to find that kind of evidence. I am very pleased to indicate that apparently his researches have not proved that to be occurring now.

Senator COOPER. Thank you very much.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I guess you signified that you wanted me to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may proceed. We may have a vote pretty soon, I am told. I wonder if we can come back this afternoon. We have two more witnesses. Can you come back for a while this afternoon?

Senator CASE. I can come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead until the bell rings, but we are expecting a vote on the Mondale amendment.

POSSIBILITY OF CORRUPT USES OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator CASE. On this new program, Colonel, why don't you come up here and sit here because I have a couple of questions that I would like to address to you on your statements yesterday. But for the moment, I would like to pursue this Phoenix thing a little further, and you have already introduced it, Mr. Ambassador, and the line of questioning I wanted to bring out is based largely on Robert Kaiser's story in the Post.

He does say, I do not think quite as flatly as, perhaps, you suggested, that there was no present evidence of assassination, but that he had not been able to find any direct evidence of it, and, in general, plays down the Phoenix as an assassination or counter terror operation. But he does make criticism of it, as you suggest, too.

One of them is its potential for use by ambitious politicians against their political opponents, not the Vietcong at all. And I take it you are conscious of this possibility.

Would you comment on it?

Mr. COLBY. This is a possibility, Senator, and this possibility has been raised in the Vietnamese Legislature.

The Vietnamese Legislature called the government to account on a series of stories that they had heard in various provinces about this. They interrogated the government and indicated that they were concerned about it.

Any program can be abused, of course, if the parties in power wish to do so. This is true of the armed forces or the Administration or any other. But to date it is our impression that this is not being used substantially for internal political purposes, if you except the Communists from the area called internal.

Senator CASE. So Mr. Kaiser states. He talks about this as a potential, and certainly it is a potential because it involves roving bands of government agents with, in effect, kangaroo court powers if they are exercised.

Mr. Colby. Yes, it is. They are not really roving bands, Senator. They are members of the police and military apparatus. They are under the command of the appropriate level of authority, the province chief and the district chief. They are part of the government structure.

Senator Case. But this possibility does exist.

The article says, "Phoenix contributes substantially to corruption. Some local officials demand payoffs with threats of arrest under the Phoenix program, or release genuine Vietcong for cash."

What about that?

Mr. Colby. I would say that occasionally that happens, yes. I could not give you a percentage of how often this happens. It is a problem not only in the Phoenix program; it is a problem in other programs.

The shakedown is a problem in a variety of nations around the world. All I can say is that I have heard the President and the Prime Minister on many occasions give very strong directions that the focus of the effort is on the Vietcong, that this is the object of the operation, and that it is not to be used for other purposes.

INCONSISTENCY IN GVN ACTION AGAINST MR. DZU

The Chairman. Will the Senator allow me to ask a question? Can you tell us, where is Mr. Dzu, the man who ran second in the last election? Is he still in jail?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Dzu is in Chi Hoa jail in Saigon.

The Chairman. How do you reconcile that with your statement of the very objective view of the Prime Minister? I do not see how you do reconcile it.

Mr. Colby. He was not arrested under the Phoenix program, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I know. I realize that. I mean this estimate of yours of their high-mindedness in this matter. This has always puzzled me. How you can defend an administration that did that to Mr. Dzu and apparently are going to give it to Mr. Chau, too. That is all.

It does seem to me quite inconsistent with what you said about it.

Mr. Colby. I believe I was discussing the Phoenix program, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I understand that. But you say they are giving instructions to be so careful not to use the program for political purposes, when Thieu himself has put a man in prison for no other crime that we know of than that he ran second to him in the election.

Senator Case. I think that just, perhaps, suggests this is a privilege reserved for the higher officials. [Laughter.]

The Chairman. I see.

PHOENIX PROGRAM'S FOCUS ON LOW-LEVEL OPERATORS

Senator Case. A third specific suggestion about this program is that it is helping the Vietcong more than hurting them, by throwing people into prison who are just low-level operators even under duress, and not really enemies of the regime, and alienating a substantial number of people in a population who ought to be persuaded to come on the side of the Saigon Government.

Is this also true?

Mr. Colby. Well, of course, Senator, as I will bring out in later testimony, there is an active program to invite members of the enemy to join the government's side, a very energetic program.

Senator Case. I understand that.

Mr. Colby. So if they would join the government's side they would be welcomed.

Senator Case. I understand——

Mr. Colby. As for your point, however, this has been a problem. The government adopted the A, B, C classifications of the members of the apparatus so that the lower levels would not count as part of this program, and so that they would not be the object of the effort.

It was an effort to downgrade that kind of targeting and to focus on the key members of the enemy apparatus, and I believe they have had some success.

Senator Case. That is the general objective, but how about the quotas? Are the quotas met by anybody?

Mr. Colby. No, sir; the quotas are only met by A's and B's not by C's.

A's, B's, and C's

Senator Case. Tell us roughly who is an A, who is a B, and who is a C.

Mr. Colby. There is a detailed breakout in this green book, which is in Vietnamese.

Senator Case. Just tell me.

Mr. Colby. The A levels are People's Revolutionary Party Members, party members who are obviously fellows who have gone through the candidate stage and become convinced members of the enemy apparatus.

The B level are leaders of the various front groups, the leading elements of the so-called farmers association in an area, the other senior people who are trying to give actual leadership, although they may not be party members yet. The C level are generally the rest of the people who participate in the actions.

Effectiveness of Phoenix Program

Senator Case. Now, Mr. Kaiser sort of switches it around and says this model bears small resemblance to actuality. He says the thing has hardly worked at all, and the main reason is that the Government, Saigon people, military and whatnot, the military officials supposedly on the Government side, are not interested in prosecuting it.

They do not want to disturb things. They would rather take their chance with things as they are, not upset people. They do not want to go after the Vietcong.

Mr. Colby. Senator, I used to be quoted to the effect that I did not feel that the operation had begun to hurt the enemy at all. I have changed my evaluation in the past, I would say, 2 to 3 months.

I do not think it is being all that effective yet, but I do believe it is beginning to bite.

The normal VCI now goes with a bodyguard. He does not live in the village any more. He lives out in the forest, in the safe area. This is beginning to put some pressure on this apparatus.

There are many things to be done to improve it. Beside the ones mentioned here, I know a few of my own. We will try to improve these and make it work the way it should.

It is having some impact now, though I think it is increasingly having an overall positive impact as distinct from the possibility of counterproductive impact which it may have had some time ago.

VIETNAMIZATION OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator CASE. Kaiser concludes his piece by saying " 'Vietnamization' of Phoenix has, in a sense, already been completed," so far as the Americans involved. As you said, they were advisers, and he says that some officials think most of them should be withdrawn. " 'We have done all we can,' one official said. 'If they want to get the VCI they can do it. We can't do anything more.' "

Mr. COLBY. As for the wanting to eliminate this, Senator, I believe that there are——

Senator CASE. Our participation in it.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, but both the national leadership and the local leadership have a considerable interest in eliminating this Vietcong terrorist effort.

As I brought out yesterday, over 6,000 people were killed last year in the course of these terrorist incidents. Fifteen thousand were wounded. This is a very serious business to the local village chief, to the local district chief, to the local province chief. They know who is organizing this kind of a program. It is this apparatus. So they are anxious to do it.

Now, the Government made a further step on October 1 when they changed the program from being a private government effort to a public program. They publicized it; they made it the subject of leaflets and banners, and so forth, with the theme that this program protects the population against terrorism.

Since that time they have published leaflets with the pictures of people who have been wanted. Some of these people have come in; some of them have been captured; some of them have been reported on by their neighbors as a result of being identified through this program.

The People's Self-Defense Force has been assisting in carrying out this program of identifying and picking up members of the other side.

Senator CASE. I take it, in general, you operating gentlemen, you, Colonel, Major, certainly would not disagree—I would assume you would not disagree—with the Ambassador?

Mr. COLBY. If they wish to, sir, they are quite at liberty. They are under oath to tell the truth.

IS PHOENIX PROGRAM BEST WAY TO DO THE JOB?

Senator CASE. Is this the best way to do the job? Is Phoenix all that important or are the negative sides equal to the positive value in your experience?

Mr. MILLS. Senator, I would say it is a job that has to be done one way or the other in the same way that the FBI——

Senator CASE. Would you identify yourself?

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir.

I am Hawthorne Mills, Province Senior Adviser in Tuyen Duc. I testified yesterday in your absence.

I would say this job has to be done. There are some questions about the Phoenix organization, as a manmade mechanism to go about rooting out the underground organization, is the best way to do it.

Senator CASE. That is what we are talking about. Nobody, at least this Senator, is in any way criticizing the idea of a successful effort in South Vietnam.

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. But this Senator is questioning this particular thing and its effectiveness and the dangers involved in it, whether it is counterproductive.

Mr. MILLS. Yes, sir.

I think the Phoenix program was designed to overcome some of the weaknesses in the counterintelligence organization of the Vietnamese Government. This may be a further step toward the situation in most countries of the world, wherein the police or the national equivalent of the FBI handle this type of program. The Vietnamese police are playing the effective part in this.

It may be that some of the weaknesses which have been pointed out are weaknesses in the operation of this thing, but not in the concept.

I think there has been a misunderstanding which has come out today that somehow or other the Phoenix program is operating against innocent civilians who are working under the normal political rules. This is not the case, as the Ambassador pointed out.

These are organizers of the terrorist activities that the Vietcong are conducting. I would say that in Tuyen Duc Province the Phoenix program is a great advance over what was being done in the past.

But, perhaps, as security conditions allow, the normal police can take over this operation, and this will be, perhaps, a better way of handling it.

TRIAL AND DETENTION UPON EVIDENCE OF VC CONNECTION

Senator CASE. It says here that if there is some evidence of a Vietcong connection, the people apprehended are brought to trial before a provincial security team. That is before the Phoenix team, I take it?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; that is the provincial security committee. That is made up of the province chief, the deputy for administration, the chairman of the provincial council, the province judge, the chief of police, and a few other officials on the province level.

Senator CASE. Is that the way normal criminal justice is administered?

Mr. COLBY. No; it is not. That is the second system. That is the administrative detention proceeding.

The other system is a military tribunal that can give a real conviction after a full trial.

Senator CASE. Then people are not, so far as you know, at least the rule is that they are not, punished beyond detention without such a trial?

Mr. COLBY. No, Two-year detention is the rule. It can be extended.

Senator CASE. So it is indefinite detention, which is possible by these terms?

Mr. Colby. But normally they are released, Senator.

Senator Case. Is there anything you want to say, either of your colleagues?

Mr. McManaway. The detention is not decided by the team, sir; it is by the security committee.

Senator Case. Which has just been described.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Case. Major?

EFFECTIVENESS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM IN BINH CHANH

Major Arthur. Yes, sir. In reference to your question as to how it is working and whether it is the most effective tool to accomplish the mission, it is not working all that well in Binh Chanh district.

During the months of June through December, with a quota of 80, they got 46 VCI. However, it is better than what they had before. It is an honest effort to collate all the intelligence that comes into the district to get it in one central place and get it together so they can identify the people who are causing problems.

Let me give you an example. In An Lac Village, about the first week in November, a Vietcong terror team came in and assassinated an old man by taking him out and bayoneting him. They left his body on the road with a message. He was a distant relative of the district chief.

District forces, regional and popular forces had conducted an armed raid from An Lac 1 to An Lac 4. They had a fire fight and killed one terrorist. The other one never was seen again.

Approximately a week later, the Vietcong went into An Lac 4 and went to the home of a woman whom they suspected of telling where they were hiding. They bayoneted her. They came back the next night and killed her son and nephew.

We put everything we could together—revolutionary forces, development cadre, the district intelligence squad, the PF platoons normally assigned to the village, the PSDF, the whole thing, everything. This went on for about a month, but didn't get anything really at all.

Then we got some intelligence that they were going to be coming back into the village, and we increased the security, particularly in the area they thought they would come in.

A fire fight did ensue that night, and when the bodies were identified, one was Le Cong Dong who was the An Lac Village chief for security. He was the head guy who had been sponsoring all this assassination by the Vietcong.

So it does work. This was not specific targeting. We just knew they were going to come back into the village at some time, and we thought it was going to be a certain night, and increased the security of that village.

Senator Case. This village chief——

Major Arthur. He is still in business.

Senator Case. He was ostensibly a representative of the Saigon government, their village chief, but turned traitor.

Major Arthur. No, sir. He was on the Vietcong side as the Vietcong security chief for the shadow government of An Lac Village.

Senator CASE. Was he discovered in the village or was his identification, his identity, discovered later?

Major ARTHUR. We knew who he was. We knew the leader. He was identified once he was killed. Documents on the body identified him as such. We were not sure whether he would be coming back with that three-man or four-man guerrilla squad at night.

Senator CASE. Is there anything further, Colonel, that you would like to say about this program?

PROBLEMS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM IN THE DELTA

Mr. VANN. I would just like to add a comment or two, Senator Case.

I have some 2,500 American advisers in the Delta. By and large, their standard of morals and ethics are about the same as that of the normal American. They are normal Americans.

We, on a continuing basis, do have problems in all programs, and certainly in the Phung Hoang program, because we have in many cases people who are given responsibilities who have either not had adequate training or proper training or have not had adequate experience in the discharge of the responsibilities on the Vietnamese side.

In many cases leaders develop who have motivations that are not for the effort but are personal, and so you do have aberrations that take place on the part of these people.

You have people who are abusing this program or any other. You can have a good program such as simply building a school become a tool for corruption when instead of the man building a school he will sell the cement or will sell half the cement, and you end up with walls which might fall down on the children.

Visitors to Vietnam, and particularly reporters, when they go out into the Delta, and we have 725 villages——

DELTA VILLAGES AND HAMLETS

Senator CASE. Excuse me. By villages you mean what we call small towns?

Mr. VANN. No, sir, these are groups of towns. We go to what we call——

Senator CASE. You mean a collection of villages?

Mr. VANN. A village is a collection of hamlets. A hamlet is what we would call a small town. A hamlet may be as little as 50 people, or it may be as many as 15,000 or 20,000. We have 4,205 of these hamlets.

Senator CASE. The average, just to give a little more of the picture, the average population of that hamlet is about what?

Mr. VANN. The average population of a Government-controlled hamlet in the Delta is 1,600. The average population of a Vietcong-controlled hamlet in the Delta is about 850. This just reflects the fact that where there is better security and better economic opportunity there will be a greater cluster of population.

TENDENCY TO REPORT EXTREMES IN PHOENIX PROGRAM

What I wanted to say was that, as a reporter or a visitor or an analyst goes through he looks for the unusual. When you are looking

into the Phoenix program the normal course of operations does not make news, and it is not worthy of separate analysis.

Therefore, there is always a tendency to report the extremes, and so, even though in 725 villages we may have village administrations that are functioning well in the main, when you find one that has a corrupt village chief or one who has taken the police and the popular forces who have been assigned to him and who is using them to collect rentals for absentee landlords or using them to bully the people, that becomes kind of a cause celebre. When it does we try to focus attention on it and try to correct it.

But I must say as a citizen that I to some extent resent the implication that we Americans would be over there aiding, abetting, assisting, or directing a program which was designed to assassinate civilians, particularly civilians that may or may not be members of the opposition. We don't. In my instructions, I have often said to the advisers:

> You are the conscience not only of the American effort but, because this is a very young country, and because it has been subject to revolution, you are also the conscience of the Vietnamese effort. You must at all times be aware of your responsibility to see that standards of human decency apply.

This is just standard practice on our part over there. But when these exceptions get reported, and particularly when they are used by people who are in basic disagreement with the policy in Vietnam as a means of criticizing the effort, they are taken out of context. They in no way reflect anything that is normal.

Senator CASE. I think your latter point is the kind of evidence that we want. I do not believe there are many people who suggest that Americans do this for the fun of it. I am sure this is true. There are many who have questioned whether it may not inevitably, may not inherently, be so susceptible to bad use and to corruption in an area like this for a thousand reasons that the question is whether or not it is desirable overall. That question, I take it, you have constantly under review yourself.

I assume that this is so.

Mr. VANN. We do, sir. I might even add that——

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator will allow me to interrupt. There is a vote going on. The bell rang a moment ago. I think we ought to make it.

Can you gentlemen come back at 2:30? Would that be all right, or a quarter of 3.

Mr. COLBY. At your convenience, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is 1 o'clock now. Make it a quarter of 3 to give you time for lunch.

Senator CASE. I will let the colonel finish.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:45 p.m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, before we let Major Arthur go, there is one more question I would like to ask.

Is Major Arthur there?

Major ARTHUR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a very complicated question; it was left dangling.

DOES DEFENSE OF BINH CHANH REST SOLELY ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE?

You said in your statement that there are no U.S. combat forces in the district now and the defense of Binh Chanh rests solely on the Vietnamese.

That seems to be such a positive flat statement, I wondered if you would elaborate. What support does the United States contribute?

For example, in engagements with the enemy, are American helicopter gunships called in? Is there American artillery support or what kind of air support does the United States provide, if any?

Major ARTHUR. Sir, the Vietnamese provide their own artillery support. We do have helicopter gunships support on call. Maybe on an average of once a week a fire team of two gunships will be in the area and operate for 15 to 20 minutes. This is the extent of the U.S. combat support we are getting. We do not have any tactical air and no tactical air has been called since I have been in that district. It is available but we have not called it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would you say it is accurate to say that it rests solely on the Vietnamese? That is a little bit of an overstatement; is it not? Or do you think the gunships are of no significance? Are they de minimis?

Major ARTHUR. Pardon me, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the support of gunships is of no significance, so that they are unworthy of notice?

Major ARTHUR. Well, they do contribute some added firepower.

The CHAIRMAN. All I am arguing about is the statement when you say, "solely on the Vietnamese." If you have gunships, the way we have had these gunships described, they are quite useful instruments in the slaughtering of people. Are they not?

Major ARTHUR. Well, not in the slaughtering of people, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Killing them, whatever you like to call it. They have very powerful fire power; do they not?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir; they do.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call it? Do you prefer to say killing or slaughtering?

Major ARTHUR. I would prefer to say killing or delivering suppressive fire so the infantry can close in with the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. That sounds nicer.

Major ARTHUR. Or force them out of the water so they will surrender.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds nicer. I thought in discussing the war there is no point in trying to make it sound like a tea party. I mean their purpose is to kill people; is it not?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the whole purpose of the operation in the military sense; is it not?

Major ARTHUR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the purpose?

Major ARTHUR. The purpose, of course, would be to get them to surrender or to capture them, if possible.

The CHAIRMAN. If they don't, kill them; isn't that right?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir.

DEFENSE OF BINH CHANH DOES NOT REST SOLELY ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE

The CHAIRMAN. I am a little slow in semantics I guess. I have not had the training you have had out there in how to describe these activities. But the point I was making is that I did not realize, and I do not believe it is accurate to say, that it rests solely on the Vietnamese. What are all these troops doing out there if it rests solely on the Vietnamese? That is the only point of the question.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you insist that "solely" is an accurate description?

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, I believe the major was probably thinking in terms of those forces in the district rather than those that are available from outside. I think your point is well taken.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not rest solely on them.

Mr. COLBY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the whole point. We are trying to make this as accurate as we can. I am not trying——

Major ARTHUR. Are there any further questions, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No, that is all.

Now, we have Mr. William K. Hitchcock, who is the director of the refugee program.

Mr. Hitchcock, do you have a statement?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to proceed at this time, please, sir?

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HITCHCOCK, DIRECTOR, REFUGEE DIRECTORATE, CORDS

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the committee knows, the United States is providing substantial assistance to the Government of Vietnam to help mitigate the distress of Vietnamese people dislocated by the war. This effort, Ambassador Colby has explained, is part of the pacification program. The problems of assisting these people, however, present special challenges, and the Government of Vietnam has set up an integrated organization to deal with them at the central, regional, and provincial levels of government.

I am happy to have this opportunity to give you a report on this program and our efforts to help move it forward. My statement contains information on the background of the present situation, developments in 1969, problems we continue to confront, and our estimation of future prospects.

DISPLACEMENT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE RESULTING FROM 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT

Although other large-scale displacements of people have occurred before in Vietnam's history, two of them can be directly related to events in Vietnam since World War II. The first occurred as a result of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which gave all Vietnamese people 300 days to choose whether they wanted to live in the North or the South. Estimates vary, but to the best of our knowledge, approximately 900,000 civilians moved south and about 75,000 went north. Almost all of those who went south were absorbed into the community in about 3 years' time and they constitute an important element of South Vietnamese society today.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind an interruption at that point?

NUMBER OF REFUGEES AND ASSISTANCE IN MOVING SOUTH

There was a piece in the paper the other day about the 900,000 that moved south. President Nixon in his November 3 speech, which was, as you know, widely noted in this country, said, and I quote: "* * * the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the north."

How do you reconcile those figures? I noticed that in your statement.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I had not noticed that figure, sir, and I do not know that I have ever seen the source that has quoted a million and a half; a million is closer.

The CHAIRMAN. I have not either. I thought perhaps they had called upon you or in someway or other had checked it with you.

How did these people get to the South? Did the United States take them in American ships primarily?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The United States was involved; so, also, were the French. I am not quite sure. Perhaps, Ambassador Colby may remember the story.

Mr. COLBY. They went south in ships, Mr. Chairman; they went south in aircraft; they went south by walking—a variety of ways. But they were assisted by the United States very distinctly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean; I read that.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There was very definitely assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Will you, however, check on that figure and see what the background is for the record? It seems to me there is such a discrepancy between 900,000 and a million and a half. Not now; you do not have to do it now, but later.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir, we will.

(The information referred to appears on p.748.)

DISPLACEMENT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DURING INTENSIFICATION OF WAR

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The second large-scale displacement of people developed with the intensification of the war in the mid-1960's. The refugees of this period are defined as people who have had to leave their homes and their means of livelihood to escape from Communist pressures, from artillery or bombardment, or from the crossfire of war.

Over 3 million people, almost 20 percent of South Vietnam's total population, have sought refuge during the past 6 years. Unlike World War II European refugees who moved from country to country, South Vietnam's displaced people have remained within its own borders. They moved in large or small groups from Vietcong-controlled areas or from combat zones to some place nearby which offered them relative security. Virtually no one has voluntarily left places controlled by the Republic of Vietnam either for Vietcong-controlled areas or for North Vietnam. Most of them have been at least temporarily resettled in new locations or returned home as improved security conditions permitted.

In March 1969, 1,450,000 were still on the government's refugee rolls; by the end of December the payment of allowance had reduced this number to 270,000. An individual is removed from the active refugee caseload when he receives the payments he has been promised; a refugee site, on the other hand, continues to receive assistance until it is physically and economically up to Vietnamese standards. The completion of most individual payments in 1969 permits efforts in 1970 to be concentrated on establishing normal living conditions and a basis for achieving economic self sufficiency at each inadequate site.

Aside from regular refugees, well over a million other people have seen their homes destroyed or have had their lives otherwise disrupted by the war. They receive special assistance as war victims. What distinguishes this group from refugees is that the war-related distress they suffer does not drive them away from their homes or their established means of livelihood for more than transient periods of time. And, finally, there are numerous war widows, orphans, and physically disabled men, women, and children who require more and better organized help.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you leave that page, what is the payment of allowances to which you referred?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. That, sir, comes a few pages later in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it? OK.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I take it up in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. I did not know. That is all right. Proceed.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. These are the groups of people that have been the concern of this program since it began. They represent the principal problems of human distress among the civilian population. The scope and even the nature of the problems fluctuate with developments in the conflict. Whenever military activity is intense, the number of people displaced increases. Conversely, whenever the level of combat subsides and the armed forces have restored territorial security, refugees return home, or, if they prefer, resettle themselves and their families in new locations. In either case, they are helped by their government. Encouraging progress has been made during the past year, but the fact remains that fully satisfactory solutions to some of these problems will not be possible until the fighting stops.

BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SITUATION

Now let me be more explicit about the background of the present situation. As the conflict intensified from 1965 through 1967, there was a tremendous increase in the number of people who had to flee their

homes in search of safety. Much has been said about the heavy concentration of this refugee movement in the northern part of the country (or I Corps) where the fighting was the heaviest. It was substantial there, but the pervasive character of the conflict created refugees all over the country, and it did so in ways that varied a great deal in each of the four regions. For example, in the delta (or IV Corps) area, many people fled their homes, but, given the relative ease of subsisting there, they were quickly assimilated and they never became the obvious problem represented by people in northern refugee camps. In fact, many of the refugees in the delta never sought government assistance of any kind at the time they became refugees, and their number only began to become apparent as security in the countryside improved and they started returning home in 1969.

Saigon also presents a special kind of situation. Much of the influx of people into the city undoubtedly was motivated by a search for greater physical security, but they were able to find jobs quickly and they have become an almost indistinguishable part of their new environment. This is not to say that their adjustment, or the adjustment of the large numbers of people who came to Saigon for other reasons, has been satisfactory. Both groups pose a continuing problem, but it is being tackled as an urban rather than a refugee one.

Throughout the country, but particularly in the camps in the north, the continuous stream of people who sought refuge between 1965 and 1967 created widespread confusion and uncertainty about how to deal with the situation. The challenge of taking care of so many people in the difficult conditions of the war was enormous; and, lacking an adequate program or even the resources for one, the Government of Vietnam's response to the problem was understandably slow and hesitant.

The extended family system, which constitutes the basis of Vietnamese life, consists of large tightly knit groupings of several generations of relatives. It is the extended family which traditionally has cared for individual members afflicted by misfortune; the concept of government responsibility for the welfare of individuals used to be virtually unknown. The war, however, severely disrupted this system and created burdens which far exceeded the remaining capacity of the family structure. This required a fundamental change in the customary role of Vietnamese Government and the assumption of new responsibilities.

BEGINNING OF GVN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND U.S. ASSISTANCE

Against this background the Government's refugee assistance program got underway; but for some time it was an inadequate response to the problem, and the refugees often had to fend for themselves.

In the United States mounting concern—including the constructive interest of the Senate—focused attention on the plight of these unfortunate people, and the tempo of American efforts to assist increased significantly. I should emphasize that, from the outset, the problem was recognized as basically a Vietnamese one requiring Vietnamese solutions. But we accepted the responsibility of doing everything we could to help. In 1966 the combined efforts of both governments were concentrated on developing an organization, recruiting and training people, locating financial resources, and identifying the

kinds of assistance required in varying refugee situations. Logistics support also was a prime requirement and building it up was a time-consuming process. As these organizing efforts proceeded throughout 1966 and 1967, Vietnamese Government officials were gradually learning how to take care of displaced people. The program that began to emerge incorporated a number of political and strategic considerations, but basically it was, and is, a humanitarian undertaking.

1968 COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES

By the end of 1967 the stage was set for an organized all-out attack on the problem of the large number of persons who remained in refugee status. Then the Communists launched their Tet offensive in January 1968, followed by offensives in May and August. These enemy attacks, mostly on cities, resulted in over 1 million war victims—people who were injured or whose homes and property had been damaged or lost, but who did not have to move away from their means of livelihood. Throughout 1968, assisting these people took almost all the resources of the Government organization that had been built up to deal with the refugee problem, but, by the end of the year, virtually all of the million-plus war victims were back under roof and on their jobs. This was a substantial achievement, given the chaotic circumstances existing at that time. It also contributed greatly to the confidence of the Vietnamese Government in its ability to meet this kind of crisis and to the confidence of the people in their government.

1969 FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN REFUGEE PROGRAM

You have heard Ambassador Colby describe the accelerated pacification campaign which was initiated at the end of 1968. The results of that effort, particularly the extension of security over a large part of the countryside, plus the increase in GVN self-assurance, were the main reasons for the favorable developments in the refugee program in 1969, in which it was possible to give largely undiverted attention to the overarching refugee problem. Adequate financial resources also were available, and trained American and Vietnamese personnel were located throughout the country. So were the logistic supplies such as roofing, cement, blankets, mosquito netting, and foodstuffs. By this time the Ministry of Social Welfare had also issued detailed instructions on what to do and how to do it.

GVN REFUGEE PROGRAMS

The GVN refugee programs do not involve extensive assistance to any single individual or family, simply because the number of needy people is so large and the amount of available resources to help them is limited. This is generally what happens: soon after refugee families reach secure areas those who seek assistance are housed in Government-provided temporary camps. Each newly-arrived family gets emergency food commodities for 7 days, followed by a 30-day temporary allowance, which includes more than food, which is normally extended until the family can return home or begin to settle elsewhere. The amount of assistance given to families being resettled or to those returning home is the same: 10 sheets of aluminum roofing and 7,500

piasters for each family and 6 months' rice ration or its piaster equivalent for each family member. I might say this averaged for a family of five about $180. The out-of-camp refugees—those who do not seek shelter in Government-provided sites—are usually largely self-resettled, but they are given 1 months' rice ration and are eligible for the standard amount of assistance when, and if, they return home. You will find details of the amounts of these different refugee allowances and of the payments made to war victims in two charts which have been attached to my statement.

(The information referred to appears on pp. 224 and 225.)

The Ministry of Social Welfare also provides refugee resettlement camps with wells, latrines, classrooms, simple health facilities and services, vocational training, and where land is available, vegetable seeds and other agricultural assistance. The most important and the most difficult problem is to give the refugees the opportunity to rebuild their lives—to give them some hope for the future. I will discuss this later in my statement.

Before leaving the subject of allowances I should add that the general adequacy of food supplies in Vietnam and the existence of almost full employment in the cities are important factors which lessen the amount of government assistance these displaced people require. Without these factors the condition of Vietnamese refugees, which often still is unsatisfactory, would be immeasurably worse.

1969 ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

As I indicated earlier, last year over 1 million of the 1½ million refugees on the rolls in March 1969, received the individual resettlement allowances they had long been promised. Some 100,000 new refugees and about 225,000 war victims also were assisted during the year. Moreover, approximately 488,000 refugees were given help by the Government in returning to their homes as security improved in their native hamlets and villages. This number of returnees included all categories of people who had previously fled from their homes—those in-camp and those out-of-camp, those previously resettled, and those never previously recorded. We estimate that approximately another 100,000 refugees have returned home and have not yet received Government assistance. Having returned on their own, they are now in the process of being registered and validated. I believe this movement home was the most significant step forward last year, representing as it does the reoccupation of many parts of the countryside formerly abandoned to the Communists. In this sense it adds a new dimension to the pacification program.

EXAMPLE OF KIEN PHONG PROVINCE

One example of this development in 1969, one of many, can be seen in Kien Phong Province in the Delta where 18,936 refugees, many of them previously unrecorded, returned to their original homes. Fourteen thousand of them returned along the Thap Muoi Canal, a major supply route from the Delta to the metropolitan Saigon area, which had been closed since 1966. Almost as soon as territorial security forces established new outposts along the canal in 1969, the population began

to move back. The area is now 75 percent populated by former refugees who have rebuilt their homes and replanted their fields, and the canal is crowded with commerce. As new outposts are constructed, refugees do not wait for an announcement that the pacification has been completed. Instead they return while it is in process, convinced by the experience of others that they will be able to resume the lives they once knew.

PROGRESS IN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

The demands of resettling themselves have encouraged the inventiveness, ingenuity, and self-reliance of the refugees throughout the country. For example, one group from Binh Dinh Province in II Corps resettled on a sandy area in Ninh Thuan Province, also in II Corps, where they have been able to develop a prosperous livelihood raising onions, garlic, watermelons, and a number of other crops on small plots of sand. They have built an irrigation system which not only supplies water for themselves and their crops, but for two neighboring hamlets as well. Then, too, a number of refugee farmers who returned to their homes in Thua Thien Province, which is in I Corps, pooled half their rice allowance to buy 232 rototiller tractors, which enabled them to cultivate their land rapidly and thereby become self-supporting much more quickly. Incidentally, in Thua Thien Province alone approximately 130,000 refugees have returned to their native villages, rebuilt their homes, and reopened their land.

Most of the refugees in II, III, and IV Corps who were resettled away from their native homes are now satisfactorily situated in economic and social circumstances comparable to those of other citizens in the Vietnamese village hamlet political system. Arable land is generally available for refugees in these regions, and many of them who are not farmers have been able to reestablish themselves as fishermen, craftsmen, laborers, and other self-supporting members of their communities.

A statistical view of the number of refugees on the rolls and progress in return to village and payment of resettlement allowances is given in tables and graphs attached to this statement.

(The information referred to appears on pp. 224—227.)

PLIGHT OF REFUGEES IN I CORPS CAMPS

Problems remain, but the one that is particularly difficult is the plight of a large number of people, mainly in I Corps, who have not been able to return home and who are living in crowded, far from satisfactory, camps. Most of these camps are in the three southern provinces of I Corps—Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. Rehabilitation of refugees is more difficult there for several reasons. Arable land was scarce in these provinces long before the refugees began to concentrate in the areas that were relatively secure. Security is not as good as it is in other provinces with large numbers of refugees. Big enemy units operate in the area and the frequency of military action creates a great deal of disruption in the Vietnamese Government's efforts to improve the living conditions of refugees there. In contrast to other areas, most of the refugees in these provinces are in camps and most of these camps are economically unviable ones.

Some camps are located in islands of relative security in areas which are otherwise insecure. Access to them often may be possible only by helicopter. They are subject to fairly frequent Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army attacks.

In Quang Nam, for example, on December 23 last year at Thanh Quang Hamlet in Duy Xuyen District, a plastic device exploded among a group of Catholic refugees watching a Christmas play. Resulting casualties were five killed and 65 wounded, 20 still in serious condition. Most were women and children. On January 4, NVA–VC units shelled the refugee camp at Go Chua in Duc Duc District, in the same province, with 12 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar fire. Fourteen were killed, 55 were wounded, and 15 houses were destroyed. At the same time, two were killed, 15 wounded, and five houses destroyed in Loc Quy, a nearby hamlet in the same district.

Almost all of these I Corps refugees want to go back to their homes, but most of them will not be able to do so in the near future. The payment of resettlement allowances in 1969, to all but about 150,000 of them, has set the stage for a concerted effort in 1970, to improve the economic and physical conditions of life at each of the sites.

Several projects are already underway. For example, the refugees are being introduced to techniques for improving yields of crops, particularly of vegetables, grown on marginal land. Handicraft projects have been organized. Small industries, and I mean small, such as peppermaking, responsive to the needs of the area are being developed. In those cases where untilled, secure land exists in reasonable proximity to a refugee camp, the Ministry of Social Welfare is working with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance to make it available. Public Law 480, title II, food is being distributed to the needy people in these campsites, and some food-for-work projects are taking shape. But these efforts are not yet adequate solutions for the stubborn, complex problems confronted. More needs to be done. And, even if presently-planned projects are successfully executed, the condition of some of these refugees will remain less than satisfactory until they can return to their homes.

PROBLEM OF CONTINUING INFLUX OF NEW REFUGEES

Another problem is the continuing, though substantially reduced, influx of new refugees generated by military actions. For a brief period in the mid-1960's, forcing people to leave outlying areas was seen as a way of denying the Vietcong manpower they could exploit. Many, of course, sought refuge on their own as a way of escaping such exploitation. However, most refugees over time have probably been created by the intensified fighting and its accompanying destruction. Instructions issued in 1967, and expanded in 1969, require military operations to be conducted in such a manner as to minimize property destruction and the generation of refugees. These instructions, along with the geographical shift of heavy fighting out of populated areas toward the western frontier, the extension of territorial security, and the general decline in the level of military activity, have been major factors in reducing the number of new refugees.

When an operation is planned which is likely to result in a substantial displacement of people, prior permission must be obtained

from the Central Pacification and Development Council and arrangements must be made in advance by the military for taking care of them until the Ministry of Social Welfare can bring organized assistance to them. The basic principle of this policy is that security should be brought to the people, not the people to security. One exception has been the temporary removal of people from an area in which military clearing activities are underway. People so moved are the responsibility of the allied armed forces and they are returned home immediately after the military operation is concluded, usually within a week or two. If their homes have been damaged, the Vietnamese Government assists them as war victims, not as refugees.

In recent months there have been a few cases in which military forces have moved people for more than temporary periods without obtaining the required approval in advance. This means that the Ministry of Social Welfare is not always aware of the problem soon enough to avoid delays in providing assistance in an organized way. As these cases arise, we have taken steps to remedy them as quickly as possible.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF REFUGEE PROGRAM

The refugee program has important political objectives, although the techniques used to achieve them are more social and economic than political. The Government of Vietnam's hope is to normalize the lives of refugees as soon as possible and to do this in ways which introduce an element of confidence on which they can rebuild their lives. This usually means giving them an economic base they can exploit. Almost invariably they prefer farming or fishing. Elections are held as soon as possible in the resettled or revived villages. Once the village administrative machinery is set up, refugees are able to take part in local self-government as full Vietnamese citizens. They also gain access to such other sources of assistance as the village and provincial development funds. The availability of these normal government resources is important, but additional help for these people also is usually required. Refugees being resettled in new locations are involved in building a hamlet from the very ground up. Those returning home face a similar problem because their hamlets usually are entirely, or at least partially, destroyed. The goal of all these efforts is to make the refugee once again a regular citizen, living in conditions not noticeably different from those of other citizens, hopeful for the future but well aware of the fact that it will depend largely on his own efforts.

IMPACT OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS

The impact of these programs is difficult to assess. The recipient's appreciation usually is obvious, and there is little doubt that the Government benefits from this attitude, even in cases where benefit payments may have been delayed for a long time. Understandably, few refugees enjoy their lives. Almost all of them want to return home as soon as possible, but they usually wait until they are convinced the area is reasonably safe. Virtually no one wants to reexpose himself to the insecurity or exploitation which caused him to seek refuge in the first place.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS

Financial assistance for these programs comes largely from the United States. The Government of Vietnam budget defrays the cost of personnel, space, supplies, some war damage claims, and other miscellaneous Vietnamese expenditures. The budgeted costs of the United States and the GVN and an estimate of private voluntary agency contributions are given for the last 3 years in an exhibit attached to this statement. This exhibit shows that U.S. support, both in dollars and piasters (AID-generated) and in Public Law 480 title II commodities, was equivalent to $65.4 million in fiscal year 1968 and $70.2 million in fiscal year 1969; $59.3 million is estimated for fiscal year 1970. These costs should drop considerably beginning in calendar year 1971, if the favorable trends of 1969 persist and security conditions throughout the country continue to improve.

(The information referred to appears on p. 228.)

Thirty-two private voluntary agencies, mostly from the United States, are actively engaged in refugee and social welfare programs, and their reported annual budgets total approximately $25 million a year. This is a major contribution and much of it comes from individual Americans. The programs of these organizations are effectively carried out and they are deeply appreciated by the Vietnamese people and their Government.

Finally, the military forces of the United States, Vietnam, and others engage in numerous civic action projects which, though difficult to assess in terms of cost, have become a valuable part of the total effort. In addition, military units, operational military units, provide substantial help to new refugees from the moment they first arrive in secure areas until they are turned over to the GVN refugee program.

PEOPLE WORKING ON REFUGEE PROGRAMS

Apart from the budget it is important to make a few observations about the number of people working in Vietnam on these programs. The GVN Ministry of Social Welfare has by far the largest number, having built its staff up to an authorized strength of 1,900 from about 125 in January 1966.

I might digress to say that until March 1966 they had no organized governmental agency to cope with this kind of problem at all.

At the present time, 1,536 of these positions are filled, 637 in Saigon and 899 in the field. American and third country voluntary agencies have 431 specialists from abroad and 741 Vietnamese employees. From a high of 116 positions authorized and 109 on board in early 1969—up from 18 in January 1966—the U.S. official advisory group at present consists of 79 people in the country against an authorized strength of 97. This reduction in the number of U.S. advisers has been possible largely because of the increasing competence of the Ministry of Social Welfare staff. Further reductions will be made by the end of 1970 if present trends continue and if the program remains unchanged. I am attaching a table which shows the breakdown of both GVN and CORDS staffing.

(The information referred to appears on p. 228.)

American refugee advisers are stationed in all provinces where there is a substantial problem. If the numbers of displaced persons are small and we do not require a full-time adviser in the province, we draw on other members of the provincial advisory team, or, in emergencies, we send specialists from the regional offices or Saigon.

ACTIVITIES PLANNED FOR 1970

This year the Vietnamese Government, with our help, will concentrate on the following activities:

1. Assisting people to return home wherever security conditions are adequate.
2. Improving the viability of life in refugee sites whenever it is not possible for refugees to return home in the foreseeable future.
3. Concluding benefit payments to the remaining 270,000 refugees on the rolls.
4. Taking care of any new refugees who may be generated, and
5. Augmenting presently inadequate programs of help to other types of war victims such as widows, orphans, the disabled and the aged needy people.

SUMMATION

To sum up: Although Vietnam has had a long history of population movements, the problem which concerns us now arises out of large-scale displacements of people and other hardships they have suffered during the past 6 years.

It took a considerable amount of time to develop and staff an organization capable of dealing with a crisis situation of this kind. By the end of 1967, the Vietnamese Government was providing emergency assistance to the refugees, helping some of them to resettle themselves or return home, and preparing for large-scale rehabilitation programs. This effort was disrupted during most of 1968 by the Communist Tet offensive and their offensives in subsequent months.

From November 1968 to date considerable progress has been made in paying refugees the allowances due them, in returning almost 600,000 to their homes, in resettling many of the remaining refugees, and in starting out on a program to assist war widows, orphans, and other disabled people.

The three southern provinces of I Corps remain a special problem.

Our primary tasks in 1970 will be to continue our efforts to help those people who still are refugees—or who become refugees—to return to their homes or to effectively resettle elsewhere.

(The attachments referred to follow:)

REFUGEE BENEFITS

	Duration	Rice allowance or money equivalent	Salt for Montagnards	Commodities	House construction allowance
Immediate relief assistance.	7 days limit	500 grams per person per day.	20 grams per person per day.	3 cans of condensed milk per family.	
Temporary assistance	1 month (can be extended if necessary).	Either VN $15 or 500 grams+VN $5 per person per day.	----------	----------	
Resettlement or return-to-village assistance	6 months	Either 15 kilograms or VN $300 per person per month.	20 grams per person per day.	----------	VN $7,500 and 10 sheets of roofing.

WAR VICTIM BENEFITS

	Rice allowance	Commodities	House construction allowance	Solatium
To families whose house was damaged 20 to 50 percent.	500 grams per person per day for 15 days.	2 meters cloth per person. 1 blanket and 1 mosquito net per family of 2 to 4 persons; 2 blankets and 2 mosquito nets for each family with 5 or more members.	VN $3,000	
To families whose house was damaged over 50 percent.	500 grams per person per day for 30 days.	Same as above	VN $7.500 and 10 sheets of roofing.	
For deaths				VN $4,000 if deceased was 15 years old or more; VN $2,000 if deceased was less than 15 years.
For injuries requiring medical treatment for at least 7 days.				VN $2,000.

NUMBERS OF REFUGEES BY CATEGORIES—1969

	End 1st quarter	End 2d quarter	End 3d quarter	End 4th quarter
Temporary refugees:				
I CTZ	289,985	323,899	242,285	135,894
II CTZ	73,810	44,447	11,500	1,477
III CTZ	8,285	6,090	2,283	6,425
IV CTZ	64,743	61,278	37,074	6,809
Total	436,823	435,714	293,142	150,605
Refugees in resettlement process:				
I CTZ	95,966	37,363	13,919	17,183
II CTZ	85,511	80,514	70,679	36,568
III CTZ	67,187	40,540	22,841	1,779
IV CTZ	26,204	12,938	15,593	10,399
Total	274,868	171,355	123,032	65,929
Out of camp refugees:				
I CTZ	300,525	151,516	133,084	16,026
II CTZ	270,824	235,999	110,860	18,265
III CTZ	7,402	23,123	22,382	1,335
IV CTZ	156,188	179,436	107,626	16,092
Total	734,939	590,074	373,952	51,718
Total refugee population:				
I CTZ	686,476	512,778	389,288	169,103
II CTZ	430,145	360,960	193,039	56,310
III CTZ	82,874	69,753	47,506	9,539
IV CTZ	247,135	253,652	160,293	33,300
Total	1,446,630	1,197,143	790,126	268,252

REFUGEE POPULATION
1969



NUMBERS OF REFUGEES RETURNED TO VILLAGE OR PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES, 1969 [1]

	Total, 1st quarter	Total, 2d quarter	Total, 3d quarter	Total, 4th quarter	Year's total
RETURNED TO VILLAGE					
I CTZ	17,283	26,231	19,510	73,093	136,117
II CTZ	1,087	32,694	85,319	40,031	159,131
III CTZ	0	75	6,293	2,524	8,892
IV CTZ	9,639	36,284	38,313	99,844	184,080
Total	28,009	95,284	149,435	215,492	488,220
PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES					
I CTZ	1,056	4,529	76,285	95,181	177,051
II CTZ	13,123	42,103	29,433	143,098	227,766
III CTZ	12,757	32,794	28,254	25,227	99,032
IV CTZ	12,620	12,899	13,991	43,029	82,539
Total	39,565	92,325	147,963	306,535	586,388

[1] The payment of resettlement and return-to-village allowances represents only the GVN's responsibility to individual refugee families. In addition, the GVN accepts responsibility for assistance to the resettlement or return-to-village community to foster its economic viability and a normal life for all its members.

NUMBERS OF REFUGEES RETURNED TO VILLAGE
OR PAID RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES*
1969



*The payment of resettlement and return-to-village allowances represents only the GVN's responsibility to individual refugee families. In addition, the GVN accepts responsibility for assistance to the resettlement or return-to-village community to foster its economic viability and a normal life for all its members.

SUPPORT FOR REFUGEE AND SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM

[Dollars shown in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1968	1969	1970
I. Refugee dollar budget	$18,724	$16,400	$10,452
II. Refugee piaster budget [1]	30,254	32,119	34,430
Subtotal	48,978	48,519	44,882
III. Food for Freedom, Public Law 480 (Ref. and Soc. Wel.)	16,380	21,638	14,399
Total U.S. contribution	65,358	70,157	59,281

	Calendar year—		
	1968	1969	1970
GVN National Budget (VN$ and $US equivalent in thousands)	511,223 ($4,332)	429,600 ($3,641)	510,000 ($4,322)

	Fiscal year—		
	1968	1969	1970
Estimated Voluntary Agency and Free World Assistance contribution	$25,500	$28,995	$25,500

[1] Calendar year counterpart piasters generated by AID Commodity Import Program and title I, Public Law 480 sales. The use of these funds is subject to joint U.S.-GVN agreement. They are administered by the GVN through its budget procedures.

CORDS, MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE, VOLUNTARY AGENCIES—PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO REFUGEE PROGRAM AS OF JANUARY 1970

	On board CORDS			On board ministry, social welfare	On board voluntary agencies		
	U.S. civilian	U.S. military	Local nationals		United States	TCN	VN
Saigon	27	3	33	637	84	44	213
Field	52	6	18	899	193	110	528
Total	79	9	51	1,536	277	154	741

	Authorized CORDS			Authorized ministry, social welfare	Authorized voluntary agencies		
	U.S. civilian	U.S. military	Local nationals		United States	TCN	VN
Saigon	26	4	38	680	(1)	(1)	(1)
Field	71	10	26	1,220			
Total	97	14	64	1,900			

[1] Not applicable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hitchcock.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very thorough description, I think, of the program.

OTHER LARGE MIGRATIONS OF PEOPLE IN VIETNAM

You mentioned one thing that caught my attention. You said that there have been other large migrations of people in Vietnam.

To what did you have reference prior to this war?

Mr. Hitchcock. My understanding of Vietnamese history is not deep, Mr. Chairman, but even at the beginning, before around 200 B.C., it began as a nomadic movement of people to escape out of China. Throughout history there have been a number of Chinese invasions and some internal insurrections and movements of the people.

Many people characterize the history of the country as a recurring movement of the people of this kind—possibly not of this magnitude.

The Chairman. Has anything like this occurred since the French took the country about a hundred years ago?

Mr. Hitchcock. Not to the best of my knowledge.

The Chairman. Did the French displace many people when they moved in? I am just curious.

Mr. Hitchcock. Not to the best of my knowledge.

The Chairman. I had not heard about it.

Mr. Colby. There was one additional movement, Mr. Chairman, in the period of about 1958 to 1962, when the Diem government was moving substantial numbers of refugees up into the highland areas who had formerly been in the lowlands. There was a certain excess of population in the lowland areas, but also there were some refugees from North Vietnam. They went up into the highland areas and established new communities in that part of the country.

Vietnam has spread over two millenia from its source in the Red River Valley around Hanoi. It began moving south about 1450, reaching the area around Saigon only in 1750.

In the course of that, they essentially pushed out of the way a whole civilization called the Chams, and they also pressed the Khmers, Cambodia's ancestors, back out of the way.

You have also had a substantial movement of Chinese down into South Vietnam in the period around the turn of this century.

The Chairman. What percentage are the Chinese now? Do you know?

Mr. Colby. It is pure guesswork; but I mean that it is not only mine, but it is basically guesswork. It is in the neighborhood of a million, we would estimate.

The Chairman. Out of the 17 million?

Mr. Colby. Out of the 17 million.

REFUGEES GENERATED BY RELOCATION

The Chairman. You said in your statement that for a brief period in the sixties, forcing people to leave outlying areas was seen as a way of denying the Vietcong manpower they could exploit.

You do not have any refugees created by this program?

Mr. Hitchcock. Sir, the subject of refugees created in those years is extremely vague. The reporting of figures was done hardly at all in many cases, and very imperfectly in the rest.

This becomes a part of the total figure that I estimated of something over 3 million in the last 6 years, but in the last 4 years there have been something approaching 2 million—a couple of hundred thousand less than 2 million—so, possibly in the period of 1965 and late 1964 there may have been a million. I am not sure of how long this particular approach of relocating people persisted, but it was in the 1965–66 period.

In 1966, there were about a million refugees generated, but I cannot say that they are all attributable to that, by any means.

EFFECT OF WAR ON VIETNAMESE EXTENDED FAMILY SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. You said previously, I believe, that the extended family system looked to the family for taking care of people in this unfortunate circumstance. They had never looked to the government before. Is that right?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. That is, by and large, true, as I understand it. That is, as you undoubtedly know, a common part of the societal structure in Asia—the extended or joint family structure, in which they each take care of themselves basically. During the war large numbers of people have been killed or displaced, and many people have fled from one area to another; in this process there has been a dismembering effect on the family unity to the point where that which remains of the extended family structure is no longer capable of doing that which it did traditionally. One other manifestation of it is that sometimes a family gets so dismembered that a man may be in the service, the wife has had to become the breadwinner, and she has had on frequent occasions to put their children in orphanages.

You frequently find orphans in Vietnam who are, in fact, literally not orphans. One or possibly both parents may be alive. But this is a manifestation of this breakdown of the family structure.

EFFECT OF WARS ON UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. There was a time in this country not too long ago in which this was more or less the custom; wasn't it?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not always had social security and Government intervention; have we?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. What, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. We have not always had social security and government intervention in America; have we?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. This is rather recent development in this country; is it not?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN. When do you think it started in this country?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, it began in a rather meaningful way, I think, in the early thirties—1932.

The CHAIRMAN. Subsequent to World War I?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Subsequent to World War I.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that there is any association at all between war and the development of these things?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, war obviously creates basic social dislocations.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly does.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. And problems which society feels it has to deal with, I presume consciously, in the circumstances which are created.

The CHAIRMAN. It is rather ironic that war seems to be the principal enemy of what we used to think of as the self-reliant free enterprise system; isn't it?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no greater force that leads to socialization of a country than war; is there? Wouldn't you agree?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes, and also, unfortunately or fortunately a great deal of technological advance is usually stimulated by wars.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that? To what do you have reference?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I mean, in World II many of the advanced techniques which have now widespread ability and application—radar may be a case in point—were a consequence of the kind of money that was made available.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think those are very significant counterbalances to the misfortunes which are brought about?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No; I would not argue that for a second.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were suggesting that.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Just think; we could even point to going to the moon. We have had two wars, and we can now go to the moon. Doesn't that make you feel good?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I do not know quite how I feel about that sir. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. You are very wise not to say anything.

My greatest misfortune is that I have a tendency to say what I think about these things. One should not do that in Washington.

CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF REFUGEES AS RESETTLED

In your figures about the refugees in March of 1969, you state there were 1,450,000 still on the Government's refugee rolls and it had been reduced to 270,000 in December. A Mr. David Hoffman, writing in the Washington Post, which is a rather well-known local journal of which you probably have heard——

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes, I know the article.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Says:

> American advisers report from the countryside, however, that tens of thousands of refugees are being erased from the rolls and reclassified as resettled citizens without being productively resettled.

This raises the question: Has there been any change in the last year in the policy of who was considered to be a refugee and what constitutes resettlement?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I welcome Mr. Hoffman's article, but there was a failure in the article to point out that the rehabilitation of refugees has been a two-part process. Some of the difficulty of achieving it I have already described for the I Corps area. Part of the process, and an essential part of the process, is to pay the people the allowances which they have been promised. These are allowances which are essential for rehabilitation; the second part is to upgrade, to improve situations in which they find themselves, whether it be a camp or whether it be their former home, to which they have returned.

Now there has been a lot of confusion about this. I think it is important to make it clear that in 1969 the Government of Vietnam decided that it would give first priority attention to making the payments to refugees, payments which were long delayed in many cases, and that to the extent they had resources, they would simul-

taneously do this upgrading of the sites on which the refugees were located.

They did do that with some measure of success in II, III and IV Corps areas.

In I Corps—and in I Corps I am talking only of the southern three Provinces of I Corps—they did not have the same measure of success for the reasons I stated.

In the northern two Provinces of I Corps, the one next to the DMZ, Quang Tri, and the next one down, Thua Thien, it was impressively done, with a couple of exceptions in each case.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I take it that the answer to the question is that you have not changed the criteria by which you determine whether a person is resettled or not?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, we have not, sir.

PRESENT NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. How many people are considered refugees in South Vietnam now?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. This is a rather complicated question, sir, but on the active case rolls at the moment are 270,000 who have yet not received their benefits. Their allowances for resettlement have not been received. This does not mean that those who have received all their allowances have been satisfactorily resettled, as we were discussing just before you arrived——

Senator SYMINGTON. How many of these are there?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. This gets into the highly estimative field, but I would guess about 520,000 have received their allowances and are not satisfactorily resettled.

Senator SYMINGTON. You would add 270,000 to those?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No, I would include those 270,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. So, 520,000.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. These are in camps which still need attention. Many of the people in those camps have already received their allowances.

RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCES AND SITES

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by allowances exactly?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It is a resettlement allowance given.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It amounts to about $180 a family.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who pays for it?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It is paid by the Government of Vietnam with money provided by the United States.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do they do with that money when they get it?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, this is a kind of grubstake that eases the building of their homes, the development of some means of livelihood, whether it be farming or fishing or trade, and provides a cushion of 6 or more months.

Senator SYMINGTON. Six or more months?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where do they go with it?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, most of these people are in camps which are being resettled. We call them resettlement sites.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that where they are going to live permanently?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Possibly not permanently, sir. My opinion, sir, is that there are a great number of people being resettled now because there is no alternative. They say, "We want to return home when the war ends." They want to return to the homes that they left, but we do not resettle people if the chances of their returning home are imminent.

REFUGEES IN CAMPS AND RESETTLED

Senator SYMINGTON. You have 520,000 now?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. In camps which still need assistance.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many were here, say, last year?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, we had at that time 1,450,000 people in March on the active case rolls, of which——

Senator SYMINGTON. Does that mean that 900,000-plus have gone home?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. No. I sort of hesitate to get involved in the problem of numbers, because they sometimes do not add up to the total. During the year 1969 about 600,000 people have returned home. Now, they are people who came from out-of-camp situations, from in-camp situations, from camps previously resettled completely, and camps that were in the process of being resettled. So, it is not a deductive figure. Nevertheless around 600,000 went home.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they back where they came from?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. By and large, they did when security was extended.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many did you add to the number?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Add to the number?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. For what?

Senator SYMINGTON. How many people came into the camps; 600,000 went out—how many came in?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. 114,000 new refugees came in. This compares with about 300,000 the previous year, 400,000 the year before that, and upward of a million the year before that.

COST OF REFUGEE PROGRAM

Senator SYMINGTON. How much did your program cost the United States, all told, last year?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The total last year was $70.157 million. The program for fiscal year 1970 is anticipated at $59.2 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was it in 1968?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. $65.3 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1967?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. $70 million; 1969 was the year in which the impact of a lot of the special 1969 Tet assistance fell.

Senator SYMINGTON. They have pretty heavy inflation over there; haven't they?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. They have substantial inflation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, if $180 was right 2 years ago, why is it still right today?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The basic reason is that the Vietnamese are increasing their capability of doing this type of work. We have reduced quite a bit the amount of dollars. The piaster input has increased, but the net has definitely decreased, and I would anticipate——

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say "increased capacity of doing this work," what do you mean by that?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The problem of handling this kind of displaced people, people who have lost homes, whose homes have been destroyed.

Senator SYMINGTON. What amount has the Vietnamese Government put in?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The Vietnamese Government provides personnel; it pays for some war damage claims and other miscellaneous Vietnamese services. Their contribution to this program is small.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much would you say per person?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Per person, I do not know, sir, but their total has run about $4 million, its equivalent or a little more, each of the last 3 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, you divide that into the number of refugees. You could; couldn't you?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; but that is such a fluctuating number that it is hard to do the mathematics.

Senator SYMINGTON. You could get a rough amount.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. The amount that each family receives in allowances, whether they are resettling in a new location or returning home is the equivalent of about $180, which is paid in piasters or in aluminum roofing.

NUMBER AND SIZE OF REFUGEE SITES

Senator SYMINGTON. How many places have you where you put these refugees?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. At the moment, we have 646 refugee sites. There were 841 at the beginning of 1969.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many of those are in the I Corps, for example?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I do not have that figure offhand.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you supply that for the record?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I can certainly get it.

(The information referred to follows:)

There are 162 sites in I Corps.

Senator SYMINGTON. The II, III Corps, and then in the delta.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. There are practically no formal sites in the delta, although for administrative convenience we have counted some clusters of people as a site. They are included in this number of 646.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the average size of a refugee camp?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It varies tremendously. In I Corps the average size is 1,902; II Corps 986; III Corps 776; and in IV Corps the average is very close to zero because most are out of camp. There is one very large site in the northern part of I Corps of 20,000 which is considerably the largest.

Senator SYMINGTON. 20,000.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. 20,000

Senator SYMINGTON. Acres?

Mr. Hitchcock. 20,000 people. It is right near the DMZ.

Senator Symington. I meant in size, in area.

Mr. Hitchcock. I cannot tell you, sir.

It is on a sand spit. It is not a good location, and we have had major problems.

Senator Symington. It must be a pretty sizable spit if you have 20,000 there.

Mr. Hitchcock. True, but it is sand, nonetheless. We have had a difficult time making land available in I Corps, but we recently have had land opened up by extension of security in the immediate area.

REASONS REFUGEES LEFT HOMES

Senator Symington. Has any analysis been made of the breakdown between the number of refugees who left their homes because of harassment from the VC and those who left because of allied military operations?

Mr. Hitchcock. Attempts, but none of them succeeded. It is very difficult to determine the reason why an individual or a collection of refugees leave their homes. I did say in my statement, sir, that in general it appears that the majority of refugees have left home to escape the crossfire of war.

Senator Symington. I had better go vote. We will be right back.

(Short recess.)

POSSIBILITY OF CORRUPTION IN REFUGEE PROGRAMS

The Chairman. Mr. Hitchcock, how much of the aid furnished by the United States and destined for the refugee programs is lost in the pipeline to the refugees.

Mr. Hitchcock. I do not know, sir. I have been very conscious of the possibility of diversions. There have been occasions when it has been alleged that not all got to the refugees. Those cases are all investigated and in one instant case I can recall since I have been there, a service chief was jailed; a service chief is the social welfare ministry representative in the province.

There probably are greater chances for misrepresentation (not diversion) in the assessment of damage to villages and hamlets that are attacked.

I have noticed that the number of occasions when the percent of houses destroyed is given as 20 to 50 percent is relatively small compared to the times when it is given as 50 to 100 percent. There are different amounts of allowances paid for these differing amounts of damage. But I have seen no evidence and have heard of no evidence of alleged widespread or significant corruption in the program.

The Chairman. You have not?

Mr. Hitchcock. I have not.

The Chairman. No more than is normal?

Mr. Hitchcock. No more than you might say normal.

The Chairman. We hear stories. I have not heard any, as a matter of fact, of any significance about refugees. Most of them have been with regard simply to the regular aid program, the import program of commodities. There has been a lot of that in the past. I do not recall having heard too much about corruption in the refugee program

itself. Can you add anything? Do you have anything different from that, Mr. Colby?

Mr. Colby. I think the only thing we were concerned about a year or so ago was the tendency for some of the refugees to resell the material instead of using it. I do not really call this corruption in that sense, but it is use of it for another purpose. In other words, they receive certain commodities and instead of using them, they sell them. We did take the step, for instance, in the refugee program this past year of terminating the issuance of cement to refugees because we found that there was a certain leakage and resale of it. Instead the refugees receive a certain sum of money which is given to them to use as they wish to help rebuild their houses.

Mr. Hitchcock. I think the basic reason for doing away with cement distribution was a desire to utilize the private sector for the distribution of that commodity.

PAST POLICY OF GENERATING REFUGEES

The Chairman. In the staff report, Mr. Hitchcock, there occurs this statement. I want your comment on it if it is true. It says:

> Incidentally, we were told that while it had once been considered desirable to generate refugees—because they would presumably become sympathetic to the government or would at least be under government control—it was no longer regarded as advantageous and the military were being told not to do so purposely.

Mr. Hitchcock. That is true, sir.

The Chairman. Is that a true statement?

Mr. Hitchcock. Yes. I specifically addressed that in my statement. This has not been the case for the last several years. The basic policy of pacification in general is to bring security to the people rather than bring the people out of insecure areas to secure areas.

The Chairman. What was the experience with those whom you deliberately made refugees and then helped resettle? Were they grateful and did they turn out to be sympathetic to and supporters of the Government?

Mr. Hitchcock. I cannot reliably answer that question, sir.

Mr. Colby. I think our assessment, Mr. Chairman, was that it was not a very successful technique, which is the reason the Government turned against it with our full support.

The Chairman. Without knowing anything, just as a political observer, it does not appeal to me.

Mr. Colby. It does not sound very practical.

The Chairman. Without knowing anything about what your experience was, it does not appear a very likely program. I am not at all of the feeling that people are likely to be that grateful.

Mr. Hitchcock, in your statement you indicate procedures which have been instituted to minimize the effect of military operations in generating refugees. Then you acknowledge this does not always work, which we have discussed several times in these hearings. We have called attention to questionable practices and the answer has been. "Maybe that used to happen, but the order has now been changed."

I wonder what things are going on now that we do not know about, but which later will be corrected.

In this particular case, let me ask you about an incident reported by the Washington Post in another article by Mr. David Hoffman on December 24. He writes as follows:

> For example: Navy landing craft and big troop-carrying helicopters discharged many thousands of soldiers on Quangngai's Batangan Peninsula in early January. Elements of the 2d ARVN division, the American Division and the Marine 26th Regimental Landing Team cordoned off the whole peninsula, transplanted 11,000 peasants and razed their Vietcong-infested hamlets. The operation, code-named Russell Beach, was one of the largest hard cordons of the war.
>
> A giant helicopter airlift was organized to transport the peasants, en masse, to a "combined holding and interrogation center" some 50 miles from their homesites. The refugees lived there, in a tent colony, for almost 3 months while Russell Beach spent itself.
>
> Advisory Team 17 at Quangngai was given approximately 20 days notice that an operation contemplated by the military could be expected to generate 5,000 refugees, no more. It was Team 17's responsibility, along with Colonel Khien, to care for the displaced persons—when and if they materialized.
>
> "That one operation cost the Province 6 months work," said a Team 17 adviser recently. "We thought Russell Beach was a gigantic mistake, and few of us have changed our minds since it ended." But the advice of advisers is not always solicited.

This raises several question including the effectiveness of the coordination between the CORDS and the operational military elements.

Do you have any comment to make on that?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, I have some familiarity with that from the point of view of the refugees generated. Most of the basic facts there are true. Over 11,000 people were removed in advance of the military sweeps through the Batangan Peninsula area. They were not held, I believe, as long as 3 months. I believe it was closer to 2 months.

They were screened, and they were returned. They were returned to places which were not in all cases the precise home that they had left. This is an area which had been for many, many years a Vietcong stronghold. Whether or not the military operation was worth the effort put forth, I cannot judge. I have heard it contended that it was in military terms.

These people were returned to five different places on the peninsula. They were assisted as refugees. They were assisted also while they were in the reception center. Conditions in the reception center were overcrowded, but they did not lack in the way of food or sanitation.

It was not obviously a desirable kind of thing if you can avoid it, but the alternative might have been a lot of deaths of these people in the military operation that was undertaken.

So I would not care to balance all this out in terms of pros and cons.

Most of the people who were returned to the five locations on the peninsula subsequently have dispersed throughout the peninsula to the immediate home areas that they originally left.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very difficult and heart-rendering kind of operation concerning these people.

I do not know that I have any other questions. Do you have anything further you would like to say before we move on to the next subject?

TECHNIQUES ARE BEING REVIEWED

Mr. COLBY. On that question you raised, Mr. Chairman, as to whether there are other things that we will find out later that we would just as soon that we were not doing now, I think the answer is yes, that there will be a number of things. Things like this are under study.

We are, I think, improving some of our techniques by studying them, reviewing them, and determining whether the net value was really worth the energy and effort involved. This applies to a variety of programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I do not think anyone in this committee or anywhere else has any doubt but that given the war, we have to do the best we can with it. Other than these questions which have been given to me, I have personally heard of nothing seriously wrong with your program.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It is not perfect, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not feel good about having to have it, but nevertheless——

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It is not perfect, but it is improving.

PRIORITY OF REFUGEE PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that relative to the other activities it has as high a priority as it ought to have? I mean is it treated fairly within the distribution of funds?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It does not suffer for lack of priority.

The CHAIRMAN. Lack of funds.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I think Ambassador Colby's attitude, for example, is quite apparent. He has been a strong supporter of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then thank you very much, Mr. Hitchcock.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Thank you. It has been a pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe, Mr. Colby, you are now going to tell us about the Chieu Hoi program; is that correct? Do you have a statement?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir, I have a small statement.

Mr. Chairman, in previous parts of this testimony, we have discussed programs by which the Vietnamese people are increasing their participation in a national effort to build as well as protect their country. Some Vietnamese, even South Vietnamese, have been in the hostile camp. I would like to describe now the program of the Vietnamese Government which seeks to include them as well in this national effort.

CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

Since 1963, the Government of Vietnam has waged a battle to win the allegiance of those who actively oppose it. In this battle, the Vietnamese Government has appealed to the enemy to return to the national cause and assisted those who returned to establish useful and meaningful lives in Vietnamese society. This program is called Chieu Hoi, or, in English, Open Arms. To the Vietnamese, it means "a call to return home."

When the returnees join the Government side, the Government reinstates their citizenship and rights, and makes every effort to fully reintegrate them into the political, social and economic life of the

Nation. They are not treated as prisoners of war, enemies of the people, or otherwise castigated for their past activities that may well have included acts of terror and violence.

The response to this appeal, especially during the past year has been impressive. Since 1963, over 142,000 Vietnamese supporting the Vietcong have come over to the Government of Vietnam. Almost a third of these, 47,000, rallied during the past year. In addition, some NVA, far fewer than Vietcong, to a total over the years of less than 1,000, have rallied. The appeal to return home is not the same of course for the NVA soldier in the South.

A variety of methods are used to encourage the Vietcong to rally. The Vietnamese Ministry of Chieu Hoi, the Ministry of Information, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and MACV, cooperate in producing radio broadcasts, making tapes of appeals by former Vietcong which are broadcast from aircraft or ground stations, and disseminating printed material. The most effective operations, however, are conducted by the armed propaganda teams, which are made up exclusively of returnees. The primary purpose of the team is to conduct fact-to-face operations in less secure areas to encourage VC and their supporters to return to the government side. On January 1, 1970, the Ministry of Chieu Hoi authorized an increase from 75 to 90 such teams. The current strength of these armed propaganda teams of 74 men each is 5,200 men.

RECEPTION AND TREATMENT OF RETURNEES

Once encouraged to return by the APT, armed propaganda team, or other means, the returnee begins his journey back to normal life. The first step is taken at a Chieu Hoi reception center.

Reception activities encompass all activities required to receive, process, care for, and release returnees. These activities are managed by the Chieu Hoi cadre. The manner in which the returnee is received and treated is critical for if ill-treated he will probably become incorrigible and never support the Government. Reception centers are located in 74 districts, all Provinces, and four autonomous cities. In addition, for higher ranking returnees, there are four regional centers and one national center. Upon arrival, the returnee is welcomed by the Chieu Hoi chief and then interviewed to obtain biographical data and establish a basis for classification. The returnee is interrogated by the nation police, Province S–2 and S–5, and, when available, a member of the Phung Hoang Committee, to develop information of immediate tactical value or personnel data on known VCI. The information brought in by returnees results in many successful operations against the enemy, the capture of important documents, a decrease in mine and booby trap casualties due to operations guided by Hoi Chanh and the location and capture of rice and weapons caches.

The returnee, whether rice bearer or high-ranking officer, has knowledge about the enemy, his movements, strengths, locations, and tactics. In most cases, the returnee readily volunteers this information. Also, during the interrogation process, many bogus returnees, ARVN deserters, and enemy infiltration agents are detected.

The returnee is required to remain in the Chieu Hoi center for a 60-day period to fulfill the program, although he is not physically

restrained or guarded to prevent his leaving. During that time he is supported by the Government with a small amount of money (about 50$VN or U.S. 40 cents) per day for food for himself, his wife, and any dependents over 15 years of age. Dependents under 15 years of age receive 25$VN (U.S. 20 cents) per day for food. He also receives two sets of clothes or a 1,500$VN (U.S. $13) clothing allowance. Each returnee is given 300$VN (U.S. $2.50 per month for spending money for himself and 150$VN (U.S. $1.25) for each of his dependents. In addition, when the returnee is resettled he receives a 1,200$VN (U.S. $10) resettlement allowance to get him a small start.

During his stay in the center, the returnee receives at least 72 hours of political training. The topics include: democratic processes of government; rights and duties of a citizen in a democracy; success of the GVN as contrasted to the failures of the Viet Cong; policies and programs for combating the enemy; and inconsistencies in Communist policies.

Training opportunities are offered in 17 skill areas. The most popular are mechanics, tailoring, masonry, carpentry, driving, and barbering. From the beginning of the vocational training program in 1964 until December 1969, 11,112 returnees have completed some form of vocational training. Of these 5,359 returnees, or about half of the overall total, were trained in 1969. This is not a large percentage of the total, but this training is voluntary, the program has had its problems and most returnees prefer to return to their home villages as soon as the required 2-month stay at the center is over.

Currently, two regional centers and 35 provincial centers offer some form of vocational training. By July 1970, all regional and provincial centers will offer vocational training. In addition, courses are sponsored by U.S. Navy Seabees, USAID/General Support Office, and the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture.

RESETTLEMENT OF RETURNEES

The four objectives of resettlement are:

A. To fulfill GVN promises to the ralliers.

B. To provide the means for the ralliers to reintegrate themselves into the normal flow of Vietnamese society and life.

C. To enable the ralliers to become economically self-sufficient.

D. To develop the ralliers' capability for contributing to society.

If the security situation permits, the returnee usually elects to return to his former place of residence. If not, he may establish his residence in an urban area or build a new home in a Chieu Hoi hamlet. Chieu Hoi hamlets are normally exclusively for ralliers. They are a last resort method of resettling ralliers. Currently, there are 28 operational hamlets providing homes for 4,000 families, with an additional 12 hamlets nearing completion. Each family receives a small plot of land, suitable for some gardening, from the Government. The Government also provides building materials for a home and a rice allowance for 6 months.

MILITARY SERVICE OF RETURNEES

Approximately 50 percent of all ralliers desire to return to farming upon leaving the center and do so. All ablebodied male ralliers, how-

ever, are eligible for the draft 6 months after they leave the center. Many voluntarily join paramilitary units like the APT (Armed Propaganda Team). Regional and popular forces also attract some returnees. One of the most successful utilizations of ralliers is the Kit Carson scout program. Founded in October 1966, the KCS are Hoi Chanh, ralliers, employed by U.S. and other free world military units to provide geographical expertise and tactical knowledge of the enemy's method of operation. Utilization of the scouts has been credited with saving numerous American and allied forces lives. Since the inception of the program, 230 scouts have been killed and 716 wounded.

Currently, there are 2,245 scouts. They receive a salary ranging from 5,000$VN to 10,000$VN per month, paid from the military assistance for pacification fund (AIK). In addition, the scouts receive the same medical attention as personnel in the unit to which assigned.

In total, about 25 percent of all returnees have joined some type of force actively fighting against their old associates.

EFFECTS OF CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

Another very positive indicator of the effect this program is having on the enemy is the fact that the NVA and VC have taken specific action to counteract the program. Central Office of South Vietnam Resolution No. 9, issued last fall, directly addresses the problem, and units have been ordered to carry out intensive indoctrination against the program. Special schools have been set up to train cadres to infiltrate the Chieu Hoi centers to foment discord. Chieu Hoi hamlets and provincial reception centers are priority targets for enemy attacks. Ralliers are very high on the enemy selective assassination list. All this shows that the enemy has very deep concern about the deleterious effect the Chieu Hoi program is having on their ranks.

As I said at the outset, the benefits of this program are measurable. And, while there was opposition to this program in the past—mainly from GVN officials and high-ranking military—at the present, this opposition has dwindled to almost zero due, among other things, to President Thieu's strong direction to Government officials to utilize the returnees actively. Since most VC have family roots in GVN-held territory, their reintegration into society has not been difficult.

It is true that a substantial proportion of the returnees are low-level guerrillas, lesser infrastructure members, and part-time workers or porters for the enemy. Nevertheless, these ralliers represent serious manpower losses to the enemy, and, without them, it is more difficult for the enemy to carry out his operations. Further, ralliers have proved an invaluable source of intelligence to GVN and Free World Forces. In addition to providing information on enemy strengths, dispositions, and personalities, ralliers have guided many successful operations against the enemy resulting in the capture of documents, decrease in mine and booby trap casualties, and location and capture of caches. In 1969, 190 operations resulting in discovery of weapons and food caches were led by ralliers. During the year, 8,828 weapons were captured in this fashion. It is also true that the rate of returnees has decreased in the past several weeks. This is a drop from the exceptional figures during late 1969. We ascribe this drop to the annual pre-Tet dip, to increased precautions against the program by the enemy and to the fact that expansion of pacification into new areas, which produces

many returnees from those happy to rejoin the Government side and remain home, has gone so far that there is less of this sort of population to absorb.

Future returnees may thus be fewer, but the program of offering reconciliation even to the members of the hard-core enemy will continue, and I might add in the number last week; the number that came in last week was 622, Mr. Chairman, which is a reversion to the somewhat higher figures that we had during December and some of the earlier periods. It is not the high thousands-a-week level that we used to have, that we were having during the fall, but it is very substantially over the low of 200-odd that it dipped to just before Tet.

Beyond the manpower and intelligence gains accruing to the Government corresponding to debits on the VC side of the ledger, the political benefits are really the most significant. The act of rallying is an act of political commitment to the GVN and away from the Communists. Apart from the initial act, the commitment is strengthened by good treatment and indoctrination at the Chieu Hoi Center. Further, the political posture taken by the Government in welcoming all to the national effort is a unifying force acting not only on those in the enemy camp, but those already in the GVN fold.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

TYPE OF RALLIERS UNDER CHIEU HOI

A journalist named Harvey Meyerson has written a book about Vietnam entitled "Vinh Long," which is due to be released later this month. Mr. Meyerson's book tells a story of what happened in Vinh Long Province in 1967 and 1968. He makes several observations about the Chieu Hoi program in this book. He writes that most defectors who rally under the program had been in the Vietcong for less than 11 months so that the Chieu Hoi program "had scarcely touched the Vietcong hard core" but was affecting only "fresh recruits"; that many who rallied were doing so in order to get new clothes, a daily food allowance, a welcome package and other benefits; and that still others had been brought in by others under "the third party inducement program."

Would you comment on his observations, or do you happen to know Mr. Meyerson?

Mr. COLBY. I do not offhand, Mr. Chairman. I think his comments are roughly similar to the ones I made here. I think that the great mass of the ralliers are low-level people, not any great contribution.

There have been, of course, some very notable exceptions, some very important ralliers who have given us very important intelligence, but that is a fairly small percentage of the total number. The main effect of the program over the past year has been to bite into the enemy's total manpower base, not to get at its key people.

THIRD PARTY INDUCEMENT PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. What does he mean by the third party inducement program?

Mr. COLBY. There was a program that began at the time of the accelerated pacification program, Mr. Chairman, in which various sums

were offered to third parties who would induce named or ranking Hoi Chanh (ralliers) to come in. In other words, if a lieutenant was induced by someone else to come in, this person received a reward, in a sense.

This program, we believe, had something to do with increasing the number of people coming in. We also began to have increasing doubts as to the validity of the inducement and whether there was not some arrangement in many cases so that the man who was coming in anyway was credited to some friend; and as a result the program was terminated at the end of 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. It was terminated?

Mr. COLBY. It has been terminated; yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This article that I have by Mr. Beech was printed last year. It indicated just what you said you suspected. I would expect that that would be a very difficult program to administer.

Mr. COLBY. I think it had a certain stimulating effect, but then some fellows inevitably figure out how to exploit it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is sort of hard to get a program where they cannot do that. That is true here too.

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have seen in the paper recently that in our own poverty program there seem to be some difficulties of a similar nature. It is very difficult indeed and especially in a foreign country where there are circumstances that are very unsettled.

COMPARATIVE COST OF KILLING AND RALLYING VIETCONG

Maybe this question is irrelevant to your problem. You were talking about the allowances and also Mrs. Hitchcock was talking about the allowances to refugees. Some time ago I saw an article in which some statistician had calculated how much it cost us—I believe it was the ammunition, just the war, the military aspect—to kill a VC.

Do you remember seeing such a figure?

Mr. COLBY. I do not recall it, but it is generally an astronomical figure, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It was something like $200,000 to $300,000; was it not?

Mr. COLBY. It generally—I do not know what the figure is, but I am sure it is very high.

The CHAIRMAN. When you were talking there about giving them $1.25 a month or something, I thought perhaps we could strike a bargain and give them half as much as it cost to kill them and they would all quit.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think Mr. Chairman, this is even cheaper. This particular program in 1970 cost in the neighborhood of $14 million. If you divide it roughly by the 40,000-odd people who came in, we come to a per returnee cost of $368, which is really pretty cheap. Now all of them are not the greatest accomplishment in terms of being high level Vietcong, but, on the other hand, that is a considerably smaller cost than the cost of killing them.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you did not mention the third party program in your statement simply because it had been abandoned.

Mr. COLBY. That is right, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that there is any use in pursuing that subject since it has been abandoned. There were several articles with which I assume you are familiar.

IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT OF RALLIED VIETCONG

Could you give any impression about the Vietcong who do come in in this Chieu Hoi program? Do they give the impression they are really committed or ever were committed to communism as an ideology?

Mr. COLBY. Again, I think this relates, Mr. Chairman, to their level. The great mass of them, the larger number were not. These were in great part people who were living in their local village, and in their local village they participated in the local guerrilla group, perhaps because it was the only guerrilla group around to participate in. When the Government appeared in the area and established itself and the Government programs began to work in the area, they were quite content to shift over and join the Government side. They were not deeply committed.

Now there are Vietcong who are deeply committed individuals, there is no question about that—the higher level ones. Some of these have gone through the intellectual agonies of a real defection before they have come over.

The CHAIRMAN. This question is always arising. I remember in the early days in De Gasperi's regime in Italy, we were greatly disturbed about the large Communist vote. When I was there we discussed it and it usually came down that in the opinion of many of our own people, as well as the Italians, they really were not Communists. They were against the Government. They did not like what the establishment represented and the only really effective organized opposition was the Communist Party. I think subsequent events to a great extent have supported that thesis.

Mr. COLBY. I remember a story about a peasant, Mr. Chairman, I believe in Thailand one time who was asked why he joined the Communist Party, and his reply in all ingenuousness was that this was the first time anyone had ever asked him to join anything. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is probably true. It is very likely to be true.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED WARS

I do not want to raise it again with you, but this does raise the question of whether these ideologically motivated wars in which we become engaged are justifiable in our national interests.

The other criteria we at one time used to try to apply was that it was a real threat to the security of our country regardless of what their ideology may be or is alleged to be. To my way of thinking, it has been a great tragedy that we departed from that principle, but that is another matter.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR PACIFICATION FUND

What is this military assistance for pacification fund to which you referred as AIK in your statement?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, right. This is one of those counterpart funds, Mr. Chairman. It was generated by counterpart, and it is a fund made available by the arrangements between ourselves and the Vietnamese Government for our direct dispensing. There has to be agreement on how most counterpart is to be spent and it is spent in joint programs. But this particular fund is a sum of money which is turned over to our province and district teams. They may spend it without consultation with the Government in that area.

We frankly used this very heavily right after the Tet period especially to get things moving very fast. It was more flexible and it was a fund which could be utilized very rapidly.

In calendar 1970 we are cutting this back very substantially because we have found that these other programs that have been developed which are in the Vietnamese structure, like the village self-development program, and the province self-development program, can have the necessary flexibility and, therefore, you do not need an American handled fund of that nature so much.

The source of the fund is still American dollars, Mr. Chairman, but it is an effort to develop the Vietnamese channels to handle these things rather than handling them through American funds.

The Chairman. How much does it consist of in 1970 or 1969?

Mr. McManaway. 1969 it was 1.5 billion piasters or about——

Mr. Colby. 1.5 billion piasters for 1969. In 1970 it will be reduced to one-half billion piasters.

The Chairman. Do you have difficulty with those ciphers like I do?

Mr. Colby. I do, Mr. Chairman. I am not a mathematician.

The Chairman. So do I. I tend to get lost with these figures in calculation. That is the great advantage the military has over the civilians. Their ciphers are so numerous that no one understands what they come out with and the other programs people understand them.

If you get it down to half a billion, people will know what you are spending and you will have problems.

FUNCTION, SIZE, AND PAY OF ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM

What is the function, size, and pay of an armed propaganda team?

Mr. Colby. The armed propaganda team has 74 men in it. A team of 74 former Vietcong who are recruited to work for you. They are paid between 5,000 and 10,000 piasters a month. They are armed usually, with M–2 carbines. They are uniformed, and they operate generally in smaller elements than 74. They generally operate in platoon size or even in squad size. Their function is to go around into the countryside and indicate to the people that they used to be Vietcong and that the government has received them and taken them in and that the Chieu Hoi program does exist as a way of Vietcong currently on the other side to rally. They contact people like the families of known Vietcong. They have, for instance, invited and provided the transportation to take such families for a look at the local Chieu Hoi center, to see what it is, and then return them to their homes after that one-half day visit just so the next time they see their relative they can attest to the fact that this program really is what it is. Some of them are also used as guards on the Chieu Hoi hamlets or even the Chieu Hoi centers to help protect them against possible Vietcong attack.

As I indicated, the fellow in the Chieu Hoi reception center is free to leave if he wishes.

ADVISERS TO ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Do these teams have American advisers?

Mr. COLBY. They have American advisers, sir, Australian advisers and some Filipino advisers. Each team might not necessarily have an adviser, but there will probably be an adviser in the Province to advise the total program, the reception of new Hoi Chanh and the use of the armed propaganda teams.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought the Filipinos had been withdrawn.

Mr. COLBY. These are contract people, individuals who are hired by us. They are paid by the Americans but are not Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you hire Filipinos?

Mr. COLBY. The Filipinos had a very interesting history of a program of inviting the Huks to rally, and they had the same kind of a program of resettling them and inviting them to rejoin the government side.

A number of these people who were working in the Philippines under President Magsaysay did come over and help set this program up and helped on the advisory aspects of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is General Lansdale out there?

Mr. COLBY. He is not in Vietnam now. He is here in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have anything to do with setting up this program because he worked in the Philippines before; did he not?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. I think he had something to do with setting it up in the Philippines; I could not say for sure. I think it was set up before he returned to Vietnam this time.

The CHAIRMAN. These teams have either American or, as you say, contract advisers?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The teams report to them, I take it?

Mr. COLBY. No, they report to the Chieu Hoi chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Chieu Hoi chief?

Mr. COLBY. Yes. They are part of the Vietnamese Government, and their command structure is to the Chieu Hoi chief of that particular Province.

The adviser is an adviser to the Chieu Hoi chief. They do not command these teams.

CHIEU HOI INTERROGATION PROCEDURES

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you discuss the interrogation procedure. Are these advisers present during the interrogation?

Mr. COLBY. Generally not, Mr. Chairman. The interrogation is done in the Chieu Hoi center by the national police, by the military intelligence or whoever, and it would be very rare that an American would be involved in the actual interrogation.

Once in a while that probably happens . I believe for the very important ones who come over, like some of the higher officers who have

come over, the Americans have directly interrogated them. But the rule is that a man who comes over and says he is a Hoi Chanh must be reported to the Chieu Hoi service and center and must be physically brought there within 24 hours. He then, with his consent, may be returned to an interrogation center for further discussion and elucidation of what he knows, but he must first be brought into the Chieu Hoi mechanism.

ARE HOI CHANH COUNTED UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM?

The CHAIRMAN. Are those who come in under the Chieu Hoi program also counted as defectors under the Phoenix program?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, yes. They are included in that total. Not all of them, of course, because all of them do not meet the standards of the Phoenix program, the A, B category.

IMPORTANT OFFICIALS RALLIED

The CHAIRMAN. You gave the figures; I will not repeat them. Can you indicate the percentage who are what you would call important officials or of that rank who might be called Communists in an ideological sense?

Mr. COLBY. I think the sum last year, the total number last year brought in were 47,000 of which 28,000 were military. Now, they would not be included in the category of important officials because they are not in the political apparatus; 12,500-odd are called political. I think in our Phoenix figures that 5,000-odd rallied, something of that nature, and those 5,000 out of the 47,000 would be a figure for the more important ones.

CHIEU HOI PROGRAM QUOTAS

The CHAIRMAN. Are there quotas assigned under the Chieu Hoi program?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, there have been goals set. I would call them goals rather than quotas—goals to get that many brought in; 4,800 ralliers were included in the Phoenix total last year.

The CHAIRMAN. They would be considered of some consequence rather than——

Mr. COLBY. Yes, not enormous consequence in that an A, B level could be a front leader at the village level. I mean that does not really make him a member of the central committee in Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year you said, I believe, 47,000 rallied; is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

ARVN DESERTERS

The CHAIRMAN. How many deserters or defectors did the ARVN have last year? Do you know that?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know the answer, sir. I can get it for you. It may be a matter we should give you in executive session. I will have the figure for you tomorrow.

I would add that the ARVN deserter is carried as a deserter after 15 days absence from his unit as distinct from our practice of calling him a deserter only after 30 days.

It is our experience that a number of the people who are classified as deserters actually show up again or show up in another unit sometimes. There is a certain shifting among the different units. This should be reduced in the future by reason of a fingerprint system which is well on its way toward being implemented today, so that I think we will be able to find out when that recruit was a member of some other unit.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told that figure, as you say, is classified. It was very substantially greater than the number of Chieu Hoi. We will talk further about that tomorrow.

Mr. COLBY. I will have that figure for you tomorrow.

CLASSIFICATION OF ARVN DESERTION FIGURES QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I am not quite sure why these figures should be classified if the country is supposed to understand what we are doing and what goes on. The reason I object to this classification of things of this character is how do they expect people to make a reasonably well-informed judgment if they do not know some of the critical questions?

If you let the Chieu Hoi stand alone without any reference at all to what is happening on the other side, it creates an impression that the thing is collapsing. I mean it is just about to collapse and, of course, if you hang on another year it will be over.

But if there are more desertions from the ARVN than there are desertions from the other side, that puts a little different light on the situation; does it not?

Mr. COLBY. Well, Mr. Chairman, these figures are not that comparable, because the Chieu Hoi figures are people who were on the other side who joined the government side.

Now, there are some who were on the other side and who just drift back into their homes and never go through the Chieu Hoi center. Secondly, it is our fairly firm opinion that very few of the deserters from the GVN forces actually go to the other side.

Again, as I say, a number of these shift to other units. Some of them drift off and go home and plant rice and that sort of thing, so it is not an exactly comparable figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us assume you are correct. I still do not see why they say this is a classified figure if there is an explanation. It creates then a false impression that it is perhaps more serious than it is. What I do not like is always classifying some aspect of it. I think it may well create an impression that the Government is hiding something that is bad. This contributes to a degree to this so-called credibility gap, that we do not believe what we are told. I have already gone over it. You know, we have been misled so much in the past. I think it is to your benefit not to classify these things, but to put it on the table and then if there is an explanation, such as you have given, give it.

It is much healthier and much more persuasive to say, "Yes," there were so many thousands of these deserters, but this is what happened to them. They did not go to the VC; they went home and did so and so—just what you said.

It is much healthier than your saying, "Well, that figure is classified."

Mr. COLBY. Let me examine the question, Mr. Chairman, and if it is possible to declassify it tomorrow, we will hand it to you on an unclassified basis.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very irritating you see. This keeps cropping up. It is the same as this terrible controversy we are having over the Laotian situation, with which you have nothing to do. But it is very irritating in trying to operate a democratic government, if it is still maybe called that, to be always confronted with this tendency to cover up some kind of a figure or some activity. I do not see anything wrong with your explanation of it and I am not rejecting it at all. If that is the fact, well, then, so what? Then it does not mean what it might otherwise mean if you merely make the explanation and say, "Well, the figure is classified."

Mr. COLBY. I do not want to indicate that desertion is not a problem. It is a problem: I agree with you there.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a problem. There is a considerable problem within our own forces; is there not?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have read about it. I mean there is a considerable problem about the question of the draft. This has been in the paper. This has been a pretty difficult war; has it not? Do you not agree to that?

Mr. COLBY. It has indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Or have you been too far away from us to know it?

Mr. COLBY. It is a difficult war on both sides of the ocean, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. It sure is.

There is a sort of closing note, putting together a few odds and ends.

POPULATION CONTROL MARKING SYSTEM

Are you familiar with an Army project called the population control marking system, which was described in an October 1969 Army intelligence information bulletin as one which will "enable U.S. Forces to rapidly and invisibly mark mass elements of a given population with a permanent coated agent that cannot be reasonably reproduced or forged. In this manner it will be possible through a special read-out device to rapidly and accurately ascertain to what hamlet, city, or region an individual belonged, thus identifying him as a suspect should he be detected in other than his designated area"?

Mr. COLBY. I am not familiar with that program, Mr. Chairman. I am familiar with the program of giving new identification cards to Vietnamese which will be backed up by fingerprints and photographs. These will be given to all Vietnamese. We are supporting that program. It is normal identification card type thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You think this is not this program though?

Mr. COLBY. That does not sound like it to me. But I do not know anything about that program, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. This I am told is an invisible tatooing program. You do not know anything about it?

Mr. COLBY. I am afraid you are beyond me, Mr. Chairman. We have lots of bright ideas out there, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you as well as we can learn something out of this hearing. As a matter of fact, it has just been called to my attention. I do not know about it either. We have lots of new developments going on in this country.

EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE CORRUPTION IN VIETNAM

This morning I think there was a description of corruption in South Vietnam written in 1967 by a Vietnamese, and it was suggested the document was out of date. I have now been handed a more current observation, an up-to-date statement written less than a year ago, written in the spring of 1969, also by a Vietnamese. Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau.

It relates to the success of eliminating corruption. There are a few excerpts that I thought I might read into the record and maybe you would care to comment on them as to the success. It says:

> The present countermeasures used in abolishing corruption can only solve the problem partially. Due to the following reasons, we have not yet been able to determine the main reasons that cause and nourish corruption. A campaign is directed mainly for political propaganda and for the satisfaction of criticism by American opinion. The measures taken are somewhat partial because they are only aimed at low ranking, isolated and out of power local officials. The above mentioned measures are so inefficient and erroneous that they can cause corruption to be more severe, formation of factions to be stronger and honest officials to become agitated and to have a crime obsession and an inferiority complex thus making our regime internally as well as internationally more scattered and weaker.

Do you have any comment to make on that?

Mr. COLBY. Well, my difference with the earlier statement was mainly pointed at the question of the situation in the country side, the physical condition in the countryside, Mr. Chairman. Corruption is still a problem. It has been for many years in most of Asia and I presume will be with us for a while.

There are still problems that have to be dealt with. There are some steps being taken on this. It is a matter of discussion from time to time.

We take particular pains, of course, in our own programs and in the use of our own resources to minimize, to the degree possible, any corruption.

I would suggest that you would be interested in a little story. One of our people in a district in Saigon had an idea which was adopted, and as a result in this office in Saigon today there are big painted signs on the walls describing the different forms, the different documents that are available at that office, and next to each the name of each form or each license that you need. It tells the cost of the licenses and the number of days or how long it should take to be available.

The purpose of publicizing this is to make it obvious that it is not necessary to give the extra money, the "tea" money, and so forth, to get the document through in any shorter time. It also fixes the sum for the license fee.

Now, this is not everywhere in Vietnam, but it is the kind of suggestion that comes up from some of our people from time to time which a local official will adopt to try to bring some of the problems out into the open so that the normal control of the population's interest in eliminating this kind of nuisance can begin to bear on it.

The CHAIRMAN. There is one passage in this book of Mr. Meyerson's which I thought was rather interesting. It bears upon this recurrent question of whether or not we are actually judging the situation properly. This is in his appendix and I thought it would be interesting for the record. It is very short.

This gentleman, I may say, spent quite a long time, in two different periods, altogether, I think, the equivalent of a year or a year and a half, studying this one small problem. He said:

On a visit to Saigon one day in May 1967, just after the much heralded nationwide village elections, I came upon a bundle of back issues of the French magazine "Indochina Sud Est Asiatique." They were published in 1953. Here are excerpts:

"The transport squadrons of the Army Air Force in Indochina have, since October 1952, flown 8 million kilometers. They have registered 25,261 sorties, carried 24,400 tons of cargo and 143,000 passenger, and they have dropped 75,000 paratroopers.

"I was struck by the high morale of the Vietnamese soldiers, the intelligence of the officers who command them, and above all the new fact that the population is joining in the struggle against the terrorists."

This was attributed to a statement of French President Paul Reynaud in summing up his inspection trip in Saigon.

On the next page it says:

"Each year sees a refinement of military tactics in Indo-China. Since the fall of Nghia-Lo, isolated outposts have been downgraded. The latest tactic involves hedge-hopping air mobile units.

"Vietnam has now successfully completed an extraordinary undertaking: In the midst of a violent civil war, the government has conducted village elections employing every guarantee of liberty and independence of choice that can be imagined for any modern State. . . . One need only recall the old Vietnamese saying, 'The authority of the King stops at the gates of the village,' to appreciate the full significance of these elections. . . .

"Nevertheless, certain observers have tended to write off the elections as being . . . without political significance. This interpretation vastly underestimates the importance of the event. It should be emphasized that, in the weeks preceding the elections, the Viet Minh announced a two-pronged anti-election campaign: On the one hand, terrorism and sabotage would be stepped up; on the other hand, voters would be pressured into abstaining. Yet, despite these threats, not only did 80.21 percent of eligible voters participate in the election, but, equally significant, 15,000 candidates presented themselves for the 7,000 seats at stake."

These reports going back for 20 years sound so familiar: do they not? Sometimes at least it raises a slight question about our judgment; does it not?

Mr. COLBY. I think we tried to express our judgment with appropriate caution and awareness of difficulties ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure you do. I am quite sure President Reynaud was not trying to deceive anyone. I have no reason to doubt that. They went through a very painful experience because of it. I hope I never suggested that I think any of you are trying to deceive this committee or in any way misrepresent it as you see it. The problem is how do we see it. That is true not only of that problem, but of a lot of them here at home. There is nothing peculiar about it; only it is extraordinarily difficult. I do think it is very difficult.

Anything else today?

I want to make this short announcement.

SECURITY ASPECTS OF PACIFICATION

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, I have a document here on the security aspects of pacification that I thought we might insert in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very helpful.

Mr. COLBY. It just summarizes some of the programs that affect security. I think we have discussed most of them in the course of the past few days.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very helpful to do that.

(The information referred to appears on p. 716.)

EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION BY WITNESS

Mr. COLBY. I would like, since this would be the closing part of the public session, I understand, Mr. Chairman, to express on behalf of the various officers and men who have come here from Saigon our appreciation for your courtesy and your patience, I might add, and also your concerned curiosity about what is happening there.

Sergeant Wallace will go back to central Vietnam to rejoin his CAP platoon in the hamlet out there. Captain Geck will go down to the delta to resume life there in the village along the canals to try to help that village get established. Captain Murphy will go back to advising an RF operation in Long An Province where there is still a good fight going on. Major Arthur who spoke here is going back to his quarters in Binh Chanh District in which he lives in a double bed which has sandbags at the top underneath a sandbagged roof because the enemy rather frequently manages to mortar the place. Mr. Mills will go back to his highlanders and try to work the relationship between the Vietnamese and the highlanders in order to create some cohesion there. Mr. Vann will return to his rather intense programs of visiting all of the areas of the delta, every last corner of it. Mr. McManaway and I will return to the somewhat less arduous physical surroundings of Saigon. I think we all have been very much educated and very much impressed by this example of interest on your part, Mr. Chairman, and on the part of the other members of the committee in what we are trying to do out there.

We think we are trying to do something useful. I am sure we are.

On some occasions our perspective may be a little narrow, but I think that we are going to continue to try to do the best job we can for our Government, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CRITICISM IS NOT OF WITNESSES BUT OF HIGH-LEVEL DECISIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

You prompt me to respond by saying that I hope that all of these gentlemen understand that this committee, and certainly the chairman of this committee, do not now nor ever have intended to criticize you gentlemen who are carrying out the orders of your Government in the best way you can, whether you are fighting on the front, whether you are exposed to the enemy, or whether you are directing from Saigon.

This criticism has been misrepresented inevitably by people who differ with us as a criticism directed at the people carrying on the war. Of course, that is utterly without foundation.

The criticism that I and others on this committee have is confined to the decisions being made at the highest level, going back to 1964–65. We are not talking about what any of the people in the field have done but, to be precise, about the decisions made by the President, taken upon the advice of his Cabinet and advisers. There is a difference of opinion as to where the interests of the United States lie. It is a political question, and I have nothing but admiration for you in your position and all the gentlemen you have mentioned. It is even more difficult, in my opinion, to carry on a conflict such as this about which certainly there is greater doubt and greater criticism than any in our history, I believe.

Of course the Civil War was unique, but in any other outside of our own Civil War, where we really did fall to fighting among ourselves, there was nothing like this. To my knowledge there was nothing like this in World War I, World War II, the Korean war, nor any other war.

There was something like this long after the event in the Philippine war. There was quite a fuss raised, but due to lack of communications at that time no one knew anything about it until after it was long over.

Unfortunately this one has gone on. You give me the occasion to say I have not now nor have I ever intended to criticize what you gentlemen are doing or soldiers are doing in the field. You are doing what you conceive is your duty and your order. I have never suggested in any way that any man has any choice about this matter.

I have had many people, students and others, because of my well-known opposition to the war itself, ask my advice about the draft and so on. I have always and always shall advise them, "This is your Government and you must follow the laws of your Government."

DUTY OF SENATORS TO EXPRESS DISAGREEMENT WITH POLICY

I have tried to follow the laws of the Government. I figure it is my duty, as it is other Senators' duties if they disagree with a policy, not to meekly fall in line but to express that disagreement. That is the only way a democratic country can properly function and there is a tendency always in wartime to stifle any criticism or opposition. Generally, that is no problem or not a serious one, but in this case it has been. It is a very unfortunate part and a very unhappy role to play to disagree with your Government's policy at any time, but especially when it involves the lives of so many people and the costs.

I can well understand how you gentlemen in the field, having a job to do, are very impatient of those who back here in Washington do criticize the operation overall, even though the criticism is not directed at you, because you are bound to feel that you are doing something of importance to the country. Given the assumption that the decision was correct, you most certainly are. The question of whether or not we should be there, whether or not it is consistent with the vital national interest and security of the country, is another question. It is a legitimate question to ask not only the past Administration, but also this Administration.

It was a very important question, I think, in the last Administration's decision not to run. At least we thought it was. I think that is generally accepted. The country, I think, thought there would be a very signifi-

cant change, and there may be. That is the question we are all interested in today.

The President, as you know, published a statement yesterday on general overall policy. It is so long that due to these hearings I have not had a chance to read it yet. I hope to read it over the weekend.

QUESTION IS ONE OF JUDGMENT, NOT WITNESS' CANDOR

I want to thank you and all of you for your cooperation in coming here and giving us your advice. I hope you will not go away thinking I am suspicious or have reservations about your frankness and candor when I call attention to the fact that in the past statements about this war have not proved to have been true.

There again I did not suggest that these other witnesses were telling the committee anything that they did not believe at the time. I am suggesting these are very difficult things to judge. In our fallibility in the past we have not been correct in our judgment of how things were going and we must take every precaution possible not to fall again into this same trap. That is about the sum and substance of it.

I certainly do not wish to impugn anybody's honesty and integrity in their testimony.

Mr. COLBY. I had no suggestion of that in my statement.

SENATE'S BELIEF IN VALUE OF OPEN DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN. We raised these questions for examination. There is still in the Senate, especially among some Members, perhaps a naivete that there is some value in open discussion by a number of people. There is still the idea that among a hundred men, if they are first made aware of the facts and then have an opportunity to discuss them, the ultimate decision may be a little wiser than that taken by one man or two or three men in secret session, if I may call it that.

This is part and parcel of this argument about what should be made public. I mean what should we be allowed to know and and to discuss, such as the controversy over Laos. All it is really is the feeling among a great many Members of the Senate that there is still value in open discussion of public matters of the greatest importance.

That does not mean we arrogate to ourselves any superior wisdom. We assume we are all average, but the discussion develops the truth, we will say, or more nearly the truth.

I appreciate your statement, Ambassador Colby.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEXT HEARING

Tomorrow we will hear testimony in executive session in room S–116 in the Capitol from Capt. Armand Murphy, Regional Forces and Popular Forces Adviser in Long An Province; Capt. Richard T. Geck, Commander, Mobile Advisory Team, Kien Giang Province, and U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Richard Wallace. He is Combined Action Platoon Team Leader in Quang Nam Province.

I might point out that according to the staff the Department of Defense was prepared to have these witnesses testify in public session, but in this instance, much to my surprise, they were overruled by the

State Department. This is a salutary sign of a new relationship between the Departments of State and Defense in any case. But it is a disturbing indicator of the Department of State's unwillingness to open up all aspects of our involvement in Vietnam to public discussion.

We will also discuss the case of Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau further. The staff of this committee has looked into this case in some depth. The case of Mr. Chau seems to raise a number of important questions concerning the operations of U.S. agencies in Vietnam, the relationship of the American mission to the Thieu regime, and the prospect of representative government in South Vietnam. We will be very interested in the comments of you gentlemen tomorrow.

I also will end by apologizing for keeping you so late and for being unable to make these hearings a little shorter, but that is a very difficult thing to do.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. Colby. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene Friday, February 20, 1970, at 10 a.m.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

United States Military Advisory Program in Vietnam

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Church, Symington, Pell, Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Javits.

Also present: William E. Colby, Deputy to General Abrams; John Vann, Deputy for CORDS, IV Corps; Hawthorne Mills, Province Senior Adviser, Tuyen Duc; Maj. James F. Arthur, District Senior Adviser, Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province; and Clayton E. McManaway, assistant.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning in executive session at the insistence of the State Department to hear testimony from Captain Armand Murphy, Adviser to Regional and Popular Forces in Long An Province, Capt. Richard T. Geck, Mobile Advisory Team Commander in Kien Gian Province, and Sgt. Richard D. Wallace, Combined Action Platoon sergeant in Quang Nam Province. The committee will be interested in learning more about these assistance programs, the capacities of the Vietnamese forces involved, and the prospects for the Vietnamese to assume these responsibilities.

Following their testimony we will examine with Ambassador Colby additional details of the Phoenix program, the case of Tran Ngoc Chau and other matters.

Before Captain Murphy, Captain Geck, and Sergeant Wallace read their prepared statements, I would like to ask each of them one question. Do you have any objections to discussing in public session what you are doing in Vietnam?

Captain MURPHY. No, sir.

Captain GECK. No, sir.

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not suggest that this be in executive session?

Captain MURPHY. No, sir; Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Who wishes to begin?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARMAND MURPHY, ADVISER TO REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES IN LONG AN PROVINCE

Captain MURPHY. I will begin, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, please, sir.

Captain MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Army Capt. Armand Jordan Murphy from Florida. I have served in the Republic of Vietnam for the last 24 consecutive months, serving with the 9th U.S. Infantry Division and the last 12 months with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam. During the last 7 months I have held the position of senior Regional and Popular Forces adviser for Long An Province.

LONG AN PROVINCE

Long An Province lies to the south and west of Saigon at a distance of approximately 10 miles at its closest boundary. It is the southernmost province in III Corps tactical zone but possesses no international borders. The Province has seven districts, 81 villages, and 387 hamlets. The primary occupation of the 365,000 inhabitants is rice farming. By the latest statistics, over 85 percent of the population is under Government of Vietnam security. Militarily, Long An has 52 Regional Force companies and 163 Popular Force platoons. There are two regiments of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces totaling five battalions operating in the Province. The Third Brigade of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division with four infantry battalions operates almost exclusively in Long An. Vietnamese forces in both combat and combat support functions total approximately 16,000 personnel. U.S. forces total in excess of 5,500 personnel. Two Regional Force companies and 50 Popular Force platoons are to be added in 1970.

DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CAPTAIN MURPHY

As the senior Regional and Popular Forces adviser, my primary function is that of principal U.S. adviser to Maj. Nguyen Van Thanh, commander of Province Regional and Popular Forces. My duties consist of rendering advice and assistance to Major Thanh on all facets of Regional and Popular Force functions. My activities include assisting in the planning, preparation, and execution of tactical operations, accompanying on inspections of Regional and Popular Force units, and advising on administrative and logistical support functions.

REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES IN LONG AN PROVINCE

The Regional and Popular Forces play a key role in the pacification effort in my Province through provision of territorial security. Currently in Long An, pacification expansion is being supported by 14 Regional Force companies, four independent Regional Force platoons, and eight Popular Force platoons. Other missions undertaken by Long An Regional and Popular Forces include security for villages and bridges throughout the Province.

The proficiency of Regional and Popular Forces in Long An Province has improved measurably. This improvement is largely attributable to the efforts of the 20 mobile advisory teams operating in the

Province. These teams, consisting of two officers and three noncommissioned officers, live and operate with Regional and Popular Force units and have the mission to upgrade the overall operational effectiveness of the units they advise.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those Americans?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman; they are Americans

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Captain MURPHY. Another contributing factor to the improvement in territorial security force proficiency has been the equipment conversion program. Equipping these forces with modern weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment has not only given our allies superior firepower, communications, and transportation capabilities over the enemy, but has also resulted in a psychological effect on the individual soldier making him more self-confident and aggressive. Presence and availability of support from helicopter gunships, tactical air fighters, and medical evacuation aircraft have also greatly enhanced the combat capabilities of Regional and Popular Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Captain Murphy.

AGGRESSIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE

You were referring to making them aggressive. Were you referring to the Vietnamese?

Captain MURPHY. That is right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they not naturally very aggressive?

Captain MURPHY. It varies, sir, with the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have to inspire them with aggression?

Captain MUPRHY. It varies with the individual, and I would say with the leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think by the time we complete our job they will be aggressive enough to hold their own in this modern world?

Captain MURPHY. I think, Mr. Chairman, that we have seen considerable improvement in the aggressiveness of the units through U.S. assistance, and I would hope that through our continued efforts in this direction that we will eventually achieve a very high degree of aggressiveness and combat capability on the part of the individual Vietnamese soldier.

BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN MURPHY

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a Regular Army captain?

Captain MURPHY. No, Mr. Chairman. I am Army Reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not attend the Academy?

Captain MURPHY. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you from in Florida?

Captain MURPHY. I call St. Petersburg my hometown, on the west coast of the peninsula.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that where they have this oil slick?

Captain MURPHY. I do not know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been reading about the oil slick?

Captain MURPHY. No, I have not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is near Tampa, I believe.

Captain MURPHY. Tampa is just north of St. Petersburg.

The Chairman. They have a magnificent oil slick, killing all the wildlife and ruining all the beaches. I was recently down there for a couple of days, not at Tampa but at Fort Lauderdale. It is nice weather down there.

Captain Murphy. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I am anxious to get back.

The Chairman. How old are you?

Captain Murphy. I am 27, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. What were you doing before you were ordered to Vietnam?

Captain Murphy. I attended the Infantry Officer Candidate School.

The Chairman. What were you doing before that? Had you gone to college or had you finished school?

Captain Murphy. Yes, sir, I attended school at Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta.

The Chairman. What did you study?

Captain Murphy. I studied mechanical engineering.

The Chairman. Are you going to be an engineer?

Captain Murphy. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you do anything in the engineering field in Vietnam?

Captain Murphy. No, Mr. Chairman. I am involved almost entirely in military affairs.

The Chairman. Pacification is kind of a mixture. It is not only military but political too. Is it not social?

Captain Murphy. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. It definitely has a political aspect.

The Chairman. Do you have many reasons to call upon your training as an engineer in your present position?

Captain Murphy No, I do not

ADVISORY DUTIES OF CAPTAIN MURPHY

The Chairman. You do not, but you are becoming a politician. What exactly do you do when you advise these people? You are the senior regional adviser; is that right?

Captain Murphy. Senior Regional and Popular Forces adviser.

The Chairman. Whom do you advise directly?

Captain Murphy. I am principal U.S. adviser to Maj. Nguyen Van Thanh. Major Thanh is the deputy province chief for security in Long An.

The Chairman. What do you tell him? Give us a picture. About what do you advise him?

Captain Murphy. Well, let me, if I may——

The Chairman. Do you speak Vietnamese?

Captain Murphy. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. Does he speak English?

Captain Murphy. He speaks excellent English. We carry out all our conversations in English.

The Chairman. About what do you advise him?

Captain Murphy. Let me cite, if I may, a typical day.

The Chairman. That is what I would like.

JOINT UNITED STATES AND VIETNAMESE MORNING BRIEFING

Captain MURPHY. In the morning at approximately 8 o'clock we have a joint United States and Vietnamese briefing, which is conducted in English because the province officials are all fluent in English.

The CHAIRMAN. Who attends that meeting?

Captain MURPHY. It is attended by the province chief, Col. Le Van Tu; my counterpart, Maj. Tan An, and the Vietnamese staff; Col. Alfred Sanderson, the province senior adviser, myself, and the members of the U.S. staff.

After this briefing, Maj. Tan An and I discuss our activities——

The CHAIRMAN. Who does the briefing?

Captain MURPHY. The briefing is given by both United States and Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you one of those who does the briefing?

Captain MURPHY. No, I do not brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does it?

Captain MURPHY. The S–2 intelligence officers will brief on the enemy situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they the DOD intelligence of CIA? Whose intelligence officers are they?

Captain MURPHY. Well, the Vietnamese intelligence officer.

The CHAIRMAN. They brief you about what? Describe it as best you can.

Captain MURPHY. They will go briefly into the events of the night.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened the day before?

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The significance of the night before?

Captain MURPHY. The significant incidents. They will brief us on intelligence reports which we may have received.

The CHAIRMAN. They are bringing you up to date on developments; is that right?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, more or less, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How many are at this briefing?

Captain MURPHY. About eight.

The CHAIRMAN. Eight.

Captain MURPHY. Eight Vietnamese personnel and about the same number of Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. In effect you gather around the table and they tell you what happened as far as they know. Then what happens?

Captain MURPHY. Then the U.S. counterpart will brief immediately after the Vietnamese. He will go into detail on any reports which we may have received through our advisory channels, from our advisers in the districts or on down to the mobile advisory team.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain MURPHY. Following that, the Vietnamese operations officers, what we refer to as S–3 officers, will brief on operations for the day.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean what they are going to do in the coming day, not on what has happened.

Captain MURPHY. On this particular day of the briefing.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it plans for the day?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Captain MURPHY. Then artillery personnel will give briefings on significant radar sightings and rounds of artillery expended during the preceding night.

That is about the extent of the briefing.

The CHAIRMAN. How long does that take?

Captain MURPHY. It usually runs about 25 or 30 minutes in the morning.

ARTILLERY FIRE DURING NIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. What is a typical report? How many artillery rounds, would you say are normal? Is it 100, 200, or a thousand?

Captain MURPHY. We have both Vietnamese and U.S. artillery located within a province.

The CHAIRMAN. In an average night do they expend many artillery shells?

Captain MURPHY. Generally the United States and Vietnamese will fire a total of about 300 rounds of artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. During a night?

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. At what do they fire?

Captain MURPHY. Primarily, Mr. Chairman, on radar sightings. We have an antipersonnel or personnel detecting radar which is designed to pick up movements of personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Can that radar tell whether it is a Vietnamese or an American or a North Vietnamese or a South Vietnamese?

Captain MURPHY. No, it cannot, Mr. Chairman. There is in all areas in Vietnam a curfew of which the local inhabitants are aware. They are informed through their government channel, and it can be assumed that after a set time——

The CHAIRMAN. It picks up anything that moves.

Captain Murphy. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the artillery shoots at it.

Captain MURPHY. Yes, it does, after the target is cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean?

RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. ARTILLERY FIRE

Captain MURPHY. The target must be approved by Vietnamese Government officials. I think I should point out here that U.S. artillery is very restricted in the areas into which it can fire, both by us and by Vietnamese restrictions which are imposed upon it. For example, the U.S. artillery units have what they call a population overlay, Mr. Chairman. This is an overlay which has been drawn up through both visual reconnaissance of the areas and through coordination with Government of Vietnam officials. It shows where the population is centered, and these targets can under no circumstances be engaged by U.S. artillery. Some of these areas can be engaged by Vietnamese artillery because they do not have the visual reconnaissance factor or their overlays do not include the visual reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? If there is a justification for one, why is there not for the other?

Captain MURPHY. I think the U.S. artillery units are extremely aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Captain MURPHY. Of the possibility of injuring civilians; innocent civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. The South Vietnamese do not care; is that it?

Captain MURPHY. I would not say they do not care.

The CHAIRMAN. What does it mean then? Why do they make the distinction, if they do?

Captain MURPHY. Frankly I do not know why the Vietnamese can fire in the areas that the United States cannot.

U.S. ARTILLERY ADVISERS

The CHAIRMAN. If you advise them not to fire over there, do they follow your advice?

Captain MURPHY. I do not advise on artillery engagements generally.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not. Who does advise on artillery?

Captain MURPHY. We have an artillery advisory detachment which advises the Vietnamese artillery which is from the 25th ARVN Division. It is not Regional or Popular Force artillery, so I do not get involved with the artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. Do Americans advise on this?

Captain MURPHY. They have advisers, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Americans. You do not happen to advise them?

Captain MURPHY. No, I do not. Not on artillery matters, no.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE NIGHTLY ARTILLERY FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. Do the Americans, you say, normally expend about 300 rounds a night?

Captain MURPHY. That is combined. To give you a breakdown, Mr. Chairman, I would say the United States probably will fire about two rounds for every one Vietnamese round.

The CHAIRMAN. It is about 200 to about 100?

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What size artillery is this?

Captain MURPHY. These are 105mm and 155mm.

The CHAIRMAN. What range do they have?

Captain MURPHY. 105 can engage targets at about—let me consult with an artillery expert.

The CHAIRMAN. You can advise with him if you like.

Captain MURPHY. About 11 kilometers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you the artillery expert?

Captain MURPHY. He is an artillery officer.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the one who advises them?

Captain MURPHY. That just happened to be his basic branch, Mr. Chairman. He is an artillery officer. I am an infantry officer.

DIFFERENCE IN RESTRICTIONS ON UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. We will come to him in a minute. This is greatly interesting on how it operates. The Americans are restricted in certain areas out of a delicate feeling for the civilians I take it.

Captain MURPHY. I think they are extremely aware of the possibility of injuring civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. The ARVN is not. Is that a proper distinction?

Captain MURPHY. I would not say they are not concerned for the population. Certainly they have their restrictions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I am only trying to get you to say it the way you see it. What is the difference, if any?

Mr. VANN. Mr. Chairman, may I help out on this?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like these young men who are not quite as sophisticated as you are to answer, Mr. Vann. We will come back to you later.

Mr. VANN. I am at the level that prepares the rules of engagement under which they operate, and I do know the answer to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. You will have your opportunity, but at the moment I am very interested in Captain Murphy's observations.

Senator COOPER. May I intervene at this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Most certainly you can.

Senator COOPER. Is the difference based at least in part upon the fact that we do not command the Vietnam artillery? Do we?

Captain MURPHY. No, Senator, we do not command Vietnamese artillery.

Senator COOPER. You command your own troops, but you cannot command theirs. You might advise them, but you cannot command them.

Captain MURPHY. That is right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean to lead the witness at all. I was only trying to get him to say whatever he believes to be the facts. I do not have any viewpoint.

Senator COOPER. It is a proper inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to lead the witness. Whatever the situation is, I would like him to describe it. It is not often we get a witness of your particular qualifications, Captain Murphy. Most of our witnesses are diplomats and people highly trained in the art of evasion. [Laughter.] I like the way you answer questions. Obviously, you have not been trained.

This is no laughing matter. It is a fact. Any of you who have been around know that. What is the principal achievement of a professional ambassador? I would qualify that. That does not apply to a CIA ambassador. [Laughter.] Of course it is. It is to avoid saying what their government does not want them to say.

Captain Murphy, I am serious about it. I am very interested in seeing how this operates because we have a principal responsibility for it. We have plenty of advisers in your area. You have given the number there as 5,500 Americans; is that right?

Captain MURPHY. That is approximately correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those are advisers? How many are active, we will say, troops?

Captain MURPHY. We have about 250.

The CHAIRMAN. Advisers?

Captain MURPHY. Advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not happen yourself to advise the Vietnamese on their program for the use of artillery, but some American does; does he not?

Captain MURPHY Yes, the artillery advisory elements.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who that is?

Captain MURPHY. The advisory element that advises the 25th ARVN Division is involved in the advice of ARVN artillery units.

The CHAIRMAN. Your idea is that even though we advise them not to be indiscriminate in their use of artillery, they do not have to take that advice. Is that the distinction you make?

Captain MURPHY. They certainly do not have to take the advice.

The CHAIRMAN. As a practice, in your experience, do your counterparts take your advice?

Captain MURPHY. Generally, Mr. Chairman, yes, they do. If my counterpart chooses not to take my advice, he has always afforded me the courtesy of an explanation as to why.

CAPTAIN MURPHY'S COUNTERPART

The CHAIRMAN. How old is your counterpart?

Captain MURPHY. He is 37 years old, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he a professional soldier?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, he has been in the Army for 17 years and he holds the rank of major.

The CHAIRMAN. Infantry?

Captain MURPHY. He has served in the infantry.

The CHAIRMAN. He outranks you?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, he does.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have to salute him every time you come in his presence?

Captain MURPHY. I afford him the courtesy of a salute in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. In the morning, once a day?

Chptain MURPHY. Yes.

Tae CHAIRMAN. Are your relations good?

Chptain MURPHY. Quite good, Mr. Chairman.

Toe CHAIRMAN. Has he been implicated in any form of corruption to your knowledge?

Captain MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I can truthfully say that I have never known my counterpart to be involved in any type of corruption or graft.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he fight with the French before he fought with the ARVN?

Captain MURPHY. No, he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not a member of the French forces?

Captain MURPHY. No, he was not.

The CHAIRMAN. The French have been out 17 years. He did not fight at all then until after the Geneva accords?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What did he do before that?

Captain MURPHY. He was in the north. He came south in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he Catholic?

Captain MURPHY. No, he is not. He is a Buddhist.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean he lived around Hanoi. He lived in North Vietnam, and he came south?

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

U.S. MOBILE ADVISORY TEAMS IN LONG AN PROVINCE

The CHAIRMAN. You say 20 mobile advisory teams operate in the Province. These are all Americans?

Captain MURPHY. They are American advisory.

The CHAIRMAN. Consisting of two officers and three noncommissioned officers?

Captain MURPHY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They go about advising whom?

Captain MURPHY. They advise the Regional and Popular Force units.

The CHAIRMAN. About what?

Captain MURPHY. They render tactical, administrative, and logistical advice. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that Captain Geck is in a better position to testify on this since he is the leader of one of these mobile units.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further? I was trying to develop your own statement as best I could to get a feeling about what you do.

Is Captain Geck with one of the 20 mobile advisory teams?

Captain MURPHY. He is a team leader of one such team, yes, Mr. Chairman.

CAPTAIN MURPHY'S VIEWS ON HIS WORK

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further of significance that you should tell us? You have been there 24 months, you say?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask for an extended stay?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you enjoy this work?

Captain MURPHY. I find it most rewarding.

The CHAIRMAN. You do? Why? What do you feel you are accomplishing?

Captain MURPHY. Sir, I think I can best answer that question by relating the situation as it was when I arrived in Long An Province in January of 1968. At that time there were many areas which were under strong enemy influence and control. As a member of the 9th U.S. Army Infantry Division I operated in these areas. Many of these areas in which we engaged company and battalion size enemy forces are today prosperous centers of government support. I think a very good indicator of the progress that we have made is the open road network which now extends throughout the province.

ATTITUDE OF LOCAL PEOPLE

The CHAIRMAN. Are the people in your area reasonably happy and contented with their lot?

Captain MURPHY. On every occasion that my counterpart and I have visited these new areas which have come under Government of Vietnam security through pacification expansion, the people have been extremely receptive to the GVN, to the Regional and Popular Force units which now occupy those areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you become very friendly with many of the natives?

Captain MURPHY. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Are the ordinary people easy to know?

Captain MURPHY. Yes. They are quite willing to talk to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they? Are they friendly to you?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, they are, particularly in the new areas.

The CHAIRMAN. In the new areas. Do you have anything further to say?

Captain MURPHY. I have nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything else? We have the three officers.

Senator COOPER. I have some questions.

EXTENT OF ENEMY CONTACT IN LONG AN PROVINCE

You have been in the area 7 months?

Captain MURPHY. I have been in the area for 24 months, Senator. I have been in my current capacity for 7 months.

Senator COOPER. But you have been in this area more than the 7 months you have been adviser there. How long have you been in this province?

Captain MURPHY. In the province for 24 months, Senator.

Senator COOPER. Twenty-four months. Has there been much fighting in this Province during that time?

Captain MURPHY. There has been considerable contact with the enemy, yes, Senator.

Senator COOPER. Is this continuous contact? Has it been one of the major areas of fighting?

Captain MURPHY. Let me relate back to my statement and then elaborate on it if I may. I think I can best answer your question in this manner. When I first arrived in Long An Province, I served with the 9th Infantry Division. At that time contact with the enemy was frequent, and generally the size of the enemy unit engaged was a company size unit or better.

Today contact with the enemy is far less frequent, and generally the size of the unit engaged is normally not larger than a squad.

STRENGTH OF ARVN AND U.S. BATTALIONS

Senator COOPER. What is the strength of an ARVN battalion? You say there are five battalions?

Captain MURPHY. An Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalion has approximately 500 to 600 men.

Senator COOPER. What is the strength of a U.S. battalion, say of the four operating there?

Captain MURPHY. A U.S. battalion would have approximately the same strength, about 500 soldiers.

VIETCONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE WEAPONS

Senator COOPER. I see. What is the range and what kind of weapons other than small arms, are the Vietcong or North Vietnamese equipped with? Do they have any artillery?

Captain MURPHY. The enemy, Senator?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Captain MURPHY. Mortar is about the heaviest artillery they have, mortars and rockets.

Senator Cooper. What is the range?

Captain Murphy. Of long-range rockets?

Senator Cooper. What is the range of a mortar?

Captain Murphy. A mortar can accurately engage the target up to about 6 kilometers.

Senator Cooper. Six what?

Captain Murphy. Kilometers.

MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS BY ENEMY

Senator Cooper. Have there been many mortar or rocket attacks by the enemy upon U.S. forces or ARVN forces?

Captain Murphy. Yes, indirect mortar and rocket attacks make up the majority of the enemy-initiated actions.

Senator Cooper. Do they fire upon villages?

Captain Murphy. They do mortar villages, particularly the villages which are undergoing pacification.

Senator Cooper. What is your headquarters, what town?

Captain Murphy. We are located in Tan An.

Senator Cooper. Have there been any mortar attacks on your headquarters?

Captain Murphy. Not for over a year, Senator, and we attribute this largely to the fact that through the pacification expansion we have been able to provide security throughout the periphery of the province capital.

RF AND PF FORCES IN HAMLETS

Senator Cooper. How many of the 387 hamlets are there that have Regional or Popular Forces? Please give a rough percentage.

Captain Murphy. I would say well over 300.

Senator Cooper. How many?

Captain Murphy. Well over 300 are under GVN security.

Mr. Colby. You have said the size of your forces is 52 companies, 163 PF platoons. They are present in a certain number of those hamlets.

Captain Murphy. Yes.

WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Cooper. You have given quite a comprehensive list of weapons, vehicles, equipment that has been supplied to the Vietnamese. Have the South Vietnamese been completely equipped now or is there more equipment which is intended for them?

Captain Murphy. The M–16 rifle conversion program, which is probably the most important and receives more emphasis than any others, has been completed for all the forces which now operate in Long An Province.

Senator Cooper. You say vehicles, communications equipment. Has that been completed?

Captain Murphy. We have completed approximately 60 to 75 percent of the conversion in these two categories.

Senator Cooper. Do you have any idea what the cost of this equipment—what is the cost of this equipment that has been furnished?

Captain Murphy. No, Senator, I do not have.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT SUPPORT

Senator Cooper. You say:

Presence and availability of support from helicopter gunships, tactical air fighters, and medical evacuation aircraft have also greatly enhanced the combat capabilities of Regional and Popular Forces.

Is that support American support?

Captain Murphy. Yes——

Senator Cooper. The helicopter gunships——

Captain Murphy. The helicopter assault battalions, the troop carrying, and the helicopter gunships are flown exclusively by American pilots. The Vietnamese do have their own medical evacuation helicopters.

Senator Cooper. The support of gunships, fighters, tactical air fighters, medical evacuation support: is this in support of the American forces?

Captain Murphy. They do also support the U.S. Forces.

Senator Cooper. What I am asking is do the Vietnamese operate any helicopter gunships, air fighters?

Captain Murphy. No, not in Long An Province. They do have tactical aircraft.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN VANN, HAWTHORNE MILLS, AND CLAYTON E. McMANAWAY—Resumed

Mr. Colby. Excuse me. I think the Senator asked do the Vietnamese operate any one of these three things that are mentioned here; the gunships, no.

Captain Murphy. No.

Mr. Colby. Tactical air fighters?

Captain Murphy. Tactical air fighters, yes. The Vietnamese Air Force does have both forward air controllers and tactical aircraft pilots.

Mr. Colby. And medical evacuation?

Captain Murphy. No, medical evacuation is supported by the United States.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT CAPABILITY WITHOUT U.S. COMBAT SUPPORT

Senator Cooper. The reason I ask you this is this: Suppose this support were withdrawn, say a year from now, what would be the combat capabilities—what would you estimate the combat capabilities for Regional and Popular Forces to be?

Captain Murphy. I think, Senator, that it certainly would have an effect on their capability in a negative manner, but I think they could continue in an effective manner.

Senator Cooper. You have been there 24 months and I know you have had great experience there. Do you believe that if American forces are withdrawn, that South Vietnam forces would be able to match, be a match or could they defend themselves against the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong? Do you believe they could sustain the combat capability without the presence of American forces?

Captain Murphy. Senator, I can only answer within the scope of my perspective. In Long An Province, yes, they could. This is evidenced by the fact that recently the U.S. unit there, the 3d Brigade

of the 9th Infantry Division, has, in fact, had difficulty finding suitable areas in which to operate.

Senator COOPER. The 9th Infantry Division?

Captain MURPHY. That is right.

Senator COOPER. Because of what?

Captain MURPHY. Because of the pacification expansion, and the expanded area in which Regional and Popular Forces now are operating.

ATTITUDE OF LONG AN POPULACE TOWARD GVN

Senator COOPER. I notice at one point this province is only 10 miles from Saigon; is that correct?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator COOPER. It seems to me the people there must have some knowledge of the government in Saigon. What do they say about it? Do they support it or are they against the government there in Saigon or do they have any attitude at all?

Captain MURPHY. It is interesting to see the change in attitude in the areas under pacification from the time when the territorial security forces are first deployed to these areas as opposed to the attitude after they have been there for a while, and after the various agencies of the GVN have performed specific tasks in conveying to the people the position of the GVN. They become very much progovernment.

Senator COOPER. You hear that? Do people say that to you?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, they do. Yes, they do. In many cases it is the first time that any government has displayed a desire to help the people at that level.

Senator COOPER. I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Captain, I am interested in your testimony.

MILITARY BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN MURPHY

When did you enter the Army?

Captain MURPHY. 1966, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did you enlist?

Captain MURPHY. In Texas.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is your training, your background?

Captain MURPHY. I took the normal basic training. I then attended the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga., and received my commission in the infantry. I was sent to Vietnam in January of 1968.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any ROTC training before that?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, sir, I did. I had 2 years of ROTC.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. How old are you now?

Captain MURPHY. Twenty-seven.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you got out of Benning where did you go?

Captain MURPHY. I served a short time at Fort Benning. Then I went to Vietnam in January 1968 and served 1 year with the 9th Infantry Division. During the last 5 months I commanded the U.S. portion of what was then known as the combined reconnaissance and intelligence platoon. This was a platoon consisting of 20 American and 20 Vietnamese from the regional force province intelligence platoon. We accompanied them on many combined operations. This is when I first became involved with the Regional Forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have been out there a good deal myself—believe I have made six trips, went all over the country. In the fall of 1965, things in the delta were quite quiet. I went to Vung Tau, and then on down to Can Tho. We had no guards. We just walked around, and there did not seem to be any problem. I went back again in 1966, twice in 1967. I went down and watched that riverine operation south of where you were. You are pretty close to Saigon; are you not, just a few miles?

Captain MURPHY. I am located about 25 miles from Saigon.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the reason for the collapse in the delta? The delta was the peaceful part of the situation in 1965 and 1966, 1967. Did it collapse all of a sudden? What is the story?

Captain MURPHY. Senator, I can only answer your question as far as I have knowledge on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course.

Captain MURPHY. Because I was confined in Long An Province. I do not think we have seen a collapse there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now things are much better than last year but they were pretty good when I was there in 1967.

I am just wondering what was the problem in between times. We did not have any troops to speak of at all in the delta when I was there. The South Vietnamese seemed to be handling it pretty well.

Captain MURPHY. As far as the entire delta is concerned, I am sure Mr. Vann will be in a better position to speak than I would be, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. The problems, as I remember them, were mainly near the DMZ and Danang, Chu Lai, and up in there, and a great deal of fighting west of Pleiku. But I thought the delta——

The CHAIRMAN. He is not in the delta.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, he is.

Captain MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, the portion generally referred to as the delta is the area to the south of Saigon.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought Mr. Vann was responsible for the delta.

Captain MURPHY. He is, further down in the delta.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mekong Delta.

Captain MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. COLBY. Long An is kind of a delta. But it is not part of the Mekong Delta.

Senator SYMINGTON. The only point is I have been in the delta a lot and it seems peaceful down there.

The CHAIRMAN. What delta are we talking about so that I can follow that?

Senator SYMINGTON. You are farther down.

The CHAIRMAN. Will somebody show it?

Mr. MILLS. Here is Saigon and here is Long An. The Province stretches to the south of Saigon, but the so-called delta provinces that Mr. Vann is responsible for begin with the south.

The CHAIRMAN. South of Long An was what I understood.

Mr. VANN. That is correct. Long An and parts of Hau Nghia are geographically in what is called the delta.

Senator SYMINGTON. The only point I am trying to make is this witness I did not think purported to be as competent to speak for the delta as Mr. Vann is; is that correct?

Mr. VANN. He is speaking of Long An, sir, which is his competence. Long An is geographically part of the delta.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, proceed.

BACKGROUND OF CAPTAIN GECK

Senator SYMINGTON. Captain Geck, what is your background?

Captain GECK. I came in the Army in 1967 also. I went through OCS.

Senator SYMINGTON. How old are you?

Captain GECK. Twenty-three.

Senator SYMINGTON. Twenty-three?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What college did you go to?

Captain GECK. I do not have a college degree. I attended Seton Hall University in New Jersey.

Senator SYMINGTON. And did you enlist as a private?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator would mind. We are trying to take these men in order. I announced that when we finished with Captain Murphy we would go down the line. Each one will tell his own experiences and we have not come to either of them. What I was suggesting in the beginning was if anyone wishes to ask Captain Murphy anything. Then we will take them in order.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further from Captain Murphy?

Senator CASE. We will come back to that.

The CHAIRMAN. There are one or two small questions. I did not wish to cut you off.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was late because of another hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. He already explained he went to school. I think you will find the record is quite good on that. I do not wish to cut anyone off, but to proceed in as orderly a manner as we can.

Do you not wish to ask him anything?

Senator CASE. No, not at the moment.

ENEMY KILLED ATTRIBUTABLE TO U.S. SUPPORTING FIRE

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two questions because of your intimate knowledge on the local basis. You did not quite complete your statement to Senator Cooper, I believe. Can you estimate what percentage of the enemy killed in engagements with Regional and Popular Forces are actually killed by helicopter gunships and aircraft and artillery fire as opposed to the ARVN? Do you have any way of estimating that?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

I conducted a study on this last year, and it was determined at that time that 35 percent of enemy killed in action could be attributed to U.S. supporting fire. That includes helicopter gunships, artillery, and tactical air strikes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about one-third.

QUALITY OF RF AND PF FORCES

The CORDS handbook, entitled "The Vietnamese Village," states that, and I quote, "Studies indicate that RF and PF are often marginal men drawn from the poorest elements of village society."

Would you agree with that statement?

Captain MURPHY. That they are only marginal men, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. This is from the CORDS handbook. Does that reflect your views about it too from your experience?

Captain MURPHY. I think that——

The CHAIRMAN. I will repeat it. "Studies indicate that RF and PF are often marginal men drawn from the poorest elements of village society."

Captain MURPHY. They are drawn from village society, certainly. I am not sure I understand marginal. In what respect? Do they refer to proficiency as soldiers?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I think.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is RF and PF?

Captain MURPHY. Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I take it to mean. They are not extremely capable or efficient operators.

Captain MURPHY. Well, here, Mr. Chairman, I think we have to determine what we are comparing them to before we can say they are marginal.

The CHAIRMAN. I only asked you to make your own observations about that statement.

Captain MURPHY. I can honestly say, Mr. Chairman, that I have seen, and I have accompanied Regional Force companies on tactical operations which are as good or better than U.S. companies which I have also observed.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

MOTIVATION OF RF AND PF FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think motivated the average RF and PF member to join the force and for what does he think he is fighting?

Captain MURPHY. The Regional and Popular Forces have a great appeal to the young man of draft age because they enable him to live in his home community. The Regional Forces operate exclusively within the province in which they enlist. The Popular Forces remain within the district in which they are recruited.

The CHAIRMAN. What does he convey to you that he is fighting for?

Captain MURPHY. Well, there is no doubt he is defending his own home, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

CALIBER OF REGIONAL FORCES IN OTHER AREAS

Do you think that the Regional Forces you advise are representative of Regional Forces in other parts of Vietnam?

Captain MURPHY. I am really not prepared to answer that because I have not observed Regional Forces in other parts of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you never talked with any of your colleagues from other parts of Vietnam?

Captain MURPHY. Yes. They encounter the same problems we encounter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. But I just do not know about RF and PF proficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean do they report to you the high caliber of people, as you have described your own counterpart? Do you see any reason to say that your particular province is better or worse or different from other provinces in Vietnam? That was the question.

Captain MURPHY. No, I do not see any reason not to say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am prompted to ask this because of the comments a soldier also instructing Regional Forces made in a letter to his professor, which I have here in my hand. The soldier, who has a comparable responsibility to yours, wrote to his professor, and I quote part of it, "We're out in the field South of Hue." Of course this is the northern part and less prosperous, I take it, than your area.

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He says:

We're out in the field South of Hue giving on the job training to Regional Force Vietnamese. They are stubborn and lazy and unpredictable and we dislike having them in combined operations. I suspect they have even less incentive than we do, and all we care about is getting out of this place and going home. So you can imagine.

You can also imagine the language problems involved for no one speaks Vietnamese and vice versa. It creates some very hairy situations, for instance how do you explain the firing procedure of the M72 LAW—

Which is a light antitank weapon, I am told—

which has a number of safeties and deployment procedures plus an even more elaborate mis-fire procedure? What you do is hand the thing, fully armed, to the smiling little man who keeps nodding his head in supreme confidence, and then you run. He is then a qualified ARVN soldier. Bang—he staggers toward you, stunned by the tremendous blast, still smiling and still nodding. I can imagine the stories he'll tell when he gets back to his village.

The sad part about the whole thing is that we are told not to give any criticism of the RF's to the brass when it comes out for inspections. Just the opposite happens. We give glowing reports of progress; the brass smiles, gets back on the choppers and flies away.

The sooner the brass thinks the Vietnamese can fight for himself, the sooner we'll get out of the fighting. As far as I'm concerned, I think it's a dirty damn trick, to give a man the superficial training we do, and worst of all give him confidence based on that training and then send him out to find the enemy is a cruel joke; that man is dead.

Adding to the irony is the fact that the U.S. gives the RF's nothing but brand new weapons and equipment; believe it or not we are jealous of their goods! Again however there is a rotten motive, the government wants to avoid any blame for the failure of these forces because of lousy equipment. It will all cost a lot of people their lives.

OVERALL DISCIPLINE AND ORDER OF REGIONAL FORCES

That prompts one to raise a question as to whether all of them are as well disciplined and as well ordered as is your particular responsibility.

Would you have any comment on that letter?

Captain MURPHY. May I ask again, Mr. Chairman, who wrote that letter?

The CHAIRMAN. The letter is from a professor at the college in Sacramento, Calif. This is his old student. I will read the professor's letter. He says:

I am enclosing copies of two letters from one of my former students who is now an infantryman in Vietnam. He is a graduate of Sacramento State College where I am a professor of art and have been a member of the faculty since 1950.

I think you will be particularly interested in the second letter with its comments about the Vietnamization of the war from the point of view of one very perceptive American G.I. If it can help you in your long-range efforts to bring about a just and reasonable settlement of this tragic war, I hope you will make use of it. Despite his stated willingness to allow publication, I have removed his name, organization, and station.

Obviously he was fearful of retaliation from the authorities if the name were known, which was a very sensible precaution.

Captain MURPHY. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that the individual who wrote the letter was not an adviser, but rather was in a U.S. unit since he refers to combined operations.

The CHAIRMAN. He says he is the soldier instructing regional forces. This is a Thermofax of the actual letter that the boy wrote.

We are out in the field south of Hue giving on the job training to Regional Force Vietnamese.

Captain MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, this training that he was giving them was not part of the basic training included in any of the formal training which is given to the Regional Force soldier. The Regional Force soldier undergoes a basic training course which is comparable to our own basic training course. Then the entire Regional Force unit to which he is assigned is periodically recycled to a training center for specific training on new weapons or developments. Teaching a soldier to fire a weapon without an interpreter is not part of the Government of Vietnam's training program. This particular weapon that he describes, the M–72, is a weapon which is currently being funneled into the Vietnamese supply system. Going along with it will be courses taught to Vietnamese by Vietnamese in their own language on proper firing techniques.

The CHAIRMAN. Americans do not instruct the Vietnamese?

Captain MURPHY. We do give some instruction through interpreters; yes, Mr. Chairman. Our mobile advisory teams do give instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. One last question.

ADEQUACY OF PAYMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL SERVANTS

Mr. Robert Shaplen, who has written a great many articles and I think a book on Vietnam, has spent a great deal of time there. He writes in the New Yorker on January 31 of this year as follows:

An Army private with five children makes 7,000 piasters a month, but he cannot possibly get along on less than twice that amount. Officers and civil servants are similarly situated, and the obvious result is moonlighting, or corruption, or both.

Is that correct about what an Army private makes in the ARVN? Do you know?

Chaptain MURPHY. In Vietnamese currency?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain MURPHY. That is approximately correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What comment would you make on that statement?

Captain MURPHY. I would say that the pay grades are based upon the economic situation of the area in which they live. They have high cost of living areas and low cost of living areas. I can speak for Long An, and certainly with the various allowances that they receive they can exist on their income.

The CHAIRMAN. You can. Then would you say this was inaccurate? They do not have to moonlight?

Captain MURPHY. I would say it does not pertain to Long An Province.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not. In other words, they do not have to moonlight or to obtain——

Captain MURPHY. They are not in position to moonlight, Mr. Chairman. These people have commitments which require their services both day and night.

The CHAIRMAN. And they do not——

Senator CASE. Regional and Popular Forces, I want to know what he is talking about.

The CHAIRMAN. An Army private is the way he describes it.

Senator CASE. That is different; that is the ARVN.

Captain MURPHY. He may be referring to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. He says that officers and civil service are similarly situated.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, would the Chair yield at that point? I was very impressed with the feeling of both the President and Vice President in Vietnam about this particular matter of which they are extremely conscious and make a very big point. They simply have to raise the salaries because they are having terrible morale trouble. It is a matter of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your experience would confirm Mr. Shaplen's observation?

Senator JAVITS. I am going at a somewhat higher level than that, Mr. Chairman. The President of the country himself is very, very deeply involved and concerned in actions to improve this situation. Perhaps Ambassador Colby would comment.

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, there has been considerable inflation, as you know, an increase in prices over the past few months.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean there or here? About which are you talking?

Mr. COLBY. There.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it more there than here?

Mr. COLBY. I believe it is more there than here, but I am really not all that qualified.

Senator JAVITS. I can tell you it is more there than here.

Mr. COLBY. The Government has set up a commissary system for the miliatry personnel to try to save them some money. And they are currently discussing the possibility of some kind of direct support through provision of rice and other staple foods. The President, Vice President and Prime Minister are very much interested in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better move to Captain Geck.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two of Captain Murphy?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

ATTITUDES OF U.S. ADVISERS AND COUNTERPARTS

Senator JAVITS. Captain, I have just been in Vietnam and I am no expert at all, but I did want to ask you a couple of questions. Mind you please feel very free to tell me I am wrong about this because I am only testing out a very superficial impression with a man who has been there and lived with the problem. It would be helpful if I am right or just as helpful if I am wrong. We ought to know so I am giving a hypothesis rather than a conclusion. I had the distinct impression that our advisers, like you, were much more enthusiastic about the ideological cause than the Vietnamese of the same rank, station, and parallel responsibility. For example, you spe k of a major in your statement. Talking with him and talking with you or your prototype was like day and night. Our fellows were enthusiastic, excited, missionary in their zeal, and these fellows were still rather cynical and rather pragmatic about the corruption and the problems and the murder with which they lived. Do you have any reaction to that?

Captain MURPHY. I think one of the greatest forms of assistance we can give them is through our attitude toward problems which confront them and their Government. Certainly when we express zeal, enthusiasm, and confidence in them and their government, I think we do them a great service. We must realize they have been up against these problems for quite some time, and I know it is only human nature perhaps to let these problems run you down. So when we are enthusiastic, I think this is good.

Senator JAVITS. Do you feel that there is corruption at that level of any appreciable character?

Captain MURPHY. I have not seen any corruption. I don't have any firsthand knowledge of any corruption, Senator. I, of course, have heard rumors, but I don't have any firsthand knowledge on corruption.

Senator JAVITS. Do you think at that level there is any playing ball, as a little bit of insurance, with the Vietcong and the Communists?

Captain MURPHY. Certainly not that I have any knowledge of.

Senator JAVITS. In other words, on the Asian theory that you never lose all your options. You understand precisely what I mean by that?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, I do. Again, I have no knowledge of it.

Senator JAVITS. You have not seen it.

COMPARATIVE QUALITY OF VC AND RF AND PF

Have you had any operational contact with the Vietcong?

Captain MURPHY. I am not sure I understand your question.

Senator JAVITS. Have you been in any operations which brought you face to face with the Vietcong?

Captain MURPHY. Right; yes, I have, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. Do you think they are superior in any way to the Vietnamese troops whom you are advising. If so, tell us in what way.

Captain MURPHY. As I stated earlier, Senator, I think the degree of proficiency of the units vary. But by and large I think the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces are superior to the enemy forces.

Senator JAVITS. They are. Are they superior in firepower and number and morale? Give us a little qualitative analysis on that.

Captain MURPHY. Well, again, the degree of morale, the degree of agressiveness varies from unit to unit and depends upon a great many factors. We have some units which are less proficient probably than comparable enemy units within the province.

Senator JAVITS. But on the whole?

Captain MURPHY. By and large I feel that we have superior forces.

NECESSITY OF U.S. SUPPORT TO RF AND PF SUPERIORITY

Senator JAVITS. To what extent does this rely upon the American input, to wit, logistical support? Give it to us separately, if you can, as air support, artillery support, advisory support. There are four quantities there—logistical, air, artillery, advice.

Captain MURPHY. How does each of these affect it? Is that your question, Senator?

Senator JAVITS. Right. You are an adviser. You say you have superior forces over the Vietcong and whatever North Vietnamese there are around. Now give us the input of these four aspects of American support and as they affect your qualitative judgment that the troop strength you are advising is better than the enemy.

Captain MURPHY. The logistical support is entirely Vietnamese, Senator. We advise on techniques, but the system itself is run by Vietnamese.

Senator JAVITS. The supplies are ours.

Captain MURPHY. The materials are funneled into the system at a high level.

Senator JAVITS. That is what I am asking.

Captain MURPHY. But the distribution is by the Vietnamese.

Senator JAVITS. I understand, but how important is the actual materiel?

Captain MURPHY. It is quite important.

Senator JAVITS. Indispensable, isn't it?

Senator CASE. They haven't anything else.

Captain MURPHY. Nothing that compares with the weapons of the enemy.

Senator JAVITS. OK. The enemy's weapons would be very much superior to theirs, were it not for our input.

Captain MURPHY. Yes, I would say that.

Senator JAVITS. Second, how vital is air support to the superiority of the Regional and Popular Forces?

Captain MURPHY. It is definitely a contributing factor, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. Is that as indispensable as the supply?

Captain MURPHY. I would have to say no, I don't believe so.

Senator JAVITS. What about artillery support?

Captain MURPHY. U.S. artillery support is not that important because the Vietnamese have access to artillery in Long An Province.

Senator JAVITS. And ability to use it?

Captain MURPHY. And they can utilize it effectively.

Senator JAVITS. What about adviser backing? How indispensable is that?

Captain MURPHY. This would be related directly to the proficiency of the individual unit. What we aim to do is concentrate our field advisory effort on the units which are less effective than some other

units. This is the criteria we use for deployment of our mobile advisory teams. I think at this point the field advisory effort is indispensable, but not as indispensable as it was a year ago and not as indispensable as it was 2 years ago. Next year it will be less indispensable.

MOTIVATION OF VIETCONG AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Senator JAVITS. The popular idea in the United States is that for some reason or other the Vietcong are more inspired, are better soldiers, are more patriotic believers in their cause than the South Vietnamese in theirs. To what extent do you think this has any real validity?

Captain MURPHY. Senator, 4 or 5 years ago, this might have been a valid conviction. Certainly the degree of motivation of an individual soldier greatly influences his performance in the field. This is one of the factors which now influence the degree of proficiency of the individual soldier.

Going into an area which 2 months ago was under enemy control, providing security which has enabled the Government of Vietnam to perform its other functions, working with the people; building a road, being there providing security and seeing this progress has had a tremendous effect on the morale and the motivation of the individual soldier.

Senator JAVITS. So you think that motivation on the part of the South Vietnamese themselves is becoming higher?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, it is. It definitely is.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENT AND VIETCONG

Senator JAVITS. My last question, Mr. Chairman, is this: Again I would like to give you a hypothesis. I was there in 1965, and I was there again the other week and saw Ambassador Colby. I was not in your Corps; I was in the IV Corps area when I was there a few weeks ago. In 1966 I spent most of the time in I Corp up around Hue, but I would like to give you this hypothesis. In 1966 I had the impression that the South Vietnamese were anxious to get rid of their government because they felt their government was just another way of keeping them at war, where they had been for 20 years, that it was just that they hated it and they wanted peace at any price with anyone. They couldn't have cared less whether it was Communitsts or Zoroastrians, just so there was an end to the war.

This is my hypothesis and I want you to say I am wrong or right even from your little frame. I had the impression they had the same feeling with the Vietcong, "Go away and let us alone. You are the fellows who are now keeping this whole place in turmoil and killing us."

Captain MURPHY. Certainly, I don't think the Vietnamese people, like people anywhere, enjoy the rigors of war. I think that they are now for the first time identifying themselves with one side, and that side is the Government of Vietnam.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to ask any questions?

SIZE, POPULATION, AND MILITARY FORCES OF LONG AN PROVINCE

Senator CASE. I would like to put in terms of numbers some of these figures in your statement, if you will. You are advising in a Province.

It has roughly what, 15 by 35 miles, something like that in its dimensions roughly. You know in a rough way.

Mr. COLBY. It is bigger than that. Speaking in kilometers from north to south and east to west roughly. How many grid squares?

Captain MURPHY. From north to south I would say 20 miles, and from east to west probably twice that.

Senator CASE. I was roughly right then, and 365,000 people.

Captain MURPHY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator CASE. You have 52 Regional Force companies. How many personnel?

Captain MURPHY. That represents approximately 7,000.

Senator CASE. And 163 Popular Force platoons. How many are those?

Captain MURPHY. About 5,500 personnel.

Senator CASE. Now two regiments of the ARVN, five battalions.

Captain MURPHY. Each battalion having about 600 personnel, 500 to 600 personnel.

Senator CASE. Roughly 3,000 people.

Captain MURPHY. That would be another 3,000.

Senator CASE. Then you say our 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry, four infantry battalions almost exclusively operating there. How much is that? About 5,500?

Captain MURPHY. The United States is there with the 9th Division of about 5,500 of which about 200 or 250, Senator, are the advisory team.

Senator CASE. So you have over 20,000 troops in this area.

Captain MURPHY. Yes, Senator.

Senator CASE. In your province.

Captain MURPHY. Yes, we do.

Senator CASE. And that is fairly static and has been that way for some time.

Captain MURPHY. Since the end of 1967, we have more than doubled our Regional and Popular Force strength. At the end of 1967 we had 21 Regional and 74 Popular Force platoons as compared with the figure I gave in my statement.

Senator CASE. This is not an active military operation so far as large-scale military operations. This is more or less a permanent garrison of, I take it——

Captain MURPHY. All these forces operate within the province, yes.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LONG AN PROVINCE

Senator CASE. When you say "operate" this isn't large-scale military operation; is it?

Captain MURPHY. Well, we frequently have operations in excess of two companies. Three and four company-size operations are a daily operation now.

Senator CASE. Now these are conducted largely by the ARVN, I take it.

Captain MURPHY. Under the command and control of the province officials.

Senator CASE. Is it American operation?

Captain MURPHY. No, I am speaking of Vietnamese operations.

Senator CASE. What does our 3d Brigade do?

Captain MURPHY. They generally engage in company-size operations for the most part, sometimes even smaller.

Mr. COLBY. If I may, Senator, I believe it was an area of fairly active operations up until fairly recently. I think the Captain made that point a while ago. There was some rather major fighting that went on there.

Captain MURPHY. On a typical day, Senator, we have each of our seven districts conducting one and possibly two company-size operations. U.S. forces operate generally in the unpopulated areas in company size, utilizing, I would say, about 75 percent of their operational forces. In addition, one province-controlled operation may take place within the province center. It is generally of three to four company size.

Mr. VANN. Senator Case, if I can interject here, Long An Province has for a period of 8 years been probably the most hotly contested province in all of Vietnam. In 1962 through 1965, it had more Vietcong incidents and contacts by a multiple of 3 than any other province in Vietnam. Only in the last year has the level of activity there diminished substantially.

Senator CASE. Has the level of American activity changed?

Captain MURPHY. It has diminished; yes, it has, Senator.

Senator CASE. Would you describe this, just in a very quick way. I don't mean to go over it again.

Captain MURPHY. During my experience with the 9th Division operating in Long An, my company averaged generally two contacts with the enemy per week. On most occasions the size of the force engaged would be a company or larger. This is not the situation which exists now. The situation now is that the U.S. forces, as I said earlier, are having difficulty finding suitable areas in which to operate. This has occurred because of the pacification expansion, because of the fact there are Vietnamese forces already in these areas and operating within these forces.

Senator CASE. Have American forces been reduced then?

Captain MURPHY. The U.S. forces have not been reduced, Senator. In fact with the departure of the division headquarters from Dong Tam, which is just south of Long An, some of the support forces formerly in Dong Tam moved up to the Tan An area; the brigade headquarters are colocated with an advisory team in Tan An.

RESULTS IF U.S. SUPPORT WERE ELIMINATED

Senator CASE. Just one other question. Suppose American support was completely eliminated now, what would happen?

Captain MURPHY. All combat support?

Senator CASE. All combat support. All the four categories that Senator Javits spoke of before

Captain MURPHY. It would slow down the progress and, Senator——

Senator CASE. Is that an euphemism? What would happen actually? Who would run the show?

Mr. COLBY. The Senator also included the weapons?

Senator CASE. Talking about weapons, the weapons, I don't mean to say——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean take away their weapons and ammunition and give them bows and arrows?

Senator Case. I don't mean that. Let's take it——
Mr. Colby. Support is the word of art.

RESULT IF U.S. AIR SUPPORT WERE ELIMINATED

Senator Case. Let's take the air, no air.
Captain Murphy. The Vietnamese could contend with the current level of enemy activity.
Senator Case. Look, you kids get educated early in the language. The current level of any activity—what would happen in your judgment? We are not antagonistic; we are trying to get answers. You have been given a terrible job to do, all of you, the Ambassador, the Colonel, and everybody, and we are sympathetic as the devil. But we want to get the facts. We don't want to be getting a lot of stuff that we get from the Admiral in Hawaii and from other people which is just a bunch of baloney. We want to know in plain language what would happen in your judgment if we pulled out all air support. You can talk to us, we are Americans, just the same as you would talk to your commanding officers and to the people in the military, to Colonel Vann or anybody else. He is going to talk to us this way soon. That is why we are having an executive session.
Captain Murphy. Senator, I hesitate because I am not sure that I know what would happen. Certainly the enemy would capitalize on this and they would take advantage of the fact we didn't have air support. I presume you are asking me if they could hold the fort.
Senator Case. Sure. Would they collapse?
Captain Murphy. No, I don't think they would collapse.
Senator Case. Well, they would have in 1965; wouldn't they?
Captain Murphy. I think they would have; yes, Senator.

USE OF AIR SUPPORT

Senator Case. How often is the air support called in and for what purposes?
Captain Murphy. We only use tactical air support——
Mr. Colby. I think the Senator means to include helicopters.
Senator Case. Sure, helicopters, ambulance, or whatever you call them, you know supply, troops.
Captain Murphy. Whenever we engage an enemy which we think are of squad size or larger we employ this supporting fire on just about every contact.
Mr. Colby. How often do you have a contact, every day?
Captain Murphy. No, I would say four times a week: significant contacts, outside of ambush being sprung.

CAPTAIN MURPHY'S COUNTERPART

Senator Case. You have a counterpart in the Vietnamese force?
Captain Murphy. Yes, Senator.
Senator Case. What is his grade?
Captain Murphy. He is an ARVN major. He is the deputy province chief.
The Chairman. Senator, we really did cover every word of this.
Senator Case. But they didn't cover it for me.
The Chairman. Okay.

Senator CASE. I am sorry. I mean the chairman didn't mean to interrupt you.

The CHAIRMAN. No, go right ahead.

Captain MURPHY. He is an ARVN major. He has been in the Army for 17 years. He is 37 years old. He is the deputy province chief and RE/PF commander.

Senator CASE. He is a well trained, well educated man.

Captain MURPHY. He is well experienced.

Senator CASE. He is a well educated man.

Captain MURPHY. He has the equivalent of 2 years of college by our standards.

Senator CASE. What was his background in civilian life?

Captain MURPHY. He came south in 1954, and as I said he holds an equivalent of 2 years of college. He has been in the Army since he was 20 years old.

Senator CASE. Did he come from a well-to-do family?

Captain MURPHY. No, he didn't. He came south with just the clothes on his back and not much more.

Senator CASE. I mean before that. How did he get to be a soldier, down there?

Captain MURPHY. I get the impression from talking to him that he did came from a well-to-do family.

Senator CASE. He did; yes.

Captain MURPHY. Yes. Certainly if he has the education that he has——

ELIGIBILITY FOR EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO OFFICER CORPS

Senator CASE. The reason I ask, of course, is that it has been our understanding that only people of the upper classes and a rather small group are eligible for, one, education and, two, admission to the officer classes, is that correct still?

Captain MURPHY. Of course, there are educational requirements, and they are dependent on attaining the education to achieve his requirements. He has to be able to afford it and to be able to afford it——

Senator CASE. And in general whether purposely intended or de facto, as a word that has been used in considerable length around these premises lately, very few people are still eligible for the education that admits them to the officer corp, is that true?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, Senator, with the exception of the infantry field commander's commission which is available to anyone who exhibits leadership in the field. The educational requirement is waived for this type of commission. The individual who receives it can reach the grade of captain as a field commander.

CAPTAIN MURPHY'S COUNTERPART

Senator CASE. Is this guy corruptible?

Captain MURPHY. I don't believe he is, Senator. I have never seen any evidence of it.

Senator CASE. Has he a family down there?

Captain MURPHY. He has a wife and seven children. They live in Bien Hoa, which is to the north.

Senator CASE. You mean another province?

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

Senator CASE. I was up there myself.

Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How much does he make? Go ahead and finish it.

Senator CASE. I think an impressionistic picture of this kind is the most we can get.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. I think it is very important. All I was suggesting was that we had asked him most of those questions in the beginning before you came in.

Senator CASE. These many other questions somehow don't——

The CHAIRMAN. What is his pay?

Captain MURPHY. He makes the Vietnamese equivalent of approximately $150 a month.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to ask any questions?

Senator PELL. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Geck, will you give your statement, please.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. RICHARD T. GECK, U.S. ARMY, ADVISER, MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM, KIEN GIANG PROVINCE

Captain GECK. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I am Capt. Richard Geck of New Jersey.

Senator CASE. May I ask what town do you come from?

Captain GECK. Right now, Toms River.

Senator CASE. You have always lived in that area?

Captain GECK. No, sir, I lived in Newark, N.J.

The CHAIRMAN. I was afraid we wouldn't get to the New Jersey part.

Senator CASE. There was never any doubt if we had to sit here all week.

The CHAIRMAN. I never knew he was from New Jersey.

Senator CASE. When he raised the Seton Hall flag I knew he was a New Jersey boy.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Captain GECK. I am currently the commander of a mobile advisory team in Kien Giang Province. I would like to take a few minutes to describe, in brief, the type of work being done by the mobile advisory team in Vietnam and to give you a general idea of how the work is progressing in my area.

SOC SON VILLAGE

My experience comes from the delta region of Vietnam, specifically, Kien Giang Province, located 140 miles southwest of Saigon on the Gulf of Thailand. I will refer specifically to one village; the village of Soc Son. Soc Son is centered in the main stream of enemy infiltration into the delta, and from time-to-time large enemy units inhabit two large mountins to the west. During the month of July 1969, Soc Son was the scene of heavy fighting between the government forces and infiltrating NVA units.

OPERATION OF MOBILE ADVISORY TEAM IN SOC SON VILLAGE

From July 1969 until November 1969, I commanded a five-man mobile advisory team located in Soc Son village. The team consisted

of two officers of the combat arms and three noncommissioned officers, who specialized in light weapons, heavy weapons, and medical training, respectively. Our primary mission in Soc Son was to assist the village chief in the upgrading of the level of security within his village with the emphasis on improving the performance of his existing forces, and the formulation and training of a strong Popular Self Defense Force group in each hamlet. In addition, we accepted the secondary mission of rendering assistance where possible in the field of village administration.

Soc Son, a village of 11,000 people, was notoriously ill run. The village chief, who had lived in Rach Gia City, about 8 miles away, since Tet of 1968, for fear of assassination, was ineffective and little was expected from his staff. The VC assassinated two of the four hamlet chiefs in the village center in late June 1968, and the terrorists had virtually a free hand within the village.

My team began with the work of training the Popular Force platoons in the village. We also began to work with the village staff in forming a People's Self Defense Force and set about the task of initiating coordination between the various elements on hand. Through constant observation of the Popular Forces, we were able to see wherein their weaknesses lay and suggest methods of improvement. We accompanied the Popular Forces on their operations, rendering advice where needed, and providing liaison with supporting units. In short order, through an increased level of confidence, the results of the PF operations began to improve. Night operations became quite effective and seriously hampered enemy movement in our area. At the same time, elements of our team were busy with the village People's Self-Defense Force leaders, providing them with written material to better explain their jobs, organizing a training program and assisting in the dissemination of information on the People's Self Defense Forces. As the Popular Self Defense Forces developed, the village was able to release the PF platoons from their roles of static defense and allow them to operate offensively in the outer reaches of the village, targeting both VC military units and the infrastructure. A method of coordinating the operations of these various forces was needed. With the guidance of the advisers a village security plan was begun. This plan on completion provided each unit leader involved in the security of Soc Son with specific requirements as to his mission and responsibilities as well as the methods and requirement for coordination of operations between units. The resultant increase in security was staggering. Incidents of VC terrorism virtually came to a halt. The VC infrastructure was forced into exile and rendered ineffective. The village chief returned to the village. The Government of Vietnam gained a free hand to operate within the village and was able to turn its attention to improved administration and economic development in the area. As the people gained confidence in the Government, more information became available on enemy activities and VC operations were even further hampered.

Many of the things accomplished were made much easier through the help of the American adviser. The village chief, while in fact a good administrator, did not have the background to effectively coordinate the operations of the units within his village. Many of the staff members were new in their positions and did not know what

could or could not be done. The unit commanders, in many cases, had become too set in their methods. The alternative solutions to problems as offered by the advisers helped them to vastly improve their operations.

Presently Soc Son continues to grow. Many of the programs begun during and after the tenure of the advisory team have become examples used throughout the Province. The security plan developed in Soc Son is now used corpswide as a planning guide to village security.

In November our team moved to another village within Kien Giang Province and met with similar problems to those encountered upon our arrival in Soc Son. Progress in the new location is quite encouraging and many of the improvements witnessed in Soc Son are being seen in the new area.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of what has gone on before, I wonder if it would not be better if we let the sergeant make his statement and then you can ask questions of either one of them because time is running out. Is that agreeable to you?

Senator SYMINGTON., All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, make your statement now and then the members can ask questions of all three witnesses.

TESTIMONY OF SGT. RICHARD D. WALLACE, U.S. MARINE CORPS, SQUAD LEADER, COMBINED ACTION PLATOON, QUANG NAM PROVINCE

Sergeant WALLACE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, my name is Sgt. Richard D. Wallace, U.S. Marine Corps, from Torrance, Calif. I am assigned as the squad leader of the U.S. Marine element of combined action platoon 2–1–5 in Quang Nam Province, Vietnam.

COMBINED ACTION PLATOON

A combined action platoon, or "CAP" as we call it, is a unit composed of U.S. Marines teamed up with Vietnamese Popular Forces soldiers. The Popular Forces, or "PF" as we call them, are a form of local militia who have the responsibility of providing security to their own village. By working closely together with the PF, the Marines help them to provide this security.

DESCRIPTION OF CAP 215

In my CAP at the present time, there are 13 marines, one U.S. Navy corpsman, and 25 PF soldiers. Being residents of the local village, the PF have excellent knowledge of the area and, of course, they also know the people. The marines are strangers from a different culture, but by working with the PF every day and sharing their dangers and hardships, the marines and PF develop close ties. Aided by close ties with the PF, the marines are able to understand and to be understood by the people in the hamlets. In fact, most of the marines come to feel as if they are part of the village community themselves.

My CAP area is located in Hoa Luong Village, located about 5 miles southwest of the Danang airfield, in the area shown in yellow on this map. This village has four hamlets named La Chau, Goc Kha, Duyen

Son, and Huong Son. The principal occupation of the people in this area is farming.

CAP ACTIVITY AGAINST VC

My CAP was established in its present area in July 1967. Before that time, the VC guerrillas had a free hand in the area, and they were able to depend on the people for food, other supplies, shelter, and information about the movements of U.S. and ARVN forces. The reasons for our staying in this area for this length of time is due to the close proximity of large NVA units just west of Danang. The average stay of a CAP is 1 year.

At the present time, the VC are no longer safe in my CAP area. They no longer receive moral or material support from the people. Nearly all of the hard core VC supporters have been driven out or captured, and the people are supporting their legitimate Government with a minimum of fear that the VC will get back at them.

When I took over the Marine squad in the CAP in July 1969, the hamlet of Huong Son was being repeatedly terrorized by VC guerrillas. Since that time we have concentrated our operations in and around that hamlet, and have reduced the terrorist activities. With the help of the Vietnamese rural development cadre in the village, we have been able to rebuild this hamlet and bring it to a normal life, and we are now in the process of building a school for the children there.

As I said earlier, the CAP's mission is to protect the people. We accomplish this by patroling the area during the day and setting up two or more ambushes in different places around the hamlets at night. Because the ambushes are never in the same place from night to night, the VC never know where we will be, so they do not feel safe anywhere in our CAP area. Besides that, because they can't predict our positions, they are not able to catch us by surprise with a larger force.

A CAP marine does not live inside of a fort. He lives among the people, with the PF, often staying in their homes. With no fixed position to defend, the CAP has a closer relationship with the people and can devote full time to the people's security.

TRAINING OF POPULAR FORCES

While helping to provide security, the Marines are assigned the further task of training the PF so as to make them a more effective fighting unit. We teach them how to make better use of their weapons and we help them to develop better tactics with which to fight the VC. Eventually, the PF will be strong enough to take care of the area without Marines assistance.

DAILY ROUTINE OF CAP 215

At this point, I would like to briefly describe the daily routine of my CAP. Just before daybreak each day, we will secure from our night ambush positions and return to our daytime position. Our daytime position will normally consist of two houses farily close together, with half of the Marine squad in each one. Some members of the CAP will be detailed as sentries around the day position to guard against

surprise attack. The PF leader will normally leave six to 10 PF to stay with the Marines during the day. The remainder of the PF's will return to their homes to spend the day working.

At some time during the day, the CAP will run a patrol through the CAP area. A typical daytime patrol will consist of five marines and five PF. Also at some time during the day the Navy corpsman along with his Vietnamese assistants and a security element will go to Goc Kha hamlet, where we have set up a simple dispensary in order to offer daily medical attention to the people in the area.

The Marines in the CAP eat three meals a day. Two meals will consist of canned military "C" rations and the third meal, usually in the evening, will consist of hot prepared food delivered by truck to our position. Any other supplies we need will be delivered at the same time. At about 6 p.m., the PF leader and I will get together and complete our plans for the night's patrols and ambushes. After that, we each brief our men. Sometime after dark, the CAP splits up into two or more patrols, each of which goes out to set up ambushes under the cover of darkness. These ambushes remain in position all night, alert for the approach of the enemy.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

WITNESSES' AGE, EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE FACILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Wallace, how old are you?
Sergeant WALLACE. Twenty-two years old, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in Vietnam?
Sergeant WALLACE. I have been there 8 months, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak Vietnamese?
Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir; I don't.
The CHAIRMAN. Captain Geck, how old are you?
Captain GECK. 23, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you speak Vietnamese?
Captain GECK. Yes, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in Vietnam?
Captain GECK. 18 months, sir.

PREPARATION OF WITNESSES' STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Did you write your statement, Captain Geck?
Captain GECK. Yes, sir; I did.
The CHAIRMAN. Has it been cleared by anyone else?
Captain GECK. Sir, my statement was checked for punctuation, spelling, for things like that, but it was not checked for its content.
The CHAIRMAN. Was your statement checked?
Sergeant WALLACE. It went through my CAP director, and the content of the statement was checked for punctuation.
The CHAIRMAN. Your statements were checked only for punctuation?
Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?
Senator SYMINGTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When did you join the Army?

Captain GECK. Sir, I came into the Army in March of 1967.

Senator SYMINGTON. 1967.

Captain GECK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was your schooling before you came in?

Captain GECK. Prior to coming into the Army, sir, I attended Seton Hall Prep, and then Seton Hall University for 2 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did you enlist?

Captain GECK. I enlisted in Newark, N.J.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any ROTC before?

Captain GECK. No, sir, I did not. I was omitted from the program. Seton Hall has a ROTC program; I did not participate.

Senator SYMINGTON. You enlisted as a private?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator SYMINGTON. When were you promoted to corporal?

Captain GECK. Sir, I went through the basic training program at Camp Polk, La. Then I went to Camp Wolters, Tex., to the Army's flight training program. After that I was relieved from that course of instruction and went to the Army's artillery OCS at Fort Sill, Okla., so I was never promoted through the ranks. I went to OCS.

Senator SYMINGTON. You went right from a private. You were commissioned when?

Captain GECK. June of 1967.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you go to Vietnam?

Captain GECK. Sir, I went to Vietnam in March of 1968.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nine months after you were commissioned then?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were you commissioned a first or second lieutenant?

Captain GECK. Second lieutenant, sir, in the Army Reserve.

Senator SYMINGTON. When were you promoted to first lieutenant?

Captain GECK. A year thereafter, sir, and then a year thereafter to captain.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you told the Chairman that you spoke Vietnamese?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir. I can handle about 70 percent of my business in Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you study that before you went to Vietnam?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir. I volunteered for Vietnam in March, went to Fort Bragg, to the military assistant's training adviser's course, and then on to the Defense Language Institute where I was trained 3½ months in Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is that school?

Captain GECK. That is Fort Bliss, El Paso, Tex.

Senator SYMINGTON. You took Vietnamese there?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did you go into the Province you are in now?

Captain GECK. I worked in two Provinces, Chau Duc, which we spoke about earlier and Kien Giang. I arrived in Chau Duc in August

of 1968. Approximately 2 months later I went to Kien Giang, and I have been there ever since.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you arrived there was your Vietnamese pretty good?

Captain GECK. No, sir, it was fair. I could at that time conduct only about 40 percent of my business. It has progressed since that time.

CONDITIONS IN KIEN GIANG PROVINCE

Senator SYMINGTON. Since you have been there you think conditions have improved; is that correct?

Captain GECK. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the situation when you arrived?

Captain GECK. When I first arrived in Kien Giang Province the Army was able to operate in fairly large units in most of the area. The conditions within the villages were fairly poor. The village governments were not organized.

Right now all of the villages in Kien Giang have elected governments. Most of the hamlets have elected governments. The people now are participating in the government. I think this is quite an improvement.

The Regional and Popular Forces have never had any outside assistance from the U.S. forces in our area except for air power. We have only had assistance from the regular Army of Vietnam forces.

RIVERINE

Senator SYMINGTON. What is your relationship with the Riverine?

Captain GECK. Sir, I have no relationship with the Riverine. We have used the Riverine elements to insert units from time to time, but I have no relationship with them.

U.S. TROOPS IN DELTA

Senator SYMINGTON. When you first came there what U.S. troops were in the delta?

Captain GECK. Sir, I am not sure of any besides the 9th U.S. Infantry Division, but we had no contact with them at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, I do not believe there were any American troops in the delta in 1965 in any quantity.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did we send troops into the delta in quantity?

Mr. COLBY. We never sent troops to that part of the delta, Senator. The troops were sent to the upper delta only, I believe in early 1967.

Mr. VANN. They arrived in July of 1966 in Long An Province and in September 1966 in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa and Go Cong Provinces. U.S. troops have never been stationed in the other 13 provinces of the delta, only in three provinces.

Mr. COLBY. You do have the river forces, the Navy forces though. Some of those are in Kien Giang, so in a sense there are U.S. forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say they arrived, who arrived?

Mr. VANN. The U.S. 9th Infantry Division was assigned to Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Go Cong in September 1967.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the first time a division of U.S. troops went into the delta?

Mr. VANN. In any part of the delta?

Senator SYMINGTON. In any part of the delta.

Mr. VANN. No, sir. In July of 1967 a brigade of the U.S. 25th Division went into Long An, which is geographically the northern part of the delta.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just below Saigon?

Mr. VANN. Just below Saigon.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us talk about the delta. The first troops that went into the delta, as we consider the delta, 50 miles or whatever the distance would be, south of Saigon was when the 9th Infantry Division went in in July 1967?

Mr. VANN. The U.S. 25th Division's 23d Brigade in July 1967.

EFFECT OF INTRODUCTION OF U.S. TROOPS ON CONDITIONS IN DELTA

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, the thrust of my question is if we put troops into the delta for the first time as late as July 1967, and then increased the number of those troops in September 1967, that would automatically improve conditions, would it not?

Mr. VANN. If I might say, and in that connection, in connection with your earlier comments about 1965——

Senator SYMINGTON. First answer the question.

Mr. VANN. It would not automatically improve conditions, sir. It would depend upon how many enemy may have been introduced at the same time.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. Now take it from there.

1965 ASSESSMENT OF DELTA SITUATION

Mr. VANN. May I now address your earlier questions about 1965. Sir, in 1965 General Westmoreland sent me to survey the delta and the reports that the delta was being pacified.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were you in uniform at that time?

Mr. VANN. No, sir, I was a civilian.

The reason General Westmoreland sent me to do that was because——

Senator SYMINGTON. What was your position at that time?

Mr. VANN. I was the provincial adviser for USAID for Hau Nghia Province, which is the very northernmost part of the delta. However, I had been the senior military adviser for the Mekong Delta in 1962 and 1963.

Senator SYMINGTON. At that time were you in uniform?

Mr. VANN. I was in uniform as a lieutenant colonel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of the Army?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. VANN. General Westmoreland wanted me to assess the change in the situation in the area in which I had been the senior military adviser between 1963 and 1965. He asked me also to go beyond that area farther south into the delta. I had not previously been the adviser there, but I did have responsibility for the area when I operated as a staff adviser at the corps advisory level.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you were in the military did you have any relationship with the pacification program?

Mr. VANN. At that time, sir, we did not have a pacification program as it is now known. We did have the strategic hamlet program in 1962 and 1963.

SCHOOL AT VUNG TAU

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any relationship yourself with the school at Vung Tau?

Mr. VANN. I had relationship with the school at Vung Tau from 1965 through the middle of 1966.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was your relationship at that time?

Mr. VANN. I was the USAID adviser on the RD cadre program to the RD cadre director.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was your relationship at that time with the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. VANN. I have never had any relationship other than one of cooperation as a representative of either the U.S. Army or of the Agency for International Development.

Senator SYMINGTON. At that time wasn't the CIA running the Vung Tau operation?

Mr. VANN. They were the agency with operational responsibility.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the difference between running it and being the agency with operational responsibility?

Mr. VANN. At that time, sir, it was being officially run by the Government of Vietnam, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, and advised by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator SYMINGTON. And your relationships with the agency were always of the best?

Mr. VANN. We have had differences of opinion, sir, but I have never had a relationship of alienation with them.

I would like to address your——

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to follow this a little bit, colonel, because I am remembering a few things as you talk.

Mr. VANN. All right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1965 you had a relationship at Vung Tau and there was some disagreement about how the place should be run; was there not?

Mr. VANN. There were differences of opinion among Vietnamese as to how it should be run, and there were some differences of opinion among Americans.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you describe those a bit?

Mr. VANN. The principal——

Senator SYMINGTON. Your own position I understood was different from some of the thinking of the American authorities.

Mr. VANN. I would be happy to, sir. I would like to answer your previous question first.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will get back to that.

Mr. VANN. All right, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we can.

Mr. VANN. I would say the principal difference, first of all, concerned the size of the teams that should be employed.

A second difference concerned the manner of advising on the RD cadre program. I would say a third difference concerned how overt or how covert the U.S. role in the RD cadre program, should be.

Sentor Symington. Who did you differ with on these questions?

Mr. Vann. Some Vietnamese officials, sir, and some U.S. officials.

Senator Symington. What U.S. officials did you differ with on that?

Mr. Vann. I would say in one degree or another I differed with the MACV representative and the USIS representative.

Senator Symington. That is what I heard when I was out there, colonel.

Now, we will get back to the other question.

Mr. Vann. Thank you, sir.

Senator Symington. Right.

1965 ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN DELTA

Mr. Vann. I went to the delta in a series of trips, going each weekend to 10 different provinces over a period of about three and a half months to do this assessment for General Westmoreland.

On July 3, of 1965 I briefed General Westmoreland on my findings. I essentially told General Westmoreland that the situation in the delta had deteriorated considerably since 1963, that the Vietcong were firmly in control of the countryside in the delta, that contrary to the opinion of many advisers in the delta, the reduction of incidents was not because of pacification being successful but because the Vietcong had gained such control there was no need to have incidents. I told him that the VC had, in my judgment, made a decision to use the delta as a recruiting and food base, and that they had come to some form of an accommodation wherein they were leaving the provincial and district capitals and the road network alone so as not to get people excited and not to interfere with their operations in the countryside.

I also indicated that at that period of time up to 50 percent of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces had reached some form of accommodation with the enemy, a form of accommodation that went the gamut——

Senator Symington. Up to what period of time?

Mr. Vann. This was in July of 1965, sir. This was an accommodation that ran the gamut from a simple "I will let you live, you let me live" arrangement which would result in local cease-fires to an arrangement wherein some units were serving for the government in the daytime and operating as Vietcong at night. The latter would certainly represent the minority, the former the majority of the accommodations. I concluded by saying if the delta is pacified it is unfortunately pacified by the wrong side.

General Westmoreland listened to my arguments. He subsequently had me return to Saigon from my field post to brief his new deputy, General Throckmorton. He subsequently had me come in and brief General Rosson, the Chief of Staff when he was assigned.

Approximately a year later, when General Westmoreland decided to request troops to go into the delta, he advanced as the reasons for it some of the conclusions that I had given to him in 1965, such as that it had become a food and recruiting base for the Vietcong.

It has always been my contention——

Senator Symington. Excuse me. It was known that it was a food base for everybody; was it not? I can remember a general in the Army telling me that the tax of the South Vietnamese on rice coming

out of the delta into Saigon was greater than the tax that the Vietcong laid down for rice coming into Saigon. So I think we have known for some time, certainly in 1965, that it was a food base.

Mr. VANN. It is a food base for the entire country without question sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

CIA OPERATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VUNG TAU

Did you recommend that the CIA operation responsibility be returned to the Army?

Mr. VANN. Responsibility in what area, sir?

Senator SYMINGTON. In operating Vung Tau.

Mr. VANN. Sir, it had never been with the Army, and I did never recommend that it be returned to the Army.

I did at one point in time, suggest that it might be more acceptable to the Vietnamese Government to have either the Military Assistance Command or the Agency for International Development have the principal responsibility and the financial responsibility for the program because of a tendency of Vietnamese to, in this case wrongfully, assume the motives of the CIA in running the program. It was my observation at that time, sir, that——

Senator SYMINGTON. You could not be talking about the villagers because they did not know what CIA meant.

Mr. VANN. I was talking about the hierarchy, the district and Province chiefs.

I would further like to qualify, sir, that the program as run by the CIA was totally overt, and that there were no subterranean or hidden motives behind it. But the basis for the recommendation was the fact that the Vietnamese are naturally suspicious and that they would have a tendency to ascribe hidden motives to the RD cadre program being financed by the CIA.

REMOVAL OF MAJOR MAI

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you know Major Mai?

Mr. VANN. I know him quite well, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did you think of him?

Mr. VANN. I thought he was an extremely capable officer and one who was highly dedicated to his work.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know why he was removed?

Mr. VANN. Yes, I do know why he was removed, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why?

Mr. VANN. There was some indication, sir, that Major Mai had started his own internal political organization within the cadre program and had established cells of the Duy Dan sect of the Tan Dai Viets political party, and had them reporting to him. The objectives of that party were contrary to the objectives of the Government of Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with that? Did you know enough about it to think that was justified criticism?

Mr. VANN. Well——

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you know enough about it to think that was justified criticism of him?

Mr. VANN. Of Major Mai, sir?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. VANN. I did, sir. That does not mean I do not greatly admire and respect Major Mai.

Senator SYMINGTON. What were the objectives of Major Mai that were different from General Ky or General Thieu?

Mr. VANN. I don't know whether these were Major Mai's personal objectives, but the objectives ascribed to his party were a third force concept which was both antigovernment and anti-Vietcong.

Senator SYMINGTON. This is really quite fascinating. I was very impressed with Major Mai and so were all the people who went out there. The next time I went back he was completely obliterated from the scene and I heard that that was done because the Government did not approve of the fact that he was more interested in the people than he was in the way that the Government was being handled, including the corruption. I tried to see him but could not; I finally talked to him on the phone. I think he was an interpreter with the Korean Army in Vietnam.

Mr. VANN. It was my understanding he went to such an assignment, sir. I considered Major Mai to be a dedicated nationalist, a man who was against corruption, a man who was for a people's program, a man who had been very effective as head of the institute. I recommended strongly at that time that he be brought to the United States—he was extremely fluent in English—and lecture at our service schools and explain the nature of the war.

Now, I do agree that the Government of Vietnam at that time could not afford to have as the commandant a man who was believed by them, with some foundation, to be essentially advocating their overthrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield?

Is there any connection between this and the Tran Ngoc Chau case? It sounds a little like the Chau case.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I suddenly realized what we were getting into down there. Some people in 1965 described Major Mai as being the most outstanding young person in Vietnam, that he was not a Communist in any way, but he did not approve of the way that the Government of South Vietnam was handling U.S. money, especially as they were personally profiting heavily from it.

MAJOR MAI'S REMOVAL

Senator CASE. Would the Senator pursue this? What has happened to the major now? Is he still alive and working? What is he doing?

Senator SYMINGTON. Those are very good questions. I am interested in Colonel Vann's recommendation that he come back here and tell about the cause in this country.

Senator CASE. This was 4 years ago. What has happened since?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be interested in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Also does it relate to the Chau case?

I understand the Americans had great difficulty in preventing President Ky from imprisoning him. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. VANN. I don't know that, sir. I was not involved in it.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did you hear about it?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I knew he was removed because the Government of Vietnam believed that the political party, that it had evidence he was a member of, was anti-GVN.

Senator SYMINGTON. But it was in no way a pro-Communist Party, was it?

Mr. VANN. Absolutely not. I make no suggestion that it was pro-communist.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the point I wanted to bring out, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Vann.

Mr. VANN. I will say, sir, just in cooperation——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and say what happened to him.

Mr. VANN. Sir, I don't really know. I am aware he is alive, and I am aware he does have an official Government job and the rank of major in the Government of Vietnam service. That is the limit of my knowledge. I have not seen Major Mai since he left Vung Tau in 1966.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe in the government of Thieu and Ky today as it has been conducted?

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.] I feel that, in view of the difficulties that they face, they quite possibly are doing about as much as we can expect any group of Vietnamese to do under the circumstances.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, the thrust of my question is you recommended that Major Mai come over here and lecture to the American people, you must have had great confidence in him, and agreed with his thinking, at least to some extent, about the need for reform of the present Vietnam Government.

Mr. VANN. Sir, I felt that the man was exceptionally well qualified, particularly with regard to the village and hamlet government. I did not necessarily endorse everything he did. Certainly I could not in good conscience endorse at that level an action designed to overthrow the Government of Vietnam when I was working for a government whose official policy was to support the Government of Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any proof that he was trying to overthrow the Government?

Mr. VANN. It was the announced purpose of the party, sir, to radically change the hierarchy that existed in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. By force or by an election? Is it any different from the Democrats' attitude toward the Republicans?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I was thinking about.

Mr. VANN. Sir, there were members of the party who suggested that the way to change it was by assassinating 52 top leaders in the Government. That would be force.

MAJOR MAI'S REPLACEMENT: MAJOR BE

Let me say, sir, that the man who came to succeed him at Vung Tau at that time, Major Be, who was the Deputy Province Chief at Binh Dinh, was equally outspoken against corruption, equally outspoken against abuses of government and, in my judgment, is equally qualified as the officer to be in charge of training RD cadre programs.

Senator SYMINGTON. He belonged to the right party.

Mr. VANN. No, sir, he did not.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the difference?

Mr. VANN. Colonel Be has come in for almost as much criticism from Government leaders as did Major Mai.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they both members of the same party?

Mr. VANN. I don't know what party Major Be, or Colonel Be, may be a member of.

Senator SYMINGTON. How can you assert he was not a member of Major Mai's party?

Mr. VANN. I have no evidence that he was so; I do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Mr. VANN. However, there are many political parties who have the same general lines.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR MAI

Mr. COLBY. Senator, I might add on this, since I was partly involved at the time, as you know, that one of the factors which caused us not to really raise very much objection to the replacement of Major Mai officially was that we were supporting a very large cadre operation, and that if this became the personal political tool of one particular party the CIA would be directly in the position of doing what Colonel Vann says that many people suspected the CIA was doing, and which we do not wish to do.

REPLACEMENT AND ASSASSINATION OF HIGH CALIBER SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that. But Major Mai is just one case.

General Walt introduced me to a village chief and said he was one of the finest village chiefs around there. He was assassinated.

He then told me General Thi was a brave a man as he ever knew. He was kicked out. It is indeed difficult to understand what is going on out there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TRAN NGOC CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. I want to pursue this, Colonel Vann. How does Chau fit into this transition between Mai and Colonel Be? He has been in the news recently. We started to pursue this the other day and you said you would rather do it now. Can you fit it in now without my having to stumble around and ask a number of questions? Just tell us.

Mr. VANN. In December of 1965, then Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, Province chief of Kien Hoa Province, was appointed by the Government of Vietnam and the Minister of Revolutionary Development to be the director of the RD cadre directorate with offices in Saigon and responsibility for the RD cadre program throughout Vietnam.

A part of Colonel Chau's responsibility was the supervision of the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau, which had as its assigned commandant at that time Captain Mai, later Major Mai. Colonel Chau continued in this capacity until September or October of 1966.

During part of his tenure, Captain Mai, now Major Mai, was relieved of his responsibilities as the commandant. I believe this occurred in July of 1966.

He was replaced initially by a Colonel Thinh, and then Colonel Chau himself left his post in Saigon and went to the Vung Tau Training Center to directly supervise it.

He left there when Major Be was assigned as the commandant. Major Be was assigned as the commandant, based upon the approval of Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, who was the Minister for Revolutionary Development.

Major Be operated under the supervision of Col. Tran Ngoc Chau.

In about September or October of 1966, Colonel Chau went into a hospital with a reported illness. Essentially he was removed from the RD cadre program at his own request.

He subsequently continued working in the Ministry of RD and became an inspector of revolutionary development operations in I Corps until the summer of 1967. He had attempted to resign his commission in the army so as to be free to run for the constituent assembly in mid-1966. He was denied permission to resign.

However, at a later date, when they were having the elections for the assembly, the election laws provided that active duty army officers could run for the position of deputy.

Colonel Chau ran for the position of deputy from Kien Hoa Province, was elected as a deputy in the national assembly, and was subsequently elected by the national assembly to be its Secretary General.

The CHAIRMAN. What does Secretary General mean?

Mr. VANN. Secretary General, sir, I would ascribe as about the third ranking position in the assembly operating under the president of the assembly as his kind of chief of staff.

That is the situation. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, as you know, is still a member of the assembly and is currently embroiled in a dispute brought about by the Government's charges that he was dealing with his brother, a known Communist, without having reported this incident to the Government.

EVALUATION OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. You have evaluated Major Mai. What about Chau? The way you and the Senator from Missouri described Mai fitted what I have been told about Chau. He is also a nationalist, a great patriot, but he does not approve of the present Government and he is regarded by the present Government as a rival. Is that true or not?

Mr. VANN. I don't know how the present Government regards Colonel Chau, sir, but with my regards to how I evaluate Colonel Chau, I think it is one of the continuing surprises and paradoxes of this conflict there and of that Vietnamese society that Colonel Chau who in my judgment is a nationalist, an honest man, against corruption, for the people, a man with a great deal of charisma, one whose motives I have always found to be of the highest order and Major Mai were bitter enemies. Colonel Chau had a great deal to do with getting Major Mai removed as the commandant because they happened to have different political ideologies, despite the fact that they were both for the same basic things.

I considered all three men, Major Be, now Colonel Be, the present commandant; Major Mai; and Colonel Tran Ngoc Chau to be people who were potentially going to do great things for their country from

the standpoint of giving better government, giving government that is more responsive to the needs of the peasants. I considered them people who were familiar with the village and hamlet structure, the needs of the population. Two of these gentlemen fought with the Viet Minh against the French.

The CHAIRMAN. Which two?

Mr. VANN. Colonel Be and Colonel Chau. I don't believe Major Mai had because I believe he was too young to have done so. I feel had he been older, he would have.

The CHAIRMAN. However, Thieu and Ky both fought with the French against the Viet Minh; didn't they?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I am not totally familiar with that. I know General Ky did fly with the French Air Force. He was trained by them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby would know.

Mr. COLBY. He was, yes. He fought with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, this is very interesting.

Mr. VANN. That was my answer to your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. I am only clarifying it. You think that although Chau was, I take it you say, a political enemy of Mai, they both were high class, superior men interested in their country.

Mr. VANN. All of my contact with them, sir, would indicate that to me.

TRAN NGOC CHAU'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA

The CHAIRMAN. I read to you the other day about these allegations. There is nothing secret about it. This story is in the paper. I am trying to clarify Chau's relationship with the CIA.

Did he ever report to the CIA when he was there?

Mr. VANN. To my knowledge, sir, he has never been employed by the CIA and never reported to the CIA.

Mr. COLBY. Since he was in charge of a program that was being financed by the CIA, he certainly reported to them in that sense.

The CHAIRMAN. He reported to the CIA. Were you then in the CIA before you were ambassador?

Mr. COLBY. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you know this of your own knowledge.

Maybe you ought to comment about this aspect. I should have asked you about it. Go ahead.

Mr. COLBY. The way this program ran, Mr. Chairman, was that the CIA financed the Government of Vietnam program. The program was part of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, and Colonel Chau was the responsible officer in that ministry for that program. So that the financing of the program was conducted to some extent under his own overall supervision. In that respect he kept the CIA people informed of what they were doing with the program.

This does not mean, however, in proper CIA parlance, that he was an agent. He was not paid at all by the CIA. He was paid by the Government of Vietnam.

DID CHAU REPORT HIS MEETINGS WITH HIS BROTHER?

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is consistent with what he has said, but I believe that one of the stories, at least, was that he had reported

voluntarily his meetings with his brother or other activities of this kind. This wasn't any secret. Can you say whether he did or not? Did you know he had a brother who was a Communist?

Mr. COLBY. Frankly, Senator, it has been 2 years since I have been associated with it, and one's memory gets a little fuzzy. I would prefer to look at the records which I do not have access to [deleted] before I gave you a direct answer.

I do seem to remember that there was a story that he had a brother in the North, and that there was some possibility of a contact. I am a little fuzzy on the details.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Vann, have you any knowledge of this?

Mr. VANN. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you sit over here. There is plenty of room. There is a chair right there. I don't know whether I ask questions of exactly the right one every time.

Do you know anything about this? Did he report? In your view was he frank and open with the Americans? I am not saying he was an agent, but to your knowledge did he report?

Mr. VANN. Sir, he was a man who was very fluent in the English language, and had U.S. advisers since 1961. He was a man who was known to many Americans, admired by many Americans, and he, in turn, appeared to be an admirer of Americans and things that we were doing and programs that we were suggesting.

He was a province chief in Kien Hoa Province in 1962 and 1963, while I was the senior adviser to the zone commander, a zone that included seven Provinces of which Kien Hoa was one.

He and I became very close friends during this period of 1962 and 1963. I was in contact with him on a fairly continuing basis up until July of 1969.

Because we were close friends, he often confided to me many things that I knew he probably would not confide to other people.

In the latter part of 1965, then Lt. Col. Tran Ngoc Chau, in his role as Province chief, while I was visiting him in his Province in Kien Hoa, after giving me a very long and mysterious buildup, walked me out into his provincial palace garden at about midnight and confided to me that a very important person from Hanoi had recently visited him in his Province. He said this was a person who was a nationalist and who was interested in seeing if there was some way of getting nationalists in the north and nationalists in the south together. Colonel Chau sought my advice as to what he should do.

I asked him as to what his relationships were with his adviser, who was from the Central Intelligence Agency assigned to the Province. He said he had very good relationships.

I suggested to him that that would be a much more appropriate channel through which to report and to get advice than through me, because I was not involved at that time in things dealing with the Government of Vietnam. I was at that time assigned as an adviser to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division.

We had then tried the experiment of putting someone who had been in Vietnam with each incoming U.S. unit to help them get oriented and acclimated to the Vietnamese and to the Vietnamese officials.

We dropped the subject, and I did not report it to any of my higher headquarters, and one of the reasons I did not was that during that particular period of time I had a great many confidences given to me

by Vietnamese, which, had I reported would have resulted in their heads being chopped off careerwise because things were extremely unsettled in Vietnam. There were a series of changing governments. There was a game of musical chairs going on, and the future was pretty indefinite.

Also, the enemy was at almost the high point of his control in the countryside, and that did have many Vietnamese officials standing with one foot in both camps.

DID CHAU REPORT HIS BROTHER'S VISITS?

During a subsequent period in the summer of 1966, when Chau and I were working closely together, Chau again raised the subject with me. He told me he had had another visit from that same person, and then after a great deal of cautions and explaining how dangerous it would be to him, he confided to me that it was his brother. He then gave me the background on his brother. He gave me a picture of what I assume now to be Tran Ngoc Hien, but a picture which had several inconsistencies compared to what I now know about Tran Ngoc Hien.

At that time, Colonel Chau—he was still in the army—asked me if I would report this conversation to my higher authority, and to find out if my higher authority would like to meet with his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien. He did not identify his brother by name.

He told me at the time that his brother was coming in and out of the country on a Japanese passport and that if a meeting was to be arranged it would require 3 weeks' notice because he had to contact his brother by an advertisement in a Saigon newspaper.

I reported this to my higher authority, and went through that channel to the then Deputy Ambassador.

The Deputy Ambassador listened to the story, plus the background on Tran Ngoc Chau, informed me that they were continually getting requests for meetings of this sort from various people. [Deleted.] The bona fides of this man really had not been established, and he would let me know later what, if anything, would be done.

He subsequently called me in and said that neither the Ambassador nor he would agree to a meeting with Chau's brother but that if it was particularly desired, if Chau's brother particularly desired and thought he had something that was worthwhile that I would be authorized to represent the Ambassador at a meeting.

I gave this information to Colonel Chau, and he then said he would contact his brother. He subsequently told me approximately a month later that he had contacted his brother and that his brother was not interested in meeting with me because I was not of sufficient importance. That essentially terminated my role in the matter involving his brother.

GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO REMOVE CHAU'S IMMUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think that presently the Thieu government goes to such lengths to remove the immunity of Chau?

Mr. VANN. I really do not know, sir, because you must understand that my contacts with Chau have been very limited since this thing became a hot issue last July.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not seen him since that time?

Mr. VANN. I have seen him, but not for the purposes of discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VANN. He has attempted to see me and has made it a point, since he knows places where I go to, and I have had to excuse myself as quickly as possible after arriving.

MR. VANN'S PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. Has the Ambassador or any one of your superiors ordered you not to see him and to discuss things?

Mr. VANN. Ambassador Bunker, sir, and Ambassador Colby have told me since July that it is advisable not to become involved in this matter since it is a matter between the Government of Vietnam and one of its officials; [deleted].

Mr. COLBY. Any contacts on the subject would be made by Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VANN. That is correct.

IS CHAU A COMMUNIST?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally have any doubt in your mind about Chau's being a Communist or not being a Communist?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have to have some reservation because Ambassador Bunker has informed me that there are things about the case of which I am not aware. I do not know what these things are.

However, since I do not have access to the dossier, either of the Government of Vietnam or of such files as the political section of the Embassy may have—it is quite obvious that I don't have the total picture.

Nothing in my personal relationships with Colonel Chau and my knowledge of him since 1962 would lead me to doubt that he is other than a dedicated nationalist anti-Communist person.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I can speak to.

Mr. VANN. Right, Senator.

DISCREPANCIES IN INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY CHAU

Senator CASE. You said you were concerned about the discrepancies between what he had told you about his brother and what the facts about his brother were. Was this a distrubing thing to you?

Mr. VANN. It has become. It is my knowledge, sir, that Colonel Chau has lied to me on several matters that involved this case, for what purpose I don't know. There are several matters in which he deliberately lied.

Senator CASE. Were these significant? Were these deliberate?

Mr. VANN. The information he gave me is different from information I now know to be true. It does not concern whether he is a Communist. It concerns details about his brother and details about statements that he has ascribed to other Vietnamese officials that they have subsequently told me that they did not say.

Senator CASE. Have you any feeling that this was an intentional deception and, if so, what the intent was or what its purpose was?

Mr. VANN. I feel that a portion of this may well have been to protect the identity and location of his brother.

Senator CASE. I see.

ASSISTANCE SOUGHT BY CHAU CONCERNING CHARGES

The CHAIRMAN. Has Mr. Chau indirectly or directly sought your assistance at any point in connection with charges brought by President Thieu?

Mr. VANN. He has sought my assistance on a continuing basis, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did he ask you to do?

Mr. VANN. He has, first of all, asked me if there was some way that I could arrange for him to go to the United States. That has been an approach over the period of the last year.

He has, second, asked if I could get the U.S. Government to intervene with President Thieu in his behalf and inform them of the fact that we were aware of his brother's presence.

He has asked me to go to the Prime Minister, Prime Minster Khiem, in his behalf. He has also asked for advice as to what he should do. I have on a continuing basis advised him that he should use the same rules that he is asking the Government to use in his opposition to the Government. I have told him that at this period of time I consider his outspoken opposition—and this is particularly true in the first 6 months of 1969—was hurting the Government's efforts against the foe.

The CHAIRMAN. Against whom?

Mr. VANN. Against the foe, against the enemy. I have told him that, even though I knew his motivations were good, now was the time for all Vietnamese to get toegther and put their shoulder to the wheel, and that if he really wanted to have a different government, he should work for the 1971 elections as opposed to suggesting anything that would either aid or abet the Communist cause at the moment, even though it may not have that purpose.

U.S. POSITION ON ASYLUM FOR CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. Did our Government refuse or decline to grant him asylum?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have not asked our Government to grant him asylum. But my superiors have told me that we will not seek to get him to the United States, which is what he had requested be done. We do not interpose an objection to his government letting him go.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think it was a question of asylum, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it?

Mr. COLBY. I think it was a question of would we actively help get him out of there.

The CHAIRMAN. What is our position? Would we allow him to come if he could come surreptitiously?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think that is a question you really have to address to the Department and to Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Chairman. I am not qualified to answer it.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know?

Mr. VANN. He has asked me whether we would do such a thing, sir, and I have said I did not believe we would, but that was my operating assumption.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever ask Ambassador Bunker what he would recommend?

Mr. VANN. I have discussed Tran Ngoc Chau with Ambassador Bunker on a number of occasions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is Ambassador Bunker's attitude?

Mr. VANN. Ambassador Bunker's attitude, and his instructions to me, sir, were that I should tend to pacification in the delta and he would tend to the political situation in Vietnam. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very clear answer.

CIA CHIEF'S KNOWLEDGE ABOUT TRAN NGOC CHAU

Mr. Colby, since you were so closely identified previously with the CIA, did the CIA Chief there know about these meetings of Chau with his brother?

Mr. COLBY. As I said, Mr. Chairman, my memory frankly is a little dim, and I am not that close to the situation today. I don't have access to the files. I really would have to defer that to the CIA.

I do recall some consideration, should we say, to the fact that he had a brother. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the present CIA Chief believes Chau is a Communist or not?

Mr. COLBY. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. I have never really——

The CHAIRMAN. This is what bothers me. I had not known about this Major Mai story. I was told that with the Senator from Missouri. Now you have Chau and, of course, this immediately suggests the treatment given Mr. Dzu, who is still in jail; isn't he? As far as I know his only crime was that he ran against Thieu and came out second.

CHARGES AGAINST MR. DZU

Do you know of anything else wrong with Dzu?

Mr. VANN. I don't know Mr. Dzu at all, but I know from the papers at that time that is not the reason that ostensibly he went to jail.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the reason?

Mr. VANN. As I understand, it dealt with some matter of fraud that was part of the charges, and——

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of fraud?

Mr. VANN. Advocating against the laws of the Government of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was to make peace.

Mr. VANN. Well, advocating some arrangements with the coalition government which is against the law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. The papers that I read indicated that he did advocate that they should seek to make a negotiated peace rather than a military victory. That is about what was reported in the press, which is not unlike what apparently was in the mind of Chau when he was, at least, conferring with you with regard to the possibility of meeting with representatives of Hanoi. Is that not a correct analysis?

Mr. VANN. Chau did have in his mind, sir, an eventual political settlement of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Settlement of the war is what both of them had in mind; is that not correct?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I cannot comment on Mr. Dzu because I have never dealt with him personally.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course I have not either, but all the reports were that that was his crime.

Mr. VANN. That is right, sir.

GVN PRESSURE TO LIFT CHAU'S IMMUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any knowledge of any irregular activities or pressure brought to bear on the Vietnamese National Assembly by the Thieu regime in connection with lifting the immunity of Chau? Do you have any knowledge of that?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have on a continuing basis talked to deputies in the assembly, particularly those from the delta.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. What do you know?

Mr. VANN. The deputies have suggested to me that there is a good deal of pressure being brought by the Government, no specific person in the Government, but by the Government, on individual members of the assembly to support the Government's position.

The CHAIRMAN. To sign a petition?

Mr. VANN. I think, sir, in this country, it is called lobbying.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is one. Is it to sign the petition removing immunity?

Mr. VANN. There has been some specific reported lobbying for this purpose; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about that, Ambassador Colby?

Mr. COLBY. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not. I don't deal with the deputies normally.

The CHAIRMAN. You only deal with the diplomats and generals.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. I deal mostly with province chiefs and government officials.

The CHAIRMAN. I was kidding you.

Mr. COLBY. I know it.

The CHAIRMAN. Politics is a difficult game.

VISIT FROM MR. DZU'S SON

Colonel Vann, I think this is very interesting.

This, I must very frankly confess, bothers me a great deal. I do not know Mr. Dzu personally, but his son came to see me personally, as he did a number of members of this committee, in a humanitarian venture. He said his father was quite ill, with a heart attack or something, and he is in prison and he thinks he will be allowed to die there. His attitude is that the only real crime of his father was that he would like to settle this war with a political settlement. That is the way he described it.

The son is quite attractive. Isn't he here now or do you know?

Mr. VANN. I don't know him, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a young man and he came to see me, but I do not know. I have read all his reports.

Senator, do you wish to interrogate?

Mr. VANN. Sir, could I add one thing?

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would add anything that is significant.

Mr. VANN. This is significant to the question earlier this morning, but it does not concern the Chau case.

CRITERIA FOR U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY FIRE

In the discussion, sir, about the control of artillery and the fact that there are different criteria for U.S. artillery firing from Vietnamese artillery firing, just to clear the record, I would like to explain that U.S. units are not permitted to fire artillery shells within a thousand yards of a Vietnamese population center unless there are U.S. units under active attack.

Vietnamese units are allowed to fire at a closer distance because they can communicate directly with outposts and Vietnamese commanders who are in the population center, and the population center may be under attack. That is the reason that Vietnamese can fire into areas that U.S. troops cannot.

Secondly, if most of the firing described in Long An Province, an average of 300 rounds per day, is like that which I have observed on a continuing basis in Vietnam in some 27 other provinces, it is primarily firing of what they call an H and I, harassing and interdiction. This is fired on known communication routes, usually in unpopulated areas, and in areas where it is felt that Vietcong units may be traversing as a way of both making it more dangerous to them and of inhibiting them not to come to those areas.

That is all, sir.

CHAU'S TROUBLE WITH CIA OVER RD CADRE PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. One last question I overlooked there on the Chau case.

Did Chau have any trouble with the CIA over the RD cadre program; do you know?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, he did.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it?

Mr. COLBY. It was a question of the degree of control. I think Mr. Vann approved of that.

The CHAIRMAN. With which official of the CIA did he have the trouble?

Mr. COLBY. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman. I think it was the station as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it Mr. [deleted].

Mr. COLBY. I don't remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, Mr. Vann?

Mr. VANN. Mr. Chau's relationships with Mr. [deleted] were quite close, sir, and there was no personal disagreement between the two of them. However, Colonel Chau had a basic disagreement as to the role of the CIA representative in each province from the standpoint of handling the funds and making decisions relative to supporting or nonsupporting the program.

He felt these should be Vietnamese actions and Vietnamese decisions.

I might also add that Colonel Chau had a difference of opinion with his own superior, General Thinh, over this same matter in that Colonel Chau was much more sensitive to the CIA involvement in the RD cadre program and its possible effects than was General Thinh.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by sensitive?

Mr. VANN. Apprehensive as to possible repercussions from what he would consider to be their too overt role.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. The CIA's position on that, Mr. Chairman, was that they needed that degree of control over the funds they were disbursing. They did not want to give the funds at a central level and let it be handled by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. The difference of opinion was over close supervision of expenditures?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. The last question is a little different, but Colonel Vann, you have been there so long and had such a long experience and are so thoroughly acquainted with it, could you answer two general questions? Do you think we can take all of our troops out of Vietnam and, if so, when would you estimate this can be done? Or, will we have to keep 75,000 men, more or less there as we do in Korea? This is the thrust of the question.

Could you comment on that?

Mr. VANN. I can comment on it, sir, but I am undoubtedly going to get into trouble with both you and my boss.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not going to get into trouble. I prefaced this with "because of your long experience" and you shouldn't get into any trouble. I don't believe that you will with your boss.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I share with you the fact that in asking these questions, that we ask the colonel to be quite specific, quite detailed, and to break it down into various kinds of assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. You won't get into any trouble, colonel. You have been there too long. Go ahead.

Mr. COLBY. He has been in trouble before.

The CHAIRMAN. He is used to trouble.

Senator CASE. He is a Rutgers man, so he cannot be fazed.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us your prognosis of this situation.

Mr. VANN. Sir, first of all, any prognosis is based upon a set of assumptions, any one of which may prove to be false, and I have no more clairvoyance about how Hanoi is going to react or not react than anyone else.

In my judgment, we are proceeding on a course of action that quite clearly will get the U.S. role in Vietnam greatly diminished and greatly reduce the cost both in lives and in money.

REDUCTION TIMETABLE PROPOSED IN 1968

Now, I did at one time in 1968 propose that a time table for the reduction, based upon my judgment as to what the situation was, [deleted].

Senator CASE. Is this you in 1968 or you now?

Mr. VANN. It was me in 1968, and I made certain assumptions which have thus far held correct, and my judgment continues to be at that level, that that is about as rapidly as we can do it without unnecessarily jeopardizing the continuation of the non-Communist government in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Will you break that down.

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. At what point did you say under 100,000?

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Only to 200,000 by then.

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say it would take 5 years to get it down below 100,000?

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Three years?

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is too far to foresee beyond that?

Mr. VANN. [Deleted.] It is unpredictable as to whether Hanoi will scale up the fighting or scale down the fighting.

HANOI'S ACTIVITY DURING PREDICTED U.S. REDUCTION

Senator CASE. This is the thing that I think is kind of important. Those predictions of yours are based upon the assumption that Hanoi will be nice people.

Mr. VANN. No, rather that they will continue as they now are.

Senator CASE. Well, what is that?

Mr. VANN. Maintaining their current level of strength in South Vietnam.

Senator CASE. Suppose they decide to do more. One, will they be able to do more?

Mr. VANN. I personally, sir, don't think that they can substantially increase their effort in South Vietnam. I see several reasons as to why they may want to scale it down and go back more toward a political guerilla-type effort, and to modify their expectations for perhaps a decade or even a decade and a half.

Senator CASE. You think that they will not do more because they will not find it feasible to do more?

Mr. VANN. I think, sir, that they must be having a great number of internal problems. They are certainly having a great problem of morale among their troops at the moment, even at this level of action. They are having an extremely difficult logistical problem supporting this number of forces.

Senator CASE. This is a very important factor, it seems to me, and this is the kind of information we don't have much of.

Mr. VANN. Sir, keep in mind it is a personal opinion. It is not factual information.

Senator CASE. You haven't pulled it out of the air?

Mr. VANN. No, sir.

Senator CASE. This is based upon your observations and upon what you have heard.

Mr. COLBY. I think it is fair to say also based primarily upon Mr. Vann's position in the southern part of the country.

Senator CASE. Yes.

Well, would you, Mr. Ambassador, express a view contrary to that?

Mr. COLBY. I would say, in addition to the factors that he comes up with; you do have the problem of the DMZ and the potential for action in that area.

Senator CASE. Yes. I think there is no doubt about that.

Mr. COLBY. There is a shorter geographical distance involved and they are engaged in a logistical effort there, and so forth.

Senator CASE. You do not exclude their ability to——

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have information, of course less information, about these corps areas, but I did try to take into consideration this type of thing, too, in arriving at this overall judgment from whatever—the information that I have had available, and once a month I do get a briefing on the situation in the entire country and outside my area.

Senator CASE. Is your feeling based largely not on what Hanoi is about to do, but upon increasing strength among the South Vietnamese?

Mr. VANN. I believe there is every reason to expect that the Government's control will improve over a period of time. I see time as an element on our side and one that is hurting the enemy.

DIFFERENCE IN APPRAISALS

Senator CASE. This was a different appraisal from the one you were giving in 1967.

Mr. VANN. In 1967, sir, we had a very different situation. We had a tremendous problem in the pacification area because of the lack of the continuing close-in security for the population.

Keep in mind that in 1967 we were winning a lot of battles. That meat-grinding action may very well have caused the enemy to try the change of tactics that the Tet offensive represented.

LOSS OF U.S. LIVES INVOLVED IN PREDICTED REDUCTIONS

Senator CASE. Now, looking at your own prediction as to what you think is likely, what does this involve in 1970, 1971, 1972, in the loss of American lives?

Mr. VANN. I believe, sir, that it should be an ever-diminishing rate.

Senator CASE. Well, would you give us some order of magnitude.

Mr. VANN. Sir, I would really submit that you could get much better estimates from someone directly involved in the U.S. tactical military effort.

Senator CASE. I don't mind trying that, of course, but I would like to have your own.

Mr. VANN. Well, sir, when we think of an ever-diminishing rate, one of the factors involved in casualties is that a great number of the casualties (less now than before—at one time it was over 50 percent of U.S. casualties) are from mines and boobytraps.

Now, the fewer U.S. troops you have in Vietnam, the fewer mines and boobytraps they are going to stumble over. So there has been quite a correlation between the size of our force structure and the number of casualties. If we get down to half of the present force

structure I would imagine the casualties would be half of what they are now.

Senator Case. Are you suggesting, your belief is, that the most likely result is [deleted].

The Chairman. Could I ask, Mr. Colby, if you have any different view about this estimate?

Mr. Colby. Well, I have great respect for John Vann's attitudes and views. I think that as the nature of the American participation changes from combat units to primarily support structure, you will have the same kind of impact on American casualties. You will have a very substantial reduction, more than proportionate.

I think an example is the delta today without U.S. ground combat forces, although still with air combat forces—to refer to the Senator's statements the other day. Nonetheless, the fact is that you have very few American casualties at this time in the delta area each week and month. I think as you reduce the American participation in the ground combat work in the other parts of the country, you will get a very sharp decline in the total number of American casualties.

PROJECTION OF HANOI'S ATTITUDE

As for the projection of Hanoi's attitude and what they are thinking—if they are determined to carry on and achieve a Communist victory in South Vietnam at some appropriate time, they have a very difficult problem on their hands. They made kind of a truce on the assumption that the place would fall into their hands in 1954. They were badly deceived because the country picked itself up and put itself together and actually began to run, and I think——

The Chairman. Do you mean under Diem?

Mr. Colby. Yes, in the first couple of years in the Diem period, there was a very distinct revival of that nation or formation of a nation if you will. It deteriorated later for other reasons.

But they face the prospect of turning off the gas on this effort with the very dangerous potential for them that their forces in the south will disintegrate, that their own drive and sense of purpose will reduce, and that they would be sort of confessing to having failed. It is very dangerous politically to the heirs of Ho Chi Minh to come up and say that they failed in what their leader told them to do.

I think they will continue to keep some pressure on, with whatever they are able to use. I think that the potential for winding up and giving kind of a special effort is always there. They do have divisions in the area north of the DMZ. Their supply lines are shorter up in that area. I think there is a chance that at some time they could make a decision that their situation in the south was deteriorating to such a degree that they had to do something dramatic and sharp to shake it up, the way they obviously felt in early 1968.

Senator Case. Is there a possibility that, rather than being able to do this, they are reducing their response in response to ours and the evidence of this may be their increased activity in the plain of Jarres?

Mr. Colby. It is, of course, possible, Senator. I don't read their mind.

Senator Case. I know.

Mr. COLBY. I frankly do not think so. I frankly believe their directives to their forces, their speeches to their people, show a continued determination to keep the heat on in South Vietnam.

The Lao situation is more or less as it has been all along, except that they have put some extra forces into it in the past 6 months or year.

Senator CASE. Indeed they have.

Mr. COLBY. But it is not anywhere near the magnitude of extra forces that they have in South Vietnam.

Senator CASE. Of course not. But it is a substantial increase which suggests they are not under pressure. That is all I am trying to get at.

Mr. COLBY. Well, it suggests they are able to put those forces which are in North Vietnam into an area very close to their own homeland as distinct from sending them all the way down to the South, which is a very large logistics problem.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to barge in in this way, but you and I are directly interested in the same approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you come back at a quarter of three as you did yesterday?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir, at your disposal, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I have two constituents I promised to take to lunch.

Senator CASE. That would be a humanitarian thing to do anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come back then at a quarter of three. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:45 p.m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Sergeant Wallace, as I said, I didn't get to ask you any questions at all.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF CAP TEAM

Do you speak Vietnamese?

TESTIMONY OF SGT. RICHARD D. WALLACE—Resumed

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir, I don't. I have two marines that speak fairly good Vietnamese, and also my counterparts speak excellent English. We have a big brother program in which we select children within the hamlets to work for the Marines. The majority of these kids who work for us speak fluent English, and also write English.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say two of those in your CAP team? Your CAP team consists of five?

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir, there are 13 marines.

The CHAIRMAN. Two of them speak Vietnamese?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, not fluently but they get a point across.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you communicate with the PF soldiers and with residents in the village in which you are stationed?

Sergeant WALLACE. Again, part of the PF's, a good percentage, speak English, and the marines who speak Vietnamese are with me.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of your PF's speak English?

Sergeant WALLACE. I would say 25 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they learning?

Sergeant WALLACE. School, sir, and from the marines and from the children.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you ascertain that the marines are understood by the people in the hamlets?

Sergeant WALLACE. Well, sir, when we first arrived there, the hamlets were having quite a bit of trouble. We were primarily working within that area, operating in and around the hamlet there. The people are accepting the marines. They are more friendly with them. I am invited to all the hamlet meetings.

HAMLET MEETINGS

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of hamlet meetings?

Sergeant WALLACE. This is just the hamlet meetings where they get the older people——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they social meetings?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the nature of the social meetings?

Senator WALLACE. I just discuss things which improve the village or hamlet, and problems which have arisen and try to work these out.

NORMAL DAY OF CAP

The CHAIRMAN. Describe in the way that your predecessor, Captain Murphy did, a normal day. Give us a feeling of what you do and what is said.

Sergeant WALLACE. Fine, sir.

I start off in the evening, usually around 6:30 or a half hour or an hour after dark. We run two patrols which go out and set up their ambushes. These ambushes stay out all night. They come back the next morning at approximately 6:30, depending upon what time of the year it is.

Then we send out a security guard to guard the hamlet in the daytime. We work with the rural development cadre. We get supplies for them and help them to rebuild the hamlet.

The people need wood, cement, tin, et cetera. The Marines during this time have opportunities to sleep.

SELECTION, BACKGROUND, AND TRAINING OF CAP

The CHAIRMAN. How is your 13-man CAP team chosen?

Sergeant WALLACE. Sir, they are selected from the United States. At one time the CAP were all from within South Vietnam, but the program has been expanded and they are accepting them from the States. They are sent over with orders for the CAP program. They are screened and the better qualified Marines are taken for this program.

Senator AIKEN. Are they from rural areas?

Sergeant WALLACE. Pardon me, sir?

Senator AIKEN. Are the Marines from the rural areas largely?

Sergeant WALLACE. I don't know what you mean by rural area.

Mr. Colby. American farm areas. They are not.

Sergeant Wallace. They are not.

The Chairman. Is there any special training the squad leaders receive?

Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. We go to a CAP school, which is located in Danang. The school lasts 2 weeks. They just talk about the people, how the people live, the customs, et cetera.

The Chairman. Have the Marines under your command been given any special training?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. They also attend this 2-week course.

The Chairman. They do too?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. All Marines going through the CAP program attended this school.

The Chairman. Do you think the Marines today are trained as well as they were in the past?

Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. Present day demands for Marines are quite large. They are rushed through most of the training. They don't have as much time to grasp all the infantry aspects which they need, and are not trained as well as I was when I went through training.

The Chairman. You say this is because they are in too big a hurry?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. The demand for Marines is such that they rush them through classes.

GREAT DEMAND FOR MARINES

The Chairman. Why is the demand so great?

Sergeant Wallace. We need Marines. People are rotating and to fill their positions they must get the replacements over to Vietnam.

The Chairman. But we are reducing the numbers. Aren't we reducing the number of Marines along with the Army?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir, correct. But when they rotate a man, they still have to send replacements for the remaining units.

The Chairman. Where does the reduction come about if you replace them or is this a fiction?

Sergeant Wallace. No, sir, it is not a fiction. They are reducing the Marines.

The Chairman. If they are reducing, then you don't send a replacement every time you bring one home; do you?

Sergeant Wallace. I guess that is correct, sir.

The Chairman. I am trying to get it straight in my own mind. Why is there a greater demand for Marines now than there was when you were in training?

Sergeant Wallace. The CAP program has enlarged quite a bit. It is expanding.

The Chairman. The CAP program is expanding, not the Marines generally?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir. In my area you will find we have two infantry units which I will show you on the map here. Charlie Company from the 1–26th, and also India Company from the 3–1st. They also have started using the CAP program. They are sending men down to work with the Popular Force soldiers.

India Company has CAP units located just north of my area. The 26th Marines have a CAP which is just south of my area. They operate

primarily in Huong Son area. The CAP program has been quite effective.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose?

Sergeant WALLACE. Providing security for the hamlets.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

IS SECURITY SITUATION IN CAP 215 AREA TYPICAL OF PROVINCE?

Would you say that the area you cover is typical of the province in terms of the security situation, lack of support for the Vietcong?

Sergeant WALLACE. Would you rephrase that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the area that you cover typical of the province as a whole with regard to the security of the people and the lack of support for the Vietcong?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is typical?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not unusual.

TERMINOLOGY USED TO REFER TO VIETNAMESE

We have often read in the papers that American soldiers, including marines, refer to the Vietnamese as Dinks, Gooks, or Slants. Is the terminology generally used?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Which is the more fashionable?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give us any enlightenment as to why these terms are used by the marines?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Is this a word of affection?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Is it respect? What is it?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Your counterparts?

Sergeant WALLACE. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. You are an adviser?

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir; I am not an adviser.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a leader of the CAP's?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir; a squad.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions, Senator Aiken?

WEARING OF UNIFORMS BY MARINES AND POPULAR FORCES

Senator AIKEN. Are the Marines always in uniform?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Do the Popular Forces have a uniform too?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir; they have.

Senator AIKEN. I don't want to ask any questions. Any I would ask have probably been asked twice already, so I will get it from the record.

SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN HAMLETS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that most of the people in the hamlets in which you have been stationed support the present Government of South Vietnam?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, I do.

KILL RATIOS OF CAP'S

The CHAIRMAN. What is the kill ratio of the CAP platoons?

Sergeant WALLACE. Just a second, sir, I have the statistics. Sir, these are statistics from January 1 to November 30, 1969. Total enemy killed in this period of time was 4,735; the enemy killed by CAP's was 1,862. The ratio is 6.4 to 1.

The CHAIRMAN. 6.4 enemy to 1?

Sergeant WALLACE. Friendly.

KILL RATIO OF PF PLATOONS OPERATING ALONE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the kill ratio of Popular Force platoons operating alone after CAP teams have left?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, 3.5 to 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Just about half.

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether that is general or is that only in your area?

Sergeant WALLACE. This is for the entire CAP program, sir, the entire combined action force, 114 CAP's.

KILL RATIO OF PSDF

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the ratio of the People's Self-Defense Forces?

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir. This does not include the PSDF.

The CHAIRMAN. What is their kill ratio?

Sergeant WALLACE. I don't have that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have that, Ambassador Colby?

Mr. COLBY. We have some very poor statistics on that, Senator, which I don't have very much reliance on. It comes out roughly one for one on People's Self-Defense. These vary.

OWNERSHIP AND BOUNDARIES OF FARMS

Senator AIKEN. I would like to ask one more question. You say this is a farming community. Do the people own the land on which they work or are they tenants working as tenant farmers? Are they working for someone who owns a lot of land perhaps?

Sergeant WALLACE. Sir, I don't know.

Senator AIKEN. Is it their own? You might know. Is that situation better over there than it was?

Mr. COLBY. It varies from one part of the country to another, Senator. Up in central Vietnam they never have had a very large landlord problem. Most of the holdings there are fairly small holdings. A number of them are rented out to other people in the villages.

A family will rent out part of its land to someone else.

Senator AIKEN. The boundaries are well defined?

Mr. COLBY. Quite well defined, and they remain stable. Even when the village leaves because of the war and comes back 3 years later, the families find their old locations. The village handles a great deal of that.

Now, down in the delta area, where you did have larger holdings and absentee landlordism, there has been some modification over the past few years.

Under the Diem regime they put in a partial land reform program, let us say, and accepted as that. It reduced the maximum holding down to 100 hectares, plus a little for religious purposes. That is 250 acres.

This absorbed land which was formerly owned by the French or former bigger holdings. They spent quite a time trying to distribute this land, and by 1961–62 when the war began they had not done very much of it. This past year they had 147,000 hectares yet to distribute. They essentially had not distributed anything much over the past 7 years.

During this past year the Government set the goal of finishing up that whole 147,000. They did not make it. They did distribute about 75,000. They will clean it up in the early part of this year.

Senator AIKEN. That is quite an improvement.

Mr. COLBY. Yes. There was more distributed this year than the last 7 years.

Senator AIKEN. When a few people get control of the land it seems almost a pure formula for rebellion in the country.

Mr. COLBY. Well, the Government today has a further bill on land reform which has been in the National Assembly.

Senator AIKEN. I know.

Mr. COLBY. It is not yet up before the Senate. It is in Senate committee at the moment. This would reduce the maximum holding down quite a bit further. There is some debate as to whether it will be eight or ten hectares, but it will be way down. The thrust of the Government's position on the bill is that you will arrive at a situation where you essentially cannot be a landlord. The only way to own land is to work it. That is the thrust of their policy. That has not yet passed the National Assembly.

Senator AIKEN. Ok.

HAMLET FESTIVAL

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Murphy, perhaps you are as good as anyone on this. Are you familiar with the hamlet festival?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ARMAND MURPHY—Resumed

Captain MURPHY. No, I am not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. RICHARD T. GECK—Resumed

Captain GECK. Mr. Chairman, are you referring to a situation in which we would bring in entertainment and bring the people together where we conducted operations?

The CHAIRMAN. This is described in a handbook for military support, pacification, but it is 2 years old.

Captain GECK. I believe that is what you are referring to, sir. I have been instructed in it, but I do not use it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you use it any more? Do either of you know?

Captain GECK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether this calls—

Sergeant WALLACE. Sir, we call it Psyops. Occasionally a team of Vietnamese will come in and show a movie.

The CHAIRMAN. "The purpose of this annex is to set forth the task organization of the RVNAF teams of the hamlet festival force involved in a cordon and search operation; in addition, discussion of the physical layout of the hamlet festival is presented. Task organization and functions of RVNAF teams. * * *, cultural team, agricultural team, youth services teach," and so on.

Captain MURPHY. Possibly, Mr. Chairman, this is a function of the regular forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered whether you participated in it.

Captain MURPHY. I am not familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Either of you?

Captain GECK. It was a technique taught to us when we went through the advisory training program. We have used it in a modified sense.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not look as if it is a promising subject.

Mr. VANN. Mr Chairman, may I make mention of the fact that I am very familiar with the program. It is a program largely involving U.S. tactical forces, working in conjunction with police or provincial forces, that were involved in taking an area that had been under Vietcong control or in which there might still be members of the Vietcong. They surround the area, seal it off, and then have the National Police of the Government of Vietnam assemble the people in the center of the town and interrogate, usually the males, and some of the female adults.

To make this less onerous for the people, a county fair or hamlet festival was also established wherein food, drink, and medical aid was dispensed to the people while they were assembled. They would also sometimes show movies or even get some local Vietnamese cultural drama teams to put on entertainment. It is a technique that was used extensively in 1967.

It has largely been abandoned since that period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. I suspected as much.

SENTENCING AND RELEASE UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM

I believe we come back to the Phoenix program.

Ambassador COLBY, I believe you said your statistical information about what happens to the Vietcong after their apprehension is not very good. I notice an article by Mr. Terence Smith in the New York Times of August 19, 1969 which says:

> Officials in charge of the program acknowledge that fewer than 20 percent of the 25,233 suspected agents and sympathizers who had been arrested have received prison sentences of a year or more.

Do you think that is correct?

Mr. COLBY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I stand by the fact that our information is not very good. We did run a survey here about 8 months

ago in which we used what information we had available and could collect on what happened to people. The experience at that time did reveal that about 20 percent received a sentence of more than 6 months. Most of them were much less.

This was a one-time experiment, and I would not generalize it completely, but it was one of the factors used to discuss with the government the necessity for a tightening up of the regulations as to what kind of sentences were applied to what kinds of people.

The CHAIRMAN. The same article quotes Mr. John Mason, identified as the head of the American Phoenix Advisers, and as saying, "Many of them just go out the back door of the jail. We know that." What does he mean by that?

Mr. COLBY. He means that a number of the people who are originally arrested are released very quickly because government officials decide they do not have enough of a case to hold them.

STATEMENT ON PHOENIX PROGRAM

Mr. Chairman, if I might, I have prepared a statement on the Phoenix program, if I might submit it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.

Mr. COLBY. It is just a general roundup of the program and it might help fill out the record.

(The information referred to appears on p. 723.)

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday you mentioned a system of administrative detention of up to 2 years under the Phoenix program. Would you describe what happens to the typical member of the VC infrastructure who is arrested.

Mr. COLBY. The man is arrested. As I think Major Arthur said, he would be picked up and brought into the district. He would be interrogated there for about 24 hours maximum. He would then be sent to the province.

There he would be held in a detention center at the province level. He would be interrogated there by some more specialized teams of interrogators, people who would try to find out both his tactical knowledge and his knowledge of the enemy infrastructure.

While under interrogation a case would be prepared describing his activity and his background, describing for what reason he should be held.

This case would be reviewed by what is called the province security committee. The province security committee, as I mentioned, is made up of the province chief, the deputy province chief for administration, the chairman of the provincial council, an elected body, the local provincial judge. There is frequently only one judge in the province, and he would be a member—I think a better term for it in English is the local district attorney, frankly, because——

Senator AIKEN. Is he appointed or elected?

Mr. COLBY. Under their system of law he is appointed. He is under the Ministry of Justice. He is a national government official.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. The case would be reviewed by that body. Assuming the suspect fell within the categories and depending on what his job was in the VC, he would receive an appropriate sentence according to the subdivisions that I have outlined. Serious party members would have a minimum of a 2-year sentence.

Leaders of the fronts, and that sort of thing, but not party members, would receive a 1- to 2-year sentence. A lesser follower, someone who had just helped at the machinery, would have a maximum of 1 year.

Upon conviction, under the current legislation, he would be moved to a detention center or corrections center, as it is called, a prison, and held there until the expiration of his term.

Now I am speaking of the ideal, Mr. Chairman. I am speaking of the way the legislation says it should work. There are weaknesses in it that are being worked on. One of them, for instance, is that there is frequently a long detention period while the case is being prepared. Bureaucracy does not prepare it fast enough.

The other thing, as was mentioned, is that a number of the cases received less than the appropriate sentence for their job until recently when this had begun to tighten up a little bit.

Some of the provinces have not moved the individuals from the province detention facilities to the national corrections centers even after the sentence. Up until a few months ago the requirement was that the case be reviewed and confirmed by the Ministry of Justice, which meant another 2 or 3 months' delay in the processing. That has been changed in the past few months, so that, once the case was approved by the province security committee, the men will be moved to the national corrections center and begin serving their terms. The Ministry of Interior still does review the case but it reviews it after he has been sent to the corrections center.

PROVINCE SECURITY COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Who makes up the province security committee? I did not understand that.

Mr. COLBY. The province chief, the deputy province chief, his deputy for administration. The latter is a civilian.

The CHAIRMAN. These are all Vietnamese?

Mr. COLBY. Oh, yes. No Americans are in this. A number of these officers actually have American advisers. The province chiefs have senior advisers, for instance, but no Americans sit on committee.

RIGHTS OF ARRESTED PERSON

The CHAIRMAN. Does the arrested person have a counsel and trial?

Mr. COLBY. Generally, no.

The CHAIRMAN. May he be tried by the committee while he is in jail and in absentia?

Mr. COLBY. I think what you mean is one thing that is currently under discussion, Mr. Chairman. Does he have a right to a hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. And to be present at it?

Mr. COLBY. No, he does not have a right to a hearing under the present legislation. There is some consideration being given to modifying that.

VCI KILLED UNDER PHOENIX PROGRAM IN 1968 AND 1969

The CHAIRMAN. In 1968, out of a total of 15,776 VCI neutralized under the Phoenix program, 2,259 were killed, which is about 13 percent of the total.

Last year 6,187 were killed out of 19,534 neutralized, which is about 36 percent.

I noticed according to your statements for the record, the VCI killed about the same number of people. You said more than 6,000. What is the explanation of the great increase in the percentage of the VCI killed in 1969?

Mr. COLBY. If I may make one correction, Mr. Chairman. You will recall that 1968 terrorist figures do not include the month of February, the month of the Tet attacks, so that it is an 11-month period.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. COLBY. Actually there were more people killed during 1968 than 1969, I am quite sure.

The explanation for the difference, Mr. Chairman, is, I believe, that during 1969 increased attention has been given to the program. There has particularly been an increased discipline over the kinds of people that were credited to the program.

During 1968 they did not have precise definitions of who was a VCI and, consequently, pretty much everyone who was arrested was included as a VCI in those figures.

By 1969, these sharpened up a bit, and many people who were actually captured and arrested as VC could not be classified as VCI for this program.

Secondly, I think that the pressures on the program of concentrating on the infrastructure as a target have created a greater degree of activity and a greater degree of intensity of effort so that even though the figures in 1969 are harder, I think you are getting essentially a larger total than you had for the softer figures in 1968.

Third, as I mentioned the other day, I think that a substantial number of the killed were not ones that were particularly targeted but were ones which were identified as members of the infrastructure after having been killed in some kind of an action. But since there was a certain desire to focus on the infrastructure as a target, these people were credited to the totals.

Mr. VANN. Could I add two things to that, sir, from my experience in the Delta?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. VANN. In 1969 many more members of the infrastructure are living in base areas than in 1968.

In 1968, they were continuing to live in the hamlet. Because they now live in base areas, it means they live with the military unit as opposed to living among the civilian communities. That would account on the one hand for why there would be such a high percentage killed.

Finally, and Ambassador Colby just touched on it, you are kind of comparing apples and oranges because in 1968 the figures are A, B, and C categories. In 1969, it was A, B, and C for the first 5 months and then A and B only for the last 7 months.

If you were to take comparable figures for 1968 and 1969—A,B, and, C for the total year—the percentage of VCI killed goes down substantially.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the numbers go down?

Mr. VANN. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The number.

Mr. VANN. The number would go up.

Mr. COLBY. The number goes up very substantially.

Mr. VANN. The numbers would go up, but the number killed goes down.

The CHAIRMAN. The number 6,000 against 2,000 is substantial.

Mr. VANN. Right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Numbers, not percentage.

Mr. VANN. Right, sir. But total numbers also go up considerably in 1969.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PHOENIX PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider this program a successful one, Mr. Vann?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I consider it an essential program that has not become anywhere near as effective as we believe it can be. I also am well aware that, like any other program in Vietnam, it has its share of abuses, and by its very nature it is one which is extremely vulnerable to being misused. It requires a great deal of supervision.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for one question here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

WHY IS PHOENIX PROGRAM ESSENTIAL?

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you think it is essential?

Mr. VANN. Are you referring to me, sir, or the Ambassador?

Senator SYMINGTON. You said you thought it was essential.

Mr. VANN. I think it is essential because in any organization of the enemy the brains of that organization are what keep it going. In other words, you can kill on a continuing basis followers and yet the people who can organize things politically can get a recruiting drive going and replace these followers. They can continue to send them out where they are in danger and can be, and will be, killed and have to be replaced. The followers go out to do the missions or the dirty work, if you will. They are the ones who are sent out to do executions of GVN officials.

The best way of getting on top of that is to get the nerve center, the command post, of the enemy, and this is essentially what the Phoenix or Phung Hoang program is designed to do.

It has not yet enjoyed the success that we feel is possible. It has not done it primarily because there has not been the same degree of awareness on the part of the Government of Vietnam, speaking on the whole, not as individuals, as there is on the part of the United States as to the importance of this.

Please keep in mind their government is very militarily oriented. Even on the American side for years we had difficulty getting the

G–2 elements at various tactical levels to recognize that it was sometimes more important to capture one key organizer in an area than it was to kill 100 guerrillas because he was the man who could keep up the organization, keep it flourishing and replenish the losses as they occurred.

I had a very high level U.S. American Army G–2 officer comment to me in 1967, "Look, let us win this damned war by killing the enemy and then you civilians can screw around with the infrastructure after the war is over." That reflected all too often the attitude on the part of some U.S. personnel.

The attitude is much more prevalent on the part of the Vietnamese personnel because they are much more militarily oriented in their entire government structure than we are. This is why I consider it is an essential program, sir.

Mr. Colby. I think I might add to that, Senator, that the necessity of the program comes from the nature of the war being fought. This is a war fought on different levels. Part of the war is a subversive war, a terrorist war being fought by a political apparatus, one which refused to consider operating under any kind of normal rule.

They are the ones who began the process of subversion and developing these networks, developing the attacks on the government structure.

If you are going to fight this kind of a war, you have to fight it on this level as well as on the regular level. You have to do a better job. The government of Vietnam, however, as Mr. Vann said, has not developed much expertise in this thing.

We Americans have been learning the necessity of it. The Communist Party of Indo-China began in 1930 and they have been developing their techniques and standards ever since, so they have about a 40-year jump on us in terms of professionalism. This is a very professional covert operation that the enemy is running. A normal member of the VCI will have several aliases; he will have all the paraphernalia of covert operations, cutouts and all that sort of thing.

So it is a subversive organization and it has to be met by good, sensible, hard police methods—intelligent ones too, not brutal ones; don't get me wrong.

DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND MILITARY

The Chairman. This is directed at civilians rather than military; is that correct? I am not sure.

Mr. Colby. Sir, the difference between a civilian and a military is very fuzzy in the nature of this war.

Is the guerrilla a civilian or military? Is the political boss civilian or military? Is the fellow who is in the local force unit civilian or military? He probably does not have a uniform. He does have a weapon.

The infrastructure fellow has a weapon. Maybe he has a bomb that he places someplace. Is he civilian or military? Those distinctions are some of the things that we have learned are not that compelling. We have learned it in our CORDS organization. We have learned that we have to put civilian Americans and military Americans together to make an American team to fight this kind of war. It does not divide into civil and military.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this account for the fact that you have incidents like Mylai in which you cannot tell the difference, so you resolve all doubts in favor of the fact that they are all VCI because you cannot tell the difference?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. I think I have tried to indicate that we have devoted quite a lot of effort to identifying precisely who is a member of which part of the apparatus.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what confuses me. I thought you said it was difficult to tell the difference. I can see it would be very difficult.

Mr. COLBY. I am saying there is not a difference between civil and military.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. But the Phoenix program is aimed at identifying by name—not by character but by name—the people who do these different jobs so they can be identified and individually picked up.

Mr. VANN. Sir, there is no relationship at all between the incident which is alleged to have happened at Mylai and the type of program we are now discussing, no relationship at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see there is not in that sense, but there is the fact that you cannot tell very well the difference between a military man and a VCI, a soldier. These people don't wear their uniforms. They all wear pajamas; don't they?

Mr. VANN. Let's look at it from the other side, sir. Ambassador Colby is just as legitimate a target to the other side as is General Abrams.

When I travel in the countryside, sir, I have, not on my person, but close to me in the back of my helicopter and on my person if I am going to spend a night in an outpost, a weapon to give myself close-in protection if someone tries to assassinate me or shoot me. That is the kind of a war it is. Everything is fair game for either side.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say you have a weapon to protect you if someone is about to attack you?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where do you keep it?

Mr. VANN. If I am flying in my helicopter or in my car I have it at my feet or at my side, but out of sight because I don't like to have it visible. I will have four hand grenades in a briefcase and a pistol and 100 rounds of ammunition in my briefcase.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree this is a very peculiar war. Everything indicates that, but I am trying to understand.

ALLEGATIONS OF OFFICERS TRAINED AT FORT HOLABIRD

Are you familiar with the allegations made in the case in Baltimore involving a man named Reichmeyer? Are either of you familiar with it?

Mr. COLBY. Are those the two officers?

The CHAIRMAN. They were being trained at Fort Holabird.

Mr. COLBY. Generally. I am not precisely familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give an explanation of your point of view or your explanation of that incident if you are familiar with it?

Mr. COLBY. I am not familiar with it, Mr. Chairman. All I know is that those officers apparently had not been to Vietnam. They were talking about what they would be told to do when they got to Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

They were repeating what an instructor who had been to Vietnam told them would be expected of them when they arrived there; is that not correct? That was the report.

Mr. COLBY. Right. My only comment is that that is not expected of them. In fact, quite the contrary, we have given very specific directives to our officers as to their behavior, and I believe I have submitted one of those for the record.

(The information referred to appears on p. 61).

The CHAIRMAN. Why did the Government drop the case and not go on through with it and allow them to attempt to prove their allegation?

Mr. COLBY. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same sort of thing that the Senator from Missouri and I are concerned about in the executive hearings. In this case these two men offered to prove their allegations. The Government backed off from it and it was quashed. It reminds me a little of what is quashed in our hearings and it leaves these questions in our minds.

I would much prefer for our own satisfaction if the Government had made the explanation you are making and had been able to sustain it. It would have cleared the air and been a lot better. These two men made what they called a proffer and the Government after that dropped it and didn't prosecute them. The men were allowed whatever it was they asked for. It was a conscientious objection or something. The men said they were very deeply offended by what they believed they were expected to do if they went to Vietnam, which is what has been explained.

I grant it is just one case.

Mr. VANN. Senator Fulbright, may I submit——

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to.

Mr. VANN. Although you have a policy, a program of instruction, and clearly delineated orders and principles that people are to follow, the Army, CORDS organization, and all of our other agencies in Vietnam are, after all, made up of human beings. Many people deviate from what they have been told to do because of their own personal experience or because of their personal convictions as to what may be right. I have on a continuing basis found subordinates of mine violating my established policies. Depending upon the nature of the violation, I either get it corrected or I discipline them.

But, sir, those are not the published instructions. It is not the way these people operate. What these two young gentlemen were told, and by what instructor, is not within my knowledge, but I do submit it is quite possible it was someone acting outside of the scope of his established responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I regret that the Government did not go ahead and clear the matter up at the time.

INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLENCE IN VIETNAM

What I said reminds me of a statement yesterday. I won't undertake exactly to state what you said, Colonel Vann, but you expressed a certain resentment, I think, at what you considered an implication of some questions relating to this program.

It occurred to me afterward, when I considered how many acts of violence take place in this city or in New York City or any other city in America and the enormous increase in the amount of crime and violence here in this country, that you really should not be too surprised that people who hear about these things are not too skeptical about the allegations of crime or, we will say, acts of violence in Vietnam because we have them here at home.

We are at present a very violent people. Everything indicates that.

Mr. VANN. All I was submitting, sir, is when it happens here it is in violation of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. VANN. When it happens there it is in violation of the law as we have established it.

EFFECT OF CONDITIONS ON ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are right in a sense. I mean I don't feel that you have deliberately ordered people, or the policy orders them, to do many of the things which are done. The conditions are such that it almost inevitably results in that because this is a very nasty war. Don't you think it is?

Mr. VANN. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think it almost inevitably results in that.

Mr. VANN. I agree with you it is a nasty war, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it arises out of the fact that we intervened in a civil war and the Americans were led to believe it was a holy war on a different basis. This has nothing to do with the way you gentlemen discharge your duties. There have been many, many misapprehensions about what the war is about, but that is another matter, largely of a political nature.

Mr. COLBY. I did hope, Mr. Chairman, that in the course of these hearings we might lay to rest the belief that had gotten abroad and in the press that the Phoenix program was a program of assassination and murder and that sort of thing. I just don't think it is. It is not——

HOW DOES PHOENIX PROGRAM GET THE PEOPLE AT THE TOP?

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair will yield, the testimony recently was that you go after the people at the top. How do you get them at the top. Suppose they resist; what do you do then?

Mr. COLBY. The purpose of the program, Senator, is to——

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand what the purpose is.

Mr. COLBY. To get ahold of the fellows.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have been over the purpose. We both know—I have been in the Army myself, I have been a secretary in the Pentagon, and I think I know something about the establishment.

Mr. Vann says he has a gun by his feet and hand grenades in his valise, and so forth and so on.

Now, he emphasizes that it is not important to kill a blank number, which is what we do every week. We put out how many of them that we kill, and I think that is a relatively unimportant piece of knowledge.

With our industrial complex, if we cannot kill a lot of North Vietnamese, then I am very surprised. I wish we would have killed more North Vietnamese before they had killed more Americans. But, in any case, we kill a lot and we boast about it.

Mr. Vann comes up here and he says it is not important to kill the little people; it is important to kill the big people.

Mr. COLBY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is, in effect, what he is saying, because you say you are going to get them. Suppose you go in and arrest a man and he pulls a gun on you. What do you do, run away or do you pull a gun on him?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. But the statistics for this year, as the chairman was suggesting, show that roughly a third of these were picked up by capture, roughly a third by themselves voluntarily coming over to the Government, and roughly a third by being killed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

Mr. COLBY. Now the rest of the effort is to try to get them to come to our side, either by invitation or by grabbing them.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you are told to get them, aren't you, just like the Canadian Mounted Police are told to get their man. That is what they are told, aren't they?

Mr. COLBY. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you are told to get a civilian in a village it is stretching it a little bit to say that under no circumstances should you be considered—of course, the word "get" is an important word, you see.

Mr. COLBY. Agreed.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have been on the CIA Committee in the Senate for over a decade and I think we are beginning to get awfully wordy about what we are doing.

IDEOLOGY OF MAJOR MAI AND TRAN NGOC CHAU

Colonel Vann, you said this morning that you didn't think that Mai was a Communist; is that correct?

Mr. VANN. That is correct, sir. I have no reason to think that he is other than what he seems to be, which is a dedicated Nationalist.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. And you also said the same about Chau, didn't you?

Mr. VANN. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you think the Ambassador feels Chau is a Communist?

Mr. VANN. I don't know that he does.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I do because he told our staff people that he was.

Mr. VANN. He did not tell me that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you think he told our staff people that he was?

Mr. VANN. If he thinks that, he has information that is not available to me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Or to the head of the CIA out there Mr. [deleted] who happens to be a friend of mine, and one of the best men I know in the business. He says he is not a Communist.

Do you think Mr. Bunker takes the word of Mr. Thieu or some other official in the Saigon government over the top official in our Government?

Mr. VANN. I really cannot answer that, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you are in your own mind confident that Mr. [deleted] is right and Ambassador Bunker is wrong about his being a Communist; is that correct?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I would not phrase it in that fashion.

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you phrase it?

Mr. VANN. I would say that I have no information at all that would suggest to me that Tran Ngoc Chau is a Communist. The information I do have suggests to me that he is not a Communist. It suggests to me he is not pro-Communist.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. You have made your point.

CHAU'S DISCUSSION OF HIS CONTACTS WITH HIS BROTHER

Did Mr. Chau ever tell you that he discussed his contacts with his brother, who was a Communist?

Mr. VANN. With whom, sir?

Senator SYMINGTON. With his own brother.

Mr. VANN. He told me about his brother.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did he tell you about his brother?

Mr. VANN. He told me that his brother had come to see him and wanted to establish contact with the Americans.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he tell you that his brother was a Communist?

Mr. VANN. He told me his brother was a Communist. However, he qualified it, and we had an argument about it. He told me his brother was first a nationalist and second a Communist, and I told him I thought that no one could be a Communist and have it as a second priority and that his brother must be first a Communist.

PRIORITY OF COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM

Senator SYMINGTON. What would you say Dubczek was, first a Communist and second a nationalist in Czechoslvakia, or first a nationalist and second a Communist. What would you say about that?

Mr. VANN. First of all, sir, I know nothing about the gentlemen except for what I read in the paper.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

If a man is a Communist, do you think automatically he cannot be a nationalist; is that right?

Mr. VANN. No, sir. I just think that, if he is a Communist, that takes first priority in his thinking, and nationalism would be second.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by that?

How about the Czechoslovak Communists? You must get some papers out where you are. How about the Czechoslovaks who risk their lives protesting against communism although they are members of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia? Do you think they are nationalists first?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I don't consider communism to be monolithic.

Senator SYMINGTON. What are you talking about?

Mr. VANN. I am saying I would imagine their allegiance to the Czechoslovak Communist Party would override, if it came into conflict with their feelings of nationalism, provided they were bona fide Communists.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, we are getting into a semantic square dance.

TRAN NGOC CHAU'S CONTACTS WITH CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask you this question, Colonel Vann. Do you know of any contacts that Mr. Chau had with the CIA?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I only know that Colonel Chau worked with the CIA advisers in his province, the CIA advisers in the Vung Tau Training Center, and the CIA advisers at the ministerial level.

Colonel Chau told me that he had had contacts with the CIA.

Senator SYMINGTON. What people did he have contact with?

Mr. VANN. Sir, he told me he had contacts with Mr. [deleted] and Mr. [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he tell you he had any contact with Mr. [deleted]?

Mr. VANN. No, sir, he did not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Or Mr. [deleted]?

Mr. VANN. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know whether the CIA reported Mr. Chau's contacts to the Government of South Vietnam?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have no idea of what they did or did not report.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby, do you know about that, sir?

Mr. COLBY. I really cannot answer. I wouldn't want to answer without checking the files, Senator.

TRAN NGOC CHAU'S DIFFERENCES WITH CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Do either of you know whether Chau's differences with the CIA over the program involved Messrs. [deleted]?

Mr. COLBY. They were both there at the time, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were there differences between them?

Mr. COLBY. I could not say. It was a difference between our Agency and Mr. Chau about how the thing should be run, [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Colonel Vann, how about that?

Mr. VANN. I am aware that they did have differences of opinion on how the cadre program should be run, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What were the differences?

Mr. VANN. The differences were a matter of the degree of control that the CIA should exercise versus the degree and the type of control the Government of Vietnam should exercise.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you know that when the Ambassador sent representatives down there that they came back and agreed with Mr. Chau about some of these differences?

Mr. VANN. I am aware, sir, that two Foreign Service officers did go to Vung Tau at Deputy Ambassador Porter's request.

Senator SYMINGTON. Ambassador Porter, not Ambassador Bunker.

Mr. VANN. When they came back they gave him a report on it. They did not give me the report.

Senator SYMINGTON. You don't know how they felt about it?

Mr. VANN. I gathered from comments made afterward, I never saw their report, that they were sympathetic to Colonel Chau.

Senator SYMINGTON. And did you talk with them?

Mr. VANN. I have talked with the two officers involved on a continuing basis for the last 4 years, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know [deleted].

Mr. VANN. Quite well, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did he tell you about this?

Mr. VANN. Sir, we discussed this on numerous occasions, and——

Senator SYMINGTON. Pick the occasion that you think is most pertinent to my question.

Mr. VANN. It would be very difficult for me, 4 years past, to remember any exact date. But we remembered that Colonel Chau had some points in his favor. We also agreed that Colonel Chau is a prima donna, that he is a very ambitious man, that he had political objectives in mind in wanting to dominate this program, and that he also was extremely concerned about his own personal image as a possible employee of the CIA. This concerned his personal ideals and standards, and he became more concerned about it than his immediate superior, General Thang.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did he say to you that you thought had merit in it?

Mr. VANN. Colonel Chau?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. VANN. I agreed with him that it would be preferable, given the expansion of the program and the rather deep involvement it would have with all phases of Vietnamese life, for it to be under the sponsorship of another agency.

DESIRABILITY OF IMPROVEMENT IN CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. So even though he was very ambitious, and I say with great respect that I heard the same about you when I was out there, you do agree, and I think both of you were probably right, there could be some improvements in the Agency.

Mr. VANN. Not in the Agency, sir, but it is a fact that the Vietnamese tend to regard anything in connection with the CIA as having some spy thriller type of activity associated with it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with that?

Mr. VANN. I agree that the Vietnamese feel that way, sir. I do not agree that that is true, because all of my knowledge of the CIA involvement on the revolutionary cadre development program was that it is overt and aboveboard.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the stories I have heard of your being heavily critical of the CIA have no basis in fact.

Mr. VANN. I would not say they have no basis, sir. I was heavily critical of individual members in the CIA, and some of their manners of operation. I was also very complimentary of some of the members, such as Mr. [deleted] who I thought did a masterful job when I was out there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Mr. [deleted] today, do you know?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir. He is assigned here in Washington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Mr. [deleted]?

Mr. VANN. I do not know, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Colby, do you know, sir?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir; I do not. I am not sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do either of them have anything to do with Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. Mr. [deleted] does. Mr. [deleted], I am not sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. What does he have to do with it?

Mr. COLBY. He is in, he is a staff officer in, CIA headquarters.

REASON FOR U.S. LACK OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. I would ask you this question, Mr. Colby, and I would like the record to show again that I never met anybody who seemed to know more about what he was doing than you. Why do you think it is, with 800,000 Americans, and I count the fleet, people in Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines, why do you think it is when we have that number of people, backed up by this great military-industrial complex, that we have had so little success out there in what we are trying to do?

Mr. COLBY. This you asked me to submit a reply for the record, sir. I have written out something and I would be glad to expand on it a little bit.

Senator SYMINGTON. Go ahead.

Mr. COLBY. My comment was that during the period 1965 to 1968, Communist military strength in Vietnam was at a high level. Its regular troops rested upon active guerrilla forces and a politically organized base. The Communist regular forces were set back by U.S. regular forces.

The Vietnamese Government, with U.S. support, then strengthened its Regional and Popular Forces, the People's Self-Defense, Phoenix, and police operations, and developed a more actively engaged population.

By 1970 the nature of the war has thus changed. What was formerly a Communist war conducted on three levels became a Government-led people's war facing an increasingly North Vietnamese military force.

The territorial forces, the police, and the People's Self-Defense make the enemy military forces much less effective since they preempt the caches, the recruits, and the information.

Under these circumstances the enemy regular military force becomes less difficult to handle than the earlier combined guerrilla and regular enemy forces and infrastructure.

A weaker enemy thus faces a GVN which is stronger in the political as well as in the military field. This process has already begun in the delta where smaller total military forces are handling a situation which formerly required the assistance of regular U.S. forces.

Now, that is just a portion of the delta that I am talking about.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand you say the reason we haven't been successful out there is because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong regulars and guerrillas have increased their strength to meet our competition; is that right?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. The answer was, how can the Vietnamese be expected to assume what these 800,000 Americans have done.

Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't ask you that. At this time I asked you why it was, with 800,000 people, backed up by $80 million a day at one point and over $100 billion all told, we have been so unsuccessful in whatever it is we are trying to do out there.

Mr. COLBY. I think, Senator, the thing is that, unfortunately, as has happened in previous wars, we have learned about the tactics and technique of this war in the course of fighting it, and that we have had a very bad few years in the course of that.

Senator SYMINGTON. You don't think that if we had unshackled the Army, let them counterattack into Cambodia and North Vietnam and Laos, and if we had let the air operate as it always had before in any wars we have been in, and if we had let the Navy operate on the same basis, we could have cleaned this matter up pretty rapidly?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir, I think the nature of this war requires the active engagement of the population, the creation of a population which is really fully involved in the war. I think we have finally learned this lesson and we are beginning to apply this lesson.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thus, even though we put these 800,000 people and all this money and equipment into the war, the very fact we went at it the wrong way is the chief reason for lack of success; is that your opinion?

Mr. COLBY. I think it had a lot to do with it. It is not the sole reason.

PROSPECTS FOR VIETNAMIZATION IN NEXT FEW YEARS

Senator SYMINGTON. Nevertheless you feel that because South Vietnamese now know how to do it, with the proper equipment, Vietnamization will increase over the period of the next few years; is that correct?

Mr. COLBY. Over a period, yes, Senator. I think that having learned the techniques and having begun to apply them, and with a program which will carry it further it will succeed. A lot of these techniques are in their infancy; the Phoenix program is just beginning to be effective and there are a lot of other problems in the country. But gradually these techniques will become accepted and become implemented. The People's Self-Defense for instance is still very untrained, [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. But despite the arsenals in this country, General Westmoreland's setup, and Admiral Sharp's setup, and the Air Force, and 800,000 young Americans, the reason they did not win

was they didn't know how to fight the war right. They are learning how to fight it right, and after they get out, it will be won by the Vietnamese if we give them the equipment; is that right?

Mr. COLBY. Well, a lot of those things were necessary at one period, Senator. The war would have been lost certainly without those young men. There is no question about that. The war would certainly have been lost by 1965 or 1966 unless our troops had entered it.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I carry a few questions along that line?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to turn this over to Senator Aiken, if I may, because I have to catch a plane and Senator Fulbright said he would be back here in 10 minutes. I would be very glad to yield to you.

Senator CASE. Well, you are so gracious.

Senator AIKEN. I have one question.

REGULARS NEEDED TO COPE WITH A GUERRILLA

How many regulars does it take to cope with a guerrilla?

Mr. COLBY. If you are just talking about regulars, Senator, it is a very sticky problem because there are over 10,000 hamlets in Vietnam, any one of which can be attacked by a guerrilla. There are two possible ways to protect them. One is to go out and hit the guerrilla with a regular force, if you are lucky enough to find him. The other is to develop self-defense capabilities for all those people, all those hamlets. The only way to find the guerrillas is to do that.

Senator AIKEN. I have two definite answers. I asked General Westmoreland how many regulars it took to deal with a guerrilla and he said 10. I asked Admiral Sharp, who was some distance away from the scene, and he said, oh, four or five. It seems the further away you are——

Mr. COLBY. I would rather answer the question by saying that a guerrilla can be dealt with not only by regulars but also by guerrillas and also by policemen. But it is not a thing you can handle effectively by only regulars alone.

Senator AIKEN. The method of making war even by guerrillas, has changed.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. So that a smaller force can——

Mr. COLBY. Can tie up——

Senator AIKEN. Can tie up or hold off a much larger force than would have been possible 30, 35 years ago.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Go ahead, Senator Case.

NECESSITY OF POPULAR SUPPORT TO DEFEAT GUERRILLAS

Senator CASE. I take it, along that line, that part of the answer is also that you cannot ever defeat guerrillas unless the population is at least with you.

Mr. COLBY. I believe so.

Senator CASE. On the other hand, the guerrilla cannot be effective unless the population is sympathetic to him.

Mr. Colby. Not necessarily sympathetic, Senator.

Senator Case. Apathetic—is not antiguerrilla.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

Senator Case. You are naturally taking into account now the matter of bringing the population actively on the side of the South Vietnamese regime.

Mr. Colby. Yes.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO FIGHT WAR

Senator Case. Again, further along the lines of the questions that Senator Symington was asking. There has been a suggestion that what we did was our thing—the type of warfare, highly mechanized and supported by air and helicopters, and sophisticated equipment, communications and other things. It is argued, therefore, that our effort to Vietnamize the war cannot succeed because we won't be able to turn this kind of warfare effectively over to the Vietnamese; and yet they have been corrupted in their tactics by seeing us and wanting to copy us and being able to do the thing in the modern 20th century way.

I wish you would talk about this because the question of the success of the Vietnamese themselves in this kind of war seems to me terribly important.

I was going to ask these younger officers, too, their general views about this. Are they going to be able to operate helicopters, communications equipment, artillery, all the mechanisms that we have taught them is necessary?

Mr. Colby. We have a system in the services of starting with the junior member for an answer, Senator.

Senator Case. I wish you would sort of help me and get this information out as you think appropriate.

Mr. Colby. I think your questions are quite apt and I think we ought to start with them, not have them just say their boss is right.

Senator Case. Well, all right.

Senator Aiken. Let us begin at the end of the line.

Mr. Colby. The question, Sergeant, is. do you think the Vietnamese have been corrupted into believing they have to have very fancy equipment that they will not be able to continue to use and maintain and employ that we have spoiled them in a way in giving them this equipment and that consequently the implication of the Senator's question is we will have to continue to do it.

Sergeant Wallace. No, sir. I don't feel this way because the PSDF were given M–1's.

Senator Case. What is that, sir?

Sergeant Wallace. The People's Self-Defense Force were given M–1's carbines and Thompson machineguns. These are obsolete weapons that we no longer use yet they are willing to learn and seem to be fighting effectively with these weapons.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY WITHOUT U.S. AIR AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Senator Case. There is another side. I mean it isn't just what they will be willing to use, but what they will be able to use. Will they

be able to carry on this fight without our providing air support and logistical support, and all the rest?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, I think they can.

Senator CASE. Will they do it because they will supply air support or——

Sergeant WALLACE. We have used air support very few times in our area.

Senator CASE. In your particular experience.

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. That is not the general situation. Would anybody in the whole team talk about this air support? I had always understood air is rather important.

Captain GECK. Throughout the IV Corps, some of the Vietnamese are flying some of the helicopters themselves. I guess right now it is about 10 percent. However, the Vietnamese have quite a few pilots. I would not know the exact number of how many are in Fort Walters training at this time with helicopters. Our plan is to replace our pilots with theirs.

The Vietnamese I have flown with, and I have gone on operations, are very competent. They will fly into the same areas that the American pilots will, and give you the same sort of support.

On the maintenance side, which I was just prompted to mention, I am not exactly sure of what they have as a capability, but there is a training program for their people at a base in IV Corps near Can Tho. Naturally, the people of the Popular and Regional Forces units I work with, have been slightly spoiled by the M–16 rifles they are using now and the heavy air support they now have. They could not do without it.

In any combat situation, once you have this asset, to do without it is a hindrance. However, in my area, they have all had their own artillery. I would say it has been my experience that they have 50 percent or more of their own air support and have been flying helicopters, so that I see there is a good chance for us to pull out in the future.

Senator CASE. And you, Captain?

Captain MURPHY. I would like to attack this question from the standpoint of comparing what they do have, Senator, to what they don't have, where I am in Long An Province.

First of all, as you mentioned, they do have modern individual weapons, the M–16 rifle or the M–60 machinegun, the M–79 grenade launcher. They can utilize these weapons effectively against the enemy.

They have modern transportation and communications equipment. They have the same radios and the same vehicles that we have in the U.S. Army. They perform 100 percent their own maintenance.

Senator CASE. They do?

Captain MURPHY. On the equipment which they have, yes, they do, sir.

Senator CASE. All this?

Captain MURPHY. There is one platoon or two tubes of Vietnamese artillery operated by the 25th ARVN Division located in each of our seven districts. They have support capabilities throughout that district.

Other indirect fire weapons that they have are mortars, the same mortars that we have in the U.S. Army. What they don't have in Long An Province are helicopter gunships. However, training programs are underway whereby we train helicopter pilots, and eventually they will be able to perform and operate in their own helicopter assault companies and fly the gunship support as well.

ENDURANCE AND MOTIVATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Really, Senator, it is not very difficult to be an infantry soldier. It takes commonsense and an aggressive attitude. Certainly, the Vietnamese have all these capabilities. The one thing they do not have, which we have, is a little more endurance. The Vietnamese people, by and large, do not have the endurance capability that the U.S. soldier has.

Senator CASE. You mean physical stamina?

Captain MURPHY. Physical.

Senator CASE. That is interesting.

Captain MURPHY. But they do have something we don't have, Senator, and that is the motivation brought about by the role that they are performing in the defense of their own homes and villages.

Senator CASE. Well, you know, I will come back to you, if I may, but you had something you wanted to say about that.

CAPABILITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Major ARTHUR. It has been my observation that the Vietnamese people, as a nation, or as a race, are quite clever mechanically. They are able to take engines apart and put them back together again. You can see a man taking his motorcycle apart and repairing it on any street corner in Saigon or Binh Chanh. They are quite adept and can handle communications very well. That is one of their fortés.

The artillery that I have observed is good, and they provide all the artillery fire support in Binh Chanh.

The counterparts that I have operated with on combat missions are capable of handling air mobile operations. They would be capable of handling and controlling light fire teams, which are two helicopter gunships when we are in contact, if those gunships were flown by Vietnamese. I stand beside the captain or the colonel—whoever happens to be there. He tells me what he wants done in English, as broken as it is. If it is the captain, with the little Vietnamese that I speak and the interpreter we get the point across. I tell the pilots of the helicopters where we want them to hit, and they engage that area.

When the Vietnamese are trained to fly the helicopters, and the Vietnamese commander on the ground can talk to the Vietnamese helicopter pilot in the air in Vietnamese, they will be able to handle their own air support. There is a language problem now.

They can also handle the medical evacuation helicopter if they were talking to a Vietnamese pilot for they know the procedures, et cetera.

We speak of the modern weapons we have given them. Well, the people on the other side are carrying AK–47's made in Red China or Russia. They are modern weapons also. I feel the South Vietnamese in

my area have progressed and are capable of assuming their own defense. They provide 100 percent of the maintenance of the equipment in my area, also maintaining the jeeps that I have.

I hope I have been able to answer some of your questions, sir.

Senator CASE. Thank you. You have, indeed.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVATION AND AGGRESSIVENESS

Now, I would like to come back to the point you were making when you were last talking together, because it is what you said that sounds so different from what so many people have said and written: that the one thing that the Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, have not had is motivation or morale or aggressiveness, another one of your words, but rather the reverse of all those attributes, and this was the trouble, that they wouldn't go out to fight, and they wouldn't move in to fill gaps that we perhaps have had to leave occasionally. I wish you would develop this a little bit more because this is almost the heart of the point, it seems to me; isn't it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, it is.

Senator CASE. Is you experience unique?

Captain MURPHY. I don't believe it is unique, Senator. It is a question of what causes this motivation or this aggressiveness to evolve. I think it is partially because of the weapons, the equipment that they have now. But more than anything else, sir, I think it is a result of the individual soldier, the individual platoon leader, and the individual company commander seeing the progress that his unit has helped to bring about in the rural hamlets and villages.

That is, I think, one of the greatest factors which has contributed to it.

Senator CASE. I am sure it is, and what we are interested in is whether it really happened, or whether it happened in a real area or whatnot.

Captain MURPHY. I assure you it has.

Senator CASE. I remember when I was over there before, up in I Corps, one of the most important things about these mixed teams that I guess you said, didn't you, you were involved in one of these mixed patrols, or whatever you called them——

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, combined action platoon.

Senator CASE. The boys did all right so long as you were with them. And, seriously, that is a fact. I was not surprised at it or critical. But if you weren't with them, then what happened to them?

RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VILLAGE OR HAMLET

I would like to ask all three of you what has happened when our teams have moved out of a village or a hamlet, or whatnot, and left it to the Vietnamese.

Captain GECK. Sir, if I may make a comment here, this is something I tried to point out in my opening statement, after we moved out of villages (I cited one particular village, and we have worked quite a few) in very few cases do the units seem to return to their old level.

In most cases, I think the word is confidence. It has begun to work well. They can see they have the ability and are successful against the enemy. They continue to operate this way. They are no longer afraid of the enemy. He is no longer this giant who used to scare them. Because of Tet, 1968, he is now a real individual they have met and defeated. Also, something I have seen on the village level in both the civilian and the military side is a confidence in, if not a stable Government, at least a stable system developing in Vietnam, something they can count on for the future.

On the civilian side, you can see it in rural areas not very far, perhaps 5 kilometers from a large Vietcong base area. They are putting up a large building. People are contributing quite an investment to the villages they live in. The Vietnamese are sensible in the usage of their money as we are. They are not going to waste millions of piasters in some cases or take a chance that these buildings that they are erecting will be destroyed in the near future.

They have confidence that the village will continue to grow. I think this is the whole trick both in the military and inside the Government.

MOTIVATION OF REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES

Major Arthur. I wanted to bring up a point about their motivation, because I am talking about the Regional Forces and Popular Forces as opposed to the ARVN. I am at the Province level. I have 17 Regional Force companies and 25 Popular Force platoons in the district.

The motivation of our troops is up over previous reports that you might have heard. Primarily these are home troops. The Popular Forces are working in the district they were recruited in, and the Regional Forces are working in the Province they were recruited in. This, to me, is part of the drive to get good Regional Forces and Popular Forces and upgrade them to handle the territorial security and protect their homes in this area.

This is where the motivation comes in.

SKEPTICISM IS PRODUCT OF PAST EXPERIENCE

Senator Case. You will forgive us if we are skeptical about these things because we have had this kind of a report 5, 6, 7 years.

Major Arthur. Yes, sir, I understand.

Senator Case. People like you have not wanted to be offensive to your counterparts or make a bad record of your own accomplishments, so you come up only with the good side, and I am not saying that any of you are doing this now. What I am saying is that you have to be understanding with us when we have had to listen to this kind of thing from McNamara. We have McNamara coming back and saying the boys are going to be out of the trenches by Christmas, you will remember, 5 or 6 years ago, and not only that, but right down the line.

Major Arthur. Sir, I didn't say it was 100 percent either. There is an improvement, and there is room for improvement still.

IS REASONABLE END IN SIGHT?

Senator CASE. What we are trying to get at is, must this still be looked at as an endless thing, or is there an end in sight and is it reasonable?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir, I think it is reasonable to assume that with things going the way they are going now, there is an end in sight. I cannot really put a timetable on it. It is beyond my capability.

CAP PROGRAM IN HAMLETS

Sergeant WALLACE. Senator, I would like to mention that the primary purpose of the CAP program is to move into that hamlet, provide security for the people. The hamlets are being trained and protected by the CAP's. There are 450 hamlets which presently are protected by CAP teams; there are 350 hamlets in which the CAP's operated previously. In all there are 800 hamlets which have been provided security by the CAP program.

One hundred and fourteen platoons are now being trained by the CAP's; 90 platoons were previously trained by CAP's. This is a total of 204 platoons in 204 hamlets. Not one of these hamlets where the 90 platoons which we trained are located has been turned over to the Vietcong nor have the Vietcong been able to move in and take over the hamlets.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that one district or everywhere?

Sergeant WALLACE. This is the entire CAP program.

Mr. VANN. Senator Case, could I add just one thing?

Senator CASE. Yes.

IMPROVEMENT IN RF AND PF PERFORMANCE

Mr. VANN. We are very much aware of the skepticism and feel that there certainly has been adequate justification for it. And yet there are some others who have looked at it over the long haul and are in a position to compare realistically what existed today and what existed a year ago, or 3 or 5 years ago.

These officers have been talking about RF and PF, the Regional Forces, and Popular Forces.

We always are aware of the fact that no statistic in time of war is accurate. To some extent they are all spurious. But let us look at the very broad picture of how Regional Forces and Popular Forces performed in the past and how they are performing now. In 1966 the Regional Forces and Popular Forces, numbering less than 300,000, lost as many men and as many weapons as they killed and as they captured.

In 1969, the Regional Forces and Popular Forces killed three times as many enemy as they suffered losses themselves, and more than four times as many weapons were captured as they lost. This involved 475,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

Now, sir, there are many other measures of effectiveness. Nevertheless, this is one that in the final analysis means how people are performing in combat. There is a very substantial improvement. It is attributable to many, many things, not the least of which is certainly a much less hostile environment as far as the population is concerned than they previously had.

Senator CASE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Ambassador, do you have anything you want to contribute?

SATISFACTORY OUTCOME CAN BE ACHIEVED

Mr. COLBY. On this point, Senator, I refer back to my opening statement where I rather carefully say that we are not optimistic nor pessimistic about this situation, but I do believe that a satisfactory outcome can be achieved.

I can think of setbacks which will occur and I can think of situations which could arise which could reverse the current trends.

I think it is important, after the experience that you referred to of the disappointments of the past, that we be very serious about this. It also depends in great part upon the determination of the Vietnamese and of the Americans who are there—the determination to continue this program of increasingly developing the ability of the Vietnamese to carry this load themselves.

Therefore, we are trying not to exude optimism in our report to you here. I speak for myself certainly and I am sure for the other officers here. But we are also convinced that this is not a thing that the American people can feel is just sort of a hopeless thing that goes on forever. It is one that can be achieved.

I think you make a very valid point, can the Vietnamese expect to carry on the same standard of effort that they have with our rather fancy equipment. The answer is "No." But I also think that the Vietnamese are developing the ability to fight this kind of a war that we are faced with now with greater effectiveness, that this can make a substantial difference in the balance between them, and that consequently an outcome which gives them a free choice for the future can be achieved.

Senator CASE. Thank you, sir, very much.

Captain, may I just ask you a couple of questions.

POPULAR FORCES OPERATIONS WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT

You said in your statement that you went with the Popular Forces on their operations, gave them advice where it was necessary, and provided liaison with supporting units. Those were your words.

You are referring to U.S. support units there, are you not?

Captain GECK. Yes, Senator. I am referring basically to helicopter gunships in that case.

Senator CASE. That is the chief kind of support?

Captain GECK. Yes, Senator, it is.

Senator CASE. Do the Popular Forces continue to conduct light operations after our advisory teams have moved on to other villages?

Captain GECK. Yes, Senator, very much so. In fact, those particular Popular Forces that I am speaking of in that paragraph, have been increased. Their numbers have been increased since I left. Their operations now go further out than they ever went before, further than they ever went with us. I think in some cases they were afraid to take us out to some places, because they were afraid one of us would be hurt.

Senator CASE. You obviously believe what you are saying.

Captain Geck. Yes, sir, Senator. I am very impressed with the people I am working with.

Senator Case. I don't mean anything else except you have around this table for the most part people who want to be persuaded, but also people who have been disappointed so many times.

Captain Geck. Senator, I think, as the Ambassador said, I am probably optimistic. But, at the same time, I can see there might be setbacks. However, in the cases I have worked with, these people have learned quickly and responded well, and continued to do so after we left.

SUPERIORITY OF KIEN GIANG PROVINCE

Mr. Vann. I might say, sir, Captain Geck is working in a province that has an unusually good province chief and one in which the amount of progress made in the last year surpasses that of nearly any other place I know of in Vietnam. So his assessment would naturally be more positive than, say, someone working in Kien Hoa Province.

Kien Hoa Province, incidentally, is about the worst province in our delta, and is the one that Mr. Robert Shaplen picked to write about in his article.

Senator Case. I figure it is not going to come up spontaneously from the Defense Department or Department of State, and he had better do that job. But I am glad to have that comment; it is important.

SELECTION OF CAP SQUAD LEADERS

Sergeant, how are the CAP squad leaders chosen?

Sergeant Wallace. Sir, once we report to staging, they will issue orders to Vietnam, and I was assigned from the States to the CAP program. We are screened by a board and issued orders.

TRAINING OF CAP MARINES

Senator Case. What special training do they get?

Sergeant Wallace. Sir, all CAP marines go to 2 weeks of school in Danang.

Senator Case. Danang?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. What about the marines under your command, what do they get?

Sergeant Wallace. The same schooling.

Senator Case. The same kind?

Sergeant Wallace. Yes.

Senator Case. Senator, wouldn't you like to ask a question or two? I might want to come back before we get through, but please go ahead.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

I have a few questions, which I will direct to Ambassador Colby.

IDENTIFICATION OF VC BY PHOENIX PROGRAM

In connection with the Phoenix program, how do you identify the people whom you feel are active in the infrastructure? Perhaps Colonel Vann would want to answer that?

Mr. Colby. I can start off. This an intelligence problem initially. You develop card records on people in the area.

You know that the infrastructure in a certain province, in a certain district, probably has a certain structure. It has a chairman; it has a security man; it has a finance economy man; it has a liaison, and so forth. It has different bodies. So you know there is somebody taking care of those problems on the infrastructure side.

Then, through interrogation of ralliers—people who come over from the other side—through interrogations of prisoners, through some informants, through reports of neighbors and people of that nature, you gradually build up a picture of who these people are.

Now, initially a number of these reports may be just a single alias, a report that a certain job is filled by a man named Thanh or who calls himself Thanh. Then through the gathering of additional information, you find out that this man's name is really Nuygen Van Thanh or something, and that he was born in a certain section and place.

Senator Pell. Do any Vietnamese citizens have access to these card filing systems?

Mr. Colby. This is a Vietnamese card system, not American. The American helps the Vietnamese to set it up. The Vietnamese handle it.

Senator Pell. Is it a Vietnamese source for most of the intelligence going into it?

Mr. Colby. Yes.

PURPOSE OF THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator Pell. The statement has been made, which has concerned me, that one of the purposes of the Phoenix program or one of the results of it certainly is the elimination of the hard core of those who oppose the Thieu-Ky regime.

What is your reaction to that statement or allegation?

Mr. Colby. I think if you can go to the different areas where this program is in process you can see that the real thrust of it is to identify members of the Vietcong. That is what the problem is in a local area. These are the people who are the problem—with grenades and with contacts with the guerrillas, and so forth.

So that from the national level down to the bottom level, the whole thing is aimed at the Vietcong infrastructure and the Vietcong apparatus and terrorism.

It is possible, occasionally, that the wrong information on a man is reported, such as that he is in the infrastructure or that he holds a certain office in the Vietcong apparatus. Second, there may be a shakedown kind of thing: "I will report you unless you pay me." And, of course, you can go and say that a political jealousy in a local area could produce a wrongful report.

This is certainly possible, and I think that the National Assembly, in calling the Government to an interrogation on this, about 3 or 4 months ago, was conscious of this problem. They are following it. They are concerned about it.

I certainly would not say it has never happened, but I think the thrust of the program, the command emphasis given to it, the inspections, and the general emphasis is pretty clearly that these are members of the enemy apparatus. This is not just a little political discussion.

Unfortunately, the word "political" sometimes is difficult to translate. We call the Vietcong a political apparatus and that sounds like a political party over here.

VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS IN PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator PELL. Are the people in the Phoenix program entirely Vietnamese or are they mixed Vietnamese and Americans?

Mr. COLBY. The Vietnamese. The Phoenix program is basically a Vietnamese program. There are American advisers in it. This is a Vietnamese structure which has information centers and operation centers at the district, province, and national level. These are all Vietnamese officials.

They will have an American sitting in the office with them.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN G–2 AND PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator PELL. What is the relationship between our own intelligence organization, G–2, and the Phoenix program?

Mr. COLBY. They are not technically a part of it. The Phoenix program is a Vietnamese program. In other words, if there is an American unit in the neighborhood, a brigade or something, our G–2 of that brigade would not be a member of the local Phoenix committee. He would have liaison, but he would not be a member.

Senator PELL. I don't mean to take so much of your time, but I must be phrasing my questions poorly.

Does any member of G–2 ever feed in information to the Phoenix program—to the Vietnamese?

Mr. COLBY. Yes.

Senator PELL. And vice versa?

Mr. COLBY. We have access to most of the Vietnamese intelligence—I believe all of it—on this question.

NUMBER OF AMERICANS INVOLVED IN PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator PELL. How many Americans are involved in the Phoenix program?

Mr. COLBY. 450 Americans, almost all military being direct advisers. There are many other Americans who are associated with the organizations that work with the Phoenix: in the Phoenix program, the police, the military, and so forth.

NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN PHOENIX PROGRAM

Senator PELL. How many Vietnamese, roughly, to the nearest thousand, are involved?

Mr. COLBY. It is a hard question; it includes the Vietnamese special branch, the entire thing. The ordinary police participate in it on a part-time basis.

Senator PELL. How many have it as their main responsibility?

Mr. COLBY. There would be roughly between 4,000 or 5,000 working directly on it. But, as I say, there are literally tens of thousands more who spend part time on it.

NERVE CENTER ON WHICH PHOENIX PROGRAM FOCUSES

Senator PELL. This question I would direct more to Colonel Vann, if I might. I must say I have heard the most complimentary things about you, Ambassador Colby, and you, Colonel Vann, with respect to what you have done and the way you do it in Vietnam.

You said that part of the purpose or the purpose of the Phoenix program was to go to the nerve center. Don't we still believe the nerve center to be in Hanoi or do we believe the nerve center to be in South Vietnam?

Mr. VANN. Sir, the organization that we are focusing this program against is the South Vietnamese political infrastructure that supports COSVN, the Central Office of South Vietnam. That would be the regional political structure, provincial political structure, district and village, and even down to hamlet.

The lower the level, the more indistinct it becomes, so that at the hamlet level the Vietcong hamlet chief may also be the leader of the local Vietcong squad.

The higher the level the more sophisticated the organization becomes. You will have a separate man to do liaison, another to do tax and finance and economy, another to do women's organizations, et cetera. It also ties in directly at all levels with the military units that they command. In other words, an infrastructure chief at any level has at his beck and call a supporting unit; at the hamlet level it is a squad, at the village level it is a platoon, and at the district level it is usually a company.

Senator PELL. I would like to go up a little higher still. Isn't the nerve center for this operation in North Vietnam? Presumably the reason for our commitment in Vietnam is that the nerve center is in North Vietnam. If what you are saying is correct, we shouldn't have a single American soldier there.

Mr. VANN. COSVN, in turn, operates directly under Hanoi, sir.

Mr. COLBY. Excuse me, I think if I may, Senator, the Lao Dong Party, the central committee of the Lao Dong Party, is the nerve center.

Senator PELL. For South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. For the Communist effort of all Vietnamese. There is a separate party called the People's Revolutionary Party, which is the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party. It has a central committee and a whole structure.

As you go down, I think we really mean the nervous system rather than nerve center. The party and its apparatus is the nervous system of the enemy force. It calls upon the muscles of the guerrillas and the main forces and all the rest. But it is the nervous system that runs this.

As you correctly say, the head of it is in Hanoi, but the nervous system goes throughout the country through this apparatus. We are engaged in cutting off the apparatus at various places so that the force which is conducting this war is unable to operate.

PHOENIX PROGRAM'S EFFORTS CONCERNING ENEMY LEADERSHIP

Senator PELL. When a man gets sufficiently high up, one is pretty sure he won't rally spontaneously and he has such a security setup that he will not be able to be taken prisoner. Then will not an effort be made to assassinate him?

Mr. COLBY. Not to assassinate him in that sense. If you had clear knowledge that the province committee is at a certain place, you might well organize a very large operation of several companies or battalions to go in and clean that area out.

Senator PELL. We don't have the same situation we have with the Mafia in any part of this country where the poor soldiers, like the numbers people, get taken in all the time, but not the fellows at the top of the family. What do they call the family leaders, the dons?

Mr. COLBY. The Capo.

Senator PELL. No, the Capo are soldiers. We know who the top people are in this regard, but we do not go after them.

Mr. COLBY. No, we go after anybody that we can get. But most of the higher leadership is either in Cambodia or in a fairly secure base area way out in the jungles.

Mr. VANN. Could I add one other thing to my answer?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. VANN. I am not aware of any successful or even any attempted assassination of such a leader of the type that you talk about. In my time in Vietnam I am not aware of our ever having done that, ever trying it, or ever having been successful.

Senator PELL. I think, as a general rule of international relations, there is a policy of no government-supported assassinations. Otherwise many more of our chiefs of state and heads of government would be assassinated, which is not the case. It is not done.

Mr. COLBY. It is just not very feasible, either, in this kind of a case.

Senator PELL. Certainly around the world it would be done much more frequently than it is. There is in your former agency, as you know, a general agreement that you don't do it. You don't assassinate chiefs of government as a result of government action. It never happens in history. Do you know of an exception, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know.

Senator PELL. It is a fact because then it opens up the other way.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Going back to the rights of individuals, and this is what has bothered me particularly in Vietnam, what happens to prisoners when they are taken? Do we turn them over to the South Vietnamese and then they are rather cruelly interrogated, which we accept? Is there any way this practice can be discouraged more, or not?

Mr. COLBY. Those people taken with arms in their hands are handled as prisoners of war whether they are from North Vietnam or from South Vietnam.

If the United States captures them, we turn them over to the Vietnamese to be handled. We have advisers with the prison system, with the POW system, and so forth.

I referred to our directive about the Phoenix thing. If anything happens that does not fit the rules of war, our people are supposed to object.

The major was telling about a case in his district where he made a point of this. He objected strenuously, and it has not happened since. This was in the record a little while ago.

In our instructions, in our training of the Vietnamese, we emphasized good systems of interrogation. Now, occasionally, people do get a little loose, I am sure, but our thrust is in this direction, and I think the Vietnamese are increasingly accepting that this is what we expect about how to behave.

Now, I would add that the International Red Cross Committee does inspect the Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camps. It regularly looks them over and checks on them.

Senator PELL. The problem, as you know, is the same in Greece. It is not when you get to prison, but the process when you are taken and if you are lucky enough to be sent to jail. This is the question.

Mr. VANN. Let me add there, sir, that an American unit which captures a Vietnamese prisoner cannot just turn him over to any Vietnamese. They can only turn him over to that level of the Government of Vietnam that has an official detention center. That is usually the province level.

Senator PELL. I see. Thank you.

BETTER MOTIVATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE

I would be interested in the assessment of any of you. I don't think you covered it quite in the way I wanted it. How do you account for the better motivation of the North Vietnamese, in general, as a country, as opposed to that of South Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. Some of the Vietnamese discuss this in some degree. They wonder why it is that the North Vietnamese ethnic minority within South Vietnam has so many of the important jobs.

There is a certain characteristic energy and toughness, and so forth. The southerner spilled out onto that rich delta a few generations ago. He is less organized in the sense that the northerner has been living in tight little village communities, and has developed a rather strong discipline and self discipline.

These, like most ethnic differences, are not 100 percent by any means. But there is a difference in the characteristics of a North Vietnamese and a South Vietnamese.

Senator PELL. More vital.

Mr. COLBY. More discipline, more drive in most cases; not always by any means.

Senator PELL. Like Italy.

Mr. COLBY. This creates a certain amount of trouble in the political scene in Saigon.

Senator CASE. You know—off the record.

(Whereupon, there was a short discussion off the record.)

BLACK AMERICANS IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Is there any inhibition on the use of black Americans in the Phoenix operation? Do the black American soldiers offer any problems in dealing with the Vietnamese? I noticed the people the Department sends up here are always all white. What is the reason for that?

Mr. COLBY. We have one province senior adviser who is black, a U.S. colonel. We have a deputy province senior adviser who is a black U.S. colonel. In your province, Captain Murphy, you have a black district senior adviser.

Captain MURPHY. Yes.

Senator PELL. How about in uniform? Do any of you have a black commanding officer?

Major ARTHUR. Yes, sir, a full colonel. He is a deputy senior adviser.

Mr. COLBY. He was the one I was referring to.

Major ARTHUR. The senior adviser is a FSO–1, and the deputy is a full colonel.

FRICTION BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. We hear reports about friction between black and white. How true is that?

Major ARTHUR. I cannot say on that level. I have three black non-commissioned officers on my team. We have no problem on our level There are 14 of us.

Sergeant WALLACE. No problems at all.

Captain GECK. None in my team. I have heard of very little friction.

Senator PELL. How about you, Captain?

Captain MURPHY. I was a commander of a U.S. unit, and I am now in an advisory capacity. In neither capacity, while I was the commander of that unit, or now, have I witnessed or heard of any trouble of this nature. I just cannot think of a single incident.

Senator PELL. Either the press reports must have dealt with other parts of the country or they were ill-advised.

Thank you. Those are all the questions.

Mr. MILLS. I would just like to mention that we have had one incident of racial unrest on our team. It was on a MAT team. There were a couple of black fellows, and one white southerner who did not get along. I feel that this was a matter of the leadership of the MAT team. We transferred the officer who was a weak leader away from there. Even though the two Negroes and the white who were involved in this difficulty were kept at the same post, with a stronger leader in charge there was no longer at least overt hostility.

They did their jobs together. They did not go out socially after work was over. I think this is, perhaps, fairly typical of the situation in other parts of the country. Where you have good leadership which does not tolerate antagonism based on anything other than non-cooperation or things of that nature, you do not have racial problems.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with an article about this subject by Georgie Anne Geyer in the February 1970 True magazine? Do you know any such writer?

Senator CASE. What magazine is that?

The CHAIRMAN. True magazine, T-r-u-e. Are you familiar with her?

Mr. COLBY. She is a reporter, I believe, in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought perhaps you had met her. She apparently was in Vietnam.

Mr. COLBY. I might have met her, Mr. Chairman. I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. She reports it as her own experiences in Vietnam, and I think, for whatever it is worth, the article should be put in the record.

(The article referred to follows:)

(True Magazine, February, 1970)

THE CIA'S HIRED KILLERS

(By Georgie Anne Geyer)

As the war becomes more political and less military, targets shift from the enemy's army to its civilian leadership. To get the job done, the U.S. has trained an elite corps of assassins to eliminate the Viet Cong's "shadow government."

It was 3 o'clock one hot, dark Sunday morning in a small delta town near the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. The tough, powerfully-built American we'll call "Bill"—a paramilitary or guerrilla fighter for the Central Intelligence Agency who had spent precious little of his career worrying about the "moral implications" of his work—paced back and forth in the dingy front room of his house. His job, like that of many Americans in South Viet Nam, was terror. And for the first time in his life, this mission was bothering him. If he hadn't had eight or 10 or maybe 15 drinks, perhaps he wouldn't have talked to me about it. But he had, and he did. "I've been doing this for 22 years all over the world," Bill said, sitting down and hunching over his beer. He was very intense as he reeled off the places: Egypt when Nasser was coming to power, the Congo when we were trying to get rid of Tshombe—Bill's life story was a history of just about every place the United States had intervened or tried covertly to intervene in the past two decades. "I did it believing in it," he went on. Then he shook his head in perplexity. "But for the first time, I feel I really don't understand a situation," he said. "When people ask me, all I can say is * * * 'I don't know * * * I don't know * * * ' Hah!" He pointed at me. "If you write a story and say you don't know and * * * " His voice trailed off. There remained only the sinister silence of the tiny delta town. "The dedication of these people is fantastic," he spoke up again. "The dedication and the motivation. I wish I could understand it. You capture them and put a pistol to their heads, and they say, 'Kill me.' They're so little. * * * " Bill had shoulders like a football player—it was easy to picture the absurdity, even the vulgarity, of his enormity next to the tiny-boned, miniature, frail Vietnamese.

"You take their necks in your hands * * * you can destroy them so easily. But you can't just keep killing them. You can't ever kill them all. * * *"

Today a lot of Americans like Bill are beginning to have misgiving, as the Viet Cong hangs doggedly on, about the increasing ruthlessness and cold-bloodedness in this already most sanguinary of wars. Many are also beginning to wonder whether such methods really "work"—or whether we don't destroy more than we build in the process.

A few months ago, the mysterious arrest of eight Green Beret officers for the slaying of an alleged North Vietnamese double agent spotlighted some of the "dark side of the moon" activities in which Americans are involved. Inside sources reported at the time that Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of American forces and a man of recognized integrity, was so personally enraged by many of the "black intelligence" goings-on conducted by irregular outfits like the Green Berets and the CIA that he personally ordered the arrests as a once-and-for-all example.

"The Special Forces," he reportedly told subordinates, "are going to have to show a higher regard for human life."

The CIA was careful to divorce itself from the Berets case, but many other equally brutal operations in which the Agency and other Americans are involved are likewise coming into question. The recently disclosed massacre at Song My, and the subsequent investigations, only served to underscore the point.

With the peace talks in Paris, the deemphasis of the military role in Viet Nam, and the impending U.S. pullout, the political side of the war has been stepped up. The struggle today is to control the peace—to be on top when the ceasefire finally comes and the half-million Americans go home. The name of the game on both sides is to get your people into places of power, to win the allegiance of the countryside and its rice-roots leadership for the future, and, conversely, to get the enemy's people out of corresponding positions.

The U.S. and the South Vietnamese are using various methods of doing this. Among them are persuasion and propaganda, promises of political and economic reform, goodwill missions and * * * the use of sheer animal terror.

At the heart of the latter phase of the campaign are Bill's troops, the little-known Provincial Reconnaissance Units or PRU's (pronounced *Prews*). A regionally-based, American-led, CIA-financed paramilitary force of 5,000 Vietnamese, they were originally conceived of as a counterguerrilla organization borrowing from Chairman Mao Tse-tung's principles of living and operating among the peasantry as the fish do in the sea.

They operated out of regional safe-houses or, even, Viet Cong-like, masqueraded as peasants by day and fought as guerrillas at night. In the beginning, they practiced all the arts of guerrilla warfare—the ambush, the night raid, the kidnapping or the knifing in the night—and they also engaged in stand-up battles in which they rapidly established themselves as tigerish fighters in an army where most units resemble Snoopies looking banefully over the garden fence at the cat next door.

But of late the PRU emphasis has been on just one role of the guerrilla: to murder, kidnap, terrorize or otherwise forcibly eliminate the civilian leadership of the other side. Trained and directed by their American advisors, the PRU's have set out to target and destroy what has come to be known popularly as the "VCI"—the Viet Cong "infrastructure." These are the "shadow people" of the VC, the complex of political cadres, tax collectors, party members, couriers and others who do the base work which keeps the guerrillas and the main force units going. They also serve as the *de facto* government in VC-held territory, and the idea is to get as many of them out of the way as possible before a ceasefire turns control of the country back to the Vietnamese.

Thus in one village, a VC tax collector will be assassinated in his bed in the night. In another, "wanted" posters will be put up for a VC leader, offering a reward to try to persuade his friends to turn him in. The PRU's may also drop down from helicopters and terrorize whole villages, in the hope that they will be frightened to deal with the VC in the future. Or they may bribe VC office holders to change sides, or kidnap (technically, the word is arrest) those who prove unbribeable.

In 1968, according to Saigon government figures, approximately 15,400 of the estimated 80,000 members of the infrastructure were "eliminated." Of these, 11,000 were captured, 2,220 killed and the rest rallied to the Saigon side.

In Go Cong province in 1968, the PRU's captured the very highest VC official—the province chief. Acting on intelligence that he was hiding in a certain village, they crept out on a small midnight raid and kidnapped him from his bed. But not all "captures" are so deliberate. In Kien Giang province, on a massive raid on a village, one PRU suddenly noticed a Viet Cong trying to run away. The PRU tackled the man and the two wrestled wildly for a few minutes until the PRU stabbed and killed his opponent. The PRU's discovered only then that the dead man had been the North Vietnamese lieutenant in charge of all the movement of materiel into the delta for the 1968 Tet offensive—the battle which changed the course of the war.

In Rach Gia, the South Vietnamese colonel complained to the PRU advisors about mines on the road; so the PRU's laid an ambush that killed 40 VC who had been laying the mines at night. In another village, a South Vietnamese woman was sent with a 300 piastre (about 83) bribe to give to a VC guard to visit her husband in a VC prison in Vinh Binh. Her husband passed her a message for the PRU's outlining the entire prison layout. The next morning the PRU's hit the prison, liberating 28 shackled South Vietnamese.

The PRU types are not sentimental when one of their own turns double agent. When one group made such a discovery, it set up a field tribunal, condemned the man to death, and beheaded him. Both the head and the body were politely returned to the man's family for burial.

Indeed, the PRU's are excellent torturers and employ beatings, electric wires in the ears, water suffocation, and anything else that seems effective, constantly and regularly. "Sometimes we have to kill one suspect to get another to talk," one American advisor says cooly. Another American advisor told me—and I have no reason not to believe him—that he ate supper with his PRU's on the hearts and livers of their slain enemies.

The mission and the operation of the PRU's, of course, is still extremely hush-hush. Most correspondents know of their existence, but few have obtained any verifiable details. U.S. high officialdom in Saigon talks about them only on rare, private occasions, and Washington doesn't acknowledge their mission at all. Even the Beres's case didn't totally bring out the PRU's role.

During a recent tour of duty in Viet Nam, I asked, without much hope of approval, to be allowed to go on a PRU mission. To my surprise, permission was granted. It was not to be an assassination or kidnapping—*no* correspondent would ever be permitted to witness that—but a sudden-strike mission on a VC-held village. It seemed that the Americans wanted to show off a South Vietnamese unit that was zealous, effective and full of fight, particularly at a time when the regular Vietnamese army, the ARVN, was under severe criticism.

The American CIA chief with whom I dealt had trained guerrillas elsewhere in Asia during World War II. Intelligent, handsome, a professional in irregular warfare, he was proud as punch of his PRU's. Like many similar experts, he believed that had the war been fought more on the counterguerrilla level in the beginning, it would not have turned into such a mess. "Now we're fighting this war the way it always should have been fought," he told me once.

We started our mission by flying down to Rach Gia, a picturesque little fishing village on the South China Sea where the boats are gaily painted with the all-seeing Vietnamese eyes that actually see so little. Its airport was a deserted road cut in half by an operating road, so that when a plane came in, traffic stopped in both directions. This morning, 160 PRU's—tough-looking, wiry, cocky, incredibly eager—arrived early in trucks. While they were waiting, they sat on the runway and—just for kicks—ducked to miss the wings as the planes roared in.

One boy of 22, with a buoyancy I had never seen among the regular South Vietnamese troops, advanced the single most flabbergasting proposal I ever heard in Viet Nam. "In the ARVN, you don't get a chance to do anything," he said, "and I want to fight. Here, there's opportunity. Yesterday there wasn't room for me in the chopper, and I was sad to be left behind. I like to go on American missions because the VC like to kill Americans and then we get *them*. I like the Americans because they don't just advise you, they fight with you." Then he got his spectacular idea. "If there is a war in the United States, I would like to come and fight with you," he added.

The two American "advisors" (really the leaders) of the PRU's were friendly and obviously competent. Twenty-nine-year-old Stanley Rodimon, of Huntsville, Alabama, had studied economics at the University of Alabama. Small, dark-haired, good-looking, he was proud of his job. "We're just taking their guerrilla tactics and turning them around and using them on them," he said. "I've had no trouble adjusting. This is just a job now. I'll either stay in the service or go back to work in the bank." Franklin Flynn, 36, of Imperial Beach, California, had been detached from the Navy Seals to serve with the PRU's. Blond, husky, with a wry sense of humor, Frank also looked upon it as a job and was proud of the work he was doing.

The object of our whirling onslaught by helicopter was the small village of Ba The, a group of houses strung out on both sides of one of the arrow-straight, French-built canals that gridiron the Mekong Delta. The PRU advisors had special intelligence that several ranking VCI had been hiding in the village. The intelligence was carefully guarded. Only the advisors and the top Vietnamese PRU leader knew where we were going. As we swirled down to it, the town's VC sympathies became obvious. A large white sign hung across the canal reading: "Be sure and listen to what Uncle says. Rise up and kill the Americans." This was the same Uncle Ho Chi Minh who had also said, "I am not concerned with the military successes of the government of South Viet Nam. I would only become concerned when they and the U.S. began to destroy the VC political infrastructure."

Our choppers landed like a sinister flock of black crows coming to roost in the swaying green rice fields, and the men jumped out swiftly into the waist-deep water. Almost immediately, a small bare-shouldered man rose out of the paddy and pointed his gun at Rodimon. Rodimon killed him on the spot, and the body slipped back beneath the unbiquitous water of the delta. "I was happy when I got *him*," Rodimon exulted later.

Systematically the PRU's swept into and through the village—house by house, bunker by bunker. From the air, the town had looked as empty of human life as an Arizona ghost town, but one by one the PRU's nudged out young Vietnamese, their wet, brown shoulders glistening in the sun.

Among those "killed or captured"—it was significant that the two were lumped together—were the VCI they had sought. In all they had killed eight and captured 26—in their terms, a successful day.

That evening, as we sat in one of the advisors' houses drinking beer, the two men kept stressing, perhaps because such bloody methods were being questioned on many levels, how careful they were in their work. "The men are very selective," Rodimon insisted. "They never hurt villagers. I personally checked the pagoda in the town before we went. We're very careful of religious things. We have a fund to give money to people picked up by mistake. But the men never feel bad about killing a VC."

Were they certain that all the men they "got" were really VCI? Absolutely, they said, the intelligence was that good.

Only at one point did Frank Flynn waver, reminding me a little of Bill's misgivings. "Sometimes," he said, very late in the evening, "I wonder. Are we really doing anything for the people? Or is it just for ourselves?"

There are many more—both Americans and Vietnamese—who question and question deeply the use of deliberate counterterror and assassination on "our side." There are Americans who question not only its morality and effectiveness, but also what it does to the Americans involved when they see brutality and torture institutionalized in their military system. As one senior American officer in Viet Nam put it, "There are *no* circumstances—none whatsoever—in which murder is legal in the U.S. Army."

On one occasion, an American talked to me about the policy of shipping captured VCI to the remote Con Son island prison for the duration of the war. He shook his head. "I ask myself," he said, "is that any different from the Gestapo?"

Another said, "We use the word 'neutralize' which is a horrible word. It means kill or capture." Then he thought some more. "But on the other hand, if we're going to fight this war, we should be effective. We have to fight it their way."

That was exactly how the PRU's originated and the whole counterterror philosophy got started—through the idea of "fighting it their way." In the absence of an American or South Vietnamese ideology, it was said in the early days, why not borrow the most workable tenets of the enemy's? "After all, they stole the atomic bomb secrets and all from us," a young American named Frank Scotton said one day. "Why should we be squeamish about stealing people's warfare from them? It works better than anything we've come up with to match it, so why not give it a try?"

Thus Scotton and a few other Americans, who were both USIS and CIA-related, started a counterguerrilla movement in northern Quang Ngai province. Their emulation of the Viet Cong went to such lengths that they even had "our Vietnamese" learning the four general rules of Mao Tse-tung (respect the people, help the people, protect the people, follow orders).

Terror and assassination were included in their bag of tricks. At one point, USIS printed 50,000 leaflets showing sinister black eyes. These were left on bodies after assassinations or even—"our terrorists" are playful—nailed to doors to make people think they were marked for future efforts.

Even the American mandarinate's formidable representative to Saigon in the early days, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, once acknowledged our newfound toy with the words: "There is a brand-new type of fighting man—the terrorist, who is just as distinct as the infantryman or the aviator, and he fights in a war with no front, no rear and no flanks in which his 'base' is right among the people."

The counterguerrilla idea quickly found supporters in all quarters. The Green Berets, for instance, built their own private army of 40,000 mercenaries. Scotton's movement evolved into something called the CT's or Counter-Terrorists. Finally,

the PRU's emerged in 1966. But whereas Scotton's original counterguerrillas were both assassins in the night and goodwill organizers of the people, the PRU's were almost exclusively assassins in the night. The ideological mission was taken over by the Revolutionary Development and later the Phoenix program.

From the beginning, it was no secret that the CIA sponsored, trained, paid and led the PRU's. Or that they represented the specifically political CIA approach, as opposed to the military approach. From the beginning, the CIA had seen the war more in political terms than did the generals. And the CIA certainly turned out to be more right than wrong.

But "our terror" was different from "their terror." To the Viet Cong, terror was an indispensable weapon in the political and military war. They both pinpointed village chiefs, killing them brutally and precisely, and they used indiscriminate terror, throwing bombs into marketplaces and killing the innocent.

Terror on "our side," on the other hand, was largely selective. Victims were carefully targeted, generally by the CIA in concert with South Vietnamese intelligence. The major difference was there was no real political organization—no political ideology—behind our terror. Their boys did it for faith; our boys did it for money.

From the beginning, the PRU's were the best killers in Viet Nam. When other Vietnamese troops balked at going up Supersitition Mountain near the Cambodian border, which they believed to be cursed and where the VC had been dug in for years, it was the PRU's who climbed down into the sinuous caves.

Everywhere they fought like tigers. An estimated 30 percent were former VC who had learned well how to fight and how to hate. Often they had become ferociously embittered because a father or a brother or a relative was killed by the VC.

"That man used to be a VC," one American officer said one day, pointing to a PRU. "But they killed his family. He lit out for the bush. Spent two years out there alone, conducting a private vendetta against Charlie. God knows how many VC he killed. Finally he came in and joined up with the PRU's. He wants to kill more VC."

This fighting spirit is encouraged at the camp at Vung Tau on the coast where the PRU's are trained by CIA instructors in an intensive four-week course in clandestine warfare. They learn how to slit throats in the dark, how to make the silent capture, but get no political indoctrination. The training leads to a strong sense of comradeship, and the PRU's are ferocious about protecting their American advisors. (In Kien Giang province, they worried about one 300-pound adviser whom they would not be able to carry out if wounded.)

Their American leaders are CIA paramilitary, Navy Seals, Special Forces—anybody the CIA could dig up who had a counterinsurgency background. And in contrast to ARVN officers, the Americans generally treated the PRU's as equals. They were even promoted according to merit, in sharp contrast to the ARVN with its aristocratic caste system. When I talked to the PRU's themselves, this basic equality was the first thing every one stressed.

"I like the unit because very man's a fighting man," the Squad Leader Truong Van Lan said. "We really don't have officers, like in the ARVN where everybody's sitting in the office. The men are like brothers. We even call each other 'brother.'"

"We kill many VC," the deputy commander, Nguyen Ngoc Diep added. "We give fame to our people."

Yet, how well are the PRU's actually doing in their assigned task of rooting out the VC infrastructure? Are they actually as successful as Saigon makes them out to be?

From the beginning, the problems of this assignment were enormous. Our South Vietnamese could understand shooting at a guerrilla who was shooting at them. But a quiet little clerk they'd known from childhood who just happened to be directing the entire thing? "It's like trying to convince them to get the Mafia leader instead of the guy in the New York subway with the switchblade," one American advisor put it.

Then there were the "accommodations," by which South Vietnamese officials had, for years, made "deals" with their VC counterparts. A VC village chief near Dalat once wrote an angry letter to his South Vietnamese counterpart and demanded:

"What are you trying to do? Why are you interviewing my relatives? Why are you attacking me now?" It was hard for him to believe that his "friends" on the "other side" could have turned against him.

The early figures of apprehended were impressive, but American officials now admit that the victims were chiefly small fish in Mao's swarming waters: rice carriers, low-level VCI. Nor has that much meaningful intelligence actually been gathered. And about 80 percent of those caught are eventually let go by their South Vietnamese brothers.

Moreover, the VC appear able to regenerate cadres as fast as the Americans knock them off. "I am constantly amazed at the tasks they level on these people, that they don't just throw up their hands," one American says. But then, many of the VCI are unquestionably the most energetic, aggressive, upward-mobile and idealistic people in the country.

Many came out of the Viet Minh after it won the war against the French but lost the South. About 10,000 Viet Minh stayed south after 1954 and laid the base for the future Viet Cong leadership. Still others "signed on" after the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's infamous law 1059 by which any anti-Diem men, whether they were communists, Confucianists or whatever, were purged and often killed by the Diemists.

For these men, indoctrination by the VC was a real awakening. "Suddenly I realized what life was all about," one related after he was captured by the southerners. "We would sit around in a circle and the political cadres would talk to us. They never actually told us anything, they made it come out of us. How many villagers had the Americans killed? they would ask. How many of your women are sleeping with them? What are they doing to your country? Suddenly everything became clear."

And today, in addition to their old roles of supply, political indoctrination and tax collection, the VCI form the ostensibly-elected liberation committees—which will constitute the new VC "government" in the South to fight the government of Saigon.

Moreover, what about the whole idea of terror? Does it not destroy the loyalties of more people than it wins over? Is it really effective on "our side"? Without being naive about it, for this is a war, how does a supposedly democratic government rationalize the same kind of terror its excoriates "their side" for?

For one thing, despite the fact that it is generally effective, terror is not alway, so selective as PRU leaders claim. The roundup of hordes of people in operations like that at Ba The is bound to bring in the innocent as well as the guilty. PRU's steal from the peasants, just as the ARVN does. They often do the same dull stupid things as the South Vietnamese soldiers, only they compound it with terror and brutality.

Not only do many Americans object to these methods, so do many South Vietnamese. Torture has now come to be used so indiscriminately that the VC warn their men to beware of any released prisoner if he has not been tortured.

The Vietnamese Congress, no paragon of virtue itself, recently began a series of investigations charging Phoenix and the PRU's with corruption, clumsy police work and too many illegal arrests.

"Officials have orders to arrest a certain number of Viet Cong," charges Ho Van Minh, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives and considered one of the best and most honest young deputies. "But our investigations show there have been a multitude of cases in which they've arrested the wrong people."

He and other officials who called for an investigation of the whole program admitted that it had resulted in the capture of many agents. But they also wondered whether the malpractices were not alienating people from the government and thus simply creating more VC.

"There have been a number of arrests which really amount to kidnapping," says Ho. "A man going home from work on his bicycle is seized on the way. As far as his family knows, he has simply disappeared. Perhaps a month or two later, they find out where he is."

Another critic, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, chairman of a lower house rural-construction committee, complained that: "In Qang Nam province, I followed one operation. They jammed the entire population of four hamlets into a four-room school and a courtyard while they searched the villages. They ignored the village chiefs who might have been able to help them distinguish which people were VC. They kept the people squatting there for two whole days."

In the 1970's the PRU's will be transferred entirely to the Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior as part of the total changeover of all units to Vietnamese direction. However, the CIA is by no means immediately relinquishing control—not as

long as it pays the bills. But certainly with the Green Beret scandal and with the cold eye of criticism looking more at such covert operations, everyone will be taking a colder, harder look at PRU and other such activities.

As noted, one American officer said that there are no circumstances whatsoever in which murder is legal in the U.S. Army. Another disgruntled American civilian official put it this way: "They use terror, yes, but they also have ideology. We have terror without ideology, without revolution. And what is that? It's plain murder."

VIETNAMESE CONGRESS' INVESTIGATION OF PHOENIX PROGRAM AND PRU

There are one or two things I will ask you about. I won't read it all. The hour is getting late. It says:

The Vietnamese Congress, no paragon of virtue itself, recently began a series of investigations charging Phoenix and PRUs [Provinical Reconnaissance Units] with corruption, clumsy police work and too many illegal arrests.

Before I go on, are you aware of the Vietnamese Congress' instituting any investigation?

Mr. COLBY. Yes; I referred to that in my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I recalled it.

Mr. COLBY. The legislature did call the government to explain. The Prime Minister and several of the other ministers appeared before them to respond to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I won't read all of the article, but she quotes and says:

"Officials have orders to arrest a certain number of Viet Cong," charges Ho Van Minh, Deputy Chairman of the House of Representatives and considered one of the best and most honest young deputies. "But our investigations show there have been a multitude of cases in which they have arrested the wrong people."

That is a quote of Ho Van Minh. Do you know Ho Van Minh?

Mr. COLBY. I don't know him.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever heard of him, Mr. Vann?

Mr. VANN. I have heard of him, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree he is an honest young man?

Mr. VANN. I don't know his reputation. I do know the reputation of his associate who was involved in this, Mr. Ngo Cong Duc [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. I will try to paraphrase it. This whole thing here is not so much about the brutality of it. The point she is really making is that by this kind of clumsy administration they make enemies for the Government. She says:

Another critic, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, Chairman of a Lower House Rural-Construction Committee, complained that: "In Quang Nam Province, I followed one operation. They jammed the entire population of four hamlets into a four-room school and a courtyard while they searched the villages. They ignored the village chiefs who might have been able to help them distinguish which people were VC. They kept the people squatting there for two whole days."

Then the conclusion is that this makes enemies of the Government. In other words, it is not accomplishing its purpose.

Mr. COLBY. I think, if you would like my comments on that, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. COLBY. I think the problem of mistaken or wrongful or even deliberately erroneous allegations, as I mentioned before, does exist. It is something that just has to be stomped on and stopped. I think they are trying to do that and trying to put in controls to reduce it.

With respect to the second one, I think that that fits into the discussion we were having a little while ago of the cordons and the operations like the Russell Beach which we are really turning away from and doing much, much less of. There was some of that done some time ago, particularly up in central Vietnam. It has been used less and less.

The CHAIRMAN. There were a few other questions.

USE OF FIRE POWER AND PHOENIX PROGRAM AFTER U.S. WITHDRAWAL

Senator CASE. Just one thing on that line, if I might. It would be well to have it at this point. Both you and Colonel Vann have been concerned about this sort of thing, I know, very much, such as the use of helicopter gunships being used indiscriminately, et cetera, et cetera.

What is going to happen as we pull out, and the Vietnamese themselves are left with responsibilities for the conduct of the war in matters such as this, and the kind of thing that the chairman has just called to your attention?

Mr. COLBY. I think, Senator, that the growth of the whole program puts some internal controls upon the techniques. In other words, new rules are being applied that say that you must inform a village chief of the arrest of anybody in this village. It is a new rule that they are just beginning to implement. That kind of a thing, once it gets started and going becomes a matter of habit. It is followed and begins to put a certain control on just who gets arrested in a village.

Now, with respect to the use of firepower, the Vietnamese get used to a stricter standard. As they depend more and more upon the elected village officials and elected province officials and as their legislature takes a more active role in protesting against things like this, that kind of control will increasingly come to bear.

Two or 3 years ago the army was the only power in the country. There is no question about it. Officers' words were law. That is no longer the case. Their power is being circumscribed on the Vietnamese side, not just by American influence.

Now, there is more work to do on this, don't get me wrong, but that, I think, is the answer to your question, Senator.

Senator CASE. Do you agree?

Mr. VANN. Sir, not only do I agree, but I went to the trouble of comparing some statistical estimates. In 1969 with approximately 14 times as much airpower being applied from the standpoint of strikes against targets in South Vietnam as were applied in 1962, there were in my judgment less civilian casualties than there were in 1962. That reflects a tremendous improvement in discrimination and the use of these indirect fire and airborne weapons systems.

Senator CASE. What do you think will be the result as we progressively withdraw our advisory groups?

Mr. VANN. I wholeheartedly concur with Ambassador Colby's assessment. I really couldn't put it better.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told that Senator Symington had to leave and did not quite complete some questions about the Chau case. I will try to make these very rapid and get through with them. The hour is getting late and everyone is getting tired.

Mr. Vann, when was Chau's brother arrested? Do you remember?

Mr. VANN. In April of 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. April 1969. Was Chau accused at that time or when was Chau accused?

Mr. VANN. Sir, within a few days after Mr. Tran Ngoc Hien had been arrested, the information appeared in the newspapers that he had been in contact with his brother who was a deputy in the assembly, Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau. That is not in the form of a formal accusation.

The CHAIRMAN. When did Chau first publicly acknowledge his contacts with his brother?

Mr. VANN. To the best of my recollection, sir, in the spring of 1969, subsequent to April and prior to, I would say, June 30.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to June 30?

Mr. VANN. To the best of my recollection, but I can't really be certain as to the approximate time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure, but I thought I asked you about this. Do you believe the United States has a responsibility to intercede in Chau's behalf at least to the extent of informing the Vietnamese government of Chau's reporting on his contacts?

Mr. VANN. Sir, the Prime Minister of the country has been informed as to the facts that Colonel Chau did notify Americans of his involvement.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been informed of it?

Mr. VANN. I informed him of it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, did the CIA have a responsibility at an earlier point in time to inform the GVN of Chau's contacts?

Mr. VANN. I am not personally aware, sir, that the CIA knew of Chau's contact with his brother.

The CHAIRMAN. You testified you knew; you didn't know whether anyone else knew.

Mr. VANN. That is correct, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the Prime Minister informed of these contacts? Are you the one who informed him?

Mr. VANN. I informed him, sir, in early July of 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have reason to believe that Chau would make public his contacts with official Americans regarding his brother?

Mr. VANN. Mr. Chau informed me, sir, that when it got down to the point of his being tried he would have no recourse but to speak about the contacts.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you so inform the Embassy?

Mr. VANN. Yes, sir, I have. I informed through my channel, which was Mr. George Jacobson and Ambassador Colby.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations, if any, did you make?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I felt that although Chau had, by his own admission, violated technically the law of his country, I did not believe that he was either pro-Communist or was aiding or abetting communism, and that I considered that it would be better for all concerned if the case went no further.

EFFORT TO LIFT CHAU'S IMMUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. Can you describe a little more specifically how the Thieu government has lobbied to obtain the lifting of the immunity of Mr. Chau?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I can only say what I got from deputies.

The CHAIRMAN. In your district?

Mr. VANN. From the Delta on the matter, [deleted].

CHAU'S VIEWS ON GVN POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. What views has Mr. Chau expressed to you about appropriate Vietnamese policy about broadening the government in negotiations?

Mr. VANN. Sir, he has made so many recommendations over so long a period it would be very extensive.

Colonel, now Mister Tran Ngoc Chau, [deleted] contention on a continuing basis to me was that the non-Communist elements of the society must have a greater voice in the government of Vietnam, a voice that he does not feel that any other than those associated with the current government now have. That is his opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he express his view on a coalition government?

Mr. VANN. To me, sir, he has always expressed the view that there should be some accommodation made at the local levels and that would preclude an accommodation having to be made at the national level.

My interpretation of his views is that he would not endorse a coalition with Communists at the national level.

SELF DETERMINATION IN LIGHT OF MAI'S AND CHAU'S EXPERIENCES

The CHAIRMAN. This case is made even more significant by your exchange with and discussion of Major Mai as to what we can find or what we can do about the political situation in South Vietnam, and how realistic is the asserted objective of giving them a right of self-determination.

Mai's and Chau's experiences and also Dzu, whom I would include from what we know about it from the press, at least assuming the press statements are true, seem to me to make rather a farce of the idea of self-determination. You have a very effective dictatorship, not unlike the Greeks or any other, if an opposition man, no matter how reputable, puts up his head and off it goes. This comes back to a question asked the other day. Self-determination under the circumstances

is illusory. If there is any objective which could make any sense at all, it simply is the restraining of communism, which was the main objective expressed by former Secretary Rusk.

Mr. VANN. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, you realize there is on a continuing bases a number of people who are in opposition to the Thieu government who do speak on the matter. I believe Senator Tran Van Don is one of the foremost, and certainly to some extent, General Minh. So I would not say that it is any case of totalitarian——

The CHAIRMAN. There are all kinds of opposition. We have those distinctions too. But according to your own testimony, if I understood it correctly, Mai and Chau were two of the most promising, attractive opponents. There are other kinds of opponents. You have tame opponents as well as other kinds.

Mr. VANN. Sir, the time period that we talked of with regard to Major Mai was 1966, and the Thieu-Ky government per se did not exist then.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the Ky government.

Mr. COLBY. You didn't have constitutional government.

Mr. VANN. It was a directorate headed up by Ky.

ACCUSATIONS AGAINST AND VIEWS OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

The CHAIRMAN. In order to complete the record, I will put in some of the documents dealing with accusations against Mr. Chau and his views on a variety of subjects, and some newspaper articles dealing with this case.

(The materials referred to follow:)

AN OPEN LETTER OF DEPUTY TRAN NGOC CHAU

My countrymen and comrades-in-arms in kien hoa and throughout the country, deputies to the national assembly,
gentlemen,

In my letter of Dec. 5, 1969, to the deputies to the national assembly, I promised to defend myself when necessary?

I still honor this decision until the lower house formally carries out articles 37 and 38 of the constitution against my person.

However, in the aftermath of the president's biased accusations against my person and the threats he made in Vung Tau against the national assembly, as well as in the wake of radio and television broadcasts and demonstrations, etc. I felt the need to send to you this letter to give you and public opinion food for thought.

THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION

The constitution of Vietnam has 117 articles. To honor the constitution means to honor all the articles and the laws emanating from these articles.

Recently, the president and a small number of people have only alleged article 4 in order to condemn me and intimidate all those politicians who disagree with the government.

Why did the president and that small number of people not uphold article 7 of the constitution, and why did they abuse their power and exploit the nation's facilities to slander and and denigrate me over the radio and television, in the press and demonstrations encouraged or authorized by the government. Article 7, section 8, clearly states that "defendants are considered innocents until they are definitely found guilty by a court. In case of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the accused".

ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION

Thus, even though I may be affected by article 4 of the constitution, I am still an innocent man.

Article 4 of the constitution says clearly that: "that republic of Vietnam opposes communism under all forms; all activities aimed at publicising or promoting communism are strictly forbidden."

I cannot be so cowardly as to deny my brother Tran-Ngoc-Hien's relations and contacts with me (I did not seek to contact my brother). But the contacts were only made discreetly, between two blood brothers, and were never disclosed or publicized in order to publicize or promote communism.

On the contrary, in my contacts with Tran-Ngoc-Hien, I never failed to try to persuade my brother to:

a. renounce communism,

b. acknowledge the existence of the republic of Vietnam's regime, and

c. persuade north Vietnam to have direct negotiations with the republic of Vietnam in order to end the war.

Tran-Ngoc-Hien himself testified to my anti-communist stand at his trial on July 4, 1969. Several newspapers carried this news. Let me quote thoi the daily of July 5, 1969:

"* * * the defendant's brother (Tran-Ngoc-Chau) proved himself useless because he opposed communism too strongly."

It could by no means be believed that the above statement was intended to protect me because the documents used to accuse me were also based on other statements by Tran-Ngoc-Hien.

Previously, when talking about my "case" to a number of deputies in the dan tien (people's progress) bloc, the president had said that "Mr. Tran-Ngoc-Chau did not act in any way for the communists but only out of his connections with some american groups." this statement was disclosed to me by Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang and Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang, later, confirmed it to other deputies at the dien hong conference hall.

To tell the truth, I did not act either for the communists or for any foreign group.

Even after Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang retaliated (as I had demanded that the lower house looked into allegations that Mr. Nguyen-cao-Thang had used his money and influence to undermine the national assembly) by telling the press that I had "records of connections with the communists," premier Tran-thien-khiem denied this news and disclosed that no government agencies had such a dossier (the hoa hinh daily carried this news item which was not denied by anyone).

With the facts just mentioned, there cannot be any pretext for accusing me of violating article 4 of the constitution.

Meanwhile, president Nguyen-van-Thieu himself accepted to talk peace with north Vietnam and the NLF, agreed to allow the NLF to take part in elections. Such steps have enabled the NLF to gain prestige in the international political arena, thereby enabling them to establish a government which was recognized by many countries. The communists could not have achieved such things before the republic of Vietnam agreed to sit down at the conference table with them in Paris.

If article 4 of the constitution is to be upheld, then the president's acts just mentioned actually helped the communists publicize and promote communism.

However, I have no intention to accuse the president of violating article 4 of the constitution because I believe that the president's acts (if they were as sincere as those of other Vietnamese and my own) were all aimed at realizing national reconciliation, restore peace in freedom, and not at favoring communism.

THE PRESIDENT'S ACCUSATIONS

According to the contents of the "dossier" which the president submitted to the lower house, I was accused of the following crimes:

1. 8 times of contacts, relations and exchange of news with Hien without notifying the authorities.

2. support in money, transportation facilities and legal papers for Tran-Ngoc-Hien.

3. existence of the enemy's support for my candidacy to the lower house.

WHAT IS THE TRUTH

May I speak out the truth as follows:

1. I wrote to Hien a card agreeing to see him for the first time. The other times Hien always came to see me unexpectedly.

You may understand the situation of two blood brothers who were separated for 16 years when one of them asked to see the other. Who could be so inhumane as to decline the request?

Moreover, at that time, I thought that my brother might try to see me in order to surrender to the nationalist cause.

I never exchange news with Hien, but only tried to persuade him by analyzing the situation with a view to making Hien see that the communists could not win victory in south Vietnam. And thus, I intended to persuade Hien to renounce communism or make him persuade the communists to seek an accommodation with the republic of Vietnam in order to end the war.

I wish that you will understand why I did not denounce Tran-Ngoc-Hien. How could I ignore my feelings and traduce my brother to his death?

I believe that no nationalist could do this.

Moreover, every time Hien met me, I always told Hien that if he refused to heed my advices (a,b,c), he must get back to the north and never see me again.

Apart from such human circumstances and from the fact that the contacts between my brother and me had a family character, high government authorities who knew our relations acknowledged my sincerity. If these authorities, for some noble reasons, prefer to let me defend myself alone before public opinion, I would agree to it and would not disclose their identities and ranks.

2. As a province chief (until the end of 1965), director of the RD training program and commandant of the RD training center in Vung-Tau (until the beginning of 1967), I never gave Tran-Ngoc-Hien any document, news or facilities, except an amount of 30 thousand piasters, a car ride from Kien-hoa to my tho and a card authorizing Hien to meet me. This help was given exclusively within the framework of brotherhood and only for once.

In the above-mentioned positions and with available means, I could, if I intended to help the communists, have done much more to support Hien and the communists, especially in 1964 and 1965 when the situation in Kien-hoa and many other provinces throughout the country was critical.

On the contrary, I wrestle with the communist and people.

The result was that the day I was assigned to the RD ministry (November 1965), the leaders of the religions in the province and the provincial council members sent cables to the central government and corps authorities to request for my continued stay. And it is precisely because of my anti-communist record that it, Gen. Nguyen Ven Thieu, national directory chairman, awarded me the fourth class national order medal and first class order of merit medal. Both things rarely happens to out going province chiefs.

3. In the electoral campaign for the lower house in Kien-hoa, there were only about 90,000 people out of 500 thousand did vote. These voters were all screened and were in the government-controlled areas.

I was elected among 19 candidates with 38 thousand votes. The majority of my votes were gotten in the provincial capital (I got 8,000 votes while the runner up got less than 3,000) and in the areas where catholic voters lived.

The foregoing are my clarifications about the three accusations by the president as featured in the "dossier" which the president forwarded to the lower house.

OTHER ACCUSATIONS

Recently, the armed forces radio and a couple of newspapers in the capital disclosed another accusation, namely, that Tran-Ngoc-Hien said that Hien entrusted me with the mission of setting up a committee to work with the NLF. In this committee, there were 2 buddhist monks, 1 politician and 1 deputy.

I strongly deny and protest this additional accusation and other accusations which may be added later. I never had such activities.

Suppose this disclosure was truthful, why did not the president "dossier" mention it?

It should be noted that the "dossier" forwarded by the president did not hint at additional evidences while the "dossier" in the hands of a fellow deputy contains this item.

May I caution public opinion that after he was sentenced to life imprisonment, Tran-Ngoc-Hien has been kept in solitary confinement and has not been visited by his relatives for three months. Was this measure intended to force Tran-Ngoc-Hien to tell further of my crimes.

My countrymen and comrades-in-arms,

Fellow-deputies,

The foregoing are my clarifications about the "crimes" which the president has charged me of.

I could not guess whether there will be other accusations. However, I believed that the accusations bearing the signature of the president himself must be the most serious and complete accusations.

I agree that all shows of force and display of anti-communist spirit are rightful. But when the "secret" dossier has only been sent to the lower house for consideration and decision, and when the public and even the people who wrote for the radio and TV networks or organized the demonstrations have not been assess the validity of the dossier, any condemnation and indictment before the lower house takes a decision and the court pronounces a verdict are only acts contrary to reason and in violation of both the constitution and existing laws (article 7, section 8 of the constitution now in force).

If anyone still believes that I am guilty, my guilt should be specified as follows: "Tran-Ngoc-Chau had the courage to take up arms to kill foreign invaders and the communist during 23 years; but Tran-Ngoc-Chau did not have the courage to traduce his blood brother Tran-Ngoc-Hien who was a north Vietnamese officer".

Although there are serious pressures for accusing me, I still believe that the common sense of the nationalists will not accept any arbitrary measure and accusation against me which are severe than against the communists.

Respectfully,

TRAN NGOC CHAU.

SAIGON, *December 24, 1969.*

SELF-CONFESSION BY TRAN NGOC HIEN IN RELATION TO TRAN NGOC CHAU

PAST CONTACTS WITH TRAN NGOC CHAU

I.—First contacts without change of attitude

After studying the importance and location of the objectives as well as assessing the importance and competence of the individuals, the directorate of studies decided to work on a number of people, including Tran Ngoc Chau, who might become good news sources. Although Chau and I are blood brothers, we had not met for nearly twenty years, and I had no idea how he had changed. Therefore, I chose the following mottoes:

(*a*) To persevere in winning over him regardless of the time needed.

(*b*) To strengthen the brotherly ties and at the same time to win over him politically in accordance with the dictates of circumstances.

(*c*) To remain vigilant.

(*d*) To make careful preparations for the contacts. And to do this, I asked Mr. Tran Chau Khang, my eldest brother, to contact Chau first in order to assess his attitude in advance.

By the beginning of 1965, Mr. Khang met him and told him that I intended to see him. Mr. Khang reported to me that Chau was willing to receive me and that I could come to see him at any time; he sent me a card bearing this sentence: "please let this man come and see me immediately." Besides, he sent me a query whether I intended to surrender to the government. If I did, he would recommend me for a trip to the United States. As it was not yet timely to make a contact, I destroyed the card, fearing that it might cause trouble as I was using a false I.D. card by September 1965, when Mr. Khang went down to Kien Hoa to ask Chau to give him legal papers so that he could apply for a job, I asked Mr. Khang to reassess Chau's attitude and see whether his attitude had changed in any way. Mr. Khang told me that Chau did not say anything about plans to see him; I reasoned that there was no obstacle to my plans. Therefore, in November 1965, I decided to go to Kien Hoa to have the first contact with him. At about 1430 hours on a sunday in Nov. 1965, I went straight to the residence of the chief of Kien Hoa province and told the guards that I wanted to see Chau. I wrote a note as follows:

Dear brother: I have just arrived from central Vietnam, and, following your advice, I request to see you. Signed: contractor

We were so happy to see each other after so many years. We talked about our family. I told him about our relatives in the north. He introduced his wife and children to me. At dinner, in the presence of his wife and children, he asked me whether I needed any legal papers, thereby showing that he was a man of fair play. I thanked him and told him that I had gotten all necessary papers. As far as I can remember, I got the following ideas across to him during our conversation that night:

The front ordered me to contact you and see whether you want to support the front. Your former friends such as Buoi, Luong, Chuong, Kinh and Lien all want you to do so. No one has anything against you. We ourselves took the risk of contacting you.

The front stands for the struggle against the americans, and for demanding independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. There is nothing to communism, The revolutionaries are not against anti-communist elements who are true patriots. The revolutionaries only oppose those who, under the label of anti-communism. suppress the people and let american inference in our sovereignthy. On the other hand, the revolutionaries would be guilty of ignorance if they fought against french dominion in order to accept the rule of the russians or of the chinese.

Your interests and mine are identical; they are the interests of the people. No theory or doctrine transcends these fundamental interests.

As you believe you are a nationalist and patriot, you should not use any pretext, even that of opposing communism, to calmly let the americans murder the compatriots and devastate the country.

Chau did argue with me on those ideas, but my principle was to avoid arguments.

He said categorically: my stand is clearly to oppose the communist ideology, but not go hate the communists as individuals. He said he did not kill anybody except when he was on operations. He complained that the guerrillas had attempted to kill him with a plastic charge.

Finally, I said: the main and realistic question is not to find out who is right and who is wrong, but to work together to save south Vietnam from the nearly 30 years of war from the french till the Americans. We should not try to convert each other today. Life will do the conversion.

The next morning, CHAU had to go early for an operation; he asked me whether I could stay. I said I wanted to leave. Before departing each other, CHAU put in my pocket a bundle of 500-piaster notes (I found out later that the sum was nearly 30,000 piasters). His wife told a driver to take me to My-Tho in a private car. After this contact, I made the following report to my superiors:

(*a*) The brotherly ties are fairly good.

(*b*) (Chau's) ideas and political stand are not favorable; his opposition is still strong and shows signs of becoming stronger.

(*c*) Contacts should be temporarily suspended, pending more favorable circumstances and changes in the situation.

(*d*) No more regular contacts, but brotherly relations should be maintained.

I requested that the front's committee in Kien-Hoa forbid the guerrillas to assassinate CHAU because he could be won over in the long run.

II. By May 1966, for a second contact, I went straight to Chau's office as he had just been appointed director of the R.D. training program.

At this time, the buddhists were waging a vigorous struggle, the anti-American movement was gathering momentum, the internal situation of south Vietnam was critical. I went to see Chau this time in order to see whether the overall situation had any effect on his stand.

During this second contact, I advance the following ideas:

"The front is quite determined to fight the Americans until the end. The most appropriate political course for South Vietnam to take would be real neutralism. The South would not go communist but would not be dependent on the Americans. You have many friends among the generals, field grade officers, politicians, intellectuals. You should contact patriotic elements and form a group which would work hand in hand with the front when the opportunity arrives. This means that you can continue to oppose communism, but you should do something to oppose the Americans and defend the interests of the people. The front's policy is to seek the widest unity possible. The front does not demand that people support its platform entirely, but only wants to support people who oppose the Americans.

Here is what Chau replied to me: this is very difficult. There are here people who oppose the Americans or who do not like the government, but this does not mean that they are willing to cooperate with the communists.

He boasted that the Americans respected him, that American newspapers praised him, and that he knew many American personalities to whom he could introduce me if I wanted. But I replied: what should I see Americans for? I only want to see patriotic nationalists. We were in the midst of our conversation when an American came in, so I left.

Chau's ideas had not undergone any change. On the contrary, he appeared to be closely associated with the Americans. Therefore, I decided not to continue to work on him politically for some time, and to wait for a more favorable occasion.

II.—Apparent change of attitude, but actual intentions to profit

For a long period, I did not come to see CHAU because Mr. KHANG told me that CHAU was having close relations with the Americans.

(III) By the end of 1967, CHAU asked KHANG to tell me to come to his private house on Ngo-Tung-Chau street in Gia-dinh so that he could say something to me. The contents of the third meeting between the two brothers are as follows:

He told me he had gone to Hue. Many relatives knew that I was in Saigon. So the secret was revealed and security agents might know about my whereabouts. He advised me to take to the bush and not to go around to contact people; he said I might be arrested and bring trouble to him. I answered: don't worry, I will drop in here only occasionally and will go out immediately.

After that, he told me he would run for the elections in Kien-Hoa for the reason that he would lose his initiative if he continued to stay in the army, and that a political career would be more lasting and promising. CHAU added: can you see any way to help me? I do not need more votes because I know many people and enjoy prestige * * * among people in Kien Hoa province; moreover, I don't have important opponents; but could you tell "the other side" not to "sadden" the election day such as by preventing people from going to the polls, indulging in terrorism, shellings, etc. I asked: do you have a new policy to propose in running for the elections? He answered: I have always opposed the communist ideology but not in a blind manner; I do any thing beneficial to the people and the cause of peace.

I considered Chau to be a "potential target" who deserved to be won over in a long process. Therefore, within the framework of strategic intelligence, I intended to lead him into the path of activities useful to my purpose whereas I knew that the lower house would be a corrupt and puppet body which would not play any important role or influence anybody. I indirectly asked him why he did not stay with the army and be a province chief or work in some ministry, which give him more actual power whereas a deputy in south Vietnam could by on means deal with Mr. Loan or a gun-carrying general.

But I realized that Chau had decided to do politics at all costs. I tried to win his sympathy by saying:

The front intends to induce the people to oppose and boycot this election. But I personally am ready to support you and I will report your desire to my superiors. If they agree, orders would be promptly given to the Kien Hoa people.

Here are the contents of the cable I sent to brother Toan after I met with Chau:

"I don't know why Chau asked me to come and told me that my relatives knew about my where abouts and advised me to take to the jungles. Do you, brother Toan, have any ideas to give me?

Chau also told me that he would run for the lower house in Kien Hoa constituency and requested me to ask the front to give him a hand by limiting the sabotage of the elections there.

Since we haven't had Chau, this is a good occasion to win his sympathy and create an favorable atmosphere for to continue to work on him.

Please contact the front to see whether our Chau might be harmful to the overall policy of the front. If possible, we would propose that our forces intensify our offensive in other areas while we would scale our military action against the capital and district towns of Kien Hoa province".

About one month later, brother Toan sent me a letter: "Chau used the pretext that sy's whereabouts had been disclosed in order to force him (sy) to take to the jungles and clear the way for his entry into the political area. Sy's presence would be embarassing and inhibit Chau's freedom of action.

However, be vigilant in your goings and comings. It is possible that the CIA might have known and set up a trap".

Brother Toan did not say a word about my proposal. And until now, my superiors have not said a word about it.

During the election period, I closely follow the electoral process in Kien Hoa by reading newspapers. It appeared to be relatively smooth. Besides, I was told by Mr. Khang that during the election campaign, Chau used suzuki motorbike to move around in Kien Hoa.

There were only 3 candidates in Kien Hoa: Chau, 1 male nurse and 1 teacher. Chau believed he did not have serious opposition. The result was that Chau got 30.000 votes from 80.000 voters out of the population of 500.000.

In my opinion, the success of Chau was a matter of course and should not surprise or mystify anyone.

III.—Since the Mau Than Tet, signs of change of attitude

After the first wave of the Mau Than Tet offensive, after the second wave, after the general situation had evolved and after I had received instructions from above, I had the following intentions regarding Chau:

1.—To persevere in working on him over a long period, using three assets: brotherly sentiments, influence of the situation, political action consisting of:

(*a*) advising and criticizing Chau with a view to limit obnoxious effects of the political gimmicks that he liked to do at the national assembly;

(*b*) gradually arousing his patriotic, anti-american feelings, and at the same time making him understand and sympathize with the policies and programs of the front.

(*c*) increasing his awareness about the need for political probity.

2. to exploit all counter-intelligence information.

3. to be extremely vigilant and cautious as chau might be a tool of the CIA.

since the middle of 1968, there have been signs of:

(*a*) progress along the lines specified above.

(*b*) influence of the situation (on chau).

(*c*) Chau's change as the situation changed.

(*d*) the CIA's activities falling in line with the U.S. policy.

Little by little, the man showed more signs of change in his ideas and attitudes in subsequent contacts.

IV.—The June, 1968, contact had two objectives

(*a*) To find out whether chau could potentially participate in the Trinh dinh Thao alliance.

(*b*) To assess whether he had undergone further change after the two offensives and his trip abroad.

He raised his voice to berate and condemn Mr. Trinh-dinh-Thao. Therefore I gave up the idea to sound him out.

During this contact, although he still pretended to stick to his anti-communist stand, he did show signs of concern and display some changes in his thinking such as:

From believing that the Americans would defeat the communists he had come to admit that the Americans could not win victory because they had a wrong policy but that they could not lose either. He said: why didn't you go and fight anywhere instead of fighting in the cities thus bringing death to the people. I answered half jokingly: the countryside was all liberated. if we did not carry the fighting here where could we do it then? We did not shoot at the people. The people and their houses were destroyed because of American airplanes. As a deputy, why haven't you raised your voice to protest against American bombings of civilians?

He showed first signs of wanting to put an end to the war. He disclosed that public opinion in almost all the countries he had just visited (Japan, United States, England, Italy, France) wants:

a. Contradiction and dissention between the Americans and the authorities in Saigon.

b. The ideas, viewpoints and peace formulas of every personality and group on the Saigon or American side.

I asked Chau: are the reactions of the national assembly and of Thieu to the unilateral cessation of the bombing of the north real or not? I have heard that it was all a farce triggered by Bunker.

Chau smiled: those were real reactions. Please don't believe that the Americans can do anything they want here; we do not abide by all the decisions of the Americans.

I said: it is distressing indeed. As an outsider, I could not even put up with this. The Americans are unacceptable. They override you so crudely. This is a good occasion for the Vietnamese to find a way to shake off the American yoke.

Chau asked: please find out if the north is willing to receive a southern parliamentary delegation in order to discuss about the possibility of solving the war in the south.

I asked him: do you really intend to seek a settlement among all the Vietnamese? is this your own personal idea or is it someone else's? Chau replied: it is not appropriate to say at this time, but roughly Tran-chanh-Thanh shares this idea.

I tried to work on him: this idea is not realistic. Why go to the north while the front is the direct opponent and is the people's ligitimate representative which has full rights to make decisions? since the north still refuses to recognize, the southern regime, how could it receive a southern parliamentary delegation? this would only be beneficial to the americans because the americans can use it to soothe public opinion. The only rightful solution is to deal sincerely with the front of national liberation. However, I will report to my superiors and will give you an answer.

I did report Chau's ideas and suggestions to my superiors and askes brother Toan to:

(*a*) Find out what was behind Chau's proposals.

(*b*) Suggest to me how to answer Chau in such a way as to preserve the front's policies and at the same not to contradict Chau too sharply.

After that, Tu Hiep ordered me to answer along the lines expounded on the Hanoi and liberation radios.

(*VII*).—*The contact after the election of nixon, by the end of dec. 68:*

Chau appeared to be gratified by the election of Nixon and said: during this transition period, the position of Mr. Thieu will be rather delicate but will be better and better defined.

Following the advice of my superiors, I answered Chau that it was not timely yet to send a southern parliamentary delegation to the north. He flew into an anger and said: "so you believe your are certain of success and only want to settle with the Americans. You must not force us into the position of either siding entirely with the other side or leaning competely on the Americans. We are those who neither accept the front nor side with the ultra-rightists. We are only middle-of-the-road people (litterally: we are only people who stand in the middle).

I waited to Chau to cool down, then advanced some ideas.

The policies and platform of the north and of the front are always identical. The front's policy is that the southern problem must be settled among the Vietnamese without foreign interference.

If you or your group want to put an end to the people's 30 years of sufferings, you should deal directly with the southern front of liberation. This is inevitable, sooner or later.

The americans are presently squeezed from all sides. This is a good occasion to break away from american bondage; and the only solution is still to seek an accommodation among the Vietnamese.

(*VIII*).—*The contact after the ky dau tet, by the end of february, 1969, at Chau's invitation through Mr. Khang:*

Upon seeing me, he told me immediately: a number of deputies and possibly representatives of some religions want to set up a delegation to paris or to somewhere else in order to contact the north and the front with a view to assess the possibility of ending the war. This group's intention is to gain some political stature which would enable it to tell other circles and groups that it has the capability of promoting understanding and reaching an settlement with the other side. It does not matter for it to meet with north Vietnam first and the front second or simultaneously.

I asked: What are the group's views on a solution? He replied: to seek a settlement with the front without having to amend the constitution forbids communism while the front has never admitted that it is a communist organization. The front can in the long run be considered a political party, a minority group, and adjustments can be made for it to have deputies (to the national assembly). President Thieu has about the same ideas. There must be a settlement with the front, sooner or later, but it is too dangerous to declare so at this time. He asked me to find out whether the front and the north would agree to receive the group. If the answer was positive, he would go to paris in april or may 1969.

I asked for further information about the composition of the delegation. He roughly said he had contacts with the buddhists, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, etc.

I tried to work on him:

Is this your sincere idea or only a political gimmick or a CIA scheme; does this group have any strength or prestige? If not, after the meetings, all its members would be jailed and would not be able to achieve anything.

What is Mr. Thieu really stand for?

If you want to give your group strength, you must enroll the support of the major religions such as the catholics, the An Quang buddhists, as well as of personalities both here and abroad. It would be useless to have a group of people whose names scare off people. There must be a political platform that is in line with independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, if a settlement is to be reached. In politics, you must know the strength of the parties. On what grounds could you consider the front as a minority group?

Finally, I promised: although I have no concrete ideas yet, I will report to my superiors and will give you an early answer.

After I left Chau, I wrote a report to my superiors dealing with Chau's formula of seeking a settlement with the front within the framework of the constitution. In another letter, addressed to Tu Hiep, I wrote: "It is to be wondered what happen in paris in * * * april and may which wo ld make CHAU decide to go there to contact us".

After that, I went to see Ba Can and talked briefly about CHAU's ideas, and I said that we should study the situation more fully in order to make suggestions to the higherups.

I intended to come and see CHAU by the beginning of april, 1969, for two purposes:

(*a*) to assess the strength, policies and platform of the CHAU group.

(*b*) If favorable, to ask to contact some of the group's members in order to have clearer ideas and to expand my sources who might be useful to my strategic intelligence activities.

I had not come to see CHAU when I was arrested on April 6, 1969.

Views of Tran Ngoc Chau on GVN/NLF Talks

(Submitted by Daniel Ellsberg)

The several items following were recently sent me by Tran Ngoc Chau, formerly lieutenant colonel in ARVN, now a Deputy from Kim Hoa (when he was twice the Province Chief), and Secretary General of the National Assembly, House of Deputies. Formerly a battalion commander in the Viet Minh, rallying to the Bao Dai Government in 1950, Chau was perhaps the leading innovator and analyst of pacification techniques in Vietnam and was first head of the Revolutionary Development Cadre Program. I know Chau as a close friend and, as do many other Americans, respect him as a patriot.

Among the items sent by Chau (not reproduced below) is a hand drawn diagram headed: "This is how the GVN and NVN are competing in winning over the support of the people in South Vietnam." With the "people in South Vietnam" as a box in the center, Chau shows them as appealed to, on the one side, by successive boxes representing various vehicles ranging from the DRV (attracting "communists of the first degree"), the NLF (attracting "communists of the second degree"), Trinh Dinh Thao's alliance (for "communists of the third degree") and the proposal of coalition government (appealing to "communists of the fourth degree"); whereas on the other side, non-communists vehicles encouraged by the GVN (and U.S.) are represented by the GVN alone, appealing to "anti-communists of the first degree": "Everyone else is accused or condemned as pro-communist."

Chau is now regarded as a leader of the nationalist opposition to the present GVN, within the National Assembly. He has for several years favored ceasefire and direct talks between the GVN and the NLF in Vietnamese politics. Were it not for the immunity granted by his membership in the National Assembly, he would undoubtedly be arrested by the current GVN leadership for his recent expressions of these long-held views (as represented in the accompanying translations). That immunity is probably not absolute. His vulnerability has undoubtedly been increased by his recent public disclosure that a Viet Cong captain now in police custody is his brother (another brother is a North Vietnamese official), even though these family relationships have been known to the government for some time and represent, as he put it, a "familiar drama" in the conflict in South Vietnam.

Why Must We Talk With North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front

(By Deputy Tran-Ngoc-Chau)

On January 15, 1969, the Quyet-Tien Daily published an interview with me about attitudes towards the NLF. To make the matter clearer, I would like to add the following statement.—Deputy Tran-Ngoc-Chau

NOT GONE WITH THE WIND

From the beginning of 1945 to the end of 1949, I had the privilege of wearing torn clothes, walking bare-footed, living from hand to mouth, working without pay and living in straitened circumstances along the Truong Son Mountains to participate in the resistance, taking up arms to oppose foreign invasion.

In 1950, I changed ranks and rallied to the Nationalist camp. Since then, I have worn French uniforms and American shoes, lived in plenty and received high salaries, enjoyed comforts from Hai Phong and Hung Yen to the Ben Hai and Ca Mau, participating in the resistance against the Communists.

The time I have spent on this side is threefold or fourfold the time spent on the other side; feats of arms I have accomplished on this side also outnumber those on the other side. My authority and privileges on this side are also superior to those on the other side. My way of life and my thoughts are also more at ease on this side than on the other side. I have also more friends and relatives here than there.

Thus, there is no reason why I should support a victory of the other camp (NVN and the NLF) whether on the battlefield or at the conference table.

But we must also sincerely admit that if the great majority of our people could enjoy their basic rights under a good regime, they themselves would have long ago been determined to defend themselves against any form of Communist propaganda and terrorism. Thus, the Communists would never have been able to use minority rule to sway us and to make it necessary for us to cope with them for so many years.

In view of the above, I believe that the Communists are guilty of provoking the war, but that we ourselves, non-Communist leaders, have been incapable of improving society, of bringing confidence to the people, and of fully utilizing our capabilities to destroy the Communists.

And it is because of the above-mentioned inability that the Communists have been able to expand and attract a great part of the population to them, while we ourselves must depend on our ally, the United States, to fight the Communists.

Until the day comes when the United States changes its methods, we must face our enemy in the front and our ally in the back.

We cannot prolong this war under such conditions.

An early end must be put to the war so as to save the great majority of the population from death, from infirmity, and from bankruptcy caused by the war.

Both sides—we and the Communists—must put an end to the war for the sake of humanity.

REALISTIC REASON

There are only three ways of achieving peace in this war:

1. Surrender to the Communists.
2. Defeat the Communists.
3. Make mutual concessions.

Of course, we cannot, nor is there any reason for us, to surrender to the Communists in any form. At any rate, we remain stronger than they.

Defeat the Communists? *We have been defeating them successfully day after day.* Whoever opens the daily news bulletins and statistical reports from 1959 to the present would certainly see that the total number of Viet Cong killed stands at millions by body count, and that the population that we control comes up to twenty or thirty million. *Therefore, if we choose to defeat the Communists with the old strategy, it would mean that the war would go on indefinitely-endlessly.* Such a situation would be tantamount to continuing the present war with promises but without any end in sight.

A number of anti-Communist elements whose incomes increase and whose relatives and friends dodge military service have chosen this self-decceiving formula.

Therefore, if the two above formulas are not chosen, we must make mutual concessions to put an end to the war and bring peace to our country.

CONDITIONS TO END THE WAR

But on what basis must concessions be made? This is quite a problem which we must analyze.

As everyone of us knows:

In the past—in spite of statements and promises of peace—our government has advocated that the war must be ended on the basis that "NVN must withdraw its invasion troops", the Viet Cong must "chieu hoi" and surrender to the government, and that, even if they would do so, only elements recognized as "good" can participate in political as "individuals" in the "national community".

The above conditions require that NVN and the Viet Cong must lay down their arms and surrender—no more, no less.

In my heart and that of all non-Communist people, we hope that NVN and the Viet Cong will act that way.

Our attitude in resiging ourselves to sit down at the conference table in Paris on January 18, 1969, with a delegation equal in number to that of the United States delegation, with the presence (known to the entire world) of the National Liberation Front indicated that our government had given up the above unrealistic policy of restoring peace.

What a shame!

When the other camp consists of 8 Vietnamese facing our camp which consists of 4 Vietnamese and 4 Americans.

But let's look into the reality, into the bones and blood of the people and into the scenes of destruction of the country, and thus continue to seek peace.

The most loud-talking anti-Communist elements should raise their voices and tell people what we should do in the face of this tragic and shameful situation.

Should we accept the Communists and thus maintain Vietnamese personality (because we all still are Vietnamese) or accept dependence on the United States not necessarily to be anti-Communist, but rather to depend on the United States to lead us anywhere it wants?

Is there anyone who forgets that:

In 1963 the United States accused President Ngo-Dinh-Diem (who had been elected by the people in accordance with the Constitution) of repressing the Buddhists and attempting to come to agreement with NVN in order to come to the November 1, 1963 coup?

And that in 1966 the United States supported the most terrible repressions of the Buddhists by tanks and planes, and today (the U.S.) compels the Republic of Viet Nam to sit at the conference table, not only with North Viet Nam, but also with the National Liberation Front?

But reality, however shameful, still does not necessarily require us to choose between "dependence on the United States" and "acceptance of the Communists".

Reality still gives us a chance to choose another road, different from slavery (Communist or foreign).

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATIONALISTS

That road is one of nationalism, pure nationalism, which can overcome all temptations, influences and controls by both the Communists and the foreigners.

Those Vietnamese who sincerely love their compatriots and their country will unite to build that new road.

If there are Vietnamese who sided with the French, or follow the Americans or the Nationalist camp out of horror and hatred of the dictatorial nature and the brutal actions of the Communists, why can't there be other Vietnamese who sided with the Communists out of horror and hatred toward the arbitary and despotic nature and the selfish and cruel actions of some of us?

In the most cruel and corrupt regimes there still must be generous and honest elements.

The road to save the Vietnamese nation now and in the future in South Viet Nam, in North Viet Nam, and all over the Vietnamese territory, will not be built by the Vietnamese who follow the American, follow the Russians or follow the Chinese, but rather will be built by the Nationalistic Vietnamese.

In the face of that new reality and those new requirements, the Republic of Viet Nam should bravely talk peace directly with North Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front.

Talk with North Viet Nam in order to reach agreement on a common framework for the future of both the South and the North, and talk with the National Liberation Front in order to end the war on the territory which lies South of the 17th parallel.

Viet Nam peace cannot be settled completely between the Republic of Viet Nam and the National Liberation Front because on the other side of the parallel North Viet Nam is still ready to stir up trouble and support the war.

Nor can Viet Nam peace be settled completely between the Republic of Viet Nam and North Viet Nam because the National Liberation Front, which North Viet Nam will never abandon, is still on this side of the parallel.

We have the right to call the National Liberation Front by a hundred terms which are bad, vile and most servile, but we must admit that this organization exists in reality, and that there could never be any peace talks which could bring an end to the war if we did not agree to make some concessions to this organization and thus to satisfy some of its minimum demands.

We have done this before with regard to some armed opposition groups. Why can't we do it again with regard to the National Liberation Front? Is it because this Front is Communist or dependent on the Communists?

That is the truth.

But at present, both we and the U.S. have realized that our army and the army, technical ability and resources of the most advanced modern power in the world can't exterminate them and because of that, we are forced to talk with them at the conference table.

Whether we like it or not, we are compelled to discuss the methods of ending the war in order to restore peace.

But peace is never restored by means of a combat of wits and open discussions at the conference table.

Peace can be restored only by means of acceptance by the concerned parties.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONCERNED PARTIES

Let us ask ourselves who are the concerned parties and what understanding and concessions are possible?

The United States

First, let us speak about the United States. We must speak about the United States first because in the past the United States has proven its power through the evolution and shifts of power among the patriots and scoundrels among the leadership of the Vietnamese nation, and at present the United States is still the most influential power from our local level to the central government and from the companies and battalions to higher echelons.

If the United States had withdrawn some assistance items or some supply items, certainly what happened to President Diem, to the regime prior to 1963, would have happened to President Thieu, to the present regime.

With its available open and secret power, the United States is the main obstacle which blocks Viet Nam on the road to war or peace. If the United States does not agree with the RVN.

Therefore, let us demand that the United States reconsider its attitude at the Paris peace negotiation and at other peace talks to come.

It is precisely the presence of the United States at the conference table which has:

(*a*) encouraged North Viet Nam and the NLF to refuse to talk with the RVN;

(*b*) pushed the RVN back into a subordinate position;

(*c*) escalated its role in the war, that the Communists always make propaganda about;

(*d*) and consequently, caused the majority of the people in the world and the American people to oppose the war in Viet Nam;

(*e*) made the most pro-American nationalists feel ashamed and hate the United States;

(*f*) made the North Vietnamese feel more proud and enthusiastic because they can sit at the same level as the United States; and

(*g*) made the Southeast Asian nations friendly to the United States doubt the goodwill of the United States.

The presence of the U.S. not only entails the above consequences, but moreover the whole world knows that it is the U.S. that took the helm and forced the RVN to sit at the conference table with North Viet Nam and the NLF.

In view of the past disastrous consequences, and the obstacles that can be forecast, the U.S. must put an end to its absurd role in Paris and in other peace talks, the U.S. cannot use the fact that it has troops fighting in Viet Nam to maintain this negotiating role, because the American troops came to Viet Nam at the request of the GVN in order to meet a political need.

Peace talks are a way of solving problems on the political level. Only the RVN—a sovereign nation—has the unique competence to solve (its) political problems.

If one pretends that the U.S. needs to be present in order to solve the military problems, it will be all the more absurd.

Because military decisions must always depend on the political ones.

Assuming that we accept this reasoning, the U.S. only has the right to designate military representatives who participate within the RVN's delegation. It does not have the right (to have) an equal or separate delegation.

The righteous cause of both the U.S. and the RVN lies in these details.

The RVN is ready to conclude separate agreements with the U.S. regarding the guarantees concerning the safety and the interests of the U.S. in Viet Nam. With these guarantees, the U.S. should let the RVN negotiate directly with North Viet Nam and the NLF.

(I don't know whether the American negotiators in Paris feel ashamed when they face, not the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, but the delegates of a segment of a little country. I personally feel very ashamed over the situation of the V.N. negotiators who must sit together with the American delegation in order to talk with Vietnamese even though they are Communists.)

The Republic of Viet Nam

As for the RVN, we must be determined to put an end to the military war. But we can't surrender to the Communists.

We will accept in sequence:

(*a*) a total cease-fire;

(*b*) a number of representatives designated (chi dinh) by the NLF in the village councils, the provincial councils and in the National Assembly. The ratio of these representatives must be that of a minority.

(*c*) the incorporation of the NLF armed forces into the RVNAF.

(*d*) representatives of the NLF may stand for election to the organs provided for in the Constitution;

(*e*) a general election for the reunification of the two regions within 10 years;

(*f*) an international police organization will supervise and arbitrate the implementation of the above clauses.

Of course, such a plan must be approved by the National Assembly which will amend 1 or 2 articles of the Constitution concerning election procedures.

Once again I must stress that if we want peace, we must be realistic and make concessions.

In Italy, the Communist party is the strongest party. However, the Italian nation is still not controlled by the Communists.

In Viet Nam the Communists have not and will not triumph over us by force of arms. But they have come to the conference table with political prestige.

Why don't we accept replacing this military struggle with a political one? We will win.

Because only when faced with a direct Communist threat will the Nationalist parties unite. The South Vietnamese people don't like Communism and will choose the Nationalist parties immediately after terrorism and danger have ceased.

NORTH VIET NAM AND THE NLF

We must acknowledge that they have scored some success when they forced the U.S. to stop the bombing and come to the conference table as their equal.

But results are only a possibility.

We hope that North Viet Nam and the NLF must realize that they can never conquer South Viet Nam:

(*a*) by force of arms. Despite the fact they have initiated the most violent attacks;

(*b*) by a coup d'etat. Despite the fact that many similar attempts have occurred.

Even though the RVN has not yet defeated North Viet Nam and the NLF this year, nor next year, certainly the RVN can still continue to exterminate the Communists and prevent them from winning.

If North Viet Nam and the NLF see this reality clearly, we hope they will thrust the U.S. aside in order to sincerely seek with us a peace solution among Vietnamese, even though they are of different political views.

IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED

Assuming that peace is restored based on concessions made by the RVN, what will happen?

The NLF will become an open political party, but it must observe the Constitution, especially Article 4.

Faced with this direct and present threat, non-Communist parties will be forced to come to an agreement, make mutual concessions and form an alliance to cope with it.

The population will have the free opportunity, without fear of terrorism or danger, of choosing the side that will secure for it the greatest material welfare and spiritual guarantees.

In this environment there will certainly occur a tense competition between the non-Communist side and the NLF.

Precisely this competition will help our society progress quickly, and our fellow countrymen easily find the righteous cause.

And because of this, all open or latent conflict due to religious and regional differences among the non-Communist people will be erased. And only because they do not have a serious adversary to cope with.

In the new political struggle, the Army will no longer play the main role, but the political parties, religions and the people will have to directly and totally resist the Communists.

IS THE CONSTITUTION VIOLATED?

Many persons deem that it is unconstitutional to express the view of accepting the NLF since this Front is a tool of the NVN Communists.

The Constitution clearly forbids in Article 4 as follows:

> The Republic of Viet Nam opposes Communism in any form. Every activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited.

So, when discussing the reasons why we must talk peace with the NLF or with North Viet Nam does not mean making propaganda or carrying out Communism. Provided that the above discussions only bring up realistic data and do not praise or encourage people to follow the Communists.

We ask ourselves, when the National Assembly authorizes the government to talk peace directly with North Viet Nam (authentic Communists) can this decision be interpreted as an action aimed at making propaganda or carrying out Communism or not?

Of course not.

So the proposal (and not the decision) to talk with the NLF (which is only a Communist tool) cannot be considered unconstitutional. Especially when representatives of our government are actually talking with the representatives of North Viet Nam and the NLF in Paris (despite the fact that both parties still declare they do not recognize each other).

In summary, it is unconstitutional only when the promoters of the idea renounce the RVN regime in order to demand the recognition of the NLF as a true government, but it cannot be unconstitutional only to propose the acceptance of the NLF as a political party that must observe the RVN Constitution and its incorporation into the whole RVN structure as a minority element.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I must define clearly once again my position concerning peace talks with North Viet Nam and the NLF as follows:

1. The concerned parties must be determined to put an end to this savage war.
2. The United States must withdraw from all peace talks with North Viet Nam and the NLF. Only when this has been done will North Viet Nam and the NLF accept direct peace talks with the RVN.

3. The RVN will resolve with North Viet Nam the future regime of a Free and Unified Nation of Viet Nam.

4. The RVN will accept the NLF as a political party provided that it honors the Constitution. There may be some amendments to the Constitution with regard to election procedures.

5. The armed forces of the NLF must be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet Nam.

6. The Nationalist political parties must automatically ally to form a majority capable of checking the NLF.

7. An international force will supervise and arbitrate the implementation of the above clauses.

With the concept presented in this document, I still maintain the position of a Nationalist who puts the integrity of the body and the mind of the Vietnamese above all other ideologies or interests.

I never accept Communism, but I also never accept our subordination to a foreign country. Because subordination to either side brings the nation war and destruction as the past and the present have proven.

(Submitted By Daniel Ellsberg)

Part I. Colonel Chau's Remarks

PERSONAL BACKGROUND

In addition to the positions that Dan Ellsberg has mentioned, I want to say a few more things about my background. I was from a very conservative religious family in the Imperial City of Hue. As a young Boy Scout in 1942 I was recruited into the Vietminh by a very outstanding leader of the International Boy Scout movement named Professor Bo. Beginning in 1942 Professor Bo organized clandestine Communist units among selected Vietnamese youth. In 1944 hand-picked youths from each province were sent to a special course in North Vietnam called The First Political Military Course. This course lasted three months and at its conclusion I was made one of the first platoon leaders in the Vietminh Liberation Army which, in 1947, was renamed the Army for the Protection of the Country. In 1945 to 1950 I served at various levels in the Liberation Army and moved up to the level of Political Commissar for the 5th Vietminh Inter-zone, which consisted of the areas from Duong Nang to the 3rd Corp in South Vietnam.

I left the Vietminh for several reasons. My conservative background made me very attached to the Royal Family and when Bao Dai returned to Vietnam, we felt we had a national patriot. Besides that, the Vietminh increasingly began to discriminate against all elements they considered unreliable, such as "bourgeoise," Catholics and the like. A number of persons from religious backgrounds like myself left the Vietminh at that time. This was one of the major mistakes of the Vietminh—that they were unwilling to trust the inside cadre only on the basis of social origin. Another mistake was the 1946 assassination of all non-communist elements within the Nationalist movement.

First attempts at pacification

The first use of the term pacification was in 1952 when the French attempted three types of programs to clear the Vietminh from the countryside. One was in the Delta region of North Vietnam, a predominately Catholic area; the second type of French program occurred in the central coastal area, provinces such as Binh Dinh. The third took place in the Mekong Delta area. Each program was different and yet there were similar aspects: first, the launching of a military operation to clear Vietminh units from the area; secondly, the improvement and expansion of a French-type police system; thirdly, the reorganization of a village committee to take direct control of the village area. The basic failures of the French program are obvious from the outcome of the war against the Vietminh—the French defeat in 1954.

Pacification in 1961

Pacification was tried again in 1961 but this time much more fully under Vietnamese control. There was, however, substantial support from the U.S. and from advisors such as Thompson. The main element consisted in the effort of "combining a military spirit with the technical organization system." The youth brigades organized by the South Vietnamese government were to undertake economic development activities, but also possess military combat qualities.

There were two main failures in this 1961 program: first, an effort to do "too much too rapidly"; secondly, many of the local commanders were "intellectually hypnotized" by the instructions issued to them by Nhu's central committee. Going too fast meant that the province chiefs were too eager for success and therefore moved on to more advanced steps in the pacification process before adequately completing the necessary preliminaries. They failed to screen the VC infrastructure out of the villages before undertaking pacification activities. There were not enough economic development activities and, thirdly, the province officials, in their haste, were not willing to persuade people to undertake the actions the government desired, but instead forced them to do various things, such as the construction of combat hamlets and the like.

During this time I was one of the province chiefs who refused to make haste merely for the sake of appearing successful to my superiors. My province, Kien Hoa at that time, also continually appeared as 36th or 37th among the provinces in the monthly progress reports that we had to file. Nevertheless, I believe the 1961 pacification program would have been a success "had it not been for the 1963 Buddhist crisis." This crisis undermined the government at the center and made any progress in the field impossible.

In the aftermath of the November 1963 coup against Diem, the military regime declared there would be no more strategic hamlet programs and disbanded the combat youth that the Nhus had set up. Nevertheless within a short time the value of the program was seen and under a new name a new pacification effort was begun.

The 1963 pacification program

In setting up the new pacification program under the military regime, a major obstacle to be overcome was the fact that "many of those participating in the former pacification program had been physically or psychologically condemned." They were looked upon as "Nhu people," and felt defensive. The military said that they had collaborated with the Nhus, that they had cooperated with the Diem government and, therefore, were not reliable; yet these people such as myself and many others were the ones who had experience in pacification. Due to this psychological defensiveness, a number of the people who "joined the new pacification program did so without enthusiasm."

Current pacification program—December 1965 to present

In discussing the current pacification program I must refer to my participation and my ideas. I do this without any sense of pride and Dan Ellsberg can verify the facts that I shall relate.

General Thang became Minister of Rural Development in December 1965 and this marked the beginning of the present pacification program. He appointed me as First Director of the Cadre Training Program because, as province chief in Kien Hoa, I had begun to work on pacification in my own way with some genuine success.

The ideas that I initiated in the first part of 1964 and found extremely useful was the census grievance program, and I shall now describe it and my reasons for initiating it.

I realized that the most important reasons for lack of success in pacification was because of the non-participation of people. This non-participation was not because the people supported the Viet Cong, because if the people had supported the Viet Cong, I would not have had the courage to continue in my activities at all. Rather they were threatened by the Viet Cong in a kind of imminent way. The Viet Cong were not there in the villages I dealt with; they were relatively secure; there were few incidents. But the people had a mental fear of the Viet Cong—an obsession. They felt the Viet Cong might always come back or could be anywhere at any time.

I set up the census grievance program because I wanted to release the people from their mental fear of the Viet Cong. The people did not have psychological confidence in our forces and the army and the PF. They always suspected that one or two people in these or any other government agencies might have secret connections with the Viet Cong, and, therefore, were afraid to give any information to the government.

The census grievance program was begun in 1963. The essential idea was that one cadre would be assigned by a province chief with a closed office in each village. Then on a regular basis this census grievance official would see all the people from

the village for an equal length of time, usually about three minutes and then he would walk out the door. So it became impossible to know who had said something to the official and who hadn't—only the official knew.

The census grievance official would talk to the person and first begin to ask him about his family, how they were, who were his relations in the village, and what were the various members of his family doing. Secondly, he would begin to ask about whether the individual had any problems with government officials or with the soldiers, and whether he wanted anything done about these problems, or if he wanted more services, government aid of one kind or another. Thirdly, the official would ask the villager whether he had seen any suspicious activity lately, such as strangers near the village, change in the number of persons living in homes nearby or movement of supplies or goods in the area.

Once the census grievance program had begun operating for a little while, the people in the hamlet began to be supicious but this time in a reverse sense. They no longer merely worried about whether someone was an informer for the Viet Cong or whether they were Viet Cong agents who watched and knew what their activities were. Rather they now began to wonder whether and if some of the people were informing to the government about them. No one knew whether anyone was giving any information; no one knew what kind of information might be given. But the whole procedure and the fact that nothing could be known about what went on began to have an effect on those people who were secretly members of what we called the "on-the-spot Viet Cong." Within one month after the program began operating, seven people voluntarily left the village. These were the Viet Cong agents in the village.

In 1964 this program was so successful in my province that almost every province installed this system toward the end of 1964.

Colonel Chau's procedures for dealing with the people's grievances

A problem with the census grievance program was that the established authorities of the village, the police chief and the hamlet chief, etc., of course began to worry also about whether the people were informing on their activities. For that reason they were not cooperative at first and quite suspicious of the program. A problem I faced then was, "if I created jealousy between the census grievance cadre and the village chief, I would destroy the basis of the village chief's authority." My procedure then for dealing with complaints and grievances against the village chief was the following: (1) the census grievance cadre would put this information to the district office; (2) the district office would pass the information on to my personal staff of inspectors who would then go out and verify the fact that the grievance cited actually was occurring; (3) the inspector would report to a special committee of the province chiefs and would recommend action; (4) finally, I myself would have a talk with the village chief, explain the information and attempt to persuade him to change his ways. My purpose "was not to punish but to educate the village chiefs and to change their behavior."

I also kept two afternoons open a week at the province capital where anyone could come and personally tell me about any problems he was having in the province. This audience with me was open to anyone, first come, first served. Another technique we used was to broadcast on a radio program. We had discussion of a problem that had occurred either in a named village or a village that was described in general. The problem would be described, then the way the case was solved, the solutions that were proposed by the province chief or adopted by the village chief as the case may be. This broadcasting of real problems and real solutions, together with the afternoon audience possibilities brought many people to see me in my office, and gave many people hope that some things could be changed.

The way I handled these fears and suspicions of the other government officials was mainly to try to talk with them, listen to their problems, listen to the concerns they had about the census grievance program. I tried to make myself available to them and help them understand that as long as they performed properly, there was nothing they need worry about. In fact, with time, many police chiefs told me that they found me far from being a threat, a valuable province chief, because at least I was accessible to them and they could talk to me about the problems they were having.

Daniel Ellsberg's comments on the census grievance system

This entire discussion brings out a number of very interesting points. One is that information flow is felt to be very important by the Communists and Colonel Chau is one of those rare people in the GVN or American establishment who like-

wise is very concerned with promoting the accumulation of accurate information on the people whom government programs, pacification, military programs and the like are supposedly aimed at.

In Vietnam within the administrative agencies of the GVN there is generally a very high rate of personnel turnover, so there are very few people within the GVN who know anything about "their areas." As a result of the census grievance program in Kien Huo province, however, an enormous amount of very important data had been collected and could be passed on from one hamlet village or district or province official to the next. For example, in a very simple hamlet of the province—a hamlet would consist of a number of houses with some coconut and banana trees and the like—there would be a simple thatched hut like all the others on the outside which would contain the data collected by the census grievance system. Inside this hut would be a very accurately, in fact, even artistically drawn map of the hamlet showing the property owned by each person, exactly where it was, its extent, and what was produced on that property. In addition, there would be file cards which clearly indicated the pattern of relations among people within the hamlet and among the various hamlets in the village. Further, there would be very complete listings of all relatives presumed working with the the Viet Cong, or with the GVN administrative apparatus. In addition to that, the census grievance data cards also had breakdowns of age groups, the amount of education received by various people, land holdings, and other such socio-economic information. Colonel Chau has not mentioned this purely informational aspect of the census grievance program, but as it worked out, it provided Kien Hao province with one of the few incidences of worthwhile information on the people in a local area.

One organization in Vietnam is known for backing new ideas. It backed the census grievance program in Kien Hoa province as a pilot project. Once it began working so well, it was immediately tried on a nation-wide scale. There it could not work so well for three main reasons: (1) not all province chiefs are anywhere near as good as Colonel Chau; (2) the cadre must be instructed to collect grievances and complaints about the government rather than merely to elicit information about the Viet Cong. The cadre cannot be motivated if they are to be nothing more than spies for the government; (3) there came to be an emphasis on the third part of the census grievance program—the collection of information on the Viet Cong. As a result of this, the cadre were neither as motivated nor as effective as they had been in the initial program.

But the "effectiveness of Colonel Chau's census grievance program was not dependent on who was running it"; it did provide information. In fact, there never had been as much information as was obtained by this system. The system was by no means as good as it had been in its pilot province, but it still was effective for some purposes when extended to a national scale.

The reasons why Kien Hoa is not more secure today

Despite the success mentioned in 1964, it is correct to say that Kien Hoa province is not much more secure today than any other province in Vietnam. The reasons for this might be better understood if I describe my operations at the time a bit more.

I used the census grievance information as an input to several counterterrorist groups which I ran. These counterterrorist groups usually operated in small units of three men and were very effective in assassinating VC cadre in the area of my control. In addition to this I attempted to contact the families of persons who were working with the VC and used them as a means to bring people back to the government side.

The way I would do this was the following: once census grievance information gave us lists of people who were working with the VC, I would make a public announcement within each hamlet of the families which had a member working with the VC either in the village or elsewhere. When these families saw their names published in an open list like this, their feelings were hurt and they felt that their prestige in the community had been lessened. The whole purpose of the public announcement was to cause them some psychological shock and prepare them for visits from selected Chieu Hoi cadre who then came in and spoke with the family. These Chieu Hoi tried to convince the family that they should make an effort to get their VC members back. Usually the families then tried to get the VC members back. They would either talk to them when the VC members visited them, or they would communicate by writing or in some other way. Whether the

family was successful or not, the net effect of this was demoralizing for the Viet Cong members because they saw their families' loyalty disappear and felt themselves more alone in the movement.

Furthermore, the family's position and its unity before had been quite secure. They had a member working with the Viet Cong but no one really knew for sure, and they did not feel they had to hide anything. But with the publication of the list, the family began to feel insecure. That was the reason for their emotional shock—that was the reason they felt sorry they had a VC member in the family. And once the family felt insecure like this, they didn't want the VC members to come back as often, so the whole arrangement of membership in the Viet Cong became a much less comfortable affair for the Viet Cong member. He couldn't simply return to his family and be equally comfortable in the government side as well as the Viet Cong side of the Vietnamese scene.

Now to return to the reasons for the deterioration of the security of Kien Hoa province. First, the census grievance no longer worked after I left. Secondly, the counter-terrorist groups did not work because my successor decided to consolidate the small 3-man units, first into platoon and then even into company size. Thirdly, I had had support from eminent people in my province from the Catholics from the Hoa Hoa, from the Cao Dai, and so forth, but my successor could not obtain their support.

The reason for that is because I went around the province a lot by jeep and bicycle. I kept in constant touch with the villages and hamlets and with the officials, and I tried to be very sure to visit the hospital, both civil as well as military patients, and the prisons, at least once a week. My successor did not do this—the people made an unfavorable comparison and he did not receive their support as I have. "The failure of pacification is not due to military arrangements."

Six steps to pacification—Chau's program

When I ask people, Vietnamese or American, what is the end object of pacification, the answer always is something like, winning the hearts and minds of the people so that they will support the government. To me this is no objective at all. It merely permits all commanders on all levels of government to do what they wish.

When I hear an objective like this, I say that there is no pacification program. It's too vague.

The objective of pacification should be *people's self-defense*. By this I mean that: Ideologically as well as militarily, people must be convinced that they cannot stand as neutrals. They must either go with the Communists or with the government.

I will never consider a hamlet as pacified as long as the people are willing to protect themselves. No place in Vietnam can be considered as pacified in this sense at the present. There are only secure places which are secure because of the presence of military forces.

Now what will make people willing to defend themselves? That will occur only when people are running their own affairs. And how can this be obtained? This can be obtained when elections are really desired by the people, rather than merely imposed on them as it has happened so often in the past.

Local people's organizations

Elections will be desired by the people only when they have their roots in the understanding that government can do something for them. People's organizations exist in Vietnam as elsewhere in the world. "These organizations train people to respond to community spirit."

Farmers realize farmers belong to a farmers' association because it helps them with their crops. They then learn about representation and government when they realize that they can't devote their own time to running the farmers' organization, so they must appoint a representative to run the organization for them.

Improve living standard of people

To make local people's organizations really important, they must do something tangible for the people. What I mean by improving the living standard is an improvement in economic conditions and also an improvement in their dignity. The people are most concerned with things like justice, fairness, protection, and the like. The city and town people care the most about dignity and justice. People in the country are most concerned with economic development and, in fact,

wouldn't really understand any system that was supposed to guarantee them justice. They would see justice not in any set of procedures but merely in the way things are run.

This is where AID programs should come in—they should be brought in at this level—at the village hamlet level—to improve the economic conditions of the people.

Why have so many AID programs failed to work? Because most of the people working were technicians and they were only technicians—they did not use economic aid for political purposes in the villages and hamlets. Also, they did not really understand the local political situation and so often were taken in by the people who used economic aid for their self-interest.

Investigation into local natural leaders

For that reason it is important to know who are the most influential people in the community, that is, who are the people who can really have an impact on the people and get them to use new economic and agricultural techniques. For the most part, AID technicians don't know this and neither do Vietnamese. This must be found out by doing a thorough investigation of this before putting in economic aid.

Confidence of the people

By confidence of the people I mean two things: first, security from the Viet Cong and, secondly, proper behavior of the GVN. These things are necessary before anything can be done in the community.

Now in Vietnam all of these six things have been done, but they have never been done together in one place at one time and they haven't been done in the proper sequence. The sequence of events is all-important if the end result is to be the people's self-defense as I have outlined it. The sequence must be as follows: 1) confidence; 2) investigation of leaders; 3) improvement of living standards; 4) local people's organizations; 5) local elections; and 6) people's self-defense.

Pacification

You have asked me to talk about the good and bad aspects of pacification in 1966 and 1967. The good aspects were the following two: first, there was a definite pacification program; secondly, we made strenuous efforts to implement the pacification program, and finally, we made some efforts to evaluate its success and failures. It was only toward the end of 1966 that we in the Ministry of Rural Development were able to convince the Vietnamese military of the need for pacification.

Question. What lessons did you learn about pacification in 1966?

The most important failure was "the improper selection of areas to be pacified." Our failure was that we tried to make too rapid progress and we neglected the district towns and other areas that were marked as secure. The point was that only in a few pacified areas that had been considered insecure before 1966 could district and local officials show any real progress in pacification. So we neglected the central towns and district capitals, etc., and other such secure areas, and concentrated our pacification efforts on the areas just outside the secure areas.

The bureaucratic process of selecting areas to be pacified

In theory, suggestions of areas to be pacified was by the suggestion of the district chief, but in fact the province chief told the district chiefs which hamlets to select. Andt he province chief was told by the corps commander or division commander which area to pacify and his main purpose was to extend the secure areas.

But this description of the actual process by which areas were selected is not quite accurate.

In practice pacifications areas were selected sometimes by the district chief, sometimes by the province chief, and sometimes by the divisional corp commander.

Impact of burcaucratic, economic and other interests on the selection of areas to be pacified

Actually the selection of areas to be pacified did not depend so much on the matter of tangible interests, but rather was more related to the "concept the various people had of pacification."

The province chief usually selected areas on a political basis. I selected my areas on the basis of these factors: (1) Whether there was enough security. This is the most important factor—security enough for the pacification teams to work. (2) The manpower factor, meaning the number of people living there. I used this as a guideline to how important the area was. (3) The existence of notable people who could mobilize people to participate in pacification programs. (4) My estimate of the sympathy of people in the area to be pacified and if it would be possible to win them over.

Many Vietnamese government institutions talk about the criteria of selection for pacification but say nothing about the final objectives for pacification.

It is impossible to select areas or to establish criteria for selection without a clear idea of the real objectives for pacification.

The ABC area concept

Consider three concentric rectangles with the inside one the first one, the A area; the second one the B area, and third one the C area. Assume that the A area marks the immediate location of hamlets and villages around a major district or province town. According to my ideas, the A area is the place where one should begin working on pacification, that is, it is secure enough for the pacification forces to work in, and now with additional effort, one tries to get the people to organize their own self-defense—the end objective of pacification as I have mentioned earlier.

Under those circumstances one deploys pacification personnel in the A area; the B area we will call the contested area, and in that, military deployment is needed to keep the Viet Cong out of the A area. And, in the C area we'll call that the Viet Cong-controlled, the Viet Cong may have large forces, bases, and hideouts.

(Comment by Ellsberg: The current situation is that people in A areas haven't taken sides, and an area is secure only when it is saturated with troops. The people in these "secure" areas are passive; they don't cooperate with the government in their defense; they haven't been forced to take sides in the manner that Chau envisions. A major reason the government doesn't want to work in the A areas is because this will not permit statistical display of progress since the areas are already called "secure.")

My overall strategy is to move out from a number of relatively secure areas within a province, deploying pacification cadre first in the A areas, then to the B areas, and so forth, hoping to link up several foci so that the net area that might be called truly pacified grows and becomes connected together.

The strategy called for spreading out from many centers of security. It is not possible to begin with one area and then continually enlarge the sphere of security because that would mean in effect abandoning many districts and province towns that are now relatively secure. If people are abandoned who already have, in effect, sided with the government, the effect may be disastrous. To do that and concentrate all efforts in one area and then spread out would be giving up much too much. The Viet Cong would take over all the areas that had been left, of course.

(Comment by Pauker: Whether a single center or many overall strategies are adopted probably depends on popular attitudes. If areas are secure only because there are lots of troops there, but the people really haven't made any commitment of any kind to the government or might even be leaning toward the VC, then theoretically not much is lost by withdrawing to a single area and concentrating resources in order to begin spreading out from there. If, on the other hand, people in the other centers of pacification activity, have in a sense come to depend on the government or trust it, or what not, then withdrawing could be catastrophic.)

Area	Current deployment	Chau's preferred deployment
A	ARVN base	A popular self-defense force plus (presumably) RD cadre.
B	Some ARVN, some U.S. troops, some PF	A uniform police force—field police which had absorbed the RF and PF, and the urban police force.
C	None—or popular force; regional force	ARVN operations in the "C" area.

In effect, my concept of military operations reverses the current situation. Right now the popular forces in the C area in effect protect ARVN which huddles in the district and province towns of the A area. I would make the deployment as

indicated (see page 25) and give political control of the A and B areas to the province chief, while leaving ARVN in control of the C area. The C area, then, would be the primary field of ARVN operations with the uniform police handling police and security functions in the A and B areas.

(Comment by Menges: Has Chau or anyone else made any preliminary estimates of the extent to which the ABC area concept in reality reflects the security situation in South Vietnam? Might it not be that there are corridors or patches of B and C areas within a larger A area, or vise versa? Or, put another way, I might ask whether the A, B, and C areas are mere constructs or whether they are meant to reflect geographically contiguous regions. Does geography here really matter? Partially I'll answer my own question by saying that since force deployment and political authority is involved, territorial units are basic to Chau's scheme. The notion of ARVN operating in a C area which crosses through A or B areas or of having uniform police operate in a defined A area while one-half mile away the C area is left to ARVN, and so forth, seems completely absurd. In other words, since the concept does depend in broad measure on the security situation in South Vietnam, being divisible into more or less contiguous if not necessarily concentric A-, B-, or C-type areas, the first question that needs to be answered is whether this, in fact, is the case in South Vietnam. It also seems logical to ask whether Chau or anyone else has tried any variant of this scheme.)

Organization of youth as a strategy

Question. Might it not now be time and in fact essential to begin the organization of semitotalitarian youth groups similar to the young communists or Hitler Youth as a way of building an anti-Communist cadre?

It is not possible in Vietnam to extract one group from the society and deal with it alone as was done in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union or in Communist Cuba. Programs of this type have failed in the past because the indoctrination did not include the parents, relatives and other elements of the society that are essential since the youth will not simply follow an organization alone. Also, in order to have indoctrination it is necessary to have a doctrine.

Question. But for the very young children, eight, nine, and ten years old, the doctrine can be relatively simple anti-communist, and youth and sport associations can be the means by which subtly a gradual measure of indoctrination occurs.

Well, the French tried to do exactly this in the mid-1940s. They formed many sport organizations and the like in order to get youth to use up energy and not think about nationalism and other such ideas. But in fact it had precisely the reverse effect; I was in the Boy Scouts as I mentioned before and other youth and sport associations, but when we went out to the countryside bicycling and other such things, we enjoyed it but this did not leave us satisfied. We, in a sense, became more energetic because of these organizations, became more disciplined, more concerned about the society and, in fact, ultimately we became more nationalistic.

In Vietnam many youth organizations have been tried since 1954. Many were formed and many have been disbanded. Diem's approach was the Republican youth and this ended in 1963. As I mentioned, Vietnamese will join if they are told to join something, but that isn't the same thing as being truly committed.

Comments on ARVN

Responding to the question of the quality of the officer corps of ARVN, I would make the following breakdown: NCOs, 90 percent are good; company commanders, that is, lieutenants and second lieutenants about 80 percent; captains, 70 percent good; majors, about 60 to 50 percent; then colonels and generals from 20 to 15 percent good. In other words, the higher the rank, the lower the political morale and military quality of the persons who hold them.

Reasons for the GVN's neglect of the people

The major reason the people are neglected by the GVN is what I shall call facilities and resources aspect of the situation. On the government's side all facilities and resources come from the state—they come from outside the people, it seems, while on the VC side, it is necessary to get all these facilities and resources directly from the people, so they are not able to ignore the people.

This is a fundamental difference—one side is directly and clearly tied to the people. It understands this—the Communists know that unless they are able to extract and coerce and voluntarily get resources from people, they will have nothing. On the government side, though, it seems that the people's cooperation is not directly necessary for anything.

The Vietminh did not steal from the people, not because of communist ideology and other high-blown reasons, but due to "practical necessity." They knew that they would have to get supplies from the people tomorrow, so, if they were to steal one time, they understood that the people would immediately begin to hide all the supplies from them, and they would not have a second, third, or fourth opportunity to steal from the people. The Vietminh knew this even though they might have been willing to use force. If they stole or were too rough with the people, they would simply not be able to find the supplies they needed. They wouldn't even be able to buy the supplies they needed.

Main problems at the top echelons of the South Vietnamese government

After the fall of Diem in 1963, there were in reality three powers in South Vietnam: ARVN, United States, and the Viet Cong.

That means for the South Vietnamese government there were in effect two two powers, and the dramatic situation is that no one seems to be the real leader. Americans expect initiative and performance from the Vietnamese; they wait for the Vietnamese to act. At the same time the Vietnamese expect ideas, initiative, and leadership from the United States.

Many of the natural leaders in South Vietnam expected various things from the United States while the U.S. people did not want to take over the real leadership for obvious reasons. As the situation now is, no one acts as a leader.

The Americans interfere but not enough to get anything really done; and the Vietnamese initiate but they don't follow through in doing anything.

Question. Perhaps you could take the 1966 pacification program and give us a case study description of the way these problems work at the top.

The situation in the rural development ministry was the following: General Thang was in charge of the program. Colonel Lok was his deputy and he was in charge of what I would call "routine" operations, that is, getting the supplies there on time, taking care of running the day-to-day things. Colonel Quang had to handle the budget; his role was to decide how much went into each of the various programs, and I was in charge of the rural operations and the rural development cadre program. In effect it meant that there were two people who had a planning role; these were myself and General Thang.

Question. For example, how did the Ministry of Rural Development go about getting budget support—what bureaucratic allies did it have; who were the opponents of the Rural Development Ministry?

Here the United States' role was very important. The Americans felt that this was a very good idea and they were willing to give almost the complete budget of 3 billion piasters.

Comment by Menges: Despite various efforts, it was difficult to get Colonel Chau to talk about elite politics even within the tangible context of the pacification program. Another effort was made later by Ellsberg in the discussion, and this did not meet with greater success in getting Colonel Chau to trace out the full play of elite politics.

Question. What is wrong with ARVN leadership in your opinion?

First, there is too much difference in the treatment among different ranks from General to Colonel to Major and down in the officer corps. The salaries are not too different, but the Generals and Colonels have government houses, cars, drivers, and all sorts of special funds. Captains, Lieutenants, Majors don't have government housing, don't have cars, and the like. Secondly, the promotion system is not terribly fair.

We have a Board of Promotion and everything, but despite that every General has to deal with other Generals to survive, so promotions are actually handled in the following way—if you want your men to be promoted, you have to promote those the other Generals suggest.

So when the promotion list comes around, tradition is that two-thirds of those suggested by each General actually get promoted. And all the Generals cooperate with each other on this. "So officers realize that they have to make a choice to stay with one General or another." If his career goes up, they go up; if he goes down, they go down.

This was the situation until 1965, but since then the system has gotten better. Promotion, in other words, has been mainly based on political concerns, not ability. Every officer realizes that he must have "an influential affiliation" if he is going to get ahead.

Comment by Menges: There was no chance to ask Chau how/why the system had gotten better in the last two years. This might be worth exploring.

Comments on GVN elite politics

Question. As a case study of the political process in South Vietnam, could you describe to us how one might attempt to go about changing the promotion system at the upper levels of ARVN? What might the role of the National Assembly be of the United States, etc.?

The Americans didn't like Diem so they withdrew support from him and gave it to Khanh and then to one general after another. It seems that the Americans keep looking for people. They try to impose leaders who fit their conception of leadership. Sometimes one feels that the Americans look on Vietnam as a very primitive country and they think that if they impose a suitable leader, all would be well.

There are three choices for Vietnam: a communist system, a mixed democracy-dictatorial system, or a real democratic system. We have already tried choices one and two. The communist system has failed in the North and it would have the same bad effects in the South. The mixed system under Diem was clearly unsuccessful, therefore, it is now time that we tried a genuine democratic system.

In South Vietnam at the present time neither the government nor the legislature is all-powerful. There is some sort of balance held by the United States. The legislature represents the sympathy of the people but cannot in any way mobilize their active support. While the government represents the desperate choice of the people but does not have their active support in any sense.

So the United States has to support the democratic system in Vietnam. It has to make clear to the generals and to the government of South Vietnam that it will support the principle and practice of the current constitution of South Vietnam. Right now there is some degree of danger in being a member of the legislature as I am and attempting to bring about reforms and changes in the central government. You will recall the assassination of one leading figure in the constituent assembly. I will continue to try but I won't try too hard because I realize that if arrested I'm not doing anybody any good, least of all myself. For me it is very important that I know that the United States will defend, not me personally, but the principle of legislative government if anything should happen to me. There are other people like me who are more likely to be willing to take chances in attempting to reform the system if they believe that the United States government will support the constitutional system.

Comment from Menges; There was then an approximately one hour discussion on the military aspects of local operations. This is not recorded here.

Reformist elements in ARVN

The captains and the majors are most important and reformist oriented. There are two types of captains and majors. There are the youth who have just become captains and majors, and then there is another large group of officers who had been passed over at promotion several times.

Main changes desired in the GVN

One, a better balance between executive and legislature. Two, the encouragement of a loyal opposition. Three, integration of Buddhists with the government. Since their defeat in 1966, the GVN has done nothing to win over Buddhist leadership and bring about greater cooperation with the organized Buddhist community.

This is an important element that is not at all understood by the current South Vietnamese leadership. Although one of the Buddhist leaders such as Tri Quang may have only 5 percent of his followers who would really obey his orders and become active politically at his distinct request, the other 95 percent would, if Tri Quang were persecuted, immediately move *against* the government. They would withdraw all support and collaboration with the government; that is, though they probably would fight against it, the government would have lost their support. This is what the government does not understand, that by failing to make efforts at symbolic unity with more of the factions and groups in South Vietnam, it is losing any chance of bringing the various followers of the movements and people and groups into any kind of active collaboration with it. This doesn't mean, of course, that these same people would collaborate with the Viet Cong. But in any case they are lost to the government.

Question. Why is there no effort to organize these other political elements in South Vietnam by the generals?

Two reasons: first, the government people feel that these various opposition leaders have no real following. They think there's no reason to take the trouble

to win them over politically because they can neither help them nor hurt them. Secondly, it is a matter of interest.

It is not possible to bring people in unless you give them something. I am not even speaking of economic interests in this case. If the generals want to bring leaders of other groups into Vietnamese politics, they have to share power and authority. They are afraid to share any power.

Question. Could you, without naming specific names, describe some of the elements of the circles of the power that surround the generals you mentioned?

These might be of many kinds, for example, there might be a general who has five province chiefs who are essentially his. Another general might have three ministries.

General Thang's resignation

Question. Could you tell us something about some of the obstacles to the reform program that General Thang attempted and the reason he resigned?

A very complex story with many sides. The generals could probably accept the reform plan of General Thang, but they did not want to accept it from him. The reason for this is that they believed that this whole reform scheme was essentially an American plan and that they gave it to General Thang. The South Vietnamese generals believed this was an American plan to let General Thang be successful as a reformer in order to have him take over as the Premier in South Vietnam. In other words, the Americans were getting ready to switch leaders again and for that reason the current group wanted to make sure that General Thang would not be successful. But I think that the reform plan will be adopted by the generals.

Comment by Menges: Chau was very reluctant to go into this in any greater detail on this day. Nor did he the next day when I tried to get him to speak further on these topics. Partly I believe this is a matter of ignorance on exactly how the generals operate. Partly it seems to be a matter of discretion, or desire to limit the information he gives us. Ellsberg would have a better sense of which it might be. Chau had mentioned earlier that there is a classmate circle of people who had graduated from the same military academy at the same time; these include Ky, Loan, and about four others. All graduated from Nahm Binh Academy in the early 1950s.

The Library of Congress,
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TRANSLATION (French)

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Revelations in Saigon on the Occasion of a Trial

(By Jean-Claude Pomonti)

Saigon, July 5.—Does President Thieu's regime, in spite of intentions aired and numerous concessions on fundamentals made in the course of the last eight months, sincerely consider a compromise with the NLF; i.e., as a first step, a living together under the same roof with his adversaries? A growing number of Saigon politicians doubt it and have for some time been accusing the regime more and more openly of opposing any peace initiative not originating from the government, and especially, of trying to silence the liberal groups rather than to make them partners in its enterprises. This is the impression at least that prevailed again Friday night, when the proceedings brought against some twenty persons accused of treason or corresponding with the enemy ended in service punishment in the form of imprisonment and hard labor.

This case began with a scenario that the Vietnamese have known only too well from a quarter century of war and dissension. Captain Tran Ngoc Hien, a Viet Cong officer and an old hand at intelligence—22 years of service, as he said himself, not without pride, in the course of the trial—went back to Saigon in 1964, probably on a mission. He contacted his family and friends: his wife and his three children who live in Vinh Long, in the Delta; his brother, Tran Ngoc Chau, Deputy and Secretary General of the National Assembly; a cousin, Mr. Vo Dinh Cuong, one of the Buddhist Youth leaders of the An-Quang Pagoda; as well as Mr. Nguyen Lau, the well-known publisher of the moderately anti-Communist *Saigon Daily News*.

Last April, Captain Hien, Mr. Vo Dinh Cuong, and Mr. Nguyen Lau, were arrested and accused of "treason", as were some twenty confederates. Did he know about Captain Hien's activities? Did the latter use his kin and his childhood

friends without their knowledge? Mr. Nguyen admitted in April that he suspected something, that he should have reported Captain Hien instead of sending him a letter from his paper, but that he could not make up his mind to do so, as Mr. Hien was both a childhood pal and a comrade from the anti-French Resistance of 1946–1947. On Friday he pleaded not guilty and denied having known about Captain Hien's activities, stating that his previous testimony was worthless.

A LONG STRING OF CONTACTS

"I was isolated in a cell, I heard people cry, I finally gave up", he said before the military tribunal. Captain Hien's testimony was to the same effect: an old officer like myself, he said in substance, is not going to entrust his secrets to just anybody, even if he is a friend. In short, the very type of case in which evidence is lacking and from which the most contradictory conclusions may be drawn according to whether one looks at it from the viewpoint of state of war or of peace. The military tribunal then settled it: hard labor for life for Captain Hien, 25 years of hard labor for another NLF agent (Mrs. Paulette Quoi), five years in prison for Messrs. Nguyen Lau and Vo Dinh Cuong, various penalties for the other defendants.

The case became complicated because Captain Hien's brother, Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau, published during the trial, on Friday afternoon a statement implying that the contacts he had with his brother had a highly political bent. "In April 1968, I suggested to Hien", he said to us Saturday morning, "that I go to Hanoi with a parliamentary delegation to set up discussions between Hanoi and Saigon.

"Hien came back to see me in June 1968, to tell me that the North Vietnam leaders were ready to meet with us at Hanoi or in Laos, but as visitors and not as officials. Shortly thereafter, in August, I submitted a petition to the Assembly carrying 74 signatures (or, the majority of the deputies) in favor of direct negotiations between the two Vietnams. As the Assembly showed itself hesitant, but did not reject this proposal, I asked Hien, who knew the principal leaders of the North very well, again whether Hanoi would accept receiving a joint delegation—of deputies accompanied by high-ranking persons—by stressing the necessity of receiving us as representatives of the South Vietnamese people. He answered that this would be difficult and, after an absence of 20 hours, he came back to see me to tell me that the North was maintaining its position: visitors but not officials. He added that if we would make new proposals we would perhaps be received in an official capacity. In January, I then presented a peace plan (see the statement made to *Le Monde* on January 18, 1969), but it got such an unfavorable reception in Saigon that I did nothing more until my brother's arrest."

LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS

Were President Thieu and the Americans aware of these leads? On this point, Mr. Tran Ngoc Chau refused to answer: "It is a question of honor", he said to us simply, to justify this refusal. These revelations, if they are comfirmed—Mr. Chau is expecting a categoric denial from North Vietnam—are a rather good illustration of the difficulties encountered by those who try to facilitate talks in Saigon between the different partners, thus drawing the most logical conclusions from the opening of negotiations in Paris.

It seems that the Saigon government hardly appreciates this attitude, as they are intentions, suggestions, or, especially, initiatives of which it itself is not the originator. Beyond a process that shows to what point the Vietnamese can be torn, after 20 years of war, between their convictions, their constraints, their aspirations, their past, and their friendships, another process is beginning: Do the Saigon leaders hope to convince anyone of their willingness to negotiate a compromise solution if they continue to persecute the proponents of such a solution, and those who, because of circumstances, do nothing to prevent its materialization?

Another Deputy, Mr. Ly Qui Chung, whose paper was closed down three weeks ago, issued a "warning" in other words. He stated to a group of journalists: "Only one voice is accepted, that of the diehards. The politicians are threatened, the newspapers are closed down. If the government persists in this attitude, it will gather strength in its isolation, and the opposition will be pushed more and more toward the NLF. That is what happened last year: non-Communists, students in particular, came over from the other side because they had no other

way of participating in the national cause. We do not want the overthrow of the government. We only ask for the right to express a different point of view for the sake of true opposition, and not solely for the sake of the false opposition of those who do not dare tackle the real problems."

Back from Midway on June 9, President Thieu declared that there would be "neither a cabinet of peace nor a government of coalition or reconciliation". Can the regime maintain, without reflecting upon the "good will" to which it lays claim, such an intransigence at home as the first American troops are leaving Vietnam, when the United States is inviting it publicly, as Mr. Rogers again did on Friday, unambiguously, to make new peace overtures; when the war has been falling off for two weeks almost to the point of ex-extinction; in short, when the diplomatic and military requirements for the beginning of serious negotiations are satisfied perhaps for the first time?

In eight months of negotiations, the contradiction has only become accentuated, and it is now the crux of the dispute.

J. C. Pomonti.

Translated by Elizabeth Hanunian.

[From the Los Angeles Times, Sunday, Dec. 28, 1969]

Thieu Stakes Prestige on Vote to Condemn 3 House Members

(By Arthur J. Dommen)

Saigon.—One of South Vietnam's worst political crises in recent years heads for a showdown Tuesday and the outcome could have a critical impact on the political future of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

At that time the lower house of the National Assembly is scheduled to vote on a resolution to condemn three of its members for pro-Communist activities. The vote could pave the way for stripping the members of their constitutional immunity from prosecution.

Thieu was the prime mover in bringing the charges against the deputies. He has virtually staked his prestige on the outcome of the vote. The issue has resulted in a confrontation between a president zealous in stifling Communist and neutralist sympathies and a legislative body jealous of its constitutional prerogatives.

It has even raised the possibility of impeachment proceedings against Thieu a move that could elevate a super warhawk, vice president Nguyen Cao Ky, to the nation's highest office.

The latest development was the disclosure Saturday that a nine-member assembly committee completed a three-week study of the case and supported—by a single vote—Thieu's allegations against the three deputies. The vote was four to three with two abstentions. It is the committee's resolution condemning the deputies that will be submitted to the assembly Tuesday.

The closeness of the vote, according to observers here, make it doubtful that Thieu will be able to muster the required three-fourths vote in the house needed to lift the three members' immunity.

The investigation into the accusations turned into a Thieu-assembly confrontation last Dec. 10 when Thieu hinted that if the house did not act to purge itself of elements suspected of Communist connections the "army and people" might take matters into their own hands.

This remark apparently spurred the demonstration Dec. 20 in which several hundred youths and old women invaded the house to demand action against the three deputies.

The lower house has been strongly supported by the upper house in denouncing the incident as an illegal act. President Thieu was forced to promise a house delegation that there would be no repetition of the demonstration.

Meanwhile, in other developments:

Thieu's presidential adviser, Nguyen Cao Thang, a millionaire pharmacist who has played an active role in Thieu's relations with the National Assembly and who made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in Paris last March on behalf of Thieu, reportedly met with the 35-member pro-government Dan Tien bloc in the 136-member lower house. Thang was apparently trying to line up support for passage of the resolution Tuesday.

The chairman of the house information and press committee charged that the accusations against the three deputies was part of a plot aimed at diverting public attention from a Presidential Palace spy scandal.

NEWSPAPER SUSPENDED

The Information Ministry suspended the newspaper Chanh Dao, a daily closely identified with the Buddhist church and one of the three accused deputies, on the eve of publication of a lengthy article on the case.

In the resolution considered by the lower house commission, one of the three deputies, Pham The Truc, 29, was condemned on five counts.

He accused the Saigon government of dictatorship, militarism, repression and exploitation of the people at a press conference in Tokyo last summer. He proposed a settlement of the war along the lines of Communist proposals and demanded that the United States withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam and cease it ssupport of the Saigon government, as demanded by the Communists.

Truc was charged with supporting the Communist-backed Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. He advocated the formation of a coalition government with the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, and demanded the overthrow of the Thieu regime.

Tht resolution stated that Truc was guilty of violating Article 25 of the 1967 constitution, which says "every citizen has the duty to defend the fatherland and the republic."

CONVICTED SPY RING

The resolution charged deputy Hoang Hoa Ho, 43, with being in "close relations" with Le Huu Thuy and Vu Ngoc Nha, convicted members of a Communist spy ring that extended into the Presidential Palace.

The third deputy, former province chief and Revolutionary Development program director Tran Ngoc Chau, 45, was condemned for having contacts with his brother while the latter was working as an agent for North Vietnam.

It also condemns Chau for giving financial and other assistance to his brother.

Chau has publicly admitted the contacts with his brother and defended them on the grounds he could not have refused to meet his brother again after a separation of 16 years. He has denied being a double agent, and has said the small acts of assistance he performed on his brother's behalf did nothing to harm national security.

At his press conference Friday, house press chief Ngo Cong Duc defended Chau, saying "the majority of the deputies believe Chau is a nationalist who opposes this government."

Chau was once close to Thieu. However, after his election to the house, Chau consistently criticized Thieu's policies and made several proposals for the opening of negotiations to end the war. He also accused Thang of using presidential funds to bribe the National Assembly.

COMMUNIST CADRE

In an interview with the government-controlled Vietnam Press Agency last Oct. 27, Thang described Chau as "a left-behind communist cadre in the National Assembly" and said he thought Chau should be tried for treason.

In a possibly related move, the senate Friday voted to cut by 50 million piasters ($423,700) the 400 million piasters ($3,389,600) in South Vietnam's national budget earmarked as the president's special fund for which he does not have to account.

The National Assembly has been divided up to now on most issues and Thieu has had to handle the two chambers delicately to get them to pass his legislation, even in the most favorable conditions.

He has usually succeeded in having his way. But this time Thieu appears to have united a majority of the lower house on an issue that involves the self-preservation of the house itself.

If Thieu fails to obtain satisfaction on the score of the three deputies, he can fall back on Article 4 of the constitution, which states "every activity designed to publicize or carry out communism is prohibited."

But if he accuses the three deputies of being in violation of Article 4, he leaves himself open to a similar accusation himself by the National Assembly, and there is growing talk in the assembly of impeaching him.

This is because it is now known that Thieu sent Thang to Paris last March in a secret attempt to enter into contact with the NLF delegation there. Presumably, the aim was to set up private talks to discuss a political settlement beyond the propaganda blasts exchanged between the Saigon delegation and the NLF delegation across the conference table at the weekly meetings at the Hotel Majestic.

Thang's attempt, made through French Foreign Minister Michel Debre, is known to have failed.

Now, argue some of the deputies, Thieu's secret effort to open contacts with the NLF did much more to harm national security than the occasional friendly contacts between one of his province chiefs with his brother on the other side, a situation common in Vietnam's civil war.

The attempt to make contact in Paris put the communists on notice that their principal antagonist, the leader they had vowed to overthrow, was anxious to talk, about a settlement of the war.

Some deputies even go so far as to say, in private, that Thieu may have been intent on seeking to make a private deal with the communists that would have preserved his position, although there exists no evidence of such an effort.

SPECIAL COURT

This is why there has been talk of impeachment, particularly if Chau survives the vote Tuesday.

Chau is a member of an 11-member special court that has the power to impeach the president for treasonable activities. Ten of the 11 members of the special court are members of the two chambers of the National Assembly.

Chau has maintained that if he were found guilty of violating the constitution because of his meetings with his brother, then there would be even more reason to consider Thieu guilty because of the president's attempts to meet the NLF represenatives in Paris.

Chau, Truc and Ho are all protected by parliamentary immunity under Articles 37 and 38 of the constitution.

Thieu can declare martial law and suspend the constitution. But this would seriously undercut the Saigon government's negotiating position at the Paris conference, since it is based on the premise the Saigon government is the legal product of free elections and a freely chosen constitution. The provisional revolutionary government proclaimed by the NLF is considered illegal and has no constitution.

Suspension of the constitution would also automatically undercut the U.S. negotiating position in Paris, which is that the only nonnegotiable issue in South Vietnam is the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination.

Thus, it appears Thieu is rapidly heading for an impasse on the legal and constitutional aspects of the current crisis.

The political effect of Thieu's confrontation with the National Assembly seems to be splitting the entire country at a time when national unity would appear to be the overriding necessity.

The accused deputies are Buddhists, and they are being placed on trial in a forum in which the country's Catholic minority has a disproportionate share of power. The National Assembly is heavily weighted in favor of the Catholics because the militant Buddhists virtually boycotted the 1967 elections.

Thieu, because he is a Catholic, is vulnerable to the old suspicion that the South Vietnamese had of his predecessor, President Ngo Dinh Diem—he is favoring the better organized Catholic minority over the poorly organized Buddhist majority.

The current case is likely to deepen that suspicion and risks splitting the country. The persons who demonstrated against the three deputies in Saigon and other cities, at a time when all demonstrations are forbidden by the government, were mainly Catholics.

Three of the four deputies who voted in favor of be commission resolution condemning the accused are northern Catholics, who have made a political slogan of their anticommunism.

Now a Buddhist newspaper has been closed by an information minister who is widely known to have been a member of Diem's secret Can Lao Party and is sympathetic to the anticommunist line in the Catholic sense of the word.

This is why, politically, Thieu risks provoking the Buddhists into a new upheaval on the scale of the 1963 rebellion against Diem which led directly to Diem's downfall.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Feb. 2, 1970]

Viet Fugitive Criticizes CIA, Cites Offer on Political Party

(By Keyes Beech)

SAIGON—A South Vietnamese legislator accused of pro-Communist sympathies said today the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency offered him money to finance a political party but the deal fell through because the CIA wanted him to support President Nguyen Van Thieu.

Tran Ngoc Chau, 46-year-old national assemblyman, said two CIA men approached him more than a year ago and told him they would supply the funds if he would launch his own party.

Chau, who formerly had close ties with the CIA, said he considered the proposal but failed to reach agreement because of his stand that the Saigon government should open negotiations with the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Viet Cong.

Officially at least, Thieu is bitterly opposed to negotiations with the NLF. He has accused Chau of being a "tool of communism" because the latter did not denounce his brother, a convicted Communist spy. Chau and Thieu were once close friends and as newly married young officers shared a house.

Chau declined to name the two CIA men who came to see him "because they were my friends and I don't want to hurt anybody."

But Chau is disenchanted with the Americans, especially the CIA, because, he says, they have refused to intervene in his behalf to clear him of Thieu's charges that he is a Communist. Chau swears he told CIA friends about his meetings with his brother in the mid-1960s. U.S. intelligence sources denied this.

"If this is a sample of the way the Americans treat their Vietnamese friends," Chau said, "I wonder about the future of thousands of other Vietnamese who have co-operated with the Americans."

Chau, who has been on the run for several weeks out of fear of arrest or assassination, was interviewed in a secret hideout outside Saigon.

No formal charges have been brought against Chau. However, he has been under heavy pressure since Thieu's forces sought a three-fourths vote in the assembly to strip him and two other legislators of their parliamentary immunity so they can be tried for alleged Communist leanings.

Chau is a former province chief and once was in charge of all revolutionary development cadres in South Vietnam. The revolutionary development program was backed by CIA.

After first adopting a "hands off" attitude, Ambassador Ellsworth C. Bunker reportedly asked Thieu to soften his campaign against Chau because it was hurting the president's political image in the United States.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1970]

Thieu Authorized To Try 2 Deputies for Links to Reds

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

Saigon, Feb. 4—South Vietnam's House of Representatives has authorized President Thieu to prosecute two legislators whom he has accused of consorting illegally with Communists.

One hundred and two of the House's 135 members have signed a petition empowering the government to prosecute their two colleagues, who would normally have a Vietnamese version of congressional immunity. There is some dispute about the legality of the petition, but it seems virtually certain that the government will use it to bring the legislators to trial.

The Vietnamese constitution stipulates that no member of the National Assembly can be prosecuted unless three-fourths of his peers approve. One hundred two is exactly three fourths of the House membership.

The number was reached on Sunday, according to Phan Thong, chairman of the special House committee that had investigated and upheld an accusation by Thieu that three legislators were guilty of helping the Communists. Thong held a press conference today to announce successful completion of his petition campaign.

Thong's committee—and later the House membership, but only by a simple majority—already had found that all three men accused by Thieu were guilty. But today's petition only applies to two of them.

The third, Pham The Truc, escaped because four of the 102 petition signers refused to include him. The point is of marginal significance, however, because Truc is voluntarily exiled in Paris, while the other two are in Vietnam and now subject to prosecution and, possibly, arrest before their trial.

They are Tran Ngoc Chau, a well-known figure whose brother recently confessed to being a Communist spy in South Vietnam, and Hoang Ho, an obscure legislator whose name came up in a recent espionage trial here.

Chau could not be located today, and there were unconfirmed rumors that he had been arrested. Reached at her home by telephone, Mrs. Ho said her husband had not been arrested, and was "wandering around the city."

There is likely to be a controversy over the use of a petition to get three-fourths of the House to approve prosecution of Chau and Ho.

Today, the president of the Senate, the other house of the National Assembly, said he thought a petition was illegal. He said the House should meet, debate and vote on the question. Several lawyers have taken the same position.

One, Tran Van Tuyen, a well known man in political circles, said that if this petition is allowed to stand, House members in future may as well stay home, sending in their votes on important matters in writing.

The constitution is not explicit on this question, however, and it is a rule of thumb in Vietnam that when there is any doubt about a constitutional question the presidential view will prevail.

And President Thieu has made a major issue of the legislators he accused of helping the enemy. He apparently ordered several "spontaneous rallies" around the country to try to pressure the House to strip the three of their immunity. The army radio station controlled by the government, also campaigned vigorously for House action.

Many House members believed Thieu was conducting a campaign against them. When the House debated the guilt or innocence of the three accused five weeks ago, many members refused to vote that they were guilty because they objected to Thieu's tactics.

But, in a display of Vietnamese flexibility, many of those who complained the loudest turned up on the list of signatories of the new petition that was released today.

[From the New York Times, Saturday, Feb. 7, 1970]

Thieu Opponent in Saigon Feels Betrayed by U.S.

(By Terrence Smith)

Saigon, South Vietnam, Saturday, Feb. 7—Tran Ngoc chau, an Opposition deputy accused by President Nguyen Van Thieu of Communist affiliations, says he feels he has been betrayed by the America mission here despite a long and close working relationship.

Mr. Chau, whose situation was described in Washington yesterday by Senator J. W. Fulbright, said in an interview that he had repeatedly advised the United States Embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency of several meetings he had had between 1965 and 1969 with his older brother, Tran Ngoc Hien. The brother, was convicted last July as a Communist spy and sentenced to life in prison. Mr. Chau is now being accused of pro-Communist activities because of those meetings.

U.S. knew about it

"Americans knew about it all along," Mr. Chau said, "They even wanted me to put them in touch with my brother, so they could find out what the Communists were doing. As far as I was concerned, their knowledge and encouragement of the meetings was tantamount to their approval.

"Now they refuse to admit this," he said. "This raises an important question: Is this the way the Americans treat their friends, people who have worked with them in the past? If so, it's a sad fact."

Mr. Chau is a 45-year-old political maverick who is one of three Lower House representatives that President Thieu has accused of serving as "tools of the Communists." Mr. Thieu has demanded that the House strip the three of their parliamentary immunity from prosecution so they may be tried by a military court.

During the course of a two-hour interview, Mr. Chau charged that an aide of the President had bribed a majority of his Lower House colleagues to get them to sign a petition lifting his immunity.

He said the aide, Nguyen Cao Thang, had paid bribes of as much as 400,000 piasters (about $3,400) for some of the signatures on the petition.

In Washington yesterday, Senator Fulbright made a similar charge. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said he had "very persuasive evidence" that Mr. Thieu had used bribery and threats to obtain the signatures of the three-quarters majority of the House members required to lift the deputies' immunity.

A petition bearing the necessary 102 signatures was forwarded to President Thieu earlier this week by the speaker of the lower house. Official sources confirmed today that President Theiu had ordered the Defense Ministry to initiate prosecution of Mr. Chau and a second deputy, Hoang Ho, a former journalist, who is also accused of having aided the Communists.

The two men are expected to be tried shortly by a three-man military tribunal, probably on charges of compromising national security.

"SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS"

In his remarks in Washington, Senator Fulbright also said that the United States Embassy had "shrugged its shoulders" over the Chau incident despite instructions from Washington to intervene on the deputy's behalf.

A spokesman for the embassy declined to comment on this charge today. But a high-level American source confirmed that the embassy had had communication from Washington on the Chau case and said that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker had recently discussed the matter with President Thieu.

Concerning Mr. Chau's charges, the source insisted that senior officials at the embassy had neither initiated nor encouraged the deputy's contacts with his brother. He conceded, however, that it was possible that Mr. Chau had acted with the knowledge and approval of lower level officials working for the C.I.A. or other agencies.

CLOSE RELATIONS CONCEDED

No one in the mission disputes the fact that Mr. Chau maintained close working relations with officials in the C.I.A. and embassy during his years as a province chief in the Mekong Delta, and as mayor of Danang. In 1966, he was a key official in the so-called revolutionary development program, which was devised and operated by the C.I.A. As one of the administrators of the program he worked on a day-to-day basis with C.I.A. agents.

Mr. Chau is currently hiding because he is afraid that the Government will arrest him at any time; he has slept each night for the last several weeks in a different house. He has remained in touch with his friends, however, and has seen a few foreign correspondents.

Mr. Chau acknowledges that he saw his brother, who is 46, eight times between 1965 and Mr. Hien's arrest last April.

[From the the New York Times, Feb. 11, 1970]

SAIGON COURT BIDS TWO DEPUTIES APPEAR

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb. 10 (Reuters)—A military court has ordered two members of the lower house to face questioning on alleged pro-Communist activities.

The wives of the two legislators, Tran Ngac Chau and Hoang Ho, said summonses were delivered to their homes yesterday by military policemen.

The two women said neither of their husbands had been at home for some time and their whereabouts were not known.

Mrs. Chau told reporters that her husband, a 46-year-old member who represents Kienhoa Province in the Mekong Delta, was "now staying in a quiet place writing his memoirs."

A petition signed by 102 members of the House of Representatives was sent to President Nguyen Van Thieu last week asking the Government to take action against the two men under the country's anti-Communist laws.

Under the Constitution 102 votes—a three-quarters majority—are required to strip deputies of legislative immunity.

Mr. Chau has admitted that he met eight times with his brother, Tran Ngoc Hien, a North Vietnamese intelligence agent, before the latter's arrest. Mr. Hien was sentenced last July to 20 years at hard labor for spying.

In an interview with reporters last week, Mr. Chau said he had kept the United States Embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency informed of his meetings with his brother. He accused the Americans of letting him down in not backing him against President Thieu's accusations.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has accused President Thieu of persecuting Mr. Chau because the deputy had criticized Nguyen Cao Thang, a Saigon pharmacist who is a member of the President's inner circle, and because of Mr. Chau's growing power as an opposition leader.

CLASSIFICATION OF PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. A report released last June by a study team of distinguished Americans quoted the Vietnamese Director of Correction Institutions, Col. Nuyen Phu Sanh, as stating that there were 35,000 prisoners in 41 correctional centers and that of these 64.25 percent were classified as Communists. The report stated that Mr. Don Bordenkercher, the senior American adviser to Colonel Sanh, said there were 10,000 more prisoners held in interrogation centers. This raises a number of questions:

How do the South Vietnamese authorities define the word "Communist" for purposes of putting someone in jail?

Mr. COLBY. Under the Phoenix program, sir, anyone who is associated in a certain job with the National Liberation Front or the People's Revolutionary Party.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure this was only the Phoenix program. These questions——

Mr. COLBY. These are the people held in jail. This is the object of the Phoenix program.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there 35,000 prisoners? Is that statement, taken from this report, correct? Are you familiar with the report of the U.S. study team?

Mr. COLBY. Yes there are 34,372 prisoners in 41 correctional centers. I talked to these groups.

The CHAIRMAN. You talked to them?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess that is correct.

Mr. COLBY. I think that is close enough, Mr. Chairman, for our purposes today. There are about that many.

Senator CASE. These are all prisoners?

(The report referred to follows.)

(U.S. Study Team on Religious and Political Freedom In Vietnam)

REPORT ON FINDINGS OF U.S. STUDY TEAM TRIP TO VIET NAM, MAY 25–JUNE 10, 1969

I. LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

An eight-member U.S. Study Team, joined by a British observer, was in South Vietnam, May 29 to June 5, studying religious and political freedom, prison conditions and the classification, detention and treatment of political prisoners.

The Team met with President Thieu, Minister of Interior Tran Thien Khiem and members of his staff, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and members of his staff, national religious leaders, lawmakers, intellectuals, attorneys, students, a variety of persons of different political persuasions and talked with scores of political prisoners. It visited prisons at Thu Duc, Chi Hao, and on Con Son Island, as well as the National Police Headquarters. The Government of South Vietnam was helpful in providing data, in permitting Team members to visit prisons, and in making accessible certain prisoners.

In the original press release announcing the Team's departure for Saigon (May 25, 1969), it was stated that the Team would meet with persons "not connected with the N.L.F. or the Thieu-Ky Government." It proved both necessary and helpful to meet with many government officials. To our knowledge the Team had no conversations with representatives of the National Liberation Front while in Vietnam. It should be noted that many authorities on Vietnam doubt the possibility of a truly representative government without the inclusion of the N.L.F.

Three things are readily apparent in South Vietnam: (1) As state of war exists and any meaningful study of freedom must be done against that background; (2) South Vietnam is miserably poor and is unable to provide from its own resources institutional facilities and forms of care which are taken for granted in the Western world; and, (3) whereas the United States of America has lived under the guarantee of its present Constitution for nearly two hundred years, South Vietnam does not have a tradition of political liberty and its Constitution is only two years old. Notwithstanding this, in a message cabled directly to President Nixon from Saigon, the Study Team said:

"Speaking for peace or in any other way opposing the government (in South Vietnam) easily brings the charge of communist sympathy and subsequent arrest. . . . There must be no illusion that this climate of religious and political suppression is compatible with either a representative or a stable government."

Many persons interviewed argued that President Thieu's government is less repressive than the ten years of brutal intimidation under Ngo Dinh Diem. Others, while agreeing that repression is not as obvious and violent, argued that it is equally pervasive though more subtle today. (Some of the following documentation will indicate that there is still unsubtle, violent intimidation.)

Three celebrated cases of political arrest have claimed international attention in recent months. They are the cases of Thich Thien Minh, one of the most influential Buddhist monks in South Vietnam; Truong Dinh Dzu, runner-up in the Presidential Election of 1967; and Nguyen Lau, wealthy publisher of the *Saigon Daily News*.

Thich Thien Minh was arrested on February 23, 1969, at the Buddhist Youth Center and charged with "harboring rebels, concealing weapons and illegal documents . . . harboring deserters and supporting draft dodgers". After appearing before a military field tribunal, he was sentenced to serve terms of ten and five years at hard labor, the sentences to run concurrently. Last month, his sentence was reduced to three years.

It is assumed by many that Thich Thien Minh was arrested not because of the specific crimes with which he was charged but for his public criticism of the Thieu-Ky government and his strong advocacy of peace.

In February he was summoned to the Ministry of the Interior and warned to tone down his sermons which were said to be disrespectful to the government of President Thieu. He had earlier said that the people of South Vietnam could accept neither the "terrorist regime" of North Vietnam nor the "corrupt government" in Saigon. Replying to Thien Minh, President Thieu said, "My government can die because of those pacifists, but before we die, they will have to die first."

The Study Team visited both Thich Thien Minh and Quang Duc Buddhist Youth Center. The Youth Center, closed at the time of Thich Thien Minh's arrest (20 other Buddhists were arrested at the same time), was handed back by the Government and re-opened during the Team's stay in Saigon. Team members saw Thich Thien Minh's room, as well as the many hallways, rooms and stairways that separated him from the tiny room and wooden closet with the false back that were said to be the hiding place of the V.C. agent and a cache of small arms. Seeing the distances and buildings involved, it is not difficult to believe the monk's assertion that he had no personal knowledge of a V.C. agent's presence in that hidden room.

The Team talked with Thich Thien Minh, who has been held in military custody. They interviewed him in a small house, a part of a larger complex of carefully guarded government buildings. The Team observed the office of a U.S. Advisor two doors removed. At one point, three government officials pointedly left the room that the discussion might be private. However, it had been determined during the conversations that there was a government agent only four feet from the Venerable, behind a thin wall. Thus, the interview was necessarily inhibited. Thich Thien Minh had been moved four times since his arrest and was kept under the strictest security. Though badly injured by a hand grenade, said to have been thrown by a V.C. in 1966, he said his health was good. He added, "My only offense is that I believe in peace."

On May 1, 1968, Truong Dinh Dzu was arrested "on charges of urging the formation of a coalition government as a step toward peace." In August, he was sentenced to five years of forced labor. Although the N.L.F. is now participating in the Paris peace talks and a coalition government is being widely discussed by responsible government officials in the United States, Mr. Dzu has not yet been released.

In a national election that denied certain candidates the right to run [1] because they were peace advocates, and that heavily favored the Thieu-Ky regime because of its domination of the military and political structures of South Vietnam and because of the well-known support of the American 'presence' in Vietnam, Mr. Dzu ran second, polling 18 percent of the vote. He wisely did not announce his "white dove" platform until after his candidacy had been approved. (It is interesting to note that in the election, the Thieu-Ky ticket gained only 35 percent of the vote. In March 1968, Vice-President Ky told an Italian journalist, "Our last elections were a loss of time and money, a mockery.") Dzu has never been accused of being pro-communist and is, as President Thieu openly acknowledged, a "political prisoner." The fact that, running as a peace candidate and freely talking of a coalition government, he ran second only to the President, accounts more than anything else for his imprisonment. Mr. Dzu was moved from Con Son Prison Island to Chi Hoa Prison in Saigon during the last week in May, 1969. U.S. Study Team members saw him in his cell in Chi Hoa. Suffering from a heart condition, he looked well and various kinds of medicines were in evidence. He said he wanted to serve his country as a nationalist. On June 5, President Thieu told the Team that support for a coalition government cannot be tolerated.

On April 16, 1969, Nguyen Lau, publisher and owner of the *Saigon Daily News* was arrested for "having maintained private contacts with a Vietcong political agent." The agent, a boyhood friend of Lau, returned to Saigon in 1964 from North Vietnam. He talked with Lau many times during the past five years and had, at one time, asked him to supply information for the V.C. According to both Lau and Tran Ngoc Hiem, the agent, Lau had refused to supply the information.

In discussing Lau's case with a member of the Team, one of Saigon's most highly regarded foreign correspondents explained its background. In Vietnam, a culture influenced immeasurably by Confucianism, family ties and friendship are revered. Mr. Lau, in a press conference held by government officials at National Police Headquarters, made no attempt to deny his associations with Hiem. He said that Communism was poisoning the minds of many, but that Vietnam would surely survive Communism. He added, "Even today, sitting before you, I keep wondering if as a publisher and as a Vietnamese intellectual, I should denounce a friend who I have known since boyhood."

Mr. Lau was educated at Oxford and the Sorbonne. As a member of an old and important family of wealth he has no respect for war profiteers and little sympathy for corruption in government. As a respected journalist and an avowed anti-Communist, he considered it part of his responsibility to be open to every facet of Vietnamese life. He once said, "If people are free to walk the streets, they are free to talk to me."

He insisted upon his right to criticize. On March 24, 1969, the *New York Times* quoted him as saying, "Diem said bluntly that he was not going to tolerate freedom of the press. There were no illusions then. We are living a lie now. People say they are giving you freedom and someone without experience in journalism may be

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[1] General "Big" Minh was kept in exile in Bangkok and Au Truong Thanh, the other leading contender was refused candidate status because of his alleged "neutralism". The Study Team talked with Au Truong Thanh in exile in Paris.

innocent enough to believe that this is paradise. Now you may be carried away by your illusions and land in trouble." Less than a month later Nguyen Lau was arrested.

Members of the Study Team visited the National Police Headquarters. There, Lt. Col. Nguyen Mau, Chief of Special Branch, told them about the government's case against the publisher. The only "evidence" he produced was the photostat of a press card, allegedly issued by Mr. Lau to one Tan That Dong, the alleged V.C. alias of Tran Ngoc Hiem. Such "evidence", however, raises serious questions. Two days following Lau's arrest, police brought a "so-called Vietcong" to the Lau home. In Mrs. Lau's absence, they proceeded to take pictures of him in various positions around the house. When her two sons (aged 10 and 14) protested, they were handcuffed while the picture-taking continued. When told of the incident, Mrs. Lau courageously went to the authorities. A senior police official did admit that police had visited the house with a V.C. agent and camera to gather "evidence".

Members of the Study Team were not permitted to see Mr. Lau, still being held without sentence. Nor were they permitted to see thirteen other prisoners they had made specific requests to visit.

These three cases have not been isolated because they are more important than others, but because they are more well known. They are symptomatic of a climate of intellectual, religious and political repression that has led to the imprisonment, exile or silencing of thousands of loyal Vietnamese nationalists, persons who are not pro-Communist, but who are critical of the Thieu-Ky government and who insist upon the right to think for themselves.

The government's sensitivity at this point is revealed in its attitudes toward dissidents, so-called "militant Buddhists", students and intellectuals, strenuous political opposition and the press.

The religious picture in South Vietnam is confused. About one-tenth of the nation's population is Roman Catholic. Yet, from the time of Diem and the Nhu's on, Catholicism has played a dominant role in Vietnamese political life. (Actually, this goes back to the 18th Century French missionary-priest, Pigneau de Behaine, and the continuing influence of French Catholicism during colonial days.) President Thieu reminded the Study Team that, though he had trouble with Buddhists, Catholics had supported his administration. The former editor of a Catholic magazine, a friend and confidante of Archbishop Nguyen Van Binh, agrees that fewer than 10 percent of the Catholics in South Vietnam are critical of the war and of Thieu's government. It must be remembered that about 1,000,000 of South Vietnam's Catholics were born in what is now North Vietnam and came south following 1954. They are, for the most part, vigorous anti-Communists.

However, there are Catholics who want a closer tie with Buddhists and who are seeking what some call, a "third solution". They are trying to find answers between Communism and corrupt militarism. Father Hoang Quynh, an active leader of the All-Religion Citizen's Front, has worked with Buddhists in trying to prevent further friction between the Buddhist and Catholic communities. He has said, "Catholic faithful must learn to live a responsible political life." Other Catholics, like Father Lan and attorney Nguyen Van Huyen seem close to the Pope's views on meaningful negotiations and peace. They have won the confidence of Buddhist leaders.

When, in January 1968, all of the bishops of South Vietnam released a four-page statement supporting Pope Paul's message on Vietnam and calling for a bombing halt in North Vietnam, it seemed that there had been a breakthrough. However, and without exception, those with whom Study Team members spoke indicated that the hierarchy in South Vietnam had confined themselves to what the Pope had said with no desire or inclination to supplement or further interpret the Vatican's plea concerning peace. There continues to be sharp feeling between Buddhists and Catholics. As one Buddhist complained, "When Catholics talk about peace, the Thieu government hears it one way. When we use the word, it is supposed to mean something else." Many Buddhists feel, and justifiably so, that they have been discriminated against by a succession of governments in Saigon.

There are two major Buddhist factions in South Vietnam: the "moderate" government-authorized faction of Thich Tam Chau, and the "activist" [2] faction

[2] The term "militant" is usually applied to the An Quang Pagoda faction. However, Buddhists are committed to non-violence. In French, "militant" means an "active supporter or worker in a political group".

of Thich Tri Quang and the An Quang Pagoda. However, the Unified Buddhist Church of the An Quang Pagoda is made up of both Mahayana (northern) and Therevada (southern) Buddhists. Early in 1967, the government sought to fragment the Buddhists, withdrawing its charter from the Unified Church and recognizing the "moderate" wing of Thich Tam Chau. However, the An Quang Pagoda continues to be a major factor in the religious and political life of the country. On the Buddha's 2513th birthday, celebrated May 30, at the An Quang Pagoda, former Chief of State, Phan Khac Suu, Tran Ngoc Chau, General Secretary of the House of Representatives, other deputies and senators, Father Quynh, as well as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders were present, indicating a broad base of popular support among disparate groups.

During the ceremonies, white doves of peace were released as a crowd of more than 3,000 people looked on, and Thich Tinh Khiet, Supreme Patriarch of the Unified Buddhist Congregation said, "Every hostile tendency of the world has jostled its way into the Vietnam war in order to exploit it and seek for victory, whereas all the Vietnamese people—either on this side or on the other side of the 17th Parallel—are mere victims of this atrocious war. Our nation is thus forced to accept ready-made decisions without having any right to make our own choice." President Thieu and pro-government supporters may insist that such peace talk is "political". If so, it is an obvious expression of that freedom essential so an emerging democracy. And it is no more political than the forms of protection and support offered innumerable Catholic priests and parishes; no more political than a sleek caravan of government-owned cars driving Thich Tam Chau to the Saigon Airport on June 5, to meet the Nepalese delegation to a World Buddhist Conference on Social Welfare; no more political than the imprisonment of hundreds of Buddhist monks.

Often the Buddhists who protest government policy are students. Following the government-controlled elections of 1967, Buddhist students joined by some of their professors were promptly singled out by the government for retaliatory acts. A professor of law said, "Van Hanh University (Buddhist) was the chief target for attack . . . . If students go to meetings, the police follow them and they can be arrested any time. Many times, they are drafted before the legal age or before their deferments as students expire."

As a result of a peace meeting held in September, 1968, in Saigon University, the Student Union was closed by police. Students, professors, deputies from the Lower House and some Buddhist monks had participated in the meeting. Thirty persons, mostly students, were arrested. More arrests followed.

At about the same time, a student in the Medical School was murdered. He had been kidnapped by the N.L.F. and later rescued by American troops. He was accused of having "leftist tendencies". He was found dead with his hands tied behind his back, having been pushed from a third floor window. The police called it "probable suicide" and made no investigation.

Student resistance continued. On Christmas Eve, responding to the Pope's plea for peace, 2,000 students, many of them Catholic, held a peace procession. In the aftermath, hundreds were arrested.

In spite of set-back and discouragement, the spirit of the student peace movement remains unbroken. A Buddhist student stepped out of a sullen mass of prisoners at Camp No. 7 on Con Son Island and addressed members of the Team. The government translator said, "He is here because he refuses to be drafted. He says he doesn't want to serve the United States. As a Vietnamese citizen he will go into the Army only when we have independence." A student, recently released from Con Son, reacting to the devastation visited on his country by modern instruments of war, said much the same thing: "I will not serve a country that has done so much to my own."

Students, intellectuals and Buddhist monks do not comprise the only opponents who threaten President Thieu's government.

There is a growing mood of independence in the Lower House. It is only found in a few deputies, but they are voicing increasing opposition to the policies and practices of the Thieu-Ky government. There have been criticisms of Operation Phoenix in the National Assembly. Two members of the Lower House raised serious questions about prison policies early in May. The president's tax program has been challenged. Constitutional questions challenging the prerogatives of the executive branch are frequently raised.

President Thieu proudly points to the "new alliance" of political parties in South Vietnam as an indication of the breadth of his support. This alliance

includes the Greater Union Force, the political arm of militant Roman Catholic refugees, the Social Humanist Party, a rebirth of Ngo Dinh Nhu's Cam Lao party, the Dai Vet, an erstwhile grouping of anti-French nationalists, a faction of the Hoa Hao sect based in the Delta and the Viet Kuomintang, a pro-government bloc formed after the Tet offensive in 1968. All of these parties together, combined with the Thieu-Ky vote, failed to capture half of the popular vote in the 1967 elections.[3]

While there is genuine political opposition, most of it has been driven underground. Members of the Study Team met with leaders of five old-line political parties no longer permitted to function as recognized entities. These men had all been active in the resistance movement against the French and were ardent nationalists. Their parties have been outlawed, their requests to publish a newspaper have gone unanswered and their voices have been muted. These men, and they reflect a vast middle-position in South Vietnam, struggled against the French and consider the Americans their new colonial masters. Over the past twenty-five years, they have known imprisonment and sacrifice. (A retired general present had been in prison eleven times.) They are opposed to Communism. But, they argue that unity and independence cannot be achieved under present circumstances. One of them said, "We know the American government is anti-Communist and they help us fight Communism. But when they look at Viet Communists, they think of them as western Communists. That is a bad mistake." It is the conviction of the Study Team that there will be no truly representative government in South Vietnam until voices such as these can be legitimatized and participate in the democratic processes of the republic.

One further evidence of political oppression is the government's attitude toward the press. Although it seems reasonably tolerant of foreign correspondents, and they are permitted to function without too many instances of censorship, the government's relationship to the Vietnamese press is far more direct and inhibiting. Twelve months ago, censorship was officially eliminated in South Vietnam. Since then, at least twenty-five newspapers and two magazines have been suspended. Mr. Lau's *Daily News* has been suspended for thirty days for hinting that Thich Thien Minh's trial might have been unfair. *Tin Sang* was closed when it suggested that Prime Minister Huong (one of the most highly regarded members of the Thieu government and a former political prisoner himself) once yielded to pressure in a cabinet appointment.[4] Nguyen Thanh Tai a UPI combat photographer, was arrested in May, 1968, for taking pictures "detrimental" to South Vietnam.

One of the most credible and influential anti-government nationalist leaders with whom we talked prepared a three-page position paper for the Team. The English translation was his own. In part, he said:

"The range of political expression as legally exists here is narrow indeed . . .

"Let us imagine for a moment that those people *are given* a chance. What would they do?

"They would firstly negotiate with the Government of the United States an agreement on the Allied Forces Establishment in Viet Nam which would provide for progressive withdrawals when the situation warrants it. Of course, they would bear in mind the security and the honor of the Allied troops who came here to protect ourselves and prevent a Communist domination.

"They would secondly invite the Vietnamese people to actively participate in national affairs and take their share of responsibility. Democratic freedom would be enforced without restrictions, how adventurous this might first look. Live forces such as students, intellectuals, religious leaders and workers' unions would be given an authorized say. Unjust treatment would be redeemed. One cannot fight for freedom without ensuring freedom at home . . ."

Although many of the nationalist leaders with whom the Study Team talked believed that a continuing American presence in South Vietnam is an unfortunate necessity until the political situation can be stabilized and made more representative, one student leader who had been imprisoned twice by the Thieu government for his activities on behalf of peace argued that no *truly* representative democracy can come into being as long as U.S. troops are present and U.S. policy is being enforced. He said, "By now, we should have learned the irony of having any Vietnamese government that is embraced by U.S. power. The Americans must

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[3] The United States sent election "observers" to Vietnam to report on election procedures. As one cynical Vietnamese put it: "We are planning to send twenty-two Vietnamese observers who don't speak English to the United States . . . for four days to see if your elections are fair."

[4] See: *New York Times*, March 24, 1969.

depart leaving us to decide our own future." He spoke those words with anguish, obviously knowing the problems that Vietnamese nationalism and many of its long-suffering advocates would face in dealing with the N.L.F. in the wake of an American withdrawal. Yet, he bitterly insisted that after many years of American military presence and American good intentions, there was no other way.

At the luncheon given the Team by members of the Lower House, Deputy Duong Minh Kinh talked about the vast expenditures poured into North Vietnam by the Soviet Union and China, and into South Vietnam by America. He said, "We are beggars from all of the people in the world in order to destroy ourselves. That is the greatest tragedy of all."

II. DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT

The large majority of those imprisoned in South Vietnam are held because they oppose the government; they are "political prisoners." Undoubtedly a great many of these are, as the government classifies them, "Viet Cong." Legally speaking, they are properly prisoners of war—though they are kept in a separate category from military prisoners. Undoubtedly, a number are "civilians related to Communist activities;" i.e. V.C. agents, and accurately classified as such. Yet it is clear that a great many people, many of them detained without hearing or trial, should be seen in two other categories. Some have been picked up in a sweep and are innocent of anything save being present in an area of military operations. Others are political prisoners. They are nationalists and not Communists—though seen by the government as inimical to its continuing control. In the official statistics, these categories are kept very low and thus their existence is all but denied. As the following examples of official estimates show, the practice is to classify almost everyone held as either "Communist" or "criminal" (though this division omits the large numbers of "detainees" held without hearing or trial.)

The classification of prisoners in 41 Correctional Centers as given by Col. Nguyen Psu San, Director of Correctional Institutions, is:

16.98% Criminals
64.25% Communists
4.16% Civilians related to Communist activities
11.91% Military
.21% Political activities harmful to national interest
2.49% War prisoners temporarily in correctional centers

Warden Pham Van Lien of Chi Hoa prison reported to Team members on June 3, 1969, a classification in Chi Hoa as follows:

45% Criminals
40% Communists
4% Civilians condemned by military court
10% Military
.6% Political—non-Communist

Prison Governor Minh, of Thu Duc prison, classified the 1,126 prisoners held by him on June 3, 1969 as follows:

265 Criminal offenders
843 Communists
15 Civilians condemned by military courts
3 Military prisoners
0 Political prisoners
0 Prisoners of war

The Warden of Con Son Island prison reported that there were 7,021 men and boys in Con Son, of whom:

984 were soldiers who committed political offenses (helped or sympathized with the V.C.)
2,700 were civilians who had worked directly with the V.C.,
769 were soldiers who committed criminal offenses,
252 were civilians who committed criminal offenses, and
2,316 were detainees, never tried or sentenced.

(Note that only the Warden of Con Son Island prison separately identified unsentenced detainees in his statistics. The rest of the breakdowns presumably distribute the detainees among the classifications according to file, or dossier, information.)

There are no figures available on the religious affiliation of prisoners. Warden Lien reported that there were about 120 Buddhist monks in Chi Hoa prison on June 3 when Team members visited.

Colonel Sanh said that there are 35,000 prisoners in 41 Correctional Centers. The senior American advisor to Col. Sanh, Mr. Don Bordenkercher, estimated that, in addition, there are 10,000 held in interrogation centers. He reported that the number had gone up gradually since the Tet offensive of 1968 when the jump was precipitate. Ambassador Colby, General Abrams' Deputy for Pacification, said that the number of prisoners had gone up and will continue to go up as the pacification program (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) develops.

The national police in Saigon and in the provinces are the official organ for making arrests. In addition, there appear to be many other arrest and detention agencies.[1] It is clear that those arrested are taken to a variety of detention centers for interrogation and that many are held in these centers for considerable periods of time. *According to the U.S. Mission, American advisors are involved only with cases of Viet Cong or suspected Viet Cong sympathizers and with persons apprehended during military operations (e.g., "Operation Phoenix"—the 18 month-old program which pools* information from half a dozen U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence and security agencies with the purpose of identifying and capturing Viet Cong political agents.)

Of course, estimates of the total number of political prisoners in South Vietnam—including those held as prisoners of war, by intelligence agencies and in military prisons, as well as in the correctional institutions and by the various arresting agencies to which we have referred—run much higher than the official statistics and estimates we have recited. The methods of reporting and keeping such statistics are such that we doubt any one knows whether any of such estimates approach accuracy. That the number exceeds the official statistics, and that it is rising, are the only conclusions that can be accepted as reliable.

In addition to the 37 (officially listed) provincial Correctional Centers, there are four large prisons for essentially civilian prisoners. These are Chi Hoa in Saigon, Thu Duc in Gia Dinh (for female prisoners), Tan Hiep near Bien Hoa, and Con Son on an island off the southeastern coast. Team members were enabled by the Ministry of the Interior to visit Chi Hoa, Thu Duc, and Con Son Island Prison. They were also shown through the interrogation center at National Police Headquarters.

Thu Duc (Women's Prison)

Members of the Study Team spent several hours at the Women's Prison, where the staff, headed by Prison Governor Minh, gave full explanations of the prison's operation and enabled members to see everything they requested. The administration of the prison is evidently efficient in most respects, and the large compound contains many elements normally found in such establishments.

There was overcrowding of the cells. This was especially hard on nursing mothers and those with small children. In the cell where babies were shown to the Team, it was confirmed that fifty people lived in a room 40′ by 30′. Primitive sanitation was severely inadequate. The medical provisions of the camp, if used as it was claimed, could ameliorate the situation, but there was evidence that some prisoners had not had recent medical attention, and skin ailments among little children pointed to low standards. Of particular concern are: the length of sentences; the youth of some classified as Communists; the large numbers of unconvicted prisoners; and the looseness and generality of charges and classifications. Governor Minh told us that there were 50 children from birth to 14 years in the prison; 40 were classified as young offenders (13–17 years); presumably the remainder were in prison solely because one or both parents were there.

The Team members found reason to conclude that recent adjustments in classification had taken place. To judge from both interviews and official explanations, the circumstances of many classified as "communist" did not justify this classification. Governor Minh asserted that "hard-core communists" served life imprisonment, though those whose "communist" activities had resulted from coercion would be released on record of good behavior and "repentance." Two students who were so classified were found by the Team members to be unsen-

[1] A future thorough investigation should check carefully into the number and types of arrest and detention agencies; this was impossible for the present team with limited time and staff.

tenced detainees. On examination of the dossiers, it was found that they were being held simply because they had exhibited "leftist tendencies". On inquiry put to all of the prisoners in another cell block, twenty percent responded that they had not been tried or sentenced. The Team members concluded that the "evidence" against those classified "communist" was often weak and that many deserved the designation "political" prisoners.

Chi Hoa

Chi Hoa is often referred to as the "showcase" prison. Since 1963 American funds have been available for the improvement of facilities, and American advisors have helped set up rehabilitation programs. The Team was given an attractive brochure with pictures of prisoners in classes; at worship; enjoying recreational activities. The brochure states that "the present Vietnamese system of corrections is * * * based on the principles of humanity, charity and equality."

The Warden said that there were about 5,500 men and boys now in the prison of whom 40% were Communist and only .6% were non-Communist political prisoners. Each prisoner wore a colored badge indicating his classification. The Warden estimated that 40% of the inmates had not yet been tried or sentenced. He said someone from the Ministry checked the lists every month and an effort was made to have those prisoners who had been in longer than six months brought to trial and sentenced.

The Team members were taken on a tour of the prison. Wherever the group went, they found the halls and cells clean. They were shown the vocational classes in which about 300 prisoners were enrolled and met daily over a six-month period.

Team members saw the Catholic Chapel, a Buddhist shrine and a Buddhist pagoda. In the pagoda, they talked with several monks who are in prison for resisting the draft. These monks were the only prisoners in any of the institutions who did not stand at rigid attention. Sometimes prisoners shouted ear-splitting anti-Communist slogans when Team members stopped to see them.

The Warden estimated that there were 200 children from 10 to 14 years of age and 200 from 14 to 18 in the prison not yet sentenced. All children, he said, were in a separate section and given education. Team members asked to see the children's section and were shown two cells. In one room, about 40 feet by 25, there were 47 children *under 8 years of age*. One child, 4 years old, said he was in prison because he had been caught stealing a necklace. The children were squatting in one end of the room eating when the Team members entered. They live in a bare room, with sanitary facilities at one end. No materials for play or study were in evidence. The food was rice with vegetables and fish. It looked adequate. The children seemed to be well physically. Immediately when the Team members entered they left their bowls of food and assembled in lines without any order from the adult in the room or from the Warden. They all, even the 4 year old, stood at attention and did not move or speak; only their eyes followed the visitors moves. In the next cell, similar in size, there were 67 children slightly older but under 10 years. The situation was the same in all respects.

The Team members saw three cells in the men's section. They were about the same size as the cells for children. There were about 50 men in each of the rooms viewed. Some of the men were preparing over tiny burners various kinds of food which had been brought by friends or relatives. None of the men in these three cells had been sentenced.

Upon asking to see the disciplinary cells, the Team members were shown a room with iron rings for shackling prisoners, which, we were told, were seldom used. The iron looked rusty. Team members did not get to see any of the 100 prisoners who the Warden said were in solitary.

The prison is in the form of a hexagon, four stories high facing inside. The wedge-shaped area in front of each of the six sections contains water tanks for bathing and washing clothes and an open space. The Warden said that after 5 p.m. the inmates are allowed here for sports and bathing. Since there is an average of about 1000 inmates in each section, it is obvious that only a very small proportion of the inmates could play soccer, volley ball, bathe or wash clothes at one time.

Con Son Island Prison

Con Son Island Prison, an escape-proof prison about 50 miles off the southeast coast is said by officials to contain 7021 prisoners, most of them "political." In many of the barracks, the majority of the prisoners were "political" prisoners who had been "tried" before a Military Field Court, usually without legal representa-

tion. They wore red tags which identified them as either V.C. or V.C. sympathizers. Those with yellow badges (detainees) presented another kind of problem. A show of hands, taken in a number of barracks, revealed that many detainees had been imprisoned as long as a year and a half with little hope of being released unless, conceivably, space was required for new prisoners. It was explained that frequently the means or records necessary to determine whether charges should be brought were unavailable. The failure to observe even a minimum amount of due process in the overwhelming majority of cases is a fair conclusion since the same circumstances were repeatedly recited by the prisoners; namely, they were either being held on charges of sympathizing with or aiding the enemy, or they had been rounded up after a military confrontation with the Viet Cong int heir village and were simply held from that point on. Others were students who had indicated their support for peace.

The tour had been carefully arranged. The only time the Team members deviated from the prepared pattern, successfully demanding to see Camp No. 4 instead of the camp that the prison authorities had scheduled, they saw something of significance. There were large dark dormitory cells (three out of about ten such cells were inspected) in which there were from 70 to 90 prisoners each, all of whom (as determined by a show of hands) were condemned to life in prison. None had had lawyers or any trial other than a judgment by a military tribunal.

The prison authorities denied the existence of "tiger cages", reputed small barred cells in which prisoners being disciplined were chained to the floor in a prone position. Although recently released prisoners referred to this practice from actual experience, the Team members were unable to elicit any more from the prison officials than that the "tiger cages" were no longer in existence. (At first any knowledge of such things was denied). One prisoner, however, speaking surreptitiously to the Team members said, in answer to a question, "Yes, the 'tiger cages' are here, behind Camp No. 2 and Camp No. 3. You looked in the wrong place." The Team members had looked behind Camp No. 4.

Taking into consideration the conditions under which such a prison had to operate, it seemed that an attempt was being made by the prison officials to conduct as clean and sanitary an operation as they could. There was a 1.3 million dollar expansion underway, which would provide 72 additional barracks.

Pursuing further the question of how prisoners were disciplined, the Team members were told that only ten out of the 7,021 prisoners were under discipline. On request, the visitors were shown two of these ten. They had been in solitary for six months because of their refusal to salute the flag. One said he would never salute it. His legs were deeply marked, the Colonel in charge explaining this was the result of a past disease. Questioned directly, the prisoner said it was the result of a long period in leg irons.

Although Team members observed no brutality, they felt that to have no disciplinary barracks other than a small number of maximum security cells was highly unusual. The Team members noted the fearful reaction of the inmates whenever prison officials appeared, surmising that there must exist a high degree punitive regimentation.

The most disturbing aspect of the prison situation in Vietnam is torture. Its existence, though minimized by many, is widely admitted by most of those outside the Vietnamese government itself who are knowledgeable about the arrest and detention system. U.S. officials, advisory to the Vietnamese prison system agree that there is torture, but insist that is does not take place in the correctional centers themselves but in the interrogation and detention centers where the prisoners are taken first. They point out that brutality could not exist in the correctional centers because the ratio of prisoners to staff (58 to 1) is so great. In at least one instance, however, the Team was advised that "trustees" were used to administer brutal punishment and such an explanation would be consistent with the high degree of fear and regimentation seen in the response of the prisoners. Many nongovernment Vietnamese interviewed, including a number of ex-prisoners, supported the conclusion that there was relatively little torture in the correctional centers.

Accounts by ex-prisoners, many of them persons of integrity, agree that most prisoners in the detention and interrogation centers are tortured. This is done to extract information—the most obvious kind being the names of companions, friends and acquantances. (It appeared that sometimes innocent persons were named in order to seem to cooperate with the interrogator.) It is also done as a matter of general procedure, being rationalized as necessary for interrogation of V.C. and their sympathizers.

One of the difficulties in appraising first-hand accounts of torture is that intellectuals, those who by definition are the ones who can most readily speak about it to outsiders, are seldom tortured except in what is called mild forms (usually simply beatings) Of course they are oppressed by conditions of overcrowding, with many prisoners stuffed into small cells which do not allow for lying down or, sometimes, even for sitting; and this, when it is steaming hot, when excrement accumulates, and when the prisoners are seldom released for exercise, is torture indeed. But as "favored" people, they do not appear to receive the normative interrogation treatment.

Beating is the most common form of abuse. It is done with wooden sticks and clubs. ("Metal" was mentioned by one observer.) The blows are applied to the back and to the bony parts of the legs, to the hands, and, in a particularly painful form, to the elevated soles of the feet when the body is in a prone position. Beating of the genitals also occurs. A number of commentators also described the immersion of prisoners into tanks of water which are then beaten with a stick on the outside. The pain is said to be particularly intense and the resultant injuries are internal.

Another type of water torture in which a soaked cloth is placed over the nose and mouth of a prisoner tied back-down to a bench is said to be very common. The cloth is removed at the last moment before the victim chokes to death, and then is reapplied. In a related form, water is pumped into the nose.

Frequently, the interrogation center at the National Police Headquarters in Saigon was mentioned as a scene of torture. The most common procedure is said to be the elevation of the victim on a rope bound to his hands which are crossed behind his back. One witness described a "bicycle torture" used in this center. For about a week the prisoner is forced to maintain a squat position with an iron bar locking his wrists to his ankles; "afterwards he cannot walk or even straighten up", it was said.

An intellectual who was arrested in 1966 and spent the first six months of his two and one-half years term in an interrogation center described what he called the "typical case" of a woman law student in a nearby cell. (Not "typical" in one respect because she was an intellectual). She had been in the interrogation center for six months when he arrived and stayed for the next six months during his own imprisonment there. Throughout this year, she was tortured, mostly by beating. When she was finally called before a tribunal to hear the charges, she had to be carried by two fellow prisoners. The tribunal, apparently because of her status, heard her case carefully and determined that it was a case of misidentification. Someone in Zone D had reported a V.C. returnee or spy who looked like her.

The same informant said, as a number of others did, that sexual torture was common. Though apparently it was not used on this woman student, it is used on many women. Frequently coke and beer bottles were prodded into the vagina. Also, there were a number of accounts of electrical wires applied to the genitals of males and females, as well as to other sensitive parts of the body. Another informant told of the torture by electricity of an eight-year old girl for the purpose of finding her father: "She said her father was dead and they just kept torturing her . . . They tortured her mother too." This was said to have occurred in the National Police Interrogation Center (Saigon) during 1968. Several ex-prisoners testified that it is not unusual to torture family members, including children, before the eyes of the prisoner. "Then," explained a woman teacher who had been imprisoned twice, "the prisoner will tell anything."

Although Team members were allowed to visit the National Police Headquarters in Saigon, it was an arranged visit. There was no evidence of the forms of torture here described. Col. Mau said that modern interrogation techniques ruled out the need for physical violence. Team members saw the interrogation rooms but no prisoners were being questioned. The Team's evidence for the tortures described come from interviews with ex-prisoners testifying to what they had endured and seen, together with the statements of doctors and others who had treated the victims. While the testimony of prison officials and the appearances of the National Police Headquarters cannot be lightly dismissed, the sheer weight of witnesses' statements seemed overwhelming and conclusive to Team members.

All informants agreed that the types and extent of torture administered in many of the detention centers in the provinces were far worse than in the National Police Interrogation Center in Saigon.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

(1) Standards and Procedures

The heart of the problem of assessing the conditions of political imprisonment in South Vietnam lies in the matters of standards and procedures. The key questions are: who is subject to arrest and imprisonment; and, how in each case is this determination made? If either the standards for determining who is subject to arrest, or the procedures for making the determination is loose, then enormous potential for official capriciousness exists and the freedoms of those subject to such caprice are ephemeral.

The Study Team found both the standards and the procedures to be loose by any measure—even by the most generous measure of allowance for the exigencies of civil and guerrilla warfare. The evidence is more than adequate to sustain the conviction of the Study Team that this looseness is used deliberately to suppress political dissent and to oppress some religious groups. In particular, loyal nationalists who are in basic disagreement with the government fear retaliation for expressing their views and do so with good reason.

Naturally, the exigencies of the particular kind of war being waged in South Vietnam bear upon the judgments of the Team. Government of Vietnam officials quite properly see an analogy between the civilians arrested for guerrilla war activities—sabotage, espionage and organization and support of National Liberation Front military cadres—and soldiers taken as prisoners in more conventional war. The validity of the analogy should be granted; we cannot class as suppression of political freedoms the imprisonment of those actively engaged in conducting war against the government. Moreover, we must concede the need for procedures sufficiently expeditious to permit such imprisonments to take place speedily and without exposure of the government to the risk of further war-like activity by the arrested person—either by release on bail pending determination or by early termination of the period of imprisonment.

It is humbling for Americans to be reminded that their own history is replete with invasions of individual rights made in the name of wartime emergency—the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War in the United States, for instance, and the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast during World War II. An American cannot presume to sit with wholly clean hands in judgment upon the Government of South Vietnam. But both the principles of justice to which their constitutions commit the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, and the pragmatic concern for winning popular support for democratic principles compels this Team to confine the restrictions on freedom made in the name of wartime exigency to those actually necessitated by war.

But the loose standards and procedures above cited do not represent concessions to those wartime exigencies. Minimization of risk of war-like activities against the government is not achieved by the imprisonment, for instance, of loyal nationalists for advocacy of reconstituting the government by forming a coalition with N.L.F. representatives. Nor does minimization of such risks require imprisonment of powerless people who scurry to avoid exposure to the demands of both N.L.F. and government forces, in so-called "insecure" areas, and are arrested on suspicion with the expectation that brutal interrogation may yield a confession of some conduct which will warrant detention.[1]

In fact, imprisonments of this kind create unnecessary risks of alienating loyalties—a hazard made doubly severe by the highly political character of the war in Vietnam. The seriousness of this hazard is underscored by the statement to the Team by one young man, a resident of a rural province, that probably a majority of the men his age who reside in "secure" areas (under Government of So. Vietnam control) of that province have experienced arrest and detention at least once during their lives. The evidence available to the Team, moreover, all suggests that the numbers of such arrests is steadily and continuously increasing.

The limits of the "war exigencies" justification are well illustrated by Article 29 of the Republic of Vietnam Constitution which clearly contemplates the existence of exceptional circumstances such as war. It provides:

"Any restriction upon the basic rights of the citizens must be prescribed by law and the time and place within which such a restriction is in force must be clearly specified. In any event the essence of all basic freedoms cannot be violated."

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[1] Credible testimony of instances of arrests fitting both these examples was given the Study Team from many sources.

A. Standards

Authority for imprisonment of non-conventional criminals is found in the State of War Law, Law No. 10/68, adopted by the National Assembly and promulgated by the President on November 5, 1968. It amends the State of War Decree promulgated prior to the present Constitution, on June 24, 1965, and as amended authorizes, among other things:

* * * * *

"The search of private houses, both by day and night;

"Fixing the place of residence of those elements judged dangerous to national security;

* * * * *

"Prohibition of all demonstrations or gatherings harmful to public security and order;

"Prohibition of the distribution of all printed matter harmful to national security;

* * * * *

"Control and restriction of communications and travel, consonant with security requirements; . . ."

In particular, the euphemistic language of the second paragraph quoted requires elaboration. Under it, numbers of persons are "assigned residence" in one or another of the provincial or national prisons by action of a Provincial Security Committee for specified but renewable terms, not exceeding two years, because they are "judged" to be "elements . . . dangerous to national security". Such a standard patently abdicates to the judging body the determination of who is to be subject to such imprisonments, almost totally without guidance from the legislature. In fact, it was determined that students with nothing more than the notation in their files that they exhibited "left-wing tendencies" were being incarcerated in national prisons whose administrator classified them in his census as "communists"; *i.e.*, in the same category with individuals found to have assumed leadership roles in organizing war-like activity for the N.L.F. Others claimed to the Team that they had been detained for no other reason than that local officials responsible for their arrest expected to extort a bribe as a condition for their release.

Under the heading of "prohibition of . . . gatherings", the Team learned of a Saigon political leader who was sentenced by a military field court to imprisonment for one year because he called a press conference without proper advance clearance from Republic of Vietnam authorities. (In this man's case, a known requirement appeared to have been deliberately violated, but the sentence suggests that the State of War Law is being used for more than minimization of military risks to national security.)

The standards just quoted should be read in conjunction with Article 4 of the Constitution which provides:

"Article 4. (1) The Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form.

(2) Every activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited."

The looseness of the prohibition against activity designed to "publicize or carry out" Communism parallels that inherent in the other standards we have discussed. Under it, President Thieu, in an interview he generously afforded the members of the Team, justified the detention of Truong Dinh Dzu as a "political prisoner" on the ground that he had allegedly advocated the formation of a coalition government in which the N.L.F. would participate. This would violate Article 4, President Thieu reasoned, since such advocacy is *ipso facto* prohibited by that article. If may be unnecessary to point out, in response to this reasoning, that the Constitution also provides machinery for its own amendment, a process hardly likely to be completed without someone having first advocated a result barred by the language of the provisions being amended.

B. Procedure

1. *Arrest, detention and interrogation.*—Because of the long periods for which individuals are often held and interrogated prior to any disposition, often for six months or more—the procedures for determining who is to be arrested and for how long he is to be detained and interrogated take on a special importance. Moreover, the frequent and serious physical abuses about which the Team

heard occur during this period. Although they seem to be employed as "aids" to interrogation, they are forms of cruel and barbarous punishment against which the citizen needs every conceivable procedural protection.

In fact, procedural protections are essentially non-existent at the arrest and interrogation stage. Arrests are made by a wide variety of local and national officials—by district police, special security forces, military forces and intelligence units—each exercising a relatively unfettered discretion. The arrest may occur for no other reason than that the arrestee was found near the scene of a guerrilla raid. Unless the arrested person is of exceptional importance, he will usually be detained by the arresting unit or by the district or security police in the district or province where arrested, and subjected to whatever interrogation methods authorities in that unit choose to apply. As we have stated, such detention for interrogation frequently continues for many months and it is at this state that the bestial brutality we have encountered occurs.

Despite the constitutional provision that:

> "(6) A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every phase of interrogation, including the preliminary investigation."

the Team was unequivocally assured by Lt. Col. Mau, Chief of the Special Branch of the National Police Forces, that no one within his knowledge ever saw a lawyer at this stage—certainly never when detained at the Interrogation Center of the National Directorate of Police in Saigon. All of the Team's information tended to confirm that this generalization applied to other places of interrogation, both in Saigon and in the provinces.

Not only is the arrestee denied a right to counsel at this stage, he is frequently denied all contact with outsiders, including members of his family. Often families are not notified of the arrest, and they may go for days or months in ignorance of any fact save that their loved-one has disappeared. In one instance,when occasional visits were permitted to an eighteen year old arrestee, the visits were stopped after several weeks on the ground that they interfered with the interrogation. Isolation itself may be used as an interrogation "aid" or technique.

2. *"Assigned residence" by Provincial Security Councils.—An unknown proportion of the persons held in the correctional system—the four national and thirty-seven provincial prisons of the system—are assigned there by action of Provincial Security Councils rather than by the judgment and sentence of any court.* An official of one province reported that 50 percent of the 1,400 occupants of the local provincial prison were assigned there by the action of the Provincial Security Council.

When Prime Minister Huong took office in May, 1968, the Team was told he made a major effort to improve the functioning of these bodies, enlarging them to include an elected official (in the provinces where elections have been held) and causing them to pare their backlogs of undisposed of business. As a result, it may be assumed that dispositions in some provinces show a greater sensitivity to local opinion and that the periods of preliminary detentions—to the extent they exceed the length of interrogation desired—have been reduced.

One of the Prime Minister Huong's first acts was to initiate a spectacular admission of wrongdoing on the part of the Thieu government in the release and commutation of the sentences of a number of political prisoners whose total has been variously estimated from 2,000 to 6,000.

On another occasion Deputy Prime Minister Khiem commendably acknowledged in response to questions raised in the National Assembly the arbitrary nature of the arrest and interrogation procedures and the official fear of repercussions which could result from the conditions of brutality.

But these steps only sweeten a system that is intolerable beyond capacity for amelioration. No society can pretend to be free that permits "administrative" detentions of the kind handled by Provincial Security Councils. One Team member was privileged to visit the members of one such Council as its regular weekly session was being concluded. Members of the Council each possessed a typewritten list of the names of the inviduals whose cases were being considered; approximately 100 names were on the list for a single afternoon's consideration. He was told that on heavy business days the Council sometimes continued to meet into the evening. An officer brought the relevant files to the meeting and read to the Council the information required for consideration. Without notice to the arrested person, without his presence or that of witnesses to the facts relevant for determination, without confrontation or opportunity for rebuttal, to say nothing of rights of counsel or to appeal, the liberty of each of the 100 persons listed was summarily determined in this manner and detentions in prison were ordered for periods—renewable by like procedure—of up to two years. No war-

time exigency, nor any other justification, can be offered to reconcile such precedure with the democracy which is claimed to be the object of the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam. Undoubtedly, the system succeeds in detaining some people for whom a real connection with the activities of the N.L.F. has been shown, although the Team was told that all serious wartime offenses are referred to a Military Field Court for disposition. But no other purpose than convenience to the interests of local or national officials which are adverse to those of the detainees—whether to suppress political opposition or otherwise—can really be served by this mechanism.

(2) *Military Field Tribunals*

The Study Team has reached the conclusion that the Thieu-Ky Government has, through the extensive and increasing use of the extra-constitutional Military Field Courts, imprisoned thousands of persons without the most fundamental elements of a fair hearing and, in a shocking number of instances, without even apprising the imprisoned persons of the charges against them. This extraordinary development has had such a devastating effect on the people of South Vietnam and such a chilling impact on all political activities that it seems important to chronicle in some detail the process by which the present Saigon Government, in the name of a wartime emergency, can deny persons arrested for political "offenses" all of the guarantees which Vietnamese constitutional and statutory law gives to persons accused of crime.

The Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, promulgated on April 1, 1967, confers in Article 7 a series of guarantees upon those accused of crime which are among the most generous and progressive of any democracy in the world. Because these rights have been denied to probably 65 to 75 percent of all of the persons committed to prisons in South Vietnam, it is important to set them forth in some detail. Article 7 reads as follows:—

"(1) The State respects and protects the security of each individual and the right of every citizen to plead his case before a court of law.

"(2) No one can be arrested or detained without a legal order issued by an agency with judicial powers conferred upon it by law, except in case of flagrant violation of the law.

"(3) The accused and his next of kin must be informed of the accusation against him within the time limit prescribed by law. Detentions must be controlled by an agency of the judiciary.

"(4) No citizen can be tortured, threatened or forced to confess. A confession obtained by torture, threat or coercion will not be considered as valid evidence.

"(5) A defendant is entitled to a speedy and public trial.

"(6) A defendant has the right to a defense lawyer for counsel in every phase of the interrogation, including the preliminary investigation.

"(7) Any person accused of a minor offense who does not have a record of more than three months' imprisonment for an intentional crime may be released pending trial, provided that he or she is employed and has a fixed residence. Women pregnant more than three months accused of minor offenses who are employed and have fixed residence can be released pending trial.

"(8) Accused persons will be considered innocent until sentence recognizing guilt is handed down.

"In event of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the accused.

"(9) If unjustly detained, a person has the right to demand compensation for damages from the State after he has been pronounced innocent, in accordance with the provisions of law."

All of these carefully spelled-out guarantees were nullified for political offenders by Law No. 10/68 of November 5, 1968, which we have earlier described. This law amends and revitalizes a pre-constitutuional decree issued June 24, 1965. By its legitimation of the Military Field Courts, this law, in effect, amended the Constitution although none of the Articles of the Constitution related to amending the document (Nos. 103–108) were complied with.

The November 5, 1968 law, in addition to authorizing the invasions of individual rights previously recited, authorizes local proclamations of martial law and in its Article 2 declares that

"All violations of the law related to national security fall within the Military Field Courts which will try them in accordance with emergency procedures."

The creation of these "Military Field Courts" is nowhere authorized in Article 76 through Article 87 of the Constitution, which provide in detail for the structure

of Vietnam's judiciary. Nor is the "Military Field Court" related to military tribunals which exist in the armed forces of South Vietnam for the prosecution of offenses committed by military personnel. *The "Military Field Courts" are not really courts at all.*

The Study Team is convinced that the number of arrests and imprisonments continues to grow larger under the law of November 5, 1968. Moreover, it is clear that the 1968 law, unlike the 1965 decree, abrogates and amends the 1967 Constitution of South Vietnam in an illegal way. Indeed, the 1968 law eviscerates that Constitution and suggests that the President and the National Assembly disregarded the Constitution in several respects and, relying on "a state of war", undertook to legitimize the Military Field Courts which imprison persons in proceedings having few if any of the features of a real trial. No matter how favorably they are viewed, these courts serve as the instrument by which the Thieu government imprisons and thereby silences its critics.

The inadequacies of the Military Field Courts are many. Among their more glaring defects are the following:

(1) These courts violate Article 77 of the Constitution which stipulates that every court should be composed of "an element that judges and an element that prosecutes, both of which are professionally qualified." In the Military Field Court, the judge is a military official not necessarily trained in law.

(2) The offenses triable by the Military Field Courts are non-bailable and convictions in these courts are non-appealable. The denial of these basic rights violates the Vietnam Constitution as well as the practices which have become customary in most of the judicial processes in the civilized world.

(3) The Military Field Courts also violate Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that, "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." This statement is now incorporated in the draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and is broadened to read as follows:

"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law."

These provisions are being violated in South Vietnam. Their violation is thus a violation of the Constitution of South Vietnam which states in Article 5 that "the Republic of Vietnam will comply with the provisions of international law which are not contrary to its national sovereignty and the principle of equality between nations."

(Signed) James Armstrong,
Bishop, United Methodist Church.
Anne M. Bennett (Mrs. John C.),
Allan Brick,
Director of National Program, Fellowship of Reconciliation.
John Conyers, Jr.,
Member of Congress.
Robert Drinan, S. J.,
Dean, Boston College Law School.
Peter W. Jenkins,
Pastor, Congregational Church, Wimbledon, England.
John de J. Pemberton, Jr.,
Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union.
Seymour Siegel, Rabbi,
Professor of Theology, Jewish Theological Seminary.
Arnold E. True,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (retired).

Organizational associations listed for purposes of identification only.
June 9, 1969.

CALLING PEOPLE COMMUNISTS

The Chairman. It is a very interesting subject even here, because there are many people in this country, in this community, in this city, who have a habit of designating as Communists anyone with whom they happen to disagree on any particular controversy or subject. This is very common. Certainly this was very common in the days of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. It is still common.

Today the insinuation is often a little more subtle than in the days of Senator Joe McCarthy, but I have had a recent experience. There is a man named Fred Schwartz who has made a great fortune in scaring people to death about communism and asking for contributions. He picked up a statement in an Austrialian paper that I said I didn't care if all the countries of Southeast Asia went Communist, which is wholly untrue and absolutely without foundation.

Senator CASE. As you got off the plane you said that. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. He is using this in a letter for soliciting funds. I suppose today you can put them out on computers for as little as 3 or 4 cents apiece. He sends out a half million letters and he receives a half million dollars or something like that. He gets a lot of money anyway. There are a number of people like this in this country who make a good living out of frightening our people about the threat of communism and calling anyone who happens to be controversial as of the moment a Communist.

This is very interesting. I wondered if the South Vietnamese are much more discriminating and careful in the use of that word than we are.

Mr. COLBY. I think the South Vietnamese in the Phoenix program, Mr. Chairman, are indeed trying to be very discriminating about identifying very clearly who the members are.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they are more careful than we are?

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think we are very careful in our Government, Mr. Chairman. Those gentlemen that you may be referring to may be less careful.

The CHAIRMAN. They have a purpose for it.

PERCENTAGE OF VC WHO ARE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS

We have already asked you what percent of the VC are really Communist members of the People's Revolutionary Party.

Mr. COLBY. The People's Revolutionary Party is the Communist Party of South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of the VC are members of that party? We had this the other day, but I have forgotten what you said. Do you remember?

Mr. COLBY. I don't recall that precise question. I don't think so. I don't believe you asked me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I ask you that, Colonel?

Mr. VANN. We touched upon it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought we did.

Mr. VANN. We had a very extensive study done by a U.S. Information Agency officer. It is now about 3½ years old. The story was done by Mr. Douglas Pike. He came up with an estimate that 3 percent of the Viet Cong were card-carrying Communist Party members.

The CHAIRMAN. Only 3 percent?

Mr. VANN. That was his estimate at that time, and I think I possibly brought it out in context that——

The CHAIRMAN. I thought we asked you about it.

Mr. VANN. For a long period of time we have recognized that certainly a very small minority of the South Vietnamese enemy force is Communist. However, that minority is the leadership, and they are directing the activities of the rest for Communist purposes.

CLASSIFICATION OF PRISONERS AS COMMUNIST OFFENDERS

The CHAIRMAN. That is consistent with other experiences, but it is not consistent with this figure that out of 35,000 prisoners they called 64 percent of them Communists. That seems outrageously high as a percentage of Communists.

Mr. COLBY. They are called Communist offenders, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASE. You mean in the jail?

The CHAIRMAN. These are in the jail.

Mr. COLBY. These are what are called Communist offenders by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered whether this means they are unsympathetic to the government. Does it?

Mr. COLBY. No, sir. What it means is that those people are somehow associated with the Viet Cong struggle against the government and have, consequently, run across the laws and done something improper. That is distinct from pure party membership, which is an elite status.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a very difficult question.

The Pentagon takes a colonel, I believe, or a Captain Rowe and he tells a story, of which one of the burdens is that people like myself, who disapprove of this war, are the principal aiders and abettors to the enemy and, in effect, if it were not for people like myself who disapprove of this war as not being in the interests of this Government, the war would have been over long ago and, therefore, most of the deaths of the GI's are attributable to me. This is the story Captain Rowe takes throughout the country under the auspices of our Government.

It seems to me it is not unusual to think that perhaps the Vietnamese Government may be doing the same thing.

Mr. COLBY. I think the distinction here, Mr. Chairman, is that the party membership is a fairly small percentage of the total number of people who are engaged somehow in this war on the enemy side. This is somewhat similar to the difference between the members of one of our political parties and the number of voters in the election.

NEUTRALISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Is it against the law in Vietnam to be a neutralist?

Mr. COLBY. I think it is against the law and you would get in trouble to advocate neutralism at the moment—no, that is not so, because Senator Don, for instance, has advocated that South Vietnam really ought to be neutral between the Communist and non-Communist camps.

Senator CASE. Can he run for office or vote?

Mr. COLBY. There is a provision of the election law that states that candidates could not be "those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism and pro-Communist neutralism or worked in the interest of communism." Those were the words used in the most recent election law in effect."

The CHAIRMAN. As the Senator says, a neutralist cannot run for office nor vote.

Mr. COLBY. A pro-Communist neutralist was the specific language.

Senator CASE. By definition you are pro-Communist if you are a neutralist or almost.

Mr. COLBY. There are some who have advocated that South Vietnam should eventually be a neutral state, so it is not as if you automatically go to jail if you say that. It is not so.

Senator CASE. Not go to jail necessarily.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not saying they will not go to jail, but that they cannot vote or run for office.

Mr. COLBY. I don't think there has been a clear-cut determination of that fact.

Senator CASE. I wonder what the general understanding is. If you are a neutralist you had better not vote; is that right?

Mr. COLBY. Well, in the middle of a war it is hard——

Senator CASE. Isn't that the general situation? That is what I thought.

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. How many of these people would you think are classified as political prisoners in a Western sense?

Mr. COLBY. In a Western sense, it depends on whether you include the Communist offenders in that category or not. [Deleted.]

U.S. ADVISERS WORKING WITH CIVILIAN PRISON SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. How many advisers are there working in connection with the civilian prison system in Vietnam?

Mr. COLBY. We have four full-time civilians at the Saigon level and one full-time military officer at each corps level. That is four additional.

In addition, the Public Safety Officer in almost every province spends some time working with this problem.

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMPS

The CHAIRMAN. How many people are there in prisoner-of-war camps?

Mr. COLBY. About 32,000 more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in addition to what we have been discussing?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN PRISONER INTERROGATION

The CHAIRMAN. Do U.S. advisors ever participate in interrogations of prisoners?

Mr. COLBY. I think, yes. I would assume so.

RURAL VIETNAMESE CONCEPT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING VC

The CHAIRMAN. Does the average rural Vietnamese consider he is engaging in an illegal activity when he helps a friend or relative who is a Viet Cong, such as giving him food, shelter or information?

Mr. COLBY. That is a very difficult question to answer, Senator. I think I would guess that, with the amount of publicity that the government has put out about the Phung Hoang program to protect

the people against terrorism and the general realization this is a war going on, the normal member of the government side knows that help to a member of the enemy camp is an unlawful act.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. There is a war going on, but it is not a traditional war. It is certainly not the kind of war in which we have been traditionally involved.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, but at night the guns go off and the flares are in the air, and the grenades go off in the marketplaces. It is a war at night.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS AND COMMUNIST OFFENDERS

The CHAIRMAN. This puzzles me, and I come back to this. When you say 3 percent of the VC——

Mr. VANN. That was the figure, sir, about 1965, when this research was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any reason to believe it has changed?

Mr. VANN. I would think there probably has been a change in the number of VC, and that it occurs largely in the number of guerrillas and the nonparty chiefs. It might be a little bit higher than it was, but I think it is definitely a very small minority.

The CHAIRMAN. It is hard for me to understand. We started out the other day with an estimated 80,000 VC; wasn't it?

Mr. COLBY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Three percent of that are only about 2,400, and yet we find nearly 65 percent of those in jail, which the staff says is 22,750, are called Communist offenders.

Mr. COLBY. These are apples and oranges, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they?

Mr. COLBY. What we are talking about is the difference between on the one hand full-party members, (the small percentage Mr. Vann mentioned) a status which can only be achieved after a candidate period and then admission to the party, which in a Communist society is a very high status indeed, and, on the other hand, those who have been arrested for assistance to the Communist cause, which are included in the figures for those in prisons.

The CHAIRMAN. But they all call them Communists.

Mr. COLBY. They call them Communist offenders.

The CHAIRMAN. On that basis then I suppose in this country all of the SDS and the Black Panthers and the Ku Klux Klan and all Members of Congress who object to the war could be put in jail as associates, as aiding and abetting the Communists. All those who voted against the ABM might be considered that.

Senator CASE. Don't stretch it too far. I have agreed with you up to that.

Mr. COLBY. Well, I think, sir, the difference is between a country which is at war and a country not at war. South Vietnam is at war, is at war for its life, and, consequently, the line is drawn very sharply between people who are helping the enemy and people who are helping the government side.

Senator CASE. It is a difference in transition, too. Free speech has never been encouraged there; is that right?

Mr. Colby. I think so. I think that certainly is true. I think it is growing, but it has a long way to go.

BASIS OF NEED FOR U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator Case. Just a couple of questions. I will ask you and anybody else who would like to speak on this. You feel, having had a good deal of experience in that part of the world, that the need for American troops ought to be considered just in the context of Vietnam or do you think we ought to keep troops there as part of our general strategic role in the area?

Mr. Colby. I was responsible for the Far East in my job in CIA. I think it depends upon the overall situation in that part of the world, the degree of threat by the other side, the degree of cohesion which has developed in that part of the world, the degree to which those countries grow and gradually pick up and assume the responsibilities for their own defenses. These are all very large-scale considerations, and I don't think we can give a very straight answer.

I would not say that we should keep troops in Vietnam in order to be available for use in that part of the world.

Senator Case. Do you have any comment?

Mr. Vann. No, I have no comment.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO U.S. ADVICE

Senator Case. On quite another matter, I would just like to bring this up to each one of you at the table, if you will, offer a very brief response.

What response are we getting generally from the Vietnamese to our advice at all levels, particularly where we have been told, by writers and others, that in many cases the South Vietnamese tell us to go to the devil and there is nothing we can do if they don't do what we tell them or advise them they should do. We are involved, our prestige is so deeply sucked in there, we just cannot do anything about pulling out anyway, and so no matter what we do we are hooked and we just have to take it.

Would you comment briefly on this and especially those who are down the line. First, have they ever sent an unfavorable report to their superiors about what the South Vietnamese to whom they have given advice have done and, if so, what happened?

Mr. Colby. Would you like to start that at the bottom, too, sir?

Senator Case. Sure. Have you ever had any South Vietnamese who didn't do what you wanted him to do?

Sergeant Wallace. Sir, in one instance, yes.

Senator Case. What did you do?

Sergeant Wallace. My counterpart and I occasionally disagree on some matter. To resolve these differences, once a week, all of the CAP squad leaders report to the company office, with their counterparts, and discuss the problems with the Marine CAP commander and his counterpart. At these meetings we will discuss our difference and try to resolve our problems. This method has been very effective.

Senator Case. Have you ever had to report to your superiors failure on your part to persuade the South Vietnamese, your counterpart?

Sergeant WALLACE. What exactly do you mean "persuade," sir?

Senator CASE. Have you ever suggested something which you thought was important that they should do which they would not do, and have you had to report that to your superior?

Sergeant WALLACE. Yes, sir, I have. Occassionally we will run a killer team and my counterpart will disagree with this. He will say, "No," and I will call district. We will discuss it over the radio and come to an agreement.

KILLER TEAM

The CHAIRMAN. What is the killer team?

Sergeant WALLACE. A killer team is a small unit, sir, designed to make contact and then return.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not to kill anyone? Why do you call it a killer team?

Sergeant WALLACE. The teams are designed to make contact and to inflict casualties on the enemy and then return to their base camp.

RESPONSE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO U.S. ADVICE

Senator CASE. What response did you get, when you had to report that you had not succeeded in your effort to persuade a response from your own people. What did your superior do?

Sergeant WALLACE. We are usually able to resolve our differences.

Senator CASE. In other words, you have not had the experience of reporting an important matter of failure on your part?

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir.

Senator CASE. To your superiors?

Sergeant WALLACE. No, sir.

Senator CASE. How about you, Captain?

Captain GECK. Sir, having had a series of counterparts I cannot think of one who has always agreed with me. Most of them have had differing views than mine as much as half of the time. In some instances I have gone to a counterpart and suggested little changes either in tactics to be used on an ambush or some village project and have received a flat no. If I am adamant about the program, I will report to my immediate superior who will go to his counterpart and try to get the program instituted from above. This method usually will bring some sort of success.

Senator CASE. Is it true that there has been any substantial amount of stubbornness on the part of the people or refusal to take reasonable advice?

Captain GECK. Sir, in many cases there is.

Senator CASE. Go ahead.

Captain GECK. For instance, it used to be a common occurrence for me to go to a military man and say "I think in such case you should do this," and he would turn around and say, "I have been here for 8 years now and I know what needs to be done." But after awhile he gains confidence in your advice. As he learns you do know what you are talking about, he will start to be more receptive. I am lucky for being down at the bottom I can send the question higher. I have no idea how the man at the top——

Senator CASE. We will try that later. Has this failure that you have run into on occasion related to direct refusals to go into fights?

Captain GECK. In one or two cases; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. What happened?

Captain GECK. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. In that case you may report to your chain up the line?

Captain GECK. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. And this is your experience; that this has not been a common thing.

Captain GECK. No, sir, it has not been common.

RESPONSE TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL OF U.S. ADVICE

Senator CASE. It has not made you disgusted?

Captain GECK. On occasion it has, but not on the whole program.

Senator CASE. Not on the whole program?

Captain GECK. No.

Senator CASE. You haven't felt we were doing a job for people who were not worth fighting for?

Captain GECK. No, sir, not at all.

Senator CASE. How about you, Captain?

Captain MURPHY. From my own personal experience there have been occasions where my counterpart has elected not to take or not to utilize the advice that I have given him. The course of action I then take is determined by how strongly I feel about the advice, exactly how the advice is to be utilized, what the advice was that I offered, and how strongly I feel about my recommendations. Where I feel very strongly about his not taking my advice, I report it to my superior, the Province Senior Adviser and recommend that he discuss the problem with the the province chief, to see if he couldn't influence my counterpart to do it the way I recommended. I am sure you understand that two people may not share the same opinion. This does not necessarily mean that one is entirely wrong.

Senator CASE. I know.

Captain MURPHY. But different individuals have different ways of doing things.

Senator CASE. You understand what I am trying to get at?

Captain MURPHY. Yes, sir, I do. On Captain Geck's level, the MAT team in the field sometimes comes up against a situation where the Regional Force company commander or Popular Force platoon leader will not accept their advice. What we do then is determine how effectively that unit is operating, how effectively the commander is accomplishing the mission.

Senator CASE. Overall.

Captain MURPHY. Perhaps he is not in a position where he needs the advice. If he is doing a satisfactory job, if he is accomplishing his mission, perhaps the MAT team should not be with him or could be utilized better in some other location with another unit.

In cases where we suspect that the commander is in violation of certain Vietnamese directives we, of course, report it through our channels to a higher headquarters. The corps commander will assign an inspection team to come down and investigate the matter based upon our report.

Senator CASE. This is the South Vietnamese corps commander?

Captain MURPHY. That is correct. Generally we get good response to our advice and our reports, to the effect that proper measures are being taken or with respect to the performance.

Senator Case. Have you had any experience of your own of your reports of this sort to our own forces, to our own people, being just put away in the drawer and ignored?

Captain Murphy. No, sir. I can't recall of any. You mean our report to our higher headquarters?

Senator Case. Yes.

Captain Murphy. No.

Senator Case. They don't tell you to forget it?

Captain Murphy. No, never. If we feel strongly about it, they will take measures to correct the problem.

Senator Case. Is this the general feeling among our officers?

Captain Murphy. Yes, it is.

Senator Case. You concur in that?

Captain Geck. Yes.

Senator Case. You are satisfied?

Captain Geck. Yes.

MAJOR ARTHUR'S ADVISING OF COUNTERPART

Major Arthur. First, I would like to say that my counterpart is a lieutenant colonel ARVN officer. He has 19 years of service. Sometimes he wonders about what advice I as a major can give. I have had two tours in Vietnam, so I have some authority to give some advice. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. How long ago did you make that report?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. How long have you been back here?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. How long have you been back home?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. So there was no response within a month anyway?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. Roughly.

EXPERIENCE WITH COUNTERPARTS AT DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISER LEVEL

What is the generality of the experiences of the people at your level?

Major Arthur. The generality of experience with my counterpart is that I have an excellent working relationship with him and my advice is generally taken. Again, I emphasize he is a mighty capable officer, well thought of, well respected, and a capable soldier. The advice that I render comes on new techniques or the use of new equipment. The advice of my subordinate officers who work with his staff officers in staff procedure is normally accepted.

Senator Case. The troubles you have had have not been related to motivation on his part or willingness to fight?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. Or this kind of things?

Major Arthur. [Deleted.]

I might add I was a battalion advisor to a ARNV infantry battalion in 1966. I did, in fact, have some bad times after a couple of fights in pursuing the enemy. We took our licks; we gave them their licks. We policed the battlefield, but we went back or stayed there for the night, and they lived to fight another day.

In some cases it might not have been wise to pursue pellmell after them and track them down and kill them all. My other counterpart had a lot of combat savvy, too, but I felt at that time they should have pressed on and followed up on the enemy. This is 1966 now I am talking about, sir.

There is no lack of desire on the part of my present counterpart or his subordinates to mix it up that I have run into yet. They are out there looking for and actively searching to engage the enemy.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

RESPONSE TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL OF ADVICE IN TUYEN DUC

Mr. MILLS. Sir, I can testify on the basis of my experience in Tuyen Duc on the question of what happens when a Vietnamese official does not take our advice or seems to us to be incapable of doing a job that is demanded of him [deleted].

Senator CASE. [Deleted.]

Mr. MILLS. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Just cancel that one.

Mr. MILLS. [Deleted.]

RESOLUTION OF INCOMPATIBILITY ON ADVICE

Mr. VANN. We have to realize that all advisers do not always give good advice, so there is a legitimate basis for a good experienced Vietnamese rejecting the advice. There is a formal system for going up the ladder to let the next advisory level know when there is incompatibility down below. When we reach this at my corps, I look into the situation. I may resolve it by telling the province senior adviser I don't think it is important enough to make an issue of.

I may resolve it by going into the province chief with him or I may resolve it by going to the corps commander and presenting the argument to him. Usually, having ascertained what he wants, I accept his decision even though it may not be what we want.

Occasionally, on a real gut issue that I cannot get resolved at my level, I will go to Ambassador Colby and ask for his assistance, but it is an ever-diminishing number of these as you go up the line.

SOAKING UP AND BURYING COMPLAINTS

Senator CASE. This used to be rather prevalent, this matter of soaking up and burying complaints and what not.

Mr. VANN. I would say we are much better organized, sir, in many respects on both the Vietnamese and the U.S. side. We have much less of a problem now because there are many more formally established plans. There is more detailed guidance as to what we are going to do and how we are going to do it, and when we are going to do it. This tends to minimize conflict.

BUREAUCRATIC STODGINESS AND INEFFECTIVNESS

SENATOR CASE. How about this general question of bureaucratic stodginess and ineffectiveness and what not that is in our establishment?

Mr. VANN. I would rather think they have about as much or more than we have.

Senator CASE. There are people who have begun to make a career of life in Vietnam. You are one, but you are not the kind of person I am talking about, but what about the typical bureaucrat who shuffles papers around and sticks them in his desk?

Mr. VANN. Sir, I have no——

Senator CASE. You know we have heard about them.

Mr. VANN. We know about these people. We tend to get them weeded out reasonably fast.

EVALUATION OF OPERATION AS A WHOLE

Senator CASE. Are you satisfied with the operation as a whole?

Mr. VANN. What I am participating in I am delighted with organizationally on the American and Vietnamese side.

Mr. MCMANAWAY. I think at times of John Vann's remarks several days ago about the change as it relates to Tet in 1968. I have been working at the national level for almost 5 years, and there has been a marked change in the attitude of the Vietnamese that I worked with since Tet in terms of their receptivity and their willingness to reach out for advice. This is reflective of a change in attitude toward the war, and in trying to get the job done.

I think most of them are interested in getting a job done and are reaching out for advice and acting on advice—more so than they were before Tet.

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. OPERATING STRUCTURE

Senator CASE. What about our own operating structure? What about the comments that have been made that for one reason or another—frustration, people are getting old, scared of losing their jobs, and not willing to take the trouble, and what not, comments that this has been very, very common in the past so far as complaints go—things aren't getting done.

Mr. MCMANAWAY. I think one of the problems we have that did reflect some of this was the big buildup both on the civilian side as well as the military side. There was a very rapid buildup from 1965 through 1967. During that same period, in the course of 10 months two massive reorganizations took place within the U.S. community, one where part of the civilian effort was put together so you had only one civilian chain of command, and one military chain of command, and then another reorganization bringing together the civilian and military into the CORDS organization. There was turbulence at that time. People didn't have enough to do because of changes being made, and so forth. I think we have come through that period. For my money the CORDS organization is one of the most dynamic I have been privileged to be associated with.

I think that is reflective even here today.

Mr. VANN. I think, Senator, you have got to understand there are many Americans who come there and can see something that is clearly wrong and report it. Then if something isn't done about it immediately, they tend to think it is being ignored. That comes from not recognizing that the Vietnamese Government is a sovereign government and there is a limit as to how much we can make them do and how fast we can make them react.

Now, a lot of the younger people, particularly in the field, don't accept this. They feel that they are getting less support than they should have, because when they report a case of corruption, we don't immediately come down and throw the fellow in jail [deleted].

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROVINCE CHIEFS AND MILITARY CLIQUES

Senator CASE. On this broad question of corruption and of ineffectiveness, the general conception was, I think, at the time that most of these province chiefs, the military clique and whatnot were a bunch of robbers.

Mr. VANN. That was much more of a basis to that at one time than now.

Senator CASE. And brigands and grafters and just hung together and scratched each others' backs and no head of a government in Saigon could touch them because they were so powerful and this kind of thing. Has this improved?

Mr. VANN. Enormously.

Mr. COLBY. That era has pretty well gone, sir, really.

Senator CASE. Well, I am very much obliged. I am not going to ask you whether you have got a good show or not. Obviously it would be embarrassing, and I am not making any suggestions that you have not. I am just going over some of the many things that partly have been told to us over many years, partly have been written about and partly things that I think we have a little experience firsthand about, and I myself am very grateful to all of you. I don't know what our chairman wants. Would you tell the chairman so far as I am concerned I have finished my questioning?

The CHAIRMAN. I have nothing more to ask. In fact, I apologize for this going on so long. I have had a little help, you will notice.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

The staff has a few questions which I am not going to ask you. These are more or less routine questions, but to complete the record we will submit them to the Department and your staff can supply the answers so that we can fill in the public record.

Mr. COLBY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mind doing that?

(The information referred to follows:)

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE VIETNAM HEARINGS, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING RECORD ON THE CORDS PROGRAM

QUESTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR COLBY

General

Question 1(a). Does the amount given as the total spending for CORDS activities include all military spending for pacification activities? For example, does it include spending for the Marine Combined Action Platoons and for civic action activities conducted by the military?

Answer. No, it does not include all. There are many military actions which directly or indirectly support pacification, the costs of which cannot be segregated. The amounts given to the Committee include those direct pacification programs and projects run by CORDS. It does not, however, include the Marine Combined Action Platoon cost as budget data for these are not available in the field. Civic action activities using the so-called "assistance in kind" (AIK) funds are included in the totals, although there are many individual civic action efforts conducted by individual units that cannot be costed.

(b) Do the U.S. budget figures include the pay and allowances for the military personnel who work in CORDS programs? If not, what is the estimated cost for these items in 1969 and 1970?

Answer. Yes, the U.S. budget figures do include the pay and allowances for the military personnel assigned to CORDS.

Question 2. How many different reports are received in CORDS headquarters each month from the field? How many reports are sent by CORDS to Washington each month?

Answer. Reports are received in CORDS from the 250-odd districts, 44 provinces and six autonomous cities and four Corps. These reports could be counted as one report, e.g., the HES, or as 250-odd reports, e.g., each district's submission counted separately. In terms of overall reports, e.g., HES counted as one. CORDS headquarters receives 11 manual and 15 ADP reports from the field each month, based on information collected from the districts, provinces and corps. CORDS sends to Washington each month approximately 10 overall summaries of pacification or specfic programs therein (e.g., refugees). Public Safety, in addition, reports directly to its Washington home office. There are 15 raw tapes from the machine reporting systems, e.g., HES, TFES, etc. sent in consolidated form to the Department of Defense.

Question 3. What kind of training does the average U.S. district advisor receive? Do military and civilian advisors receive the same training?

Answer. Civilian District Senior Advisors and Deputy District Senior Advisors receive a basic orientation course of 18 weeks at the Viet-Nam Training Center in Washington, D.C., and may receive additional training up to a total of 42 weeks. The 18-week basic course includes:

—Viet-Nam area studies (history, culture, attitudes, politics, etc.)
—Counter-insurgency
—U.S. Role in Viet-Nam
—Personal affairs and survival
—Exercises in POLWAR, etc.
—Off-site military training
—District operations (e.g., HES)
—275 hours of language training

The 42-week course is the basic 18-week course plus 1,125 hours of Vietnamese language study.

Military District Senior Advisors receive the 18-week basic course.

In Viet-Nam some but not all military and civilian DSA and DDSA personnel are programmed into the MACCORDS District Advisors Course which is conducted monthly for five days and includes a current and comprehensive briefing on CORDS Pacification Programs. They are also programmed into the PHOENIX Orientation Course at Vung Tau when feasible.

Question 4. Do CORDS personnel at the Province level report to MACV through military channels exclusively? Can they report through civilian channels to the Embassy? What is the chain of command for submission of CORDS reports to Washington? Describe the Washington organization for supporting and directing the CORDS effort. Where is overall authority vested?

Answer. The chain of command for all CORDS personnel at province level is through the Province Senior Advisor to the Corps Senior Advisor. In practice, the DEPCORDS at the Corps generally supervises the activities of the province teams. From the Corps Senior Advisor the chain of command goes to General Abrams, although the four DEPCORDS generally maintain a close association with Ambassador Colby. The formal channel is through the command at each level, however. This is supplemented by a wide variety of "technical" contacts. Various staff levels at CORDS headquarters and various staffs of USAID and others maintain direct contacts with CORDS personnel in the field on their technical specialities, subject to the overriding authority of the command channel. In addition, there are a number of informal contacts with the Embassy political reporters in the field who report directly to the Embassy. CORDS personnel are encouraged to discuss matters with the Embassy political reporters, but do not "report" formally to them. The chain of command for submission of CORDS reports to Washington is through CINCPAC to JCS, as it is an element of MACV. Information copies are generally sent to the Department of State, AID/Washington, White House and other Washington addressees. At the Washington level, overall authority stems from the National Security Council, although the component elements of CORDS report to their parent agencies.

Question 5. When was the name of the CORDS program changed from "Revolutionary" development to "Rural" development—and why?

Answer. This change was made on 1 January 1970 to reflect the GVN's change of its title for the Pacification and Development Program from Binh Dinh Xay

Dung (Pacification and Construction) to Binh Dinh Phat Trien (Pacification and Development) and the change of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development from Xay Dung Nong Thon to Phat Trien Nong Thon. The word "Revolutionary" did not exist in either version of the Vietnamese. "Rural Development" reflected the thrust of the 1970 Plan with its focus on development but maintained the CORDS acronym.

Question 6. To what extent is the increase in population controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam due to success of the military and pacification programs and to what extent is it due to a change in strategy by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. To what extent does it reflect the movement of population to urban areas?

Answer. The increase in population in relatively secure or better status since 1968 can be attributed to the effectiveness of the military and pacification campaigns and the comparative absence of enemy resistance, caused in part by their military losses during 1968 and in part by their concentration in 1969 on attacks on U.S. forces. It was not until later in 1969 that the enemy began to focus on the need to resist the pacification campaign. The movement of population to urban areas during earlier periods also contributed to increasing the population within GVN protection. During the past year the major movement has been back to the countryside rather than to the urban areas.

Question 7. How would you assess public attitudes in Viet-Nam today in terms of support for the Government of South Viet-Nam, for the Viet Cong, and those who favor neither?

Answer. There is no fully reliable system for assessing overall public attitudes in Viet-Nam so most judgments are only estimates. However, there is a general consensus among many Americans and Vietnamese that the earlier degree of active support for the Viet Cong has been substantially reduced over the past year, that the degree of active support for the government has been increased over the past year, and that there is still a substantial portion of the total population which have no very strong identification with either. The government's current programs, of course, are aimed at securing their active participation in such programs as People's Self Defense, Village Self Development, etc. Even among the non-committed there is a substantial group who believes that the government will probably win and that this is an acceptable outcome, a further difference from several years ago.

Question 8. Has there been a change in the last year in the emphasis placed on the RD cadre program?

Answer. Several years ago, the RD Cadre were looked upon as the main force for pacification. Over the past two years they have been considered only one of the forces participating in pacification, together with the RF, PF, National Police, local officials, etc. Their total strength has remained relatively constant, but their function has changed to put more emphasis on their political and organizational work and less on their paramilitary contribution.

Question 9. What is the pay of the average member of an RD team, compared with pay for a member of ARVN, the Regional or Popular Forces, a Census Grievance Team, a Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, and an Armed Propaganda Team?

Answer. The unmarried RD Cadre team member makes about the same as his ARVN private counterpart. He makes more than the average RF and PF private. Because of the additional allowances available through the military for married personnel at the same levels, the RD Cadre with three children makes more than only the PF in the same status but less than both the ARVN and RF privates.

[In Vietnamese piastres]

	RDC	PF	RF	ARVN
Month—single man:				
Base pay	3,250	2,500	2,480	2,480
Special allowance	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Rice allowance	200	200	200	200
Hazard pay	300			
Additional allowances			800	1,044
Total	4,750	3,700	4,480	4,724
Month—married with 3 children:				
Base pay	3,250	2,500	2,480	2,480
Special allowance	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Rice allowance	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Hazard pay	300			
Additional allowances			2,200	2,919
Total	5,550	4,500	6,680	7,399

Question 10. Do Province and District Advisors report on corruption? To whom? What action is then taken?

Answer. Province and District Advisors report on corruption in a variety of forms. The HES carries a question on it. In addition, individual reports are submitted through channels. Action is decided at various command levels and the matter is taken up at the appropriate level with Vietnamese officials who can take action on it.

Question 11. Is it possible that Vietnamese officials involved in local development, the RD cadres and so on, are now being organized as the nucleus of a political organization?

Answer. It is of course possible. We have not seen signs of organization outside the government structure except in certain limited areas (I Corps).

Question 12. What is the Viet Cong recruiting rate now, compared with a year ago?

Answer. The estimated average recruitment rate for the period January to August 1969 was over half again as high as it was during the period September 1969 to January 1970.

Question 13. What has been the performance thus far of the Popular Self Defense Force in terms of the ratio of Viet Cong to PSDF killed in action?

Answer. During 1969 the ratio was 1.21 enemy killed to 1 friendly.

Question 14. Is the District Advisor supposed to visit each hamlet in his district every month in connection with the Hamlet Evaluation System? How many hamlets must the average District Advisor visit in a week to cover every hamlet each month? What percentage of the "A," "B," and "C" hamlets are not visited by a District Advisor in an average month?

Answer. The District Senior Advisor must evaluate each hamlet within his district each month, visiting as many as he can, but using other sources of information such as the district staff, his own staff, contacts with local officials, MAT teams, etc. The average district in Viet-Nam contains about 50 hamlets so if he were to visit every hamlet, he would have to visit about 12 each week. Data from January HES indicates that 8.7 percent of the ABC hamlets in the nation were not visited by any U.S. advisory personnel during that month.

Question 15. What percentage of the District Advisors can speak and understand Vietnamese well enough to evaluate a hamlet without an interpreter—let us say at the three level or above? How well do interpreters speak English?

Answer. (a) Military:

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISERS AND ASSISTANT DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISERS

[In percent]

	DSA	ADSA
R1/S1	36.4	18.7
R2/S2	6.6	5.1
R3/S3	0	0
R4/S4	0	0
R5/S5	0	0
Total percentage	42.9	23.7

(b) Civilian: From a total of 80 DSAs and DDSAs, 23 are able to speak and understand Vietnamese at the S3 level or better. This represents 28 percent of the total civilian advisor force.

Question 16. How long does an average District Senior Advisor serve in his district? How long is the overlap with his predecessor? How soon after he arrives does he begin filing HES reports?

Answer. The average District Senior Advisor serves 10 months in his district. The average overlap with his predecessor is less than one week. The DSA is responsible for the HES report as soon as he takes command of the district team. In most cases, he relies heavily upon his deputy and team personnel during the first month or two.

Question 17. Does the Government of South Viet-Nam rely on U.S. collected data for its pacification and security measurements? How do their statistics of the percentage of population under South Viet-Nam Government control differ from the U.S. figures?

Answer. The GVN uses information from the HES to set goals and evaluate pacification programs. GVN references to pacification status use HES as their basic information. At various times both the GVN and U.S. sides will use different terminology but the underlying statistics are the same.

Question 18. If the Viet Cong used the HES system, is it not likely that they would count the "C" hamlets as under their control?

Answer. Since the NLF claims 80 percent of the population and territory under its control, it would necessarily claim many C hamlets. The VC might actually consider many C hamlets contested, but hardly under VC control.

Question 19. In addition to administering CORDS operations in their areas, are District Advisers also charged with evaluating the success of the activities in which they are engaged? Do you believe that this is a sound managerial principle?

Answer. District Advisors are primarily advisors, not administrators. The administration of the Pacification Program is a Vietnamese responsibility. The District Advisors evaluate their performance in addition to advising them. The District Advisor is the closest resident American to the situation on the ground and thus is the most likely to be able to follow the details of local activities. The District Senior Advisor evaluation is supplemented by inspectors and evaluators from the MACV, Corps and Province level, so that there is independent evaluation in this respect. This is the best managerial principle workable in Viet-Nam.

Question 20. (a) Does the South Vietnamese constitution provide for an inspectorate to police corruption?

(b) How long after the constitution was adopted was it organized?

(c) Has it submitted reports?

(d) How many convictions resulted?

(e) What was the average sentence?

Answer. The Vietnamese Constitution, adopted 1 April 1967, provided for an Inspectorate to be established no later than two years from the date the first National Assembly was established. The members of the Inspectorate were sworn into office on 30 October 1968.

According to the Chairman of the Inspectorate, in the first year of operation of the Inspectorate, 2,000 cases were sent to the Inspectorate for action, all of which were resolved. Twelve were prosecuted in court, 10 dismissed from office, and 20 demoted or transferred. The Inspectorate recommended punishment of 38 military officers. The additional detail is not available.

Question 21. How many Province or District Chiefs were removed for cause last year? How many were accused and convicted of corruption?

Answer. Twenty-three Province Chiefs were relieved for all causes with one of them for corruption, during the period 1 January 1969 to 28 February 1970. This officer was convicted by the GVN and is in prison. During the same period, 149 District Chiefs were relieved for all causes, two of them for corruption. It is not known whether the Inspectorate recommended their trial or was content only with their removal.

Question 22. How many South Vietnamese officials, in total, were convicted of corruption last year?

Answer. The answer in meaningful terms is not available as no composite records are being kept by the GVN.

Refugees and other Social Aspects of the War

Question 1. Were any South Vietnamese officials arrested and convicted in the last year for corrupt activities in connection with the refugee program? How many, and what was the average sentence?

Answer. During the past year four Ministry of Social Welfare Provincial Service Chiefs were arrested, three for misappropriation of commodities and one for "intent to defraud." Court decisions in these cases are still pending.

Question 2. How many refugee camps are now in operation? What proportion of the population in these camps is housed in temporary shelters? What percent of the refugees are sympathetic to the Viet Cong?

Answer. In the Refugee Program a distinction is made between temporary and resettlement camps, or sites. In *temporary sites*, refugees are housed in shelters of varying quality ranging from schoolrooms and tents to semi-permanent houses, built by the GVN. Refugees normally remain in temporary status only for a short time and then either return to their original homes or are given the opportunity to build permanent-type homes in *resettlement sites*. At resettlement sites, the houses, built with GVN assistance, compare with the average houses of the locality. As of December 1969, there were 646 refugee camps in operation, with a total population of 518,000. Of these, approximately 145,000 or 28% are living in temporary shelters. The percent of refugees sympathetic to the Viet Cong is obviously unknown, although a number of the refugees have family members with the Viet Cong.

Question 3. Why is there such a great disparity between conditions in different refugee camps?

Answer. Disparity depends on factors such as security, effectiveness of local officials, leadership among the refugees, logistics problems, etc.

Question 4. How many Vietnamese doctors and other health personnel are attached to these camps? How many U.S. civilian or military doctors or other health personnel are available to treat refugees?

Answer. Forty-three Vietnamese midwives and 39 trained health workers are attached directly to refugee camps, but no doctors. Vietnamese provincial medical personnel serve refugees as well as the general population. One third country national doctor is assigned to the CORDS Refugee Division in I Corps to inspect and arrange solutions to acute medical and sanitation problems within the camps in that area. On the U.S. side, military and civilian doctors working with the Provincial Medical Services give attention to refugees as well as the general population. Military medical personnel participate in the Medical Civil Assistance Program (MEDCAP), conducting frequent medical assistance missions to villages and refugee camps. A number of voluntary agency representatives and voluntary agency medical teams from Korea, Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, England, Spain, Iran, Nationalist China, The Philippines, and Australia also assist. These teams usually work in provincial or urban hospitals or medical centers but do provide services to refugees as well.

Question 5. How many Vietnamese have been uprooted from their homes in some way since the war began? How many people in what used to be the rural population have moved to the urban areas since the war began? What does this mean in terms of post-war adjustment problems?

Answer. About 3,500,000 people have been uprooted during the past six years. The urban population of Viet-Nam is now almost 40 percent of the total, an increase of 10 to 20 percent in the past 10 years. As security has expanded a substantial number of people have moved back to the rural areas from refugee centers and other concentrated population areas. During 1969, 488,000 people received government assistance to return to their home villages. The remaining urban concentration, however, is substantial and is a substantial problem for the Government of Viet-Nam. The Pacification and Development Plan for 1970 includes a section dealing with urban problems.

Question 6. How much does the Government of South Viet-Nam spend per capita on public health programs? How much does the United States contribute?

Answer. In the 1969 GVN National Budget, 3,885,400,000 $VN was appropriated for Public Health programs of all types. With a rounding of population figures to 17 million persons this amounts to 229 $VN per capita. This program has received increasing attention from the GVN as comparative figures show that this part of the budget was only 1.85 billion piasters in 1966, 2.5 billion in 1967, and 3.6 billion in 1968. U.S. Government assistance to public health programs in FY 69 total $41,867,000. This does not include sizable contributions by Free World Assistance and voluntary agencies.

Question 7. How much in compensation is paid by the Government of South Viet-Nam and by the United States to survivors of a civilian accidentally killed in military operations? How much is paid for a house destroyed?

Answer. In a solatium program, conducted by the Ministry of Social Welfare supported by American Aid Chapter Funds, the survivors of a civilian accidentally killed in military operations receive VN $4,000 if the deceased was 15 years or older and VN $2,000 if the deceased was younger. When a house is destroyed between 20 and 50 percent, the head of the family receives VN $3,000 for its reconstruction and a 15-day rice supply. If the house was damaged over 50 percent, the family receives VN $7,500, plus 10 sheets of roofing and a 30-day rice supply. Moreover, needy war widows, orphans, and disabled persons may receive PL-480 food. These payments are not intended as compensation, but as assistance from the government in time of need.

Question 8. What is the average time taken to settle a claim—from damage to payment? How many claims against the South Vietnamese Government and the United States for damage to persons and property are now pending? How many claims have been paid thus far for death, injury, or property damage by both governments?

Answer. In Viet-Nam, there are two war-damage claim programs: one involving claims against the U.S. Government; and one involving claims against the Vietnamese Government.

a. Against the United States Government:

Since December 1965, the U.S. Government has adjudicated 21,207 claims, approving 14,058, denying 6,937, and forwarding 212 to higher authority. A total of $4,732,750 has been paid as of 28 February 1970.

As of 28 February 1970, there were 1,518 claims pending against the U.S. Government.

b. Against the Vietnamese Government:

Under the current relief system put into effect during 1969, the emergency reserve fund at the province level is used to pay war victim claims, usually within 30 days. However, under an older system which was in effect during 1968 and early 1969, the average time taken to settle a claim was much longer.

In 1968–1969, the Ministry of Social Welfare, which is supported by the American Aid Chapter, paid 435,766 claims. In the same period, the Ministry of Defense paid 17,118 claims (excluding those of defoliation).

As of 14 March 1970, there were 35,000 claims pending at the Ministry of Social Welfare, which is supported by the American Aid Chapter, and 294 cases pending at the Ministry of Defense.

Question 9.(a). Is compensation paid by the United States or the government of South Viet-Nam for defoliation damage to crops or other growing things?

Answer. Compensation for defoliation damages are paid by the U.S. Government with funds administered under the MILCAP Program. A total of 207,380,183 $VN has been paid during the period January 1968 to December 1969. These funds are paid out by the Government of Viet-Nam.

Part (b) of question 9. How many acres have been taken out of cultivation by defoliation? How many acres have been sprayed in all thus far?

Answer. No acreage has been taken out of cultivation. The herbicides used do not prevent future recultivation. Acres subjected to herbicide operations (1962–1969):

	Acres
(1) Crop destruction	385,073
(2) Defoliation (e.g., LOCs, Tactical ops areas)	4,129,840
Total area sprayed thus far (1962–69)	4,514,913

Part (c) of question 9. How much has been paid out in compensation?

Answer. Amount of compensation paid Jan. 1968 to Dec. 1969: $VN 207,380,183.

Part (d) of question 9. Is the United States supplying defoliants to the South Vietnamese armed forces?

Answer. United States provides herbicides to the GVN.

Chieu Hoi Program

Question 1. Among those who "rallied" last year, what percentage had been in the Viet Cong for a year or less? What level was the average "rallier" who came in last year? How many defectors last year were members of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese fighting units?

Answer. Although statistics are unavailable on all Hoi Chanh as to what percentage had been in the Viet Cong for less than a year, a random survey conducted by the Systems Development Corporation in 1969 indicates that:

a. 17.9 percent served for 1–5 months prior to rallying;
b. 17.2 percent served for 6–10 months;
c. 24.8 percent served for 11–15 months;
d. 38.7 percent served 15 months or longer;
e. 1.4 percent of the sample did not give information on length of service.

57.2 percent of all ralliers are hamlet or village guerrillas or cadre. Returnees from district level or above constitute 10.6 percent. The remainder are VC civilian personnel including VCI.

28,045 returnees in 1969 were classified as military VC or NVA, meaning they belonged to some military unit (60 percent of the total).

Question 2. How do we know that a "rallier" is truly a defector? Do we rely on the Vietnamese to tell us that a "rallier" was a Viet Cong and that he has changed his allegiance? Are there any repeats under the program?

Answer. All ralliers are interrogated by the police and a cross-check is made on their story to the extent feasible. This is handled by Vietnamese, although Americans have access to the interrogations and occasionally interrogate the ralliers. There are some repeats in the program, but rarely.

Question 3. What is to prevent a "rallier" from going back to the Viet Cong? How many do?

Answer. Nothing prevents him from returning to the Viet Cong, as he is free to leave the Chieu Hoi Center and, of course, free after he is released from it. Surveys of returnees by Rand Corporation and others indicate that less than one percent may have gone back to the Viet Cong.

Question 4. Do Armed Propaganda Teams ever go on operations to capture members of the Viet Cong? Do they ever work with Provincial Reconnaissance Units?

Answer. APTs do not go on missions to capture VC nor work with the PRU. They do accompany military units on occasion on cordon and search operations etc., to make contact with VC and their families.

Question 5. Do Armed Propaganda Teams have American Advisors? If so, how many in total and to whom do they report? How is the effectiveness of a team measured?

Answer. APTs have American Advisors assigned from the province teams. Twenty-eight provinces have such advisors, who report to the Province Chieu Hoi Advisor who in turn reports to the Province Senior Advisor. APT effectiveness is determined by their activities and the numbers of Hoi Chanh who report having been induced by the APT.

Question 6. The prepared statement on the Chieu Hoi program referred to bogus returnees, ARVN deserters and enemy agents. How many of these were there last year? Are they included in the 47,000 total for last year?

Answer. No figures are kept on the number of bogus returnees or ARVN deserters who try to enter the program. These are weeded out in the interrogation process before they are classified as returnees and therefore are not counted in the total figures. During 1969, 59 enemy agents were arrested trying to infiltrate the Chieu Hoi program.

Question 7. On page 3 of the statement it was said that returnees receive 72 hours of political training at the center. How is the effectiveness of the training measured?

Answer. The effectiveness of political training is measured by evaluation forms filled in by Ministry of Chieu Hoi personnel and U.S. Advisors. This includes attitude of instructor, use of training materials, class participation, etc.

Question 8. Is there any estimate of how many Viet Cong who come in through the Chieu Hoi program were ever believers in Communism as an ideology?

Answer. Most returnees probably do not believe in Communism as an ideology. However, a 1968 survey indicated that 6 percent were party organization cadre and another 7.8 percent party rank and file. During 1969, 4,832 Hoi Chanh were credited under the Phung Hoang Program, meeting its standards as members of the infrastructure. A substantial number of these were presumably believers in Communism.

Phoenix Program

Question 1. What is the average length of sentence and of time served in jail by a person captured under the Phoenix Program? How many members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure have been arrested more than once?

Answer. Of the VCI captured, 5 to 10 percent are tried by military court and receive an average sentence of five to six years. Of those sentenced under the administrative detention procedure, the average sentence has been 9 to 12 months. We do not have a reliable estimate of the number of VCI arrested more than once, but a record system is being established which will provide this in the future.

Question 2. What was the rank of the average person "neutralized" under the Phoenix Program—high, middle, or low? Approximately what percentage of those "neutralized" were not bona fide members of the infrastructure?

Answer. See Statement for Record on Phung Hoang Program, Pages 12 and 13 for priorities and levels of those affected by Phoenix Program. During 1969, some were probably included as captured who were later released for lack of evidence. In 1970, these will be included only after sentencing so that this error should be removed. While some abuses or other errors may have taken place, these figures are believed essentially accurate as to the "bona fide members of the infrastructure" affected by the Phoenix Program.

Question 3. Have there every been any studies made by the United States at the village or hamlet level to try to measure the effectiveness of the Phoenix Program? If so, what have those studies shown? Has the abolition of the Phoenix Program, or the termination of United States participation in it, ever been proposed?

Answer. Studies have been made. These have indicated that the size and activities of the VCI have been reduced considerably in many areas, although the essential leadership structure was relatively intact, could carry on many of its earlier activities and serve as a base for future expansion. Many of the posts had been filled on paper and internal document and Hoi Chanh reported difficulty in maintaining earlier levels of activity. While informal suggestions have been made to abolish the Phoenix Program or terminate U.S. participation, a formal proposal and decision, pro or con, have not taken place. Changes in organization and structure and tactics, etc., are constantly under study in an effort to improve the program.

Question 4. Do you think that the Phoenix Program has destroyed the effectiveness of the Viet Cong Infrastructure? Is it still capable of carrying on the political and administrative side of the war for the Viet Cong?

Answer. The Phoenix Program has not destroyed but has diminished the effectiveness of the VC Infrastructure. See Statement for Record on Phung Hoang Program, Pages 15–16. The VCI is still capable of conducting political and administrative activities, but at a reduced level. The Phoenix Program has contributed to this reduction of VC capability which has also been produced by other aspects of the overall pacification program.

Question 5. Does the operation of the Phoenix Program interfere with the efforts of hamlet and village officials to maintain their own local sources of information? Should village officials have more control over the program, rather than Army or police officials who are unresponsive to local sentiment? Does the Phoenix Program run counter to the announced policy of developing village government?

Answer. The operation of the Phoenix Program does not work against hamlet and village officials, but has incorporated them as an essential element of the program. Village operations centers are being established which involve the Village Chiefs and other significant village leaders, plus the National Policeman who is under the Village Chief's authority. These collect information on the VCI in the neighborhood and integrate this information into the Phoenix Program. They do not interfere with the local officials' sources of information. Thus the Phoenix Program is consistent with the policy of strengthening village government in that it relies upon the village government for contributions to the program. Direction has been given (but is not adequately executed yet) that Village Chiefs must be informed of all arrests within the village, precisely in order to reinforce the Village Chief's authority and to ensure consideration of matters known to him as the responsible local official.

Question 6. How much U.S. money was involved in the operation of the Phoenix Program last year?

Answer. During 1969, approximately $US 350,000 was expended in direct support of U.S. civilian personnel and for necessary supplies and equipment for U.S. Phoenix advisory staff officers. This sum does not include the pay and allowances for 441 U.S. military personnel assigned to the Phoenix Program. Approximately 236 million piasters (equivalent to $US 2 million) of U.S. funds were expended in support of the Vietnamese Phonenix Program, to provide logistic support, construction, payment of local employees, and training, These costs do not include U.S. support of other programs such as the RF/PF, National Police, intelligence services, information services, etc., which participate in the Phoenix effort. It is not possible to segregate the portion of those costs devoted to Phoenix.

Question 7. Are rewards offered for information on members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure? How much and how is the money paid?

Answer. Rewards are offered for information on members of the VCI. Normally these rewards do not exceed 10,000 piasters ($84.75), although exceptions are occasionally made. The rewards are normally paid to the recipient by a Vietnamese official, who has been provided the funds and is sometimes accompanied by a U.S. advisor.

Question 8. What was the cost to the United States last year of the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit program? What is the estimated cost for 1970? Are there any ex-Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in Provincial Reconnaissance Units? If so, how many? Do U.S. advisors ever go on Provincial Reconnaissance Unit operations?

Answer. PRU budget 1969, $5,553,600; 1970, $6,159,500. There are screened ex-VC and NVA in PRU units; total estimated not over 200. Since September 1969, U.S. advisors are not authorized to participate in PRU operations.

Question 9. Why are members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure who are arrested and convicted not jailed for the duration of the conflict? What is the justification for releasing known members of the VCI while the war is still going on?

Answer. The administrative detention procedure (An Tri), is limited to a two-year maximum sentence, although this is renewable on reconsideration at the end of the two-year period. Military courts could sentence offenders to any period of time, including death. Sentences are for a determined period of years. The justification for release while the war is still going on is found in the government's program of rehabilitation. The government has sought to rehabilitate its prisoners and detainees and release those it believes rehabilitated.

Question 10. What is the current estimate of the strength of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in Saigon and the other principal urban areas?

Answer. The Viet Cong Infrastructure in Saigon and other principal urban areas is strong enough to conduct limited terrorist activity but not to exert continuing authority over the area.

QUESTIONS FOR MR. VANN

Question 1. How long do you think American support forces will be required in the Delta? How many members of these forces do you think will be required by the end of 1972?

Answer. Any answer to this question requires an assumption as to objectives and missions for both the Vietnamese and the United States. For example, I have no way of knowing to what extent we will continue to assist the GVN in a road building program, hence cannot estimate the length of time that engineer support forces will be required in the Delta. Based on current trends and assuming no major change in enemy strengths or techniques, I would estimate that a substantial reduction of support forces would take place in the Delta by the end of 1972.

Question 2. What plans are there for the future as far as the size and functions of your staff are concerned? How large do you expect your staff to be in one year? In three years? In five years? How long will it be necessary to keep United States Advisors in the Delta?

Answer. Again, an answer to this question requires speculation as to the policy and objectives of the U.S. Government and its subordinate agencies in Viet-Nam. My staff has been reduced in the past year and I expect additional reductions in the forthcoming year. These reductions are largely related to management improvement or to the completion of certain assistance (such as attaining a satisfactory level of handling education) to the GVN.

Question 3. What is enemy strength in the Delta now compared with a year ago? What is the Viet Cong recruiting rate now compared with a year ago?

Answer. Total enemy strength in the Delta is virtually unchanged as compared with a year ago, but the proportion of NVA personnel has gone up substantially, while VC guerrilla strength is down. VC recruitment is well down from a year ago.

Question 4. Is the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the Delta still functioning? How large is it now compared with a year ago? If there has been a reduction in size, how much is from the top echelon?

Answer. The Viet Cong Infrastructure is still functioning in the Delta, but overt VC and VCI activity has been decreasing steadily over the past six months. This phenomenon appears to be due primarily to the accelerating pace of territorial security. Particularly related to decreasing VC activity is improved and increased activity on the part of the paramilitary PSDF and the militia (RF/PF).

Also involved in the reduction of VC activity is an apparent change in VCI tactics. The armed VC forces and the NVA have tended lately to remain in the major VC bases areas, remote and inaccessible. According to captured documents and Hoi Chanh interrogation reports, the VCI have "gone underground" to begin operations on a more covert basis. They do this by obtaining legal GVN documentation through the Chieu Hoi or refugee programs. Once the VCI become legal cadre, they return to their native villages to await further instructions for action at a more propitious time. Indisputable proof of "directed" rallying by the VCI is difficult to obtain, but it is relatively easy to do and the VCI have made their intent clear. Thus the only safe assumption is that this type of activity is occurring. It is reportedly widespread.

Those VCI who are still functioning overtly have modified their priorities substantially. Captured VC documents stress the need for more emphasis on military proselytizing within the GVN ranks, increased farmer's association activities, and widespread general propaganda. Many Village People's Revolutionary Councils or Committees were chosen through some type of VC-controlled elections. Many of these organizations function merely on paper with little actual impact on the village, but the extent of this type of activity indicates that the VCI view basic political organizing with some sense of urgency.

Any analysis of the size of the VCI is difficult to make because estimates vary greatly. It seems probable that the actual figure may be in the vicinity of 20,000 significant VCI cadre with about one-third of the figure operating at district or higher level.

Phung Hoang reported that 6,960 VCI cadre were neutralized in 1969. This included 1,742 cadre from district and higher level—a rate of 25 percent. Since there was no directed attempt to conduct operations in order to cause maximum damage to the VCI as an organization, the individuals who were neutralized were replaced with relative ease. Captured documents do indicate that the replacements are not as well-trained or as thoroughly indoctrinated as the older, more experienced cadre.

Undoubtedly, a year and a half of Phung Hoang activity has had an effect on the VCI as an organization. It should be reiterated, however, that the major factor inhibiting the activity of the VCI is the adverse trend—from a VC point

of view—of pacification as a whole. It is this trend which has forced the VCI to adopt a low profile policy of seeking to establish legal, semi-covert cadre and build up new bases for political action at the village and hamlet level.

Question 5. Do the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese have the capacity to upset the recent progress in pacification in the Delta? What do you think they intend to do?

Answer. My assessment is that the enemy's strategy is to oppose and attempt to roll back pacification. It is my opinion that they will be unable to do this given their current strength levels and capabilities. This assessment would obviously change if the enemy were to bring in additional NVA units and apply additional resources to this objective. Even assuming the latter, there would be no dramatic roll-back of pacification since the pacification expansion is based on the physical presence of over 1,000 additional RF and PF units that did not exist a year ago.

Question 6. What is the official pay of the average Vietnamese province and district chief? How much does it cost them to live in the style expected of persons in their position? What has been your experience in seeking to have corrupt GVN officials removed?

Answer. The average province chief has the military rank of lieutenant colonel. Assuming a wife and three children a lieutenant colonel province chief would have pay and allowances totalling 28,000 VN$ (US$ 237) each month plus a house, car and servants. Additionally, he would have an expense and entertainment allowance of from 8,500 VN$ to 25,000 VN$ (US$ 72 to 212) a month. For the purpose of this answer, the average province chief would be assumed to have an expense/entertainment allowance of 17,000 VN$ (US$ 144). This net income of 45,000 VN$ (US$ 381) would be approximately half of what I estimate to be his average expenses each month: 90,000 VN$ (US$ 762). With the same assumptions for a district chief, the average district chief is deemed to be a major with a wife and three children. His income would approximate 16,250 VN$ (US$ 137.75) plus a house, car and servants. He does not receive an expense or entertainment allowance. His average expenditures per month are estimated by me to be 49,000 VN$ (US$ 415.54), or approximately three times his legal income.

In IV CTZ, during the past three years, there has been a 160 per cent turnover in the district chief positions and a 175 percent turnover in the province chief positions. About 40 per cent of these changes were due to normal duty rotation. The remainder were due to charges of corruption, malfeasance, and incompetence.

Question 7. If the South Vietnamese armed forces are not able to withstand massive enemy attacks at some point in the future, the 23,000 Americans there will be in a very vulnerable position. Are we not taking a big chance by not protecting them with American forces? And after all United States ground combat forces are withdrawn from South Viet-Nam, won't the problem of protecting hundreds of thousands become even more serious?

Answer. The question implies assumptions which, in my judgment, are not warranted. In all the time I have been in Viet-Nam, I have never been aware of an instance wherein adequate protection was not provided to American Advisors or support personnel by Vietnamese armed forces or police. If anything, U.S. personnel in such roles are provided a disproportionately high level of security sometimes to the extent of the security arrangements interfering with their work performance requirements. I do not see the likelihood that the security of U.S. personnel will be unduly jeopardized if they are not protected by U.S. combat forces. Throughout Viet-Nam, there are thousands of advisors in all Corps Tactical Zones whose security is now and has been the full responsibility of the GVN.

Question 8. How many hamlets in IV Corps have been downgraded in the HES ratings since the 9th US Infantry was withdrawn from the Delta?

Answer. The 9th US Division was physically present in only two of the 16 provinces within the Delta. Pacification progress has continued both throughout the Delta and specifically in the two provinces where the US 9th Division was located. Specifically, on 30 June 1969, there were 2,861 hamlets in the Delta in HES category ratings of A, B and C. On 31 December 1969, there were 3,319 hamlets in these categories. Within the specific area occupied by the US 9th Division (Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces), on 30 June 1969, these two provinces had a total of 593 hamlets in the HES categories A, B and C and on 31 December, they had a total of 691 hamlets in these categories or an increase of 10.4 per cent since the departure of the U S 9th Division.

Question 9. It has been reported in the press that the South Vietnamese Government has recently moved additional forces into certain Delta areas where Viet Cong forces had been strengthened. You said in your prepared statement that progress in those areas is now "slower." Have any HES ratings been lowered? If not, why?

Answer. The VNA invasion of the Delta has had little impact on pacification since most of the NVA forces have moved into unpopulated areas or have been located along remote sections of the Cambodian border. An exception to this is Tri Ton District of Chau Doc Province where the proximity of the 18-B NVA Regiment to the hamlets of Tri Ton District has resulted in 31 of these hamlets being reduced from HES categories A and B to HES category C and 19 HES category C hamlets to contested (D and E) status. Overall, however, progress has been made in pacification since and during the introduction of NVA units into the Delta.

Question 10. When were all United States combat forces withdrawn from the Fourth Corps area? Did the number of U.S. military advisors increase when U.S. combat forces were withdrawn?

Answer. A reduction of U.S. combat forces in the Delta began in June 1969 and was completed on 31 August 1969. Because of the requirement for processing these forces for out-shipment, the effective removal of U.S. ground combat forces is considered by me to have been July of 1969. The number of U.S. military advisors has not increased since the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This is true not only for the Delta in its entirety, but specifically for the two provinces where the U.S. 9th Division was located. There are no plans to increase the number of U.S. advisors within IV CTZ.

Question 11. How many reports do you file weekly, monthly, annually?

Answer. The following count is of reports submitted to various agencies by province advisory teams in IV CTZ on a recurring basis. The reports include administrative, logistical, intelligence and operational reports as well as pacification progress reporting.

Annual	1
Semiannual	1
Quarterly	10
Bimonthly	2
Monthly	36
Weekly	6
Daily	3
As required	26
Total	85

The following count is of reports submitted by CORDS headquarters and includes only those dealing with pacification progress reporting.

Quarterly	2
Monthly	7
Weekly	2
As required	4
Total	15

Equating the above listed report counts to a monthly requirement basis, the following count arises. As Required reports are not included in this computation.

Province	158
CORDS Headquarters	16
Total	174

QUESTIONS FOR MR. MILLS

Question 1. What plans are there for the future relating to the size and functions of your staff?

Answer. As I mentioned in my testimony, we constantly look for ways to work ourselves out of our jobs as Vietnamese officials gain the necessary experience and competence. In my 15 months in Dalat we have eliminated a refugee and social welfare advisor, a logistics advisor, a nursing advisor, a public information advisor, an assistant police advisor, and three military advisors at various levels. We are now working on a reorganization of the team to eliminate a separate advisory section for Dalat City, incorporating the work of one U.S. Army captain, one Vietnamese area specialist and one secretary in our existing development and military operations sections. Before the end of this year we expect to be able to eliminate an agricultural advisor, a non-commissioned advisor to the Revolutionary and Montagnard Cadre teams, an assistant advisor to the RF and PF (a captain's position), two civilian advisors to the police special branch, and several

Vietnamese administrative and clerical employees. In addition, we will share our Chieu Hoi advisor with two other provinces, replace a Filipino radio operator with a Vietnamese who is now in training, and possibly transfer a five-man mobile advisory team and a three-man RF battalion advisory team working in the Da Nhim Special Zone to the Ninh Thuan Province team whose location enables it to support and control the teams more effectively than we can. It is difficult to rapidly reduce the size of district and mobile advisory team because, operating independently in remote and frequently dangerous locations, they must be large enough so that there will always be: (a) an officer present in spite of leaves, illness, and required trips out of the area; (b) adequate personnel to handle 24-hour radio watches; (c) a medic present; and (d) sufficient personnel for team defense. Nevertheless, as our role becomes more and more that of monitoring Vietnamese programs rather than advising, we expect to be able to reduce the number of mobile advisory teams as well as the size of the province-level team.

Qestion 2. You say that there are no United States combat forces in your province. How many U.S. support forces are there? How many U.S. advisors in all—both civilian and military—are there in the province? What is the strength of the ARVN, RF, and PF? What is enemy strength in your province?

Answer. The total strength of U.S. support forces in the province is a little over 1,000. There are the following U.S. advisors: CORDS, 30 military officers, 55 NCOs, 11 civilians; Military Academy, 12 officers, 4 enlisted; Command and General Staff College, 2 Officers, 1 enlisted; Political Warfare College, 1 officer, 1 enlisted; National Police Field Force training center, 4 civilian, 6 military; regional highway advisory detachment, 2 civilians. The Vietnamese military (RF, PF, and ARVN) total some 6,000. Estimated enemy strength is around 2,000.

Question 3. Do you report on corruption? Were any Vietnamese officials in your province removed for corruption last year? Were any of them prosecuted?

Answer. As incidents or rumors of corruption come to our attention we report them. For instance, the former National Police chief and his deputy were both removed for corruption and put in jail in Saigon. Prosecution in such cases is difficult because of lack of evidence and the unwillingness of others involved to testify. As the next best alternative, suspected officials are transferred out of their former areas to new jobs where they know the American advisor is watching them closely. They frequently perform satisfactorily and honestly.

Question 4. How many member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure are in your province now compared with a year ago?

Answer. We estimate that roughly 10% of VCI strength in Tuyen Duc and Dalat was neutralized in the past year.

Question 5. Would you describe the function and method of operation of the Province Security Committee? What percentage of the apprehended Viet Cong Infrastructure are tried by these Committees? What is the average sentence and the average length of time served?

Answer. The Province Security Committee (PSC) functions as a quasijudicial tribunal which determines the sufficiency of evidence against suspected "communist offenders." It is directed by the Province Chief and is composed of the chiefs of the National Police, police special branch, sector S–2, military security service, and the judge of the provincial court acting as legal advisor. A dossier is prepared on the arrested person by the special police before his hearing. It includes bio data, family history, criminal record, personal statements during interrogation, and intelligence reports indicating his involvement with the communists. The special police chief will tentatively classify the individual in accordance with Ministry of Interior guidelines as category A (leaders of NLF and People's Revolutionary Party organizations, heads of assassination teams, espionage units, armed propaganda units, front organizations, etc.); category B (members of the above organizations); or category C (suppliers and other low-level supporters). If the PSC determines that the evidence supports this classification, it sentences the person as follows: category A, two years; category B, one year to 18 months; category C, three to six months. A and B offenders are imprisoned in national detention centers, while category C are sent to the province rehabilitation center. The sentences of A and B offenders are open ended and their cases can be heard again by the PCS at the end of their sentences.

There is no U.S. involvement after a suspect's apprehension, making it difficult to follow up to determine final disposition of the case. The PSC in Tuyen Duc has consistently applied strict rules of evidence in cases brought before it. Unless the suspect has admitted his involvement in communist activities, the PCS almost never classifies him higher than C category, with the result that most apprehended suspects serve less than six months or are released outright after investigation.

Question 6. How soon do you think the Vietnamese in your province will be capable of doing for themselves all the things in which United States personnel are now involved?

Answer. In many areas of our team's activity, the Vietnamese are already fully capable of performing the work themselves but we still must have an American to monitor the use of American commodities and prepare the required periodic reports. As discussed in question No. 1, we are consolidating such positions as quickly as possible and should be able to reduce the team to about half its present size within the next 18 months. I would hope that within about three years all CORDS advisors could be removed from this province, although I believe that peacetime programs of economic and social development such as we have supported in other developing countries may require the presence of one or two American civilians after that. As for American support troops in this province, the engineers probably will be removed after they have finished work on National Highway 11 later this year; the communications units, which chiefly provide relay services for American forces outside the province, can be reduced as U.S. forces are replaced by Vietnamese troops; and the U.S. artillery can be removed as soon as the Vietnamese receive comparable equipment and adequate experience, perhaps in as little as 18 months. Logistical and air support units will also be unnecessary when other U.S. troops have gone.

Question 7. Is the Province Chief in your province from the province originally?

Answer. The Province Chief of Tuyen Duc is from Go Cong Province in the Delta. Before coming here in March 1969, he served for four years as Province Chief in Binh Long, III Corps.

Question 8. On page 2 of your prepared statement, you mentioned that Dalat has a university, the Vietnamese National Military Academy, the Command and General Staff College and numerous other institutions. Are American advisors attached to the university, the military academy, and the Command and General Staff College? What assistance has the United States given to these institutions? Do you know the cost involved in each case?

Answer. There are no American advisors at Dalat University, although one Fulbright instructor of English teaches there full time and a USIA officer teaches part time. The university is supported by the Catholic Church and the Vietnamese Government. As far as I know, the U.S. Government has never given any money to it directly but has contributed some used furniture and some construction and roofing materials for repairs, and through a grant to the Asia Foundation assisted in the development of library facilities through the provision of books and training. Of the total grant, about $60–80 thousand is attributable to Dalat. Data on U.S. assistance to the Military Academy and Command and General Staff College is given below:

	Military academy	Command and general staff college
Authorized	16 (12 officers)	5 (4 officers).
Assigned	13 (10 officers)	4 (3 officers).
U.S. assistance	Vietnamese dollars, 300,000,000 (1968)	U.S. dollars, 6,400 (1970).
Facilities	Vietnamese dollars, 281,000,000 (1969)	

Question 9. At the top of Page 3, you stated that since Tet "the Viet Cong have continued to make night raids from their base camps in the mountains into the populated areas to get supplies, impress recruits, set up ambushes, and disrupt programs of the Vietnamese Government by assassinating officials, blowing up rural health stations, schools and administrative offices, and intimidating the people." How does Viet Cong strength now compare with two years ago? Have HES ratings of hamlets been lowered as a result of this enemy activity?

Answer. Two years ago VC military forces in the province were about the same strength as today but at that time they had free run of many populated areas from which they have since been driven by the GVN. HES ratings reflect the presence and activities of VC force in populated areas. As the GVN has extended its control to virtually all settled communities in the province and pushed the VC back into mountain base areas, the HES ratings have moved upward. In periods of heavy VC activity, however, as in the fall of 1969 and in January 1970, HES ratings have been lowered to show the decreased security.

Question 10. You must have many opportunities in your work to observe political developments in your province. Does the Embassy take advantage of the presence of Foreign Service Officers to inform itself of events of the countryside? Can you com-

municate directly with the Embassy about such matters? Does MACV prohibit your communicating with the Embassy if you do not go through the MACV chain of command?

Answer. The Embassy has selected one CORDS employee in each province, usually a Foreign Service Officer, to report on significant political and economic developments in his area. Because we work for MACV and not the Embassy, we submit our reports through the MACV chain of command rather than directly. Delays which sometimes used to occur in forwarding the reports seem to have been eliminated and I know of no case where reports to the Embassy have been stopped or altered. In addition to this formal channel, we frequently discuss our observations with the officer from the Embassy's political section who is assigned to the Corps area.

Question 11. How many reports do you file weekly? Monthly? Annually?

Answer. Our team submits the following regular periodic reports: 3 daily, 9 weekly, 48 monthly, 6 quarterly, 1 semi-annually and 4 annually. In addition, we submit perhaps 50 to 80 one-time spot reports each month.

QUESTIONS FOR MAJOR ARTHUR

Question 1. What plans are there for the future as far as the size and functions of your staff are concerned?

Answer. We plan to reduce the size of the district team in Binh Chanh District from fourteen to six members through normal rotation by 30 June 1970. Advisory positions in the reduced team are as follows: District Senior Advisor, Deputy District Senior Advisor (civilian), District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center Advisor, People's Self Defense Force Advisor and two Radio Operators.

Question 2. How would you estimate public opinion in your district in terms of support for the Government of South Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, and those not aligned with either side?

Answer. Approximately 40 per cent of the people of Binh Chanh District support the Government of South Viet-Nam, 10 per cent of the people support the Viet Cong and 50 per cent have not committed themselves to either side.

Question 3. Is the district chief a native of the district? The province?

Answer. LTC Nguyen Ba Di, the District Chief, was born in Can Giouc District, Long An Province. His birthplace is approximately ten miles from the Binh Chanh District Headquarters and while he is not technically a native of the District or Province he is a native of the same geographic and ethnic area.

Question 4. How many reports do you file weekly? Monthly? Annually?

Answer. The District submits 8 weekly, 14 monthly and 2 annual reports. These are standard reoccurring reports and do not include spot reports and reports submitted on "as required" basis.

Question 5. On page 3 of your statement, you stated that "the Viet Cong Infrastructure and the local guerrillas have been reduced to squad and half squad size units per village and there is very little organization left at hamlet level." Does the Viet Cong still have the capability of disrupting the pacification program in your district? How many Vietnamese were killed, wounded or abducted by the Viet Cong last year and how many the year before?

Answer. The Viet Cong still possess the capability to disrupt the Pacification Program for short nonsustained periods. In most cases the local village guerrillas have been unable to cause any disruption to the Program without assistance from members of the Viet Cong Main Force units which are based outside the District boundaries. Viet Cong actions directed against civilians during 1968, excluding the Tet Offensive, resulted in 46 killed, 101 wounded and 49 abducted. In 1969 there were 27 killed, 53 wounded and 9 abducted. To date in 1970 there have been 2 civilians killed and 2 wounded by the Viet Cong. These figures are approximate.

Question 6. On the bottom of Page 4 of your statement, you stated that you plan to place increased emphasis on the People's Self Defense Forces Program during 1970 "since a success in this area will increase identity with the government . . ." What do you mean by "increase identity with the government?"

Answer. When a person joins the People's Self Defense Force he identifies himself as a supporter of the Government of South Viet-Nam. In addition, he is showing his fellow villagers and the Viet Cong as well that he is willing to become involved in the affairs of his village. He accepts the fact that he must donate his time and energy in order to defend and develop his village. He does this knowing quite well that he is now a "marked man." He is no longer considered "uncommitted" by the Viet Cong. They recognize that as the people are organized into the People's Self Defense Force they will lose the passive support they have enjoyed in the past. Therefore, the Viet Cong are directing a campaign of propa-

ganda and terrorism against the members of the People's Self Defense Force to prevent the people from casting their lot with their Village, Province and National Government.

Question 7. On Page 5 of your statement, you stated that the Chieu Hoi program did not do well during 1969. Why not?

Answer. There were a number of problems in the administration of the program and training of Chieu Hoi cadres. In addition, the Viet Cong remaining in Binh Chanh District are hard-core apparently highly motivated individuals who know how to avoid allied operations, know their area of operations well and seemingly have no confidence in the Chieu Hoi Program.

STATEMENTS CONCERNING PROGRESS OR LACK OF PROGRESS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Then I want to put in the record, Mr. Reporter, some statements that have been compiled by the Library of Congress, and a similar compilation from the Washington Post, relative to the progress or lack of progress made in Vietnam over the years to give a sense of perspective to the judgment of our present people on the same situation.

(The material referred to follows:)

[From the Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, June 6, 1967]

To: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
From: Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: Selected statements by members of the executive branch on victory in Vietnam and removal of U.S. troops.

Statements by President Kennedy and his leading advisers in 1963 indicated they did not believe that large-scale introduction of U.S. troops into South Vietnam would be necessary. Statements by President Kennedy, by Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that the South Vietnamese would be able to handle the situation themselves, that U.S. troops would not be needed in more than an advisory and training role, and that even those in a training role could begin returning home in late 1963 and in 1964.

Several statements by Secretary McNamara were optimistic about the termination of the U.S. military mission. A White House statement on October 2, 1963 included the following: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965." Several statements were made by President Kennedy and by Secretary McNamara dealing with the removal of a certain number of U.S. troops by the end of 1963. Some troops were removed, a large number of whom had completed their task of training South Vietnamese policemen. The impression remained, however, that this signified the beginning of the end of the U.S. training mission.

Secretary McNamara in 1963 and 1964 made other statements that could be classified as optimistic. On February 19, 1963, he indicated he thought it would take "maybe 3 or 4 years" to defeat the Viet Cong. In February 1964 he said that "I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them." By 1965, Secretary McNamara was more cautious in his statements on the duration of the war. In November 1965, he did say after returning from a trip to South Vietnam that "the most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."

A statement by President Johnson in March 1964, made clear that a large portion of those military advisers who returned had been training guards and policemen in South Vietnam. President Johnson stated that others might return when their task was completed, but that additional men would be sent as required. Some early statements by President Johnson indicated that the Administration was still hopeful about the war's coming to an end: On January 1, 1964, in a New Year's message to the chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam, he wrote: "As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Vietnam can be progressively withdrawn." The statement he made in March indicated a gradually changing assessment of the situation. However, in September 1964, during the election campaign, President Johnson did not give the impression that U.S. troops would be used in combat. He said: "We don't want our American

boys to do the fighting for Asian boys, we don't want to get tied down in a land war in Asia." Other statements by administrative officials in 1964, in 1965, 1966 and 1967 indicated a cautious assessment of how soon the war might be over. However, the Administration did make an arbitrary assumption in drawing up the fiscal 1967 budget "that the conflict would end by June 1967."

Statements by President Johnson during the past year indicate uncertainty about how long the war might continue. In December 1966, he said: "Just how long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it." In March 1967, he said, "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for."

Though Secretary Rusk apparently has not made any specific references, with dates, as to when the U.S. might withdraw from South Vietnam, he did in 1963 show some optimism over developments there. On February 13, he said that "the momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped . . . The guerrillas are losing ground . . . government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect." In April he said, "The Vietnamese are on their way to success" but "we cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there." In February 1964, he said that the Vietnamese "can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."

On January 1, 1967 he noted that the Viet Cong "must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Vietnam by force . . . If I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Vietnam by force." On April 16, 1967 Secretary Rusk stated that "I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headways on the military side, but that does not "mean that the war is just about over."

SELECTED EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS ON VICTORY IN VIETNAM AND WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS

John F. Kennedy

May 22, 1963: "I hope we could—we could withdraw the troops, any number of troops, any time the government of South Vietnam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. We are hopeful that the situation in South Viet Nam would permit some withdrawals in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go . . . I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the skies that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of the year . . . As of today, we would hope we could begin to perhaps to do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months."

September 2, 1963: "I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet Nam, against the Communists."

October 31, 1963: "When Secretary McNamara and General Taylor came back from Viet Nam, they announced that we would expect to withdraw a thousand men from South Vietnam before the end of the year and there has been some reference to that by General Harkins. If we are able to do that, that would be our schedule. I think the first unit or first contingent would be 250 men who are not involved in what might be called front-line operations. It would be our hope to lessen the number of Americans there by 1,000, as the training intensifies and is carried on in South Vietnam. As far as other units, we will have to make our judgment bed ason what the military correlation of forces may be."

November 14, 1963: "We are going to bring back several hundred (troops from South Vietnam) before the end of the year."

Lyndon B. Johnson

January 1, 1964. New Year's message to chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Vietnam: "As the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with this aggression, American military personnel in South Vietnam can be progressively withdrawn. The U.S. Government shares the view of your government that 'neutralization' of South Vietnam is unacceptable. As long as the Communist regime in North Vietnam persists in its aggressive policy,

neutralization of South Vietnam would only be another name for a Communist takeover."

March 7, 1964: "I don't think that the American public has fully understood the reason for our withdrawing any advisers from South Vietnam, and I think they should. We have called back approximately 1000 people. A good many of those people, several hundred, were training guards, policemen . . . From time to time, as our training mission is completed, other people will be withdrawn. From time to time, as additional advisers are needed, or as people to train additional Vietnamese are needed, we will send them out there. But we see no reason to keep the companies of MP's out there, after they have already trained the Vietnamese who can perform the duty equally as well. I think that a good deal will depend on what Secretary McNamara advises concerning who is withdrawn, when they are withdrawn, and who is sent out, and when they are sent out . . . When his report is in, we will carefully evaluate it, and if additional men are needed, we will send them. If others have completed their mission, we will withdraw them."

March 17, 1964, on McNamara and Taylor report on trip to South Vietnam: "The policy should continue of withdrawing United States personnel where their roles can be assumed by South Vietnamese and of sending additional men if they are needed. It will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South Viet Nam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control."

September 25, 1964: "There are those that say you ought to go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia. There are some that say we ought to go south and get out and come home, but we don't like to break our treaties and we don't like to walk off and leave people who are searching for freedom, and suffering to obtain it, and walk out on them."

December 31, 1966, reply to news conference question on war strategy: "I think that we are making the plans that we believe are in the best interest of this country. I don't think anyone can say with any precision when the peace conference will come. We are preparing our people to protect our national interest and our agreements and commitments. Just how long they will be required to do so, I am not able to predict. If I did predict it, I would have no doubt but what I would live to regret it."

March 21, 1967, on how things look in Vietnam: "I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for."

Robert S. McNamara

February 19, 1963: "I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the influence of the Viet Cong. I think this will go on for a substantial period in the future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be maybe 3 or 4 years."

October 2, 1963, White House statement: "Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam can be withdrawn."

November 19, 1963: "It is our objective to provide the training and logistical assistance which the South Vietnamese Government has requested of us, and upon completion of certain facets of that training, small numbers of the U.S. personnel will be able to return by the end of this year."

February 3, 1964: "Last fall I was not as optimistic perhaps about the course of the war as I was about being able to bring back our personnel in certain numbers by the end of last year and also in increments. I still am hopeful of doing that. We did, of course, bring back a thousand men toward the latter part of last year. I am hopeful we can bring back additional numbers of men. I say this because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight . . . I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them. I do believe we can carry out training . . . The training, by the very nature of the work, comes to an end at a certain point."

May 14, 1964: "I firmly believe that the persistent execution of the political-military plans which the Government of Vietnam has developed to carry out that war with our assistance will lead to success."

Answer to question on number of US training personnel needed in Vietnam; "I think on balance the number is not likely to increase substantially."

March 2, 1965, reply to question on length of war: "I really can't say. I think the period of time required to counter effectively a substantially guerrilla effort of the kind that currently exists in South Vietnam is great, and whether it is 1 year, 2 years, or more, I really can't say, but a long period of time is required to reintroduce effectively peace and stability into a nation that has been torn apart as has been South Vietnam. . . . It is difficult for me to forecast the course of events in Southeast Asia, but I want to repeat what I said a moment ago: an effective opposition to a guerrilla campaign requires an extended period of time for the results to be clear. I don't believe that we can be effective in South Vietnam in a short period of time. We expanded our efforts at the end of 1961. We have been there now 3-plus years on an expanded basis. We have been there pursuing these objectives—the same objectives we have today—for 10 or 11 years, and I think that it will be more before we achieve them."

May 9, 1965: "Let me say that I think it is perfectly clear that the situation in Vietnam has deteriorated during the past year on a year and a half, both politically and militarily."

July 20, 1965, in Saigon: "In many aspects there has been deterioration since I was here last—15 months ago."

July 21, 1965: "The situation is serious today, I think, in several respects. It has deteriorated over the past 12 months. Vietcong strength has increased dramatically during that period, primarily as a result of the continuing infiltration of large numbers of soldiers—now regular army personnel from North Vietnam. That increased strength has allowed the Vietcong to expand and intensify their attacks on the political structure of South Vietnam and in particular to increase their campaign of terror against the civilian population. . . .

"I can't predict the future with accuracy. I do want to mention one thing about the future, however, that I think is very interesting. Within the last 3 or 4 weeks, Ho Chi Minh looked into the future, and he said it might take 20 years for them to win."

October 26, 1965, interview question: One of the generals in the field is quoted as saying that he once thought it was going to be a 10 year war, but now he is optimistic and leaning toward 9½ years.

Secretary McNamara: "I wouldn't make a prediction as to the duration of the war. I think it is important to recognize that progress has been made during the summer."

November 30, 1965, planeside interview at Andrews AFB, returning from South Vietnam: "The most vital impression I'm bringing back is that we have stopped losing the war."

Dean Rusk

February 1, 1963: "There are some definitely encouraging elements. The ratio of casualties between Government and Viet Cong forces, the ratio of arms captured or lost between the two sides, the steady extension of the strategic-hamlet program, the increasingly effective work of the montagnards along the border areas—all those indicate some turning in the situation. . . . I think that in such a situation as we have in Viet Nam at any one time there are going to be both pluses and minuses in the situation."

February 13, 1963: "The momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped. Complete victory for South Viet Nam is not just around the corner, but the guerrillas are losing ground and the number of guerrilla attacks has declined significantly. Major deficiencies in training, intelligence and mobility have been repaired; Government forces have the initiative and are using it with growing effect."

April 18, 1963: "The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well."

April 22, 1963: "The Government forces are able to maintain the initiative and, increasingly, to achieve the advantage of surprise. The strategic hamlet program is producing excellent results. . . . The strategic hamlet provides strength against the Communists in the countryside. . . . The villagers are fighting when attacked. . . . Rice production is up. . . . Defections from the Viet Cong have risen. . . . The Viet Cong is losing more weapons than are the Government forces. Viet Cong attacks are running at less than half the rate of January 1962. . . . The Viet Cong has been unable to carry out its plan to escalate to larger military units and to more conventional warfare. . . . We cannot promise, or expect, a quick victory there. . . . It took 8 years to wipe out the Communist terrorists in Malaya—and they were far from a major Communist base. But there is a good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and

need our help; not just our material help—they need that—but our sympathetic understanding and comradeship."

November 8, 1963: "We were also concerned in May and June and July of this year when developments in South Viet Nam indicated that there was a growing gap between the government and people of that country, and there was some danger that the solidarity of the country itself in meeting this threat would be undermined by differences within the country. . . . We believe that the present regime has moved promptly to consolidate public effort, that they will be able to resolve some of the internal difficulties that grew up, and that there will be a possibility that the people of that country will move in greater unity on behalf of the total effort."

February 24, 1964: "I think the resources and the capabilities are there to get this job done on the present basis of assistance to the Vietnamese so that they themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort."

July 1, 1964: "I think they (the Viet Cong) have very serious problems—not only in fact, in terms of losses, disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am not pessimistic about the situation. It is difficult, it is going to take some time, it is going to take more of the heroic job being done by South Vietnamese and Americans and others in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of despair whatever."

June 18, 1965: "I think they (the South Vietnamese) have been encouraged by the clear evidences of the United States support and the clear evidence that we take our commitments seriously and that they are getting major assistanse from us and growing assistance from others, I think this has had a good deal to do with strengthening their hand and sustaining their morale in what has been a very difficult and mean situation over a period of time."

August 25, 1966: "We are beginning to see some signs of success of this strategy. The Viet Cong monsoon offensive, which we know from captured documents it was their intention to carry out during the period May to October, has not materialized because of Westmoreland's tactics of carrying out spoiling operations based on intelligence he has received as to concentrations of Viet Cong . . . The number of defections this year has doubled compared to the past year. No doubt this is a sign of erosion of morale."

January 1, 1967, on the prospects for peace in Vietnam in 1967: "I think there is a possibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed on the basis of optimism. And I never close the door to the possibility that this situation will change. I do believe that one basis for optimism is that the other side must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Viet Nam by force. Now, maybe that will bring about a significant change in their political approach to this question.

But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because we have not yet seen any indication from the other side that they are prepared to give up their idea of seizing South Viet Nam by force."

April 16, 1967: "I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headway on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is just about over . . . I am reluctant to put dates on (winning conventional warfare phase of the war), but I would think we made very, very substantial headway during 1966 on the conventional type of warfare. Now, the pacification effort against the guerrillas is almost by nature a slower task . . . But that is beginning to move now, and I think that behind the cover of the military success against the large units can come an increased pace against the guerrillas. I must say that I have been impressed by the doubling of the rate of defectors from the other side."

M. T. Haggard,
Analyst in Asian Affairs.

The Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.

Statements By Executive Officials in 1967 and 1968 on Progress in Vietnam (Excerpts)

(Prepared According to the Instructions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)

The attached has been prepared for the personal use of the Member requesting it in conformance with his directions and is not intended to represent the opinion of the author or the Legislative Reference Service.

1967

February 2.—"We felt that it [the bombing of the North] would make the North Vietnamese pay a much heavier price for what they were doing. And we felt that it would make the infiltration more difficult. We think it has achieved all of those expressed purposes." (Press Conference, The White House)

March 15.—"Despite continuing increases in North Vietnam's infiltration, this strengthening of allied forces in 1966, under the brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland, was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war."

* * * * * * *

"What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the longrun key to an independent South Vietnam." (Address to a joint session of the Tennessee Legislature, Nashville.)

March 20.—"There are many signs that we are at a favorable turning point. Your [South Vietnamese] fighting men, aided by your allies, now hold the initiative and are striking heavy blows against the strongholds and refuges of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese masters." (Remarks opening the Guam conference.)

August 18.—"Our activity in the South is determined a great deal by what the enemy there is willing to do. More and more here of late—we think that because of the losses he has suffered, because of the position in which he finds himself—he is less anxious to engage our troops in combat."

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(Question: ". . . have we reached a stalemate in the Vietnam war?")

THE PRESIDENT. "No. I think there are those who are taking a pretty tough drubbing out there, who would like for our folks to believe there is a stalemate. But I haven't been there. I can't personally say that I have observed all the action that has taken place. . . . All of these men [Generals Westmoreland, Wheeler, Johnson, and Larson] think that the stalemate charge is nothing more than propaganda." (News Conference, The White House.)

September 1.—(Question: "Mr. President, do you concur with General Johnson's prediction that the troops will be brought home in 18 months from Viet Nam?")

The PRESIDENT: "That is General Johnson's opinion. I have mande no prediction and wouldn't care to at this time." (News Conference, The White House.)

September 29.—"There is progress in the war itself, steady progress considering the war that we are fighting; rather dramatic progress considering the situation that actually prevailed when we sent our troops in there in 1965; when we intervened to prevent the dismemberment of the country by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied them. The grip of the Viet Cong on the people is being broken." (Remarks in San Antonio, Texas.)

November 1.—(Question: "Are you optimistic, sir?")

The PRESIDENT. "Yes. I believe that we are making progress. I believe that we are doing what we ought to do. I think we are going to continue doing what we ought to do." (News Conference, The White House.)

November 17.—"But overall, we are making progress. We are satisfied with that progress. Our allies are pleased with that progress."

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(Question: "Do you think that at this point our force levels in Vietnam will begin to level off in authorized strength, or do you think more troops may be needed in the future?)

The PRESIDENT: "We have previously considered and approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the force level.

"General Westmoreland discussed this at some length with me last night and this morning. He anticipates no increase in that level." (News Conference, The White House.)

1968

January 1.—"We are very hopeful that we can make advances toward peace. We are pursuing every possible objective. We feel that the enemy knows that he can no longer win a military victory in South Vietnam. But when he will reach the point where he is willing to give us evidence that would justify my predicting peace this year—I am unable to do so—that is largely up to him. (News Conference Johnson City, Texas.)

February 2.—(Question: ". . . are we still winning the war?")

The PRESIDENT: "I think I see nothing in the developments that would indicate that the evaluation that I have had of this situation throughout the month should be changed. . . . I don't want to prophesy on what is going to happen, or why. We feel reasonably sure of our strength." (News Conference, The White House.)

SECRETARY RUSK

1967

January 1.—"I do believe that one basis for optimism is that the other side must surely now understand that they are not going to succeed in seizing South Vietnam by force. Now, maybe that will bring about a significant change in their political approach to this question." ("Face the Nation" interview.)

January 31.—". . . and I have no doubt at all that the bombing has made it much more difficult for them to lay on their effort and sustain it and certainly more difficult for them to increase it."

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"Well, in the first place, the effort of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces to cut the country in two has been frustrated. They have not been able to move this war to the third stage of the guerrilla tactics; that is, to the conventional stage; organized forces of battalion and regimental size are not the pattern of their action at the present time in general, because in those engagements the firepower and the force that are present there inflict very severe casualties upon them and they have therefore been pulling away from that. The problem is still the tactical problem of the guerrilla situation.

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"So we think we are making headway, but the typical guerrilla problem is still there—that is a mean and difficult kind of thing to deal with." (Interview for British television.)

March 28.—"If they [authorities in Hanoi] have supposed that they would be able to obtain a military victory in the South, they must surely now put that hope aside. If they had any hope that there would be a political collapse in South Viet-Nam, surely they must now know that all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who have some differences among themselves, are resolved to bring into being a constitutional government in which these various groups can work together on a basis of the free choice of the South Vietnamease people with respect to their future and that one point on which they are generally agreed in South Viet-Nam is that they do not wish the program of Hanoi or the Liberation Front." (News Conference statement.)

April 16.—"Well, we have a good deal of evidence, from prisoners and from documents and from what we know of their deployments, that the other side is having considerable difficulty in maintaining their forces, in giving them supply, keeping up their morale. . . . No. I think we have seen some very favorable signs that we are making headway on the military side, but that does not mean that the war is just about over."

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"Well, I am reluctant to put dates on [a conclusion of the conflict], but I would think we made very, very substantial headway during 1966 on the conventional type of warfare." ("Meet the Press" interview.)

July 1.—"Although no one foresees any United States troop withdrawals within the next six months, the United States is confident that the efforts by South Viet-Nam and its allies will continue to bring improvements, although there may be ups and downs. The important thing to bear in mind is that the military and non-military developments are inextricably intertwined in South Viet-Nam, even more than elsewhere, so that the most significant indicators of military success may be found not in battle reports and casualty statistics but in the evidence that the country is moving forward, creating political institutions, holding village and hamlet elections, improving communications and stabilizing the economy."

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"The remarkable progress being made in the direction of a constitutional government augurs well for the future if security can be maintained." (State Department press release of an interview with a Swedish newsman.)

August 29.—"Those who visit Viet-Nam and talk to our men in the field don't get a feeling of stalemate, but a sense of steady progress toward the ultimate objective of securing South Viet-Nam against this terror and this aggression, from the North." (Address to the American Legion National Convention.)

October 12.—"I cannot tell you when peace will come. I am encouraged by progress toward peace in South Viet-Nam, but I cannot name a date. But we shall continue our effort both by resisting those who would impose their solutions by brute force and by an unremitting exploration of every path which could lead to peace."

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"I know that some reporter in Saigon invented the word 'stalemate.' Our military authorities do not believe there is a stalemate. * * * There are many indicators that the government and allied forces are getting on with the job on the military side."

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"The economic situation has been improving. In other words the Viet Cong have not achieved their objective. The country is moving ahead. And I see no reason for us to be gloomy simply because it is not over yet. We have had our combat forces there for approximately 2 years, and other allies have put forces in there, and the situation is moving."

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"When you look at the total situation, it's moving; and I have no reason myself whatever to subscribe to this notion of a stalemate. It is not a stalemate at all." (News conference.)

October 16.—"I said in my press conference the other day that I know of no significant opinion in this country supporting a withdrawal and an abandonment of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia." (Interview with the foreign press, USIA transcription.)

October 30.—"What sustains Hanoi? At first and until recently, the hope of military victory in the South. That possibility is now beyond their reach. Perhaps they had some hope of a political collapse in South Viet-Nam. But in the midst of the war, the South Vietnamese have adopted a new constitution and elected a President and a Vice President and a Senate and a House, as well as village and hamlet leaders. Perhaps Hanoi has hoped to build up international pressures to cause us to alter our course. That is not occurring. I have just completed meeting with about 90 foreign ministers in the opening stages of the current meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. I can tell you that we are not under pressure from other governments to pull out of Viet-Nam." (Address at Columbus, Indiana.)

December 6.—". . . major progress since the summer of 1965—dramatic on the military side, and politically in adopting a Constitution and holding free elections. Also significant gains for much of the civilian population in education, health, roads, agriculture, and curbs on inflation."

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"If anyone doubts that our stand in Viet-Nam has been a major contribution to these highly favorable developments over a vast area (the Pacific and East Asia), let him go there and talk with responsible government officials. I cannot tell you how much longer it may take to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. . . . Meanwhile, the situation in South Viet-Nam is not a stalemate." (Address before the National Association of Manufacturers.)

1968

January 4.—". . . and a clear, I think, turn of events on the ground, as far as Viet-Nam is concerned."

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"I cannot tell you today whether there's been a change or not. . . . We know that they [Hanoi] have issued orders for an intensified offensive during the winter season. (Press Conference.)

January 22.—"In partnership with our Vietnamese allies and the other nations assisting in South Viet-Nam's defense, we have made significant progress. Repeated enemy assaults have been thrown back, at heavy loss to the other side. Protection against Viet Cong terror has been steadily extended to wider segments of the population. Five elections have been held in the past 18 months for local officials, the Presidency, and the two legislative chambers, and institutions for representative government have thus been established in the midst of a cruel war. I expect further steady progress over the coming months." (Interview with "MacLeans" magazine of Canada.)

February 4.—"We have not seen evidence around the countryside of what the Viet Cong might call a popular uprising. Now, we have known for some months they were going to launch a winter-spring offensive, they call it, which they anticipated would trigger off such a popular uprising.

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". . . and I might say also that we know there is going to be some hard fighting ahead. We are not over this period at all. As a matter of fact, the major fighting up in the northern part of South Viet-Nam has not yet occurred, so there are some hard battles ahead."

(Interview on "Meet the Press.")

SECRETARY M'NAMARA

1967

January 23.—"These trends bear out the assumption we made last year that the number of North Vietnamese would increase substantially while the supply of indigenous military manpower would be further limited.

"It is not clear [however] that the limit that results is below that the North Vietnamese planned on, and, in any event, it is not below the level necessary to support the force in the South at present."

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"Although we still have no way of knowing when the conflict will end it is perfectly clear that we must take whatever measures are necessary to ensure our ability to support our forces in the event the conflict does continue beyond June 30, 1967." (Statement before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations.)

February 15.—"I don't believe the bombing of the North, by itself, will cause the political leaders of North Vietnam to end their activities in the South. However, the impact of the bombing can be judged in part by the great efforts of North Vietnam to force us to stop bombing." (News Conference.)

March 1.—"And the magnitude of this price [air campaign against the North] to the North, I think, is recognized by them and it has been translated into their worldwide campaign to force us to stop this." (News Conference.)

July 9.—"Our casualties are high but we also have inflicted very high casualties on North Vietnamese army units. I anticipate the enemy will receive a very heavy pounding." (Statement following visit to the DMZ.)

July 12.—"The political scene has changed substantially since my last visit to South Vietnam last September and early October.

"The Constituent Assembly, as you know, has completed its work during that period. The nation now has a constitution. Preparations for the elections are advancing rapidly.

"As you are well aware, the election for the Chief Executive, the Vice President will be held within about 45 days and that will be followed very shortly thereafter—within the next 45 to 60 days—by the completion of elections for the legislative branch of the government.

"This is tremendous progress when one looks back at the situation that existed 9 months ago."

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"So there has been a very substantial improvement in the economy and a much more stable basis for future development of that economy."

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"On the military field, let me say to start with, the military commanders I met with—and I met with all of the senior military commanders in the field, all of the senior Vietnamese commanders, many of the Allied commanders, Korean and New Zealanders, for example, and many of the middle ranking and junior U.S. officers—all of the military commanders stated that the reports that they read in the press of military stalemate were—to use their words—the 'most ridiculous statements that they had ever heard.'

"In their view, military progress had occured and was continuing."

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"However, having said that, I should state to you that to be candid I must report the progress in pacification has been very slow. I think that the momentum will increase as the new organization gains in experience, but what we are really trying to do here is engage in nation building. It is an extraordinarily complex process. I would anticipate progress in what is really a very significant field would continue to be slow." (Press Conference.)

July 22.—"I do not consider it optimistic to cite the progress which has been made; I do not consider it pessimistic to cite the problems which remain." (Statement to the Press.)

August 25.—". . . I would like to restate my view that the present objectives of our bombing in the north were soundly conceived and are being effectively

pursued. They are consistent with our overall purposes in Vietnam and with our efforts to confine the conflict. We are constantly exploring ways of improving our efforts to insulate South Vietnam from outside attack and support. Further refinements in our air campaign may help. I am convinced, however, that the final decision in this conflict will not come until we and our allies prove to North Vietnam she cannot win in the south. The tragic and long-drawn-out character of that conflict in the south makes very tempting the prospect of replacing it with some new kind of air campaign against the north. But however tempting, such an alternative seems to me completely illusory. To pursue this objective would not only be futile but would involve risks to our personnel and to our Nation that I am unable to recommend.

"I don't believe that the testimony to date does support the conclusion that there is a direct relationship between the level of bombing of the north and the U.S. forces required in the south.

". . . Now on the other side of the equation, would a reduction in the air campaign in the north lead to an increase in the forces required in the south, I frankly don't know. I think it would depend on what the North Vietnamese did under these circumstances.

"Undoubtedly they would take advantage of the reduction to move material with a lesser cost to them in terms of numbers of people engaged, and this would be an advantage to them. Whether it would result in the movement of more men and material to the south I think is questionable. I don't know the answer." (Hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.)

1968

February 4.—"Just four days ago I remember reading in our press that I had presented a gloomy, pessimistic picture of activities in South Vietnam. I do not think it was gloomy or pessimistic; it was realistic. It said while they had suffered severe penalties they continued to have the strength to carry out the attacks which we have seen in the last two or three days."

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"The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have not accomplished either one of their major objectives, either to ignite a general uprising or to force a diversion of the troops which the South Vietnamese and the United States have moved into the northern areas of South Vietnam, anticipating a major Vietcong and North Vietnamese offensive in that area. And beyond that, the North Vietnamese have suffered very heavy penalties in terms of losses of weapons and losses of men in the past several days. They have of course dealt a very heavy blow to many of the cities of South Vietnam."

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"The balance has definitely moved toward the South Vietnamese. I think, however, you are putting undue emphasis on the military aspects of this war. This is a complicated question. There isn't a simple military solution to it. It's a political-economic-military problem. Each of these facets intertwine. And we should not only examine the military operations when we're talking about relative balance of progress." (Interview on "Meet the Press.")

VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY

1967

November 10.—"We are on the offensive; territory is being gained. We are making steady progress. . . ." (Television Interview.)

November 13.—". . . I am heartened by the progress I saw."

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"But there is progress—not marked from day-to-day or week-to-week, but clearly measurable over the course of months. The greatest and most obvious progress of all is in the military effort."

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"So that is the picture I bring back from Vietnam. Political, economic and social progress; steady but slow. Military progress: steady and gaining momentum. National security and national development: both proceeding. (Address to the Grocery Manufacturers of America, New York.)

CLARK CLIFFORD

1967

August 5.—"The consensus expressed in each instance, without any exception, was that the Allies are headed on the right track. They believe that the progress made on the ground in South Viet-Nam has been appreciable. They believe that pressure should be built up in South Viet-Nam.

"In each instance, without exception, the Allies agreed on the necessity and the value of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It is through North Viet-Nam that the forces of the Viet Cong and North Viet-Nam are being supplied in South Viet-Nam. The Allies feel strongly that those lines of supply should be interdicted to the best of our ability.

"So it is the general feeling, as I attempt to synthesize their attitude, that we are headed in the right direction. The maintenance of force and the possibility of increased force and pressure should bring the Allies out at the point where we hope to come out." (Press Conference, The White House.)

AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER

1967

September 10.—"Yes, I think we are making steady progress—not spectacular progress—it is not that kind of situation. I think we are making steady progress. This is a situation which cannot be solved overnight. It takes time. It takes patience. It takes steady application of pressure. As I say, it is not a situation where you have spectacular things happening. It is a question of keeping on the pressure, gradually moving ahead." (Television Interview, "Face the Nation," CBS.)

November 13.—"I don't think you can put this situation in a time frame. I think it is a great mistake to try to do it. My view is very definite and that is that we are making steady progress. I think there is every prospect, too, that the progress will accelerate, because I think that many factors point to it."

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"I described to the President my views of the situation now in Viet-Nam. I said to him, as I have said before, too, that in my view we are making steady progress in Viet-Nam, not only militarily but in other ways as well: in the evolution of the constitutional process, in the pacification program, which is, in my view, equally as important as the military situation." (News Conference, The White House.)

(News Conference, The White House.)

November 17.—"In a war with as many faces as that in Viet-Nam, one of the best indications of how things are progressing is the degree of security in the countryside.

"The Vietnamese Armed Forces are carrying the major burden in providing such security, so vital to the success of the many pacification programs designed to improve the well-being of the people and to enable them to manage their own affairs free from Viet Cong terrorism.

"Obtaining a definitive assessment of the extent of security is an extremely complex task. It is our judgment that the proportion of the population under the reasonably secure protection of the Government of Viet-Nam has increased to more than two-thirds of the 17 million people in South Viet-Nam. Just over 2 years ago, it is estimated the proportion was about one-half. Of the one-third not under Government protection today, about half are under Viet Cong control and half in contested areas.

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"This, then, is the picture in Viet-Nam as I see it. Steady but not spectacular progress is being made militarily and in nation-building. The development of representative institutions and vigorous political life is encouraging. But, quite frankly, I can't answer the big question that I know is on your minds: How long will it take?"

(Address to the Overseas Press Club, New York.)

GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND

1967

April 24.—"Although the military picture is favorable, I emphasize the fact that we have no evidence to indicate that the enemy is slowing his invasion from the North, or that he is breaking up his major units and scattering them about, or that he is giving up his plans to try to inflict major defeat upon us.

"He is taking great casualties and he does have logistics problems, but his leadership is good and his men are tough and tenacious. He needs a victory for political, psychological and morale purposes, and he will continue to strive for one.

"So the end is not in sight." (Address to the Associated Press, New York.)

July 13.—"The statement that we are in a stalemate is complete fiction. It is completely unrealistic. During the past year tremendous progress has been made. I think the Secretary [McNamara] noted this during his recent trip.

"The Secretary was there about 9 months ago and I am sure that the progress was evident to him. I live it from day to day and it is not as evident to me as it is to visitors who come in periodically.

"It is like watching your children grow up. The grandmother comes and sees them once a year. She is always surprised at the extent to which they have grown.

"I am living with the situation day-to-day and it is more evident to visitors than it is to me, but when I research my memory, go back into the records, it becomes quite evident that we have made tremendous progress."

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"During the past year tremendous progress has been made . . . We have pushed the enemy farther and farther back into the jungles . . . The ARVN troops are fighting much better than they were a year ago . . . The number of defectors coming into the government has substantially increased. The ratio of enemy personnel killed to those killed by the enemy continues to increase . . . It has doubled during the past year . . . We have succeeded in attaining our objectives . . . The enemy has not won a single, significant victory during the past year, despite the tremendous effort that he has put forth." (Press Conference.)

November 21.—"I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing. There are indications that the Viet Cong and even Hanoi know this.

"However, the enemy may be operating from the delusion the political pressure here combined with the tactical defeat of a major unit might force the U.S. to 'throw in the towel.' If he does *not* believe this, there is very little logic to be found in his continuing the war in its present pattern."

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"With 1968, a new phase is now starting. We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." (Address to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.)

1968

February 25.—"It is too early to assess the impact the recent offensive by the enemy has had on the pacification program. However, it is reasonable to assume that in many areas the program has been set back. On the other hand, in some areas we know it was untouched.

"In the areas where there was a setback, certainly it will take months in some instances to restore the effort to its former level, although the exact time involved depends on a number of imponderables."

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"In sum, I do not believe Hanoi can hold up under a long war. The present enemy offensive attitude may indicate that Hanoi realizes this, also. (Press Conference, Saigon.)

[From the Washington Post, July 23, 1969]

A Selection From Vietnam Familiar Quotations

(By Philip Geyelin)

Defense Secretary Laird's recent progress report on the Vietnam War has come under a certain amount of criticism from people who apparently have no sense of tradition. Even when allowance is made for the Pentagon's effort to tidy up the Secretary's intended meaning the next day, his declaration that "we have certainly turned the corner in the war" is a worthy addition to any compilation of Familiar Vietnam Quotations.

Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Public Affairs Jerry Friedheim was at pains the following day to say that the corner Laird was referring to had to do only with the "tremendous progress" being made in the "Vietnamization" of the war, but he might as well have saved his breath—as Robert McNamara would be the first to testify. Who now recalls, or even knows, that his celebrated 1963 projection of the war's end was not originated by him, that it grew out of a joint mission with

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, that it was polished and put out by a large group of White House advisers with the approval of President Kennedy, and that it presupposed no enlargement of the enemy war effort?

That is one rule—that it is the first impression that counts—in these matters.

The second rule is more important, and it is that predictions or appraisals having to do with the course of this war, for whatever purpose they may be made, do not have are cord of standing up very well. One can always hope. But the record, which is rich, argues otherwise—argues in fact, for public officials either making the most carefully measured estimates or making none at all and letting the facts, such as they are, speak for themselves.

Mr. Laird's assessment, for example, follows hot on the heels of his boss's much-discussed, much-amended, expression of a "hope" that he could outdo Clark Clifford's timetable for removing all of our ground combat forces by the end of our ground combat forces by the end of 1970. Mr. Clifford was dealing, incidentally, not in hopes but in the terms of a proposed line of action. But if Mr. Nixon was violating his own injunction, expressed in his first press conference ("I do not think it is helpful to make overly optimistic statements which, in effect, may impede and perhaps make very difficult our negotiations in Paris"), he was in good company, for both his remarks and those of Mr. Laird were of a piece in this respect with an appraisal offered in January 1969 by a close Presidential confidant, Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, that "(the enemy's) . . . situtation is deteriorating rather rapidly." And this, in turn, was merely the best news we had received since an assessment in September 1968 by Gen. William Westmoreland, now the Army Chief of Staff and formerly the field commander in Vietnam, that "the enemy is deteriorating."

This world "deteriorating" is much favored among appraisers of the Vietnam War. "Turning the corner" is also a stock item, if that is any comfort to Mr. Laird. In fact, whether the official in question is a general or a President or a Cabinet member, there are patterns here, certain forms to be observed. And so, for the convenience of those officials who cannot resist the impulse, as well as for the edification of those who might see some purpose in trying to fight it—given the past record—what follows are some selected quotations from the last 15 years:

". . . We have never been in a better relative position." *General Westmoreland, April 10, 1968.*

". . . We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view . . . The enemy has many problems: He is losing control of the scattered population under his influence . . . He sees the strength of his forces steadily declining . . . His monsoon offensives have been failures. He was dealt a mortal blow by the installation of a freely elected representative government . . . the enemy's hopes are bankrupt." *General Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1967.*

". . . We are generally pleased . . . we are very sure we are on the right track." *President Johnson, July 13, 1967.*

". . . Progress has been made. . . . . We have pushed the enemy farther and farther into the jungles. . . . We have succeeded in attaining our objectives." *General Westmoreland, July 13, 1967.*

"I except the . . . war to achieve very sensational results in 1967." *Ambassador Lodge, Jan. 9, 1967.*

"We are beginning to see some signs of success," and "There is an erosion of [enemy] morale." *Secretary of State Rusk, Aug. 25, 1966.*

"We have stopped losing the war." *Secretary of Defense McNamara, October, 1965.*

". . . We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousands miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." *President Johnson, Oct. 21, 1964.*

"The war in Vietnam is on the right track." *Ambassador Lodge, June 30, 1964.*

"I think the number [of U.S. personnel] in Vietnam is not likely to increase substantially." *Secretary of Defense McNamara, May 14, 1964.*

". . . The Vietnamese . . . themselves can handle this problem primarily with their own effort." *Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 24, 1964.*

"The United States still hopes to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965." *Secretary of Defense McNamara. Feb. 19, 1964.*

"I am hopeful we can bring back additional . . . men . . . because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them." *Secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 3, 1964.*

"Victory . . . is just months away, and the reduction of American advisors can begin any time now. . . . I can safely say the end of the war is in sight." *Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Commander of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, Oct. 31, 1963.*

"Secretary McNamara and General [Maxwell] Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965. . . ." *White House statement, Oct. 2, 1963.*

"I feel we shall achieve victory in 1964." *Tram Van Dong, South Vietnamese general, Oct. 1, 1963.*

". . . South Vietnam is on its way to victory . . ." *Frederick E. Nolting, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, June 12, 1963.*

"The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well." *Secretary of State Rusk, April 1963.*

"[The struggle] is turning an important corner." *Secretary of State Rusk, March 8, 1963.*

". . . The corner has definitely been turned toward victory in South Vietnam." *Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense, March 8, 1963.*

"There are definitely encouraging elements . . . the ratio of casualties . . . indicates some turning in the situation." *Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 1, 1963.*

"The war in Vietnam is going well and will succeed." *Secretary McNamara, Jan. 31, 1963.*

". . . The South Vietnamese should achieve victory in three years. . . . I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war. [The Vietcong] face inevitable defeat." *Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, Jan. 12, 1963.*

"Every quantitative measurement shows we're winning the war. . . ." "U.S. aid to Vietnam has reached a peak and will start to level off." *Secretary of Defense McNamara, 1962.*

"The Communists now realize they can never conquer free Vietnam." *Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, Official Military Aide to Vietnam, Jan. 8, 1961.*

". . . The American aid program in Vietnam has proved an enormous success, one of the major victories of American policy. . . ." *Gen. J. W. O'Daniel, Official Military Aide to Vietnam, Sept. 7, 1959.*

"With a little more training the Vietnamese Army will be the equal of any other army. . ." *Secretary of the Army Wilbur Brucker, Dec. 18, 1955.*

"I fully expect (only) six more months of hard fighting." *General Navarre, French Commander-in-Chief, Jan. 2, 1954.*

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is about all I have to say. I can only say again that you all have been most cooperative and it has been educational. I am afraid we have exhausted ourselves as well as you with the length of these hearings. We normally don't go this long, but we tried to cover this as fast as we could simply because you are away from Vietnam and are here and want to go back. At least the Government wants you to go back. Normally we would not subject you to such long hours.

I have neglected my own work and my own constituents to an outrageous extent in the last 2 weeks, but I hope they will understand that. I think these hearings will be useful to the other members of the committee and the Senate.

It did come at a busy time, and the same goes for you young men. You have made very good witnesses, I must say.

COMMENTS ON RF AND PF IN DRAFT HANDBOOK

Mr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing. You quoted from a draft handbook on the village some remarks about the RF and PF and what kind of people they were.

I would just like the record to show that this was a draft. I have not yet approved that particular book and, frankly, I don't think I would have approved that particular statement. [Deleted.]

I think I speak for all the members of this group that were invited to testify before you, sir, in expressing our appreciation for your courtesy and patience and your interest in what we are trying to do.

INTEREST IS IN U.S. DOMESTIC LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We are interested. We are not only interested in what you are doing there, but we represent constituents in this country and they are very upset at the moment. They feel that the conditions here at home are very unsatisfactory in many ways, so that we have to try to balance that off with your job and with what you are doing. This is not easy to do in a country as big as this is and with the trouble and many dislocations we have at home.

There was an incident yesterday, which while it did not kill anybody, is very embarrassing in Washington. It is one of the minor incidents, but they are going on all over the country.

All we can hope is that we can in some way bring these things back into a more normal status and in which we can allow the country to resume a more normal procedure in its domestic life as well as in international relations.

Thank you all very much. I wish you well. The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

U.S. Military Advisory Program

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Aiken, Case, and Williams.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to begin the second phase of a series of hearings to study the nature and extent of U.S. advisory and assistance programs in Vietnam. Two weeks ago the committee considered the pacification program and the advisory program for the regional and popular forces. Today the committee begins consideration of the overall U.S. military advisory program in Vietnam.

President Nixon, in discussing the prospects for Vietnamization in his recent foreign policy message to the Congress, stated, and I quote:

> We are now attempting to determine the depth and durability of the progress which has been made in Vietnam. We are studying the extent to which it has been dependent on the presence of American combat and support forces as well as on expanded and improved South Vietnamese Army and territorial forces. We are asking searching questions:
>
> What is the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations? Could they succeed in undoing our gains?
>
> What is the actual extent of improvement in allied capabilities? In particular, are the Vietnamese developing the leadership, logistics capabilities, tactical know-how, and sensitivity to the needs of their own people which are indispensable to continued success?
>
> What alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued allied success? If they choose to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war, could they simply wait out U.S. withdrawals and then, through reinvigorated efforts, seize the initiative again and defeat the South Vietnamese Forces?
>
> Most important, what are the attitudes of the Vietnamese people, whose free choice we are fighting to preserve? Are they truly being disaffected from the Viet Cong, or are they indifferent to both sides? What do their attitudes imply about the likelihood that the pacification gains will stick?

I hope that these hearings with on-the-scene personnel will help to develop the facts upon which informed judgments can be made—by Administration officials, by the Congress, and by the general public—on basic questions such as those posed by the President. After years of frustration over the course of this tragic war, the American people cannot be expected to support any Vietnam policy on faith alone.

HEARING SCHEDULE

The committee is pleased to have as witnesses today two distinguished Army officers who will discuss matters involving plans and prospects for the Vietnamization policy. They are Brig. Gen. Wallace L. Clement, director of the training directorate of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, and Col. Jesse L. Wheeler, Jr., senior adviser to the 1st Infantry Division of the South Vietnamese Army. The committee will hear additional testimony from them tomorrow in executive session on matters of a classified or sensitive nature. I hope that the information to be reserved for discussion in executive session will be kept to a minimum.

SWEARING OF WITNESSES

In order to protect these witnesses from the understandable ambivalence they may feel with respect to their responsibilities to the Army and the executive branch on the one hand and to this committee and the Senate on the other, we will follow the procedure used in the recent hearings on the pacification program and ask that they be sworn in before giving their testimony.

Would General Clement and Colonel Wheeler please stand and raise their right hands?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General CLEMENT. I do.

Colonel WHEELER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a prepared statement, gentlemen?

General CLEMENT. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read it, please.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WALLACE L. CLEMENT, DIRECTOR OF THE MACV TRAINING DIRECTORATE

General CLEMENT. I am Brigadier General Clement, Director of the MACV Training Directorate. It is my privilege to present to the committee a summary of major aspects of the U.S. military advisory effort in South Vietnam. I believe a brief history of the growth of this effort will be of interest and will serve as useful background.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE EFFORT

The original U.S. military assistance effort, MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), Indochina, was established in 1951 to administer the disposition of and report on the use of equipment sent to the French and through them to the indigenous forces. From 1951 until 1954, this MAAG Indochina was primarily a small logistics group.

In July 1954, with the signing of the Geneva accords which brought about the ceasefire in Indochina, the French began withdrawing their combat forces and the Government of South Vietnam took command of its own troops. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces had a total strength just in excess of 200,000 men, the majority being in the army. The air force was practically nonexistent and the very small navy had no independent administrative or operational capability.

At this time, MAAG Indochina was replaced by MAAG Vietnam which consisted of 342 officers and men. MAAG Vietnam's mission was to assist the Vietnamese Government in improving the military capability of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. In agreement with the French, a separate transitional organization, known as the training relations and instruction mission (TRIM) was established. TRIM was composed of French, Vietnamese, and American personnel and its mission was to assist the Government of Vietnam in the organization and development of sound, effective armed forces. TRIM was terminated in April 1956 when the French advisers withdrew. However, French missions for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force were retained until May 1957.

In May of 1961, Vice President Johnson visited South Vietnam and issued a joint communique with President Diem announcing the expansion of defense and economic development programs. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was sent by the President on a special mission to Vietnam. Near the end of the year, President Kennedy decided to enlarge the U.S. support for the South Vietnamese. From a strength of less than 700 at the end of 1960, MAAG Vietnam was increased some 2,500 personnel so that at the end of 1961 there were over 3,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam.

MAAG Vietnam was authorized to provide an adviser to each province chief and adviser teams down to battalion level for operational Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units in the field.

South Vietnamese Armed Forces have grown from about 200,000 in 1954 to a force which will approach 1 million by the end of fiscal year 1970. The total advisory strength has grown from about 340 in 1954 to approximately 14,000 today. Of the latter figure approximately one-half are the military advisers of the Vietnamese Regular Armed Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the other half?

General CLEMENT. The other half, sir, you were briefed on by Ambassador Colby.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see what you mean.

MISSION OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND

General CLEMENT. The advisory mission of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, is to: (*a*) Develop military assistance plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the U.S. Mission and other U.S. governmental agencies in the Mission, and (*b*) provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the Republic of Vietnam on military assistance matters.

ORGANIZATION OF MACV

The advisory organization is tailored to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces structure, sir. We use the acronym RVNAF and I may lapse back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. We will try to interpret.

General CLEMENT. And each U.S. military service contributes to the MACV advisory effort. If we will turn our attention to chart No. 1, I will show you where our advisers are.

At the top is the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and the MACV headquarters staff, with its component advisers. On the lower line, we

have the Vietnamese Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, all Vietnamese; separate airborne division, the artillery command, ranger command, armor command, and special forces, each with its own advisory unit. Next, the Corps—I, II, III, and IV Corps—with their advisers. And, of course, under the corps, the operational units, the divisions, with their advisers.

Finally, on the lowest line, in the center, are the Corps advisers; you were briefed on this, sir. On the left, the central logistics command with its advisers. On the right is the Central Training Command which is run by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, with its advisers, which is really my training directorate. This gives you a very brief outline of the advisory effort.

The CHAIRMAN. The total comprises about a million men in Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; the figure of approximately 1 million is the total Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces structure, which includes the RF and PF, on which you have previously been briefed.

The functions of the Vietnamese Army Headquarters are performed by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff whose counterpart is MACV. Therefore, U.S. advisers to the Vietnamese Army are assigned to MACV.

MACV discharges the army advisory task by assigning advisers to all echelons in the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and also to the corps areas under operational control of corps senior advisers. The U.S. senior adviser in each corps area is also the commander of U.S. Army and/or Marine units in that geographical area.

The Chief, Naval Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations and all naval forces. The Chief of the Naval Advisory Group is also the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.

The Marine Corps Advisory Group advises all Vietnamese Marine Corps Forces and is under the staff cognizance of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV).

The Chief U.S. Air Force Advisory Group advises the Vietnamese Chief of Air Operations and all Vietnamese Air Force units. The Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group does not command U.S. Air Force units in Vietnam.

BASIC FUNCTIONS OF ADVISORY GROUPS

The basic functions of the advisory groups are to provide advice and assistance to their Vietnamese counterparts in all matters pertaining to command, administration, training, tactical operations, logistics, and personnel with the objective of establishing combat ready and self-sufficient armed forces.

I will next discuss in broad terms some of the more salient features of the MACV advisory effort. I will exclude from my discussion the advisory effort for territorial forces (that is, regional and popular forces). The committee was briefed on this effort in February by Ambassador Colby.

CRITERIA FOR ADVISER ASSIGNMENT

The criteria for adviser assignment in each service are generally the same; that is, experience in the functional area to which assigned. In addition, to work successfully with the Vietnamese the adviser must be

sensitive to and respect their way of doing things, appreciating their strengths and weaknesses; he must be dedicated and sincere; patient and diplomatic; must appreciate the fact that the Vietnamese have been brought up to the sound of guns, have been fighting for a long time and foresee a continuing struggle. In brief, an adviser must know his business and be able to get along with the Vietnamese.

There are outstanding examples of leadership, courage, and dedication throughout the Vietnamese military system. There is an innate strength in the Vietnamese which has enabled them to endure combat, strife, and destruction and yet retain their basic values. It is important that we try to appreciate and to recognize the Vietnamese way of doing things which is based on a very ancient culture and traditions. We try to avoid uniquely "American" solutions, although this is often difficult.

METHOD OF OPERATIONS OF ADVISORY EFFORT

Gentlemen, I will describe how the adviser fits into the operational day-to-day aspects of the adviser effort.

The U.S. Army advisory effort parallels the Army of the Republic of Vietnam organization and is tailored to its present operational needs. Advisers are assigned at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff level downward through corps, division, regiment, and battalion in the combat and combat support area and downward through depots, area logistics command and subordinate support units in the administrative and logistics support area. The requirement for adviser skills runs, on one hand, from the detailed knowledge of the M–16 rifle through the operation of an automotive rebuild plant and, on the other hand, from the employment of a rifle squad in combat through the application of all types of combat power in a corps against both guerrilla and conventional enemy forces. Many of our Army advisers are committed to the training of ARVN forces—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Forces—and are colocated at the many training centers and schools throughout South Vietnam.

The Navy advisory skills run the gamut required for the conduct of naval operations against an active and aggressive enemy in both coastal and inland waterway operations. The U.S. Naval advisory effort extends from the senior Vietnamese Naval Headquarters downward through task forces and river assault and interdiction division (RAID) to an individual small craft conducting combat operations on the many inland rivers and canals in South Vietnam, with the bulk being in the Mekong Delta area. This includes advisers with training and logistic support forces.

The U.S. Marine Corps Advisory Group, operating under the U.S. Naval Advisory Group (COMNAVFORV), is involved primarily in advising a Marine Corps Division.

The U.S. Air Force adviser works with the highest Vietnamese Air Force echelon downward through combat wings, combat groups, squadrons, training centers, forward air controllers, air liaison, and air logistics commands.

A military adviser may be officer or enlisted. He works directly with one or more Vietnamese counterparts. Advisers work alongside their counterparts in all phases of their activities, both advising and assisting them in the accomplishments of assigned missions. This involves the advisers with combat units accompanying the units on both combat

and pacification operations. Staff advisers at all levels work with their counterparts on combined studies and plans. All advisory efforts are aimed at improving the quality of the RVNAF, improving their management at all levels and making them self-sufficient.

INCREASE IN TRAINING EFFORTS

Training constitutes a major adviser effort in all services. The improvement and modernization of RVNAF brought with it a pronounced expansion of RVNAF personnel strength, and an attendant increase in training requirements. The objective is to increase the level of combat readiness and combat proficiency through individual training (in-country and off shore) and unit training. There are 42 RVNAF training centers and 27 RVNAF schools involved in this effort, located throughout the whole of South Vietnam. Those being trained range from recruits at training centers to senior officers at the Command and Staff College in Dalat, or at the National Defense College in Saigon. Instruction at these centers and schools is carried out by the Vietnamese. This chart very briefly, sir, shows the rapid buildup in the program in the past 2 years in the projected programs.

In calendar year 1968, the training base was saturated. We go from there to 1969, an increased effort, and from there to the 1970 projection. That was increased even more. So there is a great training effort going on in these schools, and training centers.

In addition, to these formal training programs, there is an extensive on-the-job training effort going on in all of the services, aimed generally at the technical skills. We trained over 3,000 in the logistical field alone in this manner in calendar year 1969, and currently have over 4,000 being trained. More than 2,000 Vietnamese are presently being trained in U.S. Navy craft. Of course, the Vietnamese themselves are implementing a supplementary on-the-job program.

FUTURE OF ADVISORY EFFORT

There is continuing improvement in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. As the RVNAF continues to grow, the weight of the advisory effort will be given to the most critical areas.

The RVNAF logistical organization and system are presently capable of reasonably satisfactory logistical support to operating elements. By necessity, there is a strong advisory effort in this area which will continue for some time.

We are advising a military force which has rapidly expanded over the past few years, stretching to the limit the amount of experienced talent available. It will take time for skill levels to catch up with the force structure. This, in itself, has placed severe tasks on our advisory effort. As the force structure increase approaches the end goal, more emphasis will be placed on qualitative improvements of all existing forces.

The size and composition of our present and future advisory effort in Vietnam will be determined in light of the development of RVNAF forces to assume a larger share of the war effort and the rate at which RVNAF units can receive equipment, complete training, and attain operational readiness.

Gentlemen, MACV is very much aware of the importance of the advisory role in connection with improving the Vietnamese Armed

Forces. The advisory effort contributes to RVNAF's capability to shoulder the burden of the fighting at an accelerated rate. This allows a progressive reduction of U.S. military presence in South Vietnam.

Sir, that concludes my statement. Do you have any questions at this time?

PURPOSE OF COMMITTEE INQUIRY

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. That is a very interesting statement.

Before I proceed with any questions, General, I want to make it very clear that, at least speaking for myself and I think for most of the committee, criticism such as it has appeared in the press has never been against the military activities of your people, either the officers or the men. What we are really dealing with in this question of the difference in view is the political policy and the objectives of the operation as a whole. I hope that the military establishment realizes that we are not inquiring into these matters because of a feeling of disapproval of the way you or your men have conducted yourselves. This is not the issue at all. This committee is concerned with the political implications of the overall effort. It has often been misinterpreted that either this committee or the Senate or certain Members of the Senate did not support the Armed Forces. That is not at all a true reflection of the issue. It is not a question of supporting the Armed Forces or whether they have supported the policy. It is a question of supporting the political policy that results in these questions on Vietnam. I hope you understand.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, I understand.

OBJECTIVE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTIVITY IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This statement and most of these statements are based upon the assumption that there is a legislative objective involved in all of this activity, because it is a very substantial and very extensive activity. Do you, as a military man, feel concerned about the question of whether or not the activity as such has a legislative objective? Could you say what you believe the objective is?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I think I can address it as far as our mission, as far as the military advisers are concerned. We certainly feel it is a worthwhile objective. It is one that we are committed to and we certainly are intent on carrying it out and making sure that we do so to the best of our ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I did not make myself plain. I know as a military man you are under orders and no military organization can operate without discipline and established traditional organization. You took it back to the beginning in 1951, which is what inspired thought about this. You said the original military assistance was MAAG Indochina in 1951. Are you familiar with the circumstances of its creation?

General CLEMENT. Not in detail, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why it was created or what its purpose was?

General CLEMENT. I believe I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it? What is your feeling about it?

General CLEMENT. It was established to counter the Communist threat in Southeast Asia, which continues to this time. I think that basically is one of the primary reasons that we are there.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the nature of the threat in 1951?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am sorry. It really is outside my cognizance and I am not prepared to discuss that aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. This was really the thrust of my first question. It seems to me that perhaps quite properly, as a military man, it is not your responsibility to have a judgment. I do not wish to restrict you in any way if you have a judgment. After all, you are also a citizen of the United States. You are free to express a judgment, whether or not you concern yourself with that objective.

Senator CASE. General, would you pull those microphones closer to you.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not every sensitive. Our technological expertise is exhausted in going to the moon. We cannot make good microphones or trucks.

General CLEMENT. Sir, if you are asking me whether I feel we are performing a worthwhile task in Vietnam and whether our soldiers are, I would say yes, we certainly are, and, personally it has been a very challenging, very rewarding assignment.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you correctly, that does not involve necessarily, at least a judgment of the political justification beginning in 1951 and following through various stages of escalation after 1954 and after Kennedy came in, and then the major one in 1965. That is not your responsibility. Or do you feel it is your responsibility to have any judgment about such a matter?

General CLEMENT. I believe, strictly speaking, sir, my responsibility is to carry out the orders that are given me by headquarters and which I am trying to do to the best of my knowledge and belief.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I suspected was the proper answer. I am just curious.

ORIGIN OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

I have a very strong feeling that it was none of our business going in there in 1951. We went in in support of the French to retain control of their colony; did we not? The French were still battling to control Vietnam in 1951; were they not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; I guess they were.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no guess about it. They were. They were fighting their enemies; weren't they?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Armed Forces had a total strength of 200,000 men, the majority being in the Army. They were the remnants of the Colonial Army which the French had created to support their control of Vietnam. Is that not a fact?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; I believe it probably was.

The CHAIRMAN. It was or was not. That is a fact; is it not? You made this statement; did you not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you create this statement out of your own knowledge or did someone assist you?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I did have assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this the 100,000 you mentioned here——

General CLEMENT. That was the French forces.

The CHAIRMAN. The French Colonial Army; was it not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Their main purpose was to maintain the control of the French in Vietnam; was it not?

General CLEMENT. I am not familiar with their purpose, sir. As a matter of fact, I was relating a general historical picture. I have not had much time recently to do much historical research. I really have been concerned with this training advisory effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not have asked you about it except you mentioned it in your statement. I think it is important, not particularly for you as a military man, and that is why I said that I am not critical of you or any of your colleagues. As a matter of fact, I am not particularly critical of the men who have been charged with atrocities because they are exposed to a situation which is almost intolerable and beyond human endurance. What I am critical of, and still am, is that policy would put them in this position, and that policy finds us in this position. It did then and it still does. I think it is an intolerable position. That is no reflection whatever upon you or any of your colleagues. That is not the point at all, but this is significant.

You have raised the point here that this is the origin of this war. It does have relevance as to whether or not we have any business continuing it, in my view, as a political matter, whether or not it is worth the price that you are continuing to pay because under your statement, we have advisers at every level and we are for all practical purposes running the country militarily.

You say we have 14,000 advisers. Do you know how many French advisers to the military there were?

General CLEMENT. I do not know exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. I doubt if they had as much as we have. As a matter of fact, we have in effect taken over the effort.

You may be more acquainted with the history of this country. To give you a comparable view do you remember when the British fought the American Colonial power? You are familiar with the American Revolutionary War; are you not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; we studied it.

The CHAIRMAN. The British brought over a number of troops, of course, to help them, but the American Colonials fought them. When it was all over, and after the British finally gave it up, we had a remnant of an Army left that George Washington had created. That is the equivalent of this 200,000 that you are talking about here. Is it, or is it not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; I presume it would be.

The CHAIRMAN. No, it is not. You see, these people were fighting for the French. This is the point I wanted to make. These 200,000 were not fighting for the Colonials, the Colonists such as George Washington.

EXTENT AND ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT

I think it is very important, not so much for you as for the country. Because you are under orders, you do not have to know those things. You prompted me to raise a question which I think is central because this war is now escalating into Laos and we are getting into it deeper and deeper. It simply raised the question once again. Is it in the interest of the United States to go down this road?

Your testimony makes quite clear to me just how extensive our involvement is. You said 14,000 military advisers.

General CLEMENT. I beg your pardon. There is a total of 14,000 advisers; 7,000 is the rough number of military advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I misread it?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. If you will recall, 14,000 was the total effort and the CORDS people talked of the other 7,000. This is the 7,000 in the military effort, the military advisory unit, with the tactical units, the corps and divisions, the Central Training Command, and the logistics units.

The CHAIRMAN. They are still military or paramilitary. They are closely similar; aren't they?

General CLEMENT. For the purposes of the hearings, sir, you wanted to break out the military advisory effort from the total advisory effort. I was just putting it in perspective.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the 14,000, though, include legislatively all in the paramilitary or the police units?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, that is what Ambassador Colby mentioned in his appearance.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were there a year ago? Is this more or less than there were a year ago?

General CLEMENT. I think it is about the same, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. About the same?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, about the same number.

COST OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us what the total cost to the United States is for the military equipment supplied or turned over to the South Vietnamese to date?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do have some figures on costs. The fiscal year 1970 cost related to the support of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, excluding paramilitary, is approximately $1.5 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for fiscal year 1970?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. The costs are broken down into different appropriation areas: Military personnel, which is basically rations for the Army; operations and maintenance, which includes off-shore training, repair parts, depot overhaul programs, maintenance costs, and procurement, which consists primarily of equipment and ammunition. Those are the major parts of the $1.5 billion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an estimate of the accelerated total we have returned to the Vietnamese? This is the equipment and supplies?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; this is for equipment and supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

General CLEMENT. This is the current appropriation, $1.5 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for 1 year?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

I do not have the accumulated total.

The CHAIRMAN. An accelerated total for the past.

General CLEMENT. I do not have that here, sir. I can try to provide it for you.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you get that for the record, please? I assume it is available.

General CLEMENT. I will get it for the record of the executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimates for 1971?

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I have no projections for 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this $1.5—and the figures I want, of course, include the bases and excess equipment we turned over to the Vietnamese? We have recently turned over some large bases, have we not?

General CLEMENT. This would exclude the plant, sir, only equipment and supplies turned over.

The CHAIRMAN. The plant?

General CLEMENT. The plant, or bases, are excluded, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Everything from rifles on up?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; all the programed supplies and equipment.

PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BUDGET PAID BY UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. What portion of South Vietnam's military budget is paid for, directly or indirectly, by the United States?

General CLEMENT. We pay directly, of their fiscal year 1970 defense budget, which is about a billion dollars, about 11 percent, sir, as U.S. funds.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the military budget?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Eleven percent. Who pays the other 89 percent?

General CLEMENT. This is paid by the Government of Vietnam. They finance it through taxes and customs duties and raise other revenues.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure about this?

General CLEMENT. As it concerns their military budget, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we pay all of the civilian; is that right? How do you judge this? You know very well that the Vietnamese have no resources to pay for 89 percent of the fighting. How is this set up?

General CLEMENT. Sir, this is the way the defense budget is broken out and accounted for.

The CHAIRMAN. By whom?

General CLEMENT. It is jointly worked out by the Vietnamese and our people in MACV.

The CHAIRMAN. Those taxes which the Government collects are all paid by the Federal Government of the United States; are they not?

General CLEMENT. Sir, that is really beyond my area.

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond your area?

General CLEMENT. Of responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would know about this? Is either of your colleagues expert in this?

Are you, Colonel?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not bother about budgetary matters?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I sympathize with you. I would not either, if I did not have to. I do not blame you.

But I would guess at least 90 percent of the civilian and military costs of the Government of South Vietnam is paid for by the American Government.

What they do, of course, is tax the imports that we send in for them. We send in a very large amount, $500 million of economic goods, to support them and they levy a tax on it and then they do not call that as being derived from the U.S. Federal Government.

I said directly or indirectly. What I meant is either by direct budgetary support or by paying taxes to them in the form of import taxes or any other kind.

I am afraid the 11 percent is very misleading if you are saying that that is all that the U.S. Federal Government contributes to support of the military in Vietnam, directly or indirectly. It may be the only direct support.

I have a number of other questions I will direct later, but I want the other Senators to proceed if they are ready.

MEANING OF REDEPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND COMBAT FORCES

Senator GORE. General, I was interested in and have become increasingly interested in the last few weeks in military terminology. Now, let me read you a statement which Chief of Staff General Wheeler made. This is with respect to Vietnamization:

> Our goal is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to improve so that in the absence of an acceptable guaranteed political settlement, they may resume full responsibility for the security of their country and we may redeploy all of our ground combat forces now there.

If you would be so kind, from your familiarity with military terminology, I would like you to tell me precisely what is the meaning of these words: "Redeploy all of our ground combat forces now there."

General CLEMENT. Well, sir, I am sure General Wheeler is referring to the phase redeployment from Vietnam which is currently going on. The current accent certainly is on redeployment of ground combat forces. I am sure he is talking in this context.

Senator GORE. In testimony before this committee, I questioned Secretary Laird with respect to this. If I correctly recall his terminology, what would remain there a year hence would be support troops, not by definition or description ground combat troops. Would you mind explaining the difference between support forces and ground combat forces?

General CLEMENT. Sir, support forces would be primarily quartermaster, transportation, engineer, signal, aviation forces. When you speak of support, this is normally what is envisaged: The technical, administrative, and logistical people, et cetera, that support the combat effort.

Senator GORE. When I inquired of him if it included infantry, the answer was yes. Would you say it would include infantry?

General CLEMENT. In the definition I gave, it did not, sir. But I am not sure of the context in which the Secretary was replying to your question. Was there a broader context?

Senator GORE. I am always left with this uncertainty. Just what is meant? The other day I read in the press that Secretary Laird said there were military advisers in Laos, but then changed it and they were military attachés. I do not know exactly the difference. I am frequently left with this.

General CLEMENT. I am sure that the Secretary was talking in a broader or different context rather than strict redeployment of combat troops per se.

DEFINITION OF VIETNAMIZATION

Senator GORE. Maybe we will just leave this between you and me and not refer to what term the President or Secretary Laird has used. What is your definition of Vietnamization as you understand it?

General CLEMENT. Sir, because Vietnamization has been interpreted, paraphrased——

Senator GORE. I see you are prepared for this one.

General CLEMENT. I would like to read the definition.

Senator GORE. Yes, I think it is worthy.

General CLEMENT. Vietnamization is the process by which the United States assists the Government of Vietnam to assume increasing responsibility for all aspects of the war and all functions inherent in self-government. It means building a stronger government with improved economy and strengthening the military internal security forces sufficient to permit the United States to reduce its military and civilian presence in Vietnam without unacceptable risks to the objectives of the United States in the security of the free world and Government of Vietnam forces. Vietnamization refers only to the assumption by Vietnamese of that portion of the war effort carried on by the United States. It does not refer to the total war effort in which the South Vietnamese themselves have carried such a large and heavy burden for some years."

Senator GORE. Did you prepare this definition?

General CLEMENT. We have prepared this definition; yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I did not understand that.

General CLEMENT. We have prepared the definition. It is not original with my appearance here.

Senator GORE. I see.

Then this is an official definition?

General CLEMENT. It can be termed that, I believe; yes, sir.

SCHEDULE FOR REDUCTION OF U.S. PRESENCE

Senator GORE. Can you give us some idea of when this millenium may arrive?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I believe that President Nixon has reserved to himself the announcement of any further withdrawals, or, rather, redeployments of U.S. forces and any time schedule. I am not prepared, really, to put time limits or announce any schedules.

Senator GORE. Is there a schedule to your knowledge?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I know of no schedule and, as I say, the President has said that he will make these announcements from time to time.

Senator GORE. If there is a schedule, you are not aware of it?

General CLEMENT. I know of plans, sir, but they are plans only. I know of no schedule.

Senator GORE. Are you prepared to discuss with this committee those military plans?

General CLEMENT. I believe I can discuss aspects, perhaps, in another session.

Senator GORE. In executive session?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. I certainly shall not press you there. Do you know if agreements exist between the Pentagon or U.S. military forces and the Saigon government with respect to the support from the Saigon government's troops?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I really can't answer that. I really do not know. It is beyond my area of competence here.

Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, all I seem to be able to get is another definition. I will turn the witness back to you.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ORIGINAL U.S. ADVISORY EFFORT

The Chairman. Senator Aiken.

Senator Aiken. I have only three or four questions.

First, the witness goes back to 1951. I think we ought to realize that from 1951 until 1954 we were considering Indochina and not Vietnam, and Indochina, as I recall, included Laos and Cambodia. So there was quite a difference.

At the time that Indochina was broken up, our advisory group consisted of 324 officers and men who became advisers to South Vietnam.

That is correct; is it not?

General Clement. Yes, sir.

Senator Aiken. Then the number of advisers increased slowly until 1960; they reached something less than 700. In the meantime, as I recall, in 1954, the United States was urged to send military assistance to the French; is that correct?

General Clement. Yes, I believe it is correct.

Senator Aiken. President Eisenhower at that time refused to put our Armed Forces in there in spite of urging from some of the Joint Chiefs. So by 1960, we had less than 700 advisers there.

Then they increased rather steadily from less than 700 at the end of 1960. The advisers for Vietnam alone increased to some 2,500 personnel. So at the end of 1961 there were over 3,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. Yet it appears that as our number of advisers increased from 1961 until 1968, the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese military establishment did not increase proportionately or accordingly. Does that mean that they did not have the capacity to study them or to learn or to take the advice? Or does it mean that we considered it our war from 1963 until 1969?

Our advisers certainly were not very effective as far as strengthening the South Vietnamese during those years and were not effective until 1969, if I read correctly the reports we get. What was the trouble?

General Clement. I am not prepared, sir, to defend the previous advisory effort or to share your judgment that our advisers were ineffective. I would prefer to tell you about our advisory effort now. We feel it is quite effective.

Senator Aiken. Would you say our advice has been more effective during the last 12 months than it had been during the previous 6 or 7 years?

General Clement. Sir, I would prefer not to make comparisons out of context, because this effectiveness is a function of the enemy situation and of many other things.

Senator Aiken. Very well. I think it is so obvious you do not need to make an estimate on that.

ADVISORY EFFORT IN LAOS

The other question I had in mind concerns the military advisers in Vietnam. Do they operate entirely distinct from the military, or perhaps some would say nonmilitary, advisers in Laos who are trying to make an effective army out of those troops? Do they operate entirely distinct or is there collaboration?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I know nothing about the advisory effort in Laos and I am not prepared to discuss it. I can certainly tell you how our advisers operate, and specifically in the training field, what we do.

EFFECTIVENESS OF RECENT U.S. ADVISORY EFFORTS

Senator AIKEN. Do you feel that your work in South Vietnam has been effective during the last year?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; we do.

Senator AIKEN. Is the work which they are doing there in part responsible for the fact that we are reducing the number of our own forces in South Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. I would say the total effort, the work that everyone has done there, sir, is responsible for that. This is a total war over there.

Senator AIKEN. What do you mean by everyone?

General CLEMENT. I mean the South Vietnamese and the U.S. troops over there, our civilians working there—everybody working together.

Senator AIKEN. You mean their morale, their spirit, has been better during the last year?

General CLEMENT. I have only been there a year. I cannot make sharp judgments. I believe there has been a tremendous increase in spirit from what I have seen.

Senator AIKEN. I think we can draw our own conclusions there, because we are getting reports, which I hope are accurate, of great progress being made during recent months, in contrast to the reports that we were getting, say, from 1963 to the end of 1968.

BASIS FOR DECISION TO TURN MORE RESPONSIBILITY OVER TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE

You are aware that we had planned to turn over to the South Vietnamese more responsibility for the defense of their own country. Is that plan based on our belief that the capacity of South Vietnam to assume the burden has increased greatly, or is it based on the theory that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong are getting sick of the job?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. Personally, I think it is a function of all of those things. The South Vietnamese have demonstrated competence. I can speak particularly of the training area, where they have certainly demonstrated a competence which, for example, would be different from 2 years ago—remarkably different. So this is a part of it.

Of course, the enemy is also always a part of this picture when you are at war.

Senator AIKEN. As the spirit and confidence of the South Vietnamese rises, then the spirit and the confidence of their enemy, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, diminishes or subsides. That seems a natural assumption, anyway.

I think and I hope we do not have any more complications, that the situation is much better than it was 2 years ago.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I know it is embarrasing, General, but the questions that Senator Aiken was putting are questions that concern me very much, concern

all of us. Secretary Laird, as I recall it, came back after his first trip over there and said he was appalled at the lack of training of the Vietnamese. Now, this, as Senator Aiken pointed out, was not really indicating progress. Newspaper accounts by responsible analysts who have come back, I think some of our very best people, have made this point.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE WITH TRAINING PROGRAM

How long have you been associated with the training program?

General CLEMENT. Since September, sir. Formerly, I had a tour with the Americal Division for 9 months.

Senator CASE. What division?

General CLEMENT. Americal Division, sir.

Senator CASE. Would you say the words out?

General CLEMENT. I am sorry, sir. It was the U.S. 23d Division in the north. We worked very closely with the 2d Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the I Corps. I had opportunity daily to work and see them.

Senator CASE. How long did you work with that?

General CLEMENT. That was 9 months.

Senator CASE. So your whole experience goes back about a year?

General CLEMENT. A year ago December, yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Before that, you were not connected with this problem?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. I was not.

Senator CASE. Are there any people here who were?

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I do not believe so.

Senator CASE. So we cannot get from you any idea of what the difference has been in this particular operation between the long period Senator Aiken referred to, from 1961 to 1969, and 1969 on? You are just not prepared to talk about this?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARVN 2D DIVISION

I can talk in a general way, for example, of the division with which I worked, and the change that did take place even in those months, brief as they were.

Senator CASE. When you say division, you mean the whole training effort, the whole training program of the whole Vietnamese Army?

General CLEMENT. That is right. The net result of the training is operational effectiveness, which, of course, is what we are after. This 2d Division, we thought, was tremendous, and still is, a very fine division.

Senator CASE. How many men is that?

General CLEMENT. It runs about 12,000, sir.

Senator CASE. That is the whole division?

General CLEMENT. That is the entire division, yes, sir.

Senator CASE. That is how many?

General CLEMENT. Regiments and battalions.

Senator CASE. How large a total force?

General CLEMENT. This 12,000 would be within the division itself. There would be a backup of logistical support.

Senator CASE. I am sorry, one division out of how many?

General CLEMENT. Twelve divisions. Ten numbered divisions, the airborne division, and the marine division.

Senator CASE. Has that division been good all along?

General CLEMENT. I am certain that its effectiveness has been greater in the past year than it had been previously.

Senator CASE. Was it in past years better than the rest of it?

General CLEMENT. I am not prepared to say, sir.

Senator CASE. You do not know anything about that?

General CLEMENT. I do not know its effectiveness in past years in relation to other divisions in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. This didn't spring full blown from——

General CLEMENT. No, it had been a good division.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF ARVN 2D DIVISION

Senator CASE. Why had it been a good division? Why has it been all along a good division?

General CLEMENT. I say it had been a good division, but I believe it has been much better, frankly, in the past year based on its records.

Senator CASE. Why was it better in the old days, why is it better now than the rest?

General CLEMENT. A lot of it is built on success, and they have had success in combat. There is nothing better than that to have the morale go up.

Senator CASE. That had to begin some time. How did it get going? What are the qualities that make it different from other divisions?

General CLEMENT. Leadership; you can begin with that, sir.

Senator CASE. In the South Vietnamese Division itself?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The division commander is a good leader.

Senator CASE. Has he been the same commander for many years?

General CLEMENT. He has been there 2 or 2½ years, sir.

Senator CASE. Did this division just start being good 2 years ago?

General CLEMENT. Sir. I would like to reserve questions on the division, if you would, for later. Colonel Wheeler is prepared to discuss the 1st Division. He is the 1st Division senior adviser.

Senator CASE. He has been for some time?

General CLEMENT. Since last July.

Senator CASE. But he knows something of the history of this?

Colonel?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. You do know something of this——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield, since you are interested, the colonel has a prepared statement. Then you can go on with the questioning.

Senator CASE. I do not mind a bit. I am trying to get something specific about this, rather than this tremendous amount of generality.

The CHAIRMAN. He is the adviser. He would be able to answer you on this.

Senator CASE. I will be glad to reserve until later.

The CHAIRMAN. You can do it now.

Senator CASE. I do not want to create a break here. I am trying to get something more useful than the repetition of the many generalities we have had before.

Go ahead.

As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, why not let the colonel go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Then we will come back and you can have a go at the rest of it.

TESTIMONY OF COL. JESSE L. WHEELER, JR., U.S. ARMY, SENIOR ADVISER, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Colonel WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Colonel Wheeler, senior adviser to the 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The 1st Infantry Division is the northernmost Vietnamese division in South Vietnam. Its area of operations is contiguous with the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and includes the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The division headquarters is located on the northeast edge of Hue.

The organization of the infantry divisions in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the advisory teams are basically the same, except the 1st Infantry Division has an additional organic regiment to enhance its capability to cope with the strong threat in and along the DMZ.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF ARVN 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

I will discuss briefly the organization of the 1st Infantry Division for two reasons. First, as the senior adviser, I am most familiar with this division and, second, to depict where the advisory effort is employed.

The primary mission of the division is conduct of offensive operations against the enemy in order to provide security for the people in Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces and to facilitate the pacification effort.

The division combat units are three regiments with four battalions each and one regiment with five battalions for a division total of 17 infantry battalions and one armed cavalry squadron. Combat support and service support units are very nearly the same as in other ARVN divisions. Normally attached to the division are armored cavalry, artillery, engineer, military police, and Navy units.

The commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division is also the senior military commander of the two northern provinces, Thua Thien and Quang Tri. There are regional force companies and popular force platoons in these two provinces with whom the division is associated.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM

The mission of the 1st Infantry Division advisory team, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, is to provide advice and assistance in the fields of command, personnel, intelligence, operations, training, and logistics. The 1st Infantry Division advisory team has 197 officers and enlisted men, 49 of whom are staff advisers and 111 advisers with the combat units.

ROLE OF THE ADVISER

The role of the adviser has been to advise and assist the commander and his staff concerning all aspects of military operations to include

coordinating combat operations and the employment of U.S. combat support and combat service support assets. This advisory effort is changed in direct proportion to the increased tactical proficiency of the ARVN units. For example, as units become self-sufficient, the advisers are withdrawn. In the 1st Infantry Division only newly activated artillery battalions are assigned advisers. In the signal battalion and engineer battalion the advisers have been deleted.

The increase in the level of military sophistication is typified by the professional operations of the 1st Division throughout the two northern provinces, and particularly along the DMZ, in the A Shau Valley, and the coastal areas during 1968 and 1969.

The 1st Infantry Division has effectively developed professional battalion and regimental commanders and principal division staff officers to the degree comparable to U.S. units. The majority of the battalion and regimental commanders have an average of 10 years combat command experience. To a large degree, these commanders have operated within the same general geographical areas. This background experience has enabled these commanders to develop expertise in most areas of tactical employment of military forces. In view of this tactical expertise, the adviser in the 1st Infantry Division has become a consultant for plans development and coordinator of available U.S. combat support and combat service support assets. Accordingly, the emphasis of the advisory effort has been directed toward these functions. Specifically, the adviser must possess the necessary education and experience to assist in the employment of nonorganic combat support assets to complement the combat plan developed by his counterpart, that is, selection of appropriate firepower for the accomplishment of the mission and use of tactical air support, to include gunships where precise English is a requirement.

The adviser must continue to give assistance to battalion and regimental staffs. In general, these staffs lack experience and until the junior officers and NCO's are better trained, they provide only limited assistance to the commander. Specifically, two areas that require improvement are the analysis of intelligence and intrastaff coordination. Due to the emphasis of the advisory effort in this area, marked progress is being made in their development.

In the combat service support role, demands are made upon the advisor to be knowledgeable of both U.S. and ARVN logistical systems. The adviser must be able to complement the ARVN logistical system with any unique features of the U.S. system. Additionally, adviser assistance is required in administration, maintenance of equipment, and base management.

The adviser is expected to be knowledgeable of civilian military relations and history of the local area in which the unit operates. He must be able to discuss current events and the likely impact of these events upon US/ARVN relations. He must establish personal rapport with his counterpart, which is a most essential factor in adviser-counterpart relations and which provides the necessary foundation for which mutual advice is exchanged and acted upon.

Mr. Chairman, this is a brief résumé of the mission and role of the adviser and organization of the 1st ARVN Division which I am senior adviser.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir.

Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Colonel.

It is not necessary that I follow what the chairman said at the outset of this hearing. I think all of us are completely aware of the tremendous difficulty of the job you men have had and still have. It is for us a unique kind of operation, and questions about it are not only, as the chairman suggested based upon questions of policy but also upon whether this kind of thing can be successful.

REASONS FOR EXCELLENCE OF 1ST DIVISION

I would like to come back now to the question I did present to General Clement earlier, and address it also to you, or both of you, if you will. What is there about this 1st Division that has set it apart over the years? What sets it apart now? Besides the fact that—but you do not have to comment upon your being the adviser of it. Undoubtedly, you are responsible for a good deal of its recent excellence. But this is not new. This has been always mentioned as we have one division of the South Vietnamese Army that really is beginning to shape up. This has been going on for years. Why?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, the 1st ARVN Division enjoys its particular prestige among all combat divisions from probably two factors. One is the leadership it has in its division commander, subordinate commanders, and the soldiers within the ranks. The soldiers within the ranks of the 1st ARVN Division are 55 percent from the Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces, with 45 percent of the personnel coming from other areas in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. You mean they are natives of that area?

Colonel WHEELER. They are natives of those two provinces, sir. It has been my observation that the soldier of the 1st ARVN Division, be he private, NCO, or officer, understands the value and the reason why he is fighting. I think he understands the fact that those values are worth fighting for and in some cases, worth dying for because the alternatives were clearly demonstrated to him during the Tet offensive of 1968.

Senator CASE. That goes back only 2 years.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The 1st ARVN Division, sir, was taken over by General Truong in June of 1966 at the time that the Buddhist "struggle movements" were taking place. He has built the division through flawless leadership and has made it comparable to any U.S. division.

Senator CASE. Is he also the province political head?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir: the two provinces have their own province chiefs. He is the senior military man there and as such, he is the one who is responsible for the security of both provinces. He does not usurp their prerogatives of direct operational command of the PF and RF forces. However, he does include these forces in his planning and deployment for the security of the division tactical area components of his overall operational force.

Senator CASE. Now, when he took over in 1966, what shape was the 1st Division in?

Colonel WHEELER. The division at that particular moment, sir, was not in the best state of morale because it was torn by the Catholic and the Buddhist factions.

Senator CASE. The factor that you mentioned earlier, that half of them or more come from the two provinces in which they are actively operating, that was still effective then; was it not?

Colonel WHEELER. Would you state the question again, please sir?

Senator CASE. In 1966, though they were torn between the Catholics and the Buddhists and had other difficulties, they were still men from those two provinces; were they not?

Colonel WHEELER. They were, but I do not know the percentage, sir.

Senator CASE. Do you think that percentage has increased?

Colonel WHEELER. I cannot say, sir.

Senator CASE. Have you any reason to think it has increased?

Colonel WHEELER. I would think probably that it has increased to some extent, sir, since the recruitment for the division is primarily within those two provinces now.

Senator CASE. Now, is this a unique factor applicable or attributable to this division as opposed to other divisions in which personnel do not come from the areas in which they are operating?

Colonel WHEELER. I do not know what percentage the other divisions have of personnel from their own local areas, sir. They all receive trainees from the nationalist training centers.

Senator CASE. Including the 1st?

Colonel WHEELER. Including the 1st, sir.

UNIQUENESS OF GENERAL TRUONG

Senator CASE. Now, as to the leadership, apart from the commander, the military commander, who is unique in your experience, is he in leadership, is he unusually good?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir, he is.

Senator CASE. Why is he unusually good?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, he is a very competent individual, with an extraordinary amount of ability and intelligence. He has a very keen and analytical mind. He takes his job seriously. He is on the job 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 31 days a month.

Senator CASE. Is he independent of Saigon?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir; he is under the command of the I Corps commander, who in turn answers to JCS.

Senator CASE. Is he one of the group who we sometimes talk about as the military leader, the real leadership of Vietnam, to which we——

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir; he does enjoy prestige from all quarters, both from Vietnamese and allied officials.

Senator CASE. No, I am talking about is he one of the group of military commanders who are supposed to be the boys who really run the show?

Colonel WHEELER. I am not sure what you are speaking of here, sir. All I can say is that he devotes his primary effort to the war in the 11th Division Tactical Area which is his assigned responsibility. I will say that he assiduously avoids political involvement, although he does enjoy equal prestige, whether they be political leaders or otherwise.

Senator CASE. What I am trying to get at is does he have unique qualities in his personality and his characteristics which give him the qualities to give leadership? What are the—I know you are trying to answer, but I am trying to find out why he is unique, why we do not have a dozen leaders of this kind thrown up in the process. How did he get to the top?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, a brief history of General Truong—he graduated from My Tho College in 1953 and attended Officer Candidate School at the Thu Doc Military School from which he graduated in 1954.

Senator CASE. This is when the French were there?

Colonel WHEELER. That is correct, sir. Upon graduation he was commissioned a second lieutenant and assigned to the Airborne Division.

Senator CASE. Was he a member of the mandarin class?

Colonel WHEELER. Not that I know of, sir.

Senator CASE. Do you happen to know what his family background is?

Colonel WHEELER. He comes from the Kien Hoa Province, south of Saigon.

Senator CASE. He is a southerner?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. A Buddhist?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Please go on.

Colonel WHEELER. From the date of his commissioning until 1966 he served exclusively with the airborne division in all positions from platoon leader to deputy division commander. In June 1966, he became the commander of the 1st ARVN Division. His demonstrated leadership qualities were those associated with a professional of the military art. Furthermore they were achieved through his own efforts.

Senator CASE. Why do we not have more of them? You know, I know this is part of your problem.

Colonel WHEELER. I am sure, sir, that there are others who are very competent, too.

General CLEMENT. There are some coming along the line. There are good division commanders.

Senator CASE. Out of 12?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. That is pretty—well, I mean not in very large proportions, is it, after almost 20 years of our military advisory effort?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

Of course, we have singled out the 1st Division. Colonel Wheeler is the senior adviser. This happens to be probably the outstanding commander. He is well up there. There are others that are very good, very fine commanders. The one I worked with in the 2d Division is very fine.

Senator CASE. Where is that?

General CLEMENT. That division is also in I Corps, just south of the 1st Division.

Senator CASE. Running down to——

General CLEMENT. Quang Ngai and Quangtin Provinces.

ESTIMATE OF 1ST DIVISION

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator would allow me to read a story? It is on this subject. This is a story dated December 30 in the Christian Science Monitor. It contains an article by George Ashworth about the 1st Division:

> The Americans have obviously tried to give the 1st the best of everything, as one would a precocious, favored son.

He says:

The 1st not only is the best, but it is the largest South Vietnamese Division, with 19 maneuver battalions and a total strength of 21,000, including attachments of armored and other units. Other divisions are about half that size.

It talks about General Truong. It says, among other things, that he looks after his people. It says there is a commissary at which soldiers and their families can buy rice and other staples at well under the market level. Troops whose families are near are allowed time off, generally once a month, to go see them.

The article says:

Naturally, there are flaws in the 1st. There is a lack of depth in leadership. All enlisted leaders receive special training at the division's training center, but some important staff positions remain unfilled, probably for lack of anyone the General cares to appoint. . . .

But the question remains whether Saigon will have enough units as good as the 1st when the moment of crisis approaches . . . One shining example, such as the 1st, may not be enough.

This is the Christian Science Monitor which, as you know, is a rather reliable newspaper, if there is one according to the modern day.

What would you say about Mr. Ashworth's estimate of the 1st Division?

Colonel WHEELER. I would say his estimate, sir, is very accurate. I have met Mr. Ashworth on several occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the conclusion would be that the 1st is by no means a typical division. It is the outstanding division of the whole ARVN Army; is it not?

Colonel WHEELER. I have no way of judging the other divisions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. I should not ask you that. I withdraw the question. That is what Mr. Ashworth and other people say. Being the senior adviser, I can see why you would not want to make a self-serving statement like that. I am sure General Clement, being there on the stand with you, would not want to, either, unless he wishes to volunteer that.

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I would not wish to comment on that.

UNEVENESS OF PERFORMANCE OF ARVN FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. This is to Colonel Wheeler, too. Following that up on January 12 of this year, there was a panel discussion on national educational television among several reporters in Vietnam. In commenting on Vietnamization, Mr. Beach of the Chicago Daily News, who I believe has been out there longer than any and is very well acquainted in the area, said:

Well, the performance by the ARVN forces, and I will include the regional and popular forces in ARVN, has been very, very spotty. They have done very badly in some places and they have done very well in others. You can prove anything you want to, really, by going to a given area. You can prove that they are doing beautifully here and you can prove that they are doing simply horribly there. And that is that. It has always been true of this war.

Would you say that is a rather inaccurate statement, General?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I would say there is bound to be unevenness in performance in all units.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General CLEMENT. And I think he may have overdrawn the case somewhat.

The Chairman. You think he has, Colonel? Has he overdrawn the case?

Colonel Wheeler. I can only speak of my area, sir, I can say that the lowlands of the 11th Division tactical area are currently, and have been since last summer, secured by the RF and the PF units. The combat units and the combat support units of the 1st ARVN Division are employed in the Piedmont and the jungle areas where the NVA are located.

Senator Case. How long has the 1st Division been up there, operating where it is now?

Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARVN Division, sir, has been there since its activation in 1955.

Senator Case. So from recent history, in recent history, it has been there all the time?

Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.

NUMBER OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN 1ST CORPS AREA

The Chairman. How many American troops are in that 1st Corps area compared to the ARVN troops?

Colonel Wheeler. I do not have a figure on the total American troops in the I Corps area.

General Clement. I don't have a figure. We have a unit, sir; it is a Marine division.

The Chairman. Don't you know how many men and arms are in the 1st Corps area?

Don't you know, General?

General Clement. I am just wondering if I should provide the exact number or give you a ball park figure, sir.

The Chairman. Do you think this involves security?

General Clement. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Why don't you say so? Say you know, but don't want to tell us in open session. That is the proper answer. Don't say you don't know. You leave the impression that you came all the way from Vietnam and don't know anything to talk about. We can talk about it in executive if that is the way you feel. I did not assume it is any secret, but if it is, all right. That is your privilege.

Senator Case?

HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR 1ST ARVN DIVISION

Senator Case. What percentage of the helicopter support comes from the Vietnamese force in the 1st Corps, the 1st Vietnamese——

Colonel Wheeler. The 1st ARVN Division helicopter support provided by the Vietnamese Air Force is about 20 to 25 percent, sir.

Senator Case. Of the support that that division is given in operations?

Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. Has that markedly increased from what it was when you first went there?

Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.

At that time, we did not have support for the 1st ARVN Division provided by the Vietnamese Air Force. A helicopter unit became operational in October 1969 and that unit has provided some support to us on a daily basis for resupply and for combat assaults.

Senator CASE. Do they have a gunship helicopter?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir, they do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand. Are you talking about helicopters that first——

Senator CASE. I am talking about Vietnamese helicopter support by the Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean how many they have that are not ours?

Senator CASE. Well, I want to find out what percentage they are supplying of their own helicopter support.

The CHAIRMAN. I could not follow the answer.

Senator CASE. I thought it was about 20 to 25 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what?

Colonel WHEELER. I understand the question concerns the total amount of helicopter support that is employed or used by the 1st ARVN Division and what percentage of that is provided by the VNAF.

Senator CASE. That is right.

Colonel WHEELER. I stated 20 to 25 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Seventy-five percent by Americans.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I didn't understand.

Senator CASE. And none of that VNAF-furnished support is fighter ships?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir. VNAF has no helicopter gunships at this time.

Senator CASE. What is the plan and prospect for that?

Colonel WHEELER. I do not have the information on that, sir.

Senator CASE. That comes from the Vietnamese Air Force, I take it? This is all a matter of central ARVN control?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir, and we do get tactical air, both United States and VNAF.

The CHAIRMAN. How many helicopters does the 1st have?

Colonel WHEELER. The 1st ARVN Division does not have any organic helicopters, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, it does not have any?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

Senator CASE. So your training operation does not include any training in helicopter, even for support?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

Senator CASE. Even for support as opposed to fighting?

Colonel WHEELER. Our training includes the utilization of helicopters for combat assault and combat resupply missions.

Senator CASE. That is furnished by 75 percent Americans or 75 or 80, and 20 to 25 supplied by the Vietnamese Army?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. How long do you think it would be before—you are not prepared, I guess, to say how the Vietnamese Air Force is coming along in its training, are you? You would have to get that from some other place?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. This kind of support objective is still central to the operations as you conceive that they will be carried on, continue to be carried on?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

NECESSITY OF HELICOPTER SUPPORT

Senator CASE. You need helicopter support? It is essential, I take it?

Colonel WHEELER. It is essential to the combat operations there as long as the situation remains as it is now, sir.

Senator CASE. Will you tell me why it is essential? The North Vietnamese-Vietcong operations have never had this kind of support. Why do we have to have it?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, the location of the enemy in the area in which the division is employed requires that we have the necessary combat support. Here I am speaking of the artillery, to support the infantry units that are employed into the jungle and mountain areas. To move artillery in where there are no roads we use the helicopters.

Senator CASE. I know you do. But the North Vietnamese do not have that. How do they get around?

Colonel WHEELER. The North Vietnamese, sir, do not employ fire power from the type artillery weapons that we do.

UNITED STATES INFLUENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE WARFARE TACTICS

Senator CASE. Of course, what I am getting at, Colonel, is this other question as to whether we have corrupted the tactics of the South Vietnamese in the war and tried to make it a war in which we fight our way and try to make them fight it in that way. I wish more comment on this thing. I again am not being critical, but this comment has been made many times, that we have not only taken the war over ourselves and fought it as I expect anybody given a job would want American forces to do, but that we have made it impossible by disabling the South Vietnames from the kind of warfare they would be able to carry on any other time. What do you say about that?

Colonel WHEELER. I would say, sir, in this case, we do not have advisers in the artillery units. They are competent, fully capable, and do employ their artillery without the assistance of advisers.

Senator CASE. That is a very interesting observation, but it does not really go to the question.

General?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I think we should talk of air mobility tactics since this sort of personifies what we have there. One of the biggest reasons for the success we have had is because of the air mobility concept. This allowed us to get to places we had never been before, that the French had never been in before. Unfortunately, the French did not have this amount of helicopter support. We did. We have been able to move into the war zone C, war zone D, in and out as the enemy evaporated. This meant we could bring pressure on the enemy in places he had never had it before. We could make him move from his base areas. We could operate on his supply lines. This was a tremendous thing.

We first tried it out here in Fort Benning, Ga., and brought it over under General Kinnard and it made a tremendous difference from the very beginning.

Senator CASE. I am not advocating that we have tied our men's hands, our forces hands at all. That is not the point.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

Senator CASE. The point is have we made it impossible for the South Vietnamese to fight the way they have always fought and know how to fight?

General CLEMENT. Let me come back to that and try to paint a picture of the enemy concept and the helicopter per se. It has been a tremendous thing. You mentioned the NVA and the fact that they do not have them. They would love to have them, I am sure.

We talk about the Vietnamese. We have trained them, yes, in the use of helicopters. Many of these combat assaults that Colonel Wheeler described are ARVN. These are Vietnamese soldiers out there, understanding how to be air mobile, understanding the use of the helicopter, how to do things with it. Yes, I think a certain percentage of helicopters ought to be retained by the Vietnamese.

Now, you come to the balance of how many should be retained. The ARVN is not a mirror image army by any means. It is a much slimmer army than ours. Its divisions are not as heavily armed as ours. There would not be as many helicopters as there are in our army, obviously. Certainly air mobility is a concept which should not be forgotten and which they should keep. How much is a question of trade-offs.

IS UNITED STATES SUPPLYING CRUTCH TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE?

Senator CASE. Of course, I am not, again, trying to say how much they should have. All I am trying to say is are they getting to the point where they can take this job on themselves or are we in a sense, with the very best purpose in the world, making it impossible for them to do this by giving them this crutch and supplying this crutch which, when it is taken away, whether this year, 10 years from now, will make them unable to do the job?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I believe that you maybe paint the crutch a little bit too heavily. I do not believe it is that much of a crutch. It is another facet, another weapon to be used, a different tactical employment to be used.

These commanders we are talking about are seasoned commanders—General Truong, for example, and most of the others—they have been at war for a long time. They understand the use of this measure. If it is taken away, there is another way to do it. They can always do it the way they did it before, which would take longer, perhaps, but given the enemy threat, this is what you are always concerned with.

Senator CASE. I think I have just summed up the testimony that General Wheeler has given. I take it that you would pretty much agree, you are not prepared to talk about the prospects for self-sufficiency on the part of the Vietnamese Air Force, neither one of you.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

PROSPECTS FOR 1ST DIVISION OPERATION WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT

Senator CASE. That is involved here. You are prepared to say that in the north, these two northern provinces in the 1st Division area, the South Vietnamese Army is coming along so that it will be able to handle itself and make use of the kind of support that it is getting now and I feel we have come to lead them to think is necessary. So they will be able to take this on increasingly themselves and use it tactically and operationally. You are satisfied with this, that you could let them go fairly soon and they could run the show themselves, with the outside support, of course, especially the air support that we are now providing.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir. The staff of the 1st ARVN Division at the present time does plan by itself tactical operations, and the use of any support which we can provide, to accomplish whatever tactical plan the division commander directs.

Senator CASE. In other words, now, may I broaden this just a little bit? If the rest of the Vietnamese Army could do this, we could pull out tomorrow except for support.

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, that goes beyond my purview.

Senator CASE. What about you, General?

General CLEMENT. No, sir, and I think you paint the picture, a little too strongly for the I Corps area. There are a lot of enemy up in I Corps, and there always have been. Quang Ngai Province, I am sure you recognize, has always been one of the most difficult provinces. It still is. The units here have to cover these areas where the enemy may be found. So this problem of where the enemy may be found is a very sensitive problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Senator CASE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long do you think it will be before the 1st Division can operate completely independently without U.S. helicopter, artillery, and other support? How long do you think it will be before it can operate on its own.

Colonel WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, an answer to that particular question would certainly consider the intentions of the enemy. I would not at this time be in a position to state what those intentions are.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that there has been the assumption that their intention was not the friendliest and that there would be some conflict. I did not mean that they could operate with no war at all. I assumed that with the known attitude of the North Vietnamese.

If you cannot answer, that is all right.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

I would like to go back to a question. You said a moment ago that one reason why the 1st Division was so good is that the soldier in the 1st understands what he is fighting for and he believes in it and that is why he is the best soldier. Is that about what you said?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say that about the American soldiers there too?

Colonel WHEELER. Those that I have observed, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you feel the same way about that?

General CLEMENT. I think generally, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to examine you a bit on that. There have been a number of news stories in recent months concerning the growing disillusionment of American servicemen in Vietnam with the war. I will put a number of these in the record, but I would just ask you about a few excerpts from them.

The following from an article in the Washington Evening Star describes the problem in this way. These are Americans they are talking about and I quote:

"Soldiers do not seem to care particularly which 'gooks' finally win the war—'our gooks' or 'their gooks.' To the American slogging through the rice paddies and jungles, under blazing sun or monsoon

rain, all Vietnamese are 'gooks,' whether fighting for the Communists or the Saigon Government.

"The widespread use of the term 'gook', a leftover of World War II and the Korean conflict, reflects the repugnance and aversion of most soldiers toward the citizens of the country they are ordered to defend.

"The term, spoken with contempt, hatred, or simple resignation, simplifies a contradiction between attitude of the average 'grunt' or infantryman and that of American officials still intent on 'winning the hearts and minds of the populace.' "

Would you comment on that statement? This is by Donald Kirk, Asia Correspondent of the Washington Star.

General CLEMENT. If I could just make a brief comment, sir, from experience serving with the American troops, in the 23d Division, I would not say that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not?

General CLEMENT. I think their attitude, their morale, their dedication, was pretty outstanding.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not agree with that at all?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they know what they are fighting for?

General CLEMENT. I think they do; yes, sir.

FOR WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES FIGHTING IN VIETNAM?

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would make as clear as you can what you think they think they are fighting for?

General CLEMENT. I would rather not speak about what they think they are fighting for. I can tell you what I think I am fighting for.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General CLEMENT. I am fighting for what we first of all do recognize as a Communist threat. This has been over our heads for a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak for yourself, not with "we." You go ahead and say what you think you find.

General CLEMENT. We have encountered Communists on the battlefield, we have taken them under fire, and we feel that the country for which we are fighting, and with whose soldiers we are fighting, is making great strides toward becoming a nation on its own, self-determined, and that this is why we are doing it.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you have encountered many of these Communists. Have you?

General CLEMENT. I say in battles, engagements.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it about the Communists that you think justifies the effort that we are making?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I would prefer not to get into a lengthy political discussion about the communists.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason this question was prompted is that the Colonel says the reason the ARVN 1st Division is so good is that they know what they are fighting for. They understand it and they believe in it.

It sems to me it is a legitimate question to ask an American what he is fighting for and why he believes it and why it is so important.

There are contradictions, you see. There are Communists in Cuba, for example, only 90 miles away from America. If it is important and

the only reason you are fighting there is because these are Communists and therefore they are evil and should be eradicated, why do we not fight in Cuba? This is the kind of question I am asked. I get letters from constituents all the time and this question has been a recurring one.

If I understand you, the reason we are fighting there is because we are fighting Communists. Is that correct?

General CLEMENT. And another reason, sir; and probably the biggest one, is that our Nation has decided that that is where military forces will be committed by the United States. I am an officer and that is where I am going when I am sent there. I think that is where the forces do really go, sir. When they are sent, they go and they do a tremendous job.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a different kind of answer. You are there because you are a military man and you have been ordered there to fight for your country; is that right?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; and I also have belief.

The CHAIRMAN. I think this is legitimate, too. I have inquired with both of them. They are both legitimate and I do not quarrel with them. I am just trying to elucidate it.

This article in the Washington Star is certainly not the last word.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

I have another article here from South Vietnam, "Every Boy, U.S.A." This is apparently an interview with an American soldier. It says, "His name is Roy Miles. He came to Vietnam last February, a fresh-faced, rosy-cheeked kid, fully prepared to fight honorably for his country's ideal. There have been some changes since then." He is very disillusioned with the war. This is a quote from an interview by a man named Arnold Abrams in Saigon, carried in the February 12, 1970, Far Eastern Economic Review. He quotes Mr. Miles, saying, "'I've seen a lot of things and done a lot of thinking since I got here. * * * I feel as if I've been used. Nothing I've seen or heard about the way we've been doing things, and why, makes any sense.' If the United States was supposed to save South Vietnam, he said, 'How come we are starting to pull out now? Everyone knows the South Vietnamese can't make it by themselves.' He added: And if it's not really so important to save this country, why did we get involved in the first place—and what do we say to the parents of the 40,000 guys who have been killed?'

"This was no hippie, draft dodger, or dissenter spouting rhetorical questions. This was, if such a thing still exists, Every Boy, U.S.A.; a clean-cut, right-thinking, relatively unsophisticated, Midwestern youth who has served and suffered as a soldier, seen others die, and now asks why. Nobody, he said, has supplied a satisfactory answer.

"Miles' feelings are as representative of American troop morale in Vietnam as sentiments of the so-called Silent Majority are of prevailing public opinion in the United States. He is neither hawk nor dove; just disillusioned and disgusted."

There are other articles. I am going to put all the articles in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 9, 1969]

"Let Them Fight It Out"—Growing GI Disillusion Casts Doubt on Morale Claims

(By Donald Kirk)

Saigon.—The worn-out cliche of generals and master sergeants that "morale over here is great" no longer seems to apply to men in the field.

Unlike the veterans of previous tours in Vietnam, many of those here now say the United States should get out—as quickly as possible. "Leave it to the gooks to fight it out between themselves" is a typical comment.

Soldiers do not seem to care particularly which "gooks" finally win the war—"our gooks" or "their gooks." To the Americans slogging through the rice paddies and jungles, under blazing sun or monsoon rain, all Vietnamese are "gooks" whether fighting for the Communists or the Saigon government.

The widespread use of the term "gook," a leftover of World War II and the Korean conflict, reflects the repugnance and aversion of most soldiers toward the citizens of the country they are ordered to defend.

The term, spoken with contempt, hatred or simple resignation, symbolizes a contradiction between the attitude of the average "grunt" or infantryman and that of American officials still intent on "winning the hearts and minds of the populace."

SENSE OF FUTILITY

The reasons for GI opposition to the war range from lack of support at home for what they are doing to a sense of futility in patrolling the same patch of jungle day in and day out without any prospect of real victory.

Some soldiers express support for antiwar demonstrators at home, but many despise the demonstrators and center their discontent on the failure of the United States to throw all of its resources into winning a military victory.

Whatever the reasons, however, the prevalent GI attitude now goes far beyond routine complaints against authority or personal hardship.

"It's a crazy war," mused Spc. 4 Charles Rose, resting in the back of an armored personnel carrier in between patrols from a firebase operated by the 25th Infantry Division some 30 miles northwest of here. "It ain't really worthwhile."

To Rose, like many of the other soldiers interviewed at firebases around the country, one of the most disillusioning realizations was that the Vietnamese did not like the Americans.

"We went to a village and we asked the people some questions," said Rose, a 20-year-old former farm boy. "All they said was, 'Who's VC?' They acted like they never heard of them. The people don't give a damn for us."

GI's often are not aware that the VC will threaten and possibly kill villagers who provide them with information, but the sense of hostiliy also is manifest in plainly "friendly" areas.

Outside the bases taxi-drivers, soft-drink vendors and the like wait to charge unsuspecting soldiers five or 10 times the going prices for their services.

"These people are just out for our money," was a typical GI observation. "They want us to fight for them," observed one soldier, "and then they'll take us for all they can while we're here. That's all they care about."

"If they don't want us to help them, now's the time to go home," said Pfc. Ronald Dorsey, 21, a radio operator from Atlanta, Ga. "As long as the people don't want us here, I don't think we should be here."

The inbred Vietnamese suspicion of foreigners, whether Americans, French, Chinese or Japanese, does not seem to puzzle the troops so much, however, as the opposition to the war in the United States.

DISSENT LOUD

Despite occasional efforts by Armed Forces Radio in Saigon to downplay criticism of the war, the message of dissent at home gets through loud and clear to the men in the field. They hear reports of anti-war statements by senators and demonstrations by students.

Soldiers two, three and four years ago almost unanimously viewed such reports with disdain and disgust. To the men who were then fighting the war, the demonstrators "back in the world" were "draftdodgers" who were too frightened to go to the war themselves.

Many Americans here still hew to this view, but many others now applaud the antiwar dissidents. "They should keep on demonstrating," said one soldier. "Then maybe we'll all get to go home."

"If I was there, I'd join 'em," remarked a 22-year-old sergeant, James O. Smith of San Diego. "The demonstrations are 'No. 1.' I don't think half the people here believe in this war."

Pfc. Robert Jones, 19, countered that the demonstrations would not "help the cause" even if war was pointless. "They won't get us out of here any faster," he said, "and they might just encourage the gooks to fight harder against us."

To Jones, a native of Memphis, the central question was whether or not the United States planned to fight to the finish or merely maintain a stalemate.

RISKS CAUSE GRIPES

"I can see the point in the war to fight to win," he said. "If the war is to stop communism, I'd a lot rather stop it in Vietnam than somewhere else. But I can't see any reason for just fighting it half way."

The "half-way" nature of the war ranks as easily the greatest complaint among those soldiers who might support it as long as the United States had any intention of winning.

The most frequent gripe among infantrymen is they must risk their lives patrolling rice paddies and jungles designated as "no-fire zones" by their superiors. The reason for this designation in most cases is plain enough: artillery and bombs might kill and wound civilians and do more to injure than help the allied cause.

To the average GI, however, this reasoning makes little sense, particularly when some "civilians" turn out to be enemy soldiers or informants. And many of the troops are even less convinced of restrictions on going into enemy base areas along the Cambodian border.

"This war will always be just a stalemate," observed a GI in a battalion of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, responsible for covering the jungles of War Zone C along the frontier "Either we should invade Cambodia or go back home. There's no middle course."

The sense of puzzlement, frustration and bitterness permeates the attitudes of young officers as well as enlisted men. It is not uncommon these days to find lieutenants and captains expressing complete agreement with the "antiwar" views of some of the troops beneath them.

WAR BELIEF SHAKEN

A lieutenant at a 25th Division fire base singled out a visiting reporter and advised him "None of the men here believe in this war."

The lieutenant claimed only the Regular Army officers—career men—were enthusiastic about fighting much longer.

"Don't believe what they tell you," the lieutenant remarked when his superior officers were out of hearing. "We're just here because we have no choice and for no other reason."

Like the enlisted men, however, officers present a wide variety of views. "Personally, I think we should nuke 'em (hit with nuclear weapons)," remarked a second lieutenant in the 1st Cavalry Division. "We should have increased the bombing of North Vietnam and not have stopped it. That was the worst mistake of the war."

Amid these conflicting viewpoints, a significant number of officers and men also support the present policy of the administration of gradual withdrawal of American troops and "replacement" of them by Vietnamese units.

"It's their country, their weather, their insects," remarked Pfc. Francis McCarten, 20, of New York. "They can speak to anyone they meet. Anything the VC can do, they can do. If they thought it was their war, then they would fight it."

"Leave it to the gooks to fight for themselves," was the advice of a lieutenant who had led a platoon in War Zone C. "It's their country. They know that jungle better than we do. We're lost there."

Despite the general decline in troop morale, virtually no soldier admitted his personal attitude and views had affected his performance. "It hasn't reached that point yet," said a member of an artillery crew, "because we know we only have so much time to do here, and we just mark off the days on our calendars .

Other factors also tend to keep soldiers from refusing orders or openly rebelling. Helicopters fly hot food and mail out to the field. Post exchanges sell luxury goods as well as practical necessities at all major installations. Even on small artillery bases the troops get two cans of beer a day.

6-DAY LEAVES

And then, in the middle of his tour in Vietnam, every GI goes on a six-day leave in one of the nightclub- and girl-filled cities of Asia and even to Honolulu or Australia. No other country in history has offered this kind of diversion or spent so much to please the troops.

GI's remark, as do students at home, that the United States is the place to fight "the real war" against America's problems. To some of these soldiers, however, the enemies when they return home will not be the generals who wanted them to fight in Vietnam but the youth who demanded an end to hostilities.

"We're fighting the wrong enemy," said a 19-year-old foot-soldier who graduated from high school in June of last year. "I think we should go back to the States and turn some of these weapons and helicopters against these demonstrators. We should take care of that problem before going ahead and fighting another war overseas."

[From the Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 12, 1970]

SOUTH VIETNAM: EVERYBODY USA

(By Arnold Abrams)

A year in Vietnam had left its mark on the kid's face, but had not erased the American Midwestern wholesomeness from his features. This was his first Saigon visit after 10 months in the field, and he was absorbing the city with wide-eyed wonder, in no hurry to rejoin his unit.

"My god, the girls," he said. "I've never seen such girls. So beautiful—and the clothes they wear. Never seen anything like this in my whole life." Understandably. His whole life had taken up all of 19½ years, most of which were spent in Delavan, Wisconsin, a tiny town about 45 miles from Milwaukee. Not many Delavan girls wear Vietnamese ao-dais.

His name is Roy Miles. He came to Vietnam last February, a fresh-faced, rosy-cheeked kid fully prepared to fight honourably for his country's ideals. There have been some changes since then.

There were, to start, the physical things: Miles' nose was deeply ridged and spread across more of his face than before, the result of his detonating an enemy land mine while driving an armoured personnel carrier with the U.S. 1st Division north of Saigon. Then there was his hearing. It was off, due to a cracked eardrum caused by the boom of a B-40 rocket slamming into the rear of his carrier on another occasion.

Still, one of his companions had been killed and 10 others cut up in those incidents, so Miles really had no cause to complain about physical ailments. But more than battle bruises were bothering him, for time and medical care would heal those. His other anguish, however, was another matter: there is no known cure for disillusionment.

Miles had joined the army several months after graduating from Delavan High School in June, 1968. He had been an average student with no specific vocational aims, and had enlisted after killing time in two meaningless factory jobs.

Having respect for his parents, and noting their pride in his older brother, a military policeman stationed in the States, he had listened when his father spoke about love of country and fulfilment of obligations.

Miles knew nothing about Vietnam, but trusted his father, a police officer. He came to believe a worthy national cause was involved here, and that he should make whatever contribution he could.

Miles was ordered to Vietnam after completing basic and advanced infantry training. There was no time to return home. He phoned the news to his parents. "I don't think they had ever got themselves to believe I'd be sent to Vietnam," he said. "My mother cried when I told her. Still, their last words to me were that I should be a good soldier."

He hit the mine six weeks after arriving. He was in hospital several weeks and then went back into action even though the smashed bone structure in his nose impeded normal breathing. "The doctors said I'd eventually have to get an operation," he said, "but that in the meantime. I was in good enough shape to go back. I didn't argue. I went."

It is different with Miles now. He thinks he was a sucker. "I've seen a lot of things and done a lot of thinking since I got here," he said, "and I feel as if I've been used. Nothing I've seen or heard about the way we've been doing things, and why, makes any sense."

If the US was supposed to save South Vietnam, he said, "how come we're starting to pull out now? Everyone knows the South Vietnamese can't make it by themselves." He added: "And if it's not really so important to save this country, why did we get involved here in the first place—and what do we say to the parents of the 40,000 guys who've been killed?"

This was no hippie, draft-dodger or dissenter spouting rhetorical questions. This was, if such a thing still exists, Everyboy USA: a clean-cut, right-thinking, relatively unsophisticated Midwestern youth who has served and suffered as a soldier, seen others die, and now asks why. Nobody, he said, has supplied a satisfactory answer.

Miles' feelings are as representative of American troop morale in Vietnam as sentiments of the so-called Silent Majority are of prevailing public opinion in the US. He is neither hawk nor dove; just disillusioned and disgusted.

This boy's case has deep implications, for there is mounting evidence of a malaise spreading through American troop ranks in Vietnam. Dissent here is generally attributed to the growing number of college educated youths pulled into service.

However, behind this articulate, protest-oriented minority, are many Roy Miles: farm boys and factory workers who do not wear beads, smoke pot or paint peace posters—but who are, nevertheless, increasingly intolerant of a seemingly senseless situation .

What will he say about Vietnam to the folks back in Delavan, particularly his parents? "I really don't know. Maybe nothing." Then he added: "My father feels 'my country, right or wrong.' I once did too. But going through something like this changes your mind. America is my country, yes. But when it's wrong, it's wrong, and something should be done to correct it. People shouldn't let 40,000 guys get killed and not know why."

He doesn't sympathize with all the aims of peace demonstrators back home. "But I think they've done some good. I think they've made the point to the President and the American people that the United States can be wrong."

What would he say now about Vietnam to a draft-age son? "I don't think I'd say anything," he said. "I'd let him make up his own mind. He'd understand." Miles, due home later this month, wonders if his own father will understand.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 4, 1969]

Many GI's Disillusioned on War

but esprit de corps appears excellent in most units

(By B. Drummond Ayres Jr.)

Saigon, South Vietnam.—It was 2:25 A.M. and the moon over Landing Zone Center was high, too high for night ambushes. But the private from Phoenix had his orders.

He slung a belt of machinegun ammunition over each shoulder and wrapped a third around his waist. Then he smeared his face and hands with camouflage grease paint.

As he worked, he offered a running commentary on the war.

"If you'll look closely," he said, "you'll see some beads and a peace symbol under all of this ammo. I may look like Pancho Villa on the outside but on the inside I'm nothing but a peacenik.

"I fight because that's the only way to stay alive out here in the boonies. I don't believe this war is necessary. I just work hard at surviving so I can go home and protest all this killing."

He picked up his rifle, slid in a fresh magazine, slammed home a round and trudged off into the moonlit paddies stretching toward nearby Danang.

There are many United States soldiers in South Vietnam today who lack an ideological commitment to the war, though not all wear beads or threaten to march after discharge. But even though many voice disillusion with the war—either because they view it as unnecessary or because they feel it is not worth fighting under the present rules and circumstances—morale remains high.

'only want to stay alive'

Why do these men continue to fight and die? What carried them to Aphia Mountain? Or made them stick it out at Benhet?

Conversations with scores of infantrymen throughout the country over the last several months have produced a number of answers. Most are variations on the Arizonian's theme that "I fight because that's the only way to stay alive."

To Sgt. William Simpson, a 28-year-old reconnaissance expert from Catlett, Va., the war has not "real" meaning. After completing a recent helicopter assault in which four enemy soldiers were killed, he said:

"I'm a volunteer but this war has become only a job to me. If we're going to fight we ought to fight and not play around with a lot of sanctuaries and lulls and pauses. You could believe in the war if you could really fight it.

"As it is, I just do my job as well as I can because it's death to let up. But I don't have to like my working conditions."

Specialist 4 Kenneth McParland, a 21-year-old infantryman from Rock Valley, Iowa, does not care about the war "except that it interrupted things and I want to get out and go home."

During a break between patrols, he said: "I'm part of a squad. I pull my share of the load. The other fellows don't let me goof off and I don't let them goof off. It's the only way to stay alive."

'BIG PAIN IN THE NECK'

To Private First Class Edward Stich, a 20-year-old rifleman from Queens, the war is "a big pain in the neck."

"Who needs it?" he asked one hot morning at the end of a long march. Without waiting for an answer, he continued:

"I'm just putting in my days, doing what I'm told, doing a job. One morning I'll wake up and I'll be finished and then I'll go home and tune out, forget it all."

Many soldiers are quick to say they fight in SouthVietnam because they believe in the war, whatever the political and diplomatic complications. Many of these men are career officers or sergeants.

Typical of them is Maj. James Bramlet, a 37-year-old operations officer with the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

"I believe in what we're doing here," he said over a cold beer at the end of a day of fighting.

"A big fellow has got to help a little fellow," he added, "especially if the little fellow is a nice guy who's getting kicked around. That's what America is all about. It's not a matter of the 'yellow peril.' I don't go for that argument. It's really just a matter of a man's commitment to his fellow man when his fellow man needs help."

Another professional, Capt. Ernie Carrier, 23 years old, of Benton, La., sees the war as "duty that I requested."

Chatting with several of his men, he said: "I signed up. So I go along because that's what I'm supposed to do. If I don't like it, I can always get out."

For all the division over the war here and at home, the espirit de corps remains excellent in most United States units. Even in outfits not yet scheduled to go home a part of the new United States withdrawal plan there are no signs of eroding morale. In fact, the average American soldier seems to hold no hope that he will go home a single day earlier than originally scheduled.

"Let's face it," said Private First Class John Cuccione, 20-years old, of New Rochelle. "Specific battalions of the Ninth Division were shipped home but most of the men in those battalions with more than a month to serve were shifted to some unit not scheduled to go home. They flipflopped with men with less than a month to go."

United States commanders attribute the continuing high spirit to a number of factors, including good leadership, good medical care, good equipment and good food. The most frequently mentioned factor, however, is the relative shortness of the tour of duty in Vietnam.

"When one of my men arrives in country," said Maj. Gen. Ormond R. Simpson, commander of the First Marine Division, "he knows that in exactly 13 months he'll be going home again if bad luck doesn't send him sooner.

"For the Army boys, the tour is only 12 months. You can't beat short tours for boosting spirit in a war like this, especially when the short tours themselves are broken by a five-day free vacation to some exotic place like Hawaii or Hong Kong or Tokyo."

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 18, 1969]

Many GI's Dislike Viet Allies

Vietnamese Return the Animosity

(By Robert G. Kaiser)

Saigon.—Before I came to Vietnam I wanted a job working with the Vietnamese," the young American lieutenant said, "but now I'm glad I'm in a U.S. infantry outfit. I just don't like Gooks. Right after I got here I went out with one of our companies, one of the first operations I went on. The company got hit—they got mauled, really. Six Americans got killed, 18 wounded. You looked at those guys, dead and wounded, and you had to feel different about the Gook after that."

Gooks—or Dinks, or Slopes—are major figures in the Vietnam war who don't often get their names in the papers. They are, in GI argot, the Vietnamese people. Gooks can be friendly or hostile, ours or theirs. The only good Gook, it is said again and again on U.S. bases throughout Vietnam is a dead Gook.

Open expression of American contempt for Vietnamese is common. An Army major driving a jeep in Saigon after a heavy rain deliberately drives along the edge of the road so he can keep his outside wheel in the puddles and splash pedestrians. A sergeant in Cantho taunts a Vietnamese girl who operates a PX snack bar with lurid sexual insults, knowing she doesn't understand him, and basking in the laughter his insults evoke from his buddies.

A senior diplomat sneers, "these people are incorrigible." A soldier recuperating in an Army hospital tells a fellow patient about the old man he killed "by mistake," but it didn't matter, "He was just a Gook." One of the eight Green Berets recently accused of murder, jokes about the fate of Thai Khac Chuyen: "Just like a Gook to carry more chain than he could swim with."

The American soldier's contempt for Asians is now new. In World War II the Indians were Wogs, the Burmese and Chinese were Slopeys. But in Vietnam relations between Americans and "the little people" are more complicated.

Naive young U.S. soldiers are told that their enemy is Vietnamese—small, tough, slant-eyed, wearing black pajamas and lurking everywhere. They are also told that the United States is here to allow the South Vietnamese—small, slant-eyed, many clad in black pajamas—to determine their own destinies.

Enemy and ally don't look any different. Most GIs find it difficult to believe that some Gooks are their mortal enemies while others are devoted friends.

The ordinary soldier's attitude is undoubtedly colored by the Vietnamese he most often meets. Few GIs get to know ordinary Vietnamese people during their 12 months here. Instead the American soldier meets the riffraff of war, the camp-following pimps and bar girls, shopkeepers and hustlers who claw at him whenever he leaves his base.

It would be difficult to convince a 19-year-old American boy that these people are not typical. The Army makes little effort to promote good relations between Americans and Vietnamese.

There have been no polls or surveys to determine how many Americans in Vietnam like or dislike the Vietnamese. One can only report a personal impression: Among soldiers, negative feelings about the Gooks are as common as any openly expressed complaint. The soldier who speaks warmly of the Vietnamese, or who makes an effort to help them in his spare time or on his job, usually makes an impression, because he is an exception.

Soldiers working with the Vietnamese in advisory jobs seem much more likely to like the locals than GIs in American units.

A psychiatric social worker in the Army's 3d Field Hospital in Saigon, Maj. Aaron Dotson, reports that in his experience black soldiers are less prone to prejudice against Vietnamese than whites. But there are certainly blacks who will curse the Gooks. Dotson says anti-Vietnamese feeling is widespread.

Among American civilians hostility is much more subtle, and admirers of the Vietnamese are much more common. But candid relationships are rare.

An American cannot overhear the unguarded remarks of Vietnamese, but one suspects that they regularly return the insults. The basic slang for Americans is "Meo," which the Vietnamese equate with "Yanks," though they say it is a "funny word."

Vietnames anti-Americanism seems to come in two strains. One is practical and direct: The Americans shot up my house, dumped my vegetable stand, defiled my daughter—I don't like them. The other is more basic: We were a simple and peaceful society before the Americans came, now we are crass and commercial and our values are distorted. Vietnamese life will never be the same, the Americans have created more needs than they have satisfied.

The undercurrent of the second strain of anti-Americanism is strong in Saigon. It often emerges at the end of long lunches or long conversations, heavily coated with Oriental politeness, but forceful and sometimes bitter.

Only occasionally is anti-Americanism overt, and when it is, Vietnamese assure their American friends that it is just an aberration.

A recent example was series of editorials in the militant Buddhist newspaper Chanh Dao, organ of the An Quang Pagoda. The editorials were written by a journalist named Viet Bang, a former employee of the U.S. government who was fired from his job in Saigon.

Bang's editorials villified the United States for seeking to monopolize the Vietnamese economy, for importing foreign labor at the expense of local workers, for promoting black market sales of PX goods to undermine local products, and for many other transgressions. Bang is obviously not a representative spokesman for Vietnamese opinion, but one wonders how widely his prejudices may be secretly held.

There seems to be no single psychological explanation for the hostility between Americans and Vietnamese, but one often senses a common ingredient—resentment.

The Americans are here, they say, to save Vietnam, and they resent the Vietnamese for failing to be appropriately appreciative. Or they are here against their will, because they were drafted to fight a bewildering war, and they resent the Vietnamese for causing it. Or they are Americans who have no patience or deliberate Oriental ways, and they resent the Vietnamese for their stubborn unwillingness to adopt American ways.

For their part, the Vietnamese seem to have always been suspicious about why so many Americans came to their country. Many, including some intellectuals and politicians, are convinced that Vietnam is only a pawn in the grasp of uncaring big powers, and only one big power is available as a target for their resentment.

Some Vietnamese who are deeply grateful for the fact that the United States apparently saved them from a Communist takeover in 1965 (and there are many) nevertheless bitterly resent America's deep involvement in their domestic affairs. Only once in his tenure in office has President Thieu been a genuinely popular leader: when he stood up to the Americans and refused to take part in the Paris peace talks last November. Even Thieu's aides acknowledge to Americans that it was his finest hour.

WHY IS UNITED STATES FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

The CHAIRMAN. These are the kinds of questions that come to Senators, at least this Senator. What are we doing there? I can understand the soldier in Hue, who lives in Hue and he is fighting and he believes he is fighting for his personal existence and his way of life. It is difficult for me to explain to my constituents why we are fighting in South Vietnam. If it is just communism that you are fighting, I do not know why there are not other places, more agreeable places, to fight them if that is what we want to do. It is a very disagreeable place for the ordinary soldier; is it not? I do not mean for you, but for the boy in the paddy?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; quite.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it is very uncomfortable and unpleasant and it is very difficult for me to know why we are fighting, continuing to fight. What is worthwhile to the United States? What is the United States going to gain out of it?

If we are fighting in the traditional way to annex this area as a colony and exploit its natural resources, at least it is a traditional historical motive. But I cannot understand what the present motive is, the one that induced President Johnson to become so involved.

Can Senator Case explain that and give me a better answer? He looks as if he is anxious to reply.

Senator CASE. No, the Senator is not anxious to attempt to answer the chairman's question at this time. I was hopeful that we would use

these witnesses for their technical competence as much as we could and I was anxious to get on with a couple more things.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I yield to you. The colonel inspired that question.

Senator CASE. This question is one that plagues us all the time. Of course it is.

What I am really trying to get at now from you gentlemen, not in the way of hurrays, is again I repeat, I will continue to repeat, we have every understanding of the difficult job you have as you sit before us and the question is whether it is possible for any human being to accomplish it, if that is the question we are getting at here.

ENEMY CONTACTS OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION

How many contacts with the enemy did this 1st ARVN Division have in 1969 in the DMZ?

Colonel WHEELER. The exact number, sir, I do not have, but we have had numerous contacts.

Senator CASE. Major ones?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

We have had major contacts.

Senator CASE. Could you make—I am not trying to dig into exact operational details—a comparison between say, 1967, 1968, and 1969 in this regard?

Colonel WHEELER. Certainly during 1968, sir, there was much heavier fighting in the division tactical area than in 1969. However, the enemy presence was still great. In early 1969, through the tenaciousness of the division commander and the gallant troops under his command, pressure was maintained on the enemy forces and by summer of 1969, the major portion of the NVA and the VC had been eliminated from the lowlands. At that time, the division's efforts were applied in the Piedmont region and the Ashau Valley to destroy the base areas and sanctuaries where the enemy was located. The division commander turned over the defense and security of the hamlets and the villages to the RF and PF. At the present time, you will find the 1st ARVN Division soldiers west of QL–1, which is the north-south main highway. To the east, from QL–1 to the ocean, you will find the territory being secured only by RF and PF forces. The division has been in continuous combat. When you have 19 maneuver battalions, 17 infantry and two armored cavalry, some units will always be in contact with the enemy and others prepared to go into combat because of intelligence derived from prisoners or documents.

We engaged in 19 major regimental-sized operations during 1969.

Senator CASE. Most in the early part of the year? The majority of them?

Colonel WHEELER. The majority of them in the early part.

Senator CASE. And that has dropped off some?

Colonel WHEELER. That has dropped off some, sir, in the latter part of 1969.

Senator CASE. Is that a function—I forget the word you used—of the reduced infiltration of the Vietcong forces?

Colonel WHEELER. It was in the latter part of 1969, yes, sir.

TROOPS PROTECTING LAOS BORDER

Senator CASE. As far as the west goes, the border of Laos, this 1st Division has been screened always by our own troops, has it not?

Colonel WHEELER. Has been always screened?

Senator CASE. Protected from infiltration from the west?

Colonel WHEELER. The 1st Division has not always been screened, sir.

Senator CASE. Yes, our own American troops have been guarding the border there, have they not?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir, the 1st ARVN Division has been out there with them.

Senator CASE. With whom?

Colonel WHEELER. Currently, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division, sir.

Senator CASE. Under the 1st?

Colonel WHEELER. With the 1st. Prior to that time, the 1st ARVN operated with the 1st Cavalry Division and, before they were withdrawn, with the 3d Marine Division, sir.

PROSPECTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS

Senator CASE. I am just trying to get the fact that the ARVN Army I can take this thing over tomorrow and we can get out of there. This is what I want. You appreciate, I am sure, as well as anybody else, that this general optimistic picture is something we have been getting for 20 years, almost, and it never realizes. So Secretary Clifford comes in and tries to get somebody to say, well, how soon is it going to be—5 years, 10 years? We cannot say how long.

Do you have any estimates about it?

Colonel WHEELER. I do not, sir. I can say when the 3d Marine Division was withdrawn from their positions adjacent to the DMZ, the area was taken over by the 1st ARVN Division.

AMERICANS COMPRISE WHAT PORTION OF I CORPS?

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield. When I asked you, aren't there more Americans in I Corps, you declined to answer on security grounds. I know there are more up there. I do not think you are being frank. You leave the impression that the 1st with all its prestige is taking over the fighting, but all the stories I have heard are that the Americans still are bearing the brunt of it. Therefore, I think it is misleading and deceives us to leave the impression indirectly that they have taken over the fighting. If you leave that impression, I think then you ought to go on and say how many Americans are there.

Are there only 10 percent of the fighting men in I Corps that are Americans or what? Or are you going to leave the impression that the South Vietnamese have taken it over? I think it has to be one or the other to be frank about it.

Colonel WHEELER. I can only talk about that portion of I Corps where I am located. That is the northern part of I Corps. We do have there the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Division and those elements which support them as well as the 1st ARVN Division. They are all employed in separate areas of operation and they are gainfully employed at the present time with the threat that does exist.

INFILTRATION ACTIVITY OF ENEMY

Senator CASE. Has there not been a distinct dropping off in infiltration of enemy activity up in this area? You have already said this. Has it not been related to our bombing halt in some fashion? At least in time, we won't argue about whether it is caused by that or not, but since that, has there not been a distinct lessening in enemy infiltration up in this area?

Colonel WHEELER. I think, sir, that I could say within the confines of this discussion that there was some lessening of infiltration last fall. However, that has not been so in recent months.

Senator CASE. You mean it is stepped up again?

Colonel WHEELER. There has been some increase in infiltration, yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Has it increased to the degree at which it existed before the decrease?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, I would prefer to answer that in executive session.

Senator CASE. Well, I will defer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROSPECTS FOR OVERALL AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. We are, of course, really interested in, and it is difficult for us to get at, the prospects for the overall withdrawal of the American engagement in Vietnam. I do not know whether, judging from what you have said, you were willing to discuss that at open session. Is there any way you can approach it, general or colonel, to give any light upon the probabilities of the Americans being able to turn it over to the Vietnamese? Can you volunteer any thoughts about this?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am afraid I really can't add to what already has been said about it. That is the President's stipulation that there are three major factors—the negotiations in Paris, the enemy activities, and the rate at which the Vietnamese take on at an accelerated pace the equipment and training and operational aspects. It is dependent on those things.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you noticed any effect at all upon the attitude of the Vietnamese as a result of the increase in the activities in Laos? Do you have any knowledge at all about any reaction among the circles in which you travel in Saigon?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I have no knowledge, really of any change on the part of the Vietnamese with regard to this.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, maybe I can interject just one point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator CASE. I know that the three-pronged proposition that you have referred to has been this Administration's position. The degree of speed with which we can and the completeness with which we can get out depends upon three things—the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over; the results of negotiations in Paris; and the willingness of the North Vietnamese to let us get out without taking advantage of that—that is a paraphrase, but that is what you had in mind just now, was it not, General?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

EFFECT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS ON U.S. WITHDRAWAL

Senator CASE. When you analyze it, what you said just now, I think, was that the speed with which the Vietnamese will be able to take over depends upon negotiations and the results in Paris and the willingness of the North Vietnamese not to take advantage of them. Now, is this not really saying, in both cases, that we will be able to disengage and the South Vietnamese will be able to take over depending on just one thing. That is the willingness of the North Vietnamese to let us get out of there. That is really what you are saying, is it not?

General CLEMENT. I will refer to what I did say, sir.

Senator CASE. I am not trying to twist a word. I am just trying to get to analyzing this proposition.

General CLEMENT. Obviously, the negotiations play a big part.

Senator CASE. That again depends upon the North Vietnamese does it not?

General CLEMENT. I would say so.

Senator CASE. We are always willing to negotiate; are we not? And we would make a fair settlement at any time; would we not? There are two parties to this and so it depends upon the North Vietnamese here too; does it not?

General CLEMENT. Sir, the negotiations and those aspects are really not a part of my business.

Senator CASE. I understand, but we are just talking now, you know, man to man or person to person and really just trying to analyze what we are talking about.

Mr. Chairman, do you want to go on?

The CHAIRMAN. I would like a few minutes if the Senator does not mind.

Senator CASE. Not at all. The chairman has complete control of the time and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all.

Senator CASE. I do not mean to be interrupting, but I did interject because it seems to me we got a clear understanding of what those three points were, and it all comes down to one thing, the willingness of the North Vietnamese to let us go.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is any doubt that the North Vietnamese would like to see us go. They do not wish to let us go with an understanding that our puppets will remain in control in South Vietnam; they do not believe that that is our right. They are willing for us to go. I am quite sure they would love for us to leave tomorrow. But it is the conditions under which we go and how we can disengage.

ARE INTERESTS OF U.S. BEING SACRIFICED FOR QUESTIONABLE OBJECTIVE?

What I am interested in and trying to develop is that I think the interests of the United States are being sacrificed here for a very questionable objective. The interests of the United States to me are far greater and more important to enemy constituents and the country as a whole than as to whether or not they can preserve this government in Vietnam. The more I read about this wonderful judicial system that they have as reported in the morning paper, the way they conduct trials there, the less enthusiastic I am about sacrificing your time and your efforts along with the lives of your men for any such government.

Do you remember the report of the trials of Mr. Chau in the morning paper, General?

General CLEMENT. I have read of it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning?

General CLEMENT. Not this morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an interesting one. They have changed the whole basis of the trial now. They no longer list his immunity. It is a completely different theory of the trial. But this is such a farce and such a ridiculous and absurd way to conduct the business, the serious judicial business involving a man's life and his freedom. Yet we say we are there—not say, we are supporting this government and saying self-determination.

There were one or two other questions, General, before we adjourn.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. OFFICIALS IN SAIGON TOWARD TROOP WITHDRAWAL

The Washington Star on February 25—and this is the best way we have of getting news, because it is extremely difficult to get information from the front except through the reputable news agencies—states:

> The feeling among these officials is that reduction of American strength after the present withdrawals would leave the South Vietnamese dangerously exposed to the enemy threat. American officials in Saigon, in fact, have opposed every phase of de-escalation beginning with the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968 and then have reluctantly expressed their approval after they can no longer prevent the U.S. moves.

Would you say that is an accurate reflection from your observations?

General CLEMENT. In my particular experience, sir, working with the training directorate and working with my counterpart and observing over 50 schools and training centers and their commanders, which is a fairly good sample of their military people, I think it is an inaccurate statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Inaccurate?

Gerenal CLEMENT. I do not think it is right. From my experience in talking with those people, they feel that they perhaps are a little surprised at how well they have done. I have the general feeling, in talking with them, that they would like to get on with the job and just see what will happen.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the American officials in Saigon with whom you associate have not opposed the withdrawal of American troops?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am sorry. I was talking of Vietnamese officials and I misunderstood you.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, they are Americans. "American officials in Saigon in fact have opposed every phase of de-escalation. * * *"

American officials.

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I have not encountered American officials with these views.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, American officials in Saigon have not opposed American withdrawal of troops? That is your view?

General CLEMENT. I have not really had much contact in talking on this subject with American officials. As I say, most of my time has been spent with the Vietnamese, sir, and talking with them at times on this——

The CHAIRMAN. You don't associate much with American officials?

General CLEMENT. Well, our time is pretty restricted, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In another story on January 14, the Christian Science Monitor quotes an American officer in Saigon as saying "We have fought Washington on every reduction so far. And I am sure we will keep fighting them."

But you would say that is not accurate in your experience?

General CLEMENT. I have no experience of that, no, sir.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE GENERAL/FLAG OFFICERS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. In a news story on January 14, Christian Science Monitor, it quotes the following:

> The Vietnamese protocol list for Saigon names nearly 100 American officers of general and flag rank. By comparison, there are fewer than 50 South Vietnamese generals and admirals on active duty with all the Vietnamese armed forces.

Is that a true statement?

General CLEMENT. I am not prepared to say, sir. I do not have the data at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know either of those, sir?

General CLEMENT. I do not know the figures, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, Colonel?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who do you think would know them?

General CLEMENT. We can provide them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, can you provide that?

General CLEMENT. I think we can provide them for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

GENERAL OFFICERS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

(Department of Defense)

As of 1 January there were approximately 90 U.S. general/flag officers in Vietnam. Of this number, 29 were assigned in the Saigon area. As of 1 January 1970, there were 44 general/flag officers in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). RVNAF is authorized 196 general/flag officers.

ADEQUACY OF VIETNAM FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. Prince Sihanouk wrote in an article:

> The day the American Armies left, the Saigon Army would dissolve because today it is composed only of mercenaries, very well equipped, I am sure, but paralyzed by the lack of an idea.

Would you care to comment on that?

General CLEMENT. Sir, would you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. You know who Sihanouk of Cambodia is?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is an article that quotes the article written by Prince Sihanouk:

> The day the American Armies left, the Saigon Army would dissolve because today it is composed only of mercenaries, very well equipped, to be sure, but paralyzed by the lack of an idea.

General CLEMENT. I would prefer not to comment, sir, on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not care to comment.

The thrust of all of this is, sir, trying to find out your views and ideas of the inadequacies or adequacies of the Vietnamese forces with whom you are working if the Americans withdraw. It is very difficult, of course, to get this. I have asked in a general way would you care to estimate when you believe the Vietnamese could sustain themselves without American assistance. I believe you said you did not feel you could comment on it.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These are statements of other people. These are newspapermen from the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Star, and in particular, Mr. Ashworth of the Christian Science Monitor, who has written a great many articles, as of course, have many other people. These are their views about it and I thought maybe it would give you a vehicle either to agree or disagree with it.

ESTIMATE OF WHEN SOUTH VIETNAMESE COULD TAKE OVER

You simply do not feel that you want to make an estimate as to when the Vietnamese would be willing to take over. Is that right?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, I believe that is correct. I really could not make an estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not want to say whether it is a year, 2 years, or 10 years?

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I prefer to stay away from time frames.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say in your own statement, the implications, and it is purely an implication that one draws from some of the language, you seem to anticipate that we will be there for quite a while. I would have to look it up. This is what you say:

> The size and composition of our present and future advisory effort in Vietnam will be determined in light of the development of RVNAF forces, to assume a larger share of the war effort and the rate at which RVNAF units can receive equipment, complete training, and attain operational readiness.

The only thing I can say is that the implication is that you do not anticipate any withdrawal in the immediate future; do you? It does not indicate how long you will go on.

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I am not giving any real time-frame. I am trying to paint the general problem and picture which finally results in advisors and——

PROGRESS BEING MADE BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS

The CHAIRMAN. You feel, however, that the Vietnamese troops with whom you are acquainted, and you do spend most of your efforts in advising with them as I understand it, are making real progress. You feel that they can, at least in an indeterminate time, take over and carry the whole burden.

General CLEMENT. I would say yes, sir, they certainly are making progress. They seem to show a willingness. If you remember the training chart, the paragraph showing the training centers, there is a lot of very hard work going on. When you have overloaded centers, perhaps the quality goes down a bit because you double the student load to get them out and get them into the operating unit, but withal, they make tremendous strides and they are very serious about their work, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will put the rest of these articles in the record as illustrations of the views of other observers. There is a letter here from a Marine that I want to put in the record. I do not know that it is anything other than cumulative. It is the attitude of some of the soldiers and the comments of people interested in this matter about the prospects of the future for us as well as the Vietnamese.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 24, 1969]

EMPTY AMERICAN CHAIR—DO UNITED STATES AND SAIGON COOPERATE ENOUGH?

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the Vietnamization of the land war there. In this, the first of several dispatches, he tells of the gulf that still exists between the American and South Vietnamese commands.

Every Monday, the Vietnamese joint general staff holds an operational and intelligence briefing in Saigon for high-level Vietnamese and allied officers.

The most senior Vietnamese officers are present, along with senior generals from the Thai, Korean, Australian, and New Zealand forces.

Almost always, sources say, the front row chair marked for the senior American representative is empty. Further back in the room, sitting with the other colonels, can usually be found the senior American present.

This is the way it is at the most important briefing the South Vietnamese Army general staff gives each week. To the Vietnamese, the American absence is a disagreeable snub.

Sources say the American command has indicated such presence would be "a waste of time" in that all of the important information is available through regular American channels. So the marked American chair remains empty.

GAP RANGES DOWN THE LINE

To many observers, this separation at the top symbolizes the wide gulf remaining between Vietnamese and Americans on down the line in this fifth year of heavy United States involvement.

Many sources believe that gulf is one of the greatest obstacles to successful transfer of the war effort from the Americans to the South Vietnamese.

The Nixon administration has substantially increased emphasis on "Vietnamization" of the war effort. When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird returned to Washington in March, he was openly disappointed as he discussed preparations in Vietnam for the load burdens of war to be shifted.

Other high defense officials have visited the war zone and left saying a number of important Americans still don't believe that Vietnamization is the most important task now confronting the vast American hierarchy here.

As one young officer who has worked at length in liaison between the Americans and Vietnamese put it, "The command here has fought Washington every step of the way. Each step forward has been forced on them. And it will probably have to stay that way."

Senior Americans argue that the Americans and Vietnamese are working extremely closely together. They point out the vast numbers of civilian and military liaison teams.

HUGE NUMBERS IN LIAISON

There certainly are huge numbers of liaison teams. As one American put it, "Many of them are so big and so busy that they could get along well and keep busy even if all the Vietnamese they advise were moved away."

When the Vietnamese Army was falling apart in late 1964 and early 1965, the Americans moved in with troops and supplies and took over the war. Now, in late 1969, there are few signs of a ready willingness to give it back, no matter what Washington wants.

Americans here still live in a society largely of their own. They generally see little of Vietnamese other than maids and chauffeurs unless they are specifically assigned to do so.

Even among the advisory groups, often at very low level, it is uncommon to see Americans and Vietnamese actually living in close proximity. They work together, but when the time comes to eat or sleep or have a party, they usually go their separate ways.

In Saigon, officers in the vast Military Assistance Command headquarters freely admit they never see Vietnamese or talk to them or work with them.

Generals and colonels get into their staff cars at the end of a working day and are driven to quarters on or off post. If off post, the quarters are guarded by American military police, and the Americans often venture forth only in the company of other Americans.

This apartness continues in the field, where corps and division officers headquarters are isolated from the Vietnamese. Many staff officers, who must daily make decisions affecting the lives of hundreds of Vietnamese never have met any in the line of work or socially. Intelligence and operations officers have been able to spend whole tours without coming into contact with Vietnamese district and province officers.

When Vietnamese and American companies and battalions work together, the command points to fact proudly. And such efforts are given some symbolic name, such as Dong Tien, for "progress together."

Sometimes, when the American and Vietnamese do work together, Americans go to the other extreme. Aloofness is discarded, and visitors are treated to the appalling sight of some Vietnamese officer being trotted out, much like a favored child. Then comes the pat on the shoulder and some such praise as, "Captain Nguyen is one heck of a fighter. A real tiger, aren't you, Captain Nguyen." And Captain Nguyen smiles with embarrassment and offers his hand.

Too often, many experienced officers here say, the Captain Nguyens and other Vietnamese officers are most appreciated when their approach resembles closely that of the Americans. To many Vietnamese, there is nothing more galling than the thought that the American way is the only right way.

But that view of American correctness does permeate. At the highest levels, the Vietnamese are urged to draw up their own plans for operations, but Americans are always ready to change them, sometimes completely. Consequently, many Vietnamese take the dodge of sounding out the Americans as to what plan they want before writing anything. Then the semblance of Vietnamese sufficiency is maintained—they do write a plan, but one perfectly suited to American views.

Of course, there are notable exceptions. The Marine combined action platoons and some Army units do live and work with the Vietnamese. Many advisers try to learn Vietnamese ways and customs, try to like Vietnamese food, and try to achieve both harmony and progress without needlessly hurting feelings.

Dozens of sources are deeply convinced that it is critically important now, as American withdrawal continues, that the operational rift between the allies be closed and that the Vietnamese be truly encouraged and helped to go it alone—while that is a choice, not an absolute necessity.

In effect, sources say, the alternative to closer help and encouragement is abandonment.

[From Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 30, 1969]

'Being No. 1 Division Can Be an Experience'

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the Vietnamization of the land war there. In this second of several dispatches, he discusses the 1st Division—considered outstanding in the South Vietnamese Army.

Hue, Vietnam.—It's quite an experience to see the South Vietnamese 1st Division.

A few years ago, it wasn't much. Now it is something of a showpiece. It is setting an example for the rest of the country. For it proves, if nothing else does, that the Vietnamese Army can be efficient and effective.

The development of the 1st Division has been a gradual process over the past few years. As early as 1967, Americans would enthuse over the 1st. It was better than the others then. And it probably still is, although there have been many improvements in other units.

When experienced American officers are asked which Vietnamese divisions are good, they immediately point to the 1st. Then they usually add the 2nd, also in

northernmost 1st Corps area, and the 21st in the delta. Then the list tapers off to those divisions that are "coming along well."

There are any number of reasons for a unit to be good or bad or in the middle. But the usual one centers on the availability or otherwise of good leadership from the middle level on up. The 1st doesn't have any leadership problems, according to both Vietnamese and Americans.

COMMANDER PRAISED

As one senior American put it, when speaking of Maj. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, the division's commander: "There probably isn't an American colonel in Vietnam (the rank of a division senior adviser) who could advise General Truong. He could help the general with support and coordination, but he couldn't teach him anything."

A Vietnamese source said, "Truong is really pretty good. He does a good job, and they leave him alone. They need him. Even his classmates at the academy aren't jealous of him."

The 1st Division reached a low point in 1966. Its ranks were bitterly divided, with a number of members of the division openly sympathetic to the Buddhist struggle movement. Division troops provided protection for Buddhist leaders and demonstrated against the government. When the movement was overthrown, the government ordered 1st Division combat forces away from Hue so they could no longer provide a threat.

General Truong was put in charge of the division when morale was near bottom and desertions were high.

What has happened since has set an example for the rest of the country. And in this case there has been the important difference that the example was set by the Vietnamese themselves, not Americans.

THRUSTS BLOCKED

From almost all accounts, the 1st fought well and without faltering during the Tet, 1968, battle of Hue. And its men have fought well since, blocking thrusts in force as well as smaller endeavors by North Vietnamese main-force units, as well as Viet Cong guerrillas.

The 1st not only is the best, but it is the largest South Vietnamese division, with 19 maneuver battalions and a total strength of 21,000, including attachments of armor and other units. Other divisions are about half that size.

The Americans have obviously tried to give the 1st the best of everything, as one would a precocious, favored son. And the 1st has leaped at the ready availability of American helicopters, for instance. The 1st has been fast to learn the usefulness of helicopters for operations throughout its operating area in northern 1st Corps, but particularly in the roadless, mountainous reaches away from the coast.

Consequently, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), with its nearly 450 helicopters, finds itself hard pressed to meet the needs of two divisions—their own, the 101st, and the Vietnamese 1st.

While they use helicopters when necessary, members of the 1st are used to walking and climbing. Members of the 2nd battalion of the 1st's 3rd Regiment were the first soldiers to reach the top of "Hamburger Hill." They pulled back when American forces needed more air strikes to get on up and then went back up for the second time.

According to Col. Vu Van Giai, commander of the division forward command post, which controls the division's 2nd Regiment and 7th Mechanized Task Force, "The only thing to do is have chow, get a rifle, and go fight. That's what makes you No. 1."

Colonel Giai attended military schools in the United States and took paratroop training at Fort Benning, Ga. Like many other officers in the division, he seems to have developed a liking for Americans, an affinity which is reciprocated. There is a sense of camaraderie between Americans and Vietnamese in the 1st that is often missing elsewhere.

ORIENTATION REQUIRED

The colonel likes to talk with Americans and he speaks excellent English. But he is not given to overly long explanations. Asked to explain the division's success, Colonel Giai said, "We tried to make it No. 1 division. And we made it."

Actually, the formula wasn't that simple. Many believe an important ingredient has been the special 15-day training session given all recruits or draftees

arriving from the government's training centers or, in the case of volunteers, from the division's own training center. During the orientation for all, new soldiers are given haircuts, indoctrination, and dog tags, as well as a final brushing up to prepare them to go to the division.

As Colonel Giai puts it, "When they come here, all we must do is give them food and put them in the field."

A half or a little more of the new men coming into the division are volunteers. Each regiment has three recruiting teams that comb the villages for eligible males between 18 and 35.

When they find a potential joiner, the pressure becomes pointed. Colonel Giai says the recruiters put it simply: "There are two ways to go. Either you be No. 1, or you go to the draftee center."

He smiled slightly. "Most say, 'Make me No. 1.'"

Being No. 1 can be an experience. General Truong is a very capable leader, but he also is a demanding one. Battalion commanders have been fined or jailed for infractions that hurt the morale of the troops. He also is quite ready to get rid of any officers or enlisted men who do not measure up to the standards.

PRIVILEGES GRANTED

Concern for the troops is evident in many ways. There is a commissary where soldiers and their families can buy rice and other staples at prices well under the market level. Troops away from their families are allowed time off, generally once a month, to go see them. And there is some dependent housing. In the forward area, for instance, there is dependent housing for 500 of 3,000 eligible families with more being obtained or built.

The general spends five or six hours daily overseeing field activities. When the weather is good, he uses a helicopter to be more far-ranging.

General Truong inspires great loyalty for his efforts. Officers tell of the time he was waving as an assault force aboard helicopters started off. One man thought the general was motioning for him, so he leaped about eight feet from the hovering helicopter and ran over to report. The general waved him back, and the man ran to a point under the hovering chopper. The American gunner leaned out, whisked him aboard, and they were away.

The officers and noncommissioned officers are expected to lead and to inspire. This inevitably leads to a certain elan. Aides tell of the day Colonel Giai's headquarters was being rocketed from the DMZ area.

SOUVENIRS TAKEN

The colonel and a few men leaped aboard a helicopter and soared off to find the source of the shellings. They came in on the position, turned one rocket around, and fired it across the DMZ, then loaded the remaining two aboard to take home as souvenirs.

Naturally, there are flaws in the 1st. There is a lack of depth in leadership. All enlisted leaders receive special training at the division's training center, but some important staff positions remain unfilled, probably for lack of anyone the general cares to appoint. Although the division is nearly up to strength, some officers are below the grades those positions would warrant. And because officers tend to stay in their jobs for years, there is a lack of broad experience among many.

Some of these problems are doubtless due to the general's desire to build slowly. From every indication, what has been built has been built well. As a result, none of the problems is really serious.

By conventional measures the 1st Division stacks up well in loss rates and weapons-loss comparisons. Eleven enemy are killed for every member of the 1st. So far this year, 32 weapons have been lost to 2,441 captured.

But the question remains whether Saigon will have enough units as good as the 1st when the moment of crisis approaches. Progress has been, and remains, slow. And one shining example, such as the 1st, may not be enough.

[From Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 5, 1970]

SOME GLARING WEAKNESSES IN SAIGON MILITARY

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, having just completed a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the Vietnamization of the land war.

LAI KHE, VIETNAM.—When the Vietnamese battalion commander at Fire Base Mahone was killed in action, his battalion was quickly pulled off the line.

In the American Army, the battalion would have fought on. But the loss of a key man was a major blow to the Vietnamese battalion and raised real questions as to whether the battalion could continue in combat.

In almost any Vietnamese Army division, the loss of a senior officer in an important position has impact. This is particularly true in the Vietnamese 5th, which now is just venturing out into difficult action after years as a garrison-hugging "coup division."

President Thieu formerly commanded the 5th, and it was his power base as he began his rise to sovereignty. Under later commanders, the 5th, stationed near Lam Son north of Saigon, was available should there be a need to save the palace from insurrection.

It was not until this fall that the disgruntled American command was able to prevail upon the Vietnamese to remove the politically safe and militarily cautious commander of the 5th and replace him with another Vietnamese officer, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Hieu. While not considered brilliant, General Hieu is thought of as moderately diligent by both Vietnamese and American officers.

Now the general is trying to lead his division to some higher level of competence. Most observers agree that if the 5th does become good it will bode well for the Vietnamese Army, for the 5th now is just about the worst of the 10 Vietnamese divisions.

At one time, not so long ago, there was something of a running competition among American advisers as to who could claim to be with the absolute worst divisions. The 5th, the 18th, and the 25th were all in the running, as horror stories were swapped.

It was not until 1969 that the desire for real, measurable improvement in these divisions became more than a matter of hope. In March, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird told the command here in no uncertain terms that it had to get much more serious than ever before in preparing Vietnamese units—even the worst—to assume the burdens of war. Galvanized into action, the command began looking around for ways to step up progress.

Last summer, the American and Vietnamese units began working much more closely together in combined operations. Units of the 5th have been working with elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry, in particular, as well as the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

Since the 1st U.S. and the Vietnamese 5th began working together under the program called "dong tien," which translates as "progress together," there have been substantial increases in enemy killed, captives, Hoi Chanhs (ralliers to the government side), and weapons captured. In terms of these conventional measures, the 8th Regiment of the Vietnamese 5th is doing about three times as well as before.

The Vietnamese in general are compiling better records than the Americans. During one month, for instance, the Vietnamese 5th elements and territorial forces garnered all but eight of the 61 ralliers in the U.S. 1st Infantry's area of operations.

The 5th Division's kill rates are high, particularly in the cases of the better battalions. But American officers agree that the various tallies are an imperfect measure of a division's performance and capabilities. So far, however, nothing better has been devised.

The tallies that look so promising are somewhat a product of the special environment of the Dong Tien program, in which vast quantities of U.S. helicopter transport and gunship support, as well as massive artillery and air support, are available. Under such circumstances, high kill rates can be expected.

When one battalion of the 5th completed a cycle of working with the Americans and then worked for a similar period away from the Americans, there were few signs of continued progress. As one adviser put it, the batallion "had about held its own."

While there are doubtless advantages to be gained in working with Americans, exposure to the relative plenty of the American war machine can lead to problems, many military sources believe. The Vietnamese quickly learn that going by helicopter is easier than going by truck, that trucks are better than walking, that supplies can be quite plentiful, and that the fallen will be quickly evacuated.

But, when the Americans are gone, the supplies won't be so plentiful. There will not be so many helicopters. Medical evacuation may not be so swift. Many things will only work if the Vietnamese make them work. American help won't be so readily available.

American officers agree that the 5th Division is being given a great deal—perhaps too much—now. But, they say, this does improve Vietnamese effectiveness. At the best, sources say, this plenty may be a sort of "pump priming" that will lead to a much higher level of performance when the Americans leave. In the meantime, one American said, a "hot-house environment" is needed for improvement.

Another officer was worried over the enormous problems that continue to plague the 5th. He asked: "Are we showing them things that aren't germain?"

At present the division's three regiments are rated good, acceptable, and weak. In terms of battalions, most U.S. officers who have worked with the 5th say that about one-fourth are very good, another fourth rather marginal, and the rest somewhere in the middle.

There are excellent battalions. One is the 1st of the 8th Regiment, which recovered after the loss of its commander and is now doing well in the field. The Americans thought so highly of the slain commander, Lt. Col. Chau Minh Kien, that they renamed Fire Support Bas Mahone in his honor.

The 1st was replaced at Kien by the 3rd Regiment of the 8th, which has also done well, racking up better scores on the inevitable charts than other American battalions, including the U.S. battalion based with the Vietnamese battalion at Kien.

When a Vietnamese unit is good, it has a marked advantage over a similar American unit in terms of its ability to gather intelligence and to find out what is happening in its area. When Vietnamese units behave themselves and don't steal or destroy, they are in a better position to be accepted by the people and to work with them.

When a unit is bad, the situation can be disastrous. For instance, one battalion of the 5th is so bad, Vietnamese commanders won't let it out of training camp.

The 5th remains beset by shortages of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. Officers of appropriate rank are often unavailable to command units. Some battalion commanders are captains. One commander, a captain, told me he had officers to head the administrative, logistical or civil-affairs sections of his headquarters.

When an officer is lost, there is often no one qualified to replace him. Promotions are slow, and a Vietnamese unwillingness to move officers around denies many the broad base of experience they would need to fill a new post adequately.

This officer problem is compounded by the fact that in war many of the best officers get killed. The casualty rate is far higher among the courageous and the capable.

Desertions remain a constant source of trouble for the 5th. Unlike the 18th Division nearby, which is now exempted from taking habitual or likely deserters into its ranks, the 5th takes all who are sent. And they can be a mixed bag. An estimated half of all new men sent to the 5th are rated as desertion-prone for one reason or another.

The 5th's location within easy hiking distance of Saigon doesn't help, for deserters often find it easy to lose themselves from the authorities in Saigon.

General Hieu has taken some steps to improve the situation. There are signs of greater interest at headquarters now in the concerns of the troops. And the general has tried to get the internal squabbling that has always plagued the division within manageable levels. But pay remains very low. There isn't much dependent housing and what there is is not very good. Also food is scarce and costly.

As one Vietnamese source put it, "General Hieu has very many problems."

Within the area the 5th shares with the U.S. 1st, the enemy strength is rather low. Including Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, strength totals perhaps 5,500. There are almost no concentrations. Thus the enemy can be found usually at squad strength or less.

Since the effort to improve the 5th went into full force in mid-1969, many elements of the division have moved away from the populated areas, leaving security to territorial forces and civilian defense groups. Those working with the U.S. 1st are largely in upper Binh Duong province north of Saigon. Other units are working with the U.S. 1st Cavalry closer to the border.

There are 55 hamlets rated as Viet Cong-controlled in III Corps, which surrounds Saigon and includes the populous center of the country. All but two are in Long An Province, leaving the 5th with only two to cope with in Binh Duong.

If the Americans were to leave Binh Duong now, with the Vietnamese 5th left responsible, the 5th would succeed, most sources say. If the enemy situation were to be stronger, the 5th might encounter difficulties, they add, while agreeing that the 5th will have troubles enough as it is.

A concerted drive is now under way to overcome some of the 5th's most serious problems, and senior Americans hope for marked improvement by April. By then, they say, strength should be generally higher, and there will have been time to gain experience where it is most sorely needed.

This will not remove concerns. One senior American said he was convinced the 5th could fight the big, conventional sort of battles, but such battles appear as a thing of the past. Now, he said, there is a need for the Vietnamese to learn how to fight well in small units, in decentralized operations, with an emphasis upon stealth, endurance, and a willingness to persevere.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 8, 1970]

THIEU'S MOVE NEXT—SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT FACES QUANDRY IN CHOOSING BETWEEN MILITARY POLITICS AND UPPER-ECHELON PROFIENCY

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-month tour of South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the land war there. In this, the fourth of several dispatches, he cites pressures for President Nguyen Van Thieu to take decisive action.

SAIGON.—The next move in the quest for better South Vietnamese armed forces is up to President Nguyen Van Thieu.

There is general agreement among Vietnamese and Americans familiar with the development of the Vietnamese armed forces that the most alarming remaining problem is the caliber of the senior leadership.

That caliber remains startlingly low at this critical point in the Vietnamization process. And President Thieu has yet to do anything major to remedy the problem.

One senior American official estimated recently that of the senior generals in the Vietnamese hierarchy only one is fully competent to the job assigned him. Others, more generous, might put the competence level at 2 or 3 of the senior 14 or 15.

That is not high, and many say that continued unwillingness by the President to clean out the upper ranks could mean the ultimate failure of Vietnam's fighting forces.

In late 1964 and early 1965, the South Vietnamese Army was, one senior American put it "shattering in the face of the enemy." Losses were running at roughly a battalion a week.

RESPONSE DESCRIBED

Recalling the situation, one Vietnamese source said, "When the Army was not being attacked it would retreat. When it was attacked, it would run or surrender."

Generally speaking, the generals in charge then are in charge now.

To be sure, there have been changes. But most of those have been politically motivated. To remove a man for sheer military incompetence and nothing else is a rarity—and when it does happen it is a long and laborious process.

The American command has been able to get a couple of the very worst South Vietnamese generals moved, but only after the application of great pressure. It was significant that the most recent modest reshuffling came last fall after Presidents Thieu and Nixon met at Midway and later at Saigon.

This quest for better generals is not only an American dream. Many Vietnamese, particularly younger officers, feel very strongly on the point. In Saigon, too numerous politicians accept the present state of the military hierarchy as the single most important problem facing the military—if not the nation.

MILITARY BASE CITED

Unlike the United States, with its civilian-controlled military, South Vietnam is a miltary government. The military provide the corps commanders, the province chiefs, and the district chiefs. And all three men at the top of the government are military men.

Thus, inept or corrupt military men can greatly harm both the war and the endeavors of the government to gain that all-important support and backing of the people.

During the past two years, President Thieu has replaced most of the district chiefs. That is viewed in some quarters as a major step toward bringing corruption within bounds. But even with absolutely fine people coming into district-

chief positions—of itself a farfetched notion—corruption would not be halted.

The Vietnamese expect a certain amount of corruption, and a district chief with modest demands can win the support of his people. But given a relatively honest district chief, there remain the monetary demands of his superiors—the province chiefs and the corps commanders.

INSPECTORATE EMBARRASSED

Often, there is the show of honesty, at least for American consumption. Vietnamese sources report that one corps commander recently gave an excellent talk to his province chiefs on the merits of honest government, being true to the peasants, and that kind of thing. Afterward, he reportedly drew two of the province chiefs off into a side room and berated them heatedly for being behind in their payments to him.

There is a government inspectorate designed to expose and deal with such corruption. But it does not have the backing of President Thieu. Once, when a general was exposed, the inspectorate was roundly criticized for bringing public disgrace upon the ranks of the Army. Nothing happened to the general, although the inspectorate was shamed.

COMPETENCY QUESTIONED

From time to time, however, a colonel or two, or someone lower, will be exposed and punished. Punishment usually does not mean jail or anything like that. At worst, it usually means a less desirable post. It is, of course, easier to catch a colonel than a general because the generals are always careful to make sure that there is a patsy or two around to take the blame if something goes awry.

Incompetence is as great a problem as corruption. Only 2 or 3 of the 10 South Vietnamese regular-division commanders are considered competent by Americans who have worked in the developmental process. And it is a sure commentary on the caliber of the available general officers that Americans, when asked whether a competent commander could be found for every division, start naming Vietnamese colonels—not generals—who they believe could lead divisions well.

The South Vietnamese Army is much more tightly controlled than is the U.S. Army, which allows unit commanders a fair degree of latitude. In the South Vietnamese Army, regimental commanders maintain tight controls over the battalions, and commanders are allowed very little room for initiative. Divisions similarly control their regiments.

TIES TRACED

Above that, the control begins to break down. Corps commanders theoretically are able to give orders to divisions, but often political influences are such that the division commander is allowed to go his own way to a great extent. However, the division commander is aware that his continued prosperity depends largely upon President Thieu, who appointed him and can remove him.

The result is a system of military control tied in closely with national politics. And at the higher levels political acumen becomes more important than military skill.

Thus, there are many things to stymie young officers who would like to improve the Army. Often they have commanders they cannot respect who give them orders, based on political considerations, they cannot appreciate. Promotions are slow. Rewards are often sparse, and things these young officers believe should be done are not done.

According to South Vietnamese sources, province and district chiefs are afraid to mention many of their problems to President Thieu or to his Prime Minister, Tran Thien Khiem. They fear the complaints would get back to their superiors who, themselves unpunished, would punish the complainers.

AWARENESS NOTED

Thus much that goes on probably is unknown to President Thieu. The President takes tours through the countryside to make sure that governmental money is being spent generally where it should be spent and that affairs are approximately in order.

However, Vietnamese sources say, although the President might not know all that is wrong with his military hierarchy, he does know enough to know that something should be done.

One veteran Vietnamese politician summed up Mr. Thieu's dilemma this way: "The issue now is whether Thieu has the courage to clean out the Army and the Joint General Staff. He must decide whether to resolve the problem in the national interests or in his own. He will act if he sees the national interests as his own."

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 14, 1970]

How to Cushion GI Withdrawal

Would more U.S. advisers help Saigon?

(By George W. Ashworth)

Saigon.—In the midst of American withdrawals from Vietnam, the United States command in Saigon is endeavoring to convince Washington to allow still more advisers to the South Vietnamese.

On the surface, it would appear that advice to the Vietnamese is already plentiful. As an example, the Vietnamese protocol list for Saigon names nearly 100 American officers of general and flag rank. By comparison, there are fewer than 50 South Vietnamese generals and admirals on active duty with all of the Vietnamese armed forces.

The hope for more advisers is not generally held in the field.

In interviews throughout Vietnam, numerous Army officers and civilians acting in advisory capacities expressed the view that they could get by with fewer—not more.

But as the American involvement in combat has waned and the emphasis upon development of the South Vietnamese forces has constantly grown, the military and civilian advisory effort has been looked upon in many quarters as the new way to grow.

This desire for expansion marks what many American sources see as a major continuing problem in Vietnam: the unwillingness of the Americans to let go.

One American officer put it this way: "We have fought Washington on every reduction so far. And I am sure we will keep fighting them."

Despite withdrawals, American strength remains quite high in many areas of South Vietnam. In northernmost I Corps, for instance, there are nearly three times as many American fighting men as there are Vietnamese, despite the withdrawal in early fall of the 3d Marine Division. As of early December, there were still 55,589 American marines and 67,810 Army officers and enlisted men in I Corps. Vietnamese Army forces totaled 41,010.

In Saigon, the headquarters of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) now contains about 2,400. A senior officer thought for a moment before guessing that the headquarters could be cut by about 1,000 without great difficulty.

The latest withdrawal announcement, made Jan. 12, included orders for a 10 percent cut in many headquarters staffs. It is the first major reduction in headquarters staffs, and there is general agreement that much of the American staff in Saigon, both civilian and military, is far too large.

One officer new to the field from an assignment at the Saigon MACV headquarters termed his departure an escape.

"There were seven colonels in our office," he said, "and we had almost nothing to do. Sometimes, one or the other of us would skip lunch in hopes something would come along to do while the others were out."

In some provinces, the advisory staffs number several hundred.

The abundance of Americans at the top levels—and down the chain of command—has produced what many in the field see as a major hindrance to the development of the Vietnamese.

Withdrawals so far have left the various headquarters and advisory efforts relatively untouched. Some staffs even have grown.

As the American withdrawal continues, and still more combat troops leave, the size of the so-called "tail" will become still more disproportionate, if current trends continue.

Aware of the problem, Washington ordered the military command at one point in recent withdrawals to increase the share of headquarters personnel leaving. Even then, it was but a tiny fraction of the whole.

One senior official in Saigon suggested that the overall effort could be substantially enhanced if a careful study were made to see precisely which departments could be abolished and which moved back to the United States.

One officer suggested facetiously, "we could let those in the United States put up some barbed wire around their headquarters and wear jungle boots if they would be happier."

GRAVITY SUMMED UP

While many sources who have followed the war effort closely joke about the vast continuing American presence, they carefully agree that it is most serious problem for several reasons:

The sheer size of the bureaucracy leads to a lot of waste motion as well as dreadful slowness from time to time in matters of great urgency. And many officers, particularly younger ones, complain that mediocrity is often forthcoming when brillance is needed.

Because there are so many Americans, the Vietnamese simply are not afforded the challenges they desperately need at this stage in their development. There are so many Americans that they often must do more than they should simply to stay busy.

And there is the continuing problem of the American belief that only the American way is best acceptable. Too often, many sources here maintain, Vietnamese ideas are shunted aside needlessly and unthinkingly.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 24, 1970]

VIETNAMIZATION AND WITHDRAWAL—"WHAT IS NEEDED ARE PRECISE TIMETABLES"

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth has recently returned from a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam for this paper. From the comparative quiet of his Washington desk he reports on the Vietnamization program.

WASHINGTON.—One leaves South Vietnam with a firm conviction that so-called "Vietnamization" can work.

Even then, it is very difficult to be convinced that it will work.

But that it can is one of the few things that can be considered reasonably certain in a period and a place of rampant uncertainty.

The other day one respected reporter in Saigon said: "When I go back to the States, people will want to know what I know. And the problem is that there is nothing to know in Vietnam."

There are myriad statistics and indicators, and scores of "trends," but there remains the continuing question whether the statistics are accurate, and if they are, what they say. And if there is a trend, where does it lead?

If President Thieu is trying to do something, there are a hundred answers to the questions why and what. And, while one answer may be true to a degree, it almost certainly is not complete. Nothing in Vietnam ever is.

When they admit one into the windowless briefing room at the MACV (Military Assistance Command in Vietnam) headquarters, all of the figures on pacification are neatly packaged into multicolored slides. They tell all without telling very much. A visitor wants to know, "What does it all mean?" The answer isn't in the slides.

WHYS ARE MISSING

Intelligence is such that it is not too hard to find out what the enemy is doing in a physical sense; whether he is hungry; whether he has come into the mountains overlooking Tri Ton in Chau Doc Province; or whether he is massing. But again the whys are missing.

There are a number of people who have been in Vietnam for a long while, almost all of them civilians. The best of them admit that all one can do is conjecture. If enough factors are considered, these Americans can come up with quite acceptable and surprisingly accurate predictions.

But these are people who have watched the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong for years, who understand the political-military approaches of the enemy. They know when a captured document is just so much propaganda, or when it tells something. But they are rare, and they are getting rarer as the war goes on and other places and duties beckon.

As a result, Vietnam is jammed with Americans manifesting what seems from time to time to be a vast corporate ignorance. Few can be well informed in their jobs—particularly in the military with its fast rotation policies. By the time they have learned much they are gone. By the time an adviser has gained the

trust and confidence of his Vietnamese counterpart, if he is able, he is ready for another assignment.

In Saigon, there is a sense of unworldliness in the bunkered and fenced MACV compound, from whence few emerge to see the war in the field. Sometimes officers driven by a desire to know what is going on get away to other assignments. Then they see part of it. Few can see the whole.

Compounding the lack of the sort of knowledge that only experience can give is the reluctance of military intelligence analysts to delve into the political implications of enemy activities.

Thus political-military endeavors are frequently analyzed strictly in military terms. And a question as to why the Viet Cong are doing something elicits the response that they have been "ground down" and are only able to do that. The further question, "Why, then, if they have been hurt, did they choose this precise approach?" thus eludes answer.

The complex is reduced forcibly to the simple, with frequent and inevitable inadequacy.

This problem becomes particularly clear at the present juncture, with the American command diligently trying to predict what the enemy will do in the spring after the Tet holidays. The rice harvest is nearly over now, and with the peasants freed from the fields, more guerrillas and helpers will be available for what is to come.

Analysts have decided that there will be no offensive similar to that of Tet 1968. This is based largely, apparently, on the analysis that the enemy is not capable of trying the same thing again. Some officers, however, give greater weight to the fact that such an approach is no longer allowed by enemy strategic doctrine.

But analysis becomes hazier when the question arises. "What then is likely in light of current doctrine?" This is much harder, because the new enemy strategy was evolved last year after the fourth and final phase of the massive offensive approach following Tet last year. Thus there is no experience with a spring campaign under the new approaches.

These uncertainties, as they affect the war, are added to by the continued lack of a precise, positive plan for the continued withdrawal of American forces. The command continues to adhere to the belief that something might happen, such as some big enemy endeavor, to slow American withdrawals. That belief has been bolstered by continued warnings by Washington that the enemy would be foolhardy to do anything to take advantage of American withdrawals.

Enemy doctrine is to do precisely that by emphasizing attacks upon South Vietnamese units assuming responsibilities from departing American units. Of course, that they are taking such advantage will not slow American withdrawals, but a sense lingers that perhaps they will go one step too far, and things will slow down.

OFFICERS POORLY ATTUNED

Sources in Washington realize that it would be almost impossible for the enemy to do anything to slow down the inexorable American departures. But that point has not been brought home finally to Americans in the civilian and military hierarchies in Saigon.

As a consequence, the American command in Saigon is less attuned to the immediacy of the American withdrawal program than is Washington. Those in the field are even less attuned.

Despite the clear fact of continued American departures, sources, say, plans for corps level on down in Vietnam are based on the assumption that the American involvement will continue indefinitely at the present level.

This can lead to an air of almost unreality. I spoke with one general in charge of several United States divisions and major units late last year and asked him what he could afford to send home during 1970. He replied that he could lose one of his several major units late in the year, and the later the better. Yet in Washington plans now being studied would relieve him of virtually all of his combat forces by the end of this year.

If Washington cannot get the point driven home of what it must and will do, this sort of thing will go on. It will have very harmful effects, most sources believe. If those in the field do not plan for the assumption of tasks by the Vietnamese on a time table attuned to that of Washington, each withdrawal will come as a surprise, and the cry will go up, "We are not ready." That will, of course, be true, but sources believe it need not be.

What is needed, they say, are precise timetables, understood in Washington and in the field, that will allow and force careful planning and preparation in the field for the inevitable shifting of the burden.

There is a somewhat understandable reluctance among the military to accept the inevitability of U.S. departures, perhaps with the job not accomplished. It has been a long, sad and divisive war, and there remains in many the wistful hope that if the U.S. holds on long enough it will all turn out all right.

DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Washington, with its political urgencies and its high budgets for preparing the Vietnamese to shoulder the burden, wants fast, efficient withdrawal. If the command had its way, withdrawals would be a mere trickle, with additional forces withdrawn only when it was doubly certain that the troops could be spared. Such certainties are very elusive in this war.

Numbers of sources in Vietnam believe that continued troop departures at the present speed, or even somewhat faster, have much to commend them. Only under such a program, they say, can several urgent things occur:

The command will be forced to continue the developmental process of the Vietnamese as well as possible, and many activities that should be turned over will be turned over out of necessity. Then, too, with fewer Americans around to play "big brother," the Vietnamese will be forced to take the initiative or fail.

The Thieu government will be moved still further toward a sense of urgency that has not yet materialized. There are encouraging signs, however, and many sources believe that the challenge of continued withdrawal is about the best way to keep the government moving in productive directions.

As American troops leave, the civilian bureaucracy also will be dwindling. This should open the way for far greater efficiency and force the Americans to reevaluate many programs to see what could be cut out or reduced, what can be turned over to the Vietnamese, and what could be done with fewer Americans and done better.

In the final analysis, there are many reasons to believe that the Thieu government can bring itself and its armed forces through the trials of American withdrawal.

FOUNTAINHEAD OF CORRUPTION

Certainly many problems remain. Corruption seems almost boundless, but South Vietnam is run by its Army, and that Army is the fountainhead of corruption. As long as the Army remains in absolute control of the provinces and the districts, with military men heading the government, corruption will continue. Of course, if it weren't the Army running corruption, it would be someone else.

In their common travails, the Vietnamese have yet to pull together.

The militant An Quang Buddhists, although now sifting around for new positions, have made it clear that they would rather head for the hills than support either the government or the Communists.

There are many Vietnamese with plans for the salvation of South Vietnam, but not many with a willingness to work with what they have to help the government improve. To many who see change as urgent, nights are calm, and conversation is pleasant, and "if the Americans would only get rid of Thieu. . . ."

On the other hand, President Thieu has not approached with open arms those who would support him.

He used the legitimacy of the Assembly to argue against the formation of the advisory council the Americans wanted. Now, with that problem out of the way, he has been busy attacking the Assembly. The government reportedly has paid demonstrators—members of the civilian irregular defense forces—to demonstrate before the lower house.

Mr. Thieu has used the Army's propoganda machine to denounce Sen. Tran Van Don and Gen. Duong Van ("Big") Minh for their advocacy of a "third force." General Minh is a likely candidate for president in 1971 against Mr. Thieu, who is doing all he can now to scotch the general's chances.

TIME OF RECKONING

As many Americans and Vietnamese see it, the only thing that can temper this infighting and maneuvering, and all the other things of less urgency in this time of need, is the constant reminder that the time of reckoning is coming with the departure of the Americans.

As the Americans go, it will, hopefully, become abundantly clear to many Vietnamese that there are more important things at stake than getting reelected or making money.

If this realization does not come, sources agree, then nothing the Americans could do will make it come, and without it, there can not be much hope no matter how long the Americans stay.

To be sure, there is reason now to be encouraged. As an example, a district chief who recently fled in the face of the enemy was relieved the next day by telephone. Sources took this as a major step forward for the government in achieving speed, as well as a good omen for the phone service.

But, in more important areas, the government has moved, although in an inept fashion, to institute some austerity taxes. There is a growing feeling of dedication among many South Vietnamese military men and civilians in the field. There are signs of improvement as the government gets better organized throughout the country.

Thus there is hope.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 12, 1970]

Major Tests Ahead for Saigon Forces

U.S. withdrawals soon to put burden on South Vietnamese

Staff correspondent George W. Ashworth, now completing a six-month tour of duty in South Vietnam, gives his assessment of the Vietnamization of the land war there. In this, the last of five dispatches, he lists some of the strengths and weaknesses of South Vietnam's forces as it prepares to assume a larger role in the war.

(By George W. Ashworth)

Saigon.—Continued American withdrawals will soon open the way for the first broad-scale testing of the South Vietnamese fighting forces.

The United States presence is still so great in the South that there have been no opportunities for conclusive assessments of what the Vietnamese can do.

Yet there have been some indications, both good and bad:

On the encouraging side, a major part of the 23rd Division was partially responsible for fending off three North Vietnamese regiments in recent fighting around Du Prang and Duc Lap along the Cambodian border in II Corps central highlands.

It would be wrong, however, to tout this as a major victory for, as a senior colonel in Saigon put it, "We threw in so much air and artillery the ARVN [South Vietnamese Army] couldn't lose." Also involved were the U.S. special forces and their Cambodian civilian mercenary irregulars who proved, as they have before, quite valiant in the eight-week campaign.

Vietnamese excellence was more apparent in the fighting for the infamous Hamburger Hill last June, when elements of the 1st Vietnamese Division were the first allied force up the slopes.

In battling around Ben Hat late last spring, Vietnamese forces fought exceedingly valorously until they lost a high number of officers. Then they showed signs, as one American put it, "of coming unglued."

When the U.S. Ninth Division was pulled out of the Mekong Delta last summer, with two-thirds of the division leaving for the states, an opportunity was presented for the Vietnamese 7th to take over and prove itself.

Bases sometimes stripped

When American bases were turned over to the Vietnamese, there were several instances of widespread stripping. Much that was taken never showed up again. Vietnamese engineer units were called upon to oversee some future transfers but the damage had been done.

And in the ensuing bitterness, members of the press were persona non grata for a while with the 7th, and no pictures of stripped facilities were allowed.

Later, the military picture in the 7th began to deteriorate. On Nov. 18, in Dinh Tuomg Province, Vietnamese sources report, about 15 enemy were killed when they ambushed a battalion of the 7th.

But the ARVN lost an estimated 55 killed, more than 80 wounded, and about 70 missing. The battalion commander was killed, along with other key officers, sources report. Specifics were not officially reported.

Units of the Vietnamese 9th had been sent to help the marines in the U Minh forest, but they were rushed back to bolster the sagging 7th. Now authorities here in Saigon consider the 7th a decided problem.

PERFORMANCE EXTREME

To paraphrase the rhyme which might still be applied to the Vietnamese Army, "When it is good it is very, very good, and when it is bad, it is horrid."

The 1st in the extreme north of the country is very, very good. And there are others, such as the 2nd and the 21st, the marines and the Airborne.

But there are units like the 7th, with problems, and the 5th and the 18th, which are coming along slowly but, hopefully, consistently.

Improving the ARVN is a slow process under any circumstances. Even though priorities have shifted away from the former almost complete emphasis upon the American war machine, there remains much to be done. Many sources argue that Vietnamization was not being taken seriously here until an appalled Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird ordered it so last March.

It is still not clear what kind of army the Vietnamese will have when it is all done. There is little doubt that they will have neither the vast quantities of equipment nor the technical expertise to be a duplicate or even a passable imitation of the Americans.

That, of course, is not necessarily bad, for many sources agree that the Vietnamese will have to devise the approaches and solutions best suited to their skills, not try to emulate the Americans.

But they cannot have the opposite of what the Americans have, or a pure guerrilla-fighting army, because it is not that kind of war anymore and because, with American guidance, the South Vietnamese have more than a 10-year experience gap at fighting a guerrilla-type war.

Certainly what some sources see as the "excessive firepower" of the Americans will not be available to the South Vietnamese. Discussing the American approach, one general in Saigon said, "If we see one little VC running around, we call in the B-52's on him."

The general was being a bit facetious, of course, but the enormity of American firepower has only been diminished slightly as tight budget problems have led to some cut-backs in B-52's and other armaments. The Americans plan to support the Vietnamese with artillery and airpower for several years to come, but there is little doubt that the new approach, with the Vietnamese leading and the Americans supporting, will be somewhat less potent.

For one thing, the Americans cannot afford to leave everything behind in Vietnam. The Army is aware of probable budget strictures in the years to come, and it is realized that much military hardware must be saved from the war in Vietnam if it is to be repossessed at all.

Training is a problem, particularly that of such people as helicopter and fighter pilots and mechanics. It takes about 18 to 20 months to train a pilot, and about one-half that time is purely training in English. Thus it goes slowly.

Now the Vietnamese have about 150 helicopters. Eventually they will have 400 or so as the American combat forces leave and Vietnamese crews are trained.

Still, to show the enormous differences in mobility and firepower that can be envisioned, the Vietnamese armed forces will have fewer helicopters under present programs than the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division does now.

SIMPLER JETS BETTER?

In the case of fighters and bombers, the Vietnamese are getting relatively unsophisticated A–37 and F–5 jets, while the United States Air Force is taking home its more potent planes, such as the F–4 Phantom. And all of the new, large cargo planes are going back to the U.S.

Of course, it is probable that the Vietnamese can get by with far-less sophisticated equipment than can the Americans. This is argued particularly in the case of Jets. Any such planes, no matter how unsophisticated, will put the South Vietnamese that much ahead of the enemy, with no aircraft.

And it can even be argued that the smaller, less-sophisticated aircraft are better for use in fighting in the South, where there is no antiaircraft fire to worry about.

But all of these differences do mean that the South Vietnamese will have fighting forces much different in capabilities than the combination now in the field.

The Americans plan to use their own forces to bolster in problem areas. But it will certainly be a different war—and a war the Vietnamese have yet to prove themselves capable of fighting.

The Vietnamese are planning some reorganization to make the new war more manageable, but these needed changes are very slow in coming.

TARGETS CAREFULLY PICKED

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have decided to concentrate upon Vietnamese forces that have replaced Americans in an attempt to show any inadequacies of the Vietnamese—thus shaking the confidence of the Americans and the South Vietnamese Governments.

There is little doubt here that the Communists will have some measure of success against the Vietnamese forces. At best, sources say, the Vietnamese will have to give up areas along borders and in enemy-infested or endangered sections where the South's forces are overextended. At worst, enough of the South's forces could begin falling apart to raise again enemy hopes that a military victory in the South is possible.

Almost all sources are inclined to the view that the South Vietnamese armed forces can achieve what is necessary, given a few setbacks. But there is general agreement that the question of whether what is necessary will be done is largely contingent upon the willingness of the Vietnamese to do so.

At present, there is an air of confidence in the South Vietnamese hierarchy. But that confidence may prove to be a delusion, many sources say, unless they can develop a sense of urgency and do what must be done.

Still needed is a reorganization of the military, with the elimination of the incompetent and the burdensomely corrupt. Then there must be a far greater concern for those who serve in the services and a willingness to punish those in positions of authority who do not do well. These things have yet to come.

In essence, the Thieu government should be able to survive the American withdrawal and assume the military burden. But without a vastly greater urgency and dedication than is now manifest, the future could indeed be grim.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Feb. 25, 1970]

INTELLIGENCE GROPES FOR CLUES—WHAT ARE REDS UP TO? U.S. AIDES ASK

SAIGON.—For the first time since the 1968 Tet offfensive, American officials admit they are deeply puzzled concerning enemy plans.

Now, however, Americans convey the impression they are groping through a complex array of indicators to discern enemy aims and finding only hints and threats but nothing conclusive on what to expect.

"LOTS OF THEORIES"

"Through most of 1968 and all of 1969 we really thought we had a pretty good handle on what the enemy was considering," explained one American official. "Now all we can say is we don't know. We have lots of ideas and theories but are more puzzled than we have been for more than a year."

The main reason for the puzzlement of senior Americans here is the peculiar position in which the United States finds itself in relation to its own—and the enemy's—troop strengths.

While Americans are gradually scaling down their commitment, the North Vietnamese are building up for what may eventually prove the final, decisive campaigns of the war.

Americans are desperately attempting to shore up South Vietnam's defense capabilities against this threat but are as anxious now as they ever were for "time"—time to hold off the enemy while South Vietnamese divisions, supported by Regional and Popular Forces, reach a level deemed necessary for defeating the enemy on their own.

LESS HOPEFUL THAN LAIRD

Officials here indicate they are more pessimistic than Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, who praised the success of the "Vietnamization" program while warning of inevitable problems and setbacks.

The feeling among these officials is that reduction of American strength after the present withdrawals would leave the South Vietnamese dangerously exposed to the enemy threat.

American officials in Saigon, in fact, have opposed every phase of de-escalation beginning with the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968, and then have reluctantly expressed their approval after they could no longer prevent

the U.S. moves. Observers here expect a similar pattern surrounding the next troop withdrawals this summer.

The pattern may be somewhat different this time, however, in that officials appear less inclined to speak of the capabilities and potential of the Vietnamese forces in quite such optimistic terms as they did six months—or even two months—ago.

While claiming vast "improvements," as they did all during 1969, they give the impression they still are far from certain the South Vietnamese will be able to bear the brunt of a full-fledged North Vietnamese attack after the Americans have withdrawn.

RED BUILDUPS REPORTED

The sense of pessimism seems based largely on reports of unprecedented enemy buildups from the Mekong Delta to southern Lais, where officials report the most enemy vehicle traffic in the history of the war.

Most of the troops and equipment remain uncommitted, but officials say that obviously the North Vietnamese would not have sent them so far from staging areas in the North without intending to use them.

The influx of North Vietnamese troops and equipment into the war zone—including base areas across the borders as well in South Vietnam—has enabled the enemy to keep up its troop strength of approximately 240,000 men despite heavy losses in 1968 and the first half of 1969.

American officials believe more than 600,000 enemy troops have died in the war but admit relative ignorance of how many more troops Hanoi could send in for a showdown.

One of the greatest "unknowns" in the riddle of determining the enemy's aims is the method by which North Vietnam has governed itself since President Ho Chi Minh's death last year.

Officials here have the feeling North Vietnam is "ruled by committee," as one of them put it, although Party Secretary Le Duan seems to have emerged as the chief policy spokesman.

Le Duan's emergence bodes ill for the chances of a settlement of the war in the foreseeable future, for he has always been regarded as one of the "hardliners" in North Vietnamese ruling circles.

He has warned his countrymen of a long war requiring heavy sacrifices—an indication that North Vietnam is willing to suffer heavy losses in its effort to humiliate South Vietnamese forces and weaken the position of the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

FALL OFFENSIVE SEEN

Indicative of the puzzlement of American officials, however, is speculation the enemy will attempt to mount a major offensive next fall, in the period of the South Vietnamese senatorial elections and the American congressional campaign.

"These theories all sound very logical," said one American official, "but so far we don't have a shred of evidence to support them. We're in a position now in which we can't quite tell what they're thinking or planning."

"We're still in the midst of a 'lull' in the fighting," the official went on, "but a lot of important things could be happening. It's kind of a deceiving, intermediate period, and it's harder now than it ever was to figure out what's going on beneath the surface."

EFFECT OF U.S. COMBAT FORCE WITHDRAWAL ON ADVISER STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think as the combat forces of the United States are withdrawn from Vietnam, the number of military advisers will have to increase to compensate for that?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I think—let me in a general way speak in these terms. We look forward to a decrease in adviser strength, without a time schedule now. Looking at the nature of things advisers do, with respect to the combat forces of the Vietnamese, we would say that perhaps you can begin to pull advisers out, say from battalion levels. They have already been pulled out of some of our engineer and artillery battalions in Vietnam and we are looking at where further reductions may be made. In the training centers, we are doing the same

thing. This is apart from U.S. deployment. This is looking hard at what the Vietnamese can do. We perhaps will not need as many advisers in training centers at some time in the future.

We do see in some other areas, because of the nature of the buildup, that there will be a need to increase logistical and technical advisers so there will probably be mutual offsets.

AVERAGE DIVISION STAFF AND U.S. ADVISERS

The CHAIRMAN. General, how large is the average Vietnamese division staff?

General CLEMENT. It would probably be about 150 to 200, sir. The 1st ARVN Division runs about 200.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that division is larger. This article I read says it is twice as large as the average.

Is that right, Colonel?

Colonel WHEELER. I don't know whether it is twice as large, sir, but the division does have responsibilities that are not normally assigned to other divisions such as the DMZ and that requires an additional intelligence effort.

The CHAIRMAN. How large is your division?

Colonel WHEELER. Our division's staff approximates 200, sir. That includes all the staff elements.

The CHAIRMAN. How large is the U.S. advisory staff attached to that division?

Colonel WHEELER. My advisory team has a total of 197, of whom 49 are advisers at staff level and 111 at combat unit level, sir. The remainder are support personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. It is approximately the same size as the Vietnamese. You said 200 against 197?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that about average for the average Vietnamese division?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir; they are smaller and so is adviser staff.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean in numbers, actually, I mean in percentage.

To put it another way, in the average division, regardless of how large the staff is, is there approximately the same number of Americans as there are Vietnamese? That is what I mean.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir; total adviser effort.

Sir, there is one thing I would like to add to that. When we are speaking of advisers, all are not located at division staff level. The total figure includes advisers down to the battalion level.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I understand you said that.

ATTITUDE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICERS TO U.S. WITHDRAWAL OF COMBAT FORCES

What is the attitude of most senior South Vietnamese military officers with regard to the rate of withdrawal of the American combat forces? Can you give us an estimate of that, either one of you?

General CLEMENT. The few that I have spoken to, sir, have really felt that they could certainly live with this. I think that again, they feel that there is a momentum. I am trying to paint a picture of the feeling within the country—these are people I talk to, my counterparts and others—that they can certainly give it a go. I haven't encountered any particular pessimism on their part.

The CHIRMAN. Do they expect that most U.S. combat forces will be withdrawn by the end of 1970?

General CLEMENT. I have no judgment on that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of enemy casualties in 1969 credited to the South Vietnamese Army was due to U.S. air and artillery? Do you know that?

General CLEMENT. I don't have that data, sir.

COMBINED COMBAT OPERATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of combat operations last year were combined United States-Vietnamese operations? Do you have that?

General CLEMENT. I do not have that information, sir.

Senator CASE. I wonder if Colonel Wheeler can tell us about his own division?

Colonel WHEELER. In my division, sir, in the 1st ARVN Division, approximately 30 to 40 percent of the large scale operations, regimental sized, in 1969, were combined operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the combined operations prove advantageous? Did they produce a higher kill ratio?

Colonel WHEELER. No necessarily, sir. It was just the fact that the enemy situation at the time and the suspected target was of such size that it required a preponderance of force, considering other troop requirements, the forces were combined in order to best accomplish all tasks.

During our combined operations, the target area was further broken down into individual unit areas of operations. Each battalion sized force operated independently in its own area.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BEING TRAINED IN UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. How many South Vietnamese military personnel are being trained in the United States? Do you know that, general?

General CLEMENT. At the present time, sir, we have in the neighborhood of 1,500 or 2,000, somewhere in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how it is broken down in Army, Navy, and Air Force?

General CLEMENT. I can provide the specific for the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

(The information referred to follows:)

BREAKOUT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BEING TRAINED IN UNITED STATES

(Department of Defense)

Six thousand three hundred twenty-two Vietnamese were programmed for training in the United States during FY 70. The break out by Service was: 735 Army, 1,906 Navy/Marine, and 3,681 Air Force. As of 1 January 1970, 460 (212 Army, 14 Navy/Marine, and 234 Air Force) had completed training and 1,967 were training (321 Army, 290 Navy/Marine, and 1,356 Air Force).

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much the training given the Vietnamese in the United States costs the United States? Can you give us the cost of that?

General CLEMENT. I can give it for the record. I do not have it broken out specifically here, but we do have the figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much it costs to train an average jet pilot?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any idea?

General CLEMENT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you find that out? Are such figures available?

General CLEMENT. We can certainly look into it. There probably are figures available.

(The information referred to follows:)

COST TO U.S. FOR F.Y. 1970 OFF-SHORE TRAINING OF ARVNAF

(Department of Defense)

Estimated costs to US for FY 70 off-shore training for ARVNAF is $41.8 million.

1969 SOUTH VIETNAMESE CHANGES IN COMMAND

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many Vietnamese commanders were relieved of their commands last year?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am not saying relieved, but I know there were changes in command since last August in five divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Five divisions since last August?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the reasons?

General CLEMENT. I don't. I know specifically in two cases; the reason probably would be relief. I am not sure of the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether or not the American advisers objected to these removals?

General CLEMENT. That I do not know, sir.

DESERTION RATE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, general, what is the current desertion rate in the South Vietnamese Army?

General CLEMENT. I would like to discuss that, sir, if we could, in an executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not public property, right?

General CLEMENT. I don't believe it is.

ADVISORY ASSIGNMENTS VERSUS COMBAT ASSIGNMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do most U.S. military advisers seek advisory assignments or do they prefer combat assignments?

General CLEMENT. I think for a professional man, sir, the combat assignment, when we are in combat, is the one that is generally sought. But I must say that the advisory effort certainly has been emphasized in the past several months, particularly the idea of getting better quality advisers. The advisory effort per se is undergoing a tremendous examination right now, sir, as far as upgrading.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND VIETNAMIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, I do not know the difference in the intimacy each of you has with your counterparts. This is a matter, I suppose, of personal relationships. But do you and your opposite number in the 1st Division ever talk about such things as the withdrawal of American troops and the so-called Vietnamization program?

Colonel WHEELER. We do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What does your counterpart think about it? Does he think it is a wise thing to do?

Colonel WHEELER. The 1st ARVN division commander and his commanders and their troops with whom I have been in daily contact are willing to shoulder the load. There has been no hesitation on their part to assume their responsibilities at every opportunity and their conduct on the field of battle and the results, I think, prove it.

The CHAIRMAN. Has he ever indicated to you what he thinks would be a reasonable timetable?

Colonel WHEELER. He has not said, sir. He has only made one statement in this regard and that was he would hope that the combat support and combat service support to best deal with the NVA threat currently within his area is sufficient for him to remove the threat from the confines of the South Vietnam borders.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have anything to say, General, about the same question as to your counterpart?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

I think I had indicated earlier that I have talked to my counterpart in general terms and to many of the training center commanders about the general problem. I have had neither negative reaction nor negative attitude; they feel they can get along, can get on with the job.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further today? There are a number of these things I think you prefer to talk about in executive session.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn until tomorrow then.

(Whereupon at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene, Wednesday, March 4, 1970, at 10 a.m.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

U.S. Military Advisory Program in Vietnam

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room S–116, U.S. Capitol Building, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington, McGee, Aiken, Case, Cooper, and Williams.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting in executive session today to continue receiving testimony from Brig. Gen. Wallace L. Clement, director of the Training Directorate in the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and Col. Jesse L. Wheeler, Jr., senior adviser to the 1st Infantry Division of the South Vietnamese Army.

As high ranking officers, with the on-the-ground responsibility for training Vietnamese forces to take over the burden of the war, you gentlemen are in a far better position to appraise the problems of Vietnamization than are policymakers in the Pentagon—or legislators in the Congress, who must vote on bills to finance the war.

It might interest you that one reason I was late this morning was that I had a delegation of contractors call upon me crying the blues about why their business has gone to pot. I told them it was primarily because of the war in Vietnam, which I think is true. It was a very interesting situation. Contractors are beginning to feel they are going broke. That is why I was late. They were from Arkansas. Otherwise, I would have been here on time.

Policies can be no better than the factual information on which they are founded. That is why it is essential that this committee receive the most accurate, impartial, and detailed information available concerning the plans and prospects for disengaging American forces in Vietnam. And I hope that today you can and will provide the committee with the best factual information upon which we may judge the merits of the current policy.

It is curious, I may say. I do not think this will be on record.

(Discussion off the record.)

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WALLACE L. CLEMENT, DIRECTOR OF THE TRAINING DIRECTORATE IN THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. JESSE L. WHEELER, JR., SENIOR ADVISER, FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; AND MR. PETER R. KNAUR, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to say anything initially before we go into specific questions?

General CLEMENT. No; I have no opening statement.

COST OF OFFSHORE AND PILOT TRAINING FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

The CHAIRMAN. One question occurred to me. Did you get the figures on cost of the training of pilots and other activities I asked for yesterday?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have those for the record?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The estimated cost of offshore training for fiscal year 1970 is [deleted] and I can give you the specifics on the pilot training.

The CHAIRMAN. By offshore, do you mean the United States?

General CLEMENT. That is what I mean, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for all categories.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.] How many personnel does that contemplate?

General CLEMENT. The plan for the total year will be——

The CHAIRMAN. Fiscal year?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; fiscal year 1970. That plan encompasses [deleted] people in the fiscal year 1970 offshore program.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they all categories?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you estimate it costs to train one pilot?

General CLEMENT. I have the costs. For a UH–1, helicopter pilot, [deleted]. For a jet pilot, [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that? Why is there such a tremendous difference? Is it time or what is it?

General CLEMENT. It would be the time differential, the type of instruction they undergo, and the more expensive materials they use.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are pilot training costs confidential? Is there any reason why these figures should be classified or secret? Does this tell the enemy anything it should not know?

General CLEMENT. Sir, these are confidential figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are they confidential? This is what interests me. Is this simply to keep the American people ignorant of how much the war costs them?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you afraid the American people would become disillusioned with the war if they knew how expensive it is?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what is the reason? Just give us a good reason.

General CLEMENT. I am sure the training costs as a part of our total resources is a security matter.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it? We have a feeling, frankly, that the reasons for security are far less to prevent the enemy from knowing about it than to prevent the American people and Congress from knowing about it. I wish you would disabuse my mind of this.

General CLEMENT. Sir, I really do not know the exact reason why these figures are confidential, but I do understand the general matter—and I am sure you do—of the security aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you want to speak for yourself and tell us the reason. Why is the cost of jet pilot training confidential? You do not have to do it secondarily. We are quite willing to refer your——

Mr. KNAUR. Actually, I do not think it is in the general's or my purview to know why. I mean, it is a decision that was made by the responsible officials.

The CHAIRMAN. Who?

Mr. KNAUR. This, sir, would fall within the Security Review Branch of the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. This is so vague and indefinite. Cannot you say? Is this the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. KNAUR. In the last analysis, yes, sir. I mean——

The CHAIRMAN. Can you put it in the record? Will you procure for the record a very positive statement of why the costs of training a jet pilot must be confidential?

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir; I will.

The CHAIRMAN. And possibly be understandable and direct and simple?

Mr. KNAUR. I will try on the latter.

(The information referred to follows:)

CLASSIFICATION OF COST OF TRAINING REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM JET PILOT

The individual cost attributed to the training of a Republic of Vietnam Air Force jet pilot is not considered classified information. However, the identification of the total program with costs and strengths would be considered sensitive information.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it that the cost of training a Vietnamese to fly a jet is confidential? I cannot imagine why it should be, other than the fact that you are afraid it might disillusion the Congress and the American people with the war.

Mr. KNAUR. I am sure that is not the motivation.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are you sure it is not? I cannot think of a better one. Can you think of a better one?

BASIS FOR SECURITY RULES

Mr. KNAUR. Because I have never heard of any security rule being based on trying to deceive the American public or the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Say that over. What is this now? I did not get the thrust of that.

Mr. KNAUR. Just, sir, that I have never heard of a security rule that has been made for the prime purpose of keeping information from the American public or from the Congress.

General CLEMENT. Sir, if I may, there is another aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go to it. What is it?

General CLEMENT. If the cost of training a jet pilot is known in the budget there is an overall cost, then we are telling the other side that we are training 200 pilots this year. So this, you see, is a way these figures can be used.

The CHAIRMAN. What difference does it make?

General CLEMENT. This is a factor involved.

The CHAIRMAN. What difference does it make?

General CLEMENT. I think we should keep the enemy in as much doubt about what we are doing at all levels, and I know you share the belief with me. It is hard to get information on the battlefield, sir, and we do not like to have the enemy given it free, as you well know.

The CHAIRMAN. On that theory we should not publish budgets and we should not have debates in the Congress and should pretend the war is not going on.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Every time a speech is made about the war up here it gives some information.

General CLEMENT. Yes, and I think as I know you are well aware, this is a matter of judgment. Obviously, the American public must know and should know just as much as possible. We share that with you.

VIEWS OF ADMIRAL MCCAIN AND GENERAL CICCOLELLA

The CHAIRMAN. It is nice of you to say that, but you know yourself that some of your principal officers, such as Admiral McCain and General Ciccolella and others have denounced the Congress roundly, not only the Congress in general but me in particular, for criticizing the war or raising any question that this is not in our interest. You know that as a fact.

General CLEMENT. I cannot speak of what General Ciccolella has said. I really have no knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about it. How is it that you can be in this war and know so little? You do not know what your counterpart thinks? You never heard of General Ciccolella?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about what he thinks of it?

General CLEMENT. Sir, your question was did I know what he had said about you and I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean about the war and those who disapprove of it. You ought to have a copy of his famous speech to the chamber of commerce at Taiwan about the war and the Congress generally and all of those who do not think it is the Lord's work.

General CLEMENT. May I pick up on another point? You said I do not know what my counterpart was thinking. I must say I work closely with my counterpart and I thought I indicated that yesterday. I do try to get into these aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I not ask you what he thought about the Chau case and you said you did not know?

General CLEMENT. This is a specific case. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There may be other things but, I thought if you worked that closely—the Chau case is famous. You know about it; do you not?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure your counterpart would know about Mr. Chau.

General CLEMENT. We have not actually discussed it. In general, I discuss training matters with him.

The CHAIRMAN. It is amazing to me you do not know what Admiral McCain said. He has been publicized and he had a lead article in the Reader's Digest saying the enemy was defeated. That was a year ago, in January.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you read that?

General CLEMENT. In general terms——

The CHAIRMAN. Did you read the article?

General CLEMENT. I cannot recall specifically, but I have read these articles.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the events proved he was correct in his statement?

General CLEMENT. Well, if this is the statement he made, then the events obviously did not bear him out.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not read it? This was a question and answer interview with him.

General CLEMENT. I am sorry, sir, I do not recall.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a lead article. I think it was the first article in the Reader's Digest of a year ago January. I think I am paraphrasing accurately. He said the enemy is defeated. He just does not know it yet.

General CLEMENT. Well, a year ago January, sir, we were pretty busy in the sector I was in and I do not believe I was doing a lot of reading at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I was busy, too, but we read these things because they are of such major interest here.

CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION ON JET PILOT TRAINING

I think it is the Pentagon's responsibility and not yours really. I would like them to give reasons for classifying this type of information.

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMEN. I guess a good example is why the costs to train a jet pilot should be classified specifically.

Mr. KNAUR. I will, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If the best you can do is that the reason is that the other side might know how many jet pilots you are training. I feel very sorry for you. I do not think that is a justifiable reason.

1970 U.S. ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT EXPECTED BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE

General, we come back to something more specific. What types of American military support, for example, artillery and air support, are South Vietnamese Army commanders expecting in 1970?

General CLEMENT. Sir, let me give a general statement and then we can get some specifics in it. Under the RVNAF improvement and modernization program, which is what we are talking about [deleted] percent of all ARVN authorized units had deployed by January 31, 1970. Many ARVN units have been activated earlier than planned as a result of men and equipment being available. This includes artillery

units, an additional Marine battalion, some logistics units, and other units of this type. We have specifics which are in some detail.

COST OF TRAINING U.S. PILOT

The CHAIRMAN. General, pardon me. I apologize. I meant to ask while you are doing this to give me what it costs to train an American pilot and if that is secret. Include that in the memorandum.

Mr. KNAUR. Right, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

TRAINING COST

The United States spends approximately $82,000 to train one jet pilot for the U.S. Air Force. This cost includes equipment, training facilities, and personnel to support the training base. The individual costs are unclassified, but the entire jet pilot training program is considered sensitive information.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

1970 U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT EXPECTED BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE

General CLEMENT. As an example, we will indicate here how some of these things were completed ahead of schedule. An artillery battalion, 105 millimeter, was activated in November 1969 rather than the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1970. A light truck company was activated February 1, 1970, versus the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1970. In the Vietnamese Air Force [deleted] percent of all the authorized squadrons had been declared operational as of January 31, 1970. Many of these units have become operationally ready prior to the planned operational ready date. For example, a gunship squadron. In addition, a [deleted].

[Deleted] percent of all the authorized small combat craft have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. The Navy program has been accelerated to complete a turnover of all small craft. That would be river patrol boats principally.

These are specific examples, sir, of the kind of thing that is going on as far as our improvement and modernization program.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BEING TRAINED IN UNITED STATES

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question there?

The CHAIRMAN. You certainly may.

Senator MANSFIELD. General, following up one of the questions raised by the chairman which you indicated if answered at least in the financial sense might be of value to the enemy by giving him an idea of how many people are being trained as jet pilots and the like. I note here in the February 22 issue of the Washington Post a story under the byline of Mr. Richard Homan, which indicates that the number of Vietnamese over here being trained in various capacities will increase within this year from 1,600 to 6,000. The story itself is from Mineral Wells, Tex.

There are breakdowns as to the number of South Vietnamese being trained at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi and what they are doing, at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas and what they are doing, at Fort Wolters outside Mineral Wells, Tex. and in what they are being trained, and at Newport, R.I., where it is anticipated a 60-man class of South Vietnamese naval officer cadets will be forthcoming.

It looks as if while the costs may not be available, the numbers are available for those who want to read the U.S. newspapers. I would hazard a guess that Mr. Homan obtained this information from official sources. Otherwise, he could not write so authoritatively. I cite it and I ask that this be made a part of the record at this point only to indicate that there is too much secrecy and not enough publicity as far as our involvement in Vietnam is concerned. This is true also in the case of our involvement in Laos, which I think is pretty well known but for some reason officially is an interlude war, a nonwar, a secret war or something else.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1970]

RATE IN U.S. QUADRUPLED—VIETNAMIZATION TRAINING UP

(By Richard Homan)

MINERAL WELLS, TEX.—One after another, 30 Orange and white helicopters dropped from the brilliant Texas sky, broke their fall inches above the hardpacked clay, and settled—some smoothly and some awkwardly—onto the makeshift landing strip.

Inside one of the bubble cockpits, the student, Warrant Officer Le Tan Minh, said, "It was pretty good." His instructor, Warrant Officer William R. Wells, said, "Except—" and Minh admitted, "Except for air speed—some trouble there."

Warrant Officer Minh is a 22-year-old Buddhist Vietnamese, a high-school graduate from Hue. He and his American instructor are assigned to Ft. Wolters, 60 miles west of Dallas. They are part of the Vietnamization of the war in Southeast Asia.

The Pentagon considers the training of Vietnamese in the United States the key to eventual withdrawal of American fighting men.

This year the training of Vietnamese in the United States has quadrupled, from 1,600 to 6,000 men a year, forming the nucleus of the future Vietnamese fighting forces.

In a recent week, at Ft. Eustis, Va., 250 Vietnamese were studying to be helicopter mechanics. At Randolph AFB in Texas, 200 were receiving their first flying lessons in fixed-wing aircraft.

At Keesler Air Force Base on the Mississippi Gulf coast, 160 were in the second phase of pilot training, studying navigation, airborne electronics, or learning to be air traffic controllers.

At Lackland Air Force Base on the edge of San Antonio, Tex., 550 were taking specialized English courses, learning the technical jargon of their future military jobs.

At Ft. Wolters, outside Mineral Wells, Tex., 350 were learning to fly helicopters, and the first class of 35 moved into the final month of its 21-week course, preparing to transfer after graduation to Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Ga., for 16 weeks of advanced helicopter training.

At Newport, R.I., the Navy was preparing for the arrival in March of a 60-man class of South Vietnamese naval officer candidates.

At each of these installations, and at the Pentagon, where the program is monitored, officials are enthusiastic and describe the results so far as unexpectedly good.

Talks with students and instructors at several installations indicate that the South Vietnamese, most in their early 20s, are generally shy at the start, but have impressed instructors with the grasp of complex U.S. military machinery. In many instances, they have performed better than comparable classes of U.S. draftees.

PAINSTAKING PROCESS

But the specialties being taught the Vietnamese and the scope of the program to train Vietnamese instructors indicates that Vietnamization of the support role will be gradual and painstaking.

For example, all of the flight training at Randolph and Keesler is in single-engine, propeller-driven planes. Only a small number of Vietnamese are scheduled for advanced instruction that will enable them to fly multi-engine cargo planes or jets.

Helicopter training at Ft. Wolters and Hunter is in single-rotor, observation-type aircraft. Few South Vietnamese will learn to fly the large troop-carrying or gunship helicopters.

Because the immediate emphasis is on boosting the number of Vietnamese flying personnel, there is little effort now to develop a sizable cadre of South Vietnamese qualified to expand that country's present small pilot training facility.

Limited though it is, Pentagon officials say the training is consistent with South Vietnam's immediate needs and weaponry.

South Vietnam's Air Force has few jets or other advanced aircraft. It has three squadrons of A–1 Skyraiders, single-seat attack bombers; three squadrons of A–37s, subsonic attack jets; several C–47 cargo planes and gunships and one squadron of F–5's, simplified supersonic fighters produced primarily for recipients of U.S. military assistance.

Training is done within the framework of the Military Assistance Program, under which the U.S. annually trains several thousand men from the armed forces of 50 allied nations. Because of the sudden increase of Vietnamese students—which is expected to last at least another year—a separate taks force has been created in the Pentagon to oversee their instruction.

The emphasis is on aircraft skills, with the immediate goal, according to Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr., the doubling in size of the South Vietnamese Air Force by the end of 1971. Seamans said recently, "This is a program that will run for another year and three-quarters or so."

Through the program, the Pentagon hopes to upgrade the South Vietnamese capability to operate and repair helicopters, needed to allow the Vietnamese to carry on the mobile type of combat that the U.S. has pioneered there.

According to Pentagon planners, the expectation is that a solid grounding in the basic aircraft will allow South Vietnam to conduct more than half of the total combat sorties flown in the country—about twice as many as they now fly.

The sudden increase in Vietnamese students has forced a rapid readjustment of teaching methods.

By lengthening courses and concentrating on problem areas, U.S. instructors have been able to produce graduates who, they say, meet the same standards set for American GIs.

IS FLABBERGASTED

"I'm flabbergasted at the success, really I am," said Maj. A. Robert Cyr, a helicopter maintenance instruction supervisor at Ft. Eustis. "Let's face it. They've got a grave, grave problem with language and technical background. You can simply say 'carburetor' to an American GI and he knows what you mean. But back home in Quang Ngai province, maybe the most complicated thing the Vietnamese boy has seen is the bus going by or his uncle's bicycle."

Maj. James W. Johnson, a director of helicopter pilot training at Ft. Wolters, said, "We insist that the VNAF student is just as good as the American when he graduates, and by the same standards." At Keesler, Col. Stanley R. Lovell, director of Vietnamese pilot training, said, "We're proud of our product and we couldn't be if they put pressure on us, or a quota system."

The Vietnamese students are young, most between 20 and 23. All are high school graduates, many have attended two years of college and all have studied English before leaving Vietnam.

To be eligible for technical training in the U.S., the Vietnamese must score 65 per cent on the standard English Comprehensive Level test given all potential students from abroad.

Most however, come to the United States with a 40 per cent score and go to Lackland for English courses—eight weeks of general English and seven weeks of specialized instruction in technical terminology related to their military job.

"Technical language, even if you already speak English, is really a language all its own," John P. Devine, head of a special language unit at Lackland, said.

A few doors from Devine's office, 12 Vietnamese sitting in a circle in a tiny classroom shouted the new jargon in a strange mechanistic chant led by their civilian American teacher: "Laterally, laterally, he's vibrating laterally! Vertically, vertically, he's vibrating vertically! He vibrates vertically because he's out of track. He's vibrating vertically! The machine is out of balance. The machine! The machine! The machine is out of balance!

The influx of Vietnamese has been absorbed easily at most U.S. bases because the American de-escalation has resulted in a reduction of American GI's being trained.

At Ft. Wolters, a peak of 575 helicopter pilot graduates a month was reached in 1968. Now, even with the Vietnamese, the total is well below 500. At Ft. Eustis, where helicopter mechanics were taught in three shifts around the clock in recent years, only two shifts are needed now.

Where their numbers are large enough, the Vietnamese form separate classes. This permits the teachers to pace the instruction to their language capabilities and reduces problems of shyness and embarrassment.

The training, conducted by U.S. military personnel and civilian contract firms, is aided by staffs of four or five Vietnamese cadre, most of them captains and majors, at each base, The cadre are proficient in the specialty being taught at the base and fluent in English. Many have taught at the Vietnamese air training center in Nhatrang.

COUNSELED BY VETERAN

At Randolph Air Force Base, Capt. Nguyen Minh Duc, 31, a U.S.-trained pilot with 6000 flying hours, most of it in combat where he was shot down twice, counsels and tutors Vietnamese nervously preparing for their first solo flight. Minh, who says he is anxious to get back to combat, talked of the students' problems.

"Most of them can't drive a car," he said. "They have just graduated from high school, maybe they can drive a scooter, and that's all. Their skill with machinery was very limited. I think they have the skill now to fly airplanes, but the main problem has been the language."

At Fort Wolters, a Vietnamese captain went up in a helicopter with a student who was in danger of being eliminated because of extreme nervousness. The student flew flawlessly with his countryman, and the captain learned during the flight that the student was simply frightened at the hand gestures of his demonstrative American instructor. He thought the first instructor would hit him.

Different customs and language make it clear why the United States is pressing to develop a training capability within the Vietnamese military.

"The eventual objective," a Pentagon planner of Vietnamization said, "is to train them in their own country with their own instructors. What we're really doing now is handling the surge created by the expansion of their military.

When the expansion of the Vietnamese military has been completed, the United States expects South Vietnam to be able to train its own pilots, technicians and specialists to fill the vacancies that result from normal American attrition and rotation.

In one effort to build that capability, at Keesler Air Force Base a 12-man team of enlisted instructors, headed by a master sergeant with 15 years' background in electronics, is preparing to go to Nhatrang in August to spend a year helping South Vietnam establish courses similar to those at Keesler.

PILOT CLASS GRADUATED

Keesler also graduated a 15-man "transitional pilot" class last month, made up of Vietnamese with years of practical flying experience but little formal training in instrumentation or navigation. The course upgrades the pilots and sends them back to Vietnam as potential instructors.

At each training center, the U.S. military men speak glowingly of the enthusiasm and dedication of the Vietnamese.

Hanoi-born Capt. Ly Ngoc An, who lost his right arm in a bombing mission and has returned to the U.S. for psychological warfare training at Fort Bragg, explained, "Some people here think that because we are a country at war, the students probably would rather stay over here—not go home. But they seem very anxious to go home and serve."

When a visitor asks the students what sort of aircraft they hope eventually to fly, some talk excitedly of jets—which are flown only by their Air Force's elite. One student pilot, asked how long he expected to serve in the Armed Forces, responded solemnly, "Until I die."

Another, Warrant Officer Bui Viet Thac, 22, from Saigon, admitted to some apprehension about flying as he waited in a hangar at San Antonio's Stinson Field for his first hour of instruction. "But I think I must enjoy it if I'm going to be a pilot," he said.

Two factors contribute to the high motivation exhibited by the Vietnamese students; they are handpicked for their intelligence and attitude and the training is a volunteer program that requires an 8-year minimum military commitment.

"They see it as an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of the expansion of their military," one U.S. instructor said.

In most courses, the elimination rate for Vietnamese actually runs lower than that for Americans—because of the less rigid screening of U.S. students and the lower motivation of some U.S. draftees. At Fort Wolters, the elimination rate in the first three Vietnamese helicopter pilot classes was 6 percent. American classes run about 18 percent.

One course allows the Vietnamese up to 30 hours of helicopter flying time before they are required to solo, though most are ready to solo after about 20. U.S. students are required to solo after 16 hours of dual instruction.

To add long-term benefits for the United States and to influence the men they expect to be the South Vietnamese colonels and generals of the next generation, the Defense Department has encouraged and financed a broad travel and orientation program for the students.

One is at Fort Eustis, where Maj. William J. Blair, the post's foreign liaison officer, has supervised an ambitious program that includes visits to Colonial Williamsburg, Jamestown and Yorktown; the Newport News Maritime Museum; the Federal Reserve Bank in Richmond; cigarette factories ("to show them methods of mass production, with a product they can readily relate to") and Washington.

NOTHING HIDDEN

"I have them eat in automats and Hot Shoppes," Blair said. "I want to show them how to mass feed. I do not pull any punches at all about our country's problems and I try not to hide any minority problems. I let them see what the problems are and what we're trying to do about them. I show them the middle-class homes and the slums—so they realize we aren't all rich."

The students fly to Fort Eustis from Vietnam, but they can go back to Travis, Calif., AFB by commercial bus, if they want a longer and closer look at the United States.

At one training center, a Vietnamese liaison officer talked frankly of how the visit to the United States can erase the ugly American impression that young Vietnamese may have formed.

"In Vietnam," he said, "your GI's, they can throw a beer can wherever they want; here they put it in a trash can. It's a little thing, but it gives us a different view of Americans. And here, at a traffic light, you must stop. There, the American military can drive however they please."

Pentagon planners expect the Vietnamese student load at U.S. bases to remain at its present level for the next year or more, then drop off as the expanded Vietnamese Armed Forces fill their manpower requirements and attain the capability to train their own replacements.

The Vietnamese Air Force, for example, has a backlog of about 500 qualified cadets waiting for flight training and about 30 percent of the flight training is now being done in the United States. As the backlog is reduced and more Vietnamese instructors become available, U.S. bases will get out of the business of mass training of South Vietnamese pilots.

Until then, the attitude of many of the U.S. instructors is that Chief Warrant Officer Bob Watts. At Fort Wolters last week. Watts, who admits to being "skeptical about this self-help program at first," said, "I'd rather spend my time training an individual than standing in for him."

ACTIVITIES IN LAOS AND THAILAND

Senator MANSFIELD. Incidentally, General, are your activities confined to South Vietnam or do you have anything to do with events in Laos and Thailand?

General CLEMENT. I have nothing at all to do with those activities, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Who would be your counterpart in Thailand, if there is a counterpart? There is a different situation there. There may be none.

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do not have a counterpart in Thailand.

COST OF VIETNAM WAR TO UNITED STATES

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand that you said yesterday that the cost of the effort in Vietnam during this year——

General CLEMENT. Fiscal year 1970.

Senator MANSFIELD (continuing). This fiscal year is now down to $1.5 billion a month?

General CLEMENT. No; the total support for the RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, is $1.5 billion for the fiscal year.

The CHAIRMAN. That is only equipment; is it not?

General CLEMENT. That is the equipment and supplies, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. It will be $1.5 billion for this fiscal year.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the overall cost to us to date—applicable to the Vietnamization program?

The South Koreans and the Thais. Do you have any figures as to the total overall cost of our participation in this venture in Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do not.

Senator MANSFIELD. You have no indication as to what the cost of the military advisory effort is to date. Do any of your colleagues?

General CLEMENT. I have cumulative costs here, sir, for supporting the RVNAF up to date. Beginning in fiscal year 1965 and forward.

Senator MANSFIELD. What is the total?

General CLEMENT. Up through fiscal year 1969, a total of $3.7 billion is the investment and operating costs.

Senator MANSFIELD. That would be in addition to the $1.5 billion for this fiscal year?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I would assume for the next fiscal year the figure will be on the increase?

General CLEMENT. I do not know about fiscal year 1971, sir; I have no figures on that at all.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you have any figures as to the total overall cost to this Government and its people of the Vietnamese war?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I do not.

Senator MANSFIELD. Not even an estimate?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I do not have that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do any of your colleagues, either civilian or military, have a thought on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Pentagon have any figures?

Mr. KNAUR. I am sure they do, sir; but I do not know them.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get them for the record? What is their estimate of the cumulative cost of the Vietnam war?

Mr. KNAUR. Cumulative——

The CHAIRMAN. Cumulative including fiscal year 1970.

Mr. KNAUR. All right, we will try to ascertain that.

The CHAIRMAN. The New York Times had an estimate the other day. I would like to compare it and see whether they are accurate or not.

(The information referred to follows:)

Estimated Department of Defense outlays in support of Southeast Asia operations

(Dollars in millions)

Fiscal year:	
1965	103
1966	5,812
1967	20,133
1968	26,547
1969	28,804
1970	23,204
Total	104,603

Senator MANSFIELD. It is my understanding that the cost has been in the vicinity of $28 to $30 billion a year and that Secretary Laird indicated earlier this year or late last year that he thought the figure could be reduced to about $1.5 billion a month, which would make it a total of $18 billion a year. That is a decided drop, but still a lot of money. To that $18 billion I would assume perhaps the $1.5, which you have indicated is going for the Vietnamization of the Republic's forces, would be added. I do not know.

That is all the questions I have at this time, Mr. Chairman.

ESTIMATE OF COST OF WAR IN VIETNAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Knaur, while we are talking about it, can you give us what the Pentagon estimates the cost will be in fiscal year 1971, in Vietnam?

Mr. KNAUR. If that is possible, sir; yes.

ESTIMATES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971 SOUTHEAST ASIA COSTS

Estimates for FY 1971 Southeast Asia costs are not available for public release, because of the need to preserve flexibility in determining the scope of operations in Southeast Asia and to avoid disclosure of our intentions to the enemy. All relative information regarding FY 1971 Southeast Asia operations and costs have been provided to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate.

Senator MANSFIELD. I would like to ask one more question. What is the U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam at the present time, roughly, if you do not have the exact figure?

General CLEMENT. We do have the figure, sir. The total at this time is [deleted] men.

Senator MANSFIELD. Does that include the personnel of the 7th Fleet?

General CLEMENT. This includes the Navy force of [deleted] sir; the Naval Forces, Vietnam—who are engaged in small boat and river operations in Vietnam.

Senator MANSFIELD. That would be exclusive of the 7th Fleet then.

(The information referred to follows.)

PRESENT U.S. TROOP STRENGTH IN VIETNAM

General CLEMENT. Well, these are not a part of the 7th Fleet.

Senator MANSFIELD. But what you have are these forces in Vietnam. They have been mostly concentrated, as I understand, in the Delta region.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. They are manning small boats. I think they call them riverine forces. Is this 29,000 separate from the 7th Fleet as an entity detached?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; this is specifically attributable to the Vietnam effort. In other words, these forces come under General Abram's purview, his operational control.

Senator MANSFIELD. The 7th Fleet comes under whose authority?

General CLEMENT. Under Admiral McCain.

Senator MANSFIELD. What would you estimate would be the number of man attached to the 7th Fleet?

General CLEMENT. Sir, of the 78,900 assigned to the 7th Fleet, 23,900 are committed offshore to direct support of the Southeast Asia operation.

GREATER U.S. CONCENTRATION IN VIETNAM THAN IS GENERALLY KNOWN

Senator MANSFIELD. What I am trying to indicate is that there is a greater concentration in Vietnam than is generally known because not only do you have the forces in Vietnam proper, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard, but you have the backup installations at Clark Base in the Philippines. You have backup installations in Japan where we have a number of hospitals which take care of our people who are wounded in Vietnam. You have some sort of a connection between Okinawa and Vietnam as well. I would hazard a guess that those who are in contact, directly or indirectly, with the venture in Vietnam would very likely number somewhere in the vicinity of 600,000 or even a little more with this drawdown strength which has come into effect since this administration took office.

Mr. KNAUR. Well, Mr. Chairman, can I just comment that the 7th Fleet and the other bases that you have mentioned, have a responsibility beyond Vietnam. I mean, they are not there solely for Vietnam. The 7th Fleet——

Senator MANSFIELD. They still are now.

Mr. KNAUR. Not the 7th Fleet.

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes; they are. I will challenge that statement. I will tell you why. When I was out there last year I found that we had only two ships, destroyers, in the Gulf of Taiwan, which is the original base for the 7th Fleet concentration. This does not take in the facilities where they go for repairs like Yokosuka and the like. [Deleted.]

The straits have been relatively undefended as far as the 7th Fleet is concerned because of Vietnam and, therefore, its chief concentration is in that area and part of the installations at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines are tied to the Vietnam venture. Okinawa is too and so are in some respects the Philippines and so was, unless the B–52's have been removed, Guam itself. All of these factors veer in one direction, one objective, and for one purpose. We are in a situation which is not normal which would back up your statement, I believe, as to dispositions. Everything now is pointed in one direction and that is Vietnam. I think the record will show that.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I would only venture this observation. I think I heard the Senator from Missouri give on the floor yesterday his estimate including all of our forces in the Far East. He did not say directly Vietnam, but directly and indirectly it was 800,000. He was including those in Korea, in Thailand, Japan, Okinawa, Laos, and all that. His estimate, I think, also included civilians.

I do not know whether he made a calculation or was estimating it roughly.

CONNECTION BETWEEN VIETNAM WAR AND U.S. FORCES IN FAR EAST

Senator MANSFIELD. I think, Mr. Chairman, it would be a good thing to direct the staff to make a calculation of the situation in that area so we can have as a part of the record what the connection is between

the war in Vietnam, the 7th Fleet, the installations in Japan, Guam, Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, Laos and Thailand, and many other areas.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. It seems to me the Pentagon would have this. Could you arrange for this, Mr. Knaur? Are you representing the Pentagon or AID or what are you representing this morning?

Mr. KNAUR. I am Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you ought to have this available. I mean it ought to be very easy for you to obtain a total compilation of all the personnel.

Mr. KNAUR. We can submit that for the record; yes, sir.

CLASSIFICATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL FIGURES IN FAR EAST

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you if this is confidential and secret?

Mr. KNAUR. I do not know, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think we can do it from both ends, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KNAUR. I am sure a detailed listing of our strengths would be a classified figure.

The CHAIRMAN. It would?

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Take a figure like Korea. Every day we read it is around 60,000, but this is still classified. You see it in the paper all the time, but that still is a classified figure.

Senator MANSFIELD. I think I can show stories out of the U.S. News & World Report.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you can. I read them all the time. I want to know if it is still classified.

Mr. KNAUR. The fact that a figure exists in the paper does not declassify it.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Mr. KNAUR. And the other thing I would like to say is that a rank figure is not necessarily classified.

Senator MANSFIELD. A what kind?

Mr. KNAUR. A rank figure. If you say around 60,000 where the actual figure, and this is hypothetical, is 52,000, then the around 60,000 would not be classified where the 52,000 would be.

Senator MANSFIELD. We would like to have round figures.

Mr. KNAUR. Well, we will see if we can do that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give it for all these categories that he mentioned in the whole Far East? It is not restricted to Vietnam. I mean the total manpower and their location. By that I mean I would like to know whether or not you are including Guam or Okinawa. We can draw the conclusions as to whether or not they are related to Vietnam. You do not have to draw that. We want the disposition of personnel in the Far Eastern theater. I think you could supply that; could you not?

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure the Secretary has that at his fingertips.

Mr. KNAUR. I am sure he does.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

The CHAIRMAN. We would like what degree of classification you have applied to it. Since you are going to do that, if it is classified we would

like to know why. We have to get to the bottom of why you classify so much of the information relating to our military activities.

(The information referred to follows.)

REASON FOR SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

The disposition of United States troops in the various countries of the Far East is considered classified information, at the level of SECRET. The only purpose of any security classification is to deny access, by the enemy, or possible enemy, to information that may be of some aid or benefit to him and could therefore be inimical to the security of the United States.

Specific numbers of troops, especially by service, in specific locations could quite easily lead an enemy into deducing our capabilities and intentions in those specific areas and could over a period of time indicate trends.

I wonder, General, do you have any information on when the 486,000 you mentioned would be reduced to 250,000? Do you have any projection when it will be?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I have no knowledge, I have no projections at all of what end strengths are going to be at any time in the future.

PROJECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TRAINING SCHEDULES

The CHAIRMAN. How do you organize training schedules if you have no idea of what the level of people is going to be and when it will be reduced? On what basis do you organize a training schedule?

General CLEMENT. If you are talking of Vietnamese training schedules, we do have knowledge of how they are increasing and what their forces are going to be.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

General CLEMENT. These forces are considered in our training projections and this is——

The CHAIRMAN. What is it? Will you give us that?

General CLEMENT. In fiscal year 1971, sir, under the acceleration program, Vietnamization, we are heading toward an end strength of [deleted.] That is the total Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. RVNAF is building up toward this total. This is the agreed figure with them, [deleted] and with this——

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the fiscal year 1971.

General CLEMENT. Fiscal year 1971, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you project what that is going to be in the next few years? What is 1972? Have you a projection?

General CLEMENT. I do not have that. We have the fiscal year 1971 figure firm right now. And we have, of course, fiscal year 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. What is 1970?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.] So they are increasing [deleted] between 1970 and 1971.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you venture an opinion that that is sort of the rate of increase that you anticipate in their armed forces? Is that the overall?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I would not because this is subject to again the enemy situation and other things that are happening. We are firm on the [deleted] for fiscal year 1971. This is part of the plan I was

talking of yesterday. The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force break out in there——

The CHAIRMAN. How is that broken down?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

VIETNAMESE SAILORS AND PILOTS TRAINED IN UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you train sailors over here as well as air and jet pilots?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; there is a training program.

The CHAIRMAN. For what?

General CLEMENT. For the Vietnamese Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Vietnamese Navy?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; this is generally in the skilled areas. In other words, maintenance and that sort of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you estimate it costs to train a boat maintenance man?

General CLEMENT. I will have to provide it for the record. I cannot supply it now.

(The information referred to follows:)

COSTS TO TRAIN A BOAT MAINTENANCE MAN

Cost of training a boat maintenance man varies according to the location and skill level desired. This training (Deisel Maintenance) is accomplished at one of three places and the costs for each are as follows: CONUS (including transportation) $1320.00 per individual, Guam (on the job training) $500.00 per individual, Danang (U.S. Contractor School) $600.00 per individual. The duration of the courses are: 18 weeks CONUS, 8 weeks Guam, and 12 weeks Danang.

The CHAIRMAN. You do have a list of——

General CLEMENT. I had the overall cost for you, sir, of——

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General CLEMENT. [Deleted] would include all of those being trained in the States.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all of them, but there is a vast difference. [Deleted]. How long does it take to train that jet pilot? That [deleted] is a year or is it total?

General CLEMENT. That is the total cost.

The CHAIRMAN. Spread over how long?

General CLEMENT. Thirty weeks of language training in Vietnam, sir, plus an additional 6 or 8 weeks at Lackland Air Force Base, plus the pilot training itself which would amount to about 16 to 18 months.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems very expensive. Say 18 months at the outside it costs [deleted]. Does that not strike you as very expensive?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; I do think that training is expensive in general.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that $4,000 a month to train a pilot? Why is that? Does that include the cost of the plane or something?

General CLEMENT. It would be the operational costs to include the maintenance on the aircraft he is using, cost of the instructor who is used, and things of that nature.

RATE OF REPLACEMENT OF U.S. FORCES BY VIETNAMESE

The CHAIRMAN. When does your counterpart in the Vietnamese Army expect the American forces to be reduced to 250,000? Has he

ever indicated what he has in mind as to what he expects in this regard?

General CLEMENT. Sir, we have discussed no specific strengths and have not discussed this aspect at all.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing surprised me. You say the increase in South Vietnamese forces between fiscal 1970 and 1971 is only 6,000. At that rate, that is one for one; how many years would it take for us to withdraw 300,000? What is 6,000 into 300,000? Six into 300. That is 50. So, at that rate they would supplant our withdrawal of 300,000 in 50 years; would they not?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am not sure of the figures you are using now.

The CHAIRMAN. The actual figures are that they have increased their armed forces from [deleted]. Is that not the figure you gave me?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming they continue at this rate of increasing their figures 6,000 a year and they are to take up the place of 300,000 of our troops, it will take them 50 years to do it; will it not?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do not believe we have really——

The CHAIRMAN. What is wrong with that reasoning?

General CLEMENT. I do not think we have agreed on just how many they are replacing of ours.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you have not agreed, but this is one little fact into which we have got our teeth. You said this is what the fact is. This is what we are going to do.

I am projecting that in the absence of any estimate. You say neither you nor your counterpart can give any estimate. If you have to reduce to extrapolating that figure, it would look like you are contemplating around 50 years to make a transfer. What is wrong with that reasoning?

General CLEMENT. Well, sir; we are not speaking of any transfer. I am speaking of training the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. The Administration's policy is to withdraw Americans and ARVN take their place. Is that not the policy of the Vietnamization?

General CLEMENT. In very general terms, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In general terms we are going to withdraw and they take our place. You describe it better then. I throw this out as a thought. What is wrong with that?

General CLEMENT. In general terms I am sure it is true.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Vietnamization program. Insofar as you are willing or able to give us information, what is happening is they are increasing at the rate of 6,000 a year. I say that looks like it is going to be a very long time to bring about this withdrawal of 300,000 troops.

FACTORS OTHER THAN VIETNAMIZATION INVOLVED IN U.S. WITHDRAWAL

General CLEMENT. But, sir, it is going to depend, as you well know, on other factors besides Vietnamization.

The CHAIRMAN. I am only inviting you to explain the other factors. I am giving you an opportunity to enlighten us now. I am not trying to persuade you to say any particular thing. Tell us the other factors.

General CLEMENT. Sir, I think the Paris negotiation is obviously one big factor which is overriding. The enemy activity is another big factor that is overriding.

In other words, the activity of the North Vietnamese themselves. No. 2 would be the Paris negotiations and how that culminates, and Vietnamization, in other words, their taking on more and more of the burden. These are the three broad variables, I guess you would call them, on which the whole program is based. You have to take them all into account when we are talking strengths, speeds, and transfer of responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish I could draw the conclusion, and maybe with your support I might, that this very slow increase in their personnel indicates the administration expects to have a negotiation in Paris. Would I be correct if I draw that conclusion?

General CLEMENT. Sir, that is beyond my purview.

NUMBER OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN FAR EAST THEATER

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, there is another hearing I left and I have to get back. May I ask a couple of questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. I would welcome it. Before you came in I took your name in vain by saying I thought I remembered your saying yesterday that you estimated 800,000 American personnel in the Far East theater. Was I right or wrong?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is about right.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not say something like that?

Senator SYMINGTON. 540,000 in Vietnam. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. As of today, I thought you meant.

Senator SYMINGTON. At one point we had about 545,000 in Vietnam, didn't we?

General CLEMENT. We did earlier. Right now we have [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. And you had 50,000 in Thailand at one point, right?

General CLEMENT. I do not know about that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do. So, that would be 595,000. Then, you have the fleet which is estimated at about 60,000 all told. That adds up to 655,000. You also have all the ancilliaries, such as Japan. The Guam setup incident to B–52's, Okinawa incident to refueling of B–52's, and Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines.

What I said therefore, and the chairman is right, at the peak period we had around 800,000 people in the Far East working on the problem to the best of my analysis. Would you have any cause to dispute that?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I would really have no comment.

ABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WITHOUT U.S. SUPPORT

Senator SYMINGTON. If the United States of America having that number of people working to accomplish whatever it is that we want to accomplish out there could not do the job with the Vietnamese, regardless of the degree of training and the amount of equipment that we give to the South Vietnamese, how can we expect them to do it without those 800,000 people? That is my concern about the question on the Vietnamization program.

General CLEMENT. Well, I would like to offer some comments in general terms, sir. I think when we discuss these matters and go back in history over time and we talk of a people at a certain point in time and how they are doing, these are, by themselves, variables.

Tet 1968, 2 years ago——

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand all that. I have been to Vietnam numerous times. One of the reasons I asked that question is I asked in another committee whether the rules which have restricted our Air Force, Navy, and Army would also apply to the South Vietnamese. I was told yes, that they would apply so long as we put up the money.

Does this mean in effect that a good deal less number of people with the same rules can do a better job than we could do with the U.S. forces that were there? Now we are leaving; and I am for that. Personally I do not think there is anything left out there to win, but if we have failed as against what President Johnson wanted, and I support President Nixon's program, and we get out, how can they win without us under the same rules?

To me it is mathematical, but I would like to get your comments on it.

General CLEMENT. If I understood it, I would like to bring it down to Vietnam itself, our present deployment there, and what we are doing there. I think you broadened it to include all of Southeast Asia and I would rather stay——

Senator SYMINGTON. No: I am only talking about South Vietnam and the rules that apply to the fighting there.

General CLEMENT. Again, sir: I am saying, as you analyze the problem, you are analyzing the forces you are dealing with, our own and the Vietnamese. We feel the Vietnamese have come a long way—that is why I went back to Tet of 1968—there has been a tremendous change. I think if you were there at that time and there now you would see a tremendous difference.

This change in an Army is a factor that is taken into account—it is a big thing, as a matter of fact.

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you mean a big thing? I was there just a few weeks before Tet.

General CLEMENT. I think it is a big thing that we have the feel for their effectiveness. The way they have operated has been effective and we have seen this demonstrated in the past.

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean an improvement in the forces of South Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think those forces are improving to a point where they can handle the situation without us in the not too distant future?

General CLEMENT. No, sir: I would not estimate when we would be able to leave or in what form. I think that it is a function of the forces we are working with and Vietnamization. This is why I believe there is such, well guarded optimism about this particular subject. We believe that the South Vietnamese forces are responding.

I think another——

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sure they are responding. The figure you have I think, is $1½ billion for the annual cost of equipment. Does that include training?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir: that includes training and equipment; $1.5 billion is what we are talking about for fiscal year 1970.

U.S. HELICOPTERS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. And how many helicopters are we giving them? Do you know roughly?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; under the program they will have in the area of [deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. And in rough figures how much is that worth?

General CLEMENT. About $250,000 per helicopter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you saying the average cost of these helicopters is $250,000 apiece? Is that right?

General CLEMENT. About $250,000, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many helicopters have we lost in Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. I believe you mentioned a figure of 1,500, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I did not mention it, I do not think but——

General CLEMENT. It was mentioned in an article and I do not have the total at hand, but it is probably in that area.

TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE HELICOPTER PILOTS

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you find helicopters pretty tricky to run? Are the South Vietnamese learning how to handle them well?

General CLEMENT. Yes sir; I think you will find that they are. As a matter of fact, they are pretty good pilots and I think this is another reason for guarded optimism. They have demonstrated an ability to fly helicopters and jet aircraft and have performed well. They seem to be quite eager. They take English language training. It would be very stimulating the next time you are over there to visit the English language training program to see these young Vietnamese getting trained by our young airmen. These young airmen are given a course of instruction in English language training by the Defense Language Institute in Vietnam, and then these young men go on to teach the Vietamese. It is quite gratifying to see them perform.

Senator SYMINGTON. The airmen speak Vietnamese?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. They are teaching English. The course runs roughly 30 weeks, I have talked to some of these VNAF airmen and asked how they are doing. They are very proud to speak the English they can speak after a few weeks. They say they like this training. We ask are you all ready to fly those choppers? Of course, they have a long way to go. They have to go back to the States and get trained at Lackland and Rucker and other places. However, they reply, yes, sir, we are ready to fly! We want to fly! This is just——

Senator SYMINGTON. Do they fly as well as the American pilots?

General CLEMENT. I would hesitate to make a judgment, sir. I have heard judgments made that they are pretty darn good pilots and I would think the same.

Senator SYMINGTON. Properly trained they are just about as good as ours?

General CLEMENT. Well, I think so, sir, in general terms. This kind of thing is what heartens you a little bit about those people. You feel a little bit stimulated about their ability to do things and their eagerness to do these things.

NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF ARVN DIVISIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. General, how many divisions do the ARVN have now?

General CLEMENT. They have 10 numbered divisions, sir: an airborne division, and a Marine division.

Senator SYMINGTON. Twelve divisions all told?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And how many people in a division?

General CLEMENT. The average strength authorized is around 12,000, sir. The 1st Division is heavier than that. But the average is about 12,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. That would give them about 144,000, something like that?

General CLEMENT. In their combat divisions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Combat divisions. And how many of those are combat soldiers? De we support those divisions with American logistic support?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. They have——

Senator SYMINGTON. How many of the 12,000 are combat troops?

General CLEMENT. Well, that would get down to the ratio of combat troops to service troops.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

General CLEMENT. I have the figure here for a typical division.

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. I cannot follow you on the regiment: please put it in the division.

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. How many combat and how many noncombat?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Thus 9,000 out of 12,000 would be combat, and 2,000 more would be combat support and 1,000 more would be noncombat. Is that a fair analysis?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So, you would say out of a division, about 11,000 could be considered combat.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

COMPOSITION OF U.S. DIVISIONS COMPARED TO ARVN

Senator SYMINGTON. Take an American Division of 15,000. How many in that are combat?

Colonel WHEELER. It would be much less, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many roughly, out of 15,000? As I remember the figure, it was two noncombat to one combat, so there would be in an American division, 9,000 noncombat and 6,000 combat. You say in a South Vietnamese division of 12,000 there are 11,000 combat and 1,000 noncombat. Does that mean that a lot of the logistics are going to continue to be performed by Americans? You see the thrust of my question.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. And may I suggest that this is part of the program. In other words, with the buildup, the combat forces are pretty well builtup so far as the ARVN goes.

Now, talking of logistical support—they do have a logistical system of their own and a pretty good one.

VC GUERRILLA AND NVA FORCES COMPARED TO ARVN

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, the way you put it you have about 130,000 combat South Vietnamese troops. How many Viet Cong regulars, guerrillas and North Vietnamese oppose them?

General CLEMENT. I am just trying to recall a figure. [Deleted] troops. The rest were guerrillas, NVA, and VC.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many of those would be combat, of the 300,000?

General CLEMENT. That is the figure I am trying to recall.

Senator SYMINGTON. OK.

General CLEMENT. There was a total given of, I think, 300,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

Well, sir, besides the infantry divisions, there is a lot of fire support—artillery and aircraft. This is a big part of the picture.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. In other words, if we give them enough modern equipment, you think that might turn the tide?

General CLEMENT. To go back to the earlier question, a part of the buildup is really to beef up their logistical force in order to give them much greater self-sufficiency.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did you say?

General CLEMENT. The Navy and the Air Force programs are giving them more combat support. This is accelerated. So this means that the combat effort, particularly groundwise, may very well be there, but the combat support is needed. This is coming, and the total picture is a much more balanced force in the future. This is why we feel that for a period of time the United States will be there, but I cannot say how long.

ABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO WAGE WAR WITHOUT U.S. AID

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, I would like you to file for the record an answer to my earlier question. If we plan to get out of Vietnam and leave it to the South Vietnamese—we are certainly not going to give them better equipment than we have given our own boys—how can they succeed if we take the 800,000 people out of the picture that we have had there? Mr. Chairman, I do not want to pursue it any further. I have been asking this question and cannot get an answer that is satisfactory to me.

General CLEMENT. Let us try to provide something.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I would appreciate it.

VIETNAMIZATION

In the four years (1965–69) of increasing U.S. participation in South Vietnam, there were very significant results achieved in the main force war, in pacification, and in the improvement and modernization of the South Vietnamese forces. This progress makes Vietnamization a credible option.

Indigenous Viet Cong forces have been seriously degraded. Recruiting is difficult and becomes increasingly so as GVN presence expands into the countryside. The brunt of the main force war must be borne by the NVA. Heavy quantitative losses in the VC/NVA forces beginning in Tet 1968 have resulted, more importantly, in severe qualitative losses in experience soldiers and in leadership.

As a measure of progress in pacification, the increase in percent of population under GVN control since the time the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was initiated, is encouraging:

	December 1967	June 1969	February 1970
GVN control	67	86	88
Contested	16	7	8
VC control and not evacuated	17	7	4
Total	100	100	100

The critical military factor in Vietnamization is the improvement and modernization of the South Vietnamese forces. In quantitative terms alone, their forces have roughly doubled in size, exclusive of the People's Self-Defense Forces.

	June 1965	June 1969	June 1970	Planned June 1973
RVNAF	522,400	875,800	986,400	1,100,000
Total forces including paramilitary	625,800	1,057,400	1,189,900	3,249,160

Qualitative improvements have been slow and laborious but have received primary emphasis during the past year. The fruits of this effort have been amply demonstrated in the highly professional performance of the RVNAF in recent engagements.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator a question? I think he has presented this in a very graphic and striking way, this question. I wonder if we are going to get any response. I want an answer to the same question—a response more or less keyed to the question of well, we can get out, if the North Vietnamese let us.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I think that is a very good observation, if I may say so, but one of the things that has worried me——

Senator CASE. Maybe we should save several alternatives.

Senator SYMINGTON. One of the things that is worrying me is Laos. We are getting so little out of the Paris talks and it would seem logical if we are not pressing them in any way and assuring them we are not going to launch an attack against Laos, it seems quite logical they will take those divisions and put them into Laos.

Senator CASE. Again the Senator will not think I am presumptuous——

Senator SYMINGTON. No, I appreciate this.

Senator CASE. In response to his question he might ask that it be responded to on the basis of an alternative: 1, the North Vietnamese do not come back and exercise a strong stand and, (2) if they do. That is all I want.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think that is very well put.

May I ask this question, General. Do you premise your opinion of success if we leave on the basis of less interest on the part of the North Vietnamese in taking over South Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am sure the whole question will be addressed in the context of the three propositions, the North Vietnamese actions, the Paris negotiations, and the rate of Vietnamization.

Senator SYMINGTON. If that is done, will that satisfy——

Senator CASE. I think so. Unless we are going to get the same old answer we have gotten since the November 3d speech and before that which is, we will come out of this fine if A, B, and C and nobody can say what will happen if A, but not B or C.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are getting down to this point on it. If I were in the executive branch, which I am not, or if I were running a company, which I am not, and somebody came to the board of directors, which is in effect what the Congress is because it puts up the money as the board does for the president of a company, and ask for blank billions of dollars to run a program, it is logical to ask what the company and the stockholders will get out of that program.

Thus for this additional $7½ billion, I would like to know what we think we are going to get and why.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DESERTION RATE IN ARVN

The CHAIRMAN. General, I have a few questions here that are sort of basic to the operation over there. I will try to make them short and maybe we can get some answers.

Of the [deleted] presently in the armed forces, what is the present desertion rate in the ARVN forces?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

DESERTION RATE

The desertion rate for the RVNAF is as follows:

Calendar year:	
1967	81,797
1968	139,670
1969	123,311
1970 (March)	27,851

General CLEMENT. Sir, I can show you a chart of the gross desertion rate for 1968 and 1969. I also have a table which may be more helpful and I will supply it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You will have to put it in the record. The record cannot show that chart. You can read from it if you like. It does not have to be precise.

General CLEMENT. Currently it is running at about [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, we have a table which is worked out on it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General CLEMENT. This is less, we would like to point out, than it was in 1968. It runs perhaps an average of two per thousand under that.

COMPARISON OF DRAFT AND DESERTION RATES

The CHAIRMAN. What is the draft rate in comparison to the desertion rate?

General CLEMENT. They have met their recruiting quotas, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do they compare with the desertion rate?

General CLEMENT. We will have to work that figure up, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you work it up and put it in the record, please?

General CLEMENT. Certainly we will.

The CHAIRMAN. What percent of the sorties are flown by South Vietnamese aircraft?

General CLEMENT. We will have to do some research.

(The information referred to follows:)

PERCENTAGE OF SORTIES FLOWN BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE AIRCRAFT

The following table is a comparison of the total South Vietnamese who were conscripted into the RVNAF and the total number of RVNAF personnel who deserted during the years 1967 and 1969.

Year	Conscripts	Desertions
1967	48,545	81,797
1968	99,145	139,670
1969	80,423	123,311

(The information referred to follows.)

BOMBS DROPPED AND ARTILLERY FIRED

The Republic of Vietnam Air Force flew 18 percent of the total strike sorties flown during February 1970 in South Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the bombs dropped and helicopter flights? Surely you have that. We are trying to show their relative effort presently this year.

General CLEMENT.

The CHAIRMAN. And the artillery fire by the South Vietnamese and do you have any projections what they will be next year?

(The information referred to follows.)

TOTAL U.S. & GVN ARTILLERY FIRE AND AIR SORTIES, 1ST QUARTER 1970

During the first quarter of 1970 a total of over 230,000 tons of bombs and over 220,000 tons of artillery ammunition was expended in South Vietnam.

Also, during the same period, U.S. and Vietnamese airforce flew over 1,000,000 armed helicopter and combat support sorties.

U.S. HELICOPTERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Do you have how many U.S. helicopters were in Vietnam a year ago and how many are there today?

General CLEMENT. I do now know a year ago, sir, but I believe roughly it is [deleted] that are there today.

The CHAIRMAN. U.S. helicopters?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that include helicopters that the Vietnamese have?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do——

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FIGHTER-BOMBERS

The CHAIRMAN. How many U.S. fighter-bombers are there in Vietnam today?

General CLEMENT. That, I will have to get. I have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have approximately what it is?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. How many were there a year ago? Is this an increase or decrease?

General CLEMENT. I think it is probably maybe a little bit less than it was a year ago because there has been some redeployment.

The CHAIRMAN. How many South Vietnamese fighter-bombers are there?

General CLEMENT. As now planned they will have [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. When? That is not today?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; that will be—completely operational in fiscal year 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. 1971. Do you have the figure there for what they are today?

General CLEMENT. I do not have it right now, sir. I can get that.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

The CHAIRMAN. How many South Vietnamese artillery battalions are there?

General CLEMENT. We do have that. And again, I can give it to you for the record, if you wish.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give what your estimate is they will be next year?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; we can show you what the projected buildup is.

(The information is classified and in the committee files.)

ARVN, NVA, AND VC MANEUVER BATTALIONS

The CHAIRMAN. How many maneuver battalions does ARVN have now compared to the number the North Vietnam and Vietcong have committed in South Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. We will have to, again, do some more research on that. We can dig out the maneuver battalions but the enemy side will have to——

(The information is classified and in the committee files.)

MEDICAL EVACUATION SUPPORT

The CHAIRMAN. Does the United States presently provide all of the South Vietnamese Armies' medical evacuation support?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; it does not.

The CHAIRMAN. About what percentage?

General CLEMENT. I can give you the numbers. We do have it broken out and let me provide it for the record. I believe that something that has not been widely known is that the Vietnamese have flown their own dust-off, as we call them. There have been VNAF medical evacuation sorties.

(The information referred to follows.)

MEDICAL EVACUATION

RVNAF is currently providing approximately 15% of the total helicopter medical evacuation effort in support of Vietnamese forces.

MAINTENANCE OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

The CHAIRMAN. How many U.S. personnel are now involved in the maintenance of electronic equipment being used by the Vietnamese Armed Forces?

General CLEMENT. We have none, sir. They are maintaining their own equipment. In other words, they have their own system.

The CHAIRMAN. They maintain their own electronic equipment?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many fully-trained Vietnamese are there in the field of electronics equipment? Do you know how many there are?

General CLEMENT. I am sure we can get it for you, sir. I do not have the figure on hand right now.

The CHAIRMAN. You have it available?

General CLEMENT. We can get it; yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

TRAINING

Determining the number of full-trained Vietnamese in the field of electronics equipment maintenance has consistently been one of the major obstacles in attempting to determine not only RVNAF but also civil requirements in this field. The Vietnamese do perform their own communications-electronics maintenance on the equipment currently in their inventory, however, most of this equipment is relatively unsophisticated compared with US systems equipment in Vietnam. The skills required for maintenance of this equipment are predominately lower level skills, although maintenance up to third echelon is performed by the RVNAF. Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the RVNAF personnel requirements in the communications operations and maintenance field are now filled.

As US turnover of communications and electronics (C–E) sytsems to the RVNAF is made, concurrent training programs will be conducted. Training in wide-band communications equipment is scheduled to begin in July 1970 with the ultimate goal of providing approximately 1,500 trained personnel over a 5-year period.

The military services do not maintain statisical data regarding local national civilians trained in these fields. Specific figures regarding trained RVNAF C–E personnel must be obtained from MACV.

COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any specific measures of the overall effectiveness of ARVN and other South Vietnamese forces compared to U.S. forces? Is there any way to measure that?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I do not think so. We are talking of two different forces.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought perhaps you had estimated that they are 10 percent or 50 percent as effective and, therefore, you draw a conclusion as to how many people they will need to take the place of some of the Americans. Have studies like that ever been made?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I know of none.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take one specific indication. Colonel, can you say if any such study has been made with regard to your division, which is a very special one and the best as I understand it? Has anyone ever made a comparison that it is as good or about as good or better than an American division?

Colonel WHEELER. There has been no published study that I know of, sir. I think the observations and the record of their combat actions will indicate that they are comparable to any U.S. unit considering the fact that they are on the lean side with combat support and service support. The majority of their forces are combat forces. We maintain about 85 percent combat unit strength in the 1st ARVN Division.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the ARVN divisions evaluated individually as ours are or is yours the only one?

Colonel WHEELER. No, they are all evaluated.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all evaluated individually?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say how they are evaluated today relative to a year ago? You can deal with yours and then all of them?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. I think we can show there has been an improvement.

The CHAIRMAN. This would bear upon the question of if the ARVN forces take over the full burden of the war and the activity of the enemy continues at the level of last year, then you should be able to project how large a force it would take to handle the situation. Do you know if that has been done?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. I do not know that that has been done.

COST TO UNITED STATES IF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TAKE OVER FULL BURDEN OF WAR

The CHAIRMAN. If the Vietnamese take over the full burden, is there any estimate that has been made of how much of the cost would have to be paid by the United States?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. I know of no studies on this line.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think they would make such a study in contemplation of the implementation of the President's program.

General CLEMENT. I know of none, sir.

ARVN CONTACTS WITH THE ENEMY

The CHAIRMAN. What was the total number of ARVN contacts with the enemy in 1969 compared with 1967 and 1968? Do you have that?

General CLEMENT. I am sure we can compile something along this line, sir, which will show the comparisons.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any idea yourself as to whether they were greater or less?

General CLEMENT. I will have to check, but 1968 had the Tet Offensive in it and, for that period, there is going to be a difference. So, 1968 and 1969 may be equal, but I would have to wait and put it into the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

GROUND OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY RVNAF

The total number of battalion-size or larger unit ground operations which were conducted by RVNAF are as follows:

Current year:	RVNAF
1966	3,942
1967	3,874
1968	6,973
1969	11,403
1970 (March)	2,701

ATTITUDE OF SERVICEMEN TOWARD ARVN UNITS

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us how do American officers and NCO's feel about combined operations? Are they, for example, willing to rely on ARVN units in situations in which the ARVN performance is critical to their own security?

General CLEMENT. Sir, this would just be a very general statement on my part. I do not want it to be definitive, but I think when a new man comes in, there is a need for him to get to know them. I think after you get to know them and after you work with them, there is a feeling of quite mutual respect and confidence depending on where you are in the unit.

I know specifically in my own unit we had quite a bit of confidence in the ARVN division working with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Which division was that?

General CLEMENT. Second ARVN Division.

Colonel WHEELER. The U.S. units will call for 1st ARVN Division artillery support just as quickly as they will call for the U.S. artillery support, and likewise in our combined operations they may be some cases in which we have a small portion of U.S. forces and they work very well and with complete confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. In the ARVN.
Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

ARVN AND U.S. GENERALS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS KILLED OR WOUNDED

The CHAIRMAN. How many ARVN generals have been killed or wounded in action compared to the number of U.S. generals killed or wounded?
Colonel WHEELER. I do not know, sir. I do know General Truong has been wounded twice. He has received 25 decorations for valor, two of which are U.S. Silver Stars.
General CLEMENT. This, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. These are compiled; are they not? These are available?
General CLEMENT. We would have to do research.
The CHAIRMAN. There are so few of them that would not be very many.
General CLEMENT. No. We would have to dig that out.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)
The CHAIRMAN. In the same way could you supply the casualty rate last year for junior officers of the ARVN and those of U.S. forces comparable in grade or rank? If those studies had been made——
General CLEMENT. I am not familiar with the data, but I think we can get——
The CHAIRMAN. I think I have seen some of these comparisons made in the papers.
(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Have any new American forces ever been put under Vietnamese command?
General CLEMENT. No, sir. We never had that where I was. I do not know about you, Colonel.
Colonel WHEELER. We have had operational control, but not command.
General CLEMENT. We have operational control. We work closely.
Colonel WHEELER. Operations control but not command.
The CHAIRMAN. Could you define for the record briefly the difference between command and operational control?
General CLEMENT. It is defined operational control which controls the maneuver of the units, the general fighting plan, while full command involves all the administrative aspects, discipline and the rest of it.
(The following information was subsequently submitted by the Department of Defense.)

COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL

The following is the definition for Command and Operational Control:
(*a*) Command—The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.
(*b*) Operational control—The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish *specific missions* or *tasks* which are usually *limited to function, time, or* location: to deploy units con-

cerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include administrative or logistic control (these functions are the responsibility of individuals who exercise command over the assigned units.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have the Vietnamese been put under the command of American officers?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir. It has been one of operational control and it has worked very satisfactorily without any question with regard to who was specifically in command.

General CLEMENT. I think the same thing as previously stated, operational control.

COMMISSIONING OF SOUTH VIETNAM NCO'S AND ENLISTED MEN

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us how many noncommissioned officers or other enlisted men in the South Vietnamese Army became commissioned officers last year?

General CLEMENT. I can give you an estimate on it, sir. There is now a program called the special reserve officer candidate school program. In 1967 they had no such program. In this program they take people from the ranks and into the officer corps.

The results have been they feel, most gratifying. I think we do, too. Out of—I will speak in round numbers—about 10,000 OCS students who went through their infantry school at Thu Duc, near Saigon, in the neighborhood of 1,000 came out of the special program for NCO's. This has been a very gratifying thing.

Obviously, it is a good thing to have men who have been in battle several years and recognize the fact that they can lead, and they do.

In fiscal year 1970, they anticipate 30 percent of the 9,000 or 10,000 OCS candidates will come from the ranks. So, it is a program that is not well known, but it is going well.

ARVN OFFICERS RELIEVED OF COMMAND FOR CORRUPTION

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us how many ARVN officers were relieved of their command for corruption last year?

General CLEMENT. No, sir, I do not believe I can.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were convicted or sentenced?

General CLEMENT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have that?

General CLEMENT. Nothing on that, sir.

ADEQUACY OF ARVN PAY SCALE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the pay of the ARVN officers and soldiers is adequate?

General CLEMENT. Sir, they have a very low pay scale.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

General CLEMENT. A private, for example, gets about $40 a month. A major gets about twice that. If you would like the entire pay scale for the record, we can provide it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Put it in.

(The information referred to follows:)

MONTHLY PAY RANGES FOR ARVN REGULAR FORCES PERSONNEL

[U.S. dollar equivalent]

Grade	Mimimum	Maximum	Grade	Minimum	Maximum
General	185	437	ASP	58	174
Lieutenant general	169	392	Master sergeant 1st class	53	168
Major general	159	371	Master sergeant	50	165
Brigadier general	151	399	Sergeant 1st class	47	161
Colonel	116	392	Sergeant	44	157
Lieutenant colonel	110	311	Corporal 1st class	43	151
Major	103	287	Corporal	40	123
Captain	86	265	Private 1st class	39	119
1st lieutenant	76	229	Private	38	118
2d lieutenant	70	211			

The CHAIRMAN. Have you estimated how much it would cost to raise the pay to what you would call an adequate level?

General CLEMENT. I do not have it, sir. There are studies underway in this general area. There are joint studies going on in the area of morale, pay, housing, rations, social welfare, family problems, and leave. All these things bear on a soldier's attitude.

COST TO UNITED STATES OF ARVN PAY INCREASE

The CHAIRMAN. Could you put in with that information how much of the cost of any increase would have to be paid by the United States?

General CLEMENT. Sir, before I can say, let me see what we can give you on this, and if possible, we certainly will.

(The information referred to follows:)

EFFECT ON U.S. SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE OF ARVN PAY INCREASE

If the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) are granted a 20 percent pay increase, the cost to the GVN is estimated to be over 24 billion piasters.

A pay increase for RVNAF would not necessarily require an increase in U.S. supporting assistance. The level of supporting assistance reflects the difference between the resources necessary to support GVN military activity and the ability of the GVN to provide such resources from the domestic economy of South Vietnam. A military pay increase would require increased supporting assistance only to the extent that the GVN was unable to transfer sufficient resources to cover the increase from other sectors of the domestic economy. The ability of the GVN to effect such transfers in any given instance depends upon a variety of factors, including security, levels of domestic production, administrative capabilities, and legislative authority, to note the most obvious.

PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVISORY FUNCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. Do the U.S. forces advise the South Vietnamese forces on public relations matters?

General CLEMENT. We do have an information advisory element working with Vietnamese counterparts in the Joint General Staff. We also have advisory functions with some units.

The CHAIRMAN. You do have advisory functions.

General CLEMENT. We do have an advisory function, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are U.S. reporters allowed to accompany the South Vietnamese on combat operations?

Colonel WHEELER. In the 1st ARVN Division they are permitted to go as they so desire. I believe when Mr. Moose and Mr. Lowenstein were there in December, the same courtesies were extended to them.

The Chairman. Are they allowed to do so in other divisions or just the First?

General Clement. I am sure it is a general policy throughout Vietnam.

The Chairman. In all of these?

General Clement. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do U.S. advisers insist on preparing press information concerning battle actions involving South Vietnamese troops?

General Clement. No, sir, I would say they do not.

The Chairman. If they advise on public relations matters, why do they not advise on those releases?

General Clement. Sir, I do not have the detailed information but, in general, the advice is on the mechanics of handling and doing and I am certain the substance of releases is under Vietnamese control.

U.S. ADVISERS TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY UNITS, 1971

The Chairman. Can you estimate how many U.S. advisers to Vietnamese military units will be in Vietnam a year from now?

General Clement. I cannot give you a precise number, sir; but I think it will be slightly larger than the 7,000 military advisers that I have spoken of previously. This is because of the buildup that we have shown, particularly in the Navy and the Air Force. There may be some more.

The Chairman. You would not venture a guess or was that dependent upon how many more people are put in their armed forces?

General Clement. No, sir. It is dependent on the buildup of the units themselves. Principally Navy and the Air Force.

It will be in the area of perhaps another 300 or 400, sir. Again, I think I can check this more specifically.

U.S. MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman. Did I ask you the estimate for the cost to the United States of the military equipment, supplies, and bases to be turned over to the Vietnamese in 1971?

General Clement. I believe you did. I do not believe we have that cost for 1971 estimated.

The Chairman. Could you not have that for 1971?

General Clement. We do not have it, sir.

The Chairman. You make such projections; do you not? You are contemplating next year's operations now, are you not?

General Clement. Sir this is beyond my cognizance. I have fiscal year 1970 costs which I have given you.

The Chairman. Have you given it for 1970?

General Clement. I gave you the $1.5 billion, sir.

The Chairman. Do you expect U.S. support for the Vietnamese military budget to increase in the future?

General Clement. Sir, I would hesitate to make a guess on these budgetary matters which are beyond my purview.

The Chairman. Is there specific agreement concerning the amount of budget support that will be provided for various military purposes?

General Clement. I really do not know that there is such an agreement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From what sources and under what authorization does the equipment, supplies, and other aid to the Vietnamese armed forces come?

General CLEMENT. This is under the Military Assistance Service funded program, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all of it; or how much of it is provided under the Department of Defense budget?

General CLEMENT. I am not sure. The figure that I gave you of 1.5 is part of Department of Defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Department of Defense. The military aid is, I thought, part of the AID program.

Mr. KNAUR. No, sir; the military assistance for Vietnam was transferred totally to the regular——

The CHAIRMAN. All of it?

Mr. KNAUR. Totally in 1966, yes, sir, for the regular Defense budget.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the whole billion and a half is DOD.

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Only the economic now comes out of the AID.

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is that?

Mr. KNAUR. The economic, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is around $500 million; is that correct?

Mr. KNAUR. I am not aware of that.

ASSIGNMENTS OF U.S. ADVISERS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. How many advisers are attached to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff?

General CLEMENT. We have approximately 400 advisers——

The CHAIRMAN. You have 400 attached to the Joint General Staff. How many to the South Vietnamese corps commanders?

General CLEMENT. The total is just over 3,000. I have precise figures. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. How many are attached to the ARVN division commanders?

General CLEMENT. The corps figure of 3,000 actually encompasses the divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. That is corps and divisions?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many are attached to smaller units than divisions? How is that broken down?

General CLEMENT. The total figure includes all regimental and battalion advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. How many are in that category?

General CLEMENT. Well, for example, the 1st ARVN Division Advisory Team has a total of [deleted] officers and men. That includes advisers to the division headquarters and to the regiments, battalions, and subordinate units. We can give you some figures on division advisory team strength.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, give us a feeling of how it is divided.

General CLEMENT. Well—and we have the corps figures also.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(The information referred to follows:)

DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM—A TYPICAL DIVISION ADVISORY TEAM ORGANIZATION

	Officer	Enlisted men	Total
Division command and staff advisers	22	23	45
Regimental headquarters advisers (3 regiments)	9	9	18
Infantry battalion advisers (12 battalions)	24	24	48
Armored cavalry squadron advisers (1 squadron)	4	4	8
Artillery advisory team	1	1	2
Division recon company team	1	1	2
Direct support battalion team	4	4	8
Team support branch (administrative, logistical, and security personnel for support of the advisers)	1	20	21
Total	66	86	152

Colonel WHEELER. In the 1st ARVN Division there are [deleted] officers and NCO's advising at regimental and battalion level.

The CHAIRMAN. Out of about 200?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of these advisers, how many are with the Navy?

General CLEMENT. The Navy has roughly 900, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many with the Air Force?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. How many are attached to military academies and service groups?

General CLEMENT. That total, sir, is in the Training Directorate and it runs in the area of 250.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other advisory positions that Americans occupy?

General CLEMENT. The logistics advisory positions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they?

General CLEMENT. It is in the area of 500 and I have the specifics on it. They are advisers to the area logistics commands and the technical services, for example.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that one press report we have seen reported that after the U.S. combat supported logistical troops are withdrawn from South Vietnam, about 50,000 or more U.S. advisers will be left in Vietnam indefinitely.

U.S. ADVISERS LEFT IN VIETNAM AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF LOGISTICAL TROOPS

Would you say that is a possibility?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I would prefer to make no comment at all on what might be left at any time in the future.

U.S. PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO MACV HEADQUARTERS

The CHAIRMAN. How many officers, enlisted men, and U.S. civilians are attached to MACV headquarters at present?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I will have to get that exact figure.

The CHAIRMAN. You have it?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you say approximately and then supply the figure?

General CLEMENT. I believe MACV headquarters is authorized about 2,000 military personnel. The civilian strength, I am not sure about.

The CHAIRMAN. Including civilians?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You can supply the figure. I just wanted to have an idea of the general size.

General CLEMENT. All right, sir.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you gentlemen want to question? These are questions prepared by the staff.

Senator COOPER. I was not able to be at the hearing yesterday. I am sorry I missed being here.

VIETNAMIZATION

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that Vietnamization has been put to a test yet?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; in this way. In the territorial forces last fall and last summer there was an acceleration of the Popular Forces training efforts by approximately 6 months. This was, what might be considered a jump on the part of the Government to move these Popular Forces platoons through these training centers and out into their hamlets very quickly and much ahead of what initially had been planned.

This has been done and I believe the general results have been rather gratifying as far as the Popular Forces platoons are concerned.

This effort is continuing right now.

Another increment is being trained, ahead of schedule again, to go on out into the hamlets. Of course, sir; when we talk of Vietnamization, we are talking of the whole effort which begins with the villages and hamlets, as Ambassador Colby has covered, and continues up to the corps level. We try to think of it in the total context—the people's Self-Defense Force, and the Popular and Regional Forces, and the regular units.

The CHAIRMAN. You think of Vietnamization as far more than just the military effort.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think of it as the total concept of building a nation?

General CLEMENT. It is a total concept, sir.

LACK OF COMBINED COMMAND IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Why has there never been a unified command for combat forces in Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Sir, MACV is a unified command under Admiral McCain.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess this question means we are talking about the previous one. Are there any plans for putting U.S. units under Vietnamese command in the future? I thought you said they were not under United States-Vietnamese command.

General CLEMENT. You are talking of a combined command.

The CHAIRMAN. Why has there never been a unified command for combat forces in Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. I think what was misleading was the term unified command, that we recognize as such, which means all of the U.S. forces under one command. No, sir; I know of no plan that envisages a combined command.

The CHAIRMAN. Why has there not been a unified command for all combat forces? What is the reason there was not?

General CLEMENT. Sir; I really have not gone into that problem in any detail at all. I could not say.

U.S. CASUALTIES DURING WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. During the time the United States is in the process of withdrawing combat forces, will the enemy attack in force, in your opinion? We have already really discussed that, have we not?

General CLEMENT. I think we have.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you did not know. I do not see how you could know.

General CLEMENT. I think that is a real crystal ball question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, have you made any estimate of the number of casualties the United States is likely to suffer under the current withdrawal schedule? Is there any estimate of that?

General CLEMENT. No; I know of none, sir.

ENEMY RECRUITMENT AND INFILTRATION, 1969

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have asked you this. What is the total enemy recruitments and infiltrations in 1969? Do you have any figures on that?

General CLEMENT. I do not have any total on this, sir.

MORALE AND TRAINING OF ENEMY FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comment to make on the morale and training of the enemy forces? How do they strike either one of you?

General CLEMENT. Again, it would have to be in general terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure; give me your impression from your own experience and from talking to your counterpart.

General CLEMENT. We find, I believe, as with any force, that it is spotty. For example. North Vietnamese Army units will vary. Up in the sector where I was in the Americal Division they had NVA regiments there that on several occasions did not do very well. It was very surprising. We thought they were supposed to be crack troops. On other occasions, they stayed around for a while and did quite well. On balance, though, we felt the quality was deteriorating and this is another aspect of why I think you find the South Vietnamese forces feel a little bit more confident. NVA leadership in several instances that I can think of was certainly not the greatest. For example, one sapper attack on a fire support base last August, near the Hiep Duc region, was really an abortive attempt. Here they came in, tipped off their hand. Their own supporting fires dropped on their own troops, which is unusual. They got to the wire and were just about decimated. In fact, there were over 50 killed on the wire and they never did penetrate the fire base. That was an example. We had other experiences with them earlier where they never did such a thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this attributable to training or morale?

General CLEMENT. That is a training aspect.

The CHAIRMAN. They were poorly trained.

General CLEMENT. I do not make a general statement. I am trying to give you examples of training where we feel their leadership must have been hurt. It has been hurt, we feel. I think another example of this is that we know, in their infantry battalions, they have ordered one company now to take sapper training. The sappers, of course, are the units that try to get into the fire bases. The sapper has been in elite units in the past and specifically trained for this mission of getting through the wire with just a pair of shorts on, a few grenades, cutting the wire, getting in, getting out on the other side after throwing their grenades and satchel charges. Rifle companies go out and become sappers now. We feel they are desperated. Sure it is a training problem. It is not the way he would have done it earlier. Now, I do not want to make general statements about it, but we do feel in instances and perhaps Colonel Wheeler can talk of some, too, that the training is not up to what it had been before.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your estimate. It is not nearly up to what it was?

General CLEMENT. And I think you are going to find examples of low morale as we have found, definitely where the Hoi Chanhs come in through the Chieu Hoi program. In Quang Tin, the province I was in, I understand 3 months ago they had almost a whole company defect. This is very unusual.

ENEMY TRAINING AND MORALE

The CHAIRMAN. From your experience, would not these two go together? If they are not trained, then I think their morale is bound to be pretty bad if they do not know what they are doing.

General CLEMENT. Again, I think you have to look at the unit and I would hate to say the enemy morale is low and their training is no good. I want to say selectively we have seen examples of it where we were working against these units and certainly it has surprised us.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure there will be that variation in it. We have already discussed the variation in the ARVN divisions, but I guess that the thrust of this is compared to a year ago or 2 years ago, how it is now. Is it deteriorating or is it as good or is it better?

Colonel WHEELER. I can elaborate in the area which I am familiar since we have both examples. First of all, the local forces and guerrillas. In their case we find their morale is much lower than it was last year because of the beating they have taken by the ARVN and the U.S. forces. On the contrary, those forces that come across the DMZ are normally well trained, well fed, well supplied and they present a more formidable force. And likewise, the forces that infiltrate from Laos. They are normally replacements and in some cases they are entire units. The morale of the prisoners depends upon the age and length of service. The younger ones obviously are surprised and disillusioned at what they find in South Vietnam whereas the older ones, the more seasoned soldier, has probably made that trip before and has come back again, hoping this time to achieve success.

Each time they meet with a stronger resistance, I think that we find the reason that the Chieu Hois are willing to talk and lead us to the locations of the enemy forces is because they, too, have lost a great deal of the previous spirit that they had.

The Chairman. Is it fair to say from that that the morale and training of the VC, the guerrilla forces has deteriorated markedly but the North Vietnamese are about the same? Is that about a fair summary?

ACHIEVEMENT OF VIETNAMIZATION IN 11TH DTA

Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir, I would like to give a brief explanation from the map, if I may, sir, with regard to Vietnamization and how it is being achieved in our area.

Generally speaking, the ARVN responsibility for the 11th Division Tactical Area (DTA) which extends north of the Hai Van Pass to the DMZ, is assigned to the 1st ARVN Division. Major operations conducted by the U.S. XXIV Corps and the 1st ARVN Division destroyed most of the NVA forces in the lowlands by the end of 1968. The success of continued operations conducted by the 1st ARVN Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 3d Marine Division, and the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division in the Piedmont region, the A Shau Valley, south of Khe Sanh and along the DMZ while maintaining pressure on the VC and the local guerrilla forces in the lowlands resulted in the enemy forces being well mauled by July 1969. At that time General Truong made the decision to turn over the internal security of the lowlands where 90 percent of the people live, to the RF and PF units. He then concentrated the efforts of the division with the support of U.S. forces west of QL1, the north-south main highway. Combined operations with the 101st Airborne Division in the A Shau Valley and ARVN independent operations in the Piedmont region destroyed the principal enemy communication/logistical complexes in base areas 101 and 114. This was accomplished prior to the withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division and the Marine combat support and combat service support forces in the fall of 1969.

The 1st ARVN Division assumed responsibility for most of the area previously occupied by the 3d Marine Division along the DMZ in accordance with a plan agreed to by CG, XXIV Corps, and CG, 1st ARVN Division. Accordingly, U.S. and ARVN forces were disposed to insure maximum security to the population. Cognizance was taken of the forthcoming monsoon season—October to March—and the enemy-announced winter/spring offensive. Chieu Hoi's prisoners and captured documents have since verified the enemy had been denied the capability of redeploying large tactical forces and resupplying existing units in the 11th DTA with sufficient food supplies, primarily rice, from the people in the lowlands. At the same time the NVA has been unable to rebuild the VC infrastructure which he considers paramount to the conduct of a successful major offensive. It is reported that the people are enjoying security in this area to a degree never before experienced. The fact that the RF, PF, and PSDF have provided most of the internal security while the combat forces were employed against the NVA is a significant factor in the people's increase support of the Government of Vietnam.

EXTENT OF PHOENIX PROGRAM'S CONTRIBUTION TO DETERIORATION OF VC OR VCI

The Chairman. Could you say to what extent the deterioration of the VCI or VC is due to the Phoenix program?

Colonel Wheeler. No, sir; I cannot.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the Phoenix program?

Colonel WHEELER. I know there is a Phoenix program, sir, but I do not deal with it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have nothing to do with it?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of its results?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

SOUTH KOREAN AND THAI FORCES IN VIETNAM

What are the plans, if any, for withdrawal of the South Korean and Thai forces in Vietnam, General?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do not know of any plans. I really do not know of any plans for withdrawal or their disposition in any way.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what the total cost of all support provided their forces in Vietnam was last year?

General CLEMENT Of all support?

The CHAIRMAN. Provided the forces of the Koreans and Thais.

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you or does anyone advise with the Thai and the Korean forces the same way they do with the Vietnamese?

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They have no advisers?

General CLEMENT. Not in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the Vietnamese have advisers with them or are they entirely on their own?

General CLEMENT. They have interpreters with them.

The CHAIRMAN. They have only interpreters?

General CLEMENT. We have liaison with them, but not an advisory force.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would we not have advisers with them if we have them with the Vietnamese? I wonder what is the rationale for that.

General CLEMENT. I think it is due to the fact that the ROK's are well-trained forces.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in a strange country, and so on. I would think they would benefit by advisers. I did not realize that. They have no American advisers?

General CLEMENT. We have no advisers with them that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. I am surprised. I rather assumed——

General CLEMENT. I would like to enlarge on that a bit. The ROK's undertake quite a tremendous training program of their own for the Popular Forces, which they conducted last year and are continuing it. It is quite a good course. They train popular forces platoon leaders and NCO's as well as units.

The CHAIRMAN. They train Vietnamese.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the Thais do the same?

General CLEMENT. I do not believe the Thais do, sir. I do not know of their program.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Thais combat troops or not? I have forgotten. Do you know?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, they have combat troops.

The CHAIRMAN. The Philippines were not combat.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had any contact with the Thai forces?

General CLEMENT. I have not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you with the Koreans?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir; with the Korean marine brigade up in the north in the sector I was in, Quang Tin.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your impression?

General CLEMENT. We feel the Koreans are pretty good soldiers.

COMBAT TROOPS REQUIRED FOR PROTECTION OF LOGISTICS FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. What is the normal ratio between logistics forces and combat troops required for their protection?

General CLEMENT. Sir, this gets back to, I think, an earlier question of the breakout which we are providing of the ratio of combat to combat support and combat service support. I think this is the question.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a further question. If 200,000 U.S. forces are required for logistics, air and artillery service to the Vietnamese forces, how many U.S. combat troops will be needed to protect them? That is the thrust of the question. Did we ask that?

General CLEMENT. No, sir; you are asking that now. Sir, I really do not have that figure.

The CHAIRMAN. That surely has been considered in the development of the program of Vietnamization though; has it not?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I am certain that there have been many proposals and discussions but there is nothing firm and no decision has been made. It would be premature to say anything about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think this would be a matter that has been discussed and some estimate made as to how many combat troops will be needed. I have heard the Secretary of Defense himself say, that of course, there would be a certain number. He did not say how many of the combat troops would be necessary for the protection of the logistics people. I wondered if you have such figures.

General CLEMENT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any such study, will you make it available? I do not know whether there is or not.

General CLEMENT. If we have it.

The CHAIRMAN. At some point I assume you will have to do that. If you have not done it yet, you will do it I reckon.

Senator CASE. I wonder if at that point, I have one or two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I am almost through. These are the staff questions.

U.S. SUPPORT AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF COMBAT TROOPS

Senator CASE. I know they are. I was just thinking about elaborating on an answer, getting some added impressions to the picture. How many bases we would have to support with our 200,000 support forces, how they would be located? Just give us some idea what the whole country would look like, General, if you have some idea. I do not mean to interrupt the chairman now, but you might be thinking about this because I would like to get some idea of what this theater is going to look like when we get our combat troops out and what kind of a war it is going to be.

General Clement. Sir, I do believe in this general vein, that the policy has been to stay away right now from figures and projections until the President deems what will be done, at which time the force that would remain would obviously have to be determined.

Senator Case. We would like to ask some questions later.

The Chairman. I am almost through.

Senator Case. I am not rushing you.

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS

The Chairman. I have only a few more. How are American military advisers selected? Is there any particular process by which military advisers are selected?

General Clement. Yes, sir; through the career management system within each service.

The Chairman. Do they have any special training when they are selected?

General Clement. Yes, sir; they do. There is a course, for example, in the Army at Fort Bragg which trains a percentage of these advisers.

The Chairman. Do they receive language training?

General Clement. Yes, sir; it varies from 3 to 12 weeks, something of that nature.

The Chairman. In language?

General Clement. Yes; there is a percentage of these people who receive language training.

The Chairman. Do you mean not all of them?

General Clement. No, sir; it is a percentage that are earmarked specifically for these advisory positions. Now, for example——

The Chairman. Are all of those selected for advisory positions given language training?

General Clement. No, sir.

The Chairman. What percentage are?

General Clement. Probably in the area of 15 percent, sir, within the Army.

The Chairman. Are advisory assignments ever offered to draftees instead of combat assignments if they would reenlist?

General Clement. Not to my knowledge.

The Chairman. I would assume this is at lower level. I do not mean at the general level but lower level.

General Clement. No, sir; at whatever level, sir.

Colonel Wheeler. Normally you will find that your adviser personnel are skilled and more experienced. They are personnel in the NCO grades. The normal draftee assigned is in a clerical status or some other nonadvisory capacity.

ASSIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM

The Chairman. Yes. To what extent are the—I do not know whether you call them surplus or not—U.S. military forces in Vietnam being redistributed to other countries in the Far East such as Thailand, Formosa, Korea? In other words, are they being brought back to the United States or being redistributed in other countries?

General Clement. No, sir; this is the general policy of career management. In other words, the man's tour overseas is so long and he then moves to his next station. I know of no specific program that allocates him to other countries.

DISTRIBUTION OF EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I think the thrust of the question is if they are pulled out of Vietnam will they be brought to the mainland, United States or put in Formosa, Korea, or Thailand? I am told this refers to equipment and arms rather than personnel.

General CLEMENT. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. I am told this refers to equipment and arms rather than personnel. I thought it meant personnel. The equipment is there. Is it left in Vietnam or is it redistributed in some other Far Eastern base?

General CLEMENT. It depends on the program itself. Obviously, if there are shortages in country and the equipment is needed, some would be earmarked to remain there. Then the total disposition is made depending on where shortages are and where the equipment is needed.

The CHAIRMAN. But the equipment of these divisions that are withdrawn is not left in Vietnam; is it?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. The divisions, I believe to date have redeployed with equipment. Neither the 1st Division nor the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, but the Marines, for example, went out with it and——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean they bring it home with them?

General CLEMENT. Or wherever they are stationed.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever they go they take the equipment with them.

General CLEMENT. That has been the case. Now, there are examples also, and this is because of the reequipment program, where the equipment is left in place, to save shipping back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. It is left there for the Vietnamese to use.

General CLEMENT. Yes, turned over to them if they are authorized it.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The CHAIRMAN. How many U.S. advisers are in the field of psychological warfare?

General CLEMENT. I will have to get that figure for you, sir. It is not a great figure but we do have 27 military personnel authorized in MACV headquarters as psychological operations advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. You do have some.

General CLEMENT. We do have some, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do U.S. units engage in this activity also? In the U.S. Forces do you have psychological warfare?

General CLEMENT. Yes. It is called the G–5 section or S–5 section in a battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they do?

General CLEMENT. Sir, for example from an operational point of view, there may be a combat action in which the battalion commander on the other side has been captured or is a casualty. Psychological operations personnel would develop a program to utilize leaflets or loud speakers to reach the rest of his unit stating your battalion commander has been captured. We suggest you come in, turn over your arms and whatnot. Chieu Hoi, for example, is this kind of thing. Chieu Hoi pamphlets are disseminated and this pamphlet is a safe conduct pass for the man to bring in and he is accepted as a Hoi Chan.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only our people do this, but you try to get the ARVN people to do the same thing.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir, and it is a valuable thing, more particularly with them, because they are talking with their own people, in their own hamlets and villages.

COST OF U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the cost to the United States of construction work on American bases last year?

General CLEMENT. I will have to see what we have.

The CHAIRMAN. That is available, I guess.

General CLEMENT. We will have to see.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have what is planned for this coming year, fiscal 1971?

General CLEMENT. We will see what we have, sir, on that.

The CHAIRMAN. How much money is being kept aside for the planned and scheduled construction? One of the things that interests us very much is the cost of this operation now and the projected cost because, as the Senator from Missouri emphasized, money is very tight in this country.

How much will be spent on construction of South Vietnamese bases as opposed to our own this year? Do you have that?

General CLEMENT. Let us see if we have something.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you supply that? And I would like in that connection to know how much of it the United States will pay. What is the total cost of all U.S. bases in Vietnam and will all of these be turned over to the Vietnamese? Can you answer that for the record?

General CLEMENT. I cannot, sir, at this time. I will have to get something.

The CHAIRMAN. You can give the total cost. You cannot give whether it will be turned over.

You do know the total cost of all the bases in Vietnam? This is a matter of record in the Pentagon, I think.

General CLEMENT. I was going to say we will have to dig out——

The CHAIRMAN. I imagine you have that available. I assume that is a cumulative total they have to present to the Appropriations Committee every year. I do not think that will be any surprise to them. Do you think they have that, Mr. Knaur?

Mr. KNAUR. I will see if we do have it.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do when you go to the Appropriations Committee and they ask you what you spend? They know what you spend. They try to keep up with it anyway. They ask you at least. I will be interested in this connection in what we spend.

(The information referred to follows:)

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

During the first nine months of Fiscal Year 1970, Military Construction funds totaling $74.4 million had been obligated to meet South Vietnamese construction requirements. Projections for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1970 indicate that an additional $21.3 million will be obligated for this purpose.

In regard to the total cost of all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, military construction in-place totaled $1.53 billion as of March 1, 1970. Of this total, $135.4 million represented Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces work-in-place. The $1.53 billion represents the total military construction investment in Vietnam, including bases, ports, airfields, roads and operational facilities. Working in collaboration with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, we are making every effort to

assure that maximum Vietnamese utilization is made of existing U.S. facilities which become excess to U.S. requirements. However, we do not anticipate that all U.S. facilities will be turned over, as there are facilities which are probably in excess of Vietnamese military requirements. These facilities are in locations which cannot be used by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Further, in some cases, U.S. facilities have exceeded their original life expectancy.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANS TO OFFSET U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL

I think this is the last question I have. I wonder, General, if you could give this, or perhaps the colonel could as some of these questions perhaps cannot be answered generally for the whole country as they can for the I Corps. In your relations with your counterparts, how do the Vietnamese plan to take up the slack, for example, Colonel [deleted]? What are their plans to take up the slack? How are they going to go about it?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. What is an AO?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand they are sharing it. We had this question yesterday, I think, and I had been informed that there were approximately [deleted] troops in the I Corps and [deleted] Vietnamese of which yours is [deleted] I believe.

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.] What I think we are trying to get at is that you are already deployed, presumably in significant areas. What do they have in mind doing when these [deleted] leave? What are they going to do about that?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage do you think of the Americans who are withdrawn can be replaced with Vietnamese who are now in training?

Colonel WHEELER. I know of no figure, sir, that would give you a percentage. Again, we would, take into consideration that the RF and the PF are growing in stature. They are undertaking the surveillance and the security of their hamlets and villages which releases the ARVN combat units to go after the NVA forces.

The CHAIRMAN. That relates certainly to the question. If I understand what you are saying, the PF and RF are going to take up much of the slack. That is what you are saying.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir; they are now, and that is why the 1st ARVN Division is in the jungle and along the DMZ making it difficult for the NVA to infiltrate and terrorize the people.

General CLEMENT. Sir, as a matter of fact, in the delta when our 9th Division came out, this is exactly what happened. The 7th ARVN Division operates in that general area now.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you rate the 7th?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. New commander?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he a good one?

General CLEMENT. He is very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he an improvement?

General CLEMENT. They think highly of him; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. Senator Case will be back in a few minutes. He has some questions. I am very sorry I was not able to come to the meeting yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we missed you. I am sorry, too.

Senator COOPER. Thank you. I had other committees I had to go to.

Senator Fulbright asked very comprehensive questions. Perhaps what I ask has been gone over before. If they have been asked you can tell me.

SUPPLY RATE FROM NORTH TO SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE BOMBING CESSATION

Since the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam, has there been an increased flow of supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I really cannot give you the data on that as to what kind of a buildup and what the rates are. I do not have these figures at hand. We want to be sure we are precise.

Senator COOPER. Perhaps though your military command observations you have some precise evidence that North Vietnam has either diminished supplies or enlarged supplies to its forces in the south. Just general observations.

General CLEMENT. In the business of intelligence estimates, I would rather stay on—

(The following information was subsequently submitted.)

SUPPLY FLOW FROM NORTH VIETNAM TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Yes, evidence does indicate that North Vietnam has increased its materiel support for its war effort in South Vietnam since the bombing halt.

NORTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Senator COOPER. Have the North Vietnamese forces been enlarged either in South Vietnam or in Laos? Cambodia? Cambodia particularly?

General CLEMENT. Let me again dig this out. This is in the intelligence business, and we want to be precise in whatever figures we give you.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

IMPROVED U.S. EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator COOPER. I assume that the United States is now in the course of providing to the South Vietnamese more effective, better equipment——

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

COMPARISON OF U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMS

Senator COOPER. I am sure that is correct. What would you say about the comparison of the arms of the U.S. forces in comparison to North Vietnam forces?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I think we have much superior fire power available.

Senator COOPER. Are our rifles as good?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Artillery?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. They use mostly rockets. A rocket by its very nature is a very imprecise weapon, but makes a big explosion and if it hits near, it causes concern. An artillery piece is much more accurate and we have a lot of artillery. Our air support again——

Senator COOPER. They use mortar?

General CLEMENT. Some mortar fire, but our artillery will generally outdistance them all and is more accurate.

Senator COOPER. Have you noticed in the last year or two more sophisticated items of equipment given to the North Vietnamese forces? We have read about their rocket capabilities, and their surface-to-air missiles.

General CLEMENT. No, sir; I think a weapon like the AK–40, is a good one. They have an antitank rocket, the B–40, which is a pretty good antitank weapon.

Senator COOPER. Surface-to-air. I remember reading Russia provided them with this.

General CLEMENT. I really have no knowledge of that kind of equipment, sir.

TRAINING OF U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator COOPER. Before the United States became involved, in combat I recall one instance when Senator Stennis in his position on the Armed Services Committee was managing the defense authorization bill and appropriations bill. Questions were asked, and in fact he raised these questions himself, that the type of training that had been given to the South Vietnamese soldier was not the kind of training that was needed for guerrilla warfare. It was in 1962 or 1963 that these questions were raised in the debate on the Senate floor.

I recall I asked him about it and after a year or so, he said that the proper kind of training had been provided.

Was it correct that at the beginning of your mission that there was inadequate training in guerrilla type of warfare?

General CLEMENT. I would like to answer generally, sir, because that is really before my time in Vietnam, but in general terms——

Senator COOPER. I am talking about the training of military advisers?

General CLEMENT. When you bring your force into a new environment you obviously start learning on the ground. Your doctrine covers so much and as you know, the doctrine of the plan bumps up against reality and then you start flexibly moving with what is actually happening. I know that there was a learning curve, if you want to call it that, as we went into Vietnam.

I assure you we started a lessons learned program which for example captures the experience of the First Cavalry Division when they went in. The lesson learned is used in our doctrine back home. Vietnamese training includes the same thing. They have a lessons learned program.

Remember, sir, they are training themselves in their schools and training centers. When you go to a Popular Force platoon, these men come from that hamlet. This is their own hamlet and they have lived there all their lives. Maybe a young man has been a platoon leader for 4 years in his hamlet and you query him. You say, platoon leader, how do you dispose—this is through an interpreter—how do you dis-

pose your platoon? First of all, schematically draw your hamlet. He will draw the stream, the hamlet, and the street. Where do you put your strong point? Here, here, here, I have one here.

Senator Cooper. Now, if the NVA or VC come from this direction, who do you communicate with and where do you get your supporting fire? Do you sweep afterwards?

General Clement. Yes, we sweep this way. So through bitter experience and through long hard experience they have been exposed to VC and they try to get that right back into their training programs.

Of course, a lot of training takes place. You have the formal program and then when you get back in the hamlet it is an on-the-job program.

So I would say, yes, lessons learned, certainly——

DIRECTION OF ATTACKS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE

Senator Cooper. I just have two more questions. Is there any pattern in your direct experience there and your knowledge of the experience of our forces there of attacks by the North Vietnamese being directed preferably at South Vietnamese forces rather than at U.S. forces or the contrary?

General Clement. No, sir. Again I will have to speak in general terms. There was an offensive last summer, I believe it was in August, or earlier, which was specifically aimed at U.S. fire bases to inflict U.S. casualties and at the same time attack the hamlets. In other words, where popular force platoons are. Based on documents captured later, they were going to hit the pacification program, and inflict U.S. casualties and, as a matter of fact, it seemed in our sector, ARVN units were avoided at that time. They had so much ammunition to expend, and recognize that they do not have a great supply to haul down those trails. They were hitting U.S. bases, so a part of their policy was to single out at that time the U.S. forces.

Senator Case. This was last summer?

General Clement. Yes. Now, more recently I know the pacification program is a fair target because they recognize, and I believe Ambassador Colby covered this, that the accelerated pacification program of President Thieu, seems to have stolen a march on the enemy. In other words, they got these platoons out into the hamlets before—and this man on the other side is very meticulous and studies hard—before he could crank up a campaign on his side to counter it. But now, yes, I think you will find that they seem to be going after the pacification effort. ARVN units selectively have been hit. For example, at Bien Het and Bu Prang, ARVN units were specifically hit and the fighting was successfully handled by the ARVN themselves. There were some casualties there but ARVN inflicted more casualties than they suffered. This was strictly ARVN. As a matter of fact, up in Bien Het it seemed to be a test of Vietnamization. Bien Het is in Kontum Province. Elements of the 4th Division had been operating up in that area and this area had been turned over to the ARVN and it seemed the NVA decided to test them.

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield? I need to go to the floor. I wonder if Senator Case will carry on as long as you care to and ask all the questions.

Senator Case. When we are finished——

The Chairman. Just adjourn. Gentlemen, I appreciate very much your coming here. I have been unable to go to the floor all week, so I need to go up there now. I have a very important statement I want to make.

TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Senator Cooper. We heard the U.S. forces had quite an elaborate communications and intelligence system in Vietnam for application of force wherever it is needed; air power, supplies, evacuation—a very sophisticated communications network. Is there any training of this kind being done for the South Vietnamese? Would they be able to handle such sophisticated advance communications systems?

General Clement. [Deleted.]

Some of these students will go offshore; by that I mean to Fort Monmouth, for example, in the United States. Not many. [Deleted.] They have a signal school already. It is a big problem. It is being addressed, and they are being trained right now.

MORALE OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Senator Cooper. Are you able to make any comments to compare the morale of South Vietnamese forces and North Vietnamese forces, describing their will to fight?

General Clement. Sir, I think, generally speaking, we feel that the South Vietnamese morale is pretty good. One example is, I believe, that they have been able to get out into these hamlets where they have not been before. They have been able to accelerate their training. They have been able to pick up the equipment, the accelerated Vietnamization program we have been talking about, and go. They have had some successes. The two battles that I mentioned are examples. Yes; they have been in it, did it the hard way, but they did finally come out all right. In the delta, the 9th Division, ARVN, has operated with more mobility and more rapidly and covered more ground than any division has done for some time. This is not only in the area where they used to operate, but also down in the U Minh Forest area, up to the north and back. So, I say as a general statement, yes.

Now, you are going to find examples where morale is low and you are going to find that everywhere. However, I do feel that in general they seem to be getting with it and getting on with it and certainly—one big thing I think that is evident is the pacification effort with the Popular Force platoons and regional force companies who are out where they have not been before.

Senator Cooper. Thank you.

LOCATION OF U.S. SUPPORT PERSONNEL AFTER VIETNAMIZATION

Senator Case (now presiding). Please do not hesitate to involve yourself in this part either. I would like to pick up a little bit, just for my own benefit, a picture of what we are really talking about here.

Earlier we discussed the hypothesis that when the period of Vietnamization was over we would still leave about 200,000 American personnel in various supporting capacities. I do not ask you to say yes or no about that figure. But at the time I was wondering if I could get some idea—assuming that that were true or something like it.

Would they all be in Saigon and Danang, a few other places, or the big harbor we have there or would there be smaller, a number of smaller units around? I would like to get some idea of yours and you particularly, Colonel, in regard to your two provinces up there in the north, just what you envisage.

First of all, let us say how is this support coming in now, and from where? And how much from that, if you could extrapolate maybe, just to get some idea what this picture is again.

General CLEMENT. Sir, in general I would rather not even project or talk about force dispositions or locations because again we are getting into the future where forces might be, how they might be deployed, things of that nature.

Frankly, I have no specific knowledge of these things and——

Senator CASE. Well, I know you do not. Let us talk about the present, then, in your operations and in the operations of our forces up there, support troops.

LOGISTIC AND COMBAT SUPPORT SUPPLIES

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, at the present time I might clarify one point regarding logistical support. Normal supplies for the division are requisitioned through the ARVN channel. This means that their ammunition, clothing, equipment, rations, et cetera, all come through the ARVN Army Logistical Command just the same as the U.S. supplies come through its own logistical system.

Now, for that combat support such as the helicopters——

Senator CASE. Where is this material? How does it get into the country and where does it go?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

The helicopter support——

Senator CASE. That particular operation is conducted by the Vietnamese Army?

Colonel WHEELER. By the Vietnamese Army, sir.

Senator CASE. Under the protection, including——

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. What is in that?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. This is the Vietnamese?

Colonel WHEELER. Vietnamese helicopter squadron; yes, sir.

Senator CASE. And what kind of helicopters? What kind——

Colonel WHEELER. Hueys, UH–1H's, sir. They are used for resupply and for combat assaults, as required.

Senator CASE. Combat assaults. You do not mean that they are fire ships, do you?

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir.

Senator CASE. Are there any helicopter fire ships?

Colonel WHEELER. They do have some gun ships.

General CLEMENT. But they have not been introduced operationally as yet.

Senator CASE. Would you describe one just in a rough general way? I did not realize we had any helicopter fire ships. I mean fighters.

General CLEMENT. Not fighters as such. They are gun ships and they have machine guns mounted on each side of them for protection. They do not have the Cobras of which you speak. This unit does not have them.

Senator CASE. But they do have——
General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]
Senator CASE. Which are used in support of ground troops.
General CLEMENT. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. How many of the [deleted].
General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]
Senator CASE. That supplies, if I remember, the testimony from yesterday about 20 percent of the helicopter requirement for the South Vietnamese 1st Division.
Colonel WHEELER. Twenty percent in my division area.
Senator CASE. Yes.
Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. So that means we are now providing 80 percent roughly.
Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. Where is that located and what is it and how does it get in?
Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]
Senator CASE. Is that the only supply?
Colonel WHEELER. There is a requirement for Medevac helicopters. They are located near the surgical hospitals; the 18th surgical at Quang Tri and the 85th surgical hospital at Phu Bai.

HELICOPTER SUPPORT

Senator CASE. Now, what kind of protection do you have for those, the helicopter——
Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]
Senator CASE. So that as long as we have helicopter support we are going to be in combat, are we not? As long as we are providing helicopter support we are going to be in combat, I take it, leaving aside—you do not have lines in this——
Colonel WHEELER. No, sir; we do not normally have front lines.
Senator CASE. I mean, it is like the Middle Ages. This is the thing that I am trying to get at, a picture of what kind of operation this would be when the so-called ground troops are gone. We are still going to have to have fighters, fighting men in protection of these various support operations. Is not that true?
General CLEMENT. Sir, I think this has been the general thrust of the announcements to date, the balanced force. In other words, the rate of Vietnamization is a function of the level of activity and of how many gun ships are needed for how long. This would be one way of interpreting that, and if I follow your questioning, again the Paris talks, the enemy, his activity and what he is doing, so that is why we cannot really talk too much in the future about the balance or how many ships are going to be devoted to combat a year from now. These figures will be—we just do not have them and I believe——
Senator CASE. But as far as you can envisage in the future and project from what we are doing now, so long as we have American helicopter support we are going to have Americans in action. Is that not true?
Colonel WHEELER. I would say given that——
Senator CASE. I am just trying to figure out—we had Americans in World War I. I remember as a small boy ambulance drivers, and they were not regarded as in action in a sense. But is it not true that the

ambulance driver in World War I was a good deal more respected as a noncombatant than the operations of ambulance helicopters in this war?

Colonel WHEELER. He is very highly respected.

Senator CASE. By the enemy as well?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir. To the extent they know that they are the ones who get in there and get out the wounded.

Senator CASE. And they lay off, in other words.

Colonel WHEELER. I am not certain, sir, as to what the directions are with regard to the enemy.

Senator CASE. What is your experience?

Colonel WHEELER. We have not experienced any helicopter Medevacs being shot down.

Senator CASE. By the enemy?

Colonel WHEELER. By the enemy. We know they do come under fire.

Senator CASE. They do come under fire? By mistake, in your judgment or deliberately?

Colonel WHEELER. That I could not answer, whether it is deliberately or not.

Senator CASE. You leave me a little confused.

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

EFFECT OF U.S. SUPPORT FORCES LEFT IN VIETNAM

Senator CASE. My point, though, really is to get an honest and fair picture of what the American public is going to be looking at as we move down the line here and—would it be a fair statement?—that so long as we are in there in any support capacity, or as advisers, whether in communications support, even medical, certainly as far as transport and gun ships, there are going to be Americans in combat either directly with the enemy or indirectly or following their presence there to protect their own forces? It is not possible to think of us as a noncombatant so long as we are providing support, is that not true? I am not saying we should or should not do it. I have not any solution to this thing. My general impression is if you want my own view just as one Senator, I am not a dove or a hawk. I have a belief that Hanoi will give up or do anything that is in its interest. If it is going to get a better deal now than it will at the end and that is the way this is going to come up, and what we are talking about is to try and bring this to some situation which will make them realize or believe that they are better off now to make a negotiation than later on a basis that is acceptable to us. Therefore, what we are talking about is some kind of a credible picture of America—this country supporting this effort for such time as is necessary to bring North Vietnam to that frame of mind.

That is, I think, what we are really talking about and that is why I am trying to find out what it is likely to be.

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. I would have to agree with you that it depends on time and we are not saying how many or when or what the nature of the forces and the environment there. Whatever forces are left in Vietnam, including just pure Vietnamese, are going to be exposed to a hostile environment as long as the enemy is there.

Senator CASE. I appreciate that and I am sure the committee will be sure never in any way to misuse it or to prove more than you said by what you have said or anything else, and if you ever see any of us doing this, tell us privately. I really mean this because the Lord knows we are only——

General Clement. I am just painting a picture——

Senator Case. We are only after the true picture and the true prospect.

CAN DEFICIENCIES IN VIETNAMIZATION STRATEGY BE OVERCOME?

General Wheeler last month said on this Vietnamization strategy several things. I would not like to comment, but I base my question on it, so I will quote:

> The question remains, then, what of the leadership, the motivation and the confidence, for these are the ingredients of military success which the United States cannot provide and they are the ingredients on which victory or defeat can turn.
>
> Lack of adequate leadership and experience has been a problem at all levels of command from squad leader to the Division Commander.

He went on:

> Rapid mobilization of both the regular forces and the paramilitary forces greatly depleted the supply of talent, education, and leadership capability. The numbers of those with potential for advancement is limited.

I should not ask you if you agree with the statement of your superior officer. Of course, you do. The second one I really want to ask is the second one here. Can these basic deficiencies be overcome within a period of 2 or 3 years and if not, how long is it going to take?

General Clement. This is a very general question. It is impossible——

Senator Case. Very general.

General Clement (continuing). Impossible to get the time——

Senator Case. Another phase of the question, how long.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TRAINING

General Clement (continuing). To solve these problems. Let me say this, sir, from the point of view of leadership, one aspect of it is training and I think I have already mentioned that the training program is going on. That is good. For example, the Vietnamese military academy graduated its first class last December. This is a 4-year course.

Senator Case. How many?

General Clement. This class was 92 officers at that time.

Senator Case. Graduated?

General Clement. Yes, sir; and they are out——

Senator Case. Is this across the board, military, naval, air, and——

General Clement. Yes. There is an allotment for each service given. This is one example of growth. Please do not multiply 92 times the four services. An enrollment of 250 is what they are looking for. These are regular officers. Lieutenants. I am just giving you an example of how leadership is coming on.

The Navy and Air Force have their own schools. They are of short duration and much more applied to Air Force problems and Navy problems. They are not the 4-year course. In addition, for senior officer leadership training there is the National Defense College; this is at a higher level.

Senator Case. You mean like staff?

General Clement. Like our National War College here, sir, the next class at the Defense College in Saigon, and they will be coming in very soon, will be 40. They are selected senior officers, colonel rank, part of the future leadership. This is part of the program.

Tu Duc, the infantry school, turned out just about 10,000 officer candidates last year and they anticipate the same kind of a turnout in fiscal year 1970. These are the young officers.

The NCO courses. There is an NCO academy up at Nha Trang for Vietnamese noncommissioned officers. This school and all of the other schools are run by the Vietnamese. This NCO academy, I think, turned out somewhere in the area of 16,000 noncommissioned officers.

Senator CASE. How long is the course for them?

General CLEMENT. The NCO course runs about, I think, 16 weeks, through that academy. This has been one of the finest academies. We really want to be sure the quality is there and that putting too many through too fast does not degrade the quality. This is, of course, a constant problem. This is a trade off.

Senator CASE. Have we had a heavy advisory operation in that?

General CLEMENT. Yes, sir. We have advisers at all of these schools. Now, for example, I believe at the NCO academy it is probably a total of 10, eight or 10 men. That would be about five officers and five enlisted men.

Senator CASE. They do not really do much instruction.

General CLEMENT. No, sir; they certainly do not. The instruction is given by the Vietnamese. What we do is check on the quality, assist the counterparts at these schools and advise in the management of it.

Senator CASE. Do these Americans have the language?

General CLEMENT. No, sir. You will find very, very few. On the other hand, you will find that most Vietnamese in responsible positions speak English. I myself do not speak Vietnamese. My counterpart speaks perfect English. This goes on in the combat units as well. In a few weeks you can learn something about the language, a few of the general expressions. I would say hello or goodbye, perhaps, but generally the English language is used and this is not a bar. The program goes on.

So, these are examples of leadership training and the training centers themselves. Quang Trung is a big one right near Saigon, for example. They train 12,000 or 15,000 men at a time in their training center and some of these are specific leadership courses that are given. So, it is being addressed and not taken for granted.

Senator CASE. Just a couple of questions that have been suggested by the staff, if I may. How many ARVN generals have been killed or wounded?

General CLEMENT. Sir, that was——

Senator CASE. This was——

General CLEMENT. This has been asked and we are going to have to do some research.

Senator CASE. This would be in comparison with the number of our general officers.

General CLEMENT. That was the context, yes.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF 1ST ARVN DIVISION

Senator CASE. Is there any plan to make the 1st Division ARVN, completely self-sufficient so they will not need any American support?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, the 1st ARVN Division as it is presently constituted, can operate on its own without U.S. support. The U.S. support is made available so that we may take better advantage of the

tactical situation in moving the ARVN combat troops to where they can decisively and quickly engage the enemy. This is a matter of being able to use the tactical mobility which U.S. forces have but which is not organic to the ARVN division.

Senator CASE. Again, I suppose this has been covered many, many times in many different ways but each time we go into it I learn a little bit. In other words, the 1st Division could subsist indefinitely.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir. The 1st Division as presently organized can——

Senator CASE. Can protect itself; is that what you are talking about?

Colonel WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Of that division.

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. This is a very interesting point because it leads toward the question of whether in using other tactics, other strategy, we can pull out entirely.

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, they use not only the U.S. tactics, they use their own. They are quick to adopt any new ideas or means that take better advantage of the enemy. We have units that use sapper tactics, the same as the NVA.

Senator CASE. When you say we——

Colonel WHEELER. Sir, 1st ARVN Division.

You asked me about their contacts with the NVA yesterday. The most recent contacts prior to my departure, ranged from small squads to platoon to company size. In all of these the ARVN troops acquitted themselves admirably and inflicted many casualties on the enemy without suffering any appreciable wounded themselves.

I think this is significant because they plan and they execute very appropriately, in a limited amount of time, those things which normally could not be accomplished by a unit that has been recently activated.

COMBAT SYSTEM IN NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES

General CLEMENT. Sir, I do not believe you can speak of divisions uniquely or pull them out and say, therefore, they are self-sufficient. They are a piece of the whole problem up there in, say, those northern two provinces and there is a system up there, a combat system which involves both U.S. and Vietnamese forces at this time. So, I do not believe we can address it out of context and divorce the whole—the PF and the RF, and it is going to vary as you look at other locales. You go to the south and go through the country, you must examine the problem in the province, in the area, from the point of view of what the enemy is doing. You must examine the context in which these operations are taking place. In the delta situation, an analysis of the enemy actions, of the forces themselves and their combat effectiveness, would undoubtedly be quite different. The environment is different in the delta from the north. You cannot answer without considering the whole package of forces that are committed, enemy, Vietnamese, American, and others, and the kind of support given these forces.

Yes; the 1st Division does a tremendous job. I just want to point out it is a part of an overall complex, an overall combat system up there in those northern two provinces.

Colonel Wheeler. I would summarize, sir. In my area the United States and ARVN have not only concentrated their combat forces on enemy units in the Piedmont and A Shau Valley, [deleted].

But simultaneously, have worked hard on building roads, pacification and resettling the refugees. When you combine these areas together, it builds the total picture and also builds the people's confidence in their government's ability to defeat the enemy.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES

Senator Case. I have the general impression that those two provinces may be self-sufficient as far as food goes under normal circumstances. Whether it is now true or not I would like to have you comment on. But there is not very much for that they have got there, is that right? That is——

Colonel Wheeler. They do not have very much industry.

Senator Case. Or no extractive industry particularly.

Colonel Wheeler. Not at the present time. They do have a capability whenever the area becomes secure to go into lumbering and fishing.

Senator Case. Mining?

Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.

Senator Case. There are mines down in—below that, I guess.

General Clement. There are mines.

Colonel Wheeler. South of Da Nang.

General Clement. And sugar cane down in the south, too.

Senator Case. Right now it is not really supporting the operations going on up there, is it?

Colonel Wheeler. No, sir.

UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOP STRENGTH IN I CORPS

Senator Case. I suppose in a sense there are—the question is if sufficient U.S. forces were taken out of I Corps to equalize the number of ARVN and U.S. troops, do you think the situation could be held if the North Vietnamese decided to make a hard push? That is, could we equalize enough troops to make our combined force with South Vietnam hold against North Vietnamese? Do you have a judgment about that?

General Clement. I would not want to make a judgment, sir.

Senator Case. In other words, how many troops have we got there now?

General Clement. [Deleted.]

Senator Case. That is in the I Corps?

General Clement. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. And I suppose that—well, while certainly they are not all in your two provinces, they are available for relief in some measure and this is an important factor, I suppose, is it not? The availability—they form a kind of reserve in a sense for operations in your province, is that not true?

Colonel Wheeler. Yes, sir.

Senator Case. And now, the South Vietnamese forces there come to what, something under [deleted].

Colonel Wheeler. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. In your division. What else is there in, say—well, in the whole I Corps?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. We have roughly three times as many now as the South Vietnamese in that I Corps area.

Colonel WHEELER. The total figure which the general has given includes all the service, support and everything United States. We have not included the ARVN service, and support elements——

Senator CASE. In our own figures. So the ratio would be even larger of American troops now.

General CLEMENT. No, sir. We have them included in the [deleted]. I would hesitate to add up all the Vietnamese support forces. I have maneuver battalions here which is again what we were talking about.

Senator CASE. I want to be sure I understand. You gave me a figure of [deleted] that was the total United States.

General CLEMENT. Total U.S. forces but I did not give you the total ARVN force because I was using combat forces. So, it would be, perhaps double the ARVN force I gave you.

Senator CASE. In I Corps, actually located there.

General CLEMENT. I believe something in that area. We can provide——

Senator CASE. So, we have then not three times as many personnel but something over 50 percent.

General CLEMENT. One and a half. Given those figures. And I may have to check that.

(The following information was subsequently submitted:)

TROOP STRENGTHS IN I CORPS

The following is the troop strength of I Corps as of January 1970.

U.S.	152,600
ARVN	80,800

Senator CASE. Now, can you tell us what would be the figure comparable in American active forces to the figure you first gave me for the South Vietnamese combat forces?

General CLEMENT. That is the 101st Division, the 23d Division, and the First Marine Division, and the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division. This is a rough estimate again, sir. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Does that include the support, that is——

General CLEMENT. No, sir. Well, no, this is a division. I am talking now about combat divisions.

Senator CASE. So, in addition we have actually in combat support——

General CLEMENT. Yes; which would come up to the total of [deleted].

Senator CASE. That is everything. I am talking about the people who actually get in there and fly missions.

General CLEMENT. I am measuring combat divisions, so I have taken the 101st Division, a separate brigade which is up there, and the 23d Division and Marine division.

Senator CASE. We actually have at least twice the combat troops in this area that the South Vietnamese do?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

Senator CASE. Equal strength in combat effort?

General CLEMENT. [Deleted.]

SIZE OF ENEMY FORCE

Senator CASE. So the question, my question then would not be based on an accurate assumption if I assumed that there was a difference. Now, that total force has been against, opposed to, roughly over the last year, what size enemy?

General CLEMENT. Sir, I would rather—these forces vary, these estimates of enemy strengths. I really cannot——

Senator CASE. Maybe you can perhaps give a high and a low or something of that sort for the record.

General CLEMENT. All right, sir.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Senator CASE. What does the ARVN 1st Division do with prisoners of war?

Colonel WHEELER. The prisoners of war, sir, are evacuated to their combined interrogation center and after they are interrogated there, they are processed.

Senator CASE. Which is countrywide?

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. Have you any observation to make about the manner in which they are interrogated?

Colonel WHEELER. Sir——

Senator CASE. Are we present at these regularly or sometimes or——

Colonel WHEELER. Yes, sir. At the combined interrogation center there are some members—Americans there and they are inspected and the facilities are quite adequate. We have been—General Truong and I have been in the field when we have captured prisoners and the U.S. press has been there. There has been no indication, no observation of my own to indicate that they have been other than treated with the utmost care and I would say this is one of the reasons why the 1st ARVN Division enjoys success, is because most times the prisoners will lead them back into the areas, and I have a good example of that just recently.

Senator CASE. Is that a matter of policy on their part? Do they understand——

Colonel WHEELER. I believe that is now a policy throughout the ARVN Army, because your best intelligence comes from the POW and he knows the area which he left prior to being captured.

Senator CASE. In other words, they do not feel—the enemy does not feel it has to fight to the death in order to avoid a worse fate.

Colonel WHEELER. No, sir; and the Chieu Hoi program, I think, has been coming along nicely.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. SOLDIERS

Senator CASE. Have you any general comments, General, about the attitude of the American soldier toward the war?

General CLEMENT. Just from my own experience in the 23d Division, I think the American soldier has been pretty well described by many of our leaders in this country. He is a pretty well motivated man when he is given a job and he gets on with it. And I must say it is very inspiring to see the young men come in, put up at a new base in some unpronounceable hamlet and see him go about his job, get out, go on patrol, come back and stay with it.

You have examples, I know, that can be publicized but I do not believe the fact has been equally publicized that these American soldiers are very professional and the American is a good fighting man. By professional attitude I mean the conscript, if you want to call him that, is a professional and his outlook very quickly gets to be to get on with the job. You know, in group identification the first thing he thinks of is his squad, his platoon, his battalion. And this is a function of leadership.

So, my general observation of the soldier over a period of many years, they are some of the finest young men we have seen.

Senator CASE. I wonder if I could ask you for the record later, or now if you wish, to answer a list of questions that are jotted down on this note to me.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. GI'S TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

How would you describe the attitude of American GI's toward the war?

(The information referred to follows:)

ATTITUDE OF THE GI TOWARD THE WAR

The Army has never polled its personnel as to whether or not they approve of the Army's assigned mission in Vietnam. As in previous periods of armed conflict the natural instinct for survival is high in the minds of all Army combat personnel; the surest aid to survival being teamwork, from the squad level to the highest command level. Such teamwork inherently encompasses obedience to lawful orders of duly appointed leaders.

Objectively viewed, it seems safe to assume that any individual—soldier or civilian—who is faced with possible death has a feeling of antipathy toward the causative agent, whether it be an active war or a careless driver on the highway. There is no reason to doubt, however, that the overwhelming majority of soldiers believe in the necessity of the Army retaining a responsive, apolitical body in implementing national policy which emanates from the Commander in Chief.

Are draftees offered less dangerous assignments if they will reenlist?

(The information referred to follows:)

REENLISTMENT OPTIONS, DRAFTEES

It is neither Army policy nor intent to unduly influence soldiers into reenlisting. It is, however, Army policy to retain on a long-term basis those qualified soldiers necessary to maintain a trained, experienced force. To achieve this goal a number of options advantageous to the soldier and the Army are offered as incentives for reenlistment.

Current reenlistment policy permits personnel serving on their initial term of service to reenlist any time after completion of eight months service for any option for which they qualify. There are two options for which such personnel serving in short tour areas, including Vietnam, may reenlist regardless of the length of time in the command.

The Present Duty Assignment Reenlistment Option permits an individual in grade E–6 and below to reenlist and be reassigned to any unit within the command. However, the unit must have a vacancy for his particular military occupational specialty.

The second option is the Army Career Group Reenlistment Option. This option permits personnel in grade E–4 and below to reenlist for training in a new military specialty. This is provided the command has the training capability and a valid requirement for the specialty. In conjunction with this option, the individual may request a transfer to another unit. Again, the unit requested must have the training capability and the vacancy to fulfill the option.

Statistical data on reenlistment which resulted in transfers from divisions or brigades to combat support or combat service support units have not been maintained in Vietnam. A recent one-time analysis of Vietnam reenlistments indicated that the majority of personnel exercising these options selected door gunner and aviation maintenance fields. It should be pointed out that these soldiers, by reenlisting for reassignment to door gunner duties, have voluntarily continued themselves in positions with a high combat exposure factor.

RACIAL INCIDENTS

Are there incidents between white and black soldiers?
Have any of these incidents resulted in a loss of lives?
(The information referred to follows:)

INCIDENTS BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK SOLDIERS

Yes, there have been some incidents. The initial racial climate that manifested itself immediately after the buildup of American forces in SEA and SVN was characterized by congenial intergroup relations in both the combat areas and the rear support activities areas. The character of racial relations that developed at this time was unique in that it incorporated a kind of pervasive intergroup rapport and social fraternization which had not been previously demonstrated on former expeditions of American forces to foreign countries. Following the outbreaks of racial disturbance in the continental United States in the summers of 1966 and 1967, letters from servicemen and the reports of news men in the area of SEA and SVN indicated a serious deterioration in relations between the races. A field visit in October 1968 to SEA by elements of the ODASD (Civil Rights) revealed that racial tensions were dangerously increasing. In 1969 we witnessed an increase in overt racial violence. The spate of racial disturbances of serious magnitude that occurred in July and August of 1969 and earlier in October of 1968 appear to have peaked and at present are in a process of winding down. Minor disturbances, intolerable though they may be, have persisted to some extent.

LOSS OF LIVES FROM RACIAL INCIDENTS

We have been unable to identify an instance of a death directly attributable to a racial incident.

I am going to have to go upstairs and vote and we will adjourn the hearing at this point. I want to thank you both for your patience and endurance, too.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

U.S. Economic Assistance Program in Vietnam

TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 1970

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, Symington, and Aiken.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The committee is meeting this morning to continue its study of the operations of the U.S. programs in Vietnam.

Thus far in this series, the committee has heard testimony from U.S. officials in Vietnam responsible for the pacification and the military advisory programs. Today the committee will hear testimony concerning the economic assistance program.

By the end of this fiscal year the United States will have provided some $4.8 billion in economic aid to South Vietnam, including food-for-peace shipments.

I would like to emphasize that this does not include the military assistance or military expenditures; this is economic aid.

Aid to Vietnam in fiscal 1970 will absorb more than one-fourth of the total appropriation for economic assistance. The purpose of this hearing is to examine how these vast sums are being spent, the plans for further U.S. aid to Vietnam, and the assumptions on which those plans are based, including the prospective impact of the Vietnamization policy and the withdrawal of U.S. forces on Vietnam's economy.

The witness today is Mr. Donald G. MacDonald, Director of the U.S. AID mission in South Vietnam, who is accompanied by a number of his associates. In keeping with the procedure followed in the previous hearings involving personnel brought back from Vietnam, I will ask Mr. MacDonald, and his associates to be sworn at this point.

SWEARING OF WITNESSES

Would you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

44-706—70——37

Mr. MacDonald. I do.
Mr. Sharpe. I do.
Mr. Farwell. I do.
Mr. Ellis. I do.
Mr. Herr. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. MacDonald, I notice that your prepared statement is some 25 pages in length. Do you think it would be feasible for you to put the entire statement in the record for reference, but summarize it now, because I know you and members of the committee have limited time and much of this is not news. If you would pick out those points which you would like to stress, I think it would be more agreeable, if you are willing to do that.

TESTIMONY OF DONALD G. MacDONALD, DIRECTOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, VIETNAM; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLARD D. SHARPE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VIETNAM BUREAU, AID, WASHINGTON; A. E. FARWELL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S. AID, VIETNAM; A. H. ELLIS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR PROGRAMS, U.S. AID, VIETNAM; AND RICHARD H. HERR, ASSISTANT PROGRAM OFFICER, U.S. AID, VIETNAM

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, of course, if that is the Chair's pleasure. I had hoped to be able to——

The Chairman. It will take an hour to read it; will it not?

Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I think I can skim it off in 29 or 30 minutes. It is triple spaced.

The Chairman. Go ahead, if that is what you prefer.

Mr. MacDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I am very glad to have this chance to tell you about the economic and technical assistance programs which my agency conducts in South Vietnam. I think they have been essential to the overall effort in the past, and are certainly important to the process you are now examining—as you indicated, Mr. Chairman—the process of Vietnamization.

Earlier witnesses have said that the problem in Vietnam is not exclusively a military one. It is a situation requiring a whole spectrum of activity—economic and social, political and psychological, as well as military. It is an unprecedented struggle and the nature and diversity of our efforts to deal with it have been, I think, unprecedented, too.

REQUIREMENT FOR NONMILITARY AID

Substantial nonmilitary aid has been required, just to cope with the consequences of the military conflict—to sustain the logistics apparatus of roads, ports, and harbors necessitated by the war; to enable a small economy to support a huge defense budget; to ease the burdens of a civilian population already living within very narrow means; to give special help to the refugee, the injured, and the other civilian casualties.

Substantial aid has also been required to help the GVN master problems of economic and social development. This has entailed an effort not just to moderate the hardships but to improve the circumstances of ordinary South Vietnamese despite the conflict and

despite the attempts of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese to worsen their economic lot. It has also entailed the growing effort of the South Vietnamese to achieve rapid social change in the midst of war; to build their nation as a better place in which to live, not at some distant time, but today and tomorrow. Finally, it entails putting down economic foundations now for independence and self-sustaining growth of Vietnam in the years ahead.

I would like to talk first about the economic problems of stabilization and Vietnamization.

THREAT OF INFLATION

Most of the assistance AID has provided South Vietnam has been given to prevent runaway inflation. Without external aid to support the necessary expansion of South Vietnam's national budget, its economy would have succumbed to a destructive inflation. The threat of such an inflation emerged in 1965 as defense spending rose, as U.S. base building began to put strains on manpower and as Vietcong interdiction of transport curtailed the distribution system.

Domestic production fell as farmers were drafted for military service, were driven from their land, or sought the security of the cities. Those who remained on their farms produced less, as their access to markets was cut. In all, over ½ million Vietnamese in the private sector who had been engaged in economic pursuits were mobilized to the public payroll and service in the nation's defense.

The most costly declines in production were those in rubber, the nation's leading export, and in rice, the foundation of the rural economy. By the end of the 1966–67 crop season, rice production had fallen by more than one-fifth, requiring South Vietnam to import more than twice as much rice that year as she had exported only 3 years earlier.

In addition to falling production, there were dangerous increases in money supply as Vietnam's defense budget and spending by United States and other free world forces grew.

These three trends—falling production, the mobilization of manpower to the public sector, and rising expenditures—created a classic inflationary situation in which too much money competed for too few goods.

It was necessary to contain this inflationary threat, not just to avoid the kind of economic chaos which has stricken other countries in similar circumstances, but to preclude the human suffering, despair, and political instability which would have ensued. To have failed in this would probably have meant to have failed in the total effort, just as allied troops were arriving to help South Vietnam avert a military defeat.

STABILIZATION EFFORT: THE IMPORT PROGRAM

A major feature of the stabilization effort which was begun in 1965 has been a combination of United States and Vietnamese Government (GVN) financed import programs which eased the inflationary pressure of the growing money supply by making goods less scarce. At the beginning of the period, the volume of U.S. imports—that is, Public Law 480 food for peace and food for freedom, and

AID imports—was greater than that of GVN imports. These U.S. imports were substitutes for goods, such as rice, which could no longer be produced in sufficient quantities, and they met new and essential demands within the economy created by the war. They also generated revenues to finance the national budget.

United States financed commercial imports peaked in 1966 when AID and the Department of Agriculture provided $335 million in commodities. In succeeding years South Vietnam's foreign exchange receipts rose with an increase in spending by free world forces. This was largely dollar spending by the U.S. Department of Defense for its piaster needs. As this occurred, AID import financing was cut back to shift more of the import bill to the Vietnamese to avoid unwarranted buildup of their foreign exchange reserves.

Total commercial imports financed under both programs rose from $282 million in 1965 to $659 million in 1969. During the same time, Mr. Chairman, government revenues derived from these imports which were needed to finance the wartime budget shot up eightfold, from about 6 billion piasters in 1965 to about 52 billion in 1969, the latter amounting to some 36 percent of the national budget.

STABILIZATION EFFORT: MONETARY REFORM

A second major feature of the early stabilization effort was devaluation of South Vietnam's currency in June 1966, to a new rate of 118 piasters to one U.S. dollar, roughly one-half of its previous worth. This increased the price Vietnamese importers were required to pay in piasters for the same amount of goods, lowered demand for imports, and reduced the need for foreign aid to finance them.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the black market rate?

Mr. MACDONALD. Pardon, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What is the black market rate?

Mr. MACDONALD. The last quotation when I left last week was, I believe, 356 last week. I do not know what it is today. We can supply that sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

BLACK MARKET RATE FOR U.S. DOLLARS (AID)

The black market rate as of Mar. 9, 1969, was 362 piastres to the dollar.

STABILIZATION EFFORT: INTERNAL TAXATION

A third feature of the overall stabilization effort has been a continuing improvement in the administration of internal taxes, as distinct from revenues from imports. There have been improvements in collections and revenues have increased substantially from 11 to 37 billion piastres in the last 4 years, but most of this increase is attributable to inflation. Much obviously still remains to be done. The Ministry of Finance is introducing improvements and striving for better performance. A 35-percent increase of 13 billion in revenues from internal taxes is expected in 1970.

STABILIZATION EFFORT: DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

A final feature of the overall stabilization effort has been the series of measures which the South Vietnamese have undertaken with our

help to encourage domestic production, to restrain imports, and check their reliance on foreign aid. Imports financed under AID's commercial import program include, in addition to essential consumer goods, basic raw materials and selected capital equipment to maintain and increase domestic production. Among the most important of these, as an example, has been fertilizer. It has been subsidized to induce farmers to use it, and during the last 3 years its importation and distribution have been transferred from less efficient bureaucratic hands to the private sector. The use has doubled in that time.

But Vietnamese policy actions have also been required to achieve domestic production increases. In 1967 and again in 1968 the Government of South Vietnam raised the price of rice, a politically difficult move, in order to provide incentives to farmers to grow more of it. These price incentives and—for the first time in history—the ready availability in markets throughout South Vietnam of agricultural inputs of all kinds, of fertilizer, pesticides, and pumps—combined to make possible in late 1967 a dramatic new program to increase rice production through the introduction of the now well-known miracle rice seeds from the Philippines. The ambitious goals the Vietnamese set for the rapid introduction of these miracle seeds, despite the substantially complicated cultivation procedures they require, are being met. Production of all kinds of rice for the current crop year is expected to be 5.1 million metric tons, the best since 1964, and the Vietnamese foresee self-sufficiency beginning in 1971.

RESULT OF STABILIZATION MEASURES

What has been the result of these stabilization measures?

The basic result has been to avoid the runaway inflation that was threatened and to slow the rate of price increases. From July 1966 to January 1970, a period of 3½ years, the average annual rate of increase in the cost of living in Saigon was held to 27 percent. That is a lot of inflation, but it is strikingly less than the 150 percent annual rate of increase which occurred in Korea in the comparable period from 1950 to 1953, bringing with it in that country and at that time not just austerity, but widespread suffering.

In contrast, there has been no hardship from purely economic causes for most South Vietnamese families since 1965. If anything, price inflation has probably been exceeded by an increase in average family real income, as the old economy of traditional underemployment—which was further depressed by heavy migration to the cities at the beginning of this period—to one of full employment with jobs for all employable members of a family. I cannot pretend that good statistics are kept on all these things, but it is clear, I think, that more South Vietnamese are gainfully employed than ever before; they have a more varied and nutritious diet, and they have access to a range of producer and consumer goods which have expanded their social and economic horizons.

From the foregoing you might conclude, Mr. Chairman, that we are overly content that efforts we made to maintain relative stability in Vietnam's economy have been successful. We are not. There have never been grounds for complacency in my time, at least, nor are there in the time ahead. Fighting inflation in wartime is like running a high-hurdles race; there is always a new obstacle just ahead. The economic impact of Vietnamization is the next hurdle.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF VIETNAMIZATION

Decisions taken in June 1969, setting higher South Vietnam force levels, made possible the beginning of the reduction of U.S. troop levels. But they called for a projected increase in the GVN defense budget of almost 40 billion piasters, nearly a doubling of the defense budget, and this immediately intensified inflationary pressures. As a corrective measure, in October 1969 the Government decreed heavy increases in import taxes on less essential goods. In 1970 these austerity taxes will nearly double revenues derived from imports by raising an additional 30 to 35 billion piasters, and in so doing will be a major factor in financing the initial costs of Vietnamization. But, they will not be enough. As American servicemen leave, South Vietnam's troop levels and its defense spending will necessarily continue to go up. The defense budget will grow further still as U.S. military base facilities, naval vessels, aircraft, and artillery are transferred to Vietnamese forces, introducing heavy new maintenance and operation costs to the budget.

We believe it is essential that the Vietnamese prepare to do as much as they can themselves to meet these rising costs of Vietnamization. They have been doing a great deal to cut least essential activities from their budget and to increase their tax collections; they can be expected to continue these efforts. And their success in reversing the decline in domestic production triggered by the war has already been remarkable, I think. But there should be renewed emphasis, despite the war, on the development of domestic production to begin to reduce the need for imports and for foreign aid in the time ahead. There are several opportunities to increase domestic output and some export potential as well, even in the relatively short run. Naturally, however, with 1.1 million men out of a population of some 17 million soon to be under arms—and I would interpose here, Mr. Chairman, that this is a defense force in the magnitude of 13 to 14 million people in American population terms—with such a force soon to be under arms and with the economy already in the condition of over-full employment, increases in domestic output and export expansion will come slowly.

A high level of U.S. economic assistance will be needed in the next few years to help finance the cost of Vietnamization. We have not yet determined the levels of assistance which will be required. When the conflict will end, how it will end, the rate at which U.S. forces will be withdrawn, the level of Vietnamese forces that need to be retained after the war, are all questions which have a bearing on these requirements and which we do not have answers to today.

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

Let me turn now to another facet of the AID program, our assistance to the South Vietnamese and their efforts to achieve rapid social change.

Colonialism established economic and social patterns inadequate to the needs of an independent Vietnam. The French left a limited range of social services, established to support and perpetuate their position as the occupying power. They left a French-oriented school system providing French education to children of the Vietnamese elite; health services largely limited to the capital and province towns,

administered by French or by French-trained Vietnamese; a system of government administration geared to a colonial society, staffed by Vietnamese trained more to control than to serve. These Government functions had three things in common: They were highly centralized, preserving authority in a few hands; they were static, drawing on the experience of the occupying power, without the potential for self-evaluation or constructive change, and they were intended to perpetuate the privileged position of the elite.

With independence, South Vietnam was hard-pressed to maintain even these limited kinds and levels of administration. Partition had denied it most of the nation's industrial base and much of its ability to school and train its manpower. Moreover, South Vietnam's leadership came to the task of nation-building with a sense of aspiration, perhaps, but with few clear goals, and it tended to think in terms of continued centralization, autocracy and privilege.

Yet, that leadership sought foreign technical assistance to help begin a process of evolutionary change. And in 1965, even as the war intensified, the nation's leaders consciously converted that process of evolutionary change to an attempt at social revolution. During a time of war, when government services are traditionally curtailed, the Government sought to create a system of universal free education. During a period when it was swamped by the problem of caring for refugees and the war injured, it nonetheless embarked on programs to develop a capacity to deliver health services to all Vietnamese. During a period of widespread insurgency when, on the evidence of history, the Government might have been expected further to centralize power, there was a restoration of constitutional authority and the delegation of governmental power to newly elected—not appointed—village officials.

During a period of budgetary deficit, the central Government chose to share with people in local communities control over national resources and the means to modify the environment in which they lived. All these efforts were undertaken as invasion and externally stimulated insurrection threatened the very existence of the nation.

I cannot, Mr. Chairman, in my opening statement, cover the full array of government services being developed in South Vietnam, so I will limit my comments to two key areas—education and land reform—and attempt to deal with other areas as you may wish later.

EDUCATION

Vietnam has adopted education as a vehicle of economic and social change, as a visible evidence of government responsiveness to public demand, and as a force for national unity. The full effort encompasses the training of teachers and the creation of a normal school system to accomplish that, the preparation and printing of Vietnamese textbooks, the revision of an old French curriculum to one based on the needs of today, and the construction of classrooms and schools. As a result, the number of children enrolled in primary school has risen since independence from about 400,000 to 2.3 million today—or nearly 82 percent of the primary school age population of the country. These are obviously not only the children of the elite.

This revolution in education has received the support and active participation of the population at large. Since 1966, some 2,000

Student-Parent Associations have been formed, with one-half million members. People in local communities are contributing their own resources—their money and labor—to the construction of additional classrooms. A threefold effort has been launched to further decentralize this national education. This effort is encompassed in a decision taken by the Ministry of Education last year to delegate to local communities administration of primary and secondary education, in efforts of the Government to revitalize the collection of local taxes by local communities, and in a delegation of authority for them to spend the revenues they collect, and finally, in the installation of a nationwide community school program involving participation by the school in the life of the community.

We realize that numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The system is numerically strong, but still qualitatively weak, inadequately staffed and struggling to handle its swelling tide of students. But it is also a system possessing a leadership capable of distinguishing between planning and dreaming, which has made a breakthrough in mass education that many countries at peace in the world are yet to begin. And it is a system already working on the next generation of problems—the problem of keeping children in school longer, of evolving a pattern of secondary education which matches the nation's needs for skills; of modifying the university system further to produce the engineers, agricultural scientists, and business administrators who still largely seek their training abroad.

The Vietnamese have, of course, received a great deal of help from us in realizing these accomplishments, but I would stress very much that the end product is wholly Vietnamese. The primary school system is now a matter of some 40,000 Vietnamese teachers instructing 2.3 million Vietnamese children in 32,000 Vietnamese classrooms, using 16 million Vietnamese textbooks.

AID once had 20 primary school advisers working with the Ministry of Education. Now there are two.

LAND REFORM

Another matter of great economic, social and political importance is land reform. The Government of Vietnam has given increasing attention in the last 2 years to long-standing programs intended to transfer the ownership of more of the nation's rice lands to those who till it. Of more recent vintage is President Thieu's revolutionary land-to-the-tiller bill, which would abolish tenancy completely in Vietnam. This bill has been passed by the Senate and will soon be sent to the President for confirmation and promulgation.

The current emphasis on land reform is a logical extension of policies which have been carried out—sometimes vigorously, sometimes not—over the past 17 years. Prior to independence, most of the land in agricultural production was owned by the French or the Vietnamese elite. The first significant reforms were taken by decrees in 1953 and 1955 to protect the security of tenants under rental contracts and to limit rents to 25 percent of the value of the crop. These regulations were difficult to administer and were not uniformly applied. But they had a good effect, strengthening the tenant in his relations with his landlord and generally lowering rents, which had been

in the range of 45 to 55 percent of crop values, to an average of about 35 percent.

Next, in 1956, the Government, by expropriation, reduced to 250 acres the amount of rice land which any individual could retain, and in 1958 it acquired the rice land holdings of French citizens. In total, the Government took ownership of about 1.7 million acres. By 1961, the program of redistributing the cultivable portion of these lands—which had gotten off to a reasonably good start in the fifties—fell prey to maladministration, deteriorating security, and the preoccupation of successive national leaders with political survival. The distribution of these lands became painfully slow; only 6,000 acres were distributed annually from 1962 to 1967.

Then, as security improved in 1968, the Government gave renewed priority to land reform. With some technical and financial assistance from AID, it revamped its administrative machinery. Procedures were simplified; purchase payments by cultivators were waived, and a nationwide freeze on occupancy and rents was decreed by the President. In the ensuing 2 years, a quarter of a million acres were distributed. Distribution of the approximately 185,000 remaining cultivable acres held by the Government is planned to be completed this year. These programs will have reduced the percentage of rice lands tilled by tenants from 77 percent in the mid-1950's to 58 percent at the end of this year.

However, the land-to-the-tiller bill just passed by the National Assembly calls for the redistribution of 3.2 million acres to at least 600,000 farm families comprising about 4 million of South Vietnam's 17 million people. When enacted into law and if successfully carried out, it may eliminate tenancy in South Vietnam within 5 years.

The foregoing is not to say that a social revolution, American-style, has been accomplished or even that the end result can be fully discerned. But the leadership of South Vietnam has begun and is pursuing a process of enlightened social change.

PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN POSTWAR PERIOD

Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly, last of all, about South Vietnam's longer-range prospects for development in the postwar period. Whatever the uncertainties about when the conflict will end and what kind of peace will follow, there are several constants in this longer-range equation.

The first constant is the constant of facilities. Vietnam will need to reconstruct damaged facilities and repair others which have deteriorated from lack of maintenance. Secondary roads and bridges, irrigation canals, and salt water intrusion barriers will need early attention.

The problems of inadequate public utilities and housing in urban centers whose populations have doubled since 1965 are becoming urgent and will be difficult. Difficult, also, will be the traditional dislocations in the transition to peace, particularly the problem of unemployment.

On the other hand, South Vietnam is generously endowed with natural resources. The fertility of the rich delta soil is unsurpassed in Southeast Asia. Double cropping and extensive crop diversification practices are already under way and can be steadily extended when

peace comes. The forests in the highlands are largely unexploited and offer excellent prospects for timber and processed wood production. Rubber, once Vietnam's leading export, could rather quickly, we believe, regain a position of importance. Fisheries offer another area of a known but as yet virtually untapped resource. I have already mentioned rice, which is approaching self-sufficiency in 1971 and may again become a significant export. These are only a few. The whole gamut of potential Vietnamese exports in the 1970's is really very favorable. A study completed for AID just last December by David Lilienthal's Development & Resources Corp. suggests potential export earnings in 1980 could be as high as $425 million compared to the meager $15 million in 1969, or prewar peak earnings of $84 million in 1961. And exports should be just the "top of the development iceberg," supported by more extensive domestic production substituting for many of today's imports and answering domestic consumption needs.

Moreover, South Vietnam will possess many excellent infrastructure assets for a country of her size and at her stage of development. First-class seaports, airports, warehousing facilities, and excellent major road arteries will be in place and in use.

And South Vietnam will inherit from the war years, also, a large reservoir of literate manpower, trained to comparatively high levels in diverse military-civilian technical and management skills.

Finally, the GVN is trying to put its planning house in order. The President of South Vietnam last fall appointed a Special Assistant for National Planning, who is now working up relatively short-term development projects. And the Vietnamese and we have already looked further ahead to a period when it will be possible to engage in projects of broader economic development. The committee has been furnished copies of the three-volume study of March 1969, entitled "The Postwar Development of the Republic of Vietnam: Policies and Programs," prepared jointly by a group of Vietnamese Government and private American experts, which I would be pleased to discuss later, if the Committee wishes.

FOREIGN AID REQUIRED FOR POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT EFFORT

Foreign aid will be required by the Vietnamese in their longer range development effort.

I must not give you the impression, however, that only American help should or will be sought. The Vietnamese and we are in frequent consultation with the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the several technical assistance agencies of the United Nations, the Japanese and other governments about development and investment opportunities. We are very much encouraged by the interest others have shown recently in playing a role in the development of Vietnam when peace comes.

From a purely economic point of view, this should be an exciting decade for South Vietnam. Given a chance at peace, it could, I believe, be the transitional decade in which South Vietnam could attain a state of self-sustaining growth without the need for continuing, consessional aid thereafter.

PRESENT U.S. ECONOMIC ROLE IN VIETNAM

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I conceive of the U.S. economic role in Vietnam today not only as one of assistance to Vietnam to carry the burdens of a costly military conflict, but, simultaneously, to help Vietnam plan for economic self-sufficiency.

Mr. Chairman, there are many things about our aid to South Vietnam I have not mentioned. I have tried to spare you a too-long recital of facts and figures and confine myself to the main purposes and elements of the Vietnamese efforts we assist, in the expectation that members of the committee will have many specific questions, and I the opportunity to respond to them.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I am very appreciative for having had the opportunity to make it.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Tell me, Mr. MacDonald, how long have you been in the AID organization?

Mr. MacDonald. I joined it in 1952, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. How long have you been in Vietnam?

Mr. MacDonald. 1966, the late summer of 1966.

The Chairman. Where were you prior to that?

Mr. MacDonald. I served a very short tour in Nigeria, where I had been assigned, expecting to stay for several years, and then was asked to come to Vietnam.

Prior to that time, sir, I served as the AID Chief in Pakistan. I was in Pakistan about 4 years.

The Chairman. You have been approximately 4 years in Vietnam. Where are you from in the United States, Mr. MacDonald?

Mr. MacDonald. I am a resident of the State of Vermont.

The Chairman. That is a coincidence. [Laughter.]

Senator Aiken. Now be careful.

The Chairman. I did not know you had been so successful in staffing the agency. [Laughter.]

U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

Mr. MacDonald, since you have been there 4 years, I wonder if you could tell me what do you think is the purpose of the U.S. efforts in Vietnam? What is the ultimate objective? Why are we there?

Mr. MacDonald. Well, in pursuit, Mr. Chairman, of national interests.

The Chairman. Whose national interests?

Mr. MacDonald. In pursuit of what the Administration conceives to be American national interest.

A shorter and more direct answer to your question is that in 1965, the beginning of the period that I am discussing, our great effort was to attempt to help the South Vietnamese avert defeat which seemed——

The Chairman. To do what?

Mr. MacDonald. To avert defeat in 1965 and 1966.

The Chairman. Defeat by whom?

Mr. MacDonald. By their enemies, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Who are their enemies?

Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, the North Vietnamese and those within South Vietnam externally stimulated by the North Vietnamese are their enemies.

The Chairman. I did not anticipate your going back to 1955, but were there substantial numbers of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam in 1955?

Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, my reference was not 1955.

The Chairman. You said 1955.

Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I said 1965. I am sorry.

The Chairman. You do not have to lean over. Pull the microphones closer to you and it will be much easier to hear you. Both of them are movable and it will make it much easier for you to speak into the microphone.

This story you give of what you are doing there is, of course, a very appealing one. I still do not quite understand why my constituents have a vital interest in what happens in Vietnam. I wondered if you could enlighten me a little because they ask me all the time in letters and I find it very difficult to justify the taxes that they pay to support the Vietnam AID program. I wondered if you could give me an idea of what you would say to a farmer in the Ozarks as to his great interest in what takes place in Saigon.

Would you help me on that?

Mr. MacDonald. Well, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would recall that I am the Director of the U.S. economic and technical assistance program in Vietnam.

The Chairman. Correct.

Mr. MacDonald. This is my responsibility. It is also my competence and I am prepared to provide you all the information that I possibly can on that.

I would respectfully suggest, sir, that the questions that you are addressing to me are of a political nature that are not in my field of competence or responsibility.

The Chairman. That is a perfectly valid answer and I accept it.

I do not think it is in my competence either. I do not know of anyone who has been here who could explain it satisfactorily to me, but I thought you might give it a try. You have been there 4 years. You have observed it and you are better prepared than most of them.

AMOUNT OF FISCAL YEAR 1970 AID PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Coming to your statement, you say this statement is to give us what was within your competence. I do not believe you gave in your statement the amounts involved in the current fiscal year in the AID program in Vietnam. Is it in your statement?

It seems to me you carefully, or at least inadvertently, avoided giving any figures about our current amounts.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes. As I said in my conclusion, I said I had hoped to spare you too full a recital of facts and figures. I have these figures.

The Chairman. I wish you would give them. You might suspect that we would be interested in the amounts. Nearly all legislators are.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir.

I have come fully prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered why you avoided that in any of your statements. There are no amounts about the current or past year. Would you read them now?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

The amounts that we estimate for the current fiscal year of 1970 broken down by——

The CHAIRMAN. What is the total?

Mr. MACDONALD. The total is $498.5 million, excluding an allocation to my mission of about $1 million from agency-wide administrative appropriations.

The CHAIRMAN. $498 million in economic assistance. That has nothing to do with military assistance?

Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that include Pulbic Law 480?

Mr. MACDONALD. That includes Public Law 480.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if you wish to break it down, into what is it broken down?

Mr. MACDONALD. The AID portion of that total figure is $352 million. I can break that further, Mr. Chairman. There is $132 million devoted to project activities of the sort that I referred to in my discussion of technical assistance in such fields as education and land reform, and an additional $220 million to finance the commercial import program that I cited in my statement as a major tool in the anti-inflation and budget revenue generation effort, for a total of $352 million under AID.

Under Public Law 480, there is $107.1 million for title I commodities which, as you know, are sold within the commercial community of the country, and another $39.4 million of title II commodities which are not sold but granted to needy people in South Vietnam.

It is a grand total of $498.5 million.

SPENDING BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. You say in your statement that the "spending by United States and other free world forces grew," but you do not give the levels.

What was the level of spending by United States and other free world forces? What are the free world forces you are thinking of?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I do not have every year at my fingertips, but this year our expectation is that U.S. spending will be $354 million, and if my memory is clear, about $45 million of these purchases will go for personal piaster purchases, and the remaining $309 million will go for official requirements to service American-based facilities, and things of that sort, $354 million this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are the other free world forces? I did not follow that.

Mr. MACDONALD. The allied countries who have forces fighting.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean the Koreans?

Mr. MACDONALD. I mean the Australians and the——

The CHAIRMAN. There are very few Australians. The Koreans are the only substantial force in numbers; are they not?

Mr. MACDONALD. They are the largest.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that whom you mean?

Mr. MacDonald. I mean all the allied forces who are there, the Koreans and the Australians and others.

The Chairman. You are counting this as the money they are spending, but all the money they are spending we are furnishing them; are we not?

Mr. MacDonald. Not all, Mr. Chairman, not all. Not the Australians.

The Chairman. No, not the Australians. Are we not furnishing the Koreans their expenses?

Mr. MacDonald. I have no competence in that.

The Chairman. OK.

Mr. MacDonald. I think that is a military question. I do not know the arrangements.

U.S. AGREEMENT CONCERNING KOREAN TROOPS IN VIETNAM

The Chairman. We have had evidence. I thought I would like to put it in here. We made an agreement with the Koreans to transport them to Vietnam, feed them and pay them.

I thought you knew that. The famous Brown letter has been widely publicized, but it is not directly your responsibility.

EXCHANGE RATE OF PIASTER

With regard to monetary reform you say in your statement that the piaster was devalued in 1966 to a rate of 118, and today the black market rate you said is 386.

Mr. MacDonald. I said 356 last week.

The Chairman. 356. Do you think there should be a further devaluation?

Mr. MacDonald. Well, the exchange rate is not a terribly complicated thing, but it is not quite that simple.

As a practical matter, the Government of South Vietnam has what can only be described as a multiple exchange rate system. There is not a single exchange rate against which all imports come into the country.

For instance, in my opening statement I made mention of the emphasis that we gave to the importation of fertilizer, and I think I added that it was subsidized to induce farmers to use it. Fertilizer enters the economy at the very, very low rate of 80 piasters to 1 dollar. That is even lower than the 118 which is legally the official rate.

I might as an aside say that the 80-to-1 rate is probably a little too low.

The other end of the spectrum, Mr. Chairman, will take you all the way to, for a car for instance, something on the order of 1,005 to 1,010 piasters to 1 dollar. They have a series of customs and austerity taxes which are applied over and above the basic 118 rate, so there is in effect a multiple system.

FISCAL YEAR 1970 ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM IS A GRANT

The Chairman. Before I move away from it, the $498 million is not loans; that is a grant?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, all these figures, sir, that I have given so far are grants.

In an earlier time there were a few dollar loans made.

PAYMENT FOR IMPORTS

The Chairman. Is the United States paid in piasters for the imports at all?

Mr. MacDonald. Not for AID; but Public Law 480 title I foods are sold by the United States to South Vietnam for piasters, 20 percent of which are returned for U.S. uses.

The Chairman. When you ship in televisions, are you paid for them or are they given to the people or the recipients?

Mr. MacDonald. AID does not finance TV sets in its commercial import program. All of the goods which enter Vietnam under import programs enter through normal commercial channels under business-like procedures.

The Chairman. Do they pay at the official rate?

Mr. MacDonald. They pay at whatever the effective rate is for the article. As I have indicated to you the farmer will pay but 80 piasters for——

The Chairman. It is a variable rate; there is no definite rate.

Mr. MacDonald. There is an official basic rate of 118 per dollar.

The Chairman. What is the significance of that if it is not used in imports?

Mr. MacDonald. It is a base from which one can depart to subsidize a particular commodity which it is important to make available for widespread use, or to restrict the importation of other goods by putting on very high austerity taxes.

1971 BUDGET REQUEST

The Chairman. What is the estimate of next year's budget? What is next year's budget request?

Mr. MacDonald. 1971 has not yet been finally determined, Mr. Chairman. I believe that my superior, Dr. Hannah, is scheduled to make an appearance, if not tomorrow, early next week before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Decisions have not yet been made as to the levels that will be sought.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP FINANCE VIETNAMIZATION

The Chairman. You say in your statement that "a high level of U.S. economic assistance will be needed in the next few years to help finance the cost of Vietnamization." What is your estimate of that?

Mr. MacDonald. Well, as I indicated, Mr. Chairman, it is not really possible to provide a single estimate. I need a whole series of givens in the first instance. I need to know the rate of U.S. force withdrawal to calculate the effect that that will have on foreign exchange earnings of South Vietnam. I would need to know the intentions of the enemy and what that implies for the size of South Vietnamese force levels in the years ahead.

These are unanswerable questions, Mr. Chairman. I am not avoiding your question. If I were given a series of hypothetical assumptions, I and my staff could come up with estimates.

The CHAIRMAN. I based the question on only your own statement. I thought you had some idea of which that high level would be. It is quite all right if you haven't made such an estimate.

AMOUNT OF U.S. AID TO EDUCATION

You talk about the help to education. You say the Vietnamese have received educational help. What amount have they received for education?

Mr. MACDONALD. The dollar amount of our assistance, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MACDONALD. If you will give us a moment I think we can probably supply that or would you prefer that we supply it for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, supply it for the record if you don't have it.

(The information referred to follows:)

A.I.D. EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM

The total AID dollar obligations for assistance to South Vietnam in the field of education from fiscal year 1954 through fiscal year 1970 are $62.2 million.

FINANCING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give an estimate of the percentage of the Vietnamese national budget derived directly or indirectly from U.S. assistance or U.S. military spending?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. Let's see, it is something in excess of 50 percent. 53.4 or 53.6 percent of the total piaster budget of the Government of Vietnam is supported by American aid, whether that be defined as direct economic aid or as indirect economic aid, about 53 percent, sir.

If you would like a discussion on this point, I would be pleased to carry it further. I even have a chart.

Let me answer you by giving you the figures in this way: The way in which the 1969 budget was financed, if you will permit me to deal with 1969 rather than 1970—I was reading the Wall Street Journal a couple of weeks ago with an editorial to the effect that projections of U.S. inflationary estimates are like snowflakes, they melt before they hit the ground—I would be more comfortable with the firmer 1969 figures.

There are five sources of funding of the South Vietnamese budget. The first is counterpart with which you are familier, I know, and also local currency——

The CHAIRMAN. Describe it. Counterpart are the funds generated by our imports; is that right?

Mr. MACDONALD. In part. It is only in part the piaster generated——

The CHAIRMAN. As a practical matter it is no different from a direct grant; is it? They are not going to repay any of it.

Mr. MACDONALD. This is very clearly an American contribution to the budget.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I wanted to say.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. Counterpart.

The CHAIRMAN. Counterpart is a word generated years ago and it has a kind of a mystical feeling. It has a disguise so that people won't understand how much we are throwing away.

Mr. MACDONALD. Let me explain it. When a dollar's worth of AID-financed commodities are imported into South Vietnam, counterpart to the extent of 118 piasters to a dollar are generated and put into a special counterpart account of the Government of Vietnam for their use with the concurrence of the United States. That is the first category of sources of budgetary funds.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about one-third of the going black market rate; isn't it?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. About one-third.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. I will come to the austerity taxes which will get the proceeds up to a level commensurate with the so-called black market rate.

In addition to counterpart there is also, Mr. Chairman, the local currency sales proceeds of Public Law 480 commodities, which come in at the same rate of 118 piasters to the dollar.

The second category of funds available for financing the Vietnamese budget are customs duties on commercial imports financed by U.S. aid, duties over and above the 118 piasters which are extracted and put into the counterpart fund.

The CHAIRMAN. Who pays the customs duty?

Mr. MACDONALD. The importer who imports the goods. As I have said, in the case of a car, which we do not finance under the AID program, the customs duties would bring the rate to 1,000 piasters or something in that magnitude.

The third source of financing for the budget is customs on GVN financed imports, imports which they bring in with dollars from their own treasury.

The fourth is the generation of tax revenues from income taxes, direct taxes, excise taxes, the receipts of government agencies, such as the post office, these sorts of things.

The fifth, Mr. Chairman, is deficit financing to finance budget activities. This is in a very real sense a direct taxation of the people of Vietnam because it redeploys resources within the economy; it reduces their consumption of resources.

I would like, if you are interested, to show you a chart which lays this all out, I think it does it——

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is enough. I don't believe we need a chart.

AID PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: PERSONNEL AND PAYMENT

I wonder, Mr. MacDonald, how many people are employed in the aid programs in Vietnam, direct hire, contract, and foreign nationals. Don't you have that available?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have it here, but there are so many pages I can't count them up. There are 10 pages in this booklet. I have not counted the numbers.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, let me give you the total at the outset and remind you in doing so that I am not talking just of Americans but of Vietnamese and other nationals as well.

Our employment peaked last June at 10,272, including all categories. Now, of those——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they all on your own payroll? Those are not contract or do they include contract?

Mr. MACDONALD. This is the universe: Vietnamese, American, third country nationals, direct hire, contract employees, personal service contracts, and employees of contractors whom we engage.

We had at that time 2,183 direct hire Americans of that 10,000 total.

The CHAIRMAN. In South Vietnam.

Mr. MACDONALD. In South Vietnam. Plus 787 contract employees. In addition to that the Americans——

The CHAIRMAN. Could I clarify one point? Is the upkeep of these people included in the figure of $498 million or is that in addition to that as a cost of the Vietnam program?

Mr. MACDONALD. The $498 million figure that I gave you, sir, is a dollar figure, and it includes all of the dollar expenditures which we make.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the pay and support of all these people.

Mr. MACDONALD. Including the dollar portion of pay for these people.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, is your salary paid out of that——

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes; if you include the administrative allotment I referred to at the outset.

The CHAIRMAN. Out of that aid?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes; the only salaries not paid out of those dollars are the salaries of people who receive piasters, the Vietnamese. We have arrangements with the South Vietnamese Government under which we use counterpart funds to pay our local staff.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in addition to the $498 million.

Mr. MACDONALD. No. It is this year's manifestation of last year's dollar input which generated those piasters. It is not additive, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you expect to have a year from now? Do you have an estimate of that in personnel?

Mr. MACDONALD. Let's see, now, we are going down and we will be down in June of this year, a year since the high of 10,272, to about 9,410. I would expect, Mr. Chairman, that it would continue to drift down over the next 2 or 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. The pacification program is quite apart from the aid program; isn't it?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir. One of my responsibilities is to provide the dollar, piaster, and staff resources that Ambassador Colby requires to conduct his several programs in the pacification field. These are gross figures for AID including the support we give Ambassador Colby's program.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is that?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, let's see, I have a breakdown. Do you want personnel figures?

BREAKDOWN OF CORDS/AID PERSONNEL AND FUNDING

The CHAIRMAN. I want the personnel figures and the amounts in dollars to see how it breaks down between your and Ambassador Colby's operations.

Mr. MACDONALD. Somewhat less than half of the American personnel are provided to Ambassador Colby.

The CHAIRMAN. About a thousand?

Mr. MACDONALD. About that, sir. Also roughly 90 percent of the counterpart budget that we Americans support in our project operations is turned over to pacification programs under Ambassador Colby's purview. On a dollar basis a relatively small amount goes to CORDS. The great bulk of the dollar amount, of course, goes into our commercial import program, the Public Law 480 program and other nonpacification projects. Mr. Chairman, I can submit this for the record in full detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate roughly without the details? I mean there is a substantial part of it and I thought you could indicate in round numbers about what it is.

Mr. MACDONALD. I would like to submit the exact figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you can do both. That is right. Indicate roughly what this is and then correct it for the record so we will have it exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the cost of what you contribute to the CORDS program?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, you will recall my saying that within the $352 million that AID proposes to spend in 1970, $132 million of it would be spent on projects. Of that $132 million, roughly $46 million will be administered by agencies to which Ambassador Colby is accredited. The remainder will be spent by other agencies of the Vietnam Government to which I am accredited.

(The information referred to follows:)

USAID/CORDS BREAKDOWN

1. *Personnel.*—As of January 31, 1970, the breakdown of A.I.D.-funded American personnel was as follows:

	Direct hire	Contract	Total
USAID, in Vietnam	943	413	1,356
CORDS, in Vietnam	799	332	1,131
In training and processing (USAID and CORDS)	170		170
Total	1,912	745	2,657

2. *Funding.*—Estimated A.I.D. dollar obligations for the FY 1970 project program are broken down as follows:

	Millions
USAID	$85.9
CORDS	46.1
Total	132.0

The CHAIRMAN. Do you supply any cover or money to the CIA?

Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I have been instructed to say that all comment on such questions must be made in executive session and by other appropriate officials than myself, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

AID PAYROLL AND ALLOWANCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

What is the total cost of AID's payroll, including allowances, in Vietnam?

Mr. MacDonald. I can supply that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Could you indicate it roughly? Is it in the neighborhood of a hundred million or 50 million?

Mr. MacDonald. I can't at the moment, but I can supply it. We believe it is in the range of $50 million in 1970.

The Chairman. $50 million. The Senator from Tennessee wishes to ask questions and I yield.

(The information referred to follows:)

A.I.D. fiscal year 1970 direct hire personnel costs for USAID/Vietnam and CORDS are estimated at $56.9 million.

U.S. AID TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator Gore. Since I have another committee to which I must go, I found considerable interest in your statement with respect to the aid to education. How much money has the United States contributed to aid education in Vietnam in the past decade?

Mr. MacDonald. I can furnish that information for the record, Senator Gore.

Senator Gore. What were the expenditures last year for education?

Mr. MacDonald. Let me describe to you the componentry of expenditures by AID in such a field as education. Primarily we are talking of technical assistance which we provide to the Vietnamese in their efforts to modernize their educational system. This entails the recruitment of professionally qualified Americans to work with the Ministry of Education.

Senator Gore. I know what it is. I am trying to find out.

Mr. MacDonald. And at our peak, we had about 29. The total cost of aid for education from 1954 to 1970 was $62.2 million, Senator.

Senator Gore. Aid to education.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes.

Senator Gore. Is this an inclusive figure?

Mr. MacDonald. Is this what, sir?

Senator Gore. Is this an inclusive figure?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it is a gross figure of all costs to AID.

Senator Gore. That provides classroom aid, supplement to teachers' salaries, textbooks.

Mr. MacDonald. This is the dollar figure, Senator Gore. The salaries of our advisers who have worked with the Ministry of Education, the cost of certain imports such as cement and reinforcing steel with which schools are built, the costs of contractors' services who work with the Vietnamese in the development of a modern instructional materials center—things of this sort. These are dollar costs, Senator Gore.

QUALITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE EDUCATION

Senator Gore. Do you have an evaluation of the quality of education of the Saigon schools?

Mr. MacDonald. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we know that numbers don't tell the full story. The quality of primary

education in South Vietnam is not good by modern standards. It is steadily improving.

Senator GORE. How does it compare with the District of Columbia standards?

Mr. MACDONALD. I am not currently familiar with the District of Columbia standards, Senator, but in rough comparison I suggest to you that in level and quality, primary education in Vietnam today is something on a par with standards of 1890 to 1910 in our country where, typically, there was a small one-room schoolhouse, filled mostly by children in the primary grades, and taught by a young girl who perhaps the previous September had been a student at that school and then had been given brief training to become a teacher.

There is a very aggressive program being carried out by the Vietnamese, now that they have met their quantitative goals, to improve the quality of education.

I mentioned there were some 40,000 elementary school teachers. About 26,000 of these are 90-day wonders, to use the parlance of World War II military training in our country, or others who are less than fully qualified teachers. The remainder are graduates of 2-year normal school courses. Over the next 7 years, I think it is, Vietnam will be producing a sufficient number of graduates from the normal schools to place a fully qualified elementary school teacher in every classroom in the country.

Senator GORE. Some member of our audience sent me up a note that he lived in the District of Columbia and had to spend 15 percent of his annual income to send his children to a private school because of the inadequacy of the public schools in the District of Columbia, which suffer a lack of funds. I draw no parallel. I merely say we need funds for education everywhere.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PERCENTAGE OF AID PERSONNEL ABROAD IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MacDonald, what percentage of the total AID personnel abroad are in Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. I will have to confirm the estimate I will give you for the record later but I believe it is on the order of 40 percent. I am speaking, sir, of direct hire professional people.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you now talking of the Americans or everyone?

Mr. MACDONALD. Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't include in other words the 10,272. You are only talking about the 2,183.

Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct; yes, sir. I have no knowledge off hand——

The CHAIRMAN. You think that 2,183 is approximately one-third of all Americans abroad in the AID organization?

Mr. MACDONALD. Direct-hire Americans abroad, yes. This is my estimate and I must have the opportunity to correct it.

(The information referred to follows:)

PERCENTAGE OF AID PERSONNEL ABROAD IN VIETNAM

The exact figure is 40.3 percent as of June 30, 1969.

IMPORTANCE OF QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. You see this is the sort of thing, Mr. MacDonald, that prompted my question. I respect your right to say that it is not your concern and you have no competence to give a reason why we are in Vietnam but when we have to be concerned not only with Vietnam, as you are, but with Arkansas and Tennessee and the United States, and Latin America and other places, whether or not what we are doing there is justified is a very important question. You take a third of the total AID personnel in the whole world in this little country of 16, 18 million people. This is why the question recurs, even though you don't wish to comment on it, as to whether or not this effort is justified at all. You are very fortunate in not having to bother about that. If you can accept it and go along and do the best you can, it is all right. I don't criticize you for it because obviously you didn't make the decision to go in there, but you can see how it is a very important question to those of us who do have a responsibility for other areas than Vietnam, and especially our own areas in our own country.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is bothering me and a number of others is that we are destroying our own country in order to go off after this will-o-the-wisp 10,000 miles away and it has no real relevance to our own country, our children, or our own lives. It is very difficult to find anyone, you see, who will take this responsibility other than the President of the United States. The military people have no responsibility because they only have military responsibilities. Yet I suspect very strongly that the military reports, your reports, Mr. Colby's reports, all of them, converge to influence the President's view because all of these reports, just as yours is, are quite optimistic about the success of your individual operations. This is not any criticism of you. I am quite sure you believe what you have said about the success of your program. We have heard for, I guess, at least 6 or 8 years how remarkably successful the land program is. It always is about to come to fruition and everyone is going to have his own garden. It never quite reaches that point, but it is about to and it's been about to do that for 10 or 12 years. I don't criticize you. I am quite sure you believe it will, but his does raise very serious problems. The purpose of these hearings is simply to emphasize just how deeply bogged down we are in Vietnam and whether or not it is in the national interest to continue it.

PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF DIRECT-HIRE EMPLOYEE

How much does the average direct-hire employee receive in pay and allowances in Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. We have that, sir.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. In order to save time your aides may interject. It isn't so formal that you have to answer it all. Your assistants are quite free to give answers in order to save time.

Mr. MACDONALD. The average wage would be somewhere within the range of $28,000 to $34,000 total average cost.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the highest?

Mr. MACDONALD. $67,000 at the highest and $16,000 a the lowest.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you get $67,000 dollars a year?

Mr. MacDonald. No, sir; I suspect that perhaps the Government spends that much maintaining me there, but that is not my salary.

The Chairman. What is your salary?

Mr. MacDonald. $38,000.

The Chairman. And the difference between that and $67,000 what—your perquisites?

Mr. MacDonald. Perquisites are housing and transportation of the few sticks of furniture I took with me.

The Chairman. Do they furnish you with a house?

Mr. MacDonald. I have a house; yes.

The Chairman. They pay the rent on it?

Mr. MacDonald. My house happens to be owned by U.S. AID.

The Chairman. They bought it?

Mr. MacDonald. It is one of the few cases in which that is so. We bought it back, I think, in 1953.

EARLY U.S. AID PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Chairman. I didn't know we had a presence there in 1953.

Mr. MacDonald. There was an AID mission to——

The Chairman. In 1953?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir; in 1953, there was an AID presence. I believe it started in 1952, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The aid to the French?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes.

The Chairman. Under the Truman regime, there was an aid program. I think we gave them about $2 billion in trying to retain control of Vietnam.

FORMER ALLEGIANCES OF WITNESS' SOUTH VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATES

As a matter of fact, most of these government people that you associate with fought for the French; didn't they?

Mr. MacDonald. I do not know that to be the case.

The Chairman. You don't know that?

Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman——

The Chairman. You don't know Mr. Ky was an aviator for the French?

Mr. MacDonald. You said most of the people with whom I deal, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure that is the case. I know many who were on the other side during the earlier years. One of my counterparts, a man with whom I deal perhaps more than any other, the Minister of Economy, was a Viet Minh in those early years. He is a man of great courage and competence.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE REACTION TO CASE OF TRAN NGOC CHAU

The Chairman. Did you ever meet Mr. Chau who has recently been imprisoned?

Mr. MacDonald. I have never met Mr. Chau.

The Chairman. Do you know about him?

Mr. MacDonald. I know of the case; yes.

The Chairman. Did that case attract any interest in Vietnam?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it did.

The CHAIRMAN. It did?

Mr. MACDONALD. It did, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it favorable to the regime?

Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I am not able, I am afraid——

The CHAIRMAN. You don't wish to answer that. That is the safest answer.

Mr. MACDONALD (continuing). To improve your knowledge or understanding of the case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the safest answer, all right. I think you are quite wise in not commenting. I wanted to see what you thought.

SALARY DIFFERENTIAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

How much salary differential do U.S. personnel get for serving in Vietnam as against another country?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, let's see, the same as they do for serving in Nepal and half a dozen other places, a 25-percent differential.

The CHAIRMAN. As opposed to Washington—over Washington.

Mr. MACDONALD. Pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Over Washington or over, say——

Mr. MACDONALD. Over the basic salary, 25 percent of one's basic salary.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE INCOME TAXES

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned income taxes. Do they have an effective income tax system? Do they have an income tax system?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, the income tax rates imposed under the Vietnamese system are in some cases stiffer than those called for in the United States. They don't have as good a record of collections obviously as we do here. I think you will recall, Senator, that Vietnam after all is a country in a relatively underdeveloped stage and it faces all sorts of difficulties in the collection of its taxes.

In the first place the pattern of business there is markedly different from what it is in the United States. Private businesses are very small businesses there. For the most part they are family owned. Most of the transactions in the commercial community are made in cash. Many businesses literally do not keep books, not so much to avoid the payment of taxes as that they haven't traditionally required them.

Vietnam has had additional difficulties in the administration of its tax system during the war. Mobilization has taken many of the staff of the Director of Taxation in Saigon and the provincial tax agencies. The fighting in the countryside has made it difficult and in some cases literally impossible to collect taxes in the less secure areas.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of the budget comes from income taxes?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well——

The CHAIRMAN. Ten or 20 percent?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, let's see. Mr. Sharpe would have it. About 20 percent of all domestic tax revenues are income tax revenues.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty percent of domestic tax revenues. Does that include 20 percent of the revenues derived from customs, import taxes?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, no, purely domestic. Only those that can be reasonably attributed to Vietnamese resources.

The CHAIRMAN. That is less than 50 percent of the budget.

Mr. MacDonald. Yes.

The Chairman. It would be in the neighborhood of 10 percent, I guess, of the total budget; would it not?

Mr. MacDonald. Well, let's see, only 4 percent, actually, of the total budget comes from income taxes. The remaining 44 percent, roughly, of the total budget borne by the Vietnamese is made up of other revenue—indirect taxes, government receipts for services, and deficit financing, which is a form of taxation.

The Chairman. Four percent. You said it is much higher than in America. What would a man with a $50,000 income pay in income tax, assuming he paid his tax?

Mr. MacDonald. We have a schedule on this, a comparative schedule, Mr. Chairman. Here I have it. A single individual who is earning 50,000 U.S. dollars in the U.S. system would pay, what, $23,700. A Vietnamese would pay $23,200. But a married man with two children would pay $22,650 in Vietnam; in the United States he would pay $16,900.

The Chairman. What percentage of those earning $50,000 pay any income taxes?

Mr. MacDonald. Pay; what percentage?

The Chairman. Yes; do you have any way of knowing that?

Mr. MacDonald. No, we do not really know that. We can furnish you the numbers of people actually paying income taxes.

The Chairman. It would be interesting. What is that number?

Mr. MacDonald. I don't have it here.

The Chairman. Can you furnish it?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes, I can for the record.

The Chairman. It would be very interesting.

(The information referred to follows:)

1969 Payment of Income Taxes in South Vietnam

In 1969 a total of 169,000 corporations, businesses, and individuals filed income tax returns or had income taxes withheld from their salaries.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. ECONOMIC AID BUDGET

The Chairman. Did I ask you what percentage of the total economic aid budget goes to Vietnam?

Mr. MacDonald. The worldwide aid?

The Chairman. Yes, the economic aid budget.

Mr. MacDonald. No, you did not. I don't have that figure but I can have it furnished for the record.

The Chairman. If one of your assistants knows that, what is it?

Mr. Ellis. We do not, sir.

The Chairman. It isn't difficult. You said it is $498 million and all you need to know is your total for 1970. The $498 million is what percentage of your total? Is it a billion, a billion and a half?

Mr. MacDonald. I think it is $1,600 million worldwide when you deduct military assistance, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I meant economic. It is not too hard to figure that out. I have forgotten what your aid figure was.

(The information referred to follows:)

AID PROGRAM IN VIETNAM: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL

The AID-funded program in Vietnam of $352 million in fiscal year 1970 represents 19 percent of total AID programs worldwide. The worldwide total, $1,878 million, includes use of estimated carryover and recoveries from prior years in addition to new fiscal year 1970 appropriations.

PUBLICATION OF "VIETNAM, THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a booklet. It is a rather unusual way of publishing it, but it is an AID booklet. Are you familiar with "Vietnam, the View Beyond the Battle"?

Mr. MACDONALD. That is a booklet of 1966 vintage, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff says 1967. Why do you print it without any attribution or any date? Is that deliberate?

Mr. MACDONALD. I could not tell you that. I believe I saw that when I first came on the job, Mr. Chairman. I haven't seen it since.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't seen it since. It is a slick paper job, a very good looking job.

Mr. MACDONALD. Not produced by my mission. It is a pamphlet put out in Washington here.

The CHAIRMAN. A staff member who was recently in Vietnam brought this back. He told me it was an AID publication and he thinks it was published in 1967. It is rather strange that there is no attribution and no indication of when it was published.

Mr. MACDONALD. To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, it was not published by the AID mission in Vietnam. I can ascertain for you when it was and where it was published. It might be an AID publication; I assume it is an AID publication.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all about AID. I can't imagine anyone else publishing it.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, the U.S. Information Agency does have certain responsibilities for publicizing these programs abroad. I am not suggesting that that is a USIA document, but it may be. It is only that I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. For some reason the staff member thinks it was put out in 1967 although there is nothing to indicate that.

Mr. MACDONALD. I am at a disadvantage, sir. I don't have the document and there seems to be some question of how to identify it.

(The following information was subsequently supplied by AID:)

PUBLICATION OF BROCHUPE, "VIETNAM, THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"

The Brochure: Vietnam, the View Beyond the Battle was published at USIA Regional Service Center, Manila, in March 1967 at the request of USAID/Vietnam. It was funded from JUSPAO Vietnam impression account. In total, some 100,000 copies were published in Vietnamese and 68,500 copies were published in English.

The CHAIRMAN. It says, "More men were coming and more American expenditures." It doesn't even have a page number; I didn't know that but anyway——

Mr. MACDONALD. I also provided your staff member, I think, a copy of the report I put out about the AID operation in Vietnam. I think it bears a date.

PROPORTION OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED BY SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This doesn't; I don't know why. It says, "During 1966, Vietnam had passed India as the foremost recipient among 82 nations receiving U.S. economic aid." Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not have in mind the AID figures for India, Mr. Chairman. May I go back for a moment? You asked me to estimate the proportion of total U.S. economic aid around the world with reference to the $498 million in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MACDONALD. I cited to you my recollection about the total amount being available as would be $1.6 billion. I would recall that the $498 million that we were earlier talking about includes Public Law 480 in it; $1.6 billion does not include Public Law 480 and there are a series of other items.

The CHAIRMAN. Leaving out the Public Law 480, how does it break down?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, $352 million is the AID portion against $1.6 billion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the figure I wanted in the record.

Mr. MACDONALD. There are, I believe, however, other addons to the $1.6 and I will ascertain what they are and supply them for the record. I believe the Congress in the last session, Mr. Chairman, authorized the President to return payments on principal and interest, if my recollection is correct, on loans made in prior years for use in the AID program. So I think it is a higher total figure and, therefore, a lesser percentage that Vietnam commands.

PROPORTION OF U.S. AID RECEIVED BY SOUTH VIETNAM AND INDIA

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this was a very interesting statement. I wish you would comment on this if you will, not now but for the record, because I have never seen before that Vietnam passed India in 1966 as the foremost recipient among 82 nations, when you consider India has some 500 million people.

The Senator from Missouri is not here and I hesitate to speak in his absence, but he and others have been under the impression that India got the big end of our aid. I had never seen this statement before.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, could I put that into some context, Mr. Chairman, by recalling that there is a conflict taking place in Vietnam? I would like for the committee to understand that the people of Vietnam are producing at all time record highs despite the war; 1969 was a record year for agricultural production.

Second, the Government of Vietnam, through its various programs, is able to support from wholly and genuinely Vietnamese resources a civilian budget adequate to a country of her size at her stage of development were she not at war. The extraordinary assistance that we give Vietnam both on the military side and indeed on the economic side is occasioned by the fact of the conflict, by the fact that the South Vietnamese have found it necessary to have an army of 1.1 million people, the equivalent of a 13 or 14 million man force in U.S. terms.

I can assure you, sir, that the job of development which is my agency's traditional job, could be accomplished in Vietnam at much less cost were there not these nondevelopmental problems that afflict the country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am quite sure the war does add to the difficulty and the cost.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUDGET IN PIASTERS

Mr. Reporter, I will put in the record a table here with regard to the Vietnam budget in piasters just for our consideration here.

(The information referred to follows:)

In regard to the actual and estimated customs and austerity taxes for CY 1967, 1968, and 1969 on commercial imports, 34, 33, and 35 percent respectively are a result of duties on A.I.D.-financed imports. Total revenues derived from A.I.D. and Public Law 480 programs (import duties plus counterpart) were for CY 1967 and 1968, VN$28.12 and VN$21.77 billion, or 59 and 47 percent, respectively of budget revenues. *For CY 1969, total revenues derived from U.S. sources are estimated at VN$44.3 billion or 50 percent of budget revenues.*

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUDGET

[In billions of piastres, U.S. $1 = VN118 at import rate]

Line item	Calendar year 1967	Calendar year [1] 1968	Estimated calendar year 1969
1. Expenditures	86.19	105.19	147.8
2. National revenues	47.57	46.35	88.9
a. Domestic revenue	32.40	32.64	36.9
Direct taxes	(2.97)	(4.17)	(5.4)
Indirect taxes	(4.94)	(5.14)	(7.4)
Excise taxes	(6.25)	(6.51)	(8.3)
Registration and other	(9.38)	(7.48)	(15.8)
Preequation and equalization taxes [2]	(8.86)	(9.34)	----------
b. Custom duties and austerity tax	15.17	13.71	52.0
GVN imports	(10.08)	(9.15)	32.0
U.S.-financed imports	(5.09)	(4.56)	20.0
3. AID (counterpart)	23.03	17.21	24.3
Commodity improvement program	(13.23)	(4.11)	(15.6)
Public Law 480, title I	(9.8)	(13.1)	(8.7)
Net deficit	−15.59	−41.63	−34.6

[1] Includes only expenditures for the 1st 13 months chargeable to the budget for the fiscal year. Budgeted expenditures may be incurred up to 6 months after the end of the fiscal year. The influence of the remaining 5 months upon the magnitude of the deficit will be slight.

[2] In calendar year 1969, the revenue from these taxes are inlcuded within item b (customs and austerity taxes).

Budgetary financing by the Government of South Vietnam for the deficit after foreign aid, by source, for CY 1967, 1968 and 1969 (est.), is presented below:

(VN BILLION PIASTRES)

Line item	Calendar year 1967	Calendar year 1968	Estimated, calendar year 1969
A. Net deficit	−15.59	−41.63	−34.6
B. Sources of financing:			
Advances from national bank	14.92	35.45	30.0
Change in Treasury bonds outstanding	.67	6.18	4.6
Total	15.59	41.63	34.6

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, do you want to ask any questions?

EFFECT OF INFLATION ON AID COSTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Have you any idea to what extent the increasing amount of salaries, retirement and inflationary costs have increased the AID costs in South Vietnam? Has that been a major contribution to increased costs?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir. On the contrary, inflation hits those one can least afford to have it hit. Inflation is quickly overcome by the private sector that has the opportunity to raise prices, raise salaries, and to whatever levels are necessary to command personnel.

Senator AIKEN. I am referring to the $220 million worth of commercial imports. Don't they cost more now than they did 2 or 3 years ago?

Mr. MACDONALD. Within the country?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. MACDONALD. I am sorry, Senator Aiken. Yes; oh, yes. Four years ago, those goods were sold at 60, 70, 80, 90 piasters for each dollar's worth. Today they are being sold to the people of South Vietnam at something between 250 and 300 piasters per dollar for the same goods.

Senator AIKEN. We also have increased costs of material and goods in the United States.

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes; there has been a distinct inflationary factor over the last several years, which averaged 4, 5, 6 percent.

Senator AIKEN. I think at least that.

1969 SOUTH VIETNAMESE INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

I understand that last year there were South Vietnamese themselves who invested some $40 million in private enterprise. Is that figure about accurate?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, I believe it was $39 million, nearly $40 million of various industrial investments in 1969 alone which is, I think, an indication of a measure of confidence.

Senator AIKEN. I asked a witness yesterday if that indicated that some, if not many, of the South Vietnamese investors found the war rather profitable?

Mr. MACDONALD. Senator Aiken, obviously intense business activity, whatever its cause, provides the opportunity. I can assure you the management methods we have applied and the policies we have negotiated with the South Vietnamese have controlled the situation as far as it affects United States aid. Years ago there was an essentially monopolistic condition that existed in the import community of South Vietnam. There was a relative handful of importers. There was no competition. They could decide how much to bring in and how fast to sell it and how long to hold it and thereby realized very large markups.

As I recall the markup average prior to 1966 for imported goods was on the order of 70, 75-or-greater percent, and obviously that was exorbitant. We were able at the time that we were designing the present import program and negotiating with the Vietnamese whether there would be one or not to persuade the Vietnamese to introduce improved procedures and a liberalized import policy.

Today the American taxpayers' goods go into Vietnam and there is a markup on the order of 15 percent, which is a legitimate business

markup. No one is becoming a millionaire, out of AID's business, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Then this investment of $40 million in private enterprise in Vietnam would be made from normal earnings.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

Senator AIKEN, Of the investors, we will say.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

EFFORTS TO CONTROL BLACK MARKET PROBLEM

Senator AIKEN. Is the black market problem being brought under control at all?

Mr. MACDONALD. There is no doubt that there is a black market in Vietnam in money. The chairman has cited the black market rate for the dollar. A great deal of attention has been given to the problem both on the American side and on the Vietnamese side. In 1967 I recommended to Ambassador Bunker—and he accepted my recommendation—that there be a U.S. missionwide committee called the Irregular Practices Committee in order to maintain a continuing surveillance over our operations to see if there were loopholes in our regulations or our practices or procedures that enabled people to circumvent them. Over the past 3 years we have had great success, I think, within the U.S. mission to tighten up, to limit the amounts of PX goods made available in the commissaries and the post exchanges to proper levels, a variety of things of this sort, including currency control procedures within the military banking system.

More importantly, I think, Senator Aiken, are the efforts of the Vietnamese themselves. It is sometimes little noticed that the constitution of South Vietnam calls not only for the traditional three branches of government, but for what in effect amounts to a fourth branch of government, the Censorate, which is somewhat akin to our General Accounting Office but has wider responsibilities. The Censorate is not fully organized or fully operative, but it does have the responsibility to develop controls to minimize and preclude corruption and irregular practice within the South Vietnamese Government itself.

Also, the South Vietnamese executive has recently set up an Irregular Practices Committee of its own chaired by the Minister of Finance. Its membership includes the Minister of Economy, the governor of the national bank, the national director of police, and two or three other positions. The two American and Vietnamese Irregular Practices Committees meet regularly to see what can be done to tighten up.

EFFECTIVENESS OF LAND REFORM BILL

Senator AIKEN. I notice in this morning's paper that the South Vietnamese Senate has passed the land reform bill. Are you familiar with the kind of bill they passed?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Will it work?

Mr. MACDONALD. I believe so, Senator Aiken. I was very pleased to see the paper today. As I indicated in my opening statement this is a truly revolutionary piece of legislation, it is a sweeping bill that

will abolish tenancy in its entirety. This means there will be no absentee landlords in Vietnam. Only people who till land can own it. I think it is an unprecedented bill in my somewhat limited knowledge of other situations in the world.

Senator AIKEN. You are glad we don't have that law in Vermont; aren't you?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Or would you like to go home and start tilling? [Laughter.]

FINANCING OF LAND REFORM PROGRAM

You may recall that some time ago a suggestion was made in the Senate here in Washington that the United States finance the land reform program. Do you think we are expected to contribute rather heavily to that?

Mr. MACDONALD. The Vietnamese and we both regard the problem of financing this program internally in South Vietnam as a Vietnamese problem. That is what it is and how it should be handled. The Government will pay landlords for the land it will take. However, Senator Aiken, to be quite clear, the injection into an already very large money supply of over 50 billion additional piasters—and that was the tentative price tag of the President's bill, the minimum price tag—is going to generate additional inflationary pressure, which will have to be met in part by an increase in imports to generate additional piasters as customs and other payments are paid when they come in.

The United States has given every indication to the South Vietnamese that it realizes there is this exchange problem and that we will study in the years ahead what foreign exchange requirements the program will generate.

BORROWING CREDIT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

Senator AIKEN. Does the South Vietnam Government have borrowing credit?

Mr. MACDONALD. What?

Senator AIKEN. Does it have borrowing credit from the banks?

Mr. MACDONALD. In the world market, sir?

Senator AIKEN. In the local market, any market.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, it has; yes. It can borrow from its national bank as it does each year. This year we are expecting it to borrow something on the order of 28.6 billion piasters.

U.S. INVESTMENT BANKERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Three or four years ago I notice there was some competition among our investment bankers here in the United States to see who could get over there and get located first. Have they done a pretty good business?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes. The Bank of America and Chase Manhattan are doing rather nicely, I think, sir.

Senator AIKEN. I don't think I have any more. There isn't much use in asking questions if you already have the answers to them, although I find it is a pretty good idea to know the answer yourself before you ask a question in this town.

SOURCE OF COMPENSATION FOR LAND OWNERS UNDER LAND REFORM PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. You were speaking of land reform. How are the owners of the lands to be compensated? Are we going to pay them?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, sir, that was my point. This is a Vietnamese problem. It would not be appropriate, we feel, for the United States to enter directly into that kind of a transaction between a tenant and a landlord.

The CHAIRMAN. How can we avoid it when we are paying 52 percent of their budget? It seems to me an illusion. If we are paying or supplying, as you have already testified, over 50 percent. I think it is 52 percent.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said——

The CHAIRMAN. How in the world can it be done without our having helped?

Mr. MACDONALD. We start with the plain fact that something more than 50 percent of the national budget is financed from U.S. sources.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. MACDONALD. There is no question about that, sir. I suppose it is possible from that point to proceed to attribute, in part, the U.S. contribution to the total budget to each expenditure of the Government. I didn't mean to negate my having acknowledged the heavy share of financing that the United States puts into the budget. I merely meant to say, sir, that the Vietnamese Government will deal with the problem of paying landlords. The United States is not going to interfere in that process.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't phrase my question properly. I didn't expect that you would give the check for the money directly to the landlord. I am sure some agency of the Vietnamese Government will be the paying agent, but the source of the funds will almost inevitably be the United States up to 50 percent.

Mr. MACDONALD. There have been those who suggest a much more energetic American involvement in the land reform process. There have been those who suggested that we take the counterpart funds, funds which have already accrued to the Government of Vietnam accounts which cannot be spent without our approval, and use that to pay landlords. We are not certain that is appropriate.

SECTION 620(G) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall section 620(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act? I will read it. I think the record ought to show it. It says:

> Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no monetary assistance shall be made available under this Act to any government or political subdivision or agency of such government which will be used to compensate owners for expropriated or nationalized property and, upon finding by the President that such assistance has been used by any government for such purpose, no further assistance under this Act shall be furnished to such government until appropriate reimbursement is made to the United States for sums so diverted.

I wonder if that would create an obstacle to your continued operations in Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. Two comments, Mr. Chairman: First, as I recall the legislative history of that particular provision it had to do with

the protection of American investments in countries abroad. Perhaps its application is broader and does pertain also to expropriation of non-American assets or indigenous assets. I don't recall at the moment.

The second comment is that I am not, as I sit here, entirely clear as to whether the bill on President Thieu's desk today does in fact entail expropriation. I honestly do not know this. As I understand it, the Senate in voting last week altered the provision having to do with the methodology of taking land from the landlord. It is quite possible that the procedure will be one where the landlord turns his land over to the tenant and the Government comes in and finances it. I don't know whether legally and technically it constitutes expropriation in terms of the meaning of section 602.

The CHAIRMAN. 620.

Mr. MACDONALD. 620.

The CHAIRMAN. The method of doing it would have something of course to do with it. I don't think there is anything in the law to indicate it was intended for Americans. I rather thought that this was a prohibition against our paying foreign investors in a company. Supposing a government expropriates a telephone company of which the Americans own 60 percent and someone owns 40. I thought one of the principal objectives of this was that we were not going to pay the foreign national, for his expropriated property even though under our guarantee program which is designed to protect American investors.

Mr. MACDONALD. I am quite sure, sir, there is a sufficiency of piasters in the national budget which come from non-U.S. sources to cover the costs of the land reform bill.

LOSSES OF AND ENEMY ACTIVITY AGAINST AID PERSONNEL

Senator AIKEN. I omitted one question I was going to ask you. We have in the neighborhood of 10,000 Americans and native people engaged in the AID program in South Vietnam at this time.

Mr. MACDONALD. That was the high last June. We are going down to something over 9,000 this year, sir.

Senator AIKEN. What are the personnel losses, killed, wounded, and missing, and are they subject to continuous harassment? What is the situation? I think if we have that information we can tell whether the program is making progress in this field.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, since 1968 we have been very fortunate. We have not, to my recollection, had losses of AID people. I know we haven't in 1969 as a result of conflict. We have other losses, Senator Aiken, lots of them.

Senator AIKEN. Accidents?

Mr. MACDONALD. My deputy, a young man of 46, suffered a heart attack 5 weeks ago. We have losses of this sort given the demands and strains put on people who work 7 days a week 12, 14, 16 hours a day.

But we have not had losses to the enemy since the year of 1968 of Tet.

Senator AIKEN. What I meant was is what we call the enemy, the Vietcong, engaged in violence against our AID workers?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes, yes, we have been targets. The year before last, as I was entering the building a grenade went off, for-

tunately for me, just around the corner. It injured 11, killed two, maimed three, and hurt the remaining six. Yes we are targeted.

Senator AIKEN. Is it a premeditated attack on the AID workers?

Mr. MACDONALD. Occasionally premeditated on the AID program, yes.

Senator AIKEN. Is it as prevalent as it was 2 years ago?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, security has much improved, but there is no ultimate protection. There is no ultimate way to preclude terrorists coming at you from out of a crowd. We know that not only in South Vietnam, sir, but unfortunately in cities in our own country.

Senator AIKEN. Is it as bad as New York, Washington, or Chicago?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I had the very good fortune of having Mrs. MacDonald join me in Saigon for the last 8 or 9 months after 3 years alone. She is able to walk freely in Saigon. Security is, I think, much better, if I may make the invidious contrast, than it is in many of the American metropolitan areas, yes.

Senator AIKEN. I see. Don't let her walk too freely in Washington. That is enough, I guess.

1969 AID FUNDS EARMARKED FOR LAND REFORM

The CHAIRMAN. I was handed a note, Mr. MacDonald, that the Agency earmarked $10 million for land reform in 1969 fiscal year funds, but it was conditioned upon their passage of the legislation and satisfactory progress. I assume this passage comes too late for the $10 million this year, or does it?

Mr. MACDONALD. No, it is a valid obligation. It is on the books, and assuming the law is signed and brought into being and put into operation, Mr. Chairman, these funds can be, and I believe certainly should be——

The CHAIRMAN. How would they be made available for this purpose?

Mr. MACDONALD. As I was saying, the injection of large amounts of piasters into the economy through the process of the government saying the landlords for the land they are about to give up would increase inflation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I heard that.

What would you do with the $10 million is what I meant.

Mr. MACDONALD. We would make the $10 million available.

The CHAIRMAN. To the government?

Mr. MACDONALD. To American suppliers to send American products through commercial channels, as ordered by Vietnamese importers, to the Vietnamese economy, and as they come through the Port of Saigon and go over the customs——

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance of saying it is earmarked for that purpose? We give them more aid in the usual fashion. This is one of our own outlets. Why do you say it is earmarked if you are going to follow the same procedure?

Mr. MACDONALD. Because it is earmarked, Mr. Chairman. On June 28, 1968, the date we executed the project agreement obligating those $10 million, we sought to estimate the foreign exchange requirements that we foresaw during 1969.

Now, we were very poor projectors. We had anticipated that the bill would pass in the late summer, in August or September, and it did not.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to belabor the matter, but I do not see any difference whatever. You increase the amount of aid in the usual way—more imports. You did not allocate it and give it to someone to go buy land, if I understand you correctly.

Mr. MACDONALD. It is a cost, it is a cost, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. It is one of the items on which you estimate what the level of the aid will be; is it not?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I meant. I guess I am confused by the semantics. Earmarking has a different significance with us than it does with you, I would think. When we earmark something in a bill it can be used only for that purpose.

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not know the language, Mr. Chairman, but we identify, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I did not want to belabor a particular point. I was not trying to make a point of it. The only point I was trying to make of it was in relation to this legal requirement that you certainly could not do it directly. I suppose they could do it indirectly.

VARIETY AND EXTENT OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY

I want to ask you a couple of questions about the variety or the extent of your involvement in the economy and the life of Vietnam. This is the Foreign Service list which has a number of pages. It is about four and a half pages of names and what they do and some of them to me are rather surprising. These are your people in AID and this is the list in Vietnam.

You have Mr. Henry R. Anderson, geologist, for example. What would a geologist be doing for you?

Mr. MACDONALD. He is working on the national water program to identify sources of fresh water for municipal, province, and town requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have Miss Barbara J. Baden, nurse, administrative hospital nursing service. Is she setting up a nursing school or something?

Mr. MACDONALD. She is working in a nurse teaching school in Saigon, helping the Vietnamese establish a capability of their own to run a nursing school, train nurses, and meet their own needs.

At the height of the crisis in 1965 and 1966, it was necessary, we felt, and there was much congressional interest, to meet this need for nurses. We brought in well over 100 American nurses to work in province hospitals throughout Vietnam.

But at the same time we have been providing a few people to furnish technical assistance to train Vietnamese nurses so that the American nurses can go home.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you pay a nurse to go out to Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not know, but I can get that for the record, I am sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you supply it for the record?

(The information referred to follows:)

PAYMENT OF A.I.D. NURSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Most nurses in Vietnam serve in positions rated FSR–5, with a base annual salary of $14,132. This is augmented by the past differential of 25 percent, bringing total compensation to $17,665.

Mr. MACDONALD. Most of our nurses come from the Public Health Service, so I imagine their salary scales are probably exactly the same as those serving here for the Public Health Service.

The CHAIRMAN. As you know, there is a great shortage of nurses in this country.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not realize this was one of the reasons.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I think it no longer is, Mr. Chairman. We have only a handful of nurses.

The CHAIRMAN. You have Mr. John Byrnes, air traffic center specialist. What does that mean?

Mr. MACDONALD. We have a team from the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) under contract to us working with its counterpart agency in South Vietnam in the operation of the country's airports.

The CHAIRMAN. Air Force?

Mr. MACDONALD. Airports.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought all airports were under the military. Is Tan Son Nhut operated as a civil airport?

Mr. MACDONALD. It is a civilian airport.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was military.

Mr. MACDONALD. It has its military base operations.

The CHAIRMAN. It is primarily military; is it not?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes, but Pan-American goes in and out, and there are international——

The CHAIRMAN. I see. You supply men to run the civilian side.

Mr. MACDONALD. Not run it. We have advisers there. We used to have, as I recall, some 51 or 52. We have fewer than that now because some Vietnamese have been trained and they are taking over.

All our work, Mr. Chairman, is work of an advisory sort. We do not do things. We do not run things. We are helping the Vietnamese develop their own capabilities.

EXTENT AND VARIETY OF U.S. ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another one: Willis W. F. Christine, traffic management adviser. Is that some other kind of traffic? Is that automobile traffic?

Mr. MACDONALD. No. I think you are still on the FAA list.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not have that——

Mr. MACDONALD. I know the man. I believe that——

The CHAIRMAN. It does not say air like the other one does.

Mr. MACDONALD. In any case, he would be an adviser to the air traffic manager in the Vietnamese directorate for civil airport operations.

The CHAIRMAN. They forgot to mention air. I thought it was automobile traffic.

Don't you have someone running the traffic? I hear Saigon has a terrible traffic problem.

Mr. MACDONALD. Does it have a traffic problem?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I have seen pictures of it which said it had a traffic problem. You would help them out with that if they had one; wouldn't you?

Mr. MACDONALD. We do not try to deal with every problem in sight, Mr. Chairman. We couldn't begin to attempt to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is hard for me to think of one that you haven't dealt with from this list.

You have here "agron adv seed inp." What does that mean?

Mr. MACDONALD. Would you give me those again?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Donald M. Coe, and it says "agron adv seed inp."

Mr. MACDONALD. He is an agronomist. He is an adviser of some sort. I do not recognize him.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you have livestock and nutrition, equipment specialist, livestock again, assistant public health, rehabilitation and development, soils and something, medical supplies, highway training schools specialist, educational, elementary, vocational education, engineering materials.

Mr. MACDONALD. If I may interject, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Architects, engineers. I don't know anything you have left out.

Mr. MACDONALD. If I may interject, you are posing a USAID director's classic dilemma, how much to do and how much not to attempt to do.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. MACDONALD. We are much put upon from various sources to do more than we do. The Congress has not been slow on occasion to suggest the need that much more be done in South Vietnam, for the South Vietnamese people in their need, than we have felt it either possible or appropriate that the United States attempt to do. It is possible for you or anyone to run through that list and identify a range of skills that encompasses the entire spectrum.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. That is the only point I was making.

Mr. MACDONALD. We are in the business of attempting to enable countries to develop their own capacities so that they will not have continuing reliance on foreign aid or dependence upon the United States, and as quickly as we achieve our objectives, goal by goal, we back out.

I think the primary school program that I mentioned in my opening statement is, perhaps, the best illustration I can offer of that procedure of finishing a job, and leaving as quickly as possible.

IMPACT OF U.S. DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I know there has been considerable emphasis upon agriculture. What would you say has been the impact on Vietnamese agriculture of the American defoliation operations which, I have read in the paper, have covered an area in Vietnam as large as the State of Massachusetts. That has been published in the paper. In the first place, is that accurate? Has an area as large as Massachusetts been defoliated?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, sir, there are as many estimates of things of this sort as there are those who turn their minds to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Surely there is a better criteria than that. Don't you have an estimate?

Mr. MacDonald. I do not have at my fingertips the area of Massachusetts nor the range of estimates of destroyed tree and other negetative areas in South Vietnam. But let me talk to the problem.

There have been economic losses due to the war, due to the deliberate defoliation of some parts of the forests, due to the deliberate cutting and destruction of trees 100 meters on each side of a lane that goes through a rubber plantation, so that American and Vietnamese soldiers won't be shot from ambush.

The Chairman. Let me come back. I did not mean to entice you into that. I should not have used Massachusetts anyway. I do not know why I did. How many acres have been defoliated?

Mr. MacDonald. That is beyond my purview.

The Chairman. It is? You mean you would not know? Who would know how much is defoliated?

Mr. MacDonald. The Department of Defense.

The Chairman. And they would not tell you?

Mr. MacDonald. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the estimates of as much as 10 to 12 percent of the country's surface having been subjected to defoliation are probably a fairly accurate estimate, 10 to 12 percent——

The Chairman. That is what I wanted—10 to 12 percent of the total acreage.

Mr. MacDonald (continuing). With varying degrees of economic loss as a consequence of that.

The Chairman. How much of that 10 percent is agricultural land and how much forests?

Mr. MacDonald. Do you have that, Mr. Sharpe?

Mr. Sharpe. Nearly all the defoliation in Vietnam has been carried on over the forested areas and very little of it deliberately, at least, over cultivated areas.

The Chairman. I do not care what their motive was. What is the actual result, whether it is deliberate or not?

RESULTS OF U.S. DEFOLIATION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MacDonald. Let me speak to the results. The 10 to 12 percent is essentially denuded forests or forests that have been partly damaged, trees that will come back 2 or 3 years hence. I suppose it is possible to do some calculations and figure out there are 600 million metric tons of timber which could potentially be cut up into wood and sold and put to productive use. But it is a hypothetical exercise, I believe, Mr. Chairman, because the fact of the matter is that the stands of timber in South Vietnam are essentially virgin stands of timber. It is unexploited, so although there has been a real physical loss, there has not been an appreciable economic loss from the defolitation of the trees.

Now, turning to another area where there has been real economic loss, the rubber trees; rubber used to be the principal export of South Vietnam. As I recall back in 1960, over half of South Vietnam's $84 million worth of exports came from her sale of rubber.

Now she has lost some. I do not have an estimate of how much has been lost by defoliation, plus how much has been lost by deliberate cutting of the trees to preclude ambushes. I can tell you

that the $48 million of exports has declined until last year only $9 million worth of rubber was exported. This is economic loss partly from damage, partly also from the fact that laborers have been drafted and taken off the plantations and cannot work, and partly from the fact that there are still inadequate aspects of the exchange system for exports. There is a disincentive to export, given the exchange rate system as it works.

The point I am trying to make here is that the permanent economic loss, the real economic loss is not great, and that recovery, particularly in the rubber field, can be quite quick. And I will conclude with the recollection, sir, that this last year, 1969, set all-time highs for South Vietnamese agricultural production including commercial crops and timber.

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that these forests that have been defoliated will be back in 2 or 3 years. On what do you base that? I have read conflicting stories about the effect of poisons, chemical poisons in particular, and the persistence of some things in this area has been considerable. Some of our conservationists are very worried about what is used in this country. I mean the use of the poisons in the cotton fields and in our own agriculture. It accumulates in the irrigation ditches and the next thing you know it kills fish. I have been reading in several stories in connection with this pollution problem and conservation that they are very dubious now about the use of pesticides and also herbicides for crop control. Many of our people are dubious here. How do you know over there that if you go out and defoliate a forest that it is going to come back in 2 or 3 years?

Mr. MACDONALD. I didn't say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you did.

Mr. MACDONALD. A dead tree is a dead tree, and it needs to be replaced.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said it would come back in 2 or 3 years.

Mr. MACDONALD. I said the Vietnamese rubber industry can come back very quickly. Most of the losses in rubber production in Vietnam are not attributable to the defoliation or the destruction of trees. Most of the loss is due to other considerations, lack of security, lack of labor.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you misspoke, because I think you first said the forests would come back 2 or 3 years. That is quite all right. We are going along pretty fast.

PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S INCOME DERIVED FROM U.S. PRESENCE

Tell me what percentage of South Vietnam's income is derived directly or indirectly from the U.S. presence. I am shifting, from the AID program alone. I will restate the question. What is the percentage of South Vietnam's overall income, direct or indirect, from all of the U.S. presence, including the presence of the Military Establishment with their expenditures and everything. What is your estimate of the percentage of the total income that is derived from that presence?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I gather that you are not talking about the budget of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Not AID, not just AID.

Mr. MACDONALD. My discussion of the budget——

The CHAIRMAN. Not just the budget; that is correct. I wondered if you could estimate what the overall amount was.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, the gross national product of a country at war receiving military assistance and receiving also large numbers of foreign troops is very difficult to compute. I think I should ask Mr. Sharpe to take this question, but before I turn to him, my recollection is that the gross national product, as best we can calculate it, is on the order of $5.5 billion in dollar equivalent, and that something more nearly on the order of $4.25 billion of that is a truly Vietnamese product. I stand to be corrected by Mr. Sharpe.

Mr. SHARPE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sharpe?

Mr. SHARPE. To give a short-cut answer, we estimate that the Vietnamese GNP per capita in real terms, and kind of brushing past the problem of exchange rate, is on the order of $150 to $175. The direct cost of U.S. aid this year per capita is about $30. I would guess, adding up all of the indirect types of U.S. aid, that you could say there is another $20 or $25.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say aid? I didn't want you to confine it to aid. All expenses, using everything.

Mr. SHARPE. Well, indirect types of assistance or indirect effects of the U.S. presence.

The CHAIRMAN. Your saying "assistance" is what put me off. I did not want you to confine it to what I call assistance. I don't know that a GI going into a nightclub is assisting them in that sense. He is spending his money, and I wanted to include everything for which they spend it. All I want is to understand you.

Mr. SHARPE. Adding up all those types of U.S. expenditures, not assistance, I would say you would get up another $20 or $25 per capita, so that perhaps in grand total the American presence is amounting to something like $50 or $55 per capita.

The CHAIRMAN. About a third.

Mr. SHARPE. Well, nearly a third.

The CHAIRMAN. You said $150 per capita.

Mr. SHARPE. $150 to $175.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

EFFECT OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTION ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY

The next question in this series would be if the American forces are reduced to 200,000, for example, and U.S. economic aid remains the same, what effect will the troop reduction have on Vietnam's economy?

Mr. MACDONALD. One of the sources of Vietnam's dollar receipts, of course, is the American military presence.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. MACDONALD. The great bulk of the dollars received from that presence are used to purchase piasters for the financing and the maintenance and operation of the facilities—an estimated $309 million of $354 million of piaster purchases in 1970. Only a very small portion is earned from piasters for personal uses, particularly those of combat troops, the man who is up on Razorback Hill in an artillery position who does not get to town.

I think the average monthly piaster expenditure for the G.I. is about $6 or $7.50 a month. Many years ago it used to be much higher than that, but it is now that low.

We are talking about the reduction of American combat troops in the first instance. As combat troops leave the dollar effect of their departure will be relatively minimal.

Is that a responsive answer?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is. You think the effect of their reduction to 200,000 would not be very great. If we cut down to 50,000, which would go far beyond the combat troops, would there be a substantial and serious impact on their economy?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes; it would. There is no question but what it would, assuming the necessity of maintaining the defense effort at the present level.

The CHAIRMAN. From the South Vietnamese point of view it is not so bad to lose the combat troops, economically speaking, but it would be bad to lose the other troops, the supporting or logistics troops. They spend their money more, being free.

NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WORKING FOR THE UNITED STATES

Could you tell how many Vietnamese work on U.S. bases, for U.S. contractors or for U.S. personnel directly?

Mr. MACDONALD. I believe last month total Vietnamese employment by U.S. agencies of all sorts, plus their major contractors was 142,000.

The CHAIRMAN. 142,000.

Do you have any estimate of how many others hold jobs which are dependent upon Americans for their patronage and——

Mr. MACDONALD. Of what sort, Mr. Chairman, the taxi driver?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean all sorts of things, personal service, cooks, and maids, all sorts of things.

Mr. MACDONALD. I would not hazard a guess.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no calculation which has been made.

I will put in the record here a story by Mr. George Ashworth of the Christian Science Monitor from Saigon in September of 1969. It discusses this subject. If you wish you may comment on it; you do not have to. Here is one thing he says:

> According to unofficial estimates, as many as two million Vietnamese may be directly dependent upon wages paid by the Americans.

Would you quarrel with that statement?

Mr. MACDONALD. I think it is a grossly exaggerated statement.

The CHAIRMAN. He says:

> In effect, the war has created a terribly artificial situation in which many depend upon employment that can't last, a black market that must some day wane and thievery that will some day have fewer available victims.

This is a sample of the article. Do you know Mr. Ashworth?

Mr. MACDONALD. No; I have not known him, but I knew his predecessors.

The CHAIRMAN. The Christian Science Monitor is a very reputable paper, if any papers are reputable any more. It certainly has a good reputation in my belief.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 26, 1969]

Economy Fragile—U.S. Exit May Add Saigon Woes

(By George W. Ashworth)

Saigon.—If a South Vietnamese Army captain with a family saved 10 percent of his salary, he could afford a Honda auto with the savings in about 30 years.

The sharp disparity between income and outgo for things Americans take for granted illustrates the plight of the Vietnamese wage-earner in a time of rampant inflation.

Actually, South Vietnam's inflationary spiral isn't so bad, considering the war, as it has been kept to about 30 percent a year.

But the inflation and the shaky state of the Vietnamese economy pose problems both for the government and the citizens under it. American withdrawal will intensify some of those difficulties. Officials here realize that some careful planning and strong action will be necessary if the economy and those dependent upon it are to avoid disaster.

If wages had kept up with inflation, of course, the problem would not be so severe for the typical Vietnamese. But income has not kept pace, particularly in the cases of Vietnamese civil servants and members of the military. Soldiers are so poor that stealing is common. Civil servants are so badly off that small bribes known as "tea money" are accepted as an economic necessity.

POLICE ACCEPT 'TOKENS'

Police at roadblocks "accept" a small token of appreciation for letting trucks with perishable produce through with dispatch. Sometimes they demand more than a small token, which can be disastrous to truck drivers who must pay their own money.

But if the driver is an employee of someone who can afford the bribe, such as an American contractor, or some private concern, Vietnamese or foreign, he doesn't mind so much. He can report the demand at double what was given and pocket the difference, which means a great deal to a poor man.

Desperation, of course, leads to dishonesty and thievery. Many poor Vietnamese adhere to the view that the Americans can afford to lose things now and then. So theft rings are organized and Americans lose traveler's checks, cameras, and cash. Bank managers sigh as they report another check theft. And American insurance companies think darkly of Saigon. The black market thrives.

The American Government and armed forces now employ perhaps 150,000 Vietnamese. Other American firms employ about 50,000 more. Despite efforts to keep pay scales in line with prevailing rates, it hasn't really worked out.

For one thing, Americans pay a lot of overtime. Neither the Vietnamese Government nor Vietnamese private employers do that. And to get good help, governmental agencies and contractors often get around the guidelines by giving unjustifiedly high job grades. Thus a simple guard becomes a well-paid guard/interpreter. He may never interpret. Indeed, he may not know how. But he draws the pay.

INCOMES WILL DROP

According to unofficial estimates, as many as 2,000,000 Vietnamese may be directly dependent upon wages paid by the Americans. Officials believe that the shortage of skilled labor will mean that most wage earners will easily find jobs after the Americans go. Of course, officials admit these Vietnamese will be somewhat saddened at their sharply reduced incomes.

In effect, the war has created a terribly artificial situation in which many depend upon employment that can't last, a black market that must someday wane, and thievery that will someday have fewer available victims. There are landlords now doing very well, indeed, with renting apartments and villas and buildings to Americans. Someday, there won't be people around to pay those high rents.

Some knowledgeable sources here believe that the beginnings of troop withdrawal will not greatly affect the Vietnamese economy. Employment will remain fairly steady for a while. Major drops will only begin when major bases are closed or turned over to the Vietnamese.

Combat troops leaving do not present a great drain upon revenues. It is estimated officially that the typical American soldier spends about $5 a month on the Vietnamese economy. Unofficial estimates put his black market dealings at another $5.

Of course, as the American pullouts become more extensive, Vietnamese employment will begin to drop. But officials believe that the economy can absorb many of these losers of jobs easily. Economic impact programs will further alleviate the problem.

But no one denies that there will be problems, many of them severe in the period ahead. Continuing inflation would complicate them.

But the typical Vietnamese cannot worry now about the future. He must occupy himself with the desperate fight for survival now. If he is fortunate enough to make an income of 10,000 piastres a month, and he has a family, he faces the prospect of spending a quarter of his income on rice alone. Then he must buy the things to go with the rice.

And those things are still going up. Medium-quality rice is up two thirds over prices last year, and refined sugar is up 118 percent over a year ago. Condensed milk prices have risen 30 percent since December, and stick beans have almost doubled.

There is solace, of course, in the fact that some few things, such as pork bellies, have stayed level in price or declined slightly. But, overall, the retail price index has risen from a January, 1965, base of 100 to the present level of 472.

Officials are, of course, trying to keep prices down. And some, such as rice, seem to have leveled off. But it is a great fight.

The Thieu government is talking now of austerity and the need to keep the government solvent and the economy from disaster.

This will mean belt-tightening for both government and people. It won't be easy, particularly with so little precedent. But officials have made clear their intentions. Hard though it may be, many Vietnamese believe there is no other alternative.

EFFECT OF U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. MacDonald, what will be the adverse effect this year on the U.S. balance of payments from the U.S. presence in Vietnam? Do you know that?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. I have some information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give it?

Mr. MACDONALD. The AID program here and elsewhere has really very little effect on the U.S. balance-of-payments problem. You will recall my saying that our program is divided into two parts.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say the AID program. I don't blame you for getting confused. I am speaking now of the overall presence as distinguished from AID alone.

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, let me do as best I can.

The CHAIRMAN. You can do both if you would like, but I wanted it to be clear. I did not ask about AID alone; I asked about presence.

EFFECT OF AID PROGRAM ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. MACDONALD. As far as the AID program, first, Mr. Chairman, is concerned, virtually all our commercial import dollars cause no balance-of-payments effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Because you buy the materials here.

Mr. MACDONALD. Either buy them here or from PD 31 countries where the dollars in the next go-around come back to the United States; for our project program last year, we were required to spend only about $2,000 in other countries where there would have been an adverse balance-of-payments effect, for instance, a French part for a French machine, which was critical to a particular operation. It is practically nonexistent, on the AID side.

GVN SPENDING OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS

The $354 million that we estimate the Vietnamese will receive this year from the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense, are dollars that they freely use to purchase goods wherever they choose to. I believe that we have in the last year seen them spend a proportionately higher amount of those free dollars in the United States than in the previous year, but the bulk is still spent outside the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. How many are there?

Mr. MACDONALD. I can get you the figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said a figure.

Mr. MACDONALD. No. I said the great bulk is spent outside the United States. The amount coming back to the United States is going up. I will have to supply that for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

GVN-FINANCED IMPORT LICENSING BY SOURCE COUNTRY, CALENDAR YEARS 1965 THROUGH 1969

[Values in thousands of dollars]

Source country	1965		1966		1967		1968		1969	
	Value	Percent of total	Value	Percent of total	Value	Percent of total	Value	Percent of total	Value	Percent of total
Total	$114,848	100.0	$225,419	100.0	$291,845	100.0	[1] $392,695	100.0	$425 149	100.0
Belgium	4,368	3.8	5,456	2.4	3,754	1.3	6,895	1.8	6,898	1.6
England	4,352	3.8	7,116	3.1	6,835	2.3	6,562	1.6	8,746	2.1
France	7,141	6.2	15,359	6.8	10,789	3.7	18,468	4.7	23,723	5.6
West Germany	9,855	8.5	16,400	7.3	10,746	3.7	19,847	5.1	18,958	4.4
Hong Kong	4,147	3.6	8,549	3.8	11,604	4.0	19,391	4.9	16,531	3.9
Italy	9,805	8.5	27,222	12.1	18,325	6.3	16,329	4.2	16,848	4.0
Japan	43,162	37.9	112,394	49.9	102,349	35.0	173,015	44.0	153,233	36.0
Singapore	853	.7	3,115	1.4	24,249	8.3	14,422	3.7	34,703	8.2
Switzerland	707	.6	2,599	1.1	6,372	2.2	14,857	3.8	14,870	3.5
Taiwan	15,338	13.3	12,396	5.5	28,535	9.8	18,786	4.8	26,346	6.2
United States	4,102	3.6	6,205	2.8	24,011	8.2	[1] 57,731	14.7	58,359	13.7
Other	11,018	9.5	8,608	3.8	44,276	15.2	26,492	6.7	45,934	10.8

[1] Includes unlicensed value of $13,100,000 for 2 Boeing-727 aircraft.

AID FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES

The CHAIRMAN. Also how much are we spending in foreign exchanges in countries other than the United States? You do not have that?

Mr. MACDONALD. I am sorry, I could not hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. The amount of your foreign exchange expenditures to countries other than the United States. Do you have that figure or will you supply it?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. In 1969 we spent $128 million in the United States. We spent $37 million in Taiwan; we spent $4 million in Korea, and these, as you will recall, are countries where dollar expenditures do not result in an adverse U.S. balance of payments.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you talking about AID's expenditures?

Mr. MACDONALD. At the moment I am.

IMPACT ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I asked about South Vietnam, overall. I am still trying to get these figures about the total impact of our presence, not only AID. Where do they spend their foreign exchange?

Mr. MACDONALD. I can supply that for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have it?

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not have it, but I can assure you that the great bulk of their free foreign exchange is spent in other countries than the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Other than the United States?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant.

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you estimate the volume of that?

Mr. MACDONALD. Last year the Vietnamese purchases from the United States were approaching the magnitude of $40 million, $50 million. This year it may go somewhat higher than that, but $40 to $60 million from $350 million still leaves the great majority of free foreign exchange being spent in other countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have $353 million in foreign exchange?

Mr. MACDONALD. The $354 million we estimate will be realized by Vietnam this calendar year of 1970 from piaster purchases by the Department of Defense. They have additional——

The CHAIRMAN. By the Department of Defense. Then that will be free. There are no strings on it; is that correct?

Mr. MACDONALD. That is correct. There are additional——

The CHAIRMAN. This is what I first asked you about the impact on our balance of payments. If the major part of that money is spent somewhere else, why isn't that an impact upon our balance of payments?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I have said——

The CHAIRMAN. Not yours.

Mr. MACDONALD. I said the AID program has a miniscule effect.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I was getting at a moment ago. It is the presence and not AID. I was trying to distinguish between them.

Mr. MACDONALD. The remainder of their foreign exchange expenditures do constitute a serious balance-of-payments effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to say that you think it is as much as at least $300 million adverse effect on the balance of payments?

Mr. MACDONALD. Something in that order of magnitude I would estimate.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot be precise on these matters. They are too big.

ECONOMIC AID FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES

Do you know how much economic aid South Vietnam received this last year from countries other than the United States?

Mr. MACDONALD. About $25 million from all sources, including multilateral agencies as well as individual countries.

It is $25 million in 1969. We see it moving up, we think, appreciably in 1970, Mr. Chairman, and, as I indicated in my opening remarks, there is a rather extensive display of interest by a number of

countries about getting involved in financing the postwar reconstruction and development effort that lies ahead.

1969 VALUE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE BLACK MARKET CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. A report of the Senate Government Operations Subcommittee estimated the value of Vietnamese black market currency transactions at $250 million last year. In your view is this a reasonably accurate estimate?

Mr. MACDONALD. I think it is exaggerated, Mr. Chairman. I think it is very greatly exaggerated. Again I will ask Mr. Sharpe to comment on the difficulties of making estimations of capital flight, capital loss, in the situation that obtains there. I have heard estimates ranging from $50 million to much higher than the one which you cited.

Mr. SHARPE. I am afraid that the problem of estimating how much money is going into the black market is one of the most difficult of all that we have. My own estimate would be certainly much smaller than $250 million.

The CHAIRMAN. What would yours be?

Mr. SHARPE. $100 million to $150 million.

CURRENCY BLACK MARKET IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I will put in the record the article I have here from the New York Times of November 19, 1969, entitled "U.S. Diplomat Testifies in Capital that Currency Black Marketeers are Undermining War Effort."

The article reads:

> A United States diplomat formerly stationed in Saigon testified today that the Vietnam war effort was being undermined by a $150 million a year currency black market run by money manipulators from India.

Did you ever run into any Indian manipulators?

Mr. MACDONALD. We don't deal with them, Mr. Chairman.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I did not expect you dealt with them, but I thought if they were that prominent you would run into them.

Mr. MACDONALD. I think I know the gentleman. It was Robert Parker, who was my special assistant for several years.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. Parker?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, yes. He was my special assistant. Because of the range and intensity of problems in this whole area of irregular practice in Vietnam I have a separate office, a special office, to help me see that our administration of the AID program is done well, and that the public's resources are protected.

Bob Parker's reference to $150 million was not a loss figure. It was his estimate of the total volume of monetary transactions taking place within the black market.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I said. The question was the amount of money. It says black market currency transactions. It did not say a loss. These transactions indicate the volume of the business. The article says that Mr. Parker "told the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee that U.S. banks, Americans in Vietnam, and deserters hiding in Saigon participated in the racket, which has been described by some as a billion-dollar operation." It goes on and says:

Mr. Parker said Moslems from India run the black market. The black marketeers are so well organized, he added, that they have a "legal services" department that promptly pays the fine of any money changer caught and sets him back up in business.

Mr. MacDonald. Reminiscent of the Mafia organization, Bob told me.

The Chairman. It says:

" 'The government's official rate is 118 piasters to a dollar,' Mr. Parker said. 'But on the black market, a dollar is worth at least 200 piasters.' " You said 328 or something like that It has gone up since he was there, since last fall?

Mr. MacDonald. Yes.

The Chairman. This is a very interesting article. It says:

A subcommittee spokesman said black-market currency transactions in Vietnam worked two ways, both based on the difference between the official exchange rate of 118 piasters to the dollar and the black market rate of 170 to 200 piasters a dollar.

In one, a check drawn for United States dollars on an American bank is given to a black market money changer in Vietnam, who pays the higher, illegal, exchange rate, then cashes the check himself for the dollars.

The second system, called a 'lateral transfer,' involves coded messages. An American in Vietnam sends a message to his bank at home, instructing it to transfer a certain amount of United States money to another account, also in the United States.

Unknown to the first bank, the second account is linked with a black marketeer in Vietnam.

Do you know about this sort of thing?

Mr. MacDonald. Oh. yes, I have read the transcript of the hearings of Senator Ribicoff's committee.

The Chairman. Have you?

Mr. MacDonald. It was of natural interest to me.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, Nov. 19, 1969]

U.S. Diplomat Testifies in Capital That Currency Black Marketeers Are Undermining War Effort

Washington.—A United States diplomat formerly stationed in Saigon testified today that the Vietnam war effort was being undermined by a $150-million-a-year currency black market run by money manipulators from India.

The diplomat, Robert R. Parker, told the Senate Permanent Investigating Subcommittee that United States banks, Americans in Vietnam and deserters hiding in Saigon participated in the racket, which has been described by some as a billion-dollar operation.

Mr. Parker was an embassy attaché and assistant director of the United States aid program in Vietnam until last month. He also worked under Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker on a special investigation of black-market currency manipulation.

"Black marketeers and illicit money changers have built a racket which has been estimated over-all as running over $150 million a year in Vietnam," Mr. Parker testified.

"They create an atmosphere of illegality and fraud, immorality and cynicism," he said, and "give aid and comfort to the enemy. They undermine what we are trying to achieve in Vietnam."

Mr. Parker said Moslems from India run the black market. The black marketeers are so well organized, he added, that they have a "legal services" department that promptly pays the fine of any money changer caught and sets him back up in business.

Mr. Parker was the first witness at the hearings, which come after a five-month subcommittee investigation.

According to Mr. Parker, the black marketeers use code-named bank accounts in the United States and Hong Kong, in addition to currency investors in Saigon, to reap profits from the difference between the official and black-market rates of exchange for United States dollars and Vietnamese piasters.

"The Government's official rate is 118 piasters to a dollar," Mr. Parker said. "But on the black market, a dollar is worth at least 200 piasters."

An aide to the subcommittee said its investigators had been in Vietnam for five months looking into the black-market situation.

Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Democrat of Connecticut, is chairman of the subcommittee. He said federal officials, economists, banking experts, businessmen and others would provide evidence of black market currency transactions through banks in the United States and Hong Kong totaling about $360 million during the last five years.

Senator Ribicoff said that the transactions were alleged to run much higher—over the billion-dollar mark. The black market "seriously harms the American economic effort in South Vietnam, severely damages the Vietnamese economy and hinders the struggle against inflation, and reduces the effect of the American aid program," he said.

METHODS DESCRIBED

A subcommittee spokesman said black-market currency transactions in Vietnam worked two ways, both based on the difference between the official exchange rate of 118 piasters to the dollar and the black-market rate of 170 to 200 piasters a dollar.

In one, a check drawn for United States dollars on an American bank is given to a black-market money changer in Vietnam, who pays the higher, illegal, exchange rate, then cashes the check himself for the dollars.

The second system, called a "lateral transfer," involves coded messages. An American in Vietnam sends a message to his bank at home, instructing it to transfer a certain amount of United States money to another account, also in the United States.

Unknown to the first bank, the second account is linked with a black marketeer in Vietnam. The contact administering the second account sends a coded message to the money changer, advising him the money has arrived, and the money changer pays the American in piasters under the black-market rate.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 21, 1969]

Black Marketing in War Is Traced

SENATE INQUIRY TELLS OF FLOW OF DOLLARS INTO GOLD

(By Peter Grose)

Washington, Nov. 20—Senate subcommittee investigators today described the operations of international syndicates said to be engaged in black-market currency transactions and war profiteering in Vietnam, starting with the dollars of American personnel and ending up as gold acquired in a Persian Gulf Sheikdom.

Through a fabric of trading companies existing mainly on paper and New York bank accounts under false names, traffic in the Vietnam black market in currency was estimated at $250 million last year alone. Repeatedly expressing astonishment through two hours of detailed testimony, Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, acting chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations, called for tighter auditing by civilian and military government agencies and closer scrutiny by American banks over accounts with funds originating in Saigon.

"After examining these bank statements," the Connecticut Democrat said, "I can't conceive how any prudent banker could draw any conclusion other than that they were being used as conduits for black market funds by an international syndicate, to the detriment of the United States."

The report on black market and profiteering operations was presented, after nearly a year's investigation, by Carmine S. Bellino, an accountant who is a consultant to the subcommittee, part of the Senate Committee on Government Operations.

BANK ACCOUNTS EXAMINED

Mr. Bellino's report included an examination, with photocopy exhibits, of 13 bank accounts with total deposits averaging about $75-million yearly. These represented, he said, "only a few of the many throughout the world which are used to siphon currency from Vietnam."

From these records, the Senate investigators identified American civilians holding Government contracts as suppliers to military installations. These suppliers, they said, engaged in illegal currency exchanges, gave and accepted kickbacks and charged excessive prices for goods sold to the Government and to military personnel at post exchanges.

"The 13 bank accounts he examined include four large accounts controlled by a group of Indian nationals in Hong Kong who have a syndicate for Vietnamese currency manipulation," Mr. Bellino said. "The group is headed by B. S. A. Rahman, who is also a motion picture producer and a manufacturer of wire and rope. Rahman was born in 1928 in Madras, India. Four male relatives assist him in his various enterprises."

The largest of these accounts was in the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company of New York, Mr. Bellino said, under the code title "Prysumeen." He reported that the authorized signatures for the account were those of two persons with a Hong Kong post office box address, whom the subcommittee investigators later identified as employes of some of Mr. Rahman's companies.

$51-MILLION DEPOSITED

During the account's existence, from February 1965, until early this year when it was closed, $51-million were deposited to Prysumeen—over half from Vietnam, Hong Kong and Singapore according to the investigators. The bulk—$42-million—was withdrawn and transferred to the credit of three banks in the city of Dubai a seaport on the Persian Gulf in the Trucial states of Oman, they added.

Some of these funds were transferred directly from Manufacturers Hanover and some went through the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Mr. Bellino reported.

"The banks in Dubai do business in gold," he explained. "Gold smuggling is prevalent in the states of the Persian Gulf and gold hoarders will pay $70 an ounce and sometimes as much as $85." The United States Treasury's price for gold is $35 an ounce.

Since one of the Dubai banks receiving the Prysumeen funds was reported to be a branch of New York's First National City Bank, the subcommittee served a subpoena on that bank in New York to get the branch records.

"Attorneys for the bank, however, advised us that the ruler of Dubai had forbidden the production of records and had issued a general prohibition on such matters to all banks operating in Dubai," Mr. Bellino said.

PROTECTION OF AID RESOURCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that these matters, while they are serious and of very specific interest to us, don't relate to the AID program per se. Perhaps, it would be appropriate for me to mention the extent to which in our administration of AID resources we have been able to assure that there has been a maximum degree of immunity and protection from the vicissitudes of that kind of behavior.

It is frequently suggested in the press and elsewhere that our loss rates of American commodities paid for by the taxpayers are enormous. I still hear occasionally estimates that we are losing 20, 30, and 40 percent of our commodities in our CIP program.

In point of fact, sir, we lose less than one-half of 1 percent from every conceivable loss, including short shipments, inadvertent as they may be, by American suppliers, losses en route from Bayonne, N.J., perhaps, to the Port of Saigon, losses on spoilage, breakage, pilferage, thievery—less than one-half of 1 percent in our commercial import program.

Our record is not quite that good in the commodity programs having to do with our projects—the goods we bring into the country on behalf of the Ministry of Education for construction of classrooms and equipment and supplies and other things for the Ministry of Health and their operation of provincial hospitals. I estimate we are losing, from causes, perhaps 2 percent of the commodities in our project program. I do not say this smugly, Mr. Chairman, as the amounts are still quite large if one multiplies one-half of 1 percent against an import program of some $200 million, but I can assure you, and this is my only point, that our AID program is run very carefully and, I believe, sir, particularly in this area very well. We do not lose in this area.

BLACK MARKET OPERATION IN COMMODITIES

The CHAIRMAN. How much of the black market operation in commodities do you estimate is due to the United States and other foreign military forces or from civilian employees acquiring PX goods and then selling them on the Vietnamese economy to get a more realistic rate of exchange?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, first, let me say virtually none from the U.S. AID programs; virtually none. There are some exceptions which would prove the rule.

Let me give you an exception to prove the rule. Bulgur is brought in under Public Law 480, title II, for needy people—given, not sold to them—given to people who are accustomed to rice and have no taste for Bulgur. Some trade it for rice. That is the kind of exception on the AID side.

The black market does traffic to a certain extent in commodities that come in unrelated to the U.S. AID program or the Department of Agriculture program—the post exchanges and the commissaries, for instance—one can see PX articles in the stalls on the black market in the streets. There are fewer and fewer cases of this, given the controls that General Abrams has instituted in the PX system, and given the increasing concern of the Vietnamese Government and its instructions to the police to clean this up.

Magnitudes I cannot estimate for you, Mr. Chairman. I do not know that anybody can.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any studies been made of the extent to which the PX and commissary goods end up in the black market?

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not know how many studies of that kind have been made.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many tons of PX articles are brought in each month?

Mr. MACDONALD. These are things I don't know, but the Department of Defense does.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been in the paper that about 36,000 tons a month are imported to the PX commissaries. Does that sound about right?

Mr. MACDONALD. I really don't have any idea, Mr. Chairman. It is not an AID matter.

The CHAIRMAN. You are really not competent to comment on the PX's.

Mr. MACDONALD. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another article here from the January 29, 1970, Christian Science Monitor. I hope you don't think I read nothing but the Christian Science Monitor, but it is a newspaper that is generally considered above politics and it is a paper that is a favorite of people who are trying to lean over backwards not to be biased and, hopefully, not to come within the purview of some of our leading officials who do not think well of other newspapers that report on these matters. That is one of the reasons why we are partial to the Christian Science Monitor. It has not been denounced as an effete snob or something of that kind.

On January 29, 1970, it quotes a report commissioned by the World Council of Churches as concluding that:

More aid is coming into Vietnam now than can be effectively absorbed.

What would be your comment on that?

Mr. MACDONALD. I do not agree with that statement. I think that good use is being made of the aid that comes in under the AID and Public Law 480 program, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Further in the article it says:

This massive infusion of aid "has also encouraged dependence on foreign aid to such an extent that many South Vietnamese have ceased to believe that the Vietnamese can solve their own problems.

What would be your comment on that?

Mr. MACDONALD. I would say there is dependence upon the outside world for help occasioned by the fact that they are under attack from an enemy also from the outside. Without that need, sir, they would certainly not have as much dependence upon us.

The CHAIRMAN. Lastly on this:

The general effect of the aid to Vietnam has been to widen the gap between rich and poor.

Mr. MACDONALD. I would take immediate and emphatic exception to that; immediate and emphatic exception to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't agree with this?

Mr. MACDONALD. Not at all, sir; not at all.

The diet, the ordinary economic circumstances of life for the average Vietnamese, tend to be somewhat better today than it was before. I think if one is going to put price tags on these things, one has to remember that there are 82 or 83 percent of the primary school-age kids in school. That is income, sir; that is income. I think, if anything, the gulf, such as it was, between a handful of the elite and the great mass of people today has narrowed very much.

(The article referred to follows:)

[From The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 29, 1970]

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES REPORT—U.S. AID TO SAIGON WIDENS GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR?

(By Daniel Southerland)

SAIGON.—A report commissioned by the World Council of Churches says that more foreign aid is currently coming into South Vietnam than can be effectively absorbed.

The report was prepared by two secretaries of the council, Don Luce and Nguyen Tang Canh, who were appointed to spend three months preparing a survey of the

needs of the people of South Vietnam. Their report is described as an "interim" report, with a final assessment yet to be made.

The 57-page document says that much of the $408 million in United States aid provided to South Vietnam in 1969 "has been caught in administrative bureaucracy and absorbed by corruption."

This massive infusion of aid "has also encouraged dependence on foreign aid to such an extent that many South Vietnamese have ceased to believe that the Vietnamese can solve their own problems."

"The general effect of the aid to Vietnam has been to widen the gap between rich and poor," the survey says.

The report warns that pumping in large amounts of voluntary aid at this time in addition to the already existing United States Government aid could merely "complicate the situation."

"More aid is coming into Vietnam now than can be effectively absorbed," it says.

Don Luce, an agricultural specialist from East Calais, Vt., has spent more than 10 years working in Vietnam, most of them with the International Voluntary Service (IVS), a kind of private peace corps that works with the Vietnamese people, training refugees, working on agricultural projects, and teaching English among other things, Mr. Luce speaks Vietnamese.

In late 1967, Mr. Luce, then IVS director for Vietnam, and three other IVS executives in Vietnam, resigned in protest against U.S. policies in Vietnam. They sent an open letter to President Johnson calling the war "an overwhelming atrocity" and appealing for deescalation, an end to crop defoliation, an end to the bombing in both North and South Vietnam, and recognition of the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front.

PEOPLE BEHIND REPORT

Mr. Luce was coauthor last year of a book called "Vietnam—the Unheard Voices," published by the Cornell University Press. The foreword was written by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D) of Massachusetts.

Nguyen Tang Canh is an "economist who did graduate work at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland.

The Luce-Canh report contrasts sharply with an optimistic year-end report recently released here by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). It maintains that "American economic aid has changed and is changing for the better the everyday living of the people of Vietnam."

The AID report says that over a period of 18 years the United States has spent or committed something less than $4 billion in economic aid to South Vietnam. It says this aid reached a high of $646 million in the fiscal year of 1967, dropped to $548 million in 1968, and to $408 million in 1969. It projects a jump back up to more than $514 million in 1970.

This has long been the largest American aid program in the world, the largest anywhere, in fact, since the Marshall Plan of more than 20 years ago. The greatest portion of the aid to Vietnam has been devoted to a commercial-import program aimed at curbing inflation.

The Luce-Canh report says the Vietnamese "have been overrun with foreign and technical experts, feasibility studies, relief goods, orphanages. . . . Social order has broken down."

"Too many Vietnamese have become dependent on handouts," it says. "Television, motorbikes, air-conditioning have been showered upon Vietnam without concern for the social and economic effects.

"Moreover, many Vietnamese feel that many of these things were imposed on a (Saigon) government too weak to resist," the report continues. "The overwhelming foreign presence has become a threat to Vietnamese manhood and nationhood."

The report calls for the "Vietnamization" of economic programs in South Vietnam and a renewal of the traditional village community life which has been disrupted by the war.

The survey is not only critical of U.S. Government aid but also of foreign voluntary agencies: "The country has been oversaturated with foreign voluntary agencies," it says. "Development of local groups has been at a minimum, partly because foreigners have allocated the resources to their own organizations rather than Vietnamese ones."

Emphasizing community development and cooperation with private Vietnamese organizations, the Luce-Canh report takes a different approach from the lengthy economic report submitted to President Nixon last year by David E.

Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and Vu Quoc Thuc, an economics professor and minister of state in the Saigon government.

DEVELOPMENT PLAN HIT

The Thuc-Lilienthal document, which took two years to prepare, amounts to the only major postwar development plan for South Vietnam.

It concludes that with a total of at least $2.5 billion in foreign aid, most of it presumably to be provided by the United States, South Vietnam could attain complete economic self-reliance—meaning freedom from dependence on foreign aid—within 10 years.

The Luce-Canh report does not directly criticize the Thuc-Lilienthal study except to say that it has been financed by the U.S. and Saigon governments and thus "reflects the Washington and Saigon political points of view."

But when questioned in an interview, Mr. Luce said he felt the Thuc-Lilienthal plan was "too westernized."

"Many Vietnamese feel the plan puts too much emphasis on projects that will require a large amount of capital from the West and that it is attempting to set up a Vietnamese economy modeled after the U.S. one," said Mr. Luce.

Mr. Luce is convinced that South Vietnam will eventually have a government much less tightly linked with the United States than the present one and that economic planners should take this into consideration.

PERCENTAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S IMPORTS FINANCED BY UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimate there of the percentage of South Vietnam's imports that are being directly or indirectly financed by the United States?

Mr. MACDONALD. Oh, virtually all. There is no question about that, if you use the word "indirectly." They imported roughly three-quarters of $1 billion in 1969. AID and Public Law 480 constituted something slightly more than one-third of that three-quarters of $1 billion. The slightly less than two-thirds remaining amount was financed by dollars of their own. But, as you suggest in your question, those dollars of their own came predominantly from the Department of Defense which purchased piasters with them.

But let us not give the Vietnamese no credit for export earnings. Their earnings have gone down precipitously in the years of war, but they still do earn some $15 to $17 million of their own. But the great bulk unquestionably is from U.S. taxpayer source. There is no question about that, sir.

COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF AID PROGRAMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND PAKISTAN

The CHAIRMAN. How do you compare your present and your experience in the last 4 years with your experience in Pakistan as to the effect of the program on the local community? How effective has it been and what is the reaction of the people to it? You were 4 years in Pakistan?

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before these 4 years in South Vietnam?

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, almost immediately before. I had a brief interlude in another country before being asked to go to Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you compare it and give us any lessons you learned?

Mr. MacDonald. They are rather incomparable.

The Chairman. Are they? They may not be the same.

Mr. MacDonald. They are rather incomparable situations. Vietnam is a country at war. Pakistan was not.

The Chairman. They didn't have the war with India when you were there?

Mr. MacDonald. It happened 2 days after I left, but it was not a war of a quarter of a century's duration, Mr. Chairman. They are hardly comparable.

The Chairman. You left just in time.

Mr. MacDonald. I would like very much to respond to your question. I am not certain how I can approach it, however. The Pakistanis in those years, and I gather since, have been doing a very creditable job in developing their resources and their economy.

In the early 1960's they were pretty much out in front among the developing countries of the world. They had a sense of discipline. They had a realization of the limited worth of external aid, an understanding that development entailed in the first place an enormous amount of self-help and a willingness to leaven their own self-help with aid, but not to depend entirely upon it.

I would say that the Vietnamese have no less an understanding that their future is dependent upon their own efforts across the board, not just in the economic sphere, but in the military area as well.

From an economic point of view I find them enormously attractive people, with great potential, great skill, great learning ability, with the determination, when they make up their mind to undertake a certain objective, to see it through.

They have had one success after another, if I may use that word to describe some of the things they have done in these last 4 years.

The Chairman. Would you say that our experience in Pakistan was a quite successful one and that AID made a real contribution to that country?

Mr. MacDonald. I think there is no question but that AID resources, the financial resources provided by Americans to Pakistan were important.

IMPACT OF AID ON UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The Chairman. I ask you this because as you know, it was not too long ago that Mr. Ayub Khan was, in a sense, deposed by General Yahya Khan. There have been stories since that time that there was a very undue concentration of economic activity and wealth in the hands of a very few people. It is sort of that old story of the 20 families, perhaps 50 families, but anyway a very high concentration.

The implication of the story I read did not really lay it to AID's activities, but it prompts this thought. I wonder if the infusion of aid through a foreign government's agency could not be subject to the criticism that it may distort the orderly—because it is so much easier and almost inevitable that you do business with those who speak English and know how to do business with the West. They know how to import; they know how to do business. The story I read described how these very rich families did practically all the importing of modern equipment all the way from automobiles to computers. They represented all of the major corporations in the West and they, of course, reaped all the benefits of import programs.

They were also closely allied with Mr. Ayub Khan's political organization and the article gave this as one of the principal reasons why there was in a sense this revolution in Pakistan.

It only raises again the question whether a foreign country, especially a very rich, big Western country, can go into a small or a large, for that matter, undeveloped country and do a job that is really to the benefit of the local people. I know you don't feel competent to answer these questions.

Mr. MacDonald. I do feel competent to answer that one, sir.

The Chairman. Do you? I thought this fell in line with my first question as to why we were in Vietnam. You didn't want to answer that one.

Mr. MacDonald. I think it is a different question.

The Chairman. I would like to have you have a go at it.

Mr. MacDonald. I think that traditional societies have generally been characterized as you just have, as societies with a small elite at the top enjoying a monopolistic position, certainly in economic terms and in many other ways. That has been the pattern of traditional culture and societies around the world.

But the whole idea of development and the effect of aid, is to alter that. It may very well be true that a country has 14 or 40 or 67 predominant families in a position to benefit by an increase in economic activity, but the net effect of the entire effort is to raise the living standards of the mass of people, not through aid alone. Aid is only a catalyst to enable a nation to meet its own needs, to increase output, the better to share national wealth with all its people.

I think there is no question but that the development efforts and the AID efforts in Vietnam have accomplished these things, and I believe in Pakistan also. There is a middle class in being that never used to be there.

The Chairman. It is very interesting and I am glad you gave your views about it.

QUESTION IS ONE OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT

As I am sure you recognize, there is a difference of opinion because the people in Pakistan didn't like what was developing there. Whatever influence you had, you were there. I don't mean you, personally, but the AID program was there for quite a while and we put quite substantial amounts of money in there. This raises a very serious question in my mind of whether a country, like ours can do what we think we are doing. I certainly don't question the motives. I think our motives in AID were about as good as we could have. I don't question that at all.

It is our judgment as to human nature and human psychology that is in question. It is like what is in question in Vietnam are not the motives of anyone past or present. It is the political judgment. Was it wise and is it in the interests of the country? That is still the question.

These are always legitimate questions in political circles. You are not responsible for our being there, so I certainly don't hold you responsible. You are doing a job.

CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Taking the old saw that no news is good news, I am bound to say that during the last couple of years there has been far less scandalous news out of Vietnam than any preceding 2 years I can remember. It used to be chronic. About every 6 weeks there would be a new scandal about speculation of one kind or another, and corruption and goods. There were even stories that most of the Vietcong supplies really came through our AID import program.

Whether you have improved it or have at least stifled the reporting, one or the other, I have not heard bad news like that very much in recent months.

Assuming that it is warranted, I will congratulate you on at least the appearances of having controlled what used to be a flagrant case of corruption. I do not know whether I would say bad management, but a situation which could not be controlled.

I will end by saying you apparently have done a good job, and I know of no reason to say you have not. I do not criticize you or mean to leave any implication or criticism for Vietnam on your being there. You are there to do a job and you think that apparently you have done a good job.

SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

It is getting late. I have a few more questions here but I have to go. I have another engagement. I wonder if the staff could submit the few other questions I have to you and your staff. They are really material for use in our consideration. I don't want to detain you. I will just say thank you very much for coming here. I think you have been very informative and it is very useful indeed.

SCHEDULE OF HEARINGS

I want to announce that the committee will continue this series of hearings on Thursday, at 10 a.m., when we will have the testimony of the Director of the USIA program in Vietnam. Prior to the testimony from the USIA witness, we will hear Congressman McCloskey.

Thank you very much, Mr. MacDonald.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene on Thursday, March 19, 1970, at 10 a.m.)

(The following are answers by the Agency for International Development to additional committee questions:)

AID Replies to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Questions of April 1, 1970

1. (a) What percentage of South Vietnam's imports last year were financed directly or indirectly by the United States? What will the percentage be this year? Next year?

Answer. Earlier, I noted that virtually all of the three-quarters of $1 billion in imports into Vietnam in 1969 was financed "directly or indirectly" by the United States. The level of imports referred to was the value of commercial import licenses and PL 480 Title I purchase authorizations issued, which totalled $740 million in 1969. Besides this commonly used measure of import activity, a more detailed analysis can be made on the basis of actual payments on import

transactions, rather than licensing. Commercial imports on a payments basis totalled $686 million in 1969, and were financed as follows:

	Millions
AID commercial import program (CIP)	$177.2
Public Law 480 title I sales	87.8
GVN-financed freight and insurance (on above)	18.5
GVN-financed imports	402.4
Total commercial imports CIF-value	685.9

A.I.D. CIP and PL 480 imports represents direct U.S. financing by the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, respectively. Of GVN-financed transactions, about $15 million-worth were covered by South Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings from visible exports. The remaining amount of $406 million was financed with dollars, also of the Government of South Vietnam, which it earned in 1969 and prior years from its invisible exports, virtually all in the form of dollars accrued in the sale of piasters to the United States for use by the Department of Defense in purchasing goods and services in South Vietnam necessary to the United States presence. Considering the latter amount as "indirect" financing by the U.S., the total percentage of commercial imports financed directly or indirectly by the United States was 98 percent.

In addition to commercial imports, the value of non-commercial imports in 1969 was approximately as follows:

	Millions
AID project commodities	$85.0
Public Law 480 title II grants	28.5
Non-U.S. foreign assistance grant commodities	10.0
Total noncommercial imports	123.5

Total commercial and non-commercial imports are thus estimated at $809.4 million on a payments basis, and the percentage financed directly or indirectly by the U.S. at 97 percent.

We expect this percentage will continue at well over 90 percent in 1970 and 1971.

(*b*) *What was the cost to the United States of the import program for each of the last three years?*

Answer. On a payments basis, the A.I.D. Commercial Import Program totalled $104.3 million in 1968, $177.2 million in 1969, and is estimated at about $200.0 million in 1970. (On a gross obligation basis by fiscal year, the amounts are $160 million in FY 1968, $130 million in FY 1969, and are estimated at $220 million in FY 1970.)

(*c*) *When do you think U.S. aid for commodity imports can be ended if the war continues at the present level?*

Answer. As long as the war continues at the present level and South Vietnam must divert over one million men from economically productive pursuits to its armed forces, there will be a need for some substantial level of commodity import assistance.

2. Has the Government of Vietnam asked the United States for additional aid to help feed the South Vietnamese Army?

Answer. A.I.D. itself has received no such request. However, the Government of Vietnam has made a proposal along these lines which is being considered by the Department of Defense.

3. Has the United States made any commitments to the Government of South Vietnam regarding the future level of U.S. aid? If so, would you provide the Committee with a copy of that agreement?

Answer. The U.S. has made no such commitment.

4. How much economic assistance did South Vietnam receive last year from other nations? What nations and what amounts from each? How much is expected for 1970?

Answer. Economic and social assistance extended to Vietnam in 1969 from countries other than the U.S. totalled $25.8 million, as follows:

	Millions
Germany	$6.1
Japan	4.9
France	4.8
Korea	3.4
Australia	2.2
Canada	1.9
United Kingdom	1.0
New Zealand	.6
Switzerland	.4
Thailand	.2
Others	.3
Total	25.8

A slightly higher total is expected in 1970 unless there is a significant diminution of hostilities, in which case we would expect other countries to plan for substantially increasing their aid.

5. Is AID financing any organized programs of study concerning Vietnam at U.S. colleges or universities? If so, please describe the scope and objectives of the assistance.

Answer. An institutional development grant of one million dollars was made to Southern Illinois University on June 30, 1969, for a five-year period. The purpose of the grant was to increase the University competence for establishing studies and programs geared to postwar economic and social development of Vietnam. Such competence will become available to A.I.D., other agencies of the U.S. Government and for program planning, personnel training, and other related needs.

The grant was made under the provisions of Section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 as amended, which authorizes such grants ". . . to research and educational institutions in the United States for the purpose of strengthening their capacity to develop and carry out programs concerned with the economic and social development of less developed countries." The 211(d) grants are for strengthening on-campus capabilities; they do not provide for direct services to A.I.D. (such as overseas technical assistance contracts) which, if any, would be carried out under separately financed contracts.

Under the terms of the grant, the objectives and scope of the studies and programs of the Center include:

1. The University will expand its permanent, full-time professional core staff, of Vietnamese and U.S. scholars under a Director of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and Programs. Activities will include organizing interdisciplinary courses of study about Vietnam in the related disciplines at the gradnate, undergraduate and special short-course levels for both U.S. and foreign graduate and special students. This will involve the development of new courses and the restructuring of some existing courses.

2. The University will expand its library and public information services on all aspects of Vietnam.

3. The University will expand its research into economic and social development technology as related to the purpose of this grant.

The expanded full-time Vietnamese-American professional core staff, courses of study, library and information program will enable the University to respond more adequately to requests for assistance on economic and social development problems in Vietnam from A.I.D., other U.S. universities, Vietnamese governmental agencies and universities, international and regional agencies, various private businesses and interested private citizens.

In addition, A.I.D. is also financing programs of study concerning Vietnam through a contract with The Asia Society, New York, N.Y. While The Asia Society is not itself a college or university, under the terms of the contract, it has organized the South East Asia Development Advisory Group—a group of professors from various academic disciplines and from different universities who are interested in development assistance to the South East Asia countries—including Vietnam. In 1969 research grants were provided to six scholars for the following studies on Vietnam:

The Changing Composition of the Political Elite in South Vietnam as Reflected in Persons Holding National Office since 1954. ($11,400) (Wesley R. Fishel, Michigan State University);

The Current and Future Role of the 1967 Lower House as an Emerging Political Institution and its Membership as an Emerging Elite. ($9,803) (Allan E. Goodman, Harvard University);

The Effects of Long Term Viet Cong/Viet Minh Control on Rural Vietnamese Social Structure and Attitude and Value Orientations of the Delta Peasantry. ($19,820) (Neil Jamison and A. Terry Rambo, University of Hawaii);

The Relationship between Economic Change and Peasant Organizations in Vietnamese Villages. ($22,670) (Samuel L. Popkin, Harvard University); and

Planning Study on Research on Village Development in Vietnam. ($18,426) (Ithiel de Sola Pool, M.I.T.).

6. How much has South Vietnam's population increased in the last ten years? What is the current birth rate? Does the United States provide family planning assistance to South Vietnam? If not, why not?

Answer. The GVN National Institute of Statistics estimates that South Vietnam's population has increased by approximately 4.1 million in the last ten years, to a 1969 total of 17,867,000. The annual estimated population growth rate during those years has varied between 2.6 and 3.0 percent. The annual crude birth rate is estimated at 4.4 percent (live births surviving 24 hours).

Because of a 1933 Vietnamese law prohibiting the practice of contraceptive techniques and dissemination of family planning information, U.S. assistance in family planning has been limited to a Ministry of Health research project. In this research project the U.S. has provided medical equipment, vehicles, audio visual training equipment and contraceptive supplies for the establishment of Family Planning Clinics within the Ministry's Maternal and Child Health system. At present there are nine of these clinics and one family planning training center for national midwives in operation. The U.S. has also provided training opportunities for 47 community health and population studies workers.

The limited direct U.S. assistance has been coordinated with the work of the following international family planning organizations:

(a) The International Planned Parenthood Federation, which has provided in-country training for national midwives, training at the IPPF regional center in Singapore for doctors and nurses, and financial support for the establishment of a private Vietnamese family planning organization.

(b) The Population Council's observational tours for GVN officials have acquainted them with successful Asian family planning programs.

(c) The Pathfinder Fund has provided assistance for GVN participation in international family planning conferences, salaries for family planning clinic clerical personnel, and contraceptive supplies.

7. (a) What is the outlook for future U.S. private investment in Vietnam?

Answer. The GVN, the Vietnamese private sector and AID are cooperating in identifying potential postwar private investment opportunities in Vietnam. While results of this work are tentative, areas of greatest attraction for investors will probably be the following: fisheries, wood products, sugar refining, fertilizer, chemicals, textiles, machinery and metal products. The extent to which U.S. private capital takes advantage of these opportunities will depend largely on the availability of investment guaranties, and the existence of an efficiently implemented, attractive Vietnamese investment incentive law. The security situation, of course, must show steady improvement over a period of time before any substantial increase in U.S. or other foreign investment can be expected.

(b) Is AID devising any special incentives to attract potential investors to South Vietnam in the postwar period?

Answer. AID Advisors are working closely with the GVN in drafting a new investment incentive law that will be competitive with those of other countries in the area. It is anticipated that such a law will be put into effect during 1970. In cooperation with the Asian Development Bank, AID is also advising the GVN Industrial Development Center on restructuring itself to become more attractive to foreign lenders. The AID investment guaranty program will be an essential element in fostering postwar U.S. investment.

8. What is the estimated total for foreign investment in Vietnam at present? How much is the U.S. investment and how much of that is covered under the investment guaranty program?

Answer. As of the end of 1969, foreign private industrial investment was estimated at US$108 million, of which U.S. investment was approximately $8.8 million. The balance was principally French investment.

AID political risk insurance coverage in effect is as follows:

American Trading Investment Corp	$135, 354
Intl. Dairy Eng. Co. (Foremost)	395, 293
Caltex (storage tanks)	294, 000
Subtotal	824, 647
Chase Manhattan Bank	30, 000, 000
Bank of America	30, 000, 000
Total	60, 824, 647

It is most unlikely that the two American banks would ever have claims for the insured amounts.

9. (b) What portion of Vietnam's spending of foreign exchange is in the United States? What other countries get sizable shares of GVN spending?

(The information referred to appears on p. 612)

10. The Lilienthal report on post-war reconstruction stated that in the next 10 years, South Vietnam's economy will require an investment of $5 billion to achieve a satisfactory growth rate and that half of this will have to come from external sources. How much of that do you expect to come from U.S. private resources? How much from U.S. foreign aid?

Answer. The Lilienthal report postulated not just the possibility of South Vietnam attaining a ". . . satisfactory growth rate . . ." following a decade of development, but rather that she could in that time attain a state of *self-sustaining growth* in which she would have no need for further concessional aid. That achievement would require satisfactory growth rates *during* the decade of development.

Given the uncertainty of future events, it is difficult to establish meaningful investment requirements for the next ten years. If the Lilienthal report's prospectus and figures are correct, and assuming a U.S. share in financing the 2.5 billion dollar investment which the report says may be derived from external sources over the next ten years, it is probable that most U.S. assistance would come from public sources. U.S. private business has only recently expressed interest in investing in Vietnam. The prospects for increased aid, both public and private, from other nations (notably Japan) are brighter, and should materialize quickly as hostilities diminish.

11. The General Accounting Office recently reported that the United States Government had paid directly or indirectly between $28 million and $34 million in rental taxes on leased facilities in Viet-Nam between 1966 and 1968 and the GAO recommended that steps be taken by the U.S. Government to obtain relief. Is anything being done to correct this situation?

Answer. Since receiving the GAO report, the U.S. Mission in Viet-Nam has determined to seek an exemption from the rental taxes on facilities leased to the U.S. Government, and steps to obtain this relief are now being discussed with the Ministry of Finance.

Since this question was put to the Director USAID/Viet-Nam, it should be noted that this problem has virtually no applicability to A.I.D. operations as virtually all piaster financing in support of them is derived from the GVN counterpart account and not from U.S.-purchased piasters as in other areas.

12. What proportion of the total cost of the land reform program will be paid by the United States—directly or indirectly? What will be the total cost to the United States?

Answer. Cost of the new "Land-to-the-Tiller" Law to the GVN is estimated at VN$75–$110 billion (US$640–960 million equivalent),[1] depending on land valuation. This amount would cover landlord compensation at 20 percent cash downpayment with the balance in bonds redeemable over an eight-year period. The U.S. does not contemplate making any direct financial contribution to these payments, which are a local currency cost. In recognition of the inflationary impact on the economy of these payments, however, we intend to assist the GVN to meet the resulting increased import demand, as we do with respect to total import requirements. Our financial assistance would be applied through the A.I.D. Commercial Import Program. We have been planning to earmark US$40 million for this purpose over the first three years of the program, through specific project agreements tied to progress in land transfers. US$10 million of this amount has already been obligated. Additional support over the life of the program will be considered as part of our overall economic stabilization assistance.

Since the level of this subsequent support will depend on a great number of economic factors besides land reform payments, an estimate of that portion of the total cost of the program which the U.S. might bear cannot be predicted now.

[1] Converted at 118:1.

13. (a) What is the total for all U.S. spending in Viet-Nam—government and private?

Answer. U.S. spending affecting the Vietnamese economy is estimated at approximately $730 million in 1969. This includes all A.I.D.-financed and PL 480 commodities, and official and troop spending. Other private spending is negligible.

(b) How much of South Viet-Nam's national income is derived, directly or indirectly, from the United States presence, including the U.S. aid program?

Answer. The computation of the Vietnamese GNP is complicated by the war situation and the exchange rate problem. At a realistic exchange rate, GNP per capita is estimated at roughly US$150–175, of which US$50–55, or about one-third, is the direct and indirect contribution of the American presence, including American aid.

(c) What effect will the continued reduction of U.S. forces and spending have on South Viet-Nam's economy and on the level of U.S. aid?

Answer. The reduction of the number of combat troops will have little direct effect on the economy, though certain dislocations in urban economies may attend the reduction of the number of support troops. Indirectly, the reduction of forces will decrease the amount of dollars available to the GVN to finance imports. A compensating increase in economic aid will probably be required to mitigate the effect of economic dislocations caused by personnel withdrawals, to help finance the increased burden shouldered by the GVN, and to supply investment capital.

14. (a) Has the United States encouraged the Government of Vietnam to devalue the piaster? If not, why not?

Answer. The United States has strongly encouraged the GVN to take a series of stabilization measures of which monetary reform is one important element.

(b) What magnitude of devaluation would be required to stem the present capital flight and reduce black market activities to insignificance?

Answer. It is difficult to say what magnitude of devaluation would stem capital flight and reduce black market activities. Any arrangement short of a freely fluctuating rate would involve limiting access to the exchange and thus insure a continued black market demand. The short-run consequences of a free rate would be too disruptive to contemplate. Of much greater importance in stemming capital flight is the matter of basic confidence in the economy, which goes beyond adjustment of the exchange rate.

15. (a) What percentage of South Vietnam revenues last year was derived from taxes? How much from income taxes?

Answer. The composition of GVN revenues in 1969 was as follows, in billion of piasters:

Customs duties and related collections	VN$52. 0
Domestic taxes	26. 0
Receipts for services, lottery proceeds, etc	110. 9
Counterpart releases	24. 3
Deficit financing	29. 6
Total revenues	142. 8

Customs and domestic taxes represent 55 percent of the total. Income taxes represent a relatively small proportion of domestic taxes, the bulk being derived from indirect, excise, and registration taxes. Income taxes amount to about 4 percent of total revenues. Domestic taxes and receipts as a whole account for 26 percent of the total; and if domestic borrowing (deficit financing) is added, the percentage of the budget financed solely by the GVN and unrelated to external assistance amounts to 46.6 percent. It is important to note that this self-financed level, the equivalent of US$562 million, substantially exceeds expenditures for the civilian portion of the budget for such areas as education, health, agriculture and public services, which totalled US$317 million equivalent in 1969. A chart giving additional detail on budget receipts and expenditures follows.

(b) Have United States officials recommended in the past that South Vietnam reform its tax structure, especially with regard to income taxes?

Answer. The U.S. has stressed the need to increase domestic revenues, including receipts from income taxes, as a necessary part of an effective economic stabilization program. Specific tax policy advice is provided by a resident United Nations advisor. The USAID/IRS tax advisory team is concerned with improving tax administration and has made many recommendations for administrative reform, including the administration of income taxes.



16. (a) How much were South Vietnam's exports last year compared with imports? What is expected for 1970?

Answer. In 1969 South Vietnam exported an estimated $15 million worth of goods. This may be compared with commercial imports of $686 million, or with total commercial and non-commercial imports of $809 million. (See tabular material, Question 1 a.). In 1970, exports should remain about $15 million and total imports are estimated in the range of $750 million.

(b) How much potential is there for export expansion, assuming that the war continues? To what extent can the South Vietnamese reduce their level of imports?

Answer. As long as the war continues at its present level, prospects for substantial export expansion are relatively slight. Increases in domestic production despite the war and a significant reduction of imports are possible and are being sought.

(c) Do you think the gap can ever be closed as long as the war goes on?

Answer. The gap between imports and exports is not at all likely to be closed as long as the war continues at its present level.

17. (a) When will South Vietnam regain self-sufficiency in rice production?

Answer. South Vietnam will regain self-sufficiency in rice production by the end of 1971, assuming there is a continued economic incentive for farmers to raise rice. Rice import and marketing policies must be such as to sustain this incentive. There is every expectation of self-sufficiency in 1971.

(b) What has happened to South Vietnam's traditional rice markets since the war began? What are prospects for her regaining these markets?

Answer. Vietnam's traditional rice exports consisted first of relatively small quantities shipped to Hong Kong and Singapore. Vietnam can probably recapture some of these markets by exporting her very high quality rice as she did when last an exporter, and by adjusting her monetary rate of exchange to encourage export sales. Additional small amounts moved to France and other European countries, but Vietnam's command of these markets was primarily the result of cheap backhaul freight rates. Finally, the majority of South Vietnam's rice exports in the past went to North Vietnam.

(c) Are the new "miracle rice" varieties of adequate quality to compete in the world market?

Answer. The original "miracle" rice strains, IR-8 and IR-5, are meeting the quantitative needs for rice in Vietnam, but they are not considered suitable for

export by Vietnam or other surplus producing countries. New improved varieties, however, such as IR–20 and IR–22, have milling and table qualities suitable for international trade. IR–20 has been distributed to all the primary rice-growing provinces in small amounts to begin the build-up of seed stocks. IR–22 is being tested and will be released in the near future if it continues to prove to be satisfactory for Vietnam's conditions. Other promising varieties are in the development stage. These improved strains are, of course, available to other rice producing countries as well as Vietnam.

18. Given the prospects for continued fighting under the Vietnamization policy, what are the prospects for reducing the imbalance between GVN spending for military purposes and for economic and social purposes?

Answer. As long as the country is under military attack by North Vietnam and subjected to harassment by local insurgents externally stimulated by the North Vietnamese, and through the North Vietnamese equipped by other foreign Powers, the present priority given military spending should and must continue. Nonetheless, GVN spending for economic and social purposes which has been large and growing the last three years will probably continue to increase absolutely in the next several years despite the war. This should bring a continuation of the rapid and unprecedented growth of public and social services being provided the South Vietnamese people by their government, in marked contrast to the situation in North Vietnam.

Given a cessation of the external aggression by North Vietnam and their aid to the Viet Cong, but a continuation of Viet Cong insurgency, a substantial reduction in the "imbalance" could be effected.

19. What is the state of South Vietnam's foreign exchange holdings now, compared with a year ago? Two years ago? What do you expect them to be a year from now? What will happen to her foreign exchange holdings as U.S. forces are withdrawn, assuming that U.S. economic aid is not increased?

Answer. Vietnam's foreign exchange holdings in millions of U.S. dollars are as follows:

	As of yearend		
	1967	1968	1969
Official GVN holdings	325	319	260
Commercial bank holdings	13	26	30
Total	338	345	290

Total foreign exchange reserves as of the end of 1970 should be about US$255 million. Future foreign exchange earnings would decline more or less sharply, depending on the pace of U.S. force withdrawal, and holdings would probably be reduced. The level of reserves, however, will be determined by a combination of GVN import, fiscal, and domestic production policies and by the magnitude of direct and indirect foreign aid, which cannot be forseen precisely now.

20. Approximately 100,000 to 300,000 South Vietnamese women are living as prostitutes, bar girls, and "temporary wives" of American servicemen, according to a report put out in October 1969 by the World Council of Churches. What, if any, steps are being taken to integrate these women into productive economic activities as American forces are withdrawn?

Answer. The figures in the referenced report were offered without substantiation. Since statistics on this subject are not kept, one could do no more than speculate whether the wide-range "guesstimate" made in the report is high, low or reasonably accurate. The American military, in a major effort to lessen the incidence of this kind of problem began over two years ago to place cities off limits to servicemen and this has doubtless had a pronounced effect.

The Ministry of Social Welfare is attempting to deal with the problem of prostitution in Vietnam through programs of vocational training and education at a few rehabilitation and detention centers, and has plans to expand this work. But the impact of these programs has been limited and it seems unlikely that the problem will be eliminated here much more quickly than it has in comparable situations in other nations suffering from war-time conditions.

21. (a) What has been the inflation in South Vietnam since 1965? What is expected for 1970?

Answer. From 1965 through 1969, the cost of living as measured by costs for the Saigon working class rose about 35 percent a year. If taken from June 1966, the

annual rate of increase through 1969 is in the order of 27 percent. Something less than that is being attempted for 1970.

(*b*) *Have any steps been taken toward easing the impact of inflation on the poor through stateowned stores selling rice and other essentials, subsidizing the price of rice, or similar measures?*

Answer. Imported U.S. rice is sold at prices below the price of domestic rice, and below the free market price for U.S. rice, to groups of people hard-hit by inflation, such as refugees, soldiers and their families, civil servants and a variety of needy persons.

22. (*a*) *How many Vietnamese work at U.S. government installations, for U.S. Government contractors, or for U.S. personnel in a private capacity?*

(*b*) *How many Vietnamese jobs are dependent, directly or indirectly, on the United States presence?*

Answer. In early 1970, some 142,000 Vietnamese were employed by all U.S. agencies and major contractors. There is no way to estimate reliably the number of Vietnamese who may be privately employed by Americans, nor how many jobs may be indirectly dependent on the U.S. presence in Vietnam.

23. Why were "austerity" taxes on imports of luxuries not imposed long before last Fall?

Answer. The "austerity" tax had its origin in 1961, and so was indeed imposed long before last Fall. As to the last two years, however, the political and economic disruptions of Tet 1968 effectively postponed additional economic austerity measures until 1969. Some were introduced in the spring, and more far-reaching measures in the fall of 1969. The result of the measures taken at that time was to increase by 65 percent the average effective cost of those imports on which additional taxes were imposed. (Twenty-seven percent of imports, considered essential, were exempted from the austerity tax increases).

24. (*a*) *How much of the black market operation in commodities do you estimate to be due to U.S. military forces, foreign military forces, or civilian employees acquiring PX goods and then selling them on the Vietnamese economy in order to get a more realistic rate of exchange?*

(*b*) *Have any studies been made of the extent that PX and commissary goods end up in the black market? If so, what do they show as to the total value of the goods so diverted?*

(*c*) *What was the total value of all goods imported into Viet-Nam last year for use in PX or commissary operations? How much does this come to per soldier?*

(*d*) *Are any reports kept, or have any studies been made, of the amount of PX sales made to persons other than U.S. military personnel? What do they show?*

[These questions asked at Hearings, pp. 617–618 of transcript, Mr. MacDonald indicating this is a DOD matter in which he has no competence.]

25. Can the United States give a more realistic rate of exchange to its employees or servicemen with the piasters it owns, if it chooses to do so?

Answer. Yes, but doing so would entail the diversion of U.S.-owned piasters which the U.S. presently uses to finance essential activities.

26. How does the GVN select the importers who will be permitted to bring in goods financed by the United States under the commodity import program? How many people were arrested and convicted last year of fraud or other corrupt activities in connection with the import program?

Answer. The GVN has an "Open General Licensing System", with established pre-qualification criteria against which commercial importing firms, dealers, and industrial enterprises apply for registration or authorization to act as importers. A large number of importers are qualified under the system and substantial competition results. During a recent 14-month period, 837 importers were issued one or more AID-financed import licenses. There were no arrests or convictions last year directly connected with the AID-financed import program. A.I.D. controls and procedures have succeeded in keeping the loss rate low on A.I.D.-financed commodities—less than one-half of one percent in the commercial import program. This includes losses from all causes including theft, breakage, spoilage, and short shipments.

Considering GVN Customs operations as a whole, there are of course many arrests for avoidance or attempted avoidance of GVN regulations by smuggling or other illicit practices. In 1969 the GVN Customs Service collected fines and penalties totalling US$ 1.8 million equivalent for violations of customs and import regulations. Over 3500 customs cases were instituted, and 2807 cases settled through administrative proceedings. Court convictions resulted in 192 of these cases.

27. Is pay adequate for GVN civil servants and is there a relationship between low pay and corruption in the ministries?

Answer. Pay increases for GVN civil servants have not kept pace with rises in the cost of living, and civil service salaries are generally lower than those in the private sector. The inadequacy of GVN civil service salaries is partially alleviated by fringe benefits such as family allowances, a rice allowance and medical benefits.

Low pay is a contributing factor to corruption. Petty officials often require "speed" money of a nominal amount as their price for processing a document, for example, a practice which some say has come to be tolerated in Vietnamese society as an unavoidable evil, a form of enforced tipping for service. Major instances of corrupt practices probably occur most often among officials, irrespective of their salary, in positions in which they can control large amounts of money. Control of the problem of corruption is being attempted through the institution of tighter audit controls, wider publicity on contract awards and similar transactions, and heavy penalties imposed for those caught in malpractices. Higher salaries would probably have a helpful effect on reducing corrupt practice.

VIETNAM: POLICY AND PROSPECTS, 1970

U.S. Assistance on Information Matters and U.S. Psychological or Propaganda Operations

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1970

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman), Church, and Gore.

Senator CHURCH. The hearing will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The principal purpose of this morning's meeting is to continue the committee's consideration of the operation of various U.S. programs in Vietnam.

First, the committee will hear testimony from Congressman Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California, who was in Vietnam only a few weeks ago. I am sure that his observations will be of interest and assistance to the committee.

Following Congressman McCloskey's testimony, the committee will hear testimony concerning U.S. activities to assist the Vietnamese Government on information matters and the scope of U.S. psychological or propaganda operations generally.

The United States is engaged in a broad-scale program to assist and promote the Government of Vietnam through the use of the entire spectrum of the communications media, from leaflet drops to television. I hope that this hearing will develop the full facts concerning the nature and extent of these activities. But of far greater significance than the specifics of what is being done in Vietnam is the underlying policy which presumes that it is proper and in the national interest for the U.S. Government to engage in propaganda activities in behalf of a foreign government.

There is also the question of whether the Congress in passing the Smith-Mundt Act, the USIA's basic statutory authority contemplated such a role for the Government's official overseas information agency.

However, the witness here to discuss U.S. programs in Vietnam, Mr. Edward J. Nickel, a career officer of the USIA, who is Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, is not responsible

for the policy which thrust the USIA into that role. His job is only to implement that policy.

We will now hear from Congressman McCloskey.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR., REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE 11TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In testifying before you today, I would like you to know first of the limitations on the accuracy of any opinions I may give.

EXPERIENCE OF WITNESS

As a Marine Corps Reserve officer, I have been a student of counter-insurgency warfare since the late 1950's and was privileged to participate in the last large-scale combat exercise in this field prior to our landing of combat troops in Vietnam in the spring of 1965. I applied for an active duty Marine Corps assignment to Vietnam in the fall of 1965, which was rejected; in the following year, I was offered the opportunity to serve as an AID provincial adviser in Vietnam but declined. Since being elected to the Congress in 1967, I have been able to visit Vietnam only twice, once for a period of 11 days just prior to the Tet offensive of January-February 1968, and more recently, for a period of 6 days in February of this year.

I tried to visit the same areas last month which I had seen 2 years earlier in order to appraise the progress of pacification, and more particularly the so-called Vietnamization program. Aside from headquarters briefings and the study of captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogations, I spent the bulk of my time in the hamlets and villages where the pacification program is being conducted, and with the infantrymen and advisers engaged in field operations.

My most recent observations and inquiries were limited to four of Vietnam's 44 Provinces, but I believe the northerly two Provinces, Binh Dinh and Quang Nam, to be fairly representative of the coastal portions of the I and II Corps areas, and the southerly Provinces, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, to reflect the range of problems faced in the delta and the territory surrounding Saigon. Since all four of these Provinces are rated fairly near the bottom for security purposes under the hamlet evaluation system (28th, 37th, 34th, and 35th, respectively, as of January), it is possible that my conclusions will be a little more pessimistic than the overall situation justifies. These conclusions are certainly susceptible of a considerable range of error in any event, but they represent my best judgment and I have no hesitancy in presenting them for your evaluation and comparison with those of our military and State Department personnel.

ORDINARY LIVING CONDITIONS IN I AND II CORPS AREAS

About 6 million people, roughly one-third of the population, reside in the I and II Corps areas. Ninety percent of them live within a few miles of the coast in fertile valleys which are bordered by rugged and heavily forested mountains.

The ordinary manner of living in the rural areas of Vietnam is in hamlets of a few hundred people. The Vietnamese rural hamlet is ordinarily a very pleasant place. The people are courteous, affectionate toward their families, respectful toward their elders and reverent about their ancestry. A family can grow its own food in the equivalent of 2 or 3 acres of land. The climate is mild and the soil fertile. There is no need, and I could observe little inclination, for leaving the area of one's home. I doubt that there are many places in the world where people can live in closer harmony with their land and environment than in the coastal provinces of the I and II Corps areas.

EFFECT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR IN I AND II CORPS AREAS

In waging counterinsurgency war in this area over the past several years, I was advised that we have destroyed 307 of the original 555 hamlets of Quang Nam Province.

I flew over miles and miles of area south and southwest of Danang where nearly every hamlet had been destroyed that was not within a mile of the main highway or larger settlements. Tree lines, hedgerows, and gravesites are all that remain.

The purpose for this destruction was to deny rice, cover, and support to the Vietcong, as well as to the North Vietnamese units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

In one interior valley of pleasant hamlets and productive soil which was pointed out to me 2 years ago, some 20,000 people have been forcibly evacuated to refugee camps along the coastal highway and their hamlets destroyed by either bombing, artillery fire or the action of individual soldiers.

The result has been predictable. One high-ranking CORDS officer told me that he estimated at least one-third of the Vietnamese people in Quang Nam Province to be hostile to the American military presence.

In the 5th Marine regimental tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) southwest of Danang, for example, the bulk of the casualties in 1969 came from booby traps. Infantrymen from the regiment discovered over 1,200 booby traps during the year, of which about half were detonated causing 95 KIA's (killed in action) and 1,195 WIA's (wounded for action), many of them amputees. Thus in 1 year's time the odds of being killed or wounded by a booby trap in this particular regimental area were about 1 in 2 for the 2,400-odd marine riflemen in the regiment.

Under these circumstances, I do not think enough can be said for the courage, morale, and patriotic service of American troops and the officers who lead them.

EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT AND TRAINING EFFORTS

In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, I visited hamlets which had originally been destroyed and defoliated, but which were in the process of resettlement. In Quang Nam Province thus far, some 63 of the 307 hamlets destroyed are being reoccupied as the Government seeks to expand the areas under Government control.

The protection of these hamlets is being assigned to PF and PSDF forces as the American forces are withdrawn, but I observed no evidence that the people were learning any great sense of commitment

to the Saigon government as they returned to their lands and commenced rebuilding homes and restoring land to production.

From a military standpoint, if U.S. troop withdrawals continue, I would predict that the entire coastal area from Binh Dinh north to to the DMZ (demilitarized zone) will fall to the Vietcong and North Vietnamese within 90 days after the last American troops withdraw.

There seems little hope that the fragile institutions of hamlet and village government will survive increasing North Vietnamese and VC pressures once American troops are withdrawn.

Withdrawal of the 3d Marine Division last year and the pending withdrawal of additional brigades from the coastal areas has already caused an increase in enemy activities; remaining American units are required to expand their tactical areas of responsibility to the breaking point.

In both Quang Nam and Binh Dinh Provinces, for example, battalions of the 1st Marine Division and 173d Airborne Brigades, respectively, have been required to cover over 100 square miles each by breaking down into platoons and small units located at considerable distances from one another. It is presently requiring the full abilities and efforts of these units to maintain a status quo with small units of local VC and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units operating in the adjacent mountainous areas.

Of the rural hamlets I visited in both provinces, it was apparent that local RF/PF (Regional Forces/Popular Forces) and PSDF (Peoples' Self-Defense Forces) forces would be unable to protect any individual hamlet in the event that U.S. Main unit forces were withdrawn. While the ARVN divisions in I Corps are deemed excellent by U.S. troop commanders who have been working with them, no American officer was willing to predict that such units alone could withstand a determined assault by NVA units presently operating in I Corps or located just across the DMZ or Laotian frontier.

There appears to be no reasonable expectation that an additional 18 months of resettlement and training of local forces would be sufficient to withstand the historic attitudes of a large percentage of the populace, exacerbated by our clear and destroy and defoliation policies of years past.

SITUATION IN THE DELTA

A different situation exists in the delta in my judgment. There, on flat terrain, with an absence of jungle and mountain cover except in the areas close to the Cambodian border and the U Minh forest pacification has progressed far more rapidly. The province chiefs and adviser teams in the two provinces I visited, Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong, had achieved a far greater cohesion at the hamlet and village level, and prosperity and security have been materially advanced in the past 2 years. American combat troops have not operated in the delta since the 9th Infantry Division vacated the area in late 1969.

The number of VC-controlled hamlets has been substantially reduced and VC local forces and guerrillas have been prevented from any major interference with commerce and communications.

Perhaps the best indication of Government success in the area has been the progress in arming the PSDF. A decision to issue arms to large numbers of civilians 2 years ago would have been unthinkable; most such weapons would have ended up in the hands of the VC.

In the hamlets I visited in Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong Provinces, however, the large number of RF/PF available plus arms issued to the PSDF had caused the hamlet chief to feel relatively secure against anything but a major NVA or VC attack.

A qualification should be noted here, however. It is not entirely certain that the loyalty of either the RF/PF or PSDF is so assured as to guarantee against infiltration by the VC. One instance was cited to me where one individual had caused an entire PSDF squad to defect to the VC.

Also, a hard-core Communist prisoner told me, in an hour-long interviewing that Americans were getting a distorted view of the true views of the rural South Vietnamese, since we only talked to them in the presence of armed forces. This prisoner, a deceptively sweet-appearing lady who had been the VC mayor of My Tho, the Province capital for Dinh Tuong Province, indicated that "resolve, not numbers, will determine the final issue."

I would tend to agree.

The military and pacification progress in III and IV Corps, coupled with the terrain there, could permit a maintenance of the status quo, solely by South Vietnamese troops, barring a major NVA invasion from the Cambodian border. Should such an invasion occur, the issue will be squarely up to the abilities and resolve of the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) divisions presently stationed in the southerly half of Vietnam. From hearsay only, I gather that most American military officers have grave doubts of the abilities of most of the ARVN units involved, and that the issue would be significantly in doubt.

ULTIMATE RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL

From what I could determine, nearly all Vietnamese, both North and South, desire reunification. If the NVA and VC resolve and willingness to undergo hardship remains firm, it would be my judgment that upon our withdrawal that they will ultimately succeed in forcing, first, a coalition government on the South and ultimately a reunification of their country.

I can see no reason why a U.S. presence of over 18 months will affect the ultimate result any differently than if we continue to withdraw, having all of our troops, both combat and support, home by the end of June 1971.

We have tended to equate "progress" with a guarantee of ultimate success. There has indeed been progress, but to obtain it, we have been required to militarize South Vietnam and to create a political structure which far outweighs the South Vietnamese economy's capacity to fund.

To cite an example, one hamlet I visited, with a population of less than 1,000, had local PF protection costing over 1.5 million piasters per year, and a civil administration costing another 1.5 million piasters per year. The total tax revenues from this hamlet were less than one-quarter million piasters per year, about a 12-to-1 ratio. These figures do not include the cost of the central government or American military and economic assistance. Repeated for some 10,500 existing hamlets in Vietnam, it is apparent that the operating expenses of the Saigon government, merely to maintain the status quo, are staggering.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CONCLUDE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

In conclusion, I would like to say a word in support of the Mathias resolution to terminate the Gulf of Tonkin authority, as well as comment on the responsibility of Congress, as opposed to the executive branch, in bringing American involvement in Vietnam to an early conclusion.

I had occasion to refer recently, Mr. Chairman, to the Federalist papers of Alexander Hamilton, particularly Nos. 24 and 26, where he was urging adoption of the Federal Constitution. It seems to me that the following statements of Mr. Hamilton are worthy of consideration by both Houses of Congress today:

> The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence.

I think that puts the burden on the Congress of the United States to determine how long we fund this conflict, and if we face that issue between now and November.

PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF PACIFICATION

I would be pleased to answer any questions. I think the summation of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is this: Pacification in the northern half is not successful and cannot be successful. In the south half of the country it is succeeding, but its continued success will depend on the ability in the——

Senator GORE. I did not understand you after the conjunction "but."

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I said in the north.

Senator GORE. I understood that part of it.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. In the south half of the country, in my judgment, pacification is proceeding successfully and can be successful, but only if the ARVN, South Vietnamese army units, are capable of withstanding a determined assault from across the Cambodian border in the future and that issue would be very much in doubt both on the quality of the ARVN troops in the south and on their resolve to fight.

Senator GORE. What dividing line do you choose between the northern part of the country and the southern part of the country?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, it is not precisely between the four corps areas, Mr. Senator. It is the nature of the terrain in the north half of the country, the mountainous jungle, heavily covered terrain where the rice paddies go right up against the areas of cover and concealment, these are the areas, in my judgment, where pacification cannot succeed. As you get down into the delta where the terrain is flat, where there is no heavily jungled cover, where there is no way in which troops can conceal themselves to come back into the villages and get their rice, in those areas pacification has been successful and is succeeding, in my judgement. But its continued success requires the prevention from intrusion of major NVA units. Every time major NVA units have come

into the area, the guerrilla incidents have increased and the loyalties of the people have become far more tenuous.

Senator GORE. May I continue with a question or two, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Certainly.

LOYALTY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO HANOI AND SAIGON

Senator GORE. Is there any loyalty, if that is the right term, on either side? Is it a matter of fear? This has been difficult for me to comprehend.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. This is an impression, Senator, because I share your committee staff's feeling that it is very difficult for an American to understand what a Vietnamese thinks from what he says. But I would appraise the situation that there is very little loyalty to the Saigon government and there is very little love for the Hanoi government amongst the rural peasantry of South Vietnam; that the overwhelming bulk of the people, over 80 percent of them, would prefer peace at any price regardless of who happened to govern them; and that loyalty to a central government located in a city far away is a term that is not appropriate to apply to the rural countryside in Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator GORE. What is your assessment of their attitude toward American military presence?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Again that would be an impression that I could not guarantee as to its accuracy, but I see no reason for them not to accept the presence of anyone who is giving them a million piasters a year, to any village that would elect a village chief.

I can understand why a village might happily welcome the Americans who bring them the million piasters. But I do not think there is any long-range love for Americans.

Senator GORE. Did you mean to imply that the measure of the bounty was the election of a chief who was friendly to us or what do you mean to suggest?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I do not detect any bitter hatred of Americans amongst the villagers who seem to bear our artillery fire and our aircraft bombardment, but whom we pay a million piasters a year to any village that will elect a village chief. But I do not detect any love on their part for us either, and I suspect, and this is only an impression and not testimony under oath, but I suspect everyone in Vietnam would welcome the day when the last American has left Vietnam.

USE OF BOOBY TRAPS

Senator GORE. I notice you described the effective use of boobytraps. Can such traps be effective without at least the tacit approval and cooperation of the natives?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No, sir. Those areas south of—southwest of Danang where tremendous boobytrap casualties are occurring in the very areas that our troops go into day after day after day and in which the populace on the surface of things is at least passive if not

friendly to us, but obviously in those areas a large percentage of the people are willing to support the Vietcong that operate amongst them.

Senator GORE. I am asking you not out of information, but out of interest. If American GI's in small numbers are stationed in isolated villages, are they particularly vulnerable because of differences in physical appearance?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I do not know that, sir. The boobytrap casualties that the young men are suffering occur when they go out on patrol either day or night into areas in which they can operate in the daytime without too much fear of receiving sniper fire. We have been able to hold VC and NVA units at bay by our power. If they mass three men at one time, we hit them with artillery or bombing or we land a helicopter full of troops and go after them, but the troops are still there. The enemy are still there. They are not showing themselves. They have adjusted their tactics to match our firepower, but they are out there sowing boobytraps every night and those boobytraps are causing casualties to us in an overwhelming percentage. The fact they are able to sow these boobytraps night after night so that when our troops go out on a path they might hit a tripwire with a detonation which may cause 2.3 casualties every time the boobytrap is detonated means they are getting the support of the local populace in the countryside or they would not be able to do that.

When I say support, I do not mean that the local populace are loving the VC more than they love Saigon, but they are not willing to commit themselves.

Senator GORE. If the natives are to avoid the boobytraps, they must at least know where they are or have some knowledge of them.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. The greatest advance by the Marine units that I observed was their growing sophistication in discovering boobytraps by locating the means by which the Vietnamese signal their location, perhaps two bamboo sticks left pointing to a "V" in a certain trail junction and apparently any Vietnamese in the area knows that means there is a boobytrap some distance away.

The American troops are gaining greater knowledge to deal with this situation.

Senator GORE. At least we are not slow to catch on.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. We are not slow, but the penalty of failure can be that you lose both legs, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. I think, Congressman McCloskey, your statement was excellent.

LIKELY RESULT OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Is it your judgment that, after we have left Vietnam, two things are likely to happen; the present Government is likely to be replaced in Saigon by some form of coalition government and the two halves of Vietnam are likely to be reunited?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. That is correct. Just by way of example, in the village capital, in the village hut that goes for a city hall in the provinces in the north, there is a plaque on the wall that says "The Nation Overall" in Vietnamese; and the map is of all of Vietnam, North and South, not just South Vietnam. I could find no indication

on the part of anyone that South Vietnam was considered a permanent and independent nation as we would have it.

Senator CHURCH. In your judgment, then, the overwhelming sentiment in both North and South Vietnam is to reunify the country.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I think I can say honestly—I have never been to North Vietnam—the resolve that keeps them coming 800 miles south to try to unify the country would so indicate.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

American policy for years has been to keep Vietnam divided, as well as to support and sustain an anti-Communist government in Saigon that would be closely allied with our country. From your testimony I understand there is no evidence whatever that that objective has been abandoned by the present Administration——

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I would have to agree.

Senator CHURCH (continuing). And that that objective will not be achieved once American forces leave.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Senator, let me make a qualification to my prior answer. I did detect in the President's speech early after his election the mention of a peace based on the Geneva accords of 1954, and such a peace would presuppose the reunification of Vietnam within 2 years because that was the understanding under the Geneva accords of 1954. Unfortunately, I have seen no other mention by this Administration of a concurrence that they would accept a peace based on the Geneva accords which involved a unification of Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. The policy by which we fought this war has hardly been directed at a reunified Vietnam. Yet this will very likely occur by the forces that we have been opposing.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Correct.

U.S. PERCEPTION OF AND POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA QUESTIONED

Senator CHURCH. I think the inability of the U.S. Government to know how the people of Vietnam really feel, what their political values are, and what their national objectives may be, has been evident throughout the whole course of our involvement in that country. It is also reflected in what has just happened in Cambodia.

From the contacts that I have had with the State Department and from the briefings that this committee has been given, it was unanticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be displaced in Cambodia. In fact, official opinion plus informed expert opinion here had it that if anyone was secure in Southeast Asia, it was Sihanouk.

This clearly demonstrates the fragility of any policy on our part which seeks objectives that are intimately indigenous, and the futility of attempting to win a civil war in a country such as Vietnam with a foreign army.

In the face of that experience, why are we not disengaging American military forces from Southeast Asia generally, especially from Laos and Thailand, before we find ourselves confronted with questions of honor, commitment, and the other political consequences that flow from such a predicament?

Did you have an opportunity in your trip to visit Thailand or Laos?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No, sir. I have not had the privilege of visiting the other countries.

I think that the great lesson of Vietnam is that in a land where people are wedded to their soil, and their tradition, and their history, that to try to say to a country of 17.5 million people, "We will impose a government of our type, of our choice," in a country which has no real reason to have any cohesion with any government—these people live very happily in their own villages and are unwilling to make a commitment to any kind of government—that in that kind of a country, the use of American firepower is almost immoral.

Senator CHURCH. Immoral. Immoral is perhaps not strong enough a term. After all, you mentioned that 307 villages out of 555 had been destroyed in one province alone by American firepower.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I would say this, Senator. That where we seek to lead the world to a peace through law and the only legal precedents we look to are the Hague Convention and perhaps the Nuremberg agreement where we said wanton destruction of villages was a war crime, there is no way we could state that our policy of destroying Vietnamese villages to deny rice and support to the VC that operate in the vicinity and in some respects out of those villages is not of the same level to be condemned as we did in Nuremberg when we executed German officers for pursuing a policy of wanton destruction of villages, and if a war has to be fought by destroying people's homes because so many of the people who live in an area are sympathetic to the enemy, then I do not think America should ever again fight such a war with our weapons in such a country.

Senator CHURCH. I concur wholeheartedly in what you said. If we had just left those people alone, if we had just stayed out of their affairs, none of this terrible agony, none of this wanton destruction, none of this mass killing would have occurred on the scale that has taken place. And, ironically, the security interests of the United States would not have been affected one iota.

Our Vietnam policy has been touched with madness; this foreign adventure is undoubtedly the greatest catastrophe that has ever occurred in the history of our country overseas.

I appreciate very much your testimony. I think it has been very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Congressman, I am sorry I was a bit late. I read your statement, and I know something of your views. I expect anything I ask you may be repetitive and yet I do not think it hurts to go over one or two points.

U.S. OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

You have made very clear your views about the destruction of the villages. The Senator from Idaho mentioned our objective of creating a government there that was friendly to us. How do you see the objective of our policy and activity in Vietnam? What does it strike you that we seek to achieve there?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, I think, quite honestly, that the North Vietnamese have characterized it properly, and that is to permanently divide that country preventing Communist domination of the entire country, that our policy has been to divide it and to furnish such military and economic assistance as is necessary to preserve its division.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that strike you as being a valid objective?

Mr. McCloskey. No, sir; I think that in the long run you can trace most trouble spots in the world to countries that were divided—Germany, Korea, the Israelis——

The Chairman. In other words, if they did achieve their announced objective, it would not be in the interests of this country. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. McCloskey. My feeling is that any divided country is a potential source of world war III and that it should be our national policy to seek a reunification of Vietnam and Korea.

The Chairman. I suppose our people would say we are perfectly willing to reunify it provided it is on our terms and if they will accept our views as to what kind of government they will have; will they not? Our people will not object to Vietnam's reunification providing they accept our terms.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO END U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCloskey. I think if this issue is fairly debated, Senator, that the people will decide it at the polls in November. This was the reason for my quote from Alexander Hamilton because the Congress of the United States has it within its power to stop our involvement in Vietnam just as much as the President does.

The Chairman. How would you propose that that be done?

Mr. McCloskey. I would propose a continuing withdrawal over a period not to exceed 18 months offering sanctuary to any Vietnamese who chose to leave the country because he felt imperiled by our withdrawal.

The Chairman. Maybe I did not understand. You said the Congress had the power to stop the war. What did you have in mind about the Congress—cutting off the money?

Mr. McCloskey. Two ways, sir; I thought that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, under which President Johnson indicated he felt he had this power, should be terminated effective December 31, 1970. I think I would extend that now to 1971. Also under the Constitution where we are given the sole power to provide for a standing army for a period not to exceed 2 years, I think that means exactly what it says and perhaps we should attach to appropriations measures this year the qualification that the Congress will vote only such funds as are sufficient to permit our continuing and steady withdrawal with all American troops to be out at the end of fiscal 1971.

The Chairman. We have the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution under consideration and will actively consider it on Friday, I think, in the Mathias resolution, but I understand from the letter they gave us that the Administration's position is that repeal of the Tonkin Gulf would not affect the President's right to continue the war. He is not relying on it. This President says he is not relying on the Tonkin Gulf resolution for his right to carry on the war. So I do not think that would do it.

The money business I think would do it. Do you think there is a majority of the Congress that would vote that?

Mr. McCloskey. Not right now, Senator, but I think as this matter is debated between now and November and congressional candidates, all of whom run for office in November, are forced to a yes or no answer on the question, "Will you or will you not fund money to continue

our indefinite involvement in Vietnam?" that that issue may be determined by the American people, and I think exactly that is what the framers of the American Constitution had in mind when they said one body will face election every 2 years.

I have heard different figures from the Pentagon but if our strength—we had the equivalent of 12 combat infantry divisions in Vietnam, 108 maneuver battalions. Every time one division is brought home, I have heard the Pentagon say it saves this country $1.5 billion in the defense budget, so it is merely a matter of multiplying that sum of money by bringing our troops home and attaching a rider in the appropriation bills when they come before the House and Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes the votes. I have been under the impression that a very strong majority of the House supports the war.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes, sir. When I was elected to the Congress in 1967, I think I was the only Republican opposed to the war. Perhaps there were two or three others. But I noticed in October last year 64 Republicans signed a resolution drafted by Paul Findley of Illinois. They supported the President in his expressed determination to withdraw all American troops at the earliest practicable date, and I suspect by next November a majority even in the House of Representatives will support the Administration on this as troops are beginning to be withdrawn on a steady, continued rate.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if your judgment as to their sentiment is true, then it is very hopeful that something can be done.

POSSIBILITY OF CONGRESS'S ENDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

This is a drastic step. I am inclined to favor it; do not misunderstand that. I think this war is the greatest tragedy that this country has ever encountered, but our people are not conditioned to the policy of directly challenging a President of the United States.

Have you seen George Reedy's book about our Presidency? There was a portion of it in Look magazine which was entitled, "Do We Need a Kick?" Did you see that?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I have not seen that.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very interesting book. I mean it is a very good one. As you remember, Mr. Reedy had considerable experience in the White House and the sort of royal attitude and regal attitude that developed in recent years about it.

I do not know whether we can do it or not. I think it is something to consider. Your views that it might come about ought to be encouraging to the President to give him backing to move out of this place quickly.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I have supported what he has done thus far, Senator. I think that the studied and orderly withdrawal have taken out almost a third of the American combat troops in the first 9 months since he commenced the withdrawal and that this is consistent with the views I express today. I am concerned with whether or not that withdrawal will continue. Within the next 3 to 9 months I suspect that the status quo will change in Vietnam as American troops continue to be withdrawn because it is a very tenuous situation there in the north, and if those American troops continue to be withdrawn over the next year, I suspect that the balance of power will change between the conflicting elements.

NECESSITY OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate may be too interested in precedents. It has been accused of being precedent ridden, but take this case: I cannot think offhand of a war of any consequence having been stopped by one side gradually withdrawing without any negotiated agreement with regard to the ending of the war.

If I thought this could take place, as you described it, I certainly would be for it if it would happen in a reasonable period of a year or 2 years. I know of no precedent, and therefore it, among other reasons, makes me very skeptical that this is going to happen. What I anticipate as much more likely to happen is that a number of troops will be withdrawn but a very large contingent will be left with the most sophisticated weapons which will give logistics support to the best troops of the Vietnamese government and they kind of stay there in a kind of a stalemate in a modification of the enclave theory. This could go on for 5 or 10 years without a negotiated settlement.

This is the only reason. It is a practical matter. The most similar war to this is the war of the French in the same country after being there 100 years. How did they end their war? They did not just walk off. They went to Geneva and had a cease-fire and had a negotiated and agreed upon settlement called the Geneva Accord.

It is hard for me to believe that if we are really serious about ending the war with a clean-cut end to it, if that is not the procedure most likely to bring that about.

U.S. WITHDRAWAL COULD RESULT IN VIETNAMESE ACCOMMODATION

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Senator, this is speculation, of course, but as American troops continue to withdraw, and assuming that the Vietnamese who have become quite adept with our artillery, gain an increasing sophistication in the use of helicopters and communication and logistics in which they have a particularly grave problem, and assuming that they are able to build a South Vietnamese army that can hold its own, the very nature of Vietnam, as an 800 mile long country with roughly 15 ARVN divisions matched against an equal number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong, in my judgment will require the South Vietnamese forces to retire into a modified enclave giving up much of the northern coasts, some of the central highlands, some of the III Corps area, and concentrating around Saigon. If this happens, bearing in mind there will be over a million men in South Vietnam under arms and there never have been over 200,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong opposed to them, the South Vietnamese retiring and becoming stronger as their lines grow less, the North Vietnamese grow weaker as they fight a longer distance from home, you would have the Vietnamese people, a very pragmatic people, not desirous of continuing the execution of each other.

For example, I think of the four province chiefs where I had visited, two of them were from the north. Three-eighths of the Saigon government, their house of delegates, are from the north; three-eighths of the North Vietnamese leadership is from the south.

I think as a pragmatic people faced with the destruction of their country by foreign forces over all these years, they will reach some accommodation between themselves which will bring their war to an

end, and I do not see that the continuing American military presence will contribute to that settlement. I think it is counterproductive when we destroy villages, kill people, arm increasing numbers of the peasantry. We are prolonging the conflict by our presence there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so too.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. We could not train these people from 1960 to 1970, Senator. I doubt 3 years instead of 18 months remaining there will change the balance.

U.S. RESPONSE TO VC PROVOCATION DURING WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. What do you anticipate will happen if we get down to 300,000 men and the Vietcong become impatient and attack a city or do something provocative? Do we continue to deescalate? The President was implicit in his statement that if they did not sort of cooperate and make it easier for us to get out, he would retaliate.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I think it is very noteworthy in the President's two speeches that when he spoke of the possibility of retaliation he referred only to the danger to U.S. forces. He made it clear in both of those speeches, one of which was very carefully worked out by him personally, that a threat to the South Vietnamese need not provoke our retaliation, but only a threat to U.S. forces would do so. I do not think we need fear a Dunkirk. I do not know of any U.S. unit in Vietnam which would be left there without sufficient firepower and air support to defend itself in the process of withdrawal.

QUESTION IS ONE OF MOST FEASIBLE WAY TO END WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Do not misunderstand me. I am for ending the war in any way we can do it, but which is the most feasible and likely way to do it and which could come the soonest? It seems to me that the traditional political settlement by which nearly every war I can think of has been ended is the one that has the most promise, but if the other will work, I am for that too.

I do not criticize doing it. It is a question of how much time we allow. This Administration has been in nearly a year and 3 months. That is becoming a very substantial time period to look for results. There has been a decrease in the casualties, it is true, but they are still quite substantial.

EXTENT OF DEFOLIATION

I have a few more specific questions. While you were there did you notice any signs of defoliation of the countryside?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it extensive?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, let me put it this way: In the coastal plains of the north they have had to move the people into within a mile or so of the main roads in the cities and they have moved them out of their villages and destroyed their villages in the interior valleys that go back from the coast because of the desire to deny rice to the Vietcong.

Several officers pointed out to me that in the interior valleys whenever there was the indication of someone growing a crop back there, whether it was civilians left behind or people who had gone back to their homes or Vietcong, the planes were instructed to go in and imme-

diately defoliate any crops that were being grown in the interior valleys.

In the two hamlets that I visited which are being revisited, that is close to 550 in Quang Nam, 307 were destroyed, some 63 have now been resettled or they are in the process of resettlement. When I spoke with the villagers in those towns being resettled, they spoke of the fact they could not grow coconuts as they had and they pointed out the coconut trees which had been destroyed or defoliated with chemicals at the time the village had been destroyed back in 1966 or 1967, whenever it had occurred. So in the resettlement process while they can restore the rice paddies and grow some younger trees for reproduction, it is going to be a long time before they restore some of those trees that have been hurt by the defoliation.

The CHAIRMAN. We really do not know enough about the ultimate effect of defoliants to know how long it will be or how permanent is the destruction by the chemical; do we?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I can only say what I have observed, Senator, I do not know. But I did see people tilling ricefields in areas which they told me had been defoliated in the last 2 or 3 years. What the crops will be and who will suffer from them I do not know, but they were actually tilling the soil.

The CHAIRMAN. There was one article in the paper which said we had defoliated an amount of territory approximately equal to the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I could believe that from what I saw, sir, because these interior valleys that stretch away from the coast are considered free fire zones and apparently we defoliate anything growing there as part of this rice denial program, but they are substantial areas. I would say there are hundreds of square miles of areas where every village had been razed to the ground.

WITNESS' SERVICE IN MARINE CORPS

The CHAIRMAN. How long has it been since you have been in the Marines? When did you get out?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I served in the Marine Corps in Korea as a platoon leader in 1951. I was released to inactive duty in 1952. I stayed in the Reserve until 1965. I was on active duty in Operation Silver Lance at the time the 1st Marine Brigade was sent to the Gulf of Tonkin in March of 1965. I tried to remain as an infantry officer when I was a civilian between 1952 and 1967 when I went to Congress.

CIVILIAN KNOWLEDGE OF FREE FIRE ZONES

The CHAIRMAN. I had a letter this morning from a former marine in my hometown, Fayetteville, dated March 12. It says:

> This past week saw five marines charged with murder. There are elements surrounding this that I do not understand. Civilians in this instance were supposed to be in a free fire zone. I don't know what a free fire zone is. The term wasn't in currency when I was a Marine. However, I take it to mean a zone where anything that moves is a candidate for sudden death. I am very concerned about how such information on a zone of this sort is disseminated to the civilians in the area, especially in light of the fact that the area was an enemy-held territory. Did these unfortunate souls know that this part of their land was off limits to them? Who told them and how?

Do you know the answer to that?

Mr. McCloskey. I do not, sir.

The areas that we flew over and the hamlets which I visited in Quang Nam and Binh Dinh in the north, there were obviously free fire zones where nothing stood; but there were people walking around down in those areas, and this is what I spoke of in my testimony. The greatest single attachment that the Vietnamese has, in my judgment, is to his lands and they are not going to be easily moved off the lands even at the cost of the risk if they remain. They risk remaining in the zone, even with signs showing the limits of the village and the limits of the free fire zone.

The Chairman. How did we propose to tell the people they were in a free fire zone and to get out? Did we go through any motions? Did USIA tell them or not?

Mr. McCloskey. Well, I only know this by hearsay. I have not seen the operations, but I understand that in a cordon and search operation, or search and destroy, they will attempt to have people in aircraft with megaphones telling people where to go and why and what is going to be the free fire zone and what isn't and scatter thousands and thousands of leaflets. But I do not think we are ever going to be sure with that kind of information that there are 10 percent who will not get the word. And the result has been in that particular country a lot of innocent people have been killed.

The Chairman. It is very risky to go about talking from a helicopter. They could shoot it down; could they not? We have been losing on the average about one and one-tenth helicopters per day in recent months. Did I see that in the paper recently?

Mr. McCloskey. The figures seem very staggering. I could not verify the precise figures.

SITUATION OF U.S. SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

The Chairman. I would like your comment on the next paragraph of this letter. He says:

> No matter how you look at it, you cannot escape the fact that it would not have happened if we had not been there in the first place. We have put our young men in an impossible situation. They are damned if they do and they are dead if they don't.

I thought that was a rather striking way to put it. I am speaking of our own young men who are now being accused of murder.

Mr. McCloskey. I think they are the finest young men in the country.

The Chairman. I say if they did not do what they did, they are very likely to be dead; are they not? They think they would in any case. They are being put into an intolerable situation.

Mr. McCloskey. The reaction time of a marine rifleman to a situation which may or may not cause his death very seldom permits judicious decision. I think Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "Sober reflection is not required in the presence of an uplifted knife." And to that rifleman walking in a rice paddy, the question of whether he is a civilian or enemy certainly does not give him much time or opportunity and certainly not the inclination to take the chance.

The Chairman. The next sentence says:

The only possible answer to me is to remove them from this situation. If we don't, we can expect more of the same, and we will have to bear our share of the blame.

He goes on for several pages. It is quite an interesting letter. He says the time is far past when we should have stopped and asked ourselves where it is that we are going. It is a very interesting letter from a marine.

CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE TOWARD ENDING VIETNAMESE WAR

I appreciate very much your taking the time to come here. You are very optimistic, I think. I hope you are correct about the attitude of the Congress. I am not nearly in as close touch with the House, as you are and, therefore, I certainly do not wish to challenge your judgment. All I can say is I hope. When I look at some of the actions recently taken on military affairs, the urgency with which they wish to give jets to Taiwan and more money to Korea with which to fight, it does not seem to me they have become very pacific in their attitude. They seem to be much more eager to heat up the war than they are to calm it down, but I certainly hope you are correct in your judgment that they would not do it. I feel the Senate has moved very strongly in that direction.

Mr. McCloskey. I would not suggest that we have anywhere near a majority which would do as I say, Senator, with respect to cutting off the money or indeed stopping the Gulf of Tonkin authority, but I suspect with those November elections looming that perhaps the 92d Congress may be of a little different persuasion.

The Chairman. That is encouraging. After all, the final justification for our system of government is that the people do have an opportunity to make such a change this fall if they wish to take it. If they do not wish to take it, if they do not wish to make this a major issue, of course, they do not have to and we can continue. But you are quite right and I have confidence and faith in the efficiency and workability of our system. So many of us have been here too long perhaps or at least very long and we become impatient, I guess, too impatient, with the slowness with which these decisions are finally reached, especially when you are concerned with such a tragic situation as this war.

COMMENDATION OF THE WITNESS

Speaking for myself, I am very happy to see you there who can interpret what the war is about and give and bring to it an estimate and a judgment which not many people have had and which will be very important to the Congress.

Mr. McCloskey. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. I think it has been very helpful to have your testimony this morning and such testimony is one of the main reasons that maybe what you say about the judgment of the people in the coming election will come about.

Thank you very much.

WITNESSES' VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR

Mr. Reporter, I want to put in the record an interview with the Congressman.

Mr. Congressman, do you know the interview by Lou Cannon? It does not have a date on it. Was it in February? Put it in the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

[February, 1970]

MARINE VETERAN TOURS VIETNAM—GOP CONGRESSMAN SAYS WAR "IMMORAL"

(By Lou Cannon)

WASHINGTON.—A Republican congressman and former Marine officer has returned from an inspection tour of Vietnam convinced that the United States must speed its withdrawal from "this immoral war."

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey of California, the man who came to Congress in 1967 by defeating Shirley Temple Black and others in a special election, inspected Vietnam on a weeklong trip sponsored by Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

This 90-member group of essentially anti-Pentagon congressmen from both parties paid for McCloskey's $968 round trip fare to Vietnam in an effort to assess military strategy and withdrawal progress there.

McCloskey, a decorated Marine combat officer in the Korean war and a counter-intelligence reserve officer who later helped participate in guerilla war planning, emerged from his second inspection of Vietnam more critical of the U.S. role than ever before.

The California congressman believes that President Nixon, "while preserving his options," is actually embarked on a policy that will leave between 200,000 and 250,000 American support troops in Vietnam and frustrate the opportunity for a coalition settlement ending the war.

McCloskey also came away convinced that news reports of battles showing many Communists are killed in proportion to the American casualties are seriously misleading. He says the casualty figures of his own Marine regiment, the 5th, show that the United States is taking the majority of its casualties from booby traps in situations where the enemy takes no casualties at all.

But McCloskey's strongest-held perceptions appeared to involve neither military strategy nor political timetables but the U.S. participation in the war itself.

"I flew over miles and miles of areas where the hamlets and villages had been totally destroyed." McCloskey said. "I have real reservations that this policy is anything but a war crime. If you look back to Nuremberg and our policy in 1946, we insisted that it was a war crime to wantonly destroy villages."

McCloskey visited Vietnam two years ago shortly after his election to Congress.

While he was sharply critical then of the policy the United States was pursuing, he tended to view the war from the perspective of an essentially military man who was convinced the country was caught up in a war it could not win.

"When I was there two years ago it was not apparent to me that we were pursuing a scorched earth policy," McCloskey said. "No one told me and I didn't observe it. This time the difference was immediately apparent."

McCloskey said that the policy of destroying villages in the north and coastal areas has now been largely abandoned because it has been "counterproductive." But in these areas, up to one-third of the people may be living in refugee centers and McCloskey says he is convinced that the areas, now occupied by I Corps and II Corps, would quickly go Communist when the American forces withdraw.

It is the "scorched earth" policy that clearly concerns McCloskey the most.

"This bothers me more than My Lai," he says.

He does not want to comment on the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of the purported My Lai murders, but he says that the "underlying facts" are the orders to destroy villages.

"The only purpose of destroying villages was that they gave occasional shelter to the VC that came into them or provided rice for the VC," McCloskey believes. "It's exactly what we executed Germans for doing."

The situation, he found, was different in the delta area south and west of Saigon than in the I Corps and II Corps area.

Here, McCloskey discovered some "real progress" in helping villages to establish a modicum of local democracy and defense. He thinks it conceivable that the South Vietnamese forces in the delta might be able to survive on their own after American withdrawal.

But even in the delta, McCloskey is sharply critical of American policy.

He says that the villages have been defended by an uneconomic policy that expends 20 or more times on them what is taken out in taxes and that places virtually every citizen under arms.

In McCloskey's view this policy will stiffen the determination of South Vietnamese generals to resist the pressures for a coalition government and a unified Vietnam.

"We've destroyed a good part of the country and what we're doing now in the delta is almost equally indefensible," McCloskey said. "We're militarizing the country and creating seeds of warfare for the next generation."

McCloskey, who in Korea earned the Silver Star and a Purple Heart, has analyzed the casualties of his old unit during the last year.

He said the unit encountered 1,277 booby traps and detonated 604 of them. This caused, he said, the death of 99 American servicemen and the wounding of 1,135 many of whom suffered amputation. In other words, one-third of this unit's troops were killed or wounded by booby traps irrespective of battle casualties.

In the first 13 days of February this same unit lost eight killed and 31 wounded from all causes. Of this total five of the men killed and 25 of those wounded were booby trap victims.

For this reason McCloskey contended, the reports of battles which show a disproportionate Communist loss are misleading.

"We're causing casualties by massing our fire," he said. "They're causing them in situations where no enemy is even encountered or any battle fought."

McCloskey is concerned that the ratio of support to combat troops in the Nixon Administration withdrawal is only 2–1 compared to a 4–1 ratio in Vietnam.

If this continues, McCloskey said, the U.S. would wind up with four divisions in Vietnam to back up South Vietnamese forces there.

McCloskey said all forces should be withdrawn within 18 months, a goal the President still is capable of reaching.

"But I suspect that Mr. Nixon's policy is that we should get out at such a rate that the American people's concern is quieted while leaving behind enough troops that the South Vietnamese military establishment is strengthened," he added.

Other McCloskey views expressed in an interview here soon after conclusion of his trip:

—Vietnam will become an issue in the election this year unless troop withdrawals continue." The great silent majority support the President (on this issue) only because of the withdrawals."

—Nearly everyone in Vietnam desires unification and many are "hedging their commitments" in expectation of ultimate Communist victory.

—Anyone who wants sanctuary should be given the means of leaving South Vietnam, although a "blood bath" of any except the very wealthy, the province chiefs and the military commanders is unlikely.

—"There is nothing about the government in the north that is so harsh and repressive that it is worth the continued loss of life . . . The great bulk of the people want peace at any price and are denied it because of American assistance."

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Edward J. Nickel.

SWEARING IN OF WITNESSES

Mr. Nickel, in keeping with the procedure followed in the previous hearings involving personnel brought back from Vietnam, in order that I show no partiality in this matter, I will ask you and your associates who may be called upon to testify to be sworn at this point. Would you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be, to the best of your knowledge, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. NICKEL. I do.

Mr. OSBORNE. I do.

Mr. HAYS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a prepared statement, I believe, Mr. Nickel?

Mr. NICKEL. I do, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you proceed, please, sir.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD J. NICKEL, DIRECTOR, JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, SAIGON, AND OTIS E. HAYS, OFFICE OF USIA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

Mr. NICKEL. Mr. Chairman, I would like first to describe briefly the office in Saigon which I head. It is called the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office or JUSPAO. This Office, which was established in 1965, includes American military and civilian personnel and its functions are:

To provide policy guidance for all U.S. psychological operations in Vietnam.

To provide media materials in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam to the U.S. Information Agency for use in third countries.

To perform the normal USIS cultural and information mission.

To provide assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) to improve its public information programs.

ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY JUSPAO

I will confine my statement to a description of this last function. JUSPAO's efforts in this regard can be grouped in four categories:

First, assistance in the construction and operation of mass media communication facilities including the national radio network and the national television network.

Second, assistance in the improvement of personnel, training, organization, methodology, and the equipping of the Ministry of Information's field organization called the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS).

Third, assistance in the production of information materials by the Government's mass media and by the Vietnamese Information Service.

Fourth, assistance through joint planning and joint production of information materials by JUSPAO and the Ministry of Information to support the Government's pacification and development programs.

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, JUSPAO indirectly influences the psychological warfare activities of the Vietnamese Armed Forces because we provide policy guidance for psychological operations to the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) which assists the Vietnamese Armed Forces in this field.

These categories of assistance cover a wide range of cooperative efforts to which the U.S. Government and the GVN contribute staff, funds, and equipment. The number of personnel and the amounts of money contributed by each side have varied from year to year. However, in the last year and a half we in JUSPAO have begun to establish terminal dates for several assistance operations and to transfer greater responsibility for others to the Government of Vietnam. This process is related to the overall effort to replace the U.S. contribution to the war effort with an increased Vietnamese contribution.

REDUCTION OF JUSPAO CONTRIBUTIONS

JUSPAO is presently in the process of defining specific reductions in its contributions of personnel, money, and equipment. By the end of the current fiscal year American civilian positions will be reduced by 31 (from 132 to 101); American military positions by 11 (from 118 to 107); Vietnamese positions by 42 (from 385 to 343); third-country nationals by eight (from 12 to 4). As the GVN absorbs more of our currently joint operations, more American positions will be eliminated.

Our support in the information field should be completely terminated by the middle of 1972. Some projects will be completed earlier. For instance, the terminal date for the television project is June 1971. Radio construction will be completed in the spring of 1971. However, technical training needed to operate the new radio network will require an additional year.

Our role increasingly will become more and more an advisory one as our financial support and our production of media materials is reduced. But, in the category of printed material, the GVN in the near future will not be able to take over all of our present production. We believe this situation will be partially offset when the radio and television networks are completed and when more Vietnamese Information Service personnel have been trained in face-to-face communication techniques. We are planning now to increase this type of training.

For some time the GVN has lacked trained and experienced personnel needed to sustain effective information programs. Our training programs and support have helped alleviate this problem to some degree. However, many of those trained have been drafted for military service. Mass communications skills will continue to be in short supply in South Vietnam for some time.

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Lately the GVN has manifested an increasing understanding of the importance of developing better lines of communication with the people, especially those in rural areas. The 1970 pacification and development program expresses this awareness by making the goal of establishing an effective information system one of its eight national objectives. The realization of that goal could make an important contribution to successful communication between the Government and the governed.

Other objectives of the 1970 plan are designed to encourage increased participation by citizens in the governmental process and to encourage local initiative.

Among the substantive programs of the plan are land reform; elections at the local, provincial, and national levels; recruitment of citizens in local militia forces with arms provided by the Government; and Government grants of village self-help funds to be used for development projects the villagers themselves desire. A large part of the GVN information effort in 1970 and U.S. support for it is being devoted to publicizing these programs and encouraging the South Vietnamese citizens to participate in them.

I would like to describe some of our assistance projects and to indicate our plans for reducing them as the GVN assumes increasing responsibility for them.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RADIO

Between the years 1952 and 1964, the U.S. financed the purchase of low- and medium-power radio transmitters to help the GVN to set up stations in various parts of the country or to increase the signal strength of existing stations. The cost to the United States of this equipment was about $1.1 million. Australia contributed a high-powered station through the Colombo plan.

However, the collection of stations was never quite a network and its range was still inadequate. As the pace of the war stepped up 5 years ago, the United States began a project aimed at providing the GVN with an integrated radio network capable of reaching 95 percent of Vietnam's population, rather than the 65 percent possibly reachable with varying quality signals and programing through the then existing group of stations. Feasibility studies were followed by preconstruction architectural and engineering studies. These were almost completed when the 1968 Tet attacks took place. In those attacks transmitters at Hue and Ban Me Thuot were badly damaged as were studios and other installations in Saigon and Qui Nhon.

As a result of those attacks, the United States and GVN decided against constructing a 12-station network in favor of a network of four stations of higher power. This change was dictated by security and manpower considerations. It was felt it would be easier to protect four installations than 12, and also to staff them. The coverage of the population would be the same in either case—more than 95 percent.

That four-station network is now being built and will be complete about 1 year from now at a cost of approximately $6.8 million in U.S. funds. Technical training for operation and maintenance of the new network will continue for 1 year after construction is completed.

An additional sum equivalent to about $1 million in GVN-owned but jointly controlled counterpart funds is being used in the project.

The rest of the GVN contribution to this project is an indirect one, largely in the form of its budget for radio operations, including the salaries of a staff of 464 personnel. In 1965, that budget was the equivalent of about $750,000. This figure has increased steadily in the past 5 years. This year the budget is the equivalent of about $1.7 million.

We believe the quality of programing has improved during that period. More and more the GVN officials concerned with radio have become aware of the concept of providing a service to the people. This has resulted in increased use of radio broadcasting to engender participation by the people in Government programs ranging from land reform and improved agriculture to self-defense.

U.S. ASSISTANCE IN TELEVISION

In 1966 the United States agreed to install a four-station television network in Vietnam. The GVN was committed to furnishing land, buildings, staff and an operating budget.

Telecasting initially was for 1 hour nightly to the Saigon area from an airborne transmitter. Now ground stations in Saigon, Hue and Can Tho are on the air an average of 4 hours nightly. Between Saigon

and Hue an airborne transmitter provides coverage for the coastal area. By early 1971, a fourth ground station—at Qui Nhon—will have replaced the air operation.

The U.S. cost will total about $8.2 million when we phase out of the operation by July 1, 1971. GVN counterpart funds amounting to the equivalent of about $2 million paid for land and building costs. In addition, the annual operating budget of GVN television has risen from the equivalent of about $400,000 including salaries of 17 employees in 1966 to more than double that amount including salaries of 139 employees in the current year.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask for a point of information? Do the GVN counterpart funds arise from American imports?

Mr. NICKEL. In the original instance; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any real distinction in their impact upon American costs between GVN counterpart funds and $1 million?

Mr. NICKEL. The difference, of course, sir, would be that they are not directly appropriated funds.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but the total cost really is American; is it not? It is not GVN. It is American costs expressed in two different ways.

Mr. NICKEL. It would be derived from the commercial import program.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. NICKEL. A rigorous program of training in the difficult TV skills is being carried out under contract by the National Broadcasting Co., International. Most of the training is on site in Vietnam. However, six engineers who will constitute the GVN supervisor engineering staff are being trained in the RCA Institute in New York.

We estimate there are now 300,000 TV receivers in Vietnam, with a viewing audience of about 2 million. Many sets are outside the cities in the heavily populated flat delta region where the signal is particularly good.

Of the programs presented by the GVN's TV network, less than 10 percent are imported. Ninety percent of the programing is locally produced, either live or on film or tape. As with radio, the television medium is used extensively to explain GVN programs to the people. Last September the GVN began a weekly program called "The People Want to Know," during which officials and other leaders are interviewed by journalists in the format of "Meet the Press."

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE

A major part of our assistance is directed to the operation of the Vietnamese Information Service. This is the field arm of the Ministry of Information, with officer staffs at corps headquarters cities and in all provinces and districts of the country. Starting this year, the Ministry began an intensive training program for additional personnel at the village and hamlet levels. As these new lower level personnel are trained, they are now being placed under the operational control of the village and hamlet chiefs with program support coming from district and provincial VIS offices.

The job of the VIS is to use a wide range of information and psychological techniques to support GVN programs as prescribed in guidances from the Ministry in Saigon. The techniques include the publication of district newsletters and province newspapers, leaflets

and posters; the relaying of news and commentaries and the playing of prerecorded tapes over loudspeaker systems in village and hamlet centers; the showing of motion pictures; visits to families in villages and hamlets to discuss GVN programs affecting them; the distribution of national magazines and other materials received from the Ministry and JUSPAO; and the sponsoring with other local officials of campaigns, public meetings, exhibits and artistic and cultural presentations.

From fiscal year 1955 through 1967, the United States contributed an average of $497,000 in dollar funds annually to equip the VIS with audiovisual equipment, the vehicles, the office machines, and other materials necessary to carry out these programs. In the succeeding 3 years the dollar expenditure for this program has been $187,000 in 1968, $85,000 in 1969, and $60,000 in the current year. In the last 2 years we have gradually transferred to the GVN full responsibility for maintenance and replacement costs for this equipment as well as for the operation of repair centers.

During the same period, an average of the equivalent of $200,000 annually was used for the VIS from GVN counterpart funds. We do not have adequate figures for the GVN's budget for the VIS prior to 1964. However, from that year to the present the budget has averaged about the equivalent of $6.4 million annually through 1970. The 1970 budget is about the equivalent of $15 million, a substantial increase over previous years.

The CHAIRMAN. What caused that?

Mr. NICKEL. To a large extent, sir, an increase in personnel, but there was also a real increase in operations. There was a large increase in local personnel with the improvement of hamlet and village information programs.

U.S. CONTACT WITH VIS

Contact with the VIS is maintained both in the field and in Saigon. In the capital it is the function of several elements of JUSPAO. In the field it is carried out by 81 American civilian and military advisers located in 34 of the 44 Provinces. These advisers are detailed to the U.S. Military Assistance Command CORDS program and are under the operational control of the Province senior advisers at the Province level and the U.S. Command elements at the various corps headquarters. Just as the VIS chief is required to participate with the province chief and other GVN officials in planning and operating GVN programs, so our CORDS psychological operations staff perform a similar function within the U.S. province team. The providing of advice and support to the provincial VIS operation is the principal duty of these American psychological operations personnel.

Thus, the American structure for information operations parallels in broad outline that of the GVN, permitting a degree of coordination at all levels.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF VIS

The efficiency of the VIS varies from place to place. Where key officials are dedicated and competent, operations are generally effective. And there are a number of these. Where they are not well motivated and energetic, the programs suffer. And there are some of these

also. In the past year, two new approaches have been undertaken by the Ministry of Information with our cooperation to try to improve the efficiency of the VIS. These are the planning of a comprehensive series of training courses for various levels of VIS personnel and the regular holding of joint meetings of Saigon and field personnel, usually on a corps area basis. We believe these two measures have had and will continue to have a good effect on the VIS operation. During the current year, we will use the equivalent in counterpart funds of about $63,000 to support the training program. We are also providing the assistance of one American adviser to help develop course materials.

JUSPAO'S LIAISON WITH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

JUSPAO's liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms. At the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At the planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions, and guidances to media producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.

I have tried, Mr. Chairman, to describe here the evolution of some of the current major programs we are conducting to assist the GVN in the information and psychological fields. In the expansion of these programs over the years, the American contribution has been substantial. So has the Vietnamese contribution. In the past 2 years, a considerable portion of the load the United States was carrying has been shifted to the GVN. We plan to continue moving in that direction.

Thank you, sir; that is the end of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Nickel.

How long have you been in charge of this program, Mr. Nickel?

Mr. NICKEL. Two years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you live in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. I do, sir.

MAGNITUDE OF USIA EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you said there were 132 Americans under your immediate direction; is that correct?

Mr. NICKEL. We are reducing this year, sir, by 31 positions from 132 American positions to 101 American positions.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that in the office in Saigon or how extensive is this?

Mr. NICKEL. Those are civilian USIA officers, some serving in Saigon and some in the Provinces. I should add that we also have American military personnel serving with JUSPAO, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned that in the Provinces you have military advisers who are Americans. Is that right?

Mr. NICKEL. We have some civilian advisers in the provinces but the bulk of them are military, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To get some idea of the magnitude of the effort, take the present fiscal year of 1970. Is it correct to say that the civilian positions are 132 or 101?

Mr. NICKEL. 101 civilian positions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the current year.

Mr. NICKEL. Fiscal year 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of these military advisers are assigned to this work?

Mr. NICKEL. We have 107 military spaces in JUSPAO, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. 208 is the total American personnel?

Mr. NICKEL. 208 is the figure, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of the budget for the USIA operation in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. The USIA budget for Vietnam, sir, is $6.4 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that for the year of 1970?

Mr. NICKEL. For fiscal year 1970; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that include construction or is that only support of the personnel?

Mr. NICKEL. That is the USIA component of the budget, sir. Construction would be funded by an AID component of our budget. I will give you these add-ons. We also have $2.4 million funded by AID and $2.1 million funded by the Department of Defense, to make a total budget available to me for JUSPAO's operations of $10.9 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that include the pay of the military men to whom you referred?

Mr. NICKEL. It does not include military salaries. However, it does include USIA civilian salaries.

The CHAIRMAN. The military salaries would be in addition then?

Mr. NICKEL. They would be in addition, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimate of what that would cost?

Mr. NICKEL. I have no estimate, but I could furnish it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF MILITARY IN JUSPAO

(The military pay and allowances, as reported by the four Military Services whose personnel are involved, amount to $1.2 million.)

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get and what we are interested in is the total cost of this overall operation. It is the usual basic material that we would like to have.

Mr. NICKEL. I could furnish the information about military pay, sir.

MILITARY PERSONNEL WORKING IN PROPAGANDA FIELD

The CHAIRMAN. Do these personnel figures include the personnel in the military units not associated with USIA who work in the field of propaganda?

Mr. NICKEL. They do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many people there are in that?

Mr. NICKEL. May I furnish that, sir. I have it, but I cannot put my hands on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you can furnish it. Could you give a rough estimate that you can correct later?

Mr. NICKEL. Sir, I now have the information. In 1970 there are 761 U.S. military psyops field personnel and 50 serving on staff or as advisers to the Vietnamese, for a total of 811.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very much larger than your own operation; is it not?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

MISSION OF JUSPAO

The CHAIRMAN. This brings up a further question. What do you consider to be the mission of your operation? What are you trying to accomplish?

Mr. NICKEL. My principal mission, sir, is to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and conducting an effective program of communications.

The CHAIRMAN. Your mission is to assist the Vietnamese Government to create a system of communications. Is that it?

Mr. NICKEL. To assist the Vietnamese Government in developing a means of communicating with the electorate and to provide technical and professional advice.

The CHAIRMAN. What leads you to believe that the purpose of our Government in establishing the USIA was to create an agency to create a means of communication for a foreign government?

Mr. NICKEL. I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by stating that my operations are responsive to the instructions and directions I receive from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and from the American Ambassador in Saigon.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would characterize your mission to be to carry out orders. Is that the right way to put it?

Mr. NICKEL. In my position; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no idea what the real mission of this operation is other than to carry out orders?

Mr. NICKEL. I know what my instructions are.

AUTHORIZATION OF JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE MISSION QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. This is a matter, I think, of considerable interest. Let me refer to section 2 of the basic legislation creating this operation:

> The Congress hereby declares that the objectives of this Act are to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.

Do you think that language authorizes USIA to create for another country a system of communications for that government and its people?

Mr. NICKEL. My organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Mr. Chairman, was established in 1965 by order of the President. I would suggest that any justification of the suitability of the mission we are performing is something that should be addressed to the people to whom I report. I would be very happy to address this problem to them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be very interesting if you would. You say it was created by Executive order. It was not created by statute. There is no statute law authorizing you to do what you are doing; is there?

Mr. NICKEL. I said that the U.S. Public Affairs Office was created as a result of Presidential directive.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And in pursuance of that action you have been directed by your superiors to do what you are doing. So you would not wish to undertake to say what this whole operation is intended to accomplish for the people of the United States; would you?

Mr. NICKEL. I believe I said earlier, sir, that my mission in Vietnam was in large measure to assist the Vietnamese Government in developing and improving its means of communicating with its people.

ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTRY OF INFORMATION QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. It occurs to me that in this country there has always been not only a great reluctance, but aversion, to the creation of a ministry of information in our Government to inform our own people. Is that not so?

Mr. NICKEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the law not specifically forbid the USIA to indoctrinate or brainwash, or whatever you want to call it, the American people? Is that not so?

Mr. NICKEL. Clearly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you not creating in Vietnam just such an information agency? The way you describe here what you have done and are in the process of doing, it is to create in Vietnam an agency to enable that Government to control its people through this device which we ourselves abhor in this country? How does this seem to you to be consistent with our own views?

Mr. NICKEL. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that Vietnam is not unique in possessing a ministry of information. I would also suggest that in Vietnam, as in many other developing societies, there do not exist any strong commercial or nongovernmental media.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nickel, I am quite aware that it is not unique. In every dictatorship I know of they have a ministry of information just like this. But we are told, on the one hand, that we are seeking to establish the government of self-determination and this leaves the impression we are seeking to establish a democratic system there.

I quite agree with you that information agencies are typical. They were typical of Hitler's Germany and typical of nearly every dictatorship and authoritarian government I know of, but I would not have thought we would be a party to helping construct such a governmental apparatus.

Mr. NICKEL. Are there not also some regimes we regard as being democratic that have ministries of information?

The CHAIRMAN. What, for example, would be one from your point of view?

Mr. NICKEL. If I am not mistaken, is there not a French Ministry of Information?

The CHAIRMAN. I would not know. Is there one in Sweden, which is a country that I think has achieved a high degree of democracy or self-determination if you like, or England? I do not recall that in England they have a minister of information whose job it is to sell the people of England upon the merits and virtues of that Government. I do not recall ever having heard of it. France has recently gone through a rather unusual evolutionary period, almost revolutionary under De Gaulle, of course, and France may be an example. I would not want to say for sure. I do not know that.

GVN CLOSING OF PRIVATE NEWSPAPERS

How many private newspapers have been closed by the Government of Vietnam during the past year?

Mr. NICKEL. I could not give you the number, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been several.

Mr. NICKEL. There have been several closings.

The CHAIRMAN. You say there is not a heavily developed private sector. It is largely because that Government is so sensitive to criticism that they close the private newspapers whenever they criticize the Government. Is that not a fact?

Mr. NICKEL. There have been some closings; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you ever feel a bit uncomfortable in being alined with a government which is so clearly an authoritarian government or do you feel perfectly comfortable in your relationship with that government?

Mr. NICKEL. I have no problems in performing my job.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no problems. You feel perfectly at home?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

USIA PAY AND ALLOWANCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to a more pedestrian subject of the costs, could you tell me what is the average pay of the American employees of USIA in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. The average pay of a USIA employee with JUSPAO, sir, including allowances, minus housing, would be about $28,900.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the total cost to the Government of the United States for those employees, including everything? Do they furnish housing?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, housing is furnished, sir. I am unable to break out that figure for an individual. Do you want the total cost?

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps if you could tell me your own. What is your pay and what do your allowances amount to? You are the Director?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your total? What is the total cost to the Federal Government?

Mr. NICKEL. The combination of my salary and allowances, again making no provision for my housing, is $45,473.

The CHAIRMAN. Plus housing?

Mr. NICKEL. Housing?

The CHAIRMAN. Do they furnish you with a house?

Mr. NICKEL. I am furnished with housing.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the reasonable cost of the house that is paid for by the Federal Government?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, the house is paid for by the Federal Government.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is that? You ought to know that.

Mr. NICKEL. Let me see if I have that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been there for 2 years. You have no idea what that would be?

Mr. NICKEL. My house, sir, is a U.S. Government house.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a good house?

Mr. NICKEL. It is comfortable, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it one that the Government built or is it an old villa?

Mr. NICKEL. It was there. It is a U.S. Government-owned house.

The CHAIRMAN. How many houses does the U.S. Government own in Saigon? Do you know?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not know that answer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it several?

Mr. NICKEL. It is more than several.

The CHAIRMAN. It is more than several.

Then I would estimate your total cost would be somewhat in the neighborhood of at least $50,000.

Mr. NICKEL. That would seem right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you furnished an automobile?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are USIA officials in Saigon given special pay equivalent to combat pay for military people?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir. We receive a differential.

The CHAIRMAN. What does it amount to? Is it 25 percent?

Mr. NICKEL. Twenty-five percent.

U.S. COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. If our Government decides that it is proper to furnish assistance in the building of a propaganda operation for Vietnam, how does it decide in which country to do this? Is this the only country in which we have done this?

Mr. NICKEL. Specifically have done what, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Have we created a communications system which enables the government to, as you say, communicate with its citizens? Have we done it in Thailand? Are we doing it or have we done it in Thailand? Does the USIA have a comparable operation in Thailand, may be not on as large a scale but a lesser scale?

Mr. NICKEL. Certainly, as you say, not comparable in order of magnitude.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have a similar operation?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not—I personally am not aware that——

The CHAIRMAN. Are any of your associates?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not aware and I do not think my associates are aware that we are doing any such thing as building a TV network or building a radio network. I cannot speak more directly to the specific programs, sir.

NEWSPAPERS CLOSED BY GVN

The CHAIRMAN. Before I leave that, you said you did not know how many newspapers. Do either of your associates know how many newspapers the government of Saigon has closed in the last few years?

Mr. HAYS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that information not available?

Mr. OSBORNE. It can be made available. I do not have it available.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you supply it for the record?

Mr. OSBORNE. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

NEWSPAPERS SUSPENDED BY GVN FROM 1968 THROUGH MARCH 23, 1970

During 1968 the Government of Viet-Nam indefinitely suspended six newspapers. Sixteen others were temporarily suspended, for an average of 35 days per suspension.

During 1969 through March 23, 1970, the GVN indefinitely suspended 12 newspapers. An additional 14 received temporary suspensions ranging from a few days to almost 11 months, for an average of 46 days per suspension.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice in the paper every now and then there is a notice that X paper has been closed by the government. I simply have not made a counting of it, but I am under the impression there have been several.

Mr. NICKEL. I will supply it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the government controls the supply of newsprint and it is no problem for them simply to cut off the newsprint if they wish to close a newspaper. Is that so?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes.

USIA ANALYSIS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES

The CHAIRMAN. Does the USIA, Mr. Nickel, or any other agency attempt to analyze Vietnamese public attitudes periodically?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have polls been taken?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir; polls have been taken.

The CHAIRMAN. How is this done? Is it done by you directly or by contract?

Mr. NICKEL. By contract, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What organization has done it?

Mr. NICKEL. May I answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I have been informed that you have written the Director of the U.S. Information Agency asking for information about our polling in Vietnam, that this is now under consideration, and that I would prefer to have the information come to you through that channel.

The CHAIRMAN. I wrote that letter partly to give you notice that this is a matter in which we are interested. I hoped that you would be prepared to answer it this morning. Are you saying that this is a matter that affects our security and that you do not wish to testify in open session on it?

Mr. NICKEL. I prefer not to go beyond stating, sir, that we do engage in polling in Vietnam, as in some other countries.

WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TESTIMONY ABOUT POLLING

The CHAIRMEN. Have you been instructed to state to the committee that you will not testify in open session on this matter?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not able to discuss the polling in open hearing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been instructed not to respond to questions about polling?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who instructed you, sir? Did Mr. Shakespeare tell you not to answer such questions? If not, who did?

Mr. NICKEL. I have been instructed by my principal.

May I have just one moment, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. You confer with your lawyer if you like.

Mr. NICKEL. In answer to your question, sir, I have been instructed by the director of my agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shakespeare has instructed on this?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What grounds did he give you for instructing you not to reply to this question?

Mr. NICKEL. This question is under consideration as to the possible security elements involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Possible security involved.

You heard the previous witness, Congressman McCloskey; did you not?

Mr. NICKEL. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You realize that this committee has some authority in the authorization of the funds for you agency; do you not?

Mr. NICKEL. I am very well aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. We normally expect people in USIA to respond to questions about their operations if they expect this committee to authorize any funds for the agency. You realize that; do you not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does Mr. Shakespeare realize that?

Mr. NICKEL. I cannot speak for Mr. Shakespeare, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make it clear that I do not accept your reason for refusing to answer. It is a perfectly legitimate question. You are engaged in an activity which is very dubious in its authority under an executive order, in any case, and I think that you should be very careful in refusing to answer questions about these operations.

I would like to know how much you paid, for example, for a contract to take a poll in Vietnam and see how it compares to polls in this country. Would you be willing to say how much you paid for the poll?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not believe I am able to, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the gentleman who advised you not to answer? Was he sworn also?

Mr. NICKEL. The gentleman with whom I just talked did not advise me not to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not?

Mr. NICKEL. I wanted to check something with him. He is the General Counsel of the U.S. Information Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not advise you as to your instructions.

It is very unusual. I did not expect you to refuse to answer these questions. One reason why I sent that letter inquiring about these matters was, as I say, to alert the Agency that we are interested in the poll.

When was the latest poll taken? Will you refuse to answer that?

Mr. NICKEL. I find myself unable to answer it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean by saying "unable" that you do not know?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do either of your associates know when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. NICKEL. I believe, sir, that they are bound by the same instructions.

WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SUBJECT OF POLLING

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you were instructed to tell it. There is a difference between your answer if you know, and are instructed not to tell and if you do not know. I want to make the answer clear. On what grounds are you refusing to say when the latest poll was taken?

Mr. NICKEL. I am under instructions, sir, not to discuss this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do know when it was, but you are under instructions not to discuss the subject. You are in effect taking the equivalent of the Fifth Amendment; is that correct?

Mr. NICKEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is that not correct? You do not consider that the USIA is a sensitive undertaking similar to the CIA; do you?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Usually your activities are open and above board; are they not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not authorized to engage in covert operations; are you?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be willing to answer this kind of question? What was the poll about? Did it ask about the attitude of the local citizens toward Americans?

Mr. NICKEL. I find, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am unable to discuss the subject of polling.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not discuss as to whether or not the poll involved the question of the extent of the support of the Vietnamese people for the Thieu government?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not believe, sir, in line with my instructions, that I am able to respond.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say before I leave this subject, this is very unsatisfactory. I regret very much, and I hope you will tell your superior, Mr. Shakespeare, that, speaking for myself, I very much regret this attitude. This committee is entitled to know what the poll cost, what it asked, and what the results were.

This is not a document, it seems to me, that comes under executive privilege. It has nothing whatever to do with the President directly. I mean it is not a confidential document. It is a matter that is paid for by the public funds of the Government, and the committee is entitled to actually have the poll, in my opinion, and we shall ask for it. I regret he gave you such instructions.

U.S. ADVISORY WORK IN TV, RADIO, AND PRINTED MATERIALS

Do the U.S. advisers work with the Vietnamese on matters involving TV and radio program content and makeup?

Mr. NICKEL. Our advisers work with both radio and TV. They occasionally are involved in the format of a program.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they work with them in the preparation of printed information materials?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

GVN MEDIA'S TREATMENT OF TRAN NGOC CHAU CASE

The CHAIRMAN. Was the case of Tran Ngoc Chau reported over the Vietnamese radio and television stations?

Mr. NICKEL. I can only assume it was. I would have to retire to an assumption because I was not in Saigon at that particular time, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the Chau case?

Mr. NICKEL. I have read about it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know Mr. Chau?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do either of your associates know whether or not the radio and television stations of Vietnam carried any news about Mr. Chau?

Mr. HAYS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. HAYS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Mr. OSBORNE. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any printed materials put out by the South Vietnamese Government on this case?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not know, sir. I can find out.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you say "JUSPAO's liaison with the Ministry itself takes many forms." That is the Ministry of Information.

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say:

> At the top, I meet frequently with the Minister and his senior staff. At the planning level, JUSPAO policy officers meet daily with Ministry officials to plan joint campaigns, instructions and guidances to media producers and to field personnel. On the media production side, our writers and editors work together in the publication of magazines, pamphlets, posters, loudspeaker tapes, and radio programs.

In doing all of that, do you still say you do not know whether anything was put out on the Chau case?

Mr. NICKEL. If I may offer a brief explanation, sir, our relationship with the Ministry would deal with things like support of the pacification program, but would not consist of liaison in terms of tactical matters. We have never had occasion to discuss the Chau case with anyone in the Ministry.

The CHAIRMAN. Did our advisers or did you advise against the public attacks on Chau by the Government media?

Mr. NICKEL. I have never personally been involved in the Chau case in any way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of your employees under your direction give any advice whatever about the Chau case?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not believe so, sir. Again, I wish to state that I myself was absent from Saigon during most of this period, but I believe that they did not.

KINDS OF ADVICE GIVEN TO GVN BY JUSPAO

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Minister of Information in Saigon ever ask your advice about the formulation of his Government's public position on major issues?

Mr. NICKEL. My discussions with the Minister in line with my own responsibilities, sir, are concerned more with the operations of the Vietnamese Information Service program than with substance.

The CHAIRMAN. Then are you saying you do not give him advice about substantive measures; is that right?

Mr. NICKEL. My advice is primarily operational.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it exclusively?

Mr. NICKEL. No. We might, for example, Mr. Chairman, discuss how best to promote or to conduct information campaigns in support of the People's Self-Defense Force, and matters like that which fall within the pacification and development program.

I think I should point out that I am not responsible, Mr. Chairman, for our press operation in Vietnam. That responsibility falls to a colleague of mine who is the special assistant for press affairs to the Ambassador.

As the director of JUSPAO I do not speak for the Embassy on press affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his name?

Mr. NICKEL. Mr. Newman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he in Saigon now?

Mr. NICKEL. He is in Saigon, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed with the Information Minister the South Vietnamese refusal to attend the opening of the expanded Paris talks?

Mr. NICKEL. I did not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss with him what the official reaction to the death of Ho Chi Minh would be?

Mr. NICKEL. We had some discussion with the Ministry of Information about this matter; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your advice to them with regard to how to treat the death of Ho Chi Minh?

Mr. NICKEL. We agreed, sir, that a maximum effort should be made to inform the enemy forces in Vietnam of Ho's death. We also agreed that our treatment should be straight information, and that there should not be any exultation in our output to the enemy forces.

ADVICE CONCERNING IMPACT OF GVN POLICY ON UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you or any of your officials ever advise President Thieu or other GVN officials on the potntial impact in other countries of policy matters, particularly about the potential impact in the United States of GVN policies?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not advise Vietnamese officials about the impact on the United States or the impact on American public opinion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone?

Mr. NICKEL. I presume this is discussed, but not by me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know of it. You are not aware of any such advice?

Mr. NICKEL. Not specifically; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not aware of any advice that was given to Mr. Thieu or anyone else in the higher echelons of the Government as to the possible reaction in this country of the imprisonment of Mr. Chau?

Mr. NICKEL. As I said earlier, I was not involved in the Chau case. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not be a deep involvement.

Has there ever been any discussion with them about the impact in this country of his imprisonment of Mr. Dzu? Do you know about Mr. Dzu?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are aware of who he is?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what happened to him?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever advise them as to what the reaction in this country is to his imprisonment?

Mr. NICKEL. I have never advised the Minister of Information about impact on U.S. public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any U.S. personnel ever assist Vietnamese officials in the writing of speeches?

Mr. NICKEL. Certainly no one in my organization, to the best of my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Are U.S. officials consulted by Vietnamese officials in the handling of statements that relate to U.S. policy?

Mr. NICKEL. I presume so, sir, but not within my cognizance so far as my organization is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about it anyway?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

U.S. PERSONNEL LOCATED AT MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. Are any Americans attached directly to the Minister of Information's office?

Mr. NICKEL. We have one or two Americans, Mr. Chairman, who are physically located in the Ministry of Information headquarters building for liaison purposes. They are not attached directly to the office of the Minister.

The CHAIRMAN. What is their function?

Mr. NICKEL. They perform liaison in terms of our overall advisory efforts. I believe the thrust of your question was whether any of my officers are attached directly to the office of the Minister. No one serves directly on the Minister's staff, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no such thing as an adviser to the Minister of Information?

Mr. NICKEL. We have advisers to various elements of the Ministry. There is no adviser to the Minister, sir.

U.S. ADVISERS TO ELEMENTS OF MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know enough about it to make a distinction. Could you tell us the distinction? I mean advisers to an element. What is an element? It is a person; is it not? You advise people; do you not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that?

Mr. NICKEL. We have advisers who work with the radio network. We have advisers who work with the TV network.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they do?

Mr. NICKEL. We have advisers who work with the Vietnamese Information Service.

The CHAIRMAN. About what do they advise them? Do they not advise them about U.S. policy?

Mr. NICKEL. Most of their advice, sir, is concerned with improving operational efficiency of the various elements of the Information Ministry.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you improve the efficiency without any attention to the substance which they are using? Do you mean to say they are concerned only with the technical operation of the broadcast system?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir. With respect to the Vietnamese Information Service, for example, our advisers would be concerned with discussing with their Ministry counterparts how best, for example, to support and promote the various objectives of the pacification and development program.

HANDLING OF MYLAI MASSACRE

The CHAIRMAN. How has your Agency handled the Mylai massacre theme during the past several months?

Mr. NICKEL. JUSPAO, sir, has handled the Mylai incident by taking the position that a serious investigation is underway by the U.S. Government and that if a crime has been committed, the U.S. Government will try the personnel concerned. In other words, we have not in any way attempted to be evasive. We take the position it is under investigation and we have to wait and see what the investigation reveals.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been the position of the Vietnamese Information Service regarding these incidents?

Mr. NICKEL. I think the Vietnamese Information Service position has been very similar to ours, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the USIA or other American advisers offer advice to the Government of South Vietnam about the handling of this matter?

Mr. NICKEL. Our policy people in JUSPAO discussed it with the policy people in the Ministry of Information with respect to the guidance that should be given to the psyop media.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Vietnamese Government play down the incident as being of little importance?

Mr. NICKEL. It has been treated in the Vietnamese press. I am unable to say myself whether the Vietnamese Government played it down, sir. It certainly has been mentioned in the Vietnamese media.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that it had been emphasized or was it deemphasized as a matter of great significance?

Mr. NICKEL. It certainly has not been emphasized, sir.

TREATMENT OF COMMUNIST MASSACRES AT HUE

The CHAIRMAN. How has the USIA treated the Communist massacres at Hue in the program aimed at the Vietnamese people through leaflets, newspapers, or television?

Mr. NICKEL. We have done our best to assist the Vietnamese in telling the story of the massacres at Hue, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the USIA itself in its own pamphlets, newspapers and programs emphasized the massacre at Hue?

Mr. NICKEL. We in JUSPAO have provided material to USIA for use by USIA posts in other countries, sir.

NORTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS DIVISION OF JUSPAO

The CHAIRMAN. What is the function of the North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO?

Mr. NICKEL. The North Vietnamese Affairs Division of JUSPAO, sir, is a staff office which seeks to keep abreast of the propaganda developments involving the North. It is concerned with release to the media of certain enemy documents. It also releases material of a more general nature about certain enemy attitudes, activities, and practices.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE

The CHAIRMAN. Are any psychological operations being carried out against North Vietnam at the present time?

Mr. NICKEL. With respect to the operation that I am responsible for, sir, I know of nothing but radio broadcasting.

The CHAIRMAN. There are no aerial drops being made of printed material?

Mr. NICKEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have there ever been any made in the past?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give a brief description of their magnitude and purpose?

Mr. NICKEL. I could supply that for the record, sir. I cannot describe the magnitude of them since they were discontinued some time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. When were these air drops terminated?

Mr. NICKEL. At the time of the bombing halt, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They ran coincidentally with the bombing in the north; that right?

Mr. NICKEL. They took place at the same time. They were not operationally——

The CHAIRMAN. No, I mean they went on at the same time.

Mr. NICKEL. And they were discontinued at the same time.

(The information referred to follows:)

Beginning in 1965, propaganda leaflets were released from aircraft operating over North Viet-Nam, or were dropped over waters outside the boundaries of North Viet-Nam and wind-drifted into the country. Until March 31, 1968, this program was designed generally to convince North Viet-Nam—both people and regime—that North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet-Nam would fail, to motivate North Viet-Nam to seek peaceful settlement of the conflict, and to warn the people to stay away from military targets because they were subject to air strike. At its peak, the program involved some 25 million leaflets per month.

Following the partial bombing halt announced on March 31, 1968, leaflet targets were restricted to those south of 20 degrees North Latitude. The primary objective of these leaflets was that of keeping the people in the area aware of efforts by the Government of Viet-Nam and the United States to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

After the total bombing halt of November 1, 1968, the leaflet program over North Viet-Nam was terminated.

COST OF U.S. PROPAGANDA OPERATION IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure this question has been quite clarified. Is it fair to say your operation in all phases of the information, psychological warfare program in Vietnam costs approximately $10 million? Did you say it cost about $10 million?

Mr. NICKEL. I said that the money that fell within my area of responsibility was $10.9 million.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not include the military?

Mr. NICKEL. It does not include the military.

The CHAIRMAN. The military I remember now you said had 800 people against your 81?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess if yours is $10 million, theirs is $80 million, Is it fair to say we spend $80 million or $100 million on propaganda?

Mr. NICKEL. I would hesitate to answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. NICKEL. I would hesitate to even speculate on what the cost is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you venture a guess?

Mr. NICKEL. I just have no base on which to make such a judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like very much to have an idea of the total cost. Of course, I realize the Pentagon has an enormous propaganda operation in many places far greater than yours. I wondered whether you could give an estimate.

RADIO BROADCASTING BEAMED TO THE NORTH

Did I understand you to say that radio broadcasting is not beamed to the North?

Mr. NICKEL. I did not say. Some of it is, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of it is, presently.

Mr. NICKEL. Yes.

RADIO FREE ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything whatever to do with Radio Free Asia?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever hear of it?

Mr. NICKEL. I think I have. I am not sure of the title.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what it is? Do you know where the broadcasts come from?

Mr. NICKEL. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they not come from Korea?

Mr. NICKEL. I personally am not familiar with that.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, can you hear them in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not aware of that.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can, you do not know it.

Mr. NICKEL. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not either, but we have seen these letters soliciting donations to Radio Free Asia. They state that they beam radio programs all over Asia. I do not know that they say specifically Vietnam. I do not know whether they do either. It came to my attention a few weeks ago. You do not know whether you make any contribution to that operation or not.

Mr. NICKEL. We make no contribution, sir.

GVN SPENDING ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much the Vietnamese Government spent on their psychological warfare in the current year and last year, either one or both?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The Ministry of Information, sir, in its current fiscal year budget is spending $19.7 million.

The CHAIRMAN. $19.7 million?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that budget this current year, 1970?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that up or down? What was it compared to last year; do you know it?

Mr. NICKEL. That is up, sir. Last year it was $9.6 million, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From $9 to $19 million in 1 year?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you account for such a large increase?

Mr. NICKEL. I believe I mentioned earlier, sir, that there was a sizable increase in personnel which accounted for a good part of this increase from $9 to $19 million, but not all of it. There was also a substantial increase in program money.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of that do we furnish, directly or indirectly?

Mr. NICKEL. The $19 million which I cited, sir, is from the GVN's regular budget. There are no counterpart funds in that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much is planned for next year?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

JUSPAO BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much you have or are planning for fiscal year 1971 for your operations?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir. We plan to have a budget figure of $8.4 million, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For next year?

Mr. NICKEL. Next year.

The CHAIRMAN. That again does not include the military or any allied?

Mr. NICKEL. It does not include the military, although it does include, as I believe you are aware, the AID and DOD funds that are available to JUSPAO.

DISTRIBUTION OF FILM, "THE SILENT MAJORITY" IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Has the film, "The Silent Majority" been distributed in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. It has, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By you? By the USIA?

Mr. NICKEL. We made it available to Vietnamese television and to the National Motion Picture Center of Vietnam. It was shown on the GVN television network and in commercial theaters.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you estimate how many Vietnamese have seen it?

Mr. NICKEL. I will supply an estimate, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE SEEN "THE SILENT MAJORITY"

In South Vietnam, the GVN's Ministry of Information (MOI) was the sole distributor of the film "The Silent Majority." MOI estimated that 1.2 million persons saw the showings of the film on the national television network, and that an additional 300,000 urban viewers saw the film in theaters in six major cities, for an overall total of 1.5 million.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be apparently a very substantial amount. Have you any measure of public reaction to that firm?

Mr. NICKEL. We did not undertake any specific evaluation.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone that you know?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not aware that anyone did.

USIA POLLS CONCERNING ATTITUDES TOWARD UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back for a moment, it inspires me to ask a further question about the polls. Have you been instructed to decline to discuss the polling in Vietnam or all polls—any poll in any other country?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, the only polling that would come within my purview would be that in Vietnam, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The USIA takes polls in other countries; does it not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They are about public attitudes toward the United States and its policies? That has been a practice for a long time; has it not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about them and cannot testify about them; is that right?

Mr. NICKEL. When I say I do not know about them, I mean that I just do not know in detail anything about them and obviously could not speak to what they were about, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the USIA before you went to Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you serve before that?

Mr. NICKEL. In Japan, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In Japan?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. While you were in Japan, did you take polls there?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you at liberty to discuss the polls you took in Japan?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are instructed not to discuss them; is that it?

Mr. NICKEL. I am instructed not to discuss polls.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very unusual. Where did you serve besides Japan?

Mr. NICKEL. I have served in Burma, and I have served in Washington, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take polls in Burma?

Mr. NICKEL. To the best of my recollection, I do not believe we did, but that was some years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe you did?

Mr. NICKEL. I just cannot give you a definitive answer.

IS USIA TAPING PROCEEDINGS?

The CHAIRMAN. Is the USIA taking a tape of these proceedings?
Mr. NICKEL. I am unaware if they are taping these proceedings.
The CHAIRMAN. You would know if they are; would you not?
Mr. NICKEL. Let us just say that I am unaware if they are.
The CHAIRMAN. I wondered how efficient they were in reporting all these matters.

PUBLICATION OF "VIETNAM TODAY"

How many newspapers, magazines or other periodicals does the United States publish or print that are aimed at Vietnamese audiences?
Mr. NICKEL. We publish, Mr. Chairman, or I should say we assist the Vietnamese in publishing, a pacification newsheet, a weekly called "Vietnam Today," in 600,000 copies per issue.
The CHAIRMAN. 600,000?
Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that a newspaper type of publication?
Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. 600,000 copies are published weekly?
Mr. NICKEL. 600,000 copies.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that given away? What happens to it? I was interested.
Mr. NICKEL. It is given away, sir. It is distributed through the Vietnamese information service and it is more or less a vehicle for the Central Pacification and Development Council. In other words, it concentrates on developments in the pacification field.
The CHAIRMAN. It is printed in Vietnamese?
Mr. NICKEL. Printed in Vietnamese, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the cost of printing that a part of your budget?
Mr. NICKEL. The printing cost is part of my budget.
The CHAIRMAN. What would it cost a week to put out 600,000 copies of that?
Mr. NICKEL. $2,400.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is it printed?
Mr. NICKEL. Printed in Saigon, sir. Part of it—I might say that half of the printing now is handled by the Ministry of Information and half is handled by the USIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the USIA have a printing plant in Saigon?
Mr. NICKEL. JUSPAO has a small printing plant.
The CHAIRMAN. JUSPAO. Is it large enough to print this?
Mr. NICKEL. This is not printed entirely by JUSPAO. Half of the circulation—in other words, 300,000, sir—is printed by the Ministry of Information printing plant, and the other half by JUSPAO.
The CHAIRMAN. Who determines the material that goes into this publication?
Mr. NICKEL. Most of the editorial work on this newspaper now is done by the Ministry of Information, sir.

PUBLICATION OF "FREE SOUTH"

The CHAIRMAN. There is another newspaper called "Free South."
Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it published biweekly?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those are published?

Mr. NICKEL. This is published in an edition of 1.3 million copies. It is a small 8 by 10 sized newspaper. It is air dropped into contested areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Being published twice a week that is 2.6 million a week; is that correct?

Mr. NICKEL. I am sorry, sir; it is published every 2 weeks, not two a week.

The CHAIRMAN. Every 2 weeks?

Mr. NICKEL. Every 2 weeks, sir.

PUBLICATION OF "RURAL SPIRIT"

The CHAIRMAN. I notice here another one called "Rural Spirit." Are you familiar with that?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that? Describe it. Is it a magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. The Vietnamese name for Rural Spirit is Huong Que. It is a magazine designed largely for rural audiences, and it is to a great extent agricultural in its approach. It has a monthly circulation of 565,000, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many pages is a typical issue of that magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. Thirty-six pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-six pages. Is it slick paper or what?

Mr. NICKEL. No; it is not slick.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a picture magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. It has some illustrations, but it is not basically a picture magazine.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is it printed?

Mr. NICKEL. It is printed in Manila at our regional service center.

The CHAIRMAN. Printed in Manila?

Mr. NICKEL. At the U.S. Information Agency Regional Service Center. We have a large printing plant there.

USIA PRINTING PLANT IN MANILA

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have a large printing plant there?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What countries does it service?

Mr. NICKEL. It serves for the most part, sir, USIA posts in the East Asia and Pacific area.

SIZE OF CIRCULATION OF "FREE SOUTH" AND "RURAL SPIRIT"

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the Free South newspaper has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Asia outside of Japan and mainland China?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, it is a magazine. I just would not be able to make that judgment. It has a very high circulation, if you discount Free South which—are we talking about Huong Que?

The CHAIRMAN. Take both of them. One is a newspaper and one is a magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say they have the largest circulation of their kind, both magazine and newspaper, in Asia outside of Japan and mainland China?

Mr. NICKEL. I could not make that judgment. They certainly are the largest in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know of any that is larger; do you?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not know, sir.

USIA PRINTING PLANT IN MANILA

The CHAIRMAN. Did you answer the question of what countries the printing office in Manila serves? Does it serve all countries in Asia? Could you tell us how large that operation is?

Mr. NICKEL. It exists to provide backstopping for our USIS posts in Asia, Mr. Chairman. If you would like specific information on the plant, I shall see that the appropriate parties in my agency furnish it.

(The information referred to follows:)

USIA's Regional Service Center In Manila

USIA's Regional Service Center in Manila has three main functions: (1) producing publications originated by USIA in Washington for distribution to USIS posts in Asia; (2) producing publications originated by USIS posts in Asia for their own use; and (3) editing and producing regional publications. Products include magazines, photo newspaper inserts, leaflets, posters and "fast pamphlets." The latter, frequently full texts of Presidential statements, are keyed to major foreign policy events in which the time element is important.

Among the 11 American and 231 Filipino employees currently at the Regional Service Center are editors, artists, photo specialists and skilled printing technicians. The estimated operating budget for FY 1971 is $2,566,000, which includes printing service performed for other U.S. Government agencies on a reimbursement basis.

MAGAZINE ENTITLED, "THE FACE OF ANGUISH, VIETNAM"

The CHAIRMAN. Is this magazine I have here, The Face of Anguish, Vietnam, an issue of the Rural Spirit?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not its name; is it? What is this issue? It is a picture magazine; I think it came from you.

Mr. NICKEL. I do not—I cannot recognize it.

The CHAIRMAN. No; this comes from Free Asia Press, Manila, I am sorry. Is that part of our operation?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not recognize the magazine, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you are in the business, maybe I will give it to you and ask you to see if you can identify it for us. It does not seem to be identified. I do not know what the Free Asia Press is. It is a very elaborate magazine and beautifully done. Who would you say is the sponsor of that?

Mr. NICKEL. I would just say that—I have never seen it, and it does not appear to me to be one of our products.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would publish such a magazine except us?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not know.

PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF, "WHO ARE THE VIETCONG?"

The CHAIRMAN. Here is another one. It has no identification whatsoever. It is called, "Who Are the Vietcong?" Have you ever seen that pamphlet?

Mr. NICKEL. That is ours.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not identified. There is nothing in it, I am told by the staff, that would identify it as being your publication. Is that the normal way we operate? We do not identify our publications?

Mr. NICKEL. No; I would not say that is normal.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion would you say are attributed to us and are identifiable as our publications and what proportion are not?

Mr. NICKEL. It would be very hard to give a percentage. It is an English language publication, I believe, Senator. I would feel comfortable in saying that most of our English language publications are attributed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know where this was distributed? Was it distributed in South Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. Since it is an English language version, sir, I would assume that some numbers were used in South Vietnam, but I would also assume that the English language version was prepared for use primarily outside of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. In the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. No; not in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Where outside of Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. For use by posts other than Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. By the USIA?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You prepared it in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. It was—may I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to look at it or are you familiar with it?

Mr. NICKEL. May we see it, sir? The reason I am pausing is because I am not sure whether it was a JUSPAO publication or a USIA publication.

I can find out for you, sir, and supply the information.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is a pamphlet which you prepared and published?

Mr. NICKEL. We are sure it is a pamphlet in which we were involved. But whether JUSPAO prepared it or USIA prepared it, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that kind of magazine be printed in Manila rather than in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes; it would be.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would it be distributed? It would not be distributed in Japan; would it?

Mr. NICKEL. That would depend on what posts ordered it, sir. Japan certainly would not use large numbers in English.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be able to find out where that was printed and for whom and where it was distributed?

Mr. NICKEL. I will see that that information is developed.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you supply it for the record, please?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION OF "WHO ARE THE VIET CONG?"

The pamphlet "Who Are the Viet Cong?" was initially prepared in English by USIA in Washington for overseas distribution as part of USIA's worldwide information program. Texts and photos were initially sent to USIA's Regional Service Center (RSC) in Manila, where 10,250 pilot copies were printed in August 1966. Some 10,000 of these were printed for USIA, for distribution to USIS posts ordering them. There were additional printings at RSC Manila for USIS posts in Saigon, Canberra and Tel Aviv in 1967.

JUSPAO prepared a Vietnamese language version which was printed at RSC Manila in several press runs from December 1966 to March 1967, in a total of 300,000 copies. This version was distributed in South Viet-Nam.

IS ANY UNIDENTIFIED MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED IN UNITED STATES?

The CHAIRMAN. Is any material of this kind without identification ever distributed in the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are sure about that?

Mr. NICKEL. I am sure to the extent that I am very well aware of the need to keep it out of the United States, and we are always cognizant of this restriction.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is not identified, how would you keep it out? What is to prevent someone from distributing it here when there is no way of telling who printed it and where it came from except to the initiated?

Mr. NICKEL. In terms of USIS use of materials of this sort, all USIS posts, and all USIS personnel would be aware of the necessity to avoid its introduction into the United States.

BOOKLET ENTITLED "VIETNAM: THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"

The CHAIRMAN. On a recent visit to Saigon, two members of the staff of this committee were given this booklet called, "Vietnam, the View Beyond the Battle." Are you familiar with it?

Mr. NICKEL. I have seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. This was part of the materials in a welcoming kit.

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say you have seen it, who published it? Did you publish it? It also does not have a date on it.

Mr. NICKEL. I believe it was printed at our regional service center in Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very elaborate magazine with extremely fine workmanship in its maps and photographs. There is a magnificent photograph of Thieu and Ky and President Lyndon B. Johnson taken in February of 1966. It does not say itself when it was printed. Can you tell us when this was printed?

Mr. NICKEL. I believe, sir, that that was printed at our regional service center in Manila. I believe it was a USAID project, and the cost of printing——

The CHAIRMAN. Was it prepared at your request for distribution in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. I believe it was prepared by a contract writer for AID and I believe printing was at AID expense. However, I make that statement subject to check.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked the AID Director the day before yesterday if he had ever seen it. I thought perhaps it was his, but he had no

knowledge of it. He said he had never seen it and knew nothing about it.

Mr. NICKEL. I believe, sir, it was printed 2 or 3 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. He said he knew nothing about it, and he left the impression that he did not think it was an AID project. Again I raise the same question because it is such a fine piece of work. What is the purpose of publishing in English such a fine magazine and what is the distribution of it? Could you find that out on this one too?

Mr. NICKEL. I will find out on that, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION OF "VIETNAM: THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"

In 1967, because the Government of Viet-Nam wanted to tell to its citizens the story of developing nationhood in South Viet-Nam and because USAID especially was providing advice and assistance in the development, JUSPAO was requested to prepare a one-time publication, "Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the Battle." Information and photos were furnished by the GVN and USAID, with JUSPAO assuming coordinating responsibility for text, editing, layout and printing. The Vietnamese language publication was printed in 100,000 copies at USIA's Regional Service Center (RSC), at JUSPAO's request, for distribution in Viet-Nam.

An English language version was also printed in 68,500 copies. They were ordered by and shipped to JUSPAO and to USIS posts, at Manila, Djakarta, Bonn, Wellington, Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, Lusaka, Lagos, Stockholm, Taipei, Georgetown, Quito, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Rangoon, Suva, Copenhagen, Bern, Kabul, Brussels and Reykjavik.

From the JUSPAO supply, some 5,000 copies were provided to USAID for use in a briefing kit for distribution to visitors, journalists, incoming USAID officers and other persons inquiring about USAID's activities. Until early 1968 the U.S. Mission Press Center in Saigon, which operates under American Embassy supervision, distributed copies to newsmen.

WHY ARE MAGAZINES UNIDENTIFIED AS TO SOURCE?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not quite understand why magazines of this kind are not identified as to source. It obviously raises a very interesting question.

Mr. NICKEL. I will furnish the information to the committee.

(The information referred to follows:)

EXPLANATION OF LACK OF ATTRIBUTION OF PUBLICATIONS

As was pointed out in Mr. Nickel's opening statement, one of the roles performed by JUSPAO is assistance in the production of information materials by the GVN. In 1967, when "Viet-Nam: The View Beyond the Battle" was first printed, the GVN did not have the capacity to produce magazines of this type. In developing this particular project with and for the GVN, JUSPAO decided that this and similar publications might also have an audience in third countries as well. If attribution were given rightfully to the GVN, such attribution could limit USIS use overseas. On the other hand, if attribution were given to USAID or JUSPAO, it could limit or embarrass the GVN's use of the publication in Viet-Nam. As has been noted earlier, JUSPAO assisted the GVN by providing 100,000 copies of the publication in the Vietnamese language. Accordingly, a decision was made not to positively identify this type publication with either the GVN or U.S. agencies, thereby permitting all interested parties to distribute it through their own outlets.

PUBLICATION OF ATTRIBUTED AND UNATTRIBUTED MAGAZINES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who would make the contracts for the publication of such magazines? Put it this way: Has USIA ever made a contract for a similar magazine even though it is not this one?

Have you ever asked the regional office to publish for your purposes an unidentified magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. Let me answer that by saying we would occasionally use contract personnel to prepare products for us, but the use of a contract writer would not in any way be related to the decision as to whether the product would be attributed or unattributed. I do not myself know why this publication is not an attributed product.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your office ever ask for magazines similar to this from the regional office in Manila?

Mr. NICKEL. We occasionally order publications from the regional office in Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. When you do, do you specify whether they are to be attributed to you or not? Is that decision left up to the regional office?

Mr. NICKEL. If they are in English, sir, and they already exist, they already are either attributed or unattributed, so we would not get involved in the attribution. I think I am correct in assuming that most are attributed. If we are doing Vietnamese versions of basic English language publications that originate at the Manila plant, then it would be up to JUSPAO to decide whether we wanted them attributed.

The CHAIRMAN. On what basis do you decide whether it is attributed to you or not attributed to you? What is the criteria?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, speaking for myself alone——

The CHAIRMAN. You ought to speak for the Agency. I do not want you to speak only for yourself, but you can do both.

Mr. NICKEL. If you will allow me to speak——

The CHAIRMAN. Speak for yourself and then speak for the agency. That is right.

Mr. NICKEL. In making the decision as to whether something is to be attributed or not, I generally follow the policy that anything that is explaining some aspect of U.S. policy or U.S. society, should have attribution to the United States. In fact, attribution adds to the credibility of it.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you decide when not to attribute it? What is your objective?

Mr. NICKEL. Let me put it this way. I have another area of operations in Vietnam where I am engaged in helping the Vietnamese publish materials. Obviously, I do not attribute such materials to my own organization.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PUBLICATION OF MATERIALS IN ENGLISH

The CHAIRMAN. They would not publish materials in English; would they?

Mr. NICKEL. They publish some materials in English.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they?

Mr. NICKEL. A few, for use abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. For use where?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, for use abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. In the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Really?

Mr. NICKEL. But these are not materials I am involved in.

The CHAIRMAN. But they do publish materials in English that are then distributed in the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, occasionally, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know that. Of how many do you know?

Mr. NICKEL. I would have to determine that.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any examples of it?

Mr. NICKEL. I have no examples with me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the objective of such publications? To what are they directed?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, when I say for use in the United States, they publish on their own behalf without assistance from us some materials for use overseas. They publish these in French and in English, and I can only assume that some of the material they publish in English, unilaterally, is made available to their Embassy in Washington.

Now, I want to make it very clear, Mr. Chairman, these are aspects of their operation that I am not officially involved in; I provide neither support for, nor assistance in any way.

The CHAIRMAN. And no advice?

Mr. NICKEL. And no advice.

The CHAIRMAN. They do it all on their own?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you supply for the record some recent examples of publications that the Vietnamese Government has made in English?

Mr. NICKEL. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us a few examples during the last year to see what they are doing.

(The information referred to follows:)

GVN PUBLICATIONS IN ENGLISH

Sample materials provided through the Embassy of Viet-Nam include "Fighters for Peace," "Communist Atrocities During the Latest Offensives," and "Viet-Nam Bulletin."

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to these other publications, we mentioned three, I believe, the Rural Spirit, which has 565,000, and the Vietnam Today, with 600,000, and the Free South with 1.3 million per edition.

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There are nine other publications which I will not take the time to go into at length. I will name them and I think these are correct. This is material which we obtained in Saigon.

A magazine called Mother Heart. Long Me is the way you pronounce it in Vietnamese. It is published bimonthly in 200,000 copies per issue.

There is a magazine called Culture-Drama published bimonthly, 12,000 per issue.

MAGAZINE ENTITLED "MOTHER HEART"

What is "Mother Heart"?

Mr. NICKEL. Long Me, sir, is a publication of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi. We provide considerable assistance to the publication.

We print it. It is designed to explain and promote the Chieu Hoi program largely in the sense of informing families of prospective Chieu Hoi ralliers.

The CHAIRMAN. This is intended for the Vietcong whom you want to come over; is that right?

Mr. NICKEL. No; it is intended for families on the South Vietnamese side who may have relatives serving with the enemy. It provides these families with better information about the program. Also, one of its secondary objectives is to supply more information about the program to the Vietnamese officials who themselves are concerned with Chieu Hoi.

MAGAZINE ENTITLED "CULTURE-DRAMA"

The CHAIRMAN. What is the magazine Culture-Drama about?

Mr. NICKEL. It is known as the Van Tac Vu magazine, Mr. Chairman. It is a magazine designed to provide program material—songs, skits, and general raw material—for a great number of culture-drama teams which exist in Vietnam. The culture-drama form is a very attractive one.

The CHAIRMAN. Culture-drama has nothing to do with the theater, I guess.

Mr. NICKEL. It is folk theater touring——

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a theater in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. There is opera, renovated opera, classical.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have a local opera company?

Mr. NICKEL. There are performances.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they traveling people that we bring in?

Mr. NICKEL. No; this would be more on the order of classical Vietnamese drama. When I say opera, I mean classical Vietnamese opera which is not unrelated to Chinese opera.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we determine the subject matter of a magazine of that kind?

Mr. NICKEL. This particular magazine is directed at culture-drama teams which perform in the provinces, and in general perform almost like vaudevillians, if I might use the term, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the objective of our sponsoring such a magazine? What do we seek to accomplish in publishing such a magazine?

Mr. NICKEL. We seek to provide program material that is nationalist in its direction because these culture-drama teams play a role in support of the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think this kind of a role would agree with Vice President Agnew's idea of what a magazine or a publication ought to do? He would not criticize the kind of publications we put out in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. I prefer not to comment on the Vice President.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood his views, they were that magazines and newspapers ought to support the Government and, therefore, he would approve of this type of publication. It seems to me it is perfectly obvious he would.

I am not quite sure myself though what justifies the spending of American money on the cultural and drama magazine. Not that I have any aversion to culture and drama, but I did not know that we

were competent to tell the Vietnamese about culture and drama in Vietnam.

Mr. NICKEL. Well, of course——

The CHAIRMAN. We have a hard time knowing what is culture and drama in Washington.

Mr. NICKEL. Of course, Mr. Chairman, the JUSPAO staff that works on this magazine is predominantly Vietnamese.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. You think it is so constructed and edited that it would appeal to the effete, intellectual snobs of Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. I would say that it appeals to the performers and culture-drama teams in the provinces of Vietnam.

POSTERS, PAMPHLETS AND SONG SHEETS

The CHAIRMAN. Of what are posters IR–8 and IR–5 on rice examples? This is about the miracle rice.

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir. Those would be posters.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a one-shot proposition, one poster?

Mr. NICKEL. One poster.

The CHAIRMAN. 50,000 copies?

Mr. NICKEL. It is not a fixed periodical.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a recurring poster or is it?

Mr. NICKEL. It is not recurring, but obviously our interest in IR–8 is such that over a period of time we could do many posters on IR–8.

The CHAIRMAN. We have another poster entitled, "Our Project Has Been Completed." Is that a recurring poster or a single shot?

Mr. NICKEL. I would assume that is a single shot.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 50,000 copies?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have a poster called, "The Government of the Republic of Vietnam Helps Refugees Return Home." That again is just another poster?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there is a pamphlet, "Security Laws Protect the Citizens."

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 50,000 copies. Is that only for that purpose?

Mr. NICKEL. That would be a one shot pamphlet, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we have song sheets. One is called "Spring of Hope" and one is called "Native Spring." What is our objective in printing song sheets?

Mr. NICKEL. That song sheet was probably a product that was issued by the Ministry of Information in connection with the Tet observation. As you know, Tet is quite a festive holiday in Vietnam, and the songs were probably connected with the celebration of that holiday.

NUMBER OF POSTERS PRODUCED IN FISCAL YEAR 1969

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us how many different posters were put out last year?

Mr. NICKEL. I can only give you an overall figure on posters, Mr. Chairman—a total of 1.73 million copies in fiscal year 1969. That would be for individual units.

The CHAIRMAN. Individual units of posters.

Mr. NICKEL. 1.73 million pieces of paper, every one of which was a poster. I cannot give you the circulation or the production per poster. I cannot say 50,000 of this or 70,000 of that.

The CHAIRMAN. To illustrate the point, you put out 15 posters consisting of 1.7 million issues. Is that about right?

Mr. NICKEL. Those are not the figures, but that is the logic.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they are not the figures.

Mr. NICKEL. That is the logic.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant. You could not estimate how many posters there were, not individual pieces but how many different posters there were?

Mr. NICKEL. I find that very difficult.

PUBLICATIONS OF ALL KINDS PUT OUT IN A YEAR

The CHAIRMAN. Would you estimate how many publications of all kinds you put out in a year? Would it be 10 million or 50 million publications of all different kinds, including all these magazines and posters and newspapers? The newspapers alone run into several million weekly; do they not?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if you had an estimate to give us some idea of the volume of our activity.

Mr. NICKEL. 24 million plus, sir. That would be magazines, newspapers, posters, and pamphlets.

LEAFLETS DROPPED BY THE MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. Would the pamphlets include the leaflets dropped by the military?

Mr. NICKEL. That does not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimate how many there are?

Mr. NICKEL. That would be somewhere in the vicinity of 1.5 billion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Billion?

Mr. NICKEL. Billion.

The CHAIRMAN. My goodness; 1.5 billion by the military?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who prints those? Where can they get so many printed? That seems incredible.

Mr. NICKEL. They would be primarily distributed by the military.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these printed in that regional office in Manila?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the military have its own printing plant?

Mr. NICKEL. I was a bit hasty. Let me be more precise. Some might be printed in Manila. Many might be printed by the military on Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have a big printing plant on Okinawa?

Mr. NICKEL. They have a printing plant that provides support for the psychological program in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it comparable to the size of yours in Manila?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not as large?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the USIA plant in Manila a very large one?

Mr. NICKEL. It is a substantial modern plant.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it capable of printing a magazine as large as, say, Time magazine or Fortune or Newsweek?

Mr. NICKEL. It is difficult for me to answer. I am not aware of what capacity it would have for volume. I would think that technically it could do the job.

OTHER PRINTING BY THE MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. Does the military, in addition to the 1.5 billion leaflets, also print magazines and publications similar to this? Does it print anything similar to this anywhere?

Mr. NICKEL. It would be very unlikely to print a pamphelt like that. I believe they do print an employee relations magazine for the Vietnamese employees for the military in Vietnam. But to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, that is the only publication of that type that the military publishes.

LACK OF ATTRIBUTION OF "VIETNAM: THE VIEW BEYOND THE BATTLE"

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know who did this, but that is one of the finest pictures of its kind I ever saw of the people in the rice paddies. As a technical matter, regardless of its content, you could well take credit for it because it is a very fine production. I think it is a very attractive thing. Did I show it to you to see if you could identify it, or did you? I do not remember. Do you want to look at it and perhaps you can tell me?

Mr. NICKEL. I am familiar with it. I have seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have seen it.

I have so many publications here I cannot keep them all straight.

I am told by the staff that the USIS press said this morning, after they checked it, that it was printed in March 1967. I still am puzzled about this question of attribution. A magazine of this kind is such an imposing production that it is rather a shock to find there is no way of telling who printed it and where and when it was printed. Yet it is on a subject which apparently either we or the Government of Vietnam would be the only ones really interested in doing it. So I can see now that it was. I would suggest, for whatever it is worth, that it helps our credibility to identify and to claim it as our own when it is. I do not think that the world as it is today is going to be very impressed by our trying to avoid responsibility for the publication.

PRESS CREDENTIALS GRANTED TO FOUR SECURITY AGENTS IN SAIGON

Did your office have anything to do with the recent granting of press credentials in Saigon to four security agents?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not your responsibility. Do you know anything about that episode?

Mr. NICKEL. I am familiar with the general newspaper accounts of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I suppose you have friends who were aware of that in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell me in what mission these people were engaged for which they wanted such credentials?

Mr. NICKEL. I have no knowledge of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of that.

ARE CIA PERSONNEL USING USIA AS COVER?

Could you say whether any CIA personnel are using the USIA as cover?

Mr. NICKEL. Comment on such a question must be made in executive session by other appropriate officials, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF USIA PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Could you tell me what percentage of USIA personnel in Vietnam speak Vietnamese?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At three level or better. I am not talking about Vietnamese employees.

Mr. NICKEL. Six percent.

The CHAIRMAN. How many speak French at the three level or better?

Mr. NICKEL. I am sorry, sir. I gave you a percentage figure. I did not mean it to be a percentage. Six employees speak Vietnamese at the three level or better.

The CHAIRMAN. That is approximately 6 percent; is it not?

Mr. NICKEL. It also works out to approximately 6 percent, but it is not a percentage figure. The figure for French would be 24.

The CHAIRMAN. That is at the three level or better?

Mr. NICKEL. Yes, sir.

LANGUAGE FACILITY OF JUSPAO PERSONNEL

The CHAIRMAN. What about all JUSPAO personnel?

Mr. NICKEL. All JUSPAO personnel in terms of three or better or what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. NICKEL. Well, I am addressing the civilian component of JUSPAO. There are six people who speak Vietnamese and 24 who speak French.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the 800 military you mentioned? Do you know anything about them?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have the figures on them.

JOURNALISTS' TRIPS TO VIETNAM SPONSORED BY USIA

Does the USIA finance or sponsor in any way trips to Vietnam by journalists from the United States?

Mr. NICKEL. The U.S. Information Agency, sir, does have a third country journalist program.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate the magnitude of that? How many journalists in the course of a year?

Mr. NICKEL. I would be very happy to supply that for the record. It is a program administered out of the headquarters in Washington, and I cannot speak to the details, sir.

(The following information referred to follows:)

USIA THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM, FISCAL YEAR 1969

For the record, the program involved 15 foreign journalists during Fiscal Year 1969, and an anticipated equal number during the current fiscal year.

The CHAIRMAN. I want it both ways. I want trips from the United States to Vietnam of American journalists and also from other countries to Vietnam.

Mr. NICKEL. I believe, sir, that this program is only concerned with third country journalists to Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean not United States?

Mr. NICKEL. Not American journalists.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the answer to my first question is no. They do not sponsor U.S. journalists to Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. NICKEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They do sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you say what is the purpose of this program? Why do you sponsor foreign journalists to Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. To enable them, sir, to come and see for themselves the developments in that country. This is done in many instances for journalists from publications which could not afford to or would not send their correspondents to Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. When they arrive in South Vietnam, does your agency take care of them, meet them and make arrangements for their visit?

Mr. NICKEL. They are accredited, and they receive the same facilitation from the Mission Press Center, Mr. Chairman, as any accredited journalist would receive.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but in addition there is the fact that you sponsored them and paid for their passage. Do you also take care of them and give them any special treatment or are they just allowed like any other journalist?

Mr. NICKEL. We give them special treatment when they ask for it, special treatment of the same kind that we would give any journalist in Vietnam who so requested it.

To really get to the thrust of your question, Mr. Chairman, it is up to them. They come out; they are accredited; they are there like other journalists and their programs are theirs to arrange.

The CHAIRMAN. If they are not familiar with the place, I would assume in the normal course of events you would take them around and show them the places of interest. I would have thought the answer was yes. It would seem to me a rather dubious investment to bring a journalist from Europe or Africa and then let him go on his own.

Mr. NICKEL. The answer is yes. I just wanted to make it clear that what is offered them is what is available for all the journalists in Vietnam.

JUSTIFICATION FOR USIA THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I have some difficulty, I may say, in reconciling this activity with the mission of your agency that you describe. I cannot quite fit this in as to how we are justified as a government and as a people to support this activity. I wish you would enlighten me a little as to the reasoning justifying this activity of bringing foreign journalists to Vietnam to view the——

Mr. NICKEL. I think this is another matter, Mr. Chairman, which I will have to refer to my superiors and I am sure they will furnish a justification for it. I say that because it is a program that is not within my purview in terms of responsibility.

(The information referred to follows.)

THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM

This activity, known within USIA as the third country journalist program, was begun in 1965 and is currently active. The records of this Committee will reflect that, in hearings on news policies in Vietnam on August 17, 1966, the Agency provided a legal memorandum justifying this program. That record also indicates that the Committee obtained an opinion from the Comptroller General of the United States on the program that found the expenditure of funds for this program to be proper.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. In other words, this is carried on, but you have no responsibility for doing it. The decisions are all made here.

You would have to ask Mr. Shakespeare about that; is that what you said?

Mr. NICKEL. I am not sure that it would be Mr. Shakespeare, but certainly one of my principals in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. I just use him. He is the nominal head of the Agency. It is quite right he might not know about it, but someone at that level would know. But you would not be willing to share with me your views about the justification for such a program.

THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALISTS' BRIEFING AND INTERVIEWS

When these people arrive there, are they normally given briefings by the American officials?

Mr. NICKEL. If they so request.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it normal that they do request such a briefing?

Mr. NICKEL. I would say not necessarily, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No?

Mr. NICKEL. It is very hard to categorize journalists in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they normally expect to see military officials or the people in the Embassy? What would you say was the norm?

Mr. NICKEL. Many of them, Mr. Chairman, would like to interview senior officials in Vietnam. I would say, by and large, they are no more successful or no more unsuccessful in arranging interviews than the average journalist who is accredited in Vietnam.

WITNESS' INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING POLICY QUESTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. In this matter, do your instructions with regard to the polls also include policy questions? Were you instructed not to discuss policy questions with the committee?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

POLLING BY OLIVER QUAYLE

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever heard of Mr. Oliver Quayle? Does that name mean anything to you?

Mr. NICKEL. The name does not sound completely strange, but frankly I cannot associate it with anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You associate Mr. Quayle with something else; do you? That word used to be common, but I have not heard it in that connection for a long time. They have developed new words. He is a well-known figure in U.S. circles and has often done work testing public opinion. In fact there is an article in this morning's paper. One of the well-known columnists apparently has been down in Alabama with him this week. I happened to see it this morning.

I wondered if you knew whether he had ever visited Vietnam while you were there. Apparently not. You are not acquainted with his work?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He has done considerable work in this country on the testing of attitudes and opinions, and I think one of the columnists sometime back mentioned that he thought Mr. Quayle had made a poll in Vietnam. Whether he made it at the USIA's request is another matter. We will try to find that out from your superiors.

(The information referred to follows.)

POLLING BY OLIVER QUAYLE

U.S. Information Agency records indicate that USIA has never commissioned Mr. Oliver Quayle to conduct a public opinion poll in Vietnam.

ORIENTATION OF USIA OFFICERS FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN VIETNAM

Are USIA officers assigned in countries other than Vietnam ever sent to Vietnam for brief visits at Government expense?

Mr. NICKEL. USIA officers?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. NICKEL. Yes; we bring some USIA officers to Vietnam for orientation.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you indicate about how many during the course of a year are brought to Vietnam for this purpose?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not have specific figures but, during the period I have been there, we have brought groups of five officers, I would say, to Vietnam two or three times a year for orientation.

The CHAIRMAN. That means 15 or 20 officers altogether?

Mr. NICKEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. What countries did they come from while you were there?

Mr. NICKEL. They came from a variety of countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Europe?

Mr. NICKEL. Europe, South America, and East Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. The purpose of this orientation is for them to go back and do what?

Mr. NICKEL. Its purpose is to give them a firsthand appreciation of the situation in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it in order to aid them in spreading the word when they get back to their posts?

Mr. NICKEL. In order to enable them to better speak to the situation.

EFFECT OF USIA THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALIST PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the newspapermen, what has been the effect and the result of this program? Even though you did not inspire it nor originate it, do you know whether when they return to their respective countries they report and write their articles in a very sympathetic way to our purposes in Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. I do not know enough about it, sir, to be able to characterize it.

The CHAIRMAN. If they do not, it does not seem justified to carry on the program. Is there no followup to find out how they react?

Mr. NICKEL. There is.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a followup?

Mr. NICKEL. There is, sir, but the followup does not fall into my area of responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. You do not know, but clearly they could want to check to see if these people reacted in the proper way and if they appreciate the courtesies you have extended them. Would they not?

Mr. NICKEL. I am sure that our people are well aware of what was written by newspapermen who have participated in this program.

PROGRAM OF BRINGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Were you there when Mr. Moshe Dayan came to Vietnam?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that before your tour of duty?

Mr. NICKEL. That was before my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the program of bringing government officials there? You do not know about that?

Mr. NICKEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not your responsibility.

Mr. NICKEL. It is not mine, and I am not aware of any.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about it.

WESTERN INFLUENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE CULTURE

There was a recent publication in the Vietnam Embassy here in Washington which contains an article on what is happening to Vietnamese culture. This is from a statement of the Minister of Culture on which I would like to have you comment. It says and I quote:

"Few of these young city people know much about their own culture except for the well-known festival such as Tet or the Mid-Autumn Festival," says the scholar versed in eastern and western cultures. "It is not that they don't care. But access to western ways is easier than access to traditional Vietnamese culture. * * *"

Radio and television are the media mainly responsible for the changes. As a Saigon University coed says, "Probably 80 percent or even more of the young people in Saigon prefer western music and art. We like the music especially. Few of us understand our own culture, mainly because we have never had the opportunity to study its features. But the western forms can be seen and heard daily on the American forces radio and television stations. And now even Vietnamese radio and television have programs devoted to western music."

Would you say that is an accurate description of what has taken place in Saigon?

Mr. NICKEL. Certainly access to Western culture is there. The communications explosion, I would say, Mr. Chairman, has had its effect in Vietnam as elsewhere. The youth of Vietnam like the youth of other countries have been attracted by Western forms. On the other hand, in the countryside of Vietnam, the Vietnamese cultural impact is very pronounced and very visible. I would say from my own view that the cultural problem, the problem of cultural identity in Vietnam, is probably not much different from the problem of cultural identity that you find in most developing nations today.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean most developing nations or only those in which we have a large presence?

Mr. NICKEL. Perhaps I will amend that to say many developing nations. It is largely a problem of what I call the communications explosion.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any indigenous competition in Saigon to the television and radio systems which we have established?

Mr. NICKEL. Well, Mr. Chairman, on Vietnamese television, I believe that probably the most popular program offered during a week's schedule is a night devoted to Vietnamese opera, which is distinctly Vietnamese in form and a very inherent part of their own cultural pattern. You find youngsters as well as elderly Vietnamese clustered around the sets watching it.

IMPACT OF U.S. PRESENCE ON VIETNAMESE CULTURE

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the impact of the U.S. presence in Vietnam on the Vietnamese culture has been a favorable one?

Mr. NICKEL. I would answer that, Mr. Chairman, by saying that whenever you introduce a half million foreigners into a country of a population of 17 million, there are going to be dislocations and some of the dislocations are going to be cultural.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that the presence of a half million soldiers is a greater influence than the presence of the USIA with its great publications, its newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and posters? Which do you think is the greater influence on the Vietnamese culture?

Mr. NICKEL. What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that the presence of a half million foreigners in a nation of 17 million people is bound to have some impact, some cultural impact.

The CHAIRMAN. Supposing you did not have any USIA, do you think there would be a great impact if the foreigners were engaged primarily in fighting out in the rice paddies? All I mean is that it

seems to me you probably are responsible for a greater part of the impact than the soldiers.

Mr. NICKEL. I would not discount the effect of the presence of a half million people.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not discounting it.

I do not suppose there are any easy criteria by which we can measure that.

Mr. Nickel, it is getting late. I must say, outside of those areas in which you have been instructed not to answer my questions, you have been very forthcoming and I think it has been a very interesting hearing. It seems to me that you have demonstrated beyond a doubt that the presence of the Americans is overwhelming. It has almost submerged the indigenous traditions and culture, at least in Saigon, although not in some of the remote areas where I suppose it is different. But I hardly know how they could resist it and maybe that is a good thing. I do not know. I guess that is for history to determine.

I appreciate very much you and your colleagues coming here to the committee.

QUESTIONS ON U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY POLLS

We will take up with your superiors the question of whether or not we are entitled to the information about polls. I must say it is hard for me to find a justification for secrets in an agency for information created and paid for by the American people. I thought it was to instruct everyone. When we ask you what you are doing, it seems to me it is a little incongruous for you to say, "We can't tell you about that." We expect that from something like the CIA, but I was a little surprised to have it coming from an information agency. I had not thought of it in that connection, but I realize you are not the policymaker nor the highest responsible official and I do not criticize you for it. If you have been told to do that, I do not want you to cut your own throat out in the open here before the committee. We will talk to Mr. Shakespeare about it or someone else in his agency.

Thank you very much, Mr. Nickel.

Mr. NICKEL. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

(The following are answers by the U.S. Information Agency to additional committee questions:)

USIA REPLIES TO SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF QUESTIONS

1. What is the current USIA policy with regard to having in its libraries in Viet-Nam books that are critical of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam? Would you name some of the books currenty stocked that are critical of U.S. policy?

The U.S. Information Agency's policy with regard to critical books in Vietnamese libraries is one of presenting the issues, both pro and con, to interested readers.

Some typical titles on this subject include the following: J. W. Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (English and French editions); and Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution*. In addition the libraries have balanced collections of periodicals, many of which regularly have contents critical of U.S. policy, including New Republic, Nation, Harpers, Look, Life, Foreign Affairs, Newsweek, Time, Saturday Review, Asian Survey, New York Times Magazine, and the New Yorker.

2. Have any films produced by the Vietnamese Government been brought to the United States for showing? If, so, provide the details.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following GVN-produced 16 mm films to the GVN's Embassy in Washington and to the GVN's permanent observer to the United Nations since January 1969:

Title	Language	GVN Embassy	Observer to U.N.
"Carnage at Hue" [1]	English	1 print	1 print.
"Viet-Nam News Magazine"	do	2 prints	2 prints.
"Love and Hatred"	do	3 prints	None.
"Viet-Nam Fights and Builds"	Vietnamese	1 print	None.
"Back to the Fatherland"	do	None	1 print.

[1] In addition, approximately 28 prints of "Massacre at Hue," which is the same as "Carnage at Hue," were sent by the GVN to various U.S. civilian groups at the latter's request.

3. *(a) Have there been any studies made of the relative effectiveness of GVN and Viet Cong political propaganda? (b) If so, what do they show as to the effectiveness of the various methods of propaganda used by each?*

There is no record of any comparative studies. Typical Viet Cong propaganda studies report themes but no comparative evaluation.

4. *How many TV sets are there in Viet-Nam—in Vietnamese hands? How many are owned by the Vietnamese Government? How many were paid for by the United States?*

The GVN estimates that there are 300,000 television sets in use by the Vietnamese. The GVN owns 4,832 sets, of which 4,582 were USG-funded—1,082 for the Republic of Viet-Nam's Armed Forces (RVNAF), and 3,500 for the Ministry of Information's community viewing program.

5. *How many TV crews does the USIA operate in Viet-Nam? What use is made of their production?*

USIA does not have any TV crews in Viet-Nam. JUSPAO, however, does have six motion picture cameramen on its payroll, and they are available to produce materials for a TV clip service. Since January 1, 1969, JUSPAO has produced 108 TV clips for distribution to USIS posts in 36 countries. When clips are considered to have application to Vietnamese audiences, they are offered to Vietnamese TV.

6. *(a) How does the number of personnel now attached to the (1) USIA, (2) JUSPAO, and (3) in military psychological operations compare with a year ago? How many will there be a year from now?*

	1969	1970	Estimate, 1971
(1) Personnel—USIA element:			
American civilians	[1] 130	[2] 99	[3] 88
Local and 3d country nationals	[4] 397	[5] 347	[5] 347
Total	527	446	435
(2) Personnel—JUSPAO:			
American civilians	[6] 132	[6] 101	[6] 90
Local and 3d country nationals [7]	397	347	347
American military personnel	118	107	107
Total	647	555	544
(3) Personnel—Military psychological operations	996	811	([8])

[1] Includes 30 AID-funded, 6 DOD-funded, and 2 VOA-attached officers.
[2] Includes 24 AID-funded, 2 DOD-funded, and 1 VOA-attached officers.
[3] Includes 14 AID-funded and 2 DOD-funded officers.
[4] Includes 133 AID-funded personnel.
[5] Includes 117 AID-funded personnel.
[6] Includes USIA element and 2 MACV civilians.
[7] USIA element.
[8] 1971 personnel level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.

6. *(b) What percentage of all USIA personnel overseas are in Viet-Nam?*

5.04 percent of all USIA American and local overseas personnel are in Viet-Nam.

6. *(c) How many JUSPAO employees are in Saigon and how many are in the field?*

Of the total of 555 personnel, 389 are in Saigon and 166 in the field:

	Saigon	Field
American civilians	78	23
American military personnel	34	73
Local and 3d country nationals	277	70
Total	389	166

7. *Is the USIA consulted regularly concerning future military operations, with a view to obtaining its assessment of the effect of such operations on Vietnamese attitudes?*

In Saigon, the Director of JUSPAO as a member of the Mission Council has the opportunity to advise the Ambassador and fellow Mission Council members of possible effects on Vietnamese attitudes of planned general and specific military actions.

8. *The information booklet entitled "JUSPAO Viet-Nam" states that "It (JUSPAO) also produces for field use leaflets, pamphlets, newspaper articles and photographs, posters, magazines, loudspeaker tapes, motion pictures, and radio and television programs. These items are variously distributed by hand, disseminated from airplanes or broadcast by the GVN, the U.S., and other free world nations."*

8. (*a*) *What was the total number of pieces printed or produced last year for each of these categories? What is planned for this year? Next year?*

Category	1969	Estimate, 1970	Estimate, 1971
Leaflets	36,000,000	10,000,000	5,000,000
Pamphlets	[1] 3,500,000	3,000,000	1,500,000
Newspaper articles	6,000	3,000	3,000
Photographs	66,000	36,000	36,000
Posters	[1] 7,800,000	8,000,000	6,000,000
Magazines	[1] 9,900,000	9,600,000	7,800,000
Loudspeaker tapes	11,819	7,310	None
Motion picture prints	1,514	655	600
Radio programs	1,271	1,048	450
Television programs [2]	27	72	None

[1] The estimates provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony were based on volume of U.S. support for the GVN printed media program.

[2] JUSPAO provided scripts and culture-drama team support to GVN television.

8. (*b*) *Do these totals include the propaganda materials put out by the U.S. military forces? If not, how much did the military produce last year? Where are these materials printed?*

Military production, for which JUSPAO is not responsible, last year included:

Category	Quantity	Where produced
Leaflets	7.8 billion [1]	7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Do	2.4 billion [1]	4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Pamphlets	0.5 million	7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Newspaper articles	Not applicable	
Photographs	do	
Posters	15.8 million	4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Magazines	1.9 million	7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Loudspeaker tapes	1,327	4th PsyOp Group, Viet-Nam.
Motion picture prints	Not applicable	
Radio programs	208	7th PsyOp Group, Okinawa.
Television programs	Not applicable	

[1] The estimate provided in the Mar. 19, 1970, testimony was based on GVN, not United States military publication programs.

8. (*c*) *Does JUSPAO print materials for the Vietnamese government? How much of the GVN printed propaganda is printed in its own plants?*

It is estimated that during FY 1970, approximately 70 percent of JUSPAO's printing output provides information support to GVN programs. Of the GVN's total support requirements, JUSPAO estimates that the GVN produces about 46 percent of the materials.

8. (*d*) *Does JUSPAO produce materials for use by the Korean and Thai forces in Viet-Nam? Has it ever produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean atrocities against civilians?*

JUSPAO does not regularly produce materials for use by Korean and Thai forces. However, records list the following printed products:

Category	Date	Quantity	How used
Two posters in Vietnamese	1968	30,000	By Koreans troops.
Paper flags, ROK, GVN, and United States	1968	12,000	Do.
Booklet, in Korean	1969	15,000	By Korean troops involved in the Chieu Hoi program.
Poster, in Vietnamese	1968	50,000	By Vietnamese Information Service to reveal Thai assistance to Vietnam.

JUSPAO has not produced any materials relating to allegations of Korean atrocities.

8. (*e*) *How many publications, in English, concerning Viet-Nam have been produced by USIA and are currently in stock? Please provide copies of these publications, information on the distribution and the cost of each.*

USIA has one such publication in stock, "Vietnamizing the Search for Peace," printed in 20,000 copies, of which 19,720 were distributed to 13 USIS posts in East and South Asia, and the remaining 280 copies held in stock. In addition, JUSPAO has one English-language publication in stock, "Viet-Nam 1970," printed for the GVN in 20,000 copies by the Regional Production Center, Manila. Distribution was made to the GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 29 GVN diplomatic posts (excluding Washington), 11,800; GVN Ministry of Information, 6,500; 29 USIS posts where there are GVN diplomatic posts, 475 for information; RSC reserve stock, 1,000; JUSPAO reserve stock, 225.

Cost of "Vietnamizing the Search for Peace" is .7 cents per copy, and "Viet-Nam 1970" is 20 cents per copy.

8. (*f*) *How many of these publications do not bear the USIA imprint? Why?*

"Viet-Nam 1970" does not bear the USIA imprint but rather that of the GVN Ministry of Information. The publication was originally published in Vietnamese (100,000 copies) at the GVN's request for GVN use; the subsequent English language version was likewise printed for GVN use.

9. (*a*) *What facilities does the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network maintain in Viet-Nam?*

[In kilowatts]

Location	Radio/ AM power	Radio/ FM power	Television/ ER power
Quang Tri	1		40
Danang	10	25	40
Chu Lai	1		40
Pleiku	10	25	40
Qui Nhon	10	25	40
Tuy Hoa			40
Nha Trang	10	75	40
Saigon	50	100	240
Can Tho			[1]

[1] UHF translator.

9. (*b*) *How many hours is the Armed Forces TV station in operation daily compared with the operating hours for the GVN station?*

Armed Forces TV stations average 12 hours of daily operations. Three of the GVN TV stations average four hours daily; the fourth station (Saigon) averages five hours.

9. (*c*) *How many Vietnamese watch the Armed Forces TV network compared with the number who watch the GVN station?*

A comparison has not been established.

10. (*a*) *How much has been spent, or is planned to be spent, by the USIA and other U.S. agencies, to help build the physical plants for the GVN radio and television, film, printing and other information programs?*

Since 1965 and projected to the completion of the current GVN projects, U.S. agencies have spent or plan to spend the following amounts: 4-station radio network, $6.8 million; television network, $8.2 million; motion picture center, $2.5 million; information printing house, $234,000; other physical plants, none.

10. (b) *How much has the GVN put up for each of these categories?*

Actual amounts earmarked for physical plants for GVN media facilities are not identified per se in the GVN budget. However, for the period since 1965, the following monies, including those for any physical plants, have been spent or earmarked for: radio, $8.3 million; television, $4.2 million; motion picture center, $2.7 million; information printing house, $1.8 million; and Ministry of Information General Directories and the Vietnamese Information Service, $47.6 million.

11. (a) *What was the total amount spent last year by the United States on all phases of the information and psychological warfare program in Vietnam, including the costs for all aspects of military psychological operations? How much will be spent this year? Next year?*

[In millions of dollars]

Category	1969	Estimate, 1970	Estimate 1971
Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office controlled programs	13.3	12.1	9.7
U.S. military programs	14.6	10.7	(1)
Total	27.9	22.8	

[1] 1971 funding level is still in the planning stage where some reduction is being considered.

11. (b) *How much did the Vietnamese government spend on these programs last year? How much is planned for this year?*

[In millions]

Category	1969	Estimate 1970
Ministry of Information	$9.6	$19.7
RVNAF Psy War activities	[1] 4.9	4.9
Total	14.5	24.6

[1] No detailed breakout of GVN funds expended for 1969 is available. However, officials estimate that the amount is approximately the same as programed for the current year.

12. (a) *How many U.S. personnel work directly in or with GVN agencies concerned with propaganda or information matters?*

	U.S. civilians	U.S. military
JUSPAO	[1] 67	107
USMACV		167
Total	67	274

[1] This total includes 16 NBC/I contractual personnel.

12. (b) *How many Americans work in the GVN radio network?*

Three JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to the RVNAF radio branch.

How many Americans work in the GVN television activities?

Sixteen contractual advisors (National Broadcasting Company, Inc.) and three other JUSPAO advisors. In addition, there is one technical advisor assigned to the RVNAF television branch.

How many Americans in GVN films?

Two JUSPAO advisors.

13. *What is the purpose and scope of operation of "psychological operations officers" attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces? How many are there?*

They advise Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and Vietnamese Army political warfare (PolWar) units in the provinces on effective coordinated information/psychological operations in support of national and local Pacification and Development goals. There are 34 civilian and military "psychological operations officers" attached to U.S. advisory teams in the provinces to concentrate on the functions of the GVN civilian information services; an additional 43 military officers serve as advisors to the GVN military political warfare cadre.

14. *What control, if any, does the USIA have over the activities of the five Army television camera crews operating in Viet-Nam that produce materials aimed at U.S. television audiences?*

None.

15. *Have the Viet-Nam Information Services and other Viet-Nam agencies dealing with propaganda matters been receptive to USIA advice?*

They have been generally receptive to advice in program, training and engineering matters. Advice in administrative matters has been less effective.

16. (*a*) *How many members of Viet-Nam's National Assembly have come to the United States in the last two years? How many have had all or part of their expenses paid for by the United States?*

During the past two years, 33 Vietnamese senators and 42 deputies visited the United States. Ten senators and 10 deputies traveled in whole or in part at U.S. Government expense. Of these 20, six senators and five deputies were provided domestic travel expenses and per diem from the Department of State in response to invitations issued by members of the U.S. Congress.

16. (*b*) *Does the USIA sponsor any Vietnamese to come to the United States on speaking tours? If so, give details.*

None.

17. (*a*) *How many Vietnamese have been brought to the United States for study or training (non-military) in the last five years under government auspices?*

Program	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	Tota
Fulbright-Hays scholarships	9	6	0	0	[1] 1	16
Cleveland international program	2	2	3	2	2	11
East-West center scholarships	2	5	7	5	2	21
American field service scholarships	15	14	48	33	23	133
USAID grants	107	92	412	433	186	1,230
Total	135	119	470	473	214	1,411

[1] Partial grant.

17. (*b*) *How many are here now?*

Program:	
Fulbright-Hays scholarship	1
East-West Center scholarships	13
American field service scholarships	30
Television engineers to RCA Institute	5
USAID grants	526
Total	575

17. (*c*) *How many are programmed to come this year? Next year?*

Program	1970	1971
Cleveland international program	2	2
East-West Center scholarships	5	5
American Field Service scholarships	20	20
USAID grants (new)	[1] 331	411
USAID grants (renewals)	384	448
Total	742	886

[1] Although new participants have been selected and funds obligated, they are authorized to depart Vietnam up to 9 months after the obligation date.

Appendix I

Statement for the Record on the Administrative Aspects of Pacification and Development

(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)

Mr. Chairman: In this statement I will cover the organization, personnel, and costs of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) effort. I will also describe briefly how it works and how it relates to the Vietnamese organization for Pacification and Development. In my opening statement I touched on the background of the organization and briefly traced the concept and evolution of its establishment. As I indicated, CORDS is a combined civil/military organization within the U.S. Military Assistance Command (MACV) headed by General Creighton Abrams. I am General Abrams' Deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

I. U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

A. *Exhibit A* shows the organization of MACV. As you can see, CORDS is an integral part of MACV. Its headquarters component, headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff, operates under the Chief of Staff like other headquarters staff elements and through the Chief of Staff to field commands. As General Abrams' Deputy for CORDS I have access through the Chief of Staff to the Field Commands and to all the staff agencies, including CORDS. This same arrangement is repeated at the Corps level where each U.S. Field Force Commander has a Deputy for CORDS and a staff agency for CORDS. The Commander's responsibilities fall into three categories, command of any U.S. troops units in the area, the Vietnamese Army advisory effort, and the pacification and development advisory effort or CORDS. At Province level, the Province Senior Advisor, who may be military or civilian depending on the security situation commands a unified CORDS organization. Twenty-five (25) Provinces currently have military Province Senior Advisors and nineteen (19) plus four autonomous cities have civilians.

B. *Exhibit B* shows the relationship between CORDS and other Mission elements. While I am a member of the Mission Council, the CORDS organization itself relates to other U.S. Agency headquarters through the MACV structure. At the Saigon level, National Security Council Action Memorandum #362 of May 9, 1967, directed the establishment of MACCORDS and dealt with its relationship to other U.S. agencies. The Embassy, AID and JUSPAO all have independent headquarters staffs reporting directly to Ambassador Bunker. However, their field activities and personnel operate through the MACV chain of command. Thus, all field activities are under a single manager: MACV. This arrangement is an unprecedented approach, melding civil and military responsibilities and personnel into one organization.

C. Within CORDS there are staffs for each element of the Pacification and Development program. The Refugee, Chieu Hoi, Public Safety, and Community Development Directorates are concerned with civil oriented programs and therefore are staffed mainly by civilians. The Territorial Security Directorate staff is mainly military. The other Directorates, like Plans, Policy and Programs, Reports and Analysis, and Management Support are more fully combined civil/military staffs. The primary mission of the Directors is to advise their counterpart GVN agencies. In addition, they have internal MACV staff responsibilities.

II. GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

A. *Exhibit C* shows how the Vietnam Central Pacification and Development Council is organized. As you can see there are similar councils down through the GVN chain of command; at corps and province. I have weekly meetings with Major General Hon who is Chief of the Pacification Coordination Center, in effect the principal staff manager of Pacification and Development. Mr. McManaway, Director of Plans, Policy and Programs of CORDS, meets with General Hon more frequently, at times daily. I also meet frequently with the Prime Minister,

but these meetings are not on a regularly scheduled basis. At these meetings, we discuss a wide variety of problems and proposals dealing with Pacification and Development.

B. I will not describe here what the advisors at corps, province, and district do on a day-to-day basis since there are representatives from each level available here today who will be discussing that with you, but in general the relationship with the Vietnamese follows the pattern at the central level, growing closer at province and district level.

III. PERSONNEL

A. CORDS has 7,627 authorized U.S. personnel spaces. The actual on-board figure varies, of course, but as of the end of January the fill was 7,368 personnel or about 96%. *Exhibit D* breaks out the authorized figures. The great majority of total personnel are assigned in the field.

B. The largest single advisory element is the one most closely related to Vietnamization and U.S. troop redeployment. This element is the 353, 5-man Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) who rotate among the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces with the mission of assisting them in upgrading their effectiveness.

C. A similar approach toward the same objective is the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) concept employed by the Marines in I Corps. There are 114 CAP Teams who report through the I Corps Marine chain of command rather than the CORDS structure so they are not included in Exhibit D figures. Coordination takes place at the CTZ and province levels. We have with us today representatives of both the MATs and CAPs who will be describing what they do in more detail.

D. The total number of military personnel in CORDS is 6,437: 2,427 officers and 4,010 enlisted men. The majority are at Province and District levels and are involved in advising their Vietnamese counterparts on programs, as well as general management and advisory support.

E. We have 883 civilian officers, from AID and the Department of State assigned to CORDS. These personnel work in those areas of activity for which CORDS has full responsibility, such as Refugees, Chieu Hoi, and Community Development. This category does not include USAID technicians working in the areas of education, health, and agriculture, nor certain State Department personnel who are assigned by the Embassy to the field and thus come under the operational control of, rather than assignment to, MACV. The latter category totals some 242 positions.

F. The last category of U.S. personnel is DOD-funded civilians assigned to CORDS. There are 65 people in this category. These people work mainly in the Rural Development (RD) Cadre and Phoenix programs both at headquarters and in the field.

IV. SELECTION AND TRAINING

A. These, then, are the Americans involved. I will now describe how they are selected, trained and how they are assigned.

B. Military advisors, particularly those serving as Province Senior Advisors (PSA) or Deputy Province Senior Advisors (DPSA) are carefully screened and selected through a special process set up for this purpose by the Department of the Army (DA). The Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, personally notifies each individual selected and obtains his acceptance of the assignment in writing. DSAs are also selected by special, but less elaborate, procedure by the Career Branch, Department of the Army.

C. Senior civilian officers, including those in PSA and DPSA positions, are initially selected by nomination by their parent agency, AID or Department of State. The nominations are sent to USAID/Saigon which, in coordination with ACofS, CORDS and myself, reviews and accepts or rejects the nomination.

D. The military PSA/DPSA serves an 18-month tour and the DSA at least 12 months with options for extending. Civilian tours are at least 18 months. Some 45–50% of all civilian advisors return at their request for a second tour and in a number of key positions, particularly at the Saigon and Corps levels, we have officers with long and extensive experience in Vietnam and Southeast Asia generally.

E. All civilian advisors receive at least seven weeks training at the Foreign Service Institute. The majority of junior officers, both AID and Department of State, receive up to forty-two weeks of language training in Washington depending on the individual's language aptitude determined through special tests.

F. For Province Senior Advisors and their deputies, both military and civilian, there is a special course at the Vietnam Training Center in Washington. The course includes language training and may extend as long as forty-two weeks

depending on the individual's needs. Once in country, there are orientation briefings in Saigon, plus orientations when they report in at Corps and Province. The District Senior Advisors and their deputies receive 18 weeks training at the Vietnam Training Center.

G. In addition to the above there is a 5-day CORDS Advisor Orientation Course for all newly arrived personnel which provides a comprehensive review of all aspects of pacification. There is also an in-country Vietnamese language training program run by CORDS available to all CORDS personnel.

H. The MAT Team members have a special course at the Di An Training Center which runs 18 days covering all facets of their role in training and upgrading the RF and PF.

I. In terms of quality, I would say that overall we probably have had and continue to have some of the best and most dedicated officers in the U.S. Government serving in Vietnam. They are for the most part hand picked. Where an officer cannot or will not perform satisfactorily he is removed at once and either assigned to another job where he can perform or sent home. Precise figures are not available, but the CORDS military advisors do receive a high percentage of the total awards and decorations presented to MACV advisors. The CORDS civilians also have a record of dedication and achievement. Over the past year and a half there have been 24 killed, 45 wounded and 12 captured. Of the latter, one was released, one escaped, and four to the best of our knowledge have died in captivity. Since the establishment of CORDS, its civilians have been awarded the U.S. Secretary's Award twice, the Award for Heroism 18 times, the Distinguished Honor Award five times and the Superior Honor Award 11 times. More than 60 have received the Meritorious Honor Award and about 400 have received awards from the Vietnamese Government.

V. REPORTING

A. At this point I would like to discuss the reporting systems used by both the Americans and the Vietnamese in managing pacification and judging its trends. There are a number of systems now in use. These include systems reporting on terrorist incidents, Territorial Forces Evaluation, People's Self Defense Forces, National Police evaluation, the refugee situation, and others. The most important, especially in terms of overall trends in security, is the Hamlet Evaluation System. I will discuss this system in some detail and some recent changes that have been worked into it.

B. The HES was started in January 1967 to provide a way to measure trends in pacification progress countrywide. The system was developed to provide automated data processing of comprehensive evaluations of the situation in each hamlet level prepared by District Senior Advisors.

C. Each rater evaluates the hamlets in his district in terms of 18 separate indicators. Nine of the indicators are related to hamlet security and nine to socio-economic development. Each of the 18 indicators can be rated on a scale of five points running from A through E. Enemy controlled hamlets are simply rated as Category V. Scores are averages of these ratings.

D. In addition to the 18 indicator ratings, evaluators are also required to report estimates of hamlet population, map coordinates, and whether or not the hamlet was visited by GVN or U.S. officials during the month.

E. The Hamlet Evaluation System has been an effective tool for planning and managing pacification and related programs in Vietnam since 1967. The ratings are certainly not absolute measurements of security or development but they have been valuable comparative indicators of the pacification situation at different times and in different places. Weaknesses in the system have been relatively constant, thus the figures are useful trend indicators. They have served as a basis for allocating new resources, identifying weak areas, planning expansion of pacification, setting of goals and monitoring performance.

F. To improve HES and make it more useful, a revision has been in process since June 1968. This has involved a three-month trial period, November and December 1968, and January 1969, plus extensive revision and discussion thereafter. In July 1969, the new system called HES 70 was implemented in all districts of Vietnam and has been completed regularly in parallel with the regular HES. Since the GVN pacification and development plan for 1969 utilized HES extensively, it was believed essential to continue HES trends and measurements through the completion of the 1969 plan. This also gave us some solid experience with HES 70.

G. HES 70 differs from the current HES in the following respects:

(1) More objective questions which separately determine answers to specific conditions rather than the use of a grading scale.

(2) HES 70 uses a centralized mathematical scoring technique for question replies, rather than a subjective grading by the District Senior advisor. Questions are combined into categories, these then combined to achieve security, political and socio/economic ratings, and these then combined to provide an overall pacification rating for each hamlet and village in Vietnam.

(3) More data will be available centrally because of additional specific questions on hamlets and villages throughout the country.

(4) In HES 70 there are separate questions on both hamlet and village level, and separate questions monthly and quarterly. The questions cover additional subjects not covered by the current HES, but because some are answered only quarterly, fewer questions per month are completed by the District Senior advisor.

VI. COSTS

A. The last part of my statement will cover pacification funding, how much the programs I described in other statements, and the organization and advisory support I have just discussed, costs and how the GVN and the U.S. Government share the burden.

B. The total financial resources going into pacification have risen over the past five years as you can see on Exhibit E. As significant as the magnitude of the increase is the composition. The upward trend reflects the result of the GVN itself applying more of its own revenue and resources to pacification, a strong indication of the priority the GVN now places on the program, particularly in light of current budgetary constraints.

While it is true that the U.S. is still providing about half of the costs, this is largely the result of new equipment and material requirements to support increased numbers of Regional and Popular Forces. As these new U.S. dollar procurement requirements are met and the U.S. share is reduced to replacement requirements, the GVN will be carrying the greater share of pacification costs.

VII. CONCLUSION

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the committee members may have.

EXHIBIT A

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM



EXHIBIT B



RELATIONSHIP OF CORDS TO U.S. MISSION

GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION



EXHIBIT C

EXHIBIT D

CORDS US GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL
(AUTHORIZED)

SOURCE OF PERSONNEL		MILITARY	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE		6361		
MILITARY				
ARMY	(6294)			
NAVY	(23)			
AIR FORCE	(8)			
MARINE	(35)			
COASTGUARD	(1)			
TOTAL	(6361)			
CIVILIAN			65	6426
AID FOREIGN-SERVICE				
ASSIGNED TO MACV			733	
MACV OPN CONTROL			211	944
STATE FOREIGN-SERVICE				
ASSIGNED TO MACV			150	
MACV OPN CONTROL			11	161
JUSPAO				
MACV OPN CONTROL		76	20	96
USIA	(20)			
ARMY	(45)			
NAVY	(10)			
AIR FORCE	(15)			
MARINE	(6)			



STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD ON THE DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)

Mr. Chairman: In my opening statement I noted that one of the major lessons learned over the years about the people's war is that military security is not enough alone. The people want a voice in their destiny, an opportunity to earn a living, and something to live for. For this reason, the Government of Vietnam has made the political, economic, and social development of its people an integral part of their Pacification program. It is endeavoring to build a political base among the people by sharing power with them through a program of decentralization, of authority, resources, and opportunity. This process is by no means complete, but it has begun and it has produced the beginnings of a new spirit in the countryside.

I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A. The central thrust of the Government of Vietnam's development strategy over the past year and a half has been building effective, representative, and viable local government. The main focus has been on the village level which traditionally is the link between the central power and the people. It keeps important records, collects taxes, intercedes with higher officials, provides the necessary papers and channels government services to the people. In its recent history, however, the village has been merely an extension of the Palace; a vehicle to execute Saigon's decrees and taxes. There has been a considerable reversal of this relationship as a result of various recent steps taken by the Vietnamese Government.

B. First, the village and hamlet election process, initiated in 1967, was completed. *Exhibit A* shows the status of elected government as of the present. As you can see, about 95% of the villages and 94% of the hamlets are now in the hands of the elected representatives of the people. The remaining elections could not be held because of security. At the outset of 1969, less than half of the villages and hamlets had elected governments.

C. The elective process will continue and expand in 1970. In the spring the Government is scheduling elections for those areas that held elections in 1967, and for those areas not yet having had elections because of security. Both village and hamlet officials have three-year terms. The Government also plans to have elections at the province level for the first time since 1965. Province Councils which now exist mainly as ceremonial posts, will be revitalized. The National Assembly has passed a bill that has been forwarded to the President for signature, calling for expanded authority for the Province Councils and elections in the spring.

D. An integral part of building local government is training those who run it. Last year, the Government began a major training program for local officials and their staffs at the National Training Center at Vung Tau. In 1969, the Center trained more than 31,000 officials and cadre operating at the village level. *Exhibit B* shows the number of people trained by category from the opening of the Center in 1966.

E. From 1966 to 1968 the Center was used only for training Rural Development Cadre. In 1969 it was broadened to include local officials, Popular Forces Platoon leaders, Armed Propaganda Teams, and People's Self Defense (PSDF) organizers. In 1970, the Government plans to train more than 50,000.

F. The courses for local officials, partly technical, partly motivational, aim to develop a greater sense of leadership and professionalism. Senior officials of the Government address each class to emphasize the importance of the village officials in the total effort. The President himself addressed each graduating class of village and hamlet chiefs and gave them his personal assurance that they have real authority over local affairs.

G. Another element of the effort to develop local government involved strengthening its authority. Decree # 045 on April 1, 1969 revolutionized not only the village's relationship to Saigon and interim bureaucratic levels but, most importantly, its relationship to the people. Decision-making powers were placed in the hands of the Village Council headed by the Village Chief. As shown on *Exhibit C*, two Deputy village Chiefs, one for security and the other for administration, were established together with several commissioners (the number varies according to the population) for agriculture and land affairs, education and social welfare, finance, taxation, and civil status. Within the village structure there are also hamlet governments, headed by elected Hamlet Management Boards. The Hamlet Chief also has two deputies as at village plus several assistants.

H. Significantly, as reflected on the organization chart, the Village Chief for the first time in history was given control over the Popular Force Platoon(s), the National Police, People's Self Defense Forces, and the 30-man Rural Development Cadre Team(s) operating in the village. This has not yet been effectively implemented in all villages, but it has started.

I. There are also various budgetary reforms underway to permit the villages to retain a greater share of their revenues, and subsidies for those running a deficit are being improved. Village officials have been given a pay raise so they would not have to work at other jobs to support themselves and their families and to add to the prestige of office. In effect, the Village Chief is being made a manager of government at that level. Province and District Chiefs who formerly would by-pass the Village Chief now must work through him on many matters and will increasingly do so as further reforms are implemented.

II. SELF DEVELOPMENT

A. In addition to being able to vote and handle their own affairs, the people want a better life. This is a critical part of the political equation in a people's war. It means a lot of national programs like land reform, miracle rice seeds, schools, health units and roads that USAID Director MacDonald will be discussing later in these hearings.

B. At the local level, in 1969 the Government for the first time granted each village with an elected government a development fund under a new program called Village Self-Development. The funds, one million piasters per village in 1969, were placed under control of the village council after a public vote of the people. In addition to enhancing the prestige of the councils, the program stimulated the active participation of the people. The government allocated nearly two billion piasters or about $17 million to the villages in this way last year, an average of $8,100 per village. In 1970 the allocations are made on the basis of population and amount to about two and a half billion piasters (over $20 million). A provision in the use of the funds is that the people must contribute to the projects they select either in the form of labor or money. Thus, the amount of activity generated is actually much greater than the amount of money budgeted. Moreover, the people are encouraged to select revenue generating projects, for example, small hand or motorized tractors.

C. The Village Self Development process has been modified and improved since its inception in 1969 as a result of experimentation with different local development techniques conducted in five pilot provinces over a two year period. The GVN completed this pilot program in the latter half of last year and incorporated many of its techniques into the 1970 Village Self Development program.

D. While the projects themselves are important, the principal result is the political cohesion that takes shape in a community from the interchange in public meetings about common problems and goals. The dialogue that takes place is one of hope: they have the means to do something about their problems themselves and they participate in the decisions.

E. Along lines similar to the Village Self Development program, the GVN is planning to establish a one billion piaster Province Council Development program following the election of new councils in 1970. The funds will be apportioned according to population and the decision-making authority will be vested in the councils themselves. Council members will solicit proposals from among their constituents and hold open public meetings during which the decisions will be made. Once selected, projects will be turned over to the Province Pacification and Development Councils for implementation. The primary significance of this program is that it will strengthen the power of these newly elected councils and enhance their prestige among the people as well as other elements of the province administration. Furthermore, it is hoped that the increased power will also attract more capable candidates to run for council seats. This is all part of the total development effort.

III. URBAN DEVELOPMENT

A. In addition to the development effort in rural areas, the Vietnamese Government is beginning to turn more of its attention to the urban masses that make up more than 40% of the total population.

B. Following the 1968 TET and May attacks, the first urban area, understandably, to receive increased Central Government's attention was Saigon itself. The City of Saigon, encompassing over two million people in extremely high density, had been subjected to an almost continuous series of political, economic and military emergencies during the past 15 years. Shortages of financial resources and other bureaucratic problems had made it difficult for the Prefecture to provide even minimal services. In July of that year the GVN began developing a special program to generate political support among the Saigonese, especially in the poorer areas on the fringes of the City.

C. Building in large part on a successful community development program that was already operating in the City's District 8, a program was designed to ameliorate some of the worst conditions, improve communications between the Prefecture and the local groups, and maintain minimum essential municipal services. The inadequate level of services in many places, poverty, and the absence of a meaningful GVN presence, made many areas susceptible to Viet Cong subversion and intimidation. It was necessary to develop not only an effective administrative structure, but also to involve the citizen in improving and protecting his neighborhood community. Thus, some of the early activities

included organizing neighborhood People's Self Defense Forces and encouraging small self-help efforts toward community development. A Self-Help Housing Program was initiated to provide relief from the critical housing shortage brought on by the TET Offensive of 1968 and the influx of refugees. The program involves the establishment of local building councils, the pooling of land, labor, and capital. The principal thrust of the Saigon effort has been to get the people involved in working toward their mutual benefit. There are also larger improvements in health, sanitation, roads and education.

D. Since its inception, the Saigon effort has made significant headway. 276,000 PSDF members have been organized in the city, 43,000 of whom are armed. The self-help program, which provides small amounts of funds to permit the people themselves to improve their neighborhoods, has resulted in the completion of some 375 separate projects. The Self-Help Housing Program already mentioned has resulted in the construction of over 1,100 low cost houses. Another 2,400 houses are scheduled for completion in 1970. During 1969, the school-aged population enrolled in full-time classes increased from 69% to 73%, primarily the result of 67 new classrooms that were constructed. 19 of the city's 28 health dispensaries have an annual caseload of 2.5 million out-patients. A program to build and repair 28 kilometers of small roads and pathways in the poorer areas of the city is also underway.

E. For this year, the GVN has promulgated an urban campaign annex to its basic Pacification and Development plan. Essentially the plan calls for extending those programs enjoying success in the rural areas to the urban areas. Specifically, the Village Self Development Program that last year was applied only in rural areas will be applied in cites as well. The Province Development Program that in 1969 channelled its resources into expansion of security in rural areas, now is available as well to the cities for infrastructural projects, such as street repair and building markets, The Rural Development Cadre in 1970 will have urban counterparts. The five autonomous cities will also have elections for Municipal Citizen's Councils and these Councils will be eligible like the Province Councils for development funds.

F. The GVN Directorate of Reconstruction and Urban Planning has issued guidance to the Provincial and Municipal Reconstruction Services on how to approach urban development. Some activity is already evident. A land use survey is being conducted in Saigon and five such surveys have been completed in other urban areas.

IV. PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT

A. Another part of the government's effort aims at tackling development problems beyond the means of the people to solve themselves. A program called Province Development provides funds to carry out small-scale infrastructure projects in support of province pacification plans. For example, a province road that might be needed to facilitate access to remote villages. The objective is still essentially a political one in that the criteria used to determine fund allocations is the number of people benefited. Further, the program promotes political cohesion in a larger sense by opening roads and waterways to facilitate economic resurgence as well as the extension of government services.

Exhibit D is a breakout of the 1969 and 1970 Province Development allocations by area of activity. As can be seen, the bulk of the funds go into roads and bridges in both years. In 1969 this was the case because roads were needed to reach out into contested or newly secured areas. In 1970 roads are needed to consolidate the newly opened areas and to link up local communities with economic centers and the national community.

Exhibit E shows the breakouts for the same years by Corps. The Delta got the lion's share in both years reflecting the priority attached to that heavily populated area by the GVN.

B. This program operates under a set of streamlined planning and implementation procedures. This is briefly the way it works: the Province Pacification and Development Council sends a request to the Central Pacification and Development Council for funds to implement a certain project, e.g., a province road. The Central Council sends a team down to the province to look at the proposed project, see how it fits into the province's plan and determine whether or not the province has the capability to implement the project. On approval the funds are sent to the province and the province implements the project directly.

V. MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION

A. The major lines of communication are the lifelines of a government engaged in a people's war; without them the urban areas would be isolated pockets of control facing economic and political strangulation. The 1970 Combined (Military) Campaign Plan, AB–145, specifically charges military commanders in each of the area security zones to conduct operations to provide adequate security to open and protect roads and bridges, rail and waterways throughout the country.

B. Since 1969, the GVN has emphasized reopening or construction of economically important secondary roads, especially market roads in the rural areas. Since the farmer is reluctant to raise more produce than he can get to the market, the provision of safe, dependable routes from the countryside to town encourages him to increase production, thus stimulating the economy by providing more goods for sale and curtailing inflationary consumer competition for essential food items.

VI. RURAL DEVELOPMENT CADRE

A. One of the tools used by the government in implementing its development strategy at the village level is the Rural Development Cadre. There are presently 47,000 cadres assigned in 30-man teams throughout the country. Some 7,200 of these are Highlander Cadre working among their people in the Central Highlands.

B. The Cadre Teams are armed, politically motivated government representatives who work and live directly with the people. As mentioned earlier, they operate under the direction and control of the Village Chief. The Cadre are political catalysts. They help the people organize self-defense and self-development activities.

C. Dependent upon needs in a particular community and the judgment of the Village Chief, they may assist in a variety of ways, such as agriculture, land reform teachers, public information, and health workers. Their paramilitary role is defensive rather than offensive in nature. In addition to providing a measure of defense for the villagers by virtue of their presence, they help organize and train People's Self Defense Forces so that the people can protect themselves.

D. The Cadre and the People's Self Defense Force they have helped organize and train are an increasingly significant element. The People's Self Defense program is discussed in detail in the statement on security. Their contribution to local security is not the sole value; the political commitment is equally significant. The People's Self Defense Force interest to protect family and property coincides with the government's own interest in obtaining support from the people against those who would tax and terrorize in the dark of night.

VII. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

A. Mr. Edward J. Nickel will discuss the GVN's information program fully later in these hearings. The information program is an essential element of Pacification and Development, informing and stimulating all citizens to participate in a national effort. To do so, the usual media techniques of radio, TV, leaflets, etc., are being supplemented by a new program to utilize all government workers, military personnel and others such as People's Self Defense Force to carry the word orally to the people and their families and to report back their reactions. This program is just starting, and has not yet shown results.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Vietnamese have moved impressively on political, economic, and social development at the local levels as well as the national. The process continues. As more and more responsibility and power are shifted from the Palace into the hands of the people, as the people learn more about how to handle their own affairs, more decentralization will be possible and desirable. What I have described is the beginning, but it clearly points up the strategy of mobilizing and relying on the people to participate in an independent and self-sufficient Vietnam.

ELECTED GOVERNMENT STATUS

31 DEC 69

	TOTAL VILLAGES	ELECTED GOVTS	% ELECTED
I	458	419	91.5%
II	581	579	99.7%
III	386	378	97.9%
IV	726	672	92.5%
NAT	2,151	2,048	95.2%
	HAMLETS	**ELECTED GOVTS**	**% ELECTED**
I	1,792	1,762	98.3%
II	2,752	2,733	99.3%
III	1,718	1,675	97.5%
IV	4,232	3,679	86.9%
NAT	10,494	9,849	93.8%

44-706—70——46

NTC TRAINING CHART



VILLAGE GOVERNMENT UNDER DECREE#198 (1966) AS AMENDED BY DECREE#45 (1 April 1969)



PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATIONS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

	1969 amount [1]	Percent of total amount	1970 amount [1]	Percent of total amount
Public works	$647.6	68.0	$1,422.6	63.8
Irrigation	152.6	16.0	363.9	17.6
Education	43.0	4.6	137.7	6.7
Public health	68.8	7.3	118.1	5.7
Agriculture	11.9	1.3	6.6	.3
Fisheries	5.1	.5	17.2	.8
Animal husbandry	16.5	1.7	2.5	.1
Total	945.5	100.0	2,068.3	100.0

[1] In millions of Vietnamese dollars.

PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT ALLOCATIONS BY CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

[Amounts in thousands of Vietnamese dollars]

	1969		1970	
	Amount	Percentage of total allocation	Amount	Percentage of total amount
I CTZ	124.7	13	280.9	14
II CTZ	139.5	15	397.3	19
III CTZ	190.5	20	438.7	21
IV CTZ	490.9	52	951.4	46
Total	945.6	100	2,068.3	100

Statement for the Record on the Security Aspects of Pacification and Development

(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Importance

1. Security is an essential element of Pacification and Development. It has been repeatedly demonstrated in Vietnam that sustained, credible security must be the first step in the pacification and development process. While security is only one of the major concerns facing the average Vietnamese citizen, it is undoubtedly his primary concern. It is too much to ask the average citizen to make a sustained commitment to programs of social, economic or political improvement until he is confident that he can reasonably insure the safety of his family.

2. The Communists have consistently attempted to demonstrate to the Vietnamese people that their government is incapable of providing its citizens with personal security, even with foreign assistance. This policy forms a key part in the Communists' effort to achieve their ultimate objective—the political control of South Vietnam. At various times the Communists have tried to occupy the rural areas with their own military forces, to cause death and destruction by directly attacking populated areas protected by government forces, or by provoking exceptionally destructive responses by government forces to Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army actions. This combination of tactics was calculated to discredit the South Vietnamese Government both at home and abroad; it has always been a keystone in the overall Communist military political strategy.

B. Three Levels

In the People's War in Vietnam, security must be maintained on three levels: Military, Territorial, and Internal, each dealing with a specific element of the Communist threat.

1. Military security.—Military security, or the task of shielding the populated areas from Communist main forces, and at the same time seeking to eliminate them permanently as a threat to national security, is the task of the Vietnamese regular forces. These forces are advised and assisted by the Military Advisory element of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and are supplemented by U.S. and other Free World combat units. Dealing with the Communist main force units is not a part of Pacification, but is a necessary prerequisite to it. In many situations, when enemy main forces are not an immediate threat, these U.S. allied and ARVN regular units actively engage in local security and pacification operations, but their principal mission remains protection against enemy main forces.

2. Territorial security.—Territorial security, or the task of providing the populated areas with security from Communist local forces and guerrilla units is assigned to the Vietnamese Territorial Security Forces, assisted by the People's Self Defense Forces. The citizen must be permanently protected in his neighborhood, which requires a broad dispersal of these forces in small units so that the guerrilla meets opposition wherever he attacks. This is an integral element of pacification and provides an environment in which other Pacification and Development Programs can be safely and successfully implemented.

3. Internal Security.—Internal security, or the task of protecting the people from the Viet Cong Infrastructure, terrorists, and other harassment is assigned to the National Police, assisted by the People's Self Defense Forces and supported by all military and civilian agencies through the PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX Program.

II. Territorial security forces

The Territorial Security Forces of the Republic of Vietnam are the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF). The RF and PF are advised by military personnel on the CORDS Province and District Advisory Teams, and by special US Army or Marine units such as the Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs) and the Combined Action Platoons (CAPs). These teams also assist in the provision of fire support, air support and medical evacuation by US forces when necessary.

A. Regional forces (RF)

1. Mission.—*(a)* The mission of the Regional Forces is to protect the people in the pacification areas from enemy local forces and guerrilla units by conducting operations in the areas between the villages. They provide an outer security shield for the village defense forces, and maintain ready reaction forces to reinforce the

Popular Forces and People's Self Defense Forces in the event they are attacked by superior enemy forces. The RF also assist the National Police in establishing and maintaining internal security by participating in the PHUNG HOANG program, and assist the Popular Forces and Rural Development Cadre to train the People's Self Defense Force. They are, in the present emergency, full-time, uniformed soldiers fully integrated into the national armed forces. They are under the control of and are paid and supported by the Ministry of National Defense.

b. As part of the Government of Vietnam taking over a greater share of the prosecution of the war, the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan calls for priority relief by Regional Force units of Vietnamese Regular Army units assigned to territorial security missions in the populated areas so that the latter can be redeployed to combat enemy main forces in the sparsely populated areas. This in turn is designed to reduce the requirement for US and other Free World combat units presently required for this purpose.

2. Strength.—(*a*) Growth: The Regional Forces have expanded from about 150,000 in 1967 to about 260,000 men in December 1969. The basic unit of organization is the rifle company consisting of 123 officers and men. Additional RF will be activated in the first six months of 1970, some newly recruited and some by converting Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, a border defense force advised by the US Army Special Forces, into RF Companies.

(*b*) Recruitment and deployment: RF Companies are recruited from specific provinces, and are assigned for service in those provinces following basic training. The Regional Forces serve any place within the province, as assigned by the Province Chief. They may be deployed as individual companies under the direct command of the Province Chief/Sector Commander or the District Chief/Subsector Commander, or they may be deployed in multi-company groups under command of a group headquarters, which in turn answers to the District Chief or Province Chief, depending on local requirements. Thirteen Regional Force Battalions have been formed for performance of special missions assigned by the Corps Commanders, such as the defense of vital installations and airfields.

3. Equipment.—For the past year, the Regional Forces have been benefiting from the improvement and modernization program implemented by the Government of Vietnam with US support. This program aims at improving the effectiveness of the RF not only by increasing its authorized strength to a level commensurate with the requirements of the tasks assigned it, but by improving training, leadership and equipment. During 1969, substantial gains were made in RF equipment. By end-December, 94 percent of 200,000 M–16 rifles authorized had been issued, plus all of the 11,000 AN–PRC–25 radios scheduled; 99 percent of 3,300 60mm mortars; 78 percent of the M60 machine guns; 76 percent of the 23,563 M79 grenade launchers, and 69 percent of the one-ton trucks.

4. Training.—The Regional Forces soldier receives the same individual training as ARVN personnel. Each recruit receives five weeks of basic training and four weeks of advanced individual training. Individual RF soldiers are eligible to attend all leadership and specialist courses. In addition to individual training Regional Force rifle companies receive five weeks of Company Basic Unit training, and five weeks of refresher training every three years. Each Regional Force, Company is supposed to conduct at least six hours of in-place training each week.

5. Operations.—(*a*) Tactical: (1) Regional Force Companies conduct operations against VC local forces and guerrilla units in and around the pacification area, particularly in the uninhabited areas between the villages, with the following objectives:

(a) To strike enemy forces in the territory surrounding the pacification areas.

(b) To prevent the incursion of enemy forces into the secure areas and the areas undergoing pacification, either by day or night.

(c) To reinforce the Popular Forces and People's Self Defense Forces in the event of enemy attack.

(d) To protect important installations and LOCs throughout their assigned area of operations.

(2) Regional Force operations vary in size from small ambushes and patrols to multi-company operations lasting several days or longer. They may be conducted by the RF alone, or in conjunction with ARVN or US main force units, or Popular Forces and People's Self Defense Force. Since the enemy frequently uses darkness to cloak his movement, night operations, particularly patrols and ambushes protecting the approaches to the populated areas are constantly emphasized by all

command echelons. In 1969, Regional Force operations resulted in about 23,000 enemy killed and 9,600 weapons captured, at a cost of 5,647 RF killed, 23,065 wounded, and 2,040 RF weapons lost.

(*b*) Internal security: The Regional Forces participate in PHUNG HOANG operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. These operations are planned and coordinated by the local PHUNG HOANG organizations, principally the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs) and the Province Centers (PIOCCs). They may involve Regional Forces alone, or operating in conjunction with Popular, People's Self Defense, or Regular Forces in support of the National Police.

(*c*) Civic action: Regional Force units are required to conduct civic action operations, particularly to improve the social and economic situation of people in newly opened or resettled communities.

B. Popular forces (PF)

1. Mission.—(*a*) The mission of the Popular Forces is to provide close-in protection to the people in the villages undergoing pacification, to maintain security in the areas already pacified, and to assist the National Police in maintaining law and order in the secure areas. They provide an inner security shield for the hamlet population, in conjunction with the village combat Self Defense Forces. The Popular Forces also assist the National Police in establishing and maintaining internal security by participating in the PHUNG HOANG Program. They assist the Rural Development Cadre in training the People's Self Defense Forces, assuming primary responsibility for this mission in villages and hamlets which have no Cadre assigned. The Popular Forces are, like the Regional Forces, full-time, uniformed soldiers who have been fully integrated into the Armed Forces for the duration of the present emergency. They are under the control of and are paid and supported by the Ministry of National Defense.

(*b*) The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan calls for Popular Forces to take over maintenance of security from Regional Force Companies to the extent possible. By taking over the maximum possible share of the territorial security role, Popular Forces release Regional Forces for service in less secure areas, in turn releasing regular ARVN units for combat in the sparsely populated areas, presently being undertaken by US or Free World combat units.

2. Strength.—(*a*) Growth: Since 1967, the Popular Forces have expanded from about 150,000 to 215,000 men in December 1969. The unit of organization is the rifle platoon of 35 men and PF do not have larger units. During 1969, the number of activated Popular Force Rifle Platoons increased by 1,000. Additional platoons will be activated in the first six months of this year.

(*b*) Recruitment and deployment: PF Platoons are recruited from specific areas within the province and generally serve in their home villages following basic training. The Popular Forces have in 1969 been placed under the operational control of the Village Chief to deploy them throughout the village in accordance with the Village Defense Plan. In many areas, District Chiefs still maintain direct control of PF Platoons, however.

3. Equipment.—The Popular Forces participate with the Regional Forces in the Government's Improvement and Modernization Program. 98 percent of almost 200,000 M16 rifles authorized for the Popular Forces have been issued. PF Platoons are also being issued M79 grenade launchers and AN/PRC–25 radios to replace obsolete equipment presently in use.

4. Training.—Popular Force training is conducted at 14 PF Training Centers throughout the country. PF recruit training consists of five weeks basic combat training and four weeks advanced individual training. Individual PF soldiers are eligible to attend special PF leadership and specialist training courses conducted at the PF Training Centers. Newly activated PF Platoons receive a three-week Platoon Basic Unit Training Course prior to deployment. Selected PF platoons receive refresher courses at PF Training Centers. Each PF Platoon is supposed to conduct a minimum of six hours in-place training each week.

5. Operations.—(*a*) Tactical: (1) Popular Force Platoons conduct operations to defend the hamlets from VC Local Force and Guerrilla units, particularly by patrolling and ambushing in the outskirts during the hours of darkness:

(a) To intercept enemy forces or terrorists and prevent their incursion into the residential areas.

(b) To reinforce the People's Self Defense Force in the event of enemy attack.

(c) To secure important installations and LOCs within the hamlets.

(2) Popular Force operations vary in size from patrols and ambushes of squad size or less up to participation by one or several platoons in joint operations with

Regional or Regular units. In 1969, Popular Force operations resulted in over 14,000 enemy killed and 5,400 weapons captured, at a cost of 4,233 PF killed, 8,942 wounded, and 1,797 PF weapons lost.

(*b*) Internal security:

The Popular Forces participate in PHUNG HOANG operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure which are planned and coordinated by the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). The PF also assist the National Police to maintain law and order in the community. The Popular Forces play a key part in protecting the people from terrorism by detecting and intercepting terrorists attempting to infiltrate the hamlet, and by immediately reacting alone or with the PSDF to VC terrorist incidents.

III. PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCE (PSDF)

A. Mission

The mission of the People's Self Defense Forces is to defend their communities against infiltration by small armed enemy units; to detect and deter enemy terrorists and saboteurs; and to promote community improvement by full participation in local self-development programs. The members serve without pay on a part-time basis. They are organized on a community basis and take their orders from their Village Chief. As the PSDF becomes capable of defending their community with less and less assistance from the Regional and Popular Forces particularly in the more secure areas, more and more Regional Force Companies and Popular Force Platoons can be redeployed to strengthen pacification efforts in the less secure areas, and to extend pacification to less populated areas presently defended by regular combat units.

B. Strength

The People's Self Defense Force owes its origin to the 1968 Tet offensive, when thousands of people petitioned the government for arms to help defend their lives and property from Viet Cong attack. In response, the government established the PSDF under provisions of the 1968 Mobilization Law. At end-1969, the PSDF was divided into "combat" members, trained to use weapons, and "support" members, providing first aid, runners, etc. The Mobilization Law required that all men between the ages of 16 and 50 participate in the defense of their country. Under this law, any man in that age bracket who is not a member of the armed forces, is required to belong to the combat PSDF in his community. To these are added volunteers from the elderly, young people from 12 to 15, and women, who are the "support" forces. "Membership" in PSDF is somewhat imprecise, so the 3,000,000 members are not a firm statistic, but the issuance of some 400,000 weapons to the combat PSDF is reliable and confirmed by spot checks in the countryside. 1970 plans include issuing an additional 300,000 weapons, and expanding the "combat" PSDF to 1.5 million members.

C. Training

1. Interteams.—During 1970, about 500,000 combat PSDF are planned to be organized into about 15,000 35-man units, at least one for every secure hamlet. Each member of these units will be armed, and will receive special training from Vietnamese Mobile Training Teams. About 60,000 PSDF leaders will receive special training at Popular Force Training Centers. As these units complete their training, they will systematically take over assignments presently tasked to the Popular Forces—primarily maintaining the most secure areas, and defensive duties within their capabilities, such as the defense of bridges, public facilities, and intra-village roads. The remaining combat PSDF will continue to receive training from the Rural Development Cadre and Popular Force Platoons assigned to their villages and will share the weapons issued to them.

2. Nonmilitary training.—The PSDF will continue to receive training from the Rural Development Cadre, and from the village technical cadre on the practical aspects of their involvement in political and economic development programs.

D. Operations

1. Local security.—PSDF security operations primarily involve helping to guard the immediate approaches to the hamlet in order to intercept and engage enemy ground forces, or terrorists seeking to enter the hamlet at night. As indicated above, PSDF will also replace PF Platoons in certain defensive activities within the more secure areas.

2. Internal security.—The PSDF assist in the PHUNG HOANG program by identifying members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and by detecting and preventing attempted acts of terrorism or sabotage within the community.

3. Development.—(*a*) Social and economic: In addition to their contribution to community defense, the PSDF form the backbone of the community self development in their villages and hamlets. They participate in local efforts to improve the social and economic status of their communities. The political significance of this involvement in the life of the community is considered by the Viet Cong to be a greater threat to their objectives than the military threat posed by the arms they hold.

E. Political significance

1. The People's Self Defense Force provides an outlet for the growing spirit of nationalism among the Vietnamese people. It has a common insignia, simple objectives which are both practical and popular, and a program which allows all ages, sexes, religions and ethnic groups to participate, stimulating community spirit, and contributing to the common defense. At the same time it is a locally-based organization, without hierarchy or superstructure. It is by its very nature almost exclusively Vietnamese, with very little US advisory participation.

2. The decision to arm the people was initially questioned by some Vietnamese officials. The President and Prime Minister, however, took the position that it was only by showing this kind of confidence in the people that the People's War could be effectively fought. The act of giving and receiving a weapon constitutes a double act of faith on the parts of the Government and the citizen. Each makes a public commitment to the other. This commitment has been recognized and is feared by the Viet Cong. Instances have been recorded in which the Viet Cong urged the people, not to surrender their weapons to the VC, nor to destroy them, but to openly return them to the Government, thus rupturing the bond and revoking the commitment. The Communists have identified the PSDF as a major threat, the beginnings of a true people's army and a locally based political force for the future. As a result, they have repeatedly attacked it and tried to destroy it, but the PSDF have generally (not always) stood their ground, fully validating the Government's confidence.

IV. NATIONAL POLICE

A. Components and missions

1. General.—The primary responsibility of the National Police is to maintain law and order throughout the populated areas of Vietnam. In addition, the National Police is the agency charged with the primary responsibility for protecting the people from the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The National Police are advised by CORDS Public Safety Advisors at the national, Corps and province levels.

2. Uniformed police.—Uniformed Police perform functions similar to their American town or city counterparts. They represent the law in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned. In addition to maintaining general order, they direct traffic, participate in the control of resources, assist in preparing judicial cases against criminal suspects, and provide personnel for customs and immigration duty, operating communications networks, implementing the National Identity Registration Program, securing public installations, and similar duties.

3. Special police.—The Special Police are responsible for collecting, collating and evaluating intelligence pertaining to the Viet Cong Infrastructure, and coordinating available information with PHUNG HOANG Centers at various levels. The Special Police also react to intelligence collection requirements levied by the PHUNG HOANG Centers.

4. National police field forces (NPFF).—The National Police Field Forces are the paramilitary action arm of the National Police. They are responsible for protecting the people from terrorism by conducting police operations against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The NPFF participate in anti-infrastructure operations generated by Province PHUNG HOANG Centers (PIOCCs) and by District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs). They may operate alone or in conjunction with military units. Once the Viet Cong Infrastructure had been driven from an area, the NPFF has the primary responsibility of preventing a resurgence. The final mission of the NPFF is to safeguard the extension of the uniformed National Police presence into the rural areas.

5. Provincial reconnaissance units (PRU).—Provincial Reconnaissance Units are small platoon and company sized units operating under the control of Province Chiefs against the VC Infrastructure as a part of the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) operation. They are funded by the United States but in 1969 were placed under the national control of the Director General of National Police, and a Vietnamese Army officer was designated as national commander. The mission of the PRU is to collect intelligence on and conduct operations against the VC Infrastructure as directed by Province Chiefs.

6. Marine police.—The Marine Police are charged with maintaining security and law and order, and controlling resources on the inland waterways and in the ports and harbors of Vietnam.

B. Strength

1. Police forces.—During 1969, the number of National Police rose from a low of 76,330 to 85,218. Of these 45,558 are assigned to duty as uniformed police (including 1,762 Marine Police); 15,454 as Special Police; 15,113 as Field Force Police. Some 9,229 are transferees from the Armed Forces, who are in training status and have not yet received their assignments. Plans call for the expansion of the National Police to 122,000 in 1970, including the transfer of an additional 3,771 military personnel.

2. Provincial reconnaissance units.—The current strenght of the PRU is 4,454 men. The PRU are organized into 18-man units made up of three 6-man teams. The number of 18-man units assigned to a province varies according to the status of pacification, the size of the population, and the strength and concentration of the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The size of Provincial Units thus varies at present from 18 to 220 men.

C. Training

A major problem facing the National Police is expansion of its training capabilities to meet the requirements of recent and planned expansion. To solve this, the capacity of the Basic Training Facility at Vung Tau has been increased from 2,000 to 5,000 students by construction of 66 additional buildings during the last four months of 1969. In addition to the normal 12-week course, a shorter 8-week course has been adopted to train recruits with prior military service. 3,093 of the 13,000 transferees from the armed forces completed the course in late December 1969. An additional 4,643 is currently in training. To meet the demand for more qualified leadership, the National Police Academy provides professional and supervisory training. The first classes completed their six-month courses in December 1969. Courses will also be initiated for command level officials (Commissioners). Plans also call for increased emphasis on the Advanced Training Program for lower level supervisory personnel which graduated 1,661 students in 1969, and the specialized programs for training National Police Field Forces and Marine Police, which graduated 7,815 and 572, respectively, last year.

D. Operations

1. Village police.—A major effort was made to establish a police presence in the rural villages during 1969. Prior to November 1968, there were only 140 Sub-District Police Stations scattered throughout the country. By the end of 1969, 6,000 National Police had been assigned to 1,600 villages. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan calls for the assignment of from 6 to 18 police in each secure village, according to population, by the end of the year. National Police assigned to a village are under the operational control of the Village Chief.

2. Resources control.—National Police resources control efforts resulted in nearly 100,000 arrests during the year, including more than 10,000 VC and VC suspects, 4,000 ARVN deserters, and 35,000 draft evaders. Confiscations included over 1,000 land mines, grenades, plastic explosives and other ordnance, along with 50,000 units of medicines/drugs and 6,000 tons of contraband foodstuffs.

3. National identity registration program.—The National Identity Registration Program involves issuing tamper-proof identification cards to all citizens 15 years of age and over. More than 3,000,000 persons were registered during 1969. In the process, the Identification and Record Service was able to identify, through fingerprint checks, 8,414 wanted persons, including 6,820 military deserters, 928 wanted on a variety of criminal charges, 609 draft dodgers and 57 Viet Cong suspects. 1970 plans call for registration of an additional six million individuals.

4. Combined telecommunications directorate (CTD).—The National Police have the primary responsibility for the Combined Telecommunication Directorate which operates a fast effective telecom system to all provinces, cities and districts within South Vietnam. The system now passes over 2.5 million messages annually for the police, other civil security agencies and most other civil administrative and technical agencies on a common user basis. It is also responsible for maintaining and servicing the 47,000 radios in the Village/Hamlet Radio System, which provides communications between the villages and hamlets and higher administrative headquarters. The CTD also supports the 12,000 radios in the National Police Radio Telephone System. The new CTD fixed station, multichannel VHF system provides teletype and dial telephone service for official communication between Saigon and My Tho and Can Tho in the South and to Bien Hoa in the North. A total of 343 students were graduated from the CTD Training School at Thu Duc.

Training of an additional 500 Regional and Popular Force personnel for service throughout the system was initiated in January 1970.

5. Marine operations.—Operating from 15 bases, Marine Police now patrol 700 kilometers of waterways. During 1969, they searched over 400,000 craft and examined nearly three million people. As a result, 32 craft were impounded; 2,371 people were arrested and their contraband cargoes confiscated.

E. Corrections and detentions

The National Police and Directorate of Corrections receive advisory support and commodity assistance for the improvement and better security of detention and correction centers. In FY 1970 the total cost to the US of this effort, including salaries, training and commodities is $253,000.

V. PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX)

A. Purpose

The PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX program is designed to protect the people from Communist terrorism by securing information about the Viet Cong Infrastructure, identifying the individuals that make it up, and conducting operations against them. In order to insure complete restoration of security in the Republic, it is the Government's stated policy " . . . to completely eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure by capturing as many as possible, while the lenient rehabilitation policy aims at releasing as many as possible." (Ministry of Interior Decree 757, 21 March 1969)

B. Organization

All elements of the government participate in the PHUNG HOANG program through a series of PHUNG HOANG Committees whose function is to direct the program at their respective levels from central to district. It is the responsibility of the PHUNG HOANG Committee, or the District Intelligence and Operation Coordinating Center (DIOCC), as it is called at district level, to coordinate the activities of the various military and civil agencies involved. It supervises the orderly collection, collation and distribution of information on individual members of the VCI and plans operations against identified Viet Cong operatives, using the appropriate police, military or paramilitary forces. These centers are advised by US personnel.

C. Popular participation

To give the people a clear understanding of the program, its methods and objectives, and to enlist their support for the program, the President ordered, in the fall of 1969, a public information campaign to explain to the people what PHUNG HOANG was, why it was necessary, at whom the program aimed, and how the people could participate. This campaign is still in its early stages. In some areas it has produced encouraging results. Private citizens have identified local communist leaders wanted by the Government. In other cases, local citizens have induced relatives or acquaintances in the Viet Cong to seek reconciliation through the Chieu Hoi program.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. Interaction

These programs interact to provide security for pacification at the various levels on which the enemy fights this People's War. The Regular Forces fight on the military level, the Regional and Popular Forces on the territorial level, and the police and PHUNG HOANG on the internal security level. Underlying all and providing the necessary injection of the people into the effort is the People's Self Defense Force. These forces are integrated and pursue common plans worked out at the village, district, province and national levels. Forces are allocated, supporting fires are arranged, and plans for employment are developed. Great improvements have been made in coordinated planning and allocation of resources through the operations of the Pacification and Development Council, and each province and sub-division has a specific plan for the extension and improvement of security during the coming year.

B. Obstacles

There are of course many obstacles ahead. North Vietnamese in units and as individual fillers are infiltrating into the country and must be fought off. On occasion the Popular Force Platoon takes refuge in its outpost rather than actively patrols in the night. Knowledge of the complicated apparatus of the VC Infrastructure is still imperfect and important VC leaders slip through the fingers of the police and PHUNG HOANG forces. There are individual problems of leadership

at various levels and there are cases in which doctrine and directives are not followed on the ground. There is dependence on US support and reliance upon a US shield in many areas. All these are real problems which must be faced and overcome by the Vietnamese in order that the Pacification and Development program may provide security to the population.

C. *The Future*

Over the past two years, there has been a substantial strengthening of all the tools with which the Government and the people of Vietnam are fighting this war, and at the same time there has been a weakening on the Communist side. The war is not over; it will involve much hard work and some setbacks, but the structure is there. The Vietnamese at the low, as well as the high level, are in good part endeavoring to make it work so that they may take on more of the burden of holding off the enemy.

Statement for the Record on the Phung Hoang Program (Phoenix)

(By Ambassador W. E. Colby)

Mr. Chairman: The PHUNG HOANG ("PHOENIX") program of the Government of South Vietnam is designed to protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism, and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization in South Vietnam. This organization, known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure, or VCI, is the leadership and control core of the Communist campaign. The Communists try to keep it intact to deliver a political victory, if they are defeated militarily or choose as a tactic to sue for peace.

I. THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

A. *History*

At the end of the 1945–54 war, the Communists took about 75,000 native southerners north for training in organizing, propaganda and subversion. During the late 1950's these cadre returned to their southern provinces and districts. There they revived the networks they had left in 1954, organized the population into farmers' groups, women's organizations and youth groups and began to recruit and train and establish bases for guerrilla groups.

By 1960 this process was sufficiently advanced so that the Vietnamese Communists proceeded to establish formal political structures. Thus the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was founded in 1960, to be followed in 1962 by the People's Revolutionary Party, a separate southern branch of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party of North Vietnam, in 1968 by the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces, in 1968 by the establishment of Revolutionary or Liberation Committees as pretended local governments rather than simply political bodies, and finally in 1969 by the pretended Provisional Government of South Vietnam. Together all of these organizations and their local manifestations make up the VC Infrastructure.

B. Function

The VCI is an essential and integral element of the effort to overthrow and replace the Government of Vietnam. In the Communist doctrine of the People's War, the VCI is the leadership structure of the Communist insurgency. It constitutes its political, administrative, supply and recruitment apparatus. The VCI supports military operations of VC and North Vietnamese Army Units by providing guides, caches of food, clothing, weapons, medical supplies and other war materials, logistics support, and by directing and implementing a systematic campaign of terrorism, extortion, subversion, sabotage, abduction and murder to achieve Communist objectives.

C. Strength

The estimated strength of the VCI at the end of 1969 was approximately 74,000. (This estimate is very rough and is derived from the numbers of known VCI and interpolation of data on the organizational pattern of the People's Revolutionary Party and the cadre structure of the VCI.)

D. Methods

During the period when the Vietnamese government was unable to successfully oppose the Communist insurgency in the countryside, the VC were able to extort support with a minimum of overt terrorist activity, directed at local representatives of the government, or private citizens who were, for one reason or another,

unpopular with the local population. The rural people had little alternative but to acquiesce to the demands of local VC cadre. In these circumstances, the implication or latent threat of force alone was sufficient to insure that the people would comply with Communist demands. The local farmer could see the armed guerrillas, the local forces and the North Vietnamese Army units. He could not see a counterbalance to that force representing the national government. The necessarily slow process of political fencemending, called pacification, only gradually began to re-establish the government presence and to introduce that long absent counterbalance.

With the defeat of the Communist main force units in the 1968 offensive, the subsequent growth of security in the countryside, the expansion of the Regional and Popular Forces and their continually widening deployment, and the arming of the people through the People's Self Defense program, the people were provided with an alternative. It became more and more difficult for the VCI to extort the food, clothing, money, recruits and services required to sustain their insurgency from a rapidly decreasing population base. VC "recruiting" agents who had formerly been able to fill the ranks under the guise of giving the head of the family an opportunity to "volunteer" a son or daughter to fight for "freedom" now had to resort to outright kidnapping of adolescent children. VC tax collectors had to resort to methods amounting to armed robbery to fill their coffers. VC terrorists who had formerly "tried and executed" local administrators appointed by the government were now publicly murdering hamlet and village officials elected by their neighbors.

E. Terrorism

In 1969 alone, the Viet Cong infrastructure murdered more than 6,000 officials and ordinary citizens in South Vietnam, including 23 village chiefs, 126 hamlet chiefs, 229 refugees and 4,350 private citizens. In the same period the VCI wounded over 15,000 and kidnapped more than 6,000 people from among the civilian population. The purpose of the Phung Hoang program is to protect the people of South Vietnam from this terror.

II. THE PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) PROGRAM

A. Legal basis of the program

The Phung Hoang program was formally established by Presidential Decree on 1 July 1968 which defined the VCI target and established Phung Hoang committees from central down to district level.

From a legal standpoint, members of the VCI are subject to two legal procedures:

1. Prosecution for crimes against national security. These involve full judicial proceedings in military courts, and result in criminal convictions to sentences in accordance with law.

2. Administrative detention under emergency powers. These are similar to emergency measures used by other countries such as Malaya, Kenya and the Philippines during period of insurgency or national emergency. (See also U.S. Code Title 50, Section 812 et seq.) Detention is determined by a Province Security Committee, comprising the Province Chief, the Province Judge, the Chairman of the Provisional Council and other officials.

Ministry of Interior Decree 757 of 21 March 1969 provided specific definitions of classes of Communist offenders and outlined the appropriate periods of detention, depending upon their party status and responsibilities. The preamble to this decree stated "the government policy is to completely eliminate the VCI by capturing as many as possible, while the lenient rehabilitation policy aims at releasing as many as possible."

B. Forces

The Phung Hoang program has national, corps, provincial and district committee levels. The national chairman is the Minister of Interior and Secretary General is the Director General of the National Police. Its membership contains representatives from the Defense Ministry, the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Ministry, the Rural Development Ministry, the Military Security Service of the Army, the Special Police Branch, the Police Field Forces and the Joint General Staff. The composition at each of the lesser committee levels is essentially the same. While all elements of the government participate in the Phung Hoang program, a leading role is played by the National Police with the support of the Special Police, National Police Field Force (NPFF) and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). The military participates in the Phung Hoang program through its intelligence and security services and through the operations of its Regular,

Regional and Popular Forces. The People's Self Defense Force, the RD cadre, the Information Services, local officials and all other elements of the government further contribute to the effort.

The Provincial Reconnaissance Units were developed and funded by the United States to conduct operations against the VCI. They first functioned under the Authority of the GVN Joint General Staff. On 31 March 1969, by Decree 044–SL/NV, the PRU was designated a police program controlled by the Director General of National Police, and an ARVN officer was assigned as National Commander. While the PRU is still funded by the United States, plans are in progress for the transition of the PRU to full GVN funding and support. In each province the PRU is controlled by the province chief, with a subordinate province PRU commander who is in most instances an ARVN officer.

C. U.S. role

The U.S. role with respect to Phung Hoang is one of advice and assistance. This relationship is maintained by CORDS under COMUSMACV. American Phung Hoang officers are present in most District Operations Centers and U.S. staffs are present at province and at the national level, to work with the appropriate GVN Phung Hoang committees at those levels. These officers work closely with their Vietnamese counterparts in the Province Operations Centers/District Operation Centers, which operate on a 24-hour basis, receiving, collating verifying and coordinating intelligence on the VCI from all sources on the one hand, and on the other hand facilitating the exploitation of the intelligence by the various action arms of the Phoenix program.

The U.S. officers also obtain and coordinate U.S. technical, material and fire support for the Province and District Operations Centers and its action arms. Most of the American personnel are military. In addition to those American personnel working directly with Phung Hoang committees and DIOCCs, other American personnel are closely involved with many of the GVN services participating in the program, such as the military, the police and others.

On 15 October 1969, a memorandum (copy attached) was distributed to members of the Phung Hoang U.S. staff and forwarded for inclusion in the training of Phung Hoang advisors in Vietnam and at Fort Holabird, Maryland. It pointed out that the Phung Hoang program against the VCI is an inherent part of the war effort in Vietnam and that U.S. personnel are under the same legal and moral constraints with respect to operations under this program as with respect to military operations against enemy units in the field.

D. Procedures

The key element of the Phung Hoang program is the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). This is a center established at each of the 250-odd districts of Vietnam to serve as a central point of information and coordination of operations against the VCI. Its chairman is the district chief, and its membership consists of all the services which have information on the VCI or conduct operations against them. Thus, the National Police, the military, the Chieu Hoi service, Rural Development cadre and others provide to this center such information as they have on the VCI. The center collates this material and develops from it lists of VCI in the neighborhood, organizational charts and operational plans and targets. There are similar Phung Hoang committees at province, regional and national levels, and some village officials are beginning to collate information on the VCI in their village.

To reduce the threat of the VCI, the GVN has established VCI operational goals for the Phung Hoang agencies in each geographic area of South Vietnam. These goals are based on the estimated strength of the VCI, local security situations and the capabilities of the various GVN agencies. These goals can be met by counting VCI who rally or are induced to rally, those who are captured and sentenced and those who are killed in the course of security operations. The desirability of capturing VCI is stressed, for the intelligence and other values they can offer. Hoi Chanh frequently provide important intelligence and their information serves as the basis of many operations.

In order to single out key personnel for primary attention, Phung Hoang guidance for both 1969 and 1970 has designated certain VCI elements for priority attention. These include, in addition to all personnel operating at district level or above, specialists assigned to these four key components of the Viet Cong organization:

Revolutionary Committees
Current Affairs Committees

Security Sections, and
Finance and Economy Sections

In addition, the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, the goals have been made more sophisticated, requiring a percentage of the goal of those VCI neutralized to consist of previously identified VCI, rather than those whose status is only revealed during interrogation or search after capture or death. Also, VCI captured can only be credited toward the goal after they have actually been sentenced to the appropriate administrative detention or criminal conviction, and specific goals will be stated for higher level VCI, rather than permitting the entire goal to be met with lower level VCI. The effect of these changes is to place emphasis on the arrest and detention of higher level, previously identified VCI.

E. Popular Participation

The government took an important step in October 1969, when it decided to mobilize the people in the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Under the slogan of "protection of the people against terrorism," the GVN has publicized the program, the enemy against which it is aimed, and the assistance the average citizen can give it. In addition to general explanations, local Phung Hoang activities have been explained in more specific terms, in leaflets and posters featuring photographs of the neighborhood VCI. In a number of cases this has resulted in capture of a wanted person through information provided by the public, or in the individual turning himself in as a Hoi Chanh because of the pressure generated against him.

F. Justice

The government has also taken positive steps to insure justice in the implementation of the program. In Ministry of Interior Decree 2212 of 20 August 1969, a detailed procedure was established by which information would be assembled and recorded to warrant the arrest of the individual VCI. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, Annex II on Protection Against Terrorism, states the importance of treating the population and detainees in a fair, current and humane manner and sets out requirements for the implementation of the program. Prime Minister's Directive No. 1293–Th. T/PCI/M dated 27 November 1968 outlines a set of regulations for rapid screening of their cases. The government is engaged in a program of improving and upgrading its detention facilities for detainees. Higher ranking VCI are sent to maximum security detention facilities on Con Son Island. Other specialized national correction centers have been designated for women. While the Geneva Convention does not require it, the GVN has permitted the International Red Cross to inspect facilities where VCI detainees and convicted VCI are kept.

G. Results

In 1968, the year it originated, Phung Hoang operations resulted in 11,288 captures, 2,229 ralliers and 2,259 VCI killed, for a total 15,776 VCI. 2,050, or about 13% of these were personnel functioning at District level or higher.

In 1969, operating under much stricter classification criteria, the results were 8,515 captured, 4,832 ralliers and 6,187 killed for a total of 19,534, of whom 21% were from District level or above. The higher echelon personnel included:

From district level	3,031
From province level	770
From city level	279
From region level	126
From COSVN level	23
Total	4,229

About 48% of the VCI captured, rallied or killed in 1969 were specialists from the four key components singled out for priority action:

Security section personnel	4,007
From finance and economy sections	3,670
Revolutionary committee members	1,108
Members of current affairs committee	609
Total	9,394

Allowing for the 1,948 specialists who were from District level or higher, the total priority VCI targets were 11,675, or about 60% of the 19,534 overall 1969 total.

The total fell about 10% short of the 1969 goal of 21,600, largely due to poor results in the first six months of the year. Performance in the last six months averaged slightly better than the 1,800 monthly goal, but not well enough to balance the first semester short fall. There has been some decline in the figures during the past three months, which is partly a reflection of stricter GVN standards, partly increased discipline and security by the VCI and partly an end of year slump. GVN has put much stress on the program for 1970, and it should gain in effectiveness against the enemy in coming months. It needs improvement in a number of its aspects, but the direction is set to bring this about. At the same time, it is making substantial contribution to the national effort today.

In one province, for example, Party members are being assigned two or more functions in villages, due to lack of personnel to fill existing vacancies. By November, VC Infrastructure who were unable to cope with the GVN pacification campaign had fled to sparsely populated areas, and even into Cambodia, where they were able to exert little influence over the areas to which they were assigned. Reports received in late November indicated that Cadre of District level and below had been ordered to return to their villages from their Cambodian sanctuaries. There has been a complete turnover of personnel in this district in 1969, some positions two or more times; most positions remain double slotted or vacant for lack of personnel.

The most notable successes against COSVN and Regional level Viet Cong have occurred in the large urban areas around Saigon, Danang and Hue. During 1969, the Police effectively neutralized a COSVN level intelligence net directed against the office of the President and GVN Ministries in Saigon.

A member of the Political Struggle Section of VC Sub-Region 5, immediately Northwest of Saigon, expressed his concern over the situation, following his arrest on November 7. He stated that the recent period of VC inactivity in both the military and political fields was not a sign of willingness for peace, but rather a period needed by the VC to reorganize their military and political strategies. He said that COSVN Revolution 9, which places a greater degree of emphasis on political activities, was an example of this new planning. He said that the Phung Hoang (PHOENIX) Program has been given top priority for destruction by the VC.

III. CONCLUSION

The Viet Cong Infrastructure has not been severely hurt, but the Communists are having problems, and the problems are becoming more difficult to solve. The Government of Vietnam is increasing the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang Program in 1970. By continuing the publicity campaign to enlist popular support for Phung Hoang, and by emphasizing and practicing justice, the government is involving the people in the effort to end Communist terrorism. The Government is also improving the work of its agencies against this level of the enemy's activity.

In short, the VC Infrastructure is still there. The Vietnamese Government and people are determined to end this threat to internal security in Vietnam.

Appendix II

Statement of Former U.S. Senator Joseph S. Clark

I am Joseph S. Clark and it is a great personal privilege for me to present my views before this Committee and its distinguished Chairman, the Senator from Arkansas, Bill Fulbright. This Committee, on which I had the honor to serve for four years, is the one that I believe can play, and it has played, a crucial role in changing the tenor and tone of our foreign policy. The distinguished Chairman has often spoken of the historic role of this Committee, and to him and my former colleagues I can only wish God speed in their deliberations during what I believe will be the most crucial decade of our existence: the decade of the 1970's. It will be, I believe, in the next ten years that we will have to face the hard decisions about our role in the world and our prospects for enduring peace.

This Committee can be a countervailing power against those forces in the U.S. that would commit our country to military intervention in difficult and perilous danger spots around the world where our presence is neither necessary, desired nor justified. At its very best, the Senate under the guidance of this Committee can be that countervailing balance for peace and sanity, as it was during the recent secret sessions to discuss our involvement in Laos and Thailand. The resulting bipartisan amendment called on the Executive Branch *not* to commit ground troops to Laos or Thailand without Congressional consent. This was clearly in line with constitutional authority granted to Congress to give advice

and consent on foreign policy matters. We have too often seen in recent years the strong arm of the White House making its case, and implying very strongly that opposition amounted to a lack of patriotism.

The classic case of excessive Executive authority is the continuing war in Vietnam. Since leaving the Senate (involuntarily, I might say) I have been President of World Federalists, USA, a voluntary, non-partisan political action organization with headquarters in Washington, D.C. and over 100 chapters throughout the country dedicated to the goal of world peace through enforceable world law. At our last General Assembly in July, we adopted a whole host of short and intermediate range goals. On the matter of Vietnam, our policy statement reads as follows:

"No single nation should have either the right or the responsibility to intervene by military action in the affairs of another people.

The Vietnam war is glaring evidence of the urgent need for an effective world agency to keep the peace and promote justice, and of the futility of national armed force as a means for resolving political conflict. While the peace talks in Paris creep on, the killing of both soldiers and civilians continues.

The killing in Vietnam must end. We call upon all parties to the struggle to agree upon an immediate cease-fire, instead of continuing to use armed force to maneuver for some hoped-for advantage.

We welcome President Nixon's announced intention of gradually withdrawing American forces from Vietnam. We insist that the withdrawal of American forces must be complete, and must be carried out as speedily as possible.

The United States must, however, accept responsibility for the consequences of its past policy. We must provide refuge and asylum for those Vietnamese who may need it, and we must provide, under international supervision, for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Vietnam."

In view of this concern of the World Federalists, USA, I felt it would be of some value to share our evaluations of the several resolutions on Vietnam pending before this Committee.

Many of these resolutions have the support of the World Federalists, USA. Some we strongly support, and feel that their enactment may still stave off additional tragedies in that battered country.

On the whole matter of our continuing presence in Vietnam, we strongly endorse S3000 of Senator Goodell, which would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and which is appropriately entitled the "Vietnam Disengagement Act" for it states that Congress finds that the "broad foreign policy interests of the United States require that the American military presence in Vietnam be removed at the earliest possible time" and that "such action will promote the social and political well-being of the people of South Vietnam."

S3000 also states, and this is its essential thrust, that we must establish a clear time table for ending U.S. combat operations by withdrawing troop commitments in the near future. It signifies that the responsibility for ending the American involvement in Vietnam is "not the President's alone, but must be shared by the Congress under its constitutional authority to "raise and support armies" and to "declare war."

In expressing the clear intent of Congress that all military personnel be withdrawn from Vietnam on or before December 1, 1970, S3000 would give clear notice to the government of South Vietnam that it would have to assume the principal burden, which we have been led to believe is possible by countless statements by our military. On behalf of the World Federalists, USA, I strongly urge the adoption of legislation similar to S3000. We should remember that there are 1,000,000 South Vietnam under army confronting no more than 240,000 of the troops of the Vietcong and Hanoi combined. If they cannot prevent an enemy victory with a 4–1 superiority and vastly superior armament, I can see no advantage to American continuing to support them.

There are other bills and resolutions before the Committee, which we believe deserve support: I refer particularly to S. Res. 270 (Church D–Idaho), and Hatfield (R–Ore.) which states in effect that continued presence of U.S. troops in Vietnam postpones necessary political accommodations, and is therefore very much related to the Goodell Proposal in its philosophical outlines. To be sure, this goal of the Church-Hatfield proposal can only be attained by a more rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops and a commitment to fully disengage pending an orderly transition. We strongly support S. Res. 270.

If ever there was a time for the people of South Vietnam to take charge of their own destiny, it is now, and this view underlines S. Con. Res. 40 (Javits, Metcalf & Pell) which also asks that the President withdraw all combat troops by end of

1970, and terminate the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by that period. This legislation would get the rest of the U.S. troops out of Vietnam in a reasonable time thereafter, and provide through the U.N. and other international organizations asylum for those whose lives would be endangered by such actions. We also endorse S. Con. Res. 42 (Young D-Ohio). The World Federalists, USA, endorses S. Con. Res. 40, as we do S. Con. Res. 39 (McGovern and others) which really gets to the heart of the matter in its very tough, but accurate preamble. The concurrent resolution lays bare the terrible haunting tragedy of this senseless war—

The loss of more than 47,000 American lives;
Over 250,000 American casualties;
The depletion of U.S. resources to the extent of over $100,000,000,000; and
The incredible destruction of Vietnamese life and property.

S. Con. Res. 39 also appropriately emphasizes the terrible state of our national priorities in characterizing the war as "the greatest single obstacle to efforts to focus the country's financial, human, and spiritual resources upon urgent domestic needs."

We also strongly support S. Res. 268 (Hughes D-Iowa and others) urging South Vietnam to give liberty and amnesty to political prisoners, to lift censorship, and to permit political parties to organize and present a plan for a transitional provisional government representative of all groups. The legislation goes on to state that if this is not done, the United States should declare that its commitment to the present Thieu-Ky regime is ended "with all responsible haste" and our military and political and economic assistance is terminated.

We also endorse S. Con. Res. 43 which relates to the Hughes Resolution regarding amnesty but places the matter under the jurisdiction of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross. This legislation recognises that the international community has consistently demanded humane treatment for prisoners of war. The legislation calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set forth in the convention and upon all authorities involved in armed conflicts to assume this humane treatment.

Another most interesting proposal before this Committee, which we believe deserves wide discussion, is S. J. Res. 166, sponsored by Senators Mathias and Mansfield. Discussion of this resolution would constitute a most needed dialogue on the direction of our foreign policy in the past with a view to strengthening our position in the future. It would repeal the Formosa and Pescadores Security Resolution of January 1955, Section 2 of Public Law 85-7 relating to the use of the armed forces of the United States under certain circumstances to maintain peace in the Middle East, a joint resolution on Cuba in 1962 (PL 87-733) and the South East Asian Resolution (Tonkin Bay) relative to the maintenance of international peace and security in South East Asia. All of these resolutions would be repealed effectively with the sine die adjournment of this Congress.

It would create a temporary joint committee of 12 to study terminating the National Emergency proclaimed by President Truman on December 16, 1950 with a report due before adjournment.

We also endorse Senator Magnuson's S. Res. 290 relating to land reform in South Vietnam and the implementation by the government of a broad based and equitable land reform program. We believe there should be a discussion of S. Res. 275 of Senators Scott, Hatfield and Mansfield which abhors—as I do— the attempt of Phan Van Dong to associate Americans who demonstrate for peace with the cause of North Vietnam and S. Res. 271 of Senator Dole which has as its fundamental goal peace and self determination.

We do not think anything would be gained by a discussion of S. J. Res. 63 of Senator Thurmond, which does not even mention Vietnam and therefore is irrevelant to the major issues at hand. Its thinking is too obsolete to justify serious consideration.

In closing let me say that this Committee deserves great credit for the wide ranging quality of its discussions. I agree with a recent article in *Foreign Affairs* by Senator Javits (R-N Y) which warns of a "crisis in constitutional relationships" and asks Congress to reassert itself in foreign policy. He asks the Executive Branch to readjust itself "psychologically and procedurally to a new reality—the reality that the Senate will not again shrink from its responsibilities or yield its constitutional power with respect to national security issues and the solemn undertaking of national commitments." I feel that this development is already under way through the various phases of deliberation being conducted by this Committee, and I greatly appreciate the opportunity to present my views.

Thank you very much.

Committee on Foreign Relations.
FRIENDS HOUSE,
Sandy Spring, Md., October 16, 1969.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't care about testifying, all I want to do is to help in any way to have the United States withdraw its troops in Vietnam and observe the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

However, you can file this statement. Two years ago I took a group of some 35 professors and teachers around the world. In every country we visited the leaders we saw were opposed to United States policy in Vietnam. We met in London with the leaders of the Labor Party. They were all opposed to United States policy in Vietnam. In Japan every single Pres. of a University we met with signed a statement urging the United States to withdraw its troops from Vietnam. They stated that all of Vietnam should be united as provided for in the Geneva Agreement of 1954.

We are grateful to you for all you are doing,

Sincerely yours,

JEROME DAVIS, D.D., LL. D., Litt. D.

STATEMENT OF AXEL B. GRAVEM

I am grateful for permission to file a statement with your Committee. I represent no one and am a person of no importance, but feel that my views may represent those of others in the same category whose voice should be heard.

I suggest that our foreign policy, for a great many years has been inhuman in the course of human events, and that its course should now be dictated by our mottoes of "In God We Trust" and "One Nation Under God" to which our leadership gives but lip-service.

Winston Churchill has said that "The history of civilization is War; the greatest talents of mankind have been and are being spent for destruction, but the time will come when they will be spent for construction."

The Roman Emperor, Triboniam, said: "So use your own things as not to hurt others."

The scientist Steinmetz said: "The time will come when you will scrap your physical laboratories and create laboratories of the mind."

Jesus said: "If your enemy hungers feed him; if he thirsts, give him to drink; then you will be heaping coals of fire on his head."

Ralph Waldo Emerson said: "The dice of God are always loaded in His favor."

History records that the American people have made the greatest strides in technological development and that we, beyond all others, have applied the results for destructive purposes in the implementing of our foreign policy. We invented and used the atomic bomb; we have developed the hydrogen bomb; we are developing lethal gases—all for destruction! We, in fact, are the modern "Merchants of Death", selling and giving our destructive wares to both sides in conflict and using our weapons to impel our will on others in an arrogance of command and power.

In Viet Nam this has been all too fruitless, with enormous destruction of human life and incalculable waste of wealth, resulting in a collision course in our domestic social, economic and political life which could end in revolution.

Our President speaks of pragmatism and our industrial-military complex, following in a pragmatic course which has never worked, should now take heed of the moratorium in our national and international mortuary and, actually, put the God of our untrustfulness in the driver's seat and leave the driving to Him.

Obviously, this suggestion may seem to emanate from Polly Anna and the Sunday School, but, since all others efforts have so conspicuously failed, why not give constructive heed to our purported national mottoes?

The President is a Quaker, believing in tenets devoted to peace, why does he not give the order "Cease Firing" and be content to leave the aftermath to his God and to His care that the suggested blood-bath of the South Vietnamese will not occur, and that the dominoes will not fall.

If he does not do so, I suggest that your Committee cause a bill to be put in Congress demanding that the President give this order forthwith. It would appear that the entire country will rise in support of this measure. The logical person to do this is your Chairman, Senator Fulbright, who was man enough to admit his mistake in voting for the Tonkin Bay Resolution, showing more manhood than others in high office. The bald fact is that we made the most catastrophic mistake in our history. Our country is "big enough" to admit its

error and by so doing will deserve the "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" which it does not now have.

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S & WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION,
Washington, D.C., October 10, 1969.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Enclosed are two statements which we ask be included in the record of the upcoming hearings on Vietnam policy. Our union, representing members in Alaska, Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington, and Canada, believes that the war is a "disastrous mistake" and that the United States must "stop trying to be a world cop." We believe, along with important and growing sections of the labor movement, that workers and trade union people are not warmongers, and that they want peace.

Our international Convention adopted, in April of this year, the enclosed resolution "End the Vietnam War." That position was recently reaffirmed by the ILWU State Convention in Hawaii. Enclosed also is an editorial from the official union newspaper, *The Dispatcher,* of September 9, 1969, pointing out the costs of the war to working people.

We wish you every success in your deliberations and hope that they will assist in bringing an end to the tragic conflict.

Sincerely,

ALBERT LANNON,
Washington Representative.

Enclosure.

RESOLUTION ON: END THE VIETNAM WAR

Whereas It appears that a majority of our fellow Americans now agree that intervention in Vietnam was a disastrous mistake, harmful to our nation's welfare; and

Whereas ILWU members can take patriotic pride in the fact that their union spoke out against this mistaken policy from the beginning. They can be proud that ILWU, along with leaders of a number of AFL unions, gave support to the courageous and farsighted early minority which strove to arouse the American people to the ways in which the war was damaging and endangering our nation; and

Whereas The 1967 ILWU Convention called for our union to persuade the rest of the labor movement to get into the fight for peace. We took part in a noteworthy effort by many leading AFL-CIO and independent union officials to establish a Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace to show that the war program did not have solid labor support; and

Whereas Worthwhile as these efforts were, it is only fair to say that the leadership in the peace movement has not come from labor. It has come primarily from the young people whose lives and values are directly threatened by war and militarism, and from their natural friends and sympathizers—women, teachers and clergymen. The peace movement has been powerfully assisted too by the upsurge of Black resentment against the waste of national treasure and energy on foreign war to the neglect of poverty and injustice in our own backyard; and

Whereas Labor has every reason to take a leading, active part in the peace movement. American workers pay for the immense cost of the war. Their paychecks are cut by inflation, taxes and surtaxes. At the same time the conditions of life deteriorate because the war prevents government attention to the problems of transportation, pollution, crime, inadequate schools and community facilities; and

Whereas Our union must help reinforce the peace movement. A year ago LBJ's dramatic announcement of a halt in the bombing of the North diffused that movement—and thereby made it possible to continue a war which had become politically unacceptable—by deluding the American people that the war was being ended; and

Whereas Far from scaling down the fighting, the aggressive search-and-destroy actions and the instant-pacification program ordered in the last months of LBJ's term escalated the level of combat and produced more American casualties; and

Whereas The atrociousness of the war was escalated for civilians as well. Our bombers were shifted away from their wasteful and ineffective missions in the North to the "protective" destruction of the southern countryside; and

Whereas Then, as so often before, Americans were asked by Dean Rusk to be atient and support one more effort which would bring the "honorable" settlement

we had been fighting for all along: a permanently divided Vietnam with an anti-communist government in the South. This is the unrealistic objective for which the Eisenhower administration and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles first started American interference in Vietnam affairs; and

Whereas Up to now the Nixon administration has gone along with this program, while the military commanders repeat the same old bunk which has kept casualties mounting for the last six futile years: "We are winning, give us a little more time and we can bring the boys home and let the Saigon troops take over"; and

Whereas The war will continue indefinitely—both the killing and draining of money we urgently need at home—unless a national decision is made to abandon the foolhardy objectives set by Dulles, Rusk and the military hawks, and negotiate a political settlement; and

Whereas To bring about such a decision will apparently require a massive new popular anti-war protest, of which Labor must be a part. Our union must take a leading role in such a drive, doing all it can to encourage new allies from other unions, but moving ahead nevertheless. We must seek out and develop every natural alliance with other elements—youth, Blacks, and other minorities, the poor and exploited, and the growing number of clergymen, scientists and intellectuals who are concerned for peace and social progress. We need them and they need us to win our common objectives;

Therefore be it resolved, We want and will work for these objectives:

1. Stop the killing—ceasefire.
2. Negotiate a political settlement with the people who are doing the fighting.
3. Withdraw all support from the present Saigon government if it does not cooperate in the peace negotiations.
4. Cut back on military spending and use the money for urgent domestic needs.
5. Eliminate the 10% surtax.
6. No more Vietnam! Stop pouring money down the drain all over the world. Stop trying to be a world cop. Let us straighten out our own house and show how democracy can be made to work at home before we try to tell the rest of the world how to live.
7. Reassert Congressional control over the military-industrial complex. Investigate the extent to which unwarranted military secrecy has been used to hide the squandering of public funds and manipulation of public opinion for the advantage of private profits and personal careers.
8. Srrengthen the United Nations.
9. End the Cold War. Seek peaceful co-existence between nations with different social systems; and

Be it further resolved, That we demand that the Nixon Administration begin the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and that the negotiators in Paris be given instructions to move the peace talks ahead with the proposal for the withdrawal of all and any foreign troops and to leave the Vietnamese to decide their own affairs;

And be it further resolved, That we make this resolution public by sending it to all news media, our Congressmen, Senators, Secretary of State Rodgers and President Nixon.

Be it finally resolved, That we urge the officers and members of this union to take all appropriate action to these ends and to develop understanding and support for these policies in our communities and among our elected representatives.

[From the Dispatcher, September 9, 1969]

(By Sidney Roger, editor)

The time is now—and there is no time to lose—to stop the tragic Vietnam war, and get our men out of there as fast as possible. There is so much to do: Save our cities, restore our nation's health, rebuild our people's homes, clean the waters, purify the air, end unemployment and inferior education. We must reform our tax system so that the rich do not get richer, while the poor get poorer. We must concentrate our energies into making this the kind of country we keep saying it ought to be; and in a world that still has one slim hope for survival—providing there is peace.

That's a big job, an enormous challenge. But it must be done. It's getting late. Some scientists say it may even be later than we think, as the world slowly strangles in its own garbage, while populations soar and sources of food are disappearing at an alarming rate.

In recent weeks the American people have been treated to tension-creating contradictions which make people want to climb walls. On one day some top echelon administration mouthpiece hints that large numbers of troops will be removed from Vietnam soon; the next day some other brass hat says no, we may even have to send more men.

One day some expert is saying, sorry, but even if the Vietnam war ends it will be impossible to divert any of those "earmarked" military funds to domestic needs; that the Pentagon's demands are greater than ever in our quest for "defense." The next day another expert says, no, that was wrong, we can divert a few bucks over to domestic needs, but not too much.

The fact remains, and it is a fact, that $80 billion budget for death can be cut back by more than $50 billion according to some experts, and our defense wouldn't suffer one iota. The rate of spending in Vietnam is now $500 million a week. Hardly a week goes by that doesn't reveal another example of cozy, sweetheart relationships between defense contractors and Pentagon purchasers. Those billions come primarily from the pockets of working people.

As Minnesota's Senator Walter Mondale puts it so well: "In a very real sense, what we have in this country is not a pollution problem, or a farm problem, or an educational problem, but rather a war problem. And until we can bring this war problem under control . . . there is little hope for providing the funds for the explosive domestic problems which plague every state and every city in the nation."

Many people have sadly noted that what was called the "peace movement" has disintegrated—for many reasons. Then to whom can the nation look for leadership in the quest for peace?

Only one organized group in this country has the capacity to make peace work for the benefit of the people—and that's the labor movement. Working people have the least to gain, the most to lose. The labor movement is the group most concerned with planning for the future well-being of the people.

The labor movement, despite its many internal differences, understands that it takes planning to eliminate poverty; realizes there must be some kind of guaranteed annual income; that there must be training for jobs and work for those who are trained; that there must be a gigantic housing program, and a national health program, and much, much more.

Above all else, we want to see an end to the war, with no ifs, ands, or buts. What about those who say working people fear an end to war would mean unemployment and a depression?

Well, we believe the majority of working people would be willing to take their chances. That's why we have unions. The trade union movement developed out of poverty and crisis—pooling the muscle, minds and resources of the working people to bring about political and economic changes to make the system work for the working people.

Workers and trade union people are not warmongers. They know who does the dying and who pays the bills. To say working people won't give up a few extra dollars in overtime, and some of the frills of a war-born affluence, is an insult to the working class.

We believe workers want peace. We believe the working people in this country are ready to say to the military machine: "Stand aside, we've got work to do?"

LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM,
New York, N.Y., February 3, 1970.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: We note that the Committee is planning to open hearings on Vietnam. We shall greatly appreciate an opportunity to have representatives of our Committee testify at such hearings.

We wish to submit, and enclose herewith, a program evolved by our Consultative Council and our Committee for the ending of the war in Vietnam. We respectfully request that this program be inserted in the record of the hearings.

Your Committee has performed a notable service in alerting the American people into the realities of American involvement in Vietnam and to the hazards and perils it poses. On behalf of the Committee, we wish to commend the Committee for its resolute efforts.

Faithfully yours,

JOSEPH H. CROWN, *Secretary.*

Five-Point Program To End the War in Vietnam

The advent of a new Administration provides an occasion for the reassessment of our policy toward the war in Vietnam and the negotiations that are presently proceeding in Paris.

The Number-One task facing our nation is the rapid termination of the war in Vietnam. This is essential for the peace of the world; it would brighten the prospects of international order. No solution in Vietnam is possible, however, unless we face up to the realities in Vietnam. In the sections which follow, we set out the guidelines for a solution—a 5-point program to end the war.

1. ACCEPTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

Chief among these realities is the imperative need for the United States to discard the notion that the National Liberation Front is an appendage of Hanoi and to accept the fact that the NLF is a political entity in South Vietnam entitled to share governmental responsibility and a force which inevitably will play a role in the post-war government. The acceptance of this actuality may be anathema to the Saigon regime, but until the United States acknowledges the inevitability of a coalition government in South Vietnam—and impresses that point upon the Saigon regime—the Paris talks are unlikely to register any real progress. Only recently the Laotian Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma, repeated that "a coalition government is a necessity for South Vietnam [because] the NLF cannot be ignored."

Professors George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, two of America's foremost scholars in Asian affairs, in their illuminating and documented analysis of the war in *The United States in Vietnam,* have written (pages 119–120):

> Contrary to U.S. policy assumptions, all available evidence shows that the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at their own—not Hanoi's—initiative. There is no evidence to assert, as does the U.S. "White Paper" of 1965, that "the Liberation Front for South Vietnam . . . was formed at Hanoi's order." This assertion is merely a convenient assumption and is quite as devoid of actual foundation as is Secretary Rusk's dependent assumption that the civil war "could end literally in 24 hours . . . if these people in Hanoi should come to the conclusion that they are not going to try to seize Vietnam and Laos by force."
>
> The most knowledgeable noncommunist French specialists have long known all this, but their views have been studiously ignored in Washington. And one does not have to rely on their writings to reach the inescapable conclusion that the Liberation Front is not "Hanoi's creation"; it has manifested independence and it is Southern. Insurrectionary activity against Saigon government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi's injunctions. Abundant data have been available to Washington to invalidate any argument that revival of the war in the South was precipitated by "aggression from the North." The Administration's admission of this would, however, undercut the very cornerstone of its justification of American military involvement in the South and escalation of the war against the North.

2. FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

Another reality we must face up to is the recognition that the main obstacle to a settlement is the present regime in Saigon. The Saigon regime obviously has more to gain by continuing the war than by ending it—and the conduct of the Thieu-Ky regime to date indicates a keen perception of that interest. Hans J. Morgenthau, a member of our Consultative Council, recently observed in a letter to *The New York Times* that the Saigon regime "is capable of making peace because its leading members have literally a vital interest in the continuation of the war; their political and perhaps even their physical lives depend on it."

The rulers in Saigon are not a government in the sense that they can be considered to represent the interests or the desires of the people of South Vietnam. They constitute a small group of military officers installed, in effect, by the prior Administration to curb the political convulsions that were interfering with our military activities. Despite the manipulated elections boycotted by the Buddhists and characterized by the dragooning of the electorate, only one-third of the votes were counted for General Thieu. The Thieu-Ky regime has suppressed democratic freedom of expression and has indeed imprisoned the runner-up Presidential candidate, Truang Dinh Dzu, simply because he advocated peace talks.

Despite the vast sums appropriated to the Saigon regime, no serious social reform has been achieved in South Vietnam. The Saigon military officers are conscious of their participation in the displacement and destruction of South Vietnamese rural villages. There are, it is estimated, about 2,000,000 refugees—as if 26,000,000 Americans were homeless or interned in special camps. No coherent or representative political structure can evolve under these tragic circumstances. If we continue to support the Thieu-Ky regime, we are, in substance, asking these generals to negotiate their own abdication.

The situation calls for the formation of a provisional government which would be representative of the principal political, social-economic, religious and ethnic groups of South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front. The existence of the Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces formed (after the Tet Offensive) in April 1968 and consisting of respected and widely-known non-Communist personalities, drawn mainly from Saigon and Hue, can greatly facilitate the formation of the provisional government.

We believe that a negotiated rather than an elected provisional government is called for at the outset in South Vietnam. There has never been a truly free election in Vietnam and the negotiation and implementation of an electoral procedure might imperil what would otherwise be a mutually acceptable settlement of the war. Such a negotiation would obviously require great delicacy and moderation on the part of the negotiating parties, and might be assisted by private and secret negotiating sessions.

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Subsequent to the formation of the provisional government, at a fixed date in the future—perhaps one year later—and probably subject to the supervision of a neutral international observation group (possibly drawn from a reconstituted International Control Commission) free elections could be held. The object of such elections might be a Constitutional Assembly or an actual permanent government. In the interim, elections might be scheduled for district and provincial governments. These are the most meaningful units of political control for most Vietnamese. To proceed in this way would build into the peace settlement some assurance that the population of South Vietnam would recover control over its own political destiny at the earliest practical time.

International supervisory forces should be brought into South Vietnam under the aegis of the negotiating conference. A natural starting point is the International Control Commission (ICC) set up by the Geneva Conference of 1954. Both sides have indicated a willingness to use the ICC as a point of departure. Insofar as the provisional government establishes stable authority, the functions of the international forces could be reduced, and yet they might be needed to restrain certain militant elements on either side. Such a presence might also be of help in guaranteeing against reprisals.

4. TERMINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS

There should be an immediate halt to all offensive operations. "Search-and-sweep," "sweep-and-hold" missions should forthwith cease; the raids by B–52 bomber planes of villages and towns of South Vietnam should be terminated now; the bombing of Laotian territory should be promptly ended. Military action should be confined to passive defense. We view with grave concern the intelligence/extermination program now operative which aims to locate and eliminate the political and administrative leadership of the NLF to pave the way for Saigon's control of the NLF hamlets prior to a political settlement.

Independent of the negotiations, the United States should without delay begin moving troops out, without awaiting prior agreement on machinery to monitor withdrawal of all American and North Vietnamese troops. Senator McGovern's proposal for immediate large-scale evacuation of American troops (and his condemnation of the Saigon military dictatorship) are eminently sound.

The proposal of the American delegation; "withdrawal of all military and subversive forces of North Vietnam" back to the North—with "subversive forces" apparently referring to diverse forces of the NLF—is not only unrealistic; it carries forward to the negotiating table the untenable position advanced by earlier administrations—that the NLF is a mere agent and creature of Hanoi.

The restoration of the demilitarized zone, proposed by our delegation, is aimed manifestly at sealing off the North from the South. This proposal seeks to implement only one point of the 1954 Geneva agreements but ignores the prohibitions

prescribed in the Geneva Accords against the introduction of foreign troops and armaments into Vietnam and the prohibition against the establishment of bases—prohibitions grossly violated by the United States. It was these violations and South Vietnam's refusal, aided and encouraged by the U.S., to hold elections in 1956 which lie at the roots of the origin of the war. And the origins of the war must necessarily be considered in evolving a just and reasonable settlement.

The provisional government whose establishment we regard as essential, would direct the demobilization of all South Vietnamese armed forces on both sides, along with the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all outside forces, both North Vietnamese and the American and allied troops, under the surveillance of the international presence.

Successful negotiations may still leave some elements in South Vietnam in danger of reprisals. On the side of optimism is the remarkably favorable experience of the amnesty and exchange of persons between the two zones after the first Geneva Conference. On the pessimistic side is the cruel nature of the current war. The United States owes an obligation to assist persons who felt they might be in jeopardy because of the U.S. military withdrawal. The presence of the international supervisory force and the functioning of the provisional government should help mitigate against reprisals.

5. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT GUARANTEEING VIETNAM'S NEUTRALITY; THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS; THE NEED OF MASSIVE ECONOMIC AID

To promote an enduring peace in Vietnam, there should be an international agreement guaranteeing Vietnam's neutrality and its freedom from any outside interference. Major questions such as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese after the establishment of responsible government in South Vietnam and the achievement of relative stability. It should be made clear that nothing in such an agreement precludes eventual reunification of North and South should the Vietnamese so decide. Provisions for commercial and cultural exchange, freedom of movement, and postal service between the North and South might well be included.

The United Nations could aid in promoting the long-range goal of stability in Southeast Asia if mainland China and North Vietnam become participants in the world community of nations. This would require that the issue of Chinese representation in the U.N. be solved. North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, could become an Observer at the U.N. with full opportunities to take part in the economic and social programs of the U.N. system and with opportunities for diplomatic consultation at Headquarters. With Peking representation and with agreement reached for self-determination in the whole area of Vietnam, steps could be taken for some type of U.N. guarantee of the neutrality of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Underlying the immediate steps would be the broader objectives: the achievement of universality of membership in the U.N. and the development of orderly processes for the attainment of security through peaceful settlement, peaceful change. and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.

The achievement of a settlement of the Vietnamese war would open the way to fulfill the long-delayed promise of massive economic aid to the people of Vietnam. To the indigenous problem of poverty has now been added the appalling destruction of the war. The American people have a responsibility to assist in the repair of the damage wrought to both South and North Vietnam by the war. It is imperative that we do so if we are to prevent this area from becoming an explosive center for bitter anti-Americanism in the future.

Aid must be openly extended without strings attached. This is easier to do if it comes under the auspices of an international body. Full advantage should be taken of the machinery already existing under the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Under its auspices plans for the Mekong River development have been laid, projecting a technological revolution affecting the lives of over 30 million people. And following the example of the United Nations' response to the Congo crisis, a special emergency reconstruction fund could be established under United Nations auspices which would mobilize the skill and experience available through other international agencies. The Asian Development Bank could be given a larger role and the Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning could greatly expand its efforts to train government officials.

These, then, are the guidelines for a solution to the Vietnam dilemma. The past years of devastation and deadlock have shown the self-defeating nature of

military solutions to political and economic problems. A new approach must be adopted.

The experience of Vietnam has shown the need for American understanding of the social forces impelling change in various areas of the world. The tragedy of Vietnam shows that revolutionary forces can turn to civil war, and civil war can lead to outside intervention, and intervention can lead to an ever-widening arena of conflict.

American understanding must become aware of the dangerous assumption that the United States can determine the course of the whole world, either through military power or economic power. It is important that the American people be clear that our involvement in Vietnam always rested on unfounded myths. Chief of the myths propagated by the prior Administration was (a) that the NLF was an appendage of Hanoi (see Point 1); and (b) that our involvement was a response to "aggression" by North Vietnam (dealt with in the Appendix of this statement).

It is imperative to dispel these myths which sought to confuse and obfuscate American public opinion and to rationalize our involvement in Vietnam. The dissipation of these myths can clear the record and thus expedite a resolution of this tragic war. We earnestly believe the implementation of the 5-point program here advanced will assure an equitable and honorable solution to the crisis in Vietnam.

We do well to recall Pierre Mendes Frances' promise in 1954 that he would achieve a settlement of the Franco-Indochinese war in 30 days—a deadline he did indeed meet. That is the sense of urgency that should invest the new Administration—toward the end of restoring our national prestige and paving the way for the reconciliation and unity of our people.

It is fitting to recall, too, the great honor visited upon President Eisenhower for bringing the Korean war to an end. The early end of the Vietnam war would earn for this Administration the gratitude of America and of all mankind.

Appendix

Myth Vis-a-Vis "Aggression" by North Vietnam

This proposition was advanced by former Secretary of State Rusk who, in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January–February 1966, testified that the 325th Division (perhaps 8,000–15,000 men) of the North Vietnamese Army had moved into South Vietnam at the close of 1964. However, that testimony was belied by Secretary McNamara's statement on April 27, 1965 that evidence accumulated in March–April 1965 (after we had begun combat operations) confirmed merely the presence of a battalion "on the order of 400 to 500 men." Moreover, the Mansfield Report makes plain that significant armed personnel were introduced from the North only after the United States had intervened at a point in the war when "total collapse of Saigon Government's authority appeared imminent in the early months of 1965."

Professor Quincy Wright, formerly President of the American Society of International Law and a member of our Consultative Council, has noted, in his article, "Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation," which appeared in the October 1966 issue of the American Journal of International Law:

> There seems to be no evidence that organized contingents of the North Vietnamese army crossed the cease-fire line until after the United States bombing attacks began in February, 1965. . . .
>
> Ho Chi Minh's action in support of the Viet-Cong did not constitute aggression or armed attack in international relations but civil strife within the domestic jurisdiction of Viet-Nam, similar to the action of the North against the South in the American Civil War. Whether called "intervention," "reprisals," or "collective defense," the United States' response by bombings in North Viet-Nam, which began in February, 1965, violated international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Geneva Agreement, if the latter were in effect.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which had conducted intensive hearings on the war in Vietnam, noted in his book, "*The Arrogance of Power*" (page 107):

> It is said that we are fighting against North Vietnam's aggression rather than its ideology and that the "other side" has only to "stop doing what it is doing" in order to restore peace. But what are the North Vietnamese doing except participating in a civil war, not in a foreign country, but on the other side of a demarcation line between two sectors of the same country, a civil war in which Americans from ten thousand miles across the ocean are

also participating? What are they doing that is different from what the American North did to the American South a hundred years ago, with results that few of my fellow southerners now regret?

The falsity of the myth is extensively documented in *Vietnam and International Law*, a volume prepared by the Consultative Council of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam.

Statement by Mr. Klaus Loewald, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, Adelphi University

Given the prospect that the outcome of the war in Viet-Nam is a government dominated by Hanoi, and given the significance of United States involvement in that war, it is reasonable and proper for the United States to consider its responsibilities towards that country after the cessation of hostilities. This paper attempts to deal with responsibilities to individual Vietnamese citizens.

There are in Viet-Nam many citizens who would not wish to live under a government dominated by Hanoi. There are the Vietnamese who fled from that type of government once before. There are many who, selflessly or selfishly, worked with the United States and its allies these past many years. There are others, perhaps a large number, who cherish concepts of freedom and individualism in its best sense, many of whom, partly for that reason, we do not as yet know. Such people can expect little understanding or forbearance from a Hanoi-dominated government.

It is the obligation of the United States and its allies to facilitate the emigration of such Vietnamese as do not wish to live under a Hanoi-dominated government. Together we have kept them fighting to avoid that fate, and this statement is presented on the assumption that we shall not be successful.

I submit, therefore, that it is necessary for a nation claiming leadership among free peoples to declare its readiness to take responsible action. The United States ought to announce that it is prepared to open its doors to Vietnamese refugees, and it must ask its friends in the family of nations to do likewise.

While the activities of private organizations are necessary and laudable, the size of the proposed task appears to require governmental action. So does its complexity. The ordinary Vietnamese citizen today finds his efforts to obtain a valid passport severely hindered by administrative action even if another country is ready to offer him refuge. Nor must I necessarily condemn an administration for its reluctance to assist in the wholesale emigration of its citizens. To obtain its cooperation, I believe, allied governmental action is appropriate. In this connection, I am gratified by relevant statements by Senator McGovern. I urge the Congress to take requisite action.

My impulse to submit this statement to the Committee stems from expressions of an apparent popular desire to have done with Viet-Nam and to devote our energies to the solution of domestic problems. This recurrence of a national desire for a "return to normalcy" is disturbing, for even its earlier manifestation, after a victorious war, was no long-term success nor, judging with the benefit of hindsight, could it have been. Today, it is neither realistic nor moral for the United States to wash its hands of a turbulent international problem created largely by its own actions.

I am aware of possible objections to my proposal. Cynics may say that Viet-Nam ought to be left to its own devices as long as our domestic misery fares no better. Learned argument may be advanced pertaining to differing cultural concepts in Asia concerning the sanctity, if any, of life and choice. But I submit that American moral and ethical standards, even if not shared by others, must govern our acts toward them. It would be shameful that, approaching a situation which the United States has led the costly fight to avoid—costly primarily to the Vietnamese—this nation should now refrain from shouldering responsibilities pertaining to the aftermath of that fight.

Statement by D. Gareth Porter, Ph. D. Candidate, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University

Self-determination and the legitimacy of the Saigon government: an historical analysis

The primary obstacle to progress in the Paris talks has been the status of the Saigon regime led by President Nguyen Van Thieu. The North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front, have insisted that no negotiated solution is possible

until the Thieu-Ky regime is replaced by a more representative government which is willing to discuss seriously with them the establishment of an interim coalition government, to administer national elections. The U.S. official position has long been that we cannot abandon a government which was chosen through free elections under a national Constitution promulgated in 1967.

It is thus on the alleged legitimacy of the present Saigon leadership that the U.S. bases its refusal to agree to an interim coalition. It is argued that only by honoring the 1967 Constitution and Presidential election can the U.S. uphold the principle of self-determination in South Vietnam. Because the Saigon Constitution and the Presidential election which it fostered have become the primary props of the present U.S. negotiating stance, it is well to examine both of them carefully in light of the principle of popular self-determination which they are supposed to represent.

On the basis of the following examination, the author has concluded that the Thieu regime has no claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people, and that the political process cannot be said to have brought them self-determination.

I. The Constitution: January 1966–April 1967

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky promised in January, 1966, that a "Council for a Building of Democracy" would be established sometime after January 20th to propose a draft constitution and that the constitution would be finished by October and national elections held sometime in 1967. There was little enthusiasm in Saigon for these plans, since it seemed clear that the military would keep the entire processs carefully under control and the ultimate shift in authority to civilians would be put off indefinitely. Moreover, even this tentative timetable disappeared from view after the meeting in Honolulu between President Johnson and Premier Ky in February, 1966. The final communique promised to "build true democracy" and to write a Constitution "in the months ahead", but failed to repeat the pledge for assembly elections in 1967.[1] The U.S. declaration gave its support to the "purpose of free elections proclaimed by the Government of South Vietnam", indicating the low priority which a freely elected government held in American policy.[2]

In March, 1966, the first real pressure for a popularly elected National Assembly came from the militant Buddhists. For several weeks, the Buddhists and their allies effectively controlled Hue and Danang, the two major Central Vietnamese cities, as they demanded elections for a Constitutional Assembly and real legislative powers for the Assembly once the Constitution was written. Ky and his fellow generals were determined, however, to appoint the committee which would draft the constitution and keep all legislative powers in their own hands until a new government took office.[3]

A political congress in April, whose members had been appointed by the military junta supported the demands of the Buddhists rather than the position of the Generals and further asked that the rebellious Central Vietnamese cities be pacified by political rather than by military means.[4] Although Thieu and Ky signed an order establishing Assembly elections within three to five months, the other recommendations of the political congress were ignored when Ky's troops were sent in American planes to Danang and then Hue to occupy them and arrest all those who had defied the government and carried on demonstrations.

Then Ky proceeded to issue an electoral decree which brushed aside the recommendations of both the political congress and a later electoral law commission appointed by himself, which had called for an assembly which would have legislative powers beyond the drafting of a constitution. Ky's electoral decree prescribed a second election in 1967 for a legislative assembly, leaving the junta in power until after that assembly was elected.[5] Moreover, the Buddhists, who under the electoral commission's plan would have been able to use their religious symbol, the red lotus, which had been very successful in 1965 local elections, were denied the right to use it in Ky's decree. And the junta's complete control over the screening process would allow it to keep out any undesirable candidates on the grounds that they worked "directly or indirectly for Communism or neutralism." [6]

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[1] *New York Times*, January 16, 1966.
[2] Text in George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, *The United States in Vietnam* (New York: Dial Press, 1967), pp. 442–5.
[3] *New York Times*, March 29, 1966.
[4] *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1966.
[5] See Kahin and Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 258–9.

One day after issuing the election law, Ky ordered a Ranger battalion to raid the Buddhist headquarters in Saigon, and all the monks, nuns and laymen were removed and between thirty and forty leaders were arrested.[7] In Central Vietnam, several thousand soldiers, five or six hundred officers (including all the regimental commanders and six of twelve battalion commanders of the first division, who had given their allegiance to the Buddhist struggle Movement) were arrested along with 200 students from Hue and Danang, 400 monks and several members of the Hue University faculty.[8] Thus the organizational structure which had sustained the Buddhist movement's political campaign was shattered.

Even with the only coherent opposition group eliminated from competition, the junta did not refrain from using its power over the military machinery to insure a favorable result in the September, 1966 Assembly election. As Bernard Fall noted, a "seemingly innocuous provision" in the electoral decree permitting soldiers to vote wherever they happened to be stationed at the moment, rather than by absentee ballot, could be used to insure victory for a number of candidates.[9] Since the constituencies were provinces, a division of troops could give a lagging candidate a big boost. Naturally, since there were not enough divisions to distribute among the candidates, some promises were not kept. The fifth division had reportedly been promised to a candidate in the fifth district of Saigon but was rerouted to the Delta to vote when it was learned that the chairman of the People's Armed Forces Council (the enlarged Armed Forces Council), Tran Van Van, was in danger of losing.[10]

The major U.S. public relations effort on the Assembly election was focused not on the meaningful choice which was presented to the electorate—an absurd theme under the circumstances—but on the high rate of voter turnout, which demonstrated, it was said, both the weakness of the Viet Cong and the high interest and support of the Vietnamese for their government. According to Saigon's figures, 80 percent of the registered voters, or 4.2 million, went to the polls, an impressive display of political participation.[11]

This exceptionally high rate of voter turnout was certainly an important characteristic of electoral politics under the military junta. But it was nothing new to South Vietnam; as one anti-Communist political organization noted during the summer, the Vietnamese people had learned what rigged elections were through one referendum, three national assembly elections and one President election under the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem.[12] In all of these votes, the percentage of eligible voters who went to the polls was over 80 percent. (The average for the legislative elections was 85 percent, the figure for the Presidential election was 93 percent).[13] The method of insuring such turnouts was described succinctly by the *U.S. Army Area Handbook* for Vietnam as follows: "Officially, there is no fine or penalty attached to non-voting. The authorities, however, tend to regard voter participation as a criterion of loyalty, and the citizen may find his motives questioned if his identity card does not show that he has voted." [14]

This tradition was continued by the military junta in 1966. The police and civil servants distributed voting cards to these who did not pick them up, and few voters believed that it was a matter of choice for them.[15] The government's attitude toward voting was further underlined by its policy toward those who tried to organize a boycott of the vote as a protest against unfair electoral arrangements. In the II Corps area, the Corps Commander, Vinh Loc, told local government officials, police and army officers to arrest all those who opposed the election.[16] South Vietnamese police were given special powers to shoot on sight anyone found agitating against the election, and on August 31, a man discovered ripping down a government election poster in Saigon was shot and killed when he tried to flee.[17]

When the results of the election were announced it was clear that the members of the Constituent Assembly were highly conservative representatives of the well-educated middle and upper class and that the assembly would be "safe" from the junta's standpoint. In fact, Article 20 of the electoral decree had provided that

[7] *New York Times*, June 21, 1966.
[8] Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Saigon," *The New Yorker*, August 20, 1966, p. 124; *New York Times*, February 2, 1967; *tin tuong* (Paris), September, 1966, p. 13.
[9] Bernard Fall, "Vietnam: The Search for Stability", *Current History*, January, 1967, p. 11.
[10] Denis Warner, "South Vietnam's Political Awakening", *The Reporter*, November 17, 1966, p. 42.
[11] Fall, *loc. cit.*
[12] *Joint Communique of the Front of Citizens of all Religions and Political Organizations*, July 9, 1966. The Front is an interfaith group led by the strongly anti-Communist Catholic priest Father Quynh.
[13] Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963), p. 96.
[14] Quoted in Marshall Windmiller, "The Vietnam Elections" *Ramparts*, November, 1966, p. 4.
[15] *Washington Post*, September 11, 1966.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, August 31, 1966.

the head of the junta could modify legislation at will unless two-thirds of the legislature overruled him.[18] And as one deputy said after polling the membership on Article 20, "It is impossible to get a two-thirds vote of the Constituent Assembly in favor of anything that goes against the government's wishes".[19] The leader of a major bloc in the Assembly, Saigon publisher Dang Van Sung, made no secret of his willingness to help the junta write a constitution through which a general wearing civilian clothes could govern South Vietnam.[20]

The intention of the junta to maintain an iron grip on the creation of the new Constitution was indicated once again when in the first week in December, 1966, the government signed a letter rejecting any effort to modify Article 20 or limit its power to overrule the Assembly.[21] At the same time officials from Thieu's office suggested that a compromise might be worked out, meaning that the Assembly would accept the government's revisions before passing important Constitutional provisions, in return for a pledge not to use the veto.[22] A series of meetings between the junta and assemblymen began for the purpose of incorporating military demands into the draft document. Thus the assembly would avoid humiliation, while the junta maintained control over the final produce.[23]

The two major issues on which the Assembly changed its position under the junta's pressure were the power of the legislature to dissolve the cabinet and the election of province chiefs. Originally, the Assembly had favored a provision which would have given the legislature power to dissolve the cabinet by a vote of two-thirds of both houses. The junta was adamantly opposed to any such power in the hands of a legislative body, so a compromise was adopted which made any overturning of the government highly improbable. A vote of three-fourths of both houses was required in the final draft. Similarly, on the question of electing province chiefs, the junta flatly opposed it and the final draft gave the President the power to delay such elections for four years.[24]

When the assembly insisted on claiming substantial legislative powers for itself during the transition stage after the adoption of the constitution, the junta went to great lengths to force a retreat. Long after the above-mentioned compromises had been hammered out behind the scenes, Lt.-Gen. Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary General of the National Leadership Council, went before the Assembly to demand that there be no provision for electing provincial chiefs and that the President should have the right to dissolve the legislature. General Thieu himself threatened, in effect, to nullify the body's efforts by veto or, if necessary, by dissolving it, unless it agreed to modify seven articles, including the one concerning legislative powers during the transition. In the end, the Assembly satisfied itself with the power to write an electoral law, ratify treaties and other minor legislation.[25]

Thus the Constitution was the offspring of a strong military junta and a weak Assembly, a large minority of which had already agreed to cooperate with the junta in return for being elected with military help. The junta had used its power to suppress or intimidate any opposition and had maintained tight control over the entire political process leading up to the creation of the new Constitution. The way was then open for the use of the new formal structure to insure continued rule by a military man beyond the 1967 Presidential election.

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky lost little time in making clear his intention of running for the Presidency in 1967. Early in February, 1967, he began to refer to a military ticket in the Presidential election, which all military men would be expected to support. Ky's plan to head that military ticket became clear when posters began appearing around Saigon extolling "the Government of Nguyen Cao Ky" as "the government of the poor" well ahead of the time when the campaign was to begin.

The U.S. could have made it clear that it preferred an election in which the administrators of the balloting were not at the same time identified with a major candidate. But instead American policy was to remain aloof while the election was systematically rigged to insure military victory. Most American officials, from the White House to the Embassy in Saigon, believed that government by military men insured "stability", which was the primary U.S. concern while the U.S. military buildup went forward.

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[18] Kahin and Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
[19] *Christian Science Monitor*, November 10, 1966.
[20] *London Observer*, September 18, 1966.
[21] *New York Times*, December 3, 1966.
[22] *Ibid*, December 15, 1966.
[23] *London Observer*, January 25, 1967.
[24] *New York Times*, March 15, 1967.
[25] *Ibid*.

When the issue of a runoff election arose in the Assembly, followers of civilian candidates wanted the U.S. to take a stand in favor of the runoff, since without it, a united military ticket would have an easy job of winning against several civilian candidates. But U.S. officials made no attempt to influence the outcome. The pro-junta bloc in the assembly supported a single election, while nearly a third of the membership stayed away from the voting. The runoff was thus defeated 44 to 36.[26] The U.S. did use its influence, however, to make sure that the rivalry between General Ky and General Nguyen Van Thieu was resolved and that a single ticket represented the military. The result was a slate in which Ky accepted second place to General Thieu.[27]

Of the thirteen candidates who filed for candidacy, two were ruled off the ballot by the junta. Ky's own former economics Minister, Au Truong Thanh, a young, able and respected Southerner, entered the campaign to draw support for an end to the war, and adopted the slogan "Ceasefire" and the campaign symbol of a bomb with an "X" over it. A few days after the filing deadline, one of Ky's agents in the assembly filed a petition with the electoral committee urging Thanh's elimination from the ballot, charging that he was a communist. At a press conference, the National Police accused Thanh of having been active in a Communist "intellectual proselytizing committee" in Saigon, but the two documents supported no such accusation. One was a "self-confession", written by Thanh after being arrested by Diem's secret police in 1959, in which he admitted only to having a "left-leaning political credo". The other, purporting to be a report by a captured Viet Cong agent, charged him with making one pro-communist statement in a conversation.[28]

When the Assembly met to pass judgment on the eligibility of Presidential candidates one-third of the membership stayed away, and Thanh's candidacy was soundly defeated.[29] At the same meeting, the Assembly voted 54 to 14 to rule out the candidacy of General Duong Van Minh. The pretext was that Tran Ngoc Lieng, had at one time held dual French-Vietnamese citizenship and was therefore not a Vietnamese citizen—an unique interpretation of citizenship.[30] Premier Ky had earlier announced the decision of the junta that General Minh would not be allowed to return from exile in Thailand, regardless of the election results.[31]

Vietnamese were convinced by this time that the elections would be fraudulent. The respected Catholic leader Father Hoang Quynh, who maintained close contacts with rural Catholic priests, told an interviewer that his "intelligence sources" had reported that a province chief had already received orders that a "certain" ticket was to win the election. He denounced the election as "window dressing."[32] The general feeling was that the administrative, police, and military networks were being used by Thieu and Ky to insure victory.[33]

Early in the campaign civilian candidate Tran Van Huong, a former Mayor of Saigon, charged at a news conference that in six Mekong Delta provinces soldiers had been issued two voting cards, province chiefs had ordered their subordinates to produce votes for the generals, and his own campaign workers had been threatened. Huong added that he expected "voting frauds in faraway places where the foreign press does not go."[34] The representative to the Constituent Assembly from Go Cong province in the delta immediately added that the Province Chief there was actively supporting the military ticket, urging civil servants and military personnel to do likewise and trying to intimidate Huong's campaign staff.[35]

Shortly after Huong's charges, President Johnson said that these charges were no different from campaign charges in the U.S. He noted that American campaigners allowed themselves the "luxury of a great many rash statements and criticisms" and predicted there would be more of such statements in South

[26] *Washington Post*, May 8, 1967.
[27] *Christian Science Monitor*, August 2, 1967.
[28] *New York Times*, July 9, 1967.
[29] *Ibid*, July 19, 1967.
[30] Frances H. Craighill and C. Robert Zelnick, "Ballots or Bullets: What the 1967 Elections could mean," *Vietnam: Matters for the Agenda*. A Center Occasional Paper (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1967), p. 21.
[31] *Dan Tien* (Saigon), July 7, 1967.
[32] *Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 1967.
[33] Robert S. Browne, "Memorandum on the Current Political Situation in Vietnam": *Congressional Record*, July 24, 1967, p. A3708; *Washington Post*, July 24, 1967.
[34] *New York Times*, August 16, 1967.
[35] *Tin Song* (Saigon), August 17–18, 1967; *Thanh Chung* (Saigon), August 17, 1967.

Vietnam as the elections approached.[36] But while the charges were being flippantly dismissed, the U.S. embassy received from its own reporter in Go Cong province confirmation of those charges. The Province Chief, it was reported, had implied his support for Thieu and Ky at a meeting of government officials on election procedures, while Huong's local representatives had been warned to terminate their campaign activities. The report also disclosed that the pacification program cadre in the province's priority district had played an active campaign role on behalf of the military ticket, tearing down all civilian candidate's posters and replacing them with those of Thieu and Ky, among other activities.[37]

The Johnson Administration, intent on assuring the U.S. public that the Vietnamese elections would be fair, invited senators, governors, mayors and other selected political and academic figures to go to Vietnam to observe the election for four days.[38] The move appeared to civilian candidates as part of a systematic effort to legitimize the election of Thieu and Ky, which they considered a foregone conclusion.[39] "The foreigners will never understand the subtleties of government manipulation", Huong said, admitting that bringing them in was a shrewd move by Thieu and Ky.[40]

Vice-Presidential candidate Dr. Phan Quang Dan meanwhile declared that the government had issued duplicate voting cards and carried villages on the electoral roles which had long been depopulated.[41] In part to remind American observers that there was more to rigging elections than might be observed in a four-day visit accompanied by government interpreters, the committee supporting one of the candidates issued an extensive guide to election-rigging practices based on both previous elections and current practices.[42] Nevertheless, none of the American observers appeared to grasp the potentialities for both fraud and intimidation by the Saigon government. The naivete of these observers was epitomized in the remark by New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes, who said, "If peasants are pressured or intimidated, they can call their policeman." [43]

On election day, the atmosphere in Saigon was charged with further accusations of fraud. A group of highly respected political figures not connected with any candidate circulated the results of a survey which named 54 districts, or one in every six, in which officials were reported to have been ordered to insure a Thieu-Ky victory.[44] The following day, seven of the ten civilian candidates lodged protests with the Assembly concerning voting fraud.[45] A spokesman for Huong pointed out that he had been badly defeated in his native city, Vinhlong, while Phan Khac Suu, a former Chief of State, had run a miserable fourth in his hometown, Cantho.[46] Suu's running mate, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, complained of the "absurd vote" which Thieu and Ky had gotten in Gia Dinh Province, where he had maintained a free medical clinic for years and had won impressive electoral victories in the past, but this time had finished fourth.[47]

Gia Dinh province appears to be one of the many cases of election fraud at the district level or above. As David Wurfel has pointed out, Gia Dinh, where the Province Chief was a relative of National Police Chief Nguyen Ngoc Loan, was the province with the most spectacular rise in registered voters between June and August—over 80,000—and it provided a margin of more than 100,000 votes for the military ticket, the largest in the country.[48]

Not the least of the cases of fraud, it appears, was in Saigon itself where Huong was the announced winner by a slim 2,000 votes. Weeks later, civil servants who had participated in the counting disclosed to an American reporter that General Loan had ordered a narrow victory for Thieu, but that Huong actually won the city by some 20,000 votes.[49]

A significant survey carried out by a *New York Times* reporter in twenty villages revealed that in many villages, the clerks and poll-watchers had been

[36] *New York Times*, Augnst 17, 1967.
[37] Interview with Carl D. Robinson, former Chief Research and Programs, CORDS, Go Cong Province, Saigon, July, 1968.
[38] *New York Times*, August 24, 1967.
[39] *Washington Post*, September 6, 1967.
[40] *New York Times*, September 1, 1967.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Saigon Post*, September 2, 1967.
[43] *Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 1967.
[44] *New York Times*, September 3, 1967.
[45] *Ibid*, September 5, 1967.
[46] *Ibid*, September 6, 1967.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] David Wurfel, Preliminary Report on Vietnamese Election, unpublished manuscript, September 21, 1967, p. 6. According to Shaplen, 22,000 votes were said to have been added to the Thieu-Ky ticket's total at a late hour. *New Yorker*, October 7, 1967, p. 154.
[49] Critchfield, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

brought in from outside the village by the district chief and that regulations requiring that election results be posted for each polling place were ignored.[50] When the poll-watcher was from the same village, stories of voting fraud sometimes got out. One American told the author of a poll-keeper in Dinh tuong Province in the Mekong Delta who showed him an official tally sheet giving Huong 80 per cent of the vote and the military ticket only 20 per cent. Yet the district chief had reported the results as 80 per cent for Thieu and 20 per cent for Huong.[51]

The voting system in Vietnam also lent itself to fraud at the polling place, although it is likely that it was much less significant than district or province level fraud. The only way of checking to see that ballots were not added by officials was to compare voting card corners clipped with the number of ballots cast. Extra voting cards issued to military personnel and their families, the addition of voting card corners, and proxy voting by village officials were all possible. Wurfel reported that the percentage of invalid ballots was much lower in rural than in urban areas, despite the prevalence of illiteracy in the former, raising the probability that proxy voting was quite widespread where no election observers were present. [52]

Outright fraud was only a part of the whole picture of electoral manipulation. It would appear that the informal pre-election pressures on voters also played an important role in the 1.6 million total vote for Thieu and Ky. One indication of this strategy was the removal of the Deputy Province Chief for Security in Long An Province in August, because, according to U.S. officials, he was not supporting the military ticket.[53] An American official in one Delta province reported to the Embassy that "strong and inordinate pressure" appeared to have been exercised by higher GVN officials, most notably the Province Chief, to support the Thieu-Ky slate. The Deputy Province Chief, a Huong supporter, said he thought Huong would win in the province capital, but the outcome in the countryside was "questionable" because of pressure from District Chiefs and outpost commanders. Village and hamlet officials were told by the Province Chief that if they did not vote for Thieu and Ky, "they would be kicked out."[54]

As always at election time, Vietnamese felt obliged to go to the polling booth. People were threatened with the loss of their identification card if it was not clipped as evidence of having voted.[55] Moreover, there was a widespread belief among Vietnamese peasants that if they discarded the three-striped national flag (the symbol on the military ticket's ballot), they would be considered disloyal.[56] And since in many villages, only Thieu-Ky posters could be found, the sense of obligation to vote for them was heightened.

There were some provinces where manipulation by the military was either very limited or nonexistent. Tay Ninh province, for example, the home of the Cao Dai "Holy See", with a high percentage of Cao Dai followers, had a more honest election, according to U.S. and Vietnamese officials there, than most other provinces, due to the Cao Dai province Chief, a former Viet Minh, Colonel Ho Duc Trung.[57] Thieu and Ky were defeated there by Truong Dinh Dzu, 40,000 to 30,000 primarily because of Dzu's strong stand on ending the war.

There is no way of knowing what percentage of the military ticket's total vote was produced by fraud or pressure. The important point is, however, that Thieu and Ky felt obliged to resort to such techniques to insure victory despite the fact that they had already ruled out their most popular competitors and despite the fact that it would have been difficult for any military ticket to lose against a large field of mostly unknown candidates—unless it was intensely unpopular. Thus the evidence of electoral impropriety is also evidence that the military ticket was highly sensitive to its own lack of popular support.

Despite the fact that both the South Vietnamese military and the U.S. government viewed the Presidential election as a means of legitimizing rule by the military elite, there is much evidence that it had precisely the opposite effect. Student disgust at another rigged election provided the impetus for post-election protests which brought participation from the universities at Can Tho as well as from the

[50] *New York Times*, September 26, 1967.
[51] Interview with Dennis Rothaar, formerly IVS refugee aide in Dinh Tuong province, July, 1968.
[52] Wurfel, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[53] *New York Times*, August 31, 1967.
[54] Interview with Robinson.
[55] Interview with Rothaar.
[56] Francois Sully, "The Elections in Luong Hoa," unpublished report in files of *Newsweek* Bureau, Saigon, September 5, 1967.
[57] Interviews in Tay Ninh Province, July, 1968. One year later, Col. Trung was removed on the pretext of corruption, despite his apparent effectiveness and popularity, *Washington Post*, September 14, 1967.

Buddhist Van Hanh University. At a news conference after the elections, the Saigon Student Union's Executive Committee expressed its disapproval of a congratulatory message sent by President Johnson to General Thieu before the results had been officially validated.[58] Police raided the Student Union's headquarters and removed posters calling for strikes to protest the rigging of elections.[59]

Eight of ten civilian candiates meanwhile formed a "Militant Democratic Opposition Front" to demand that the Assembly invalidate the election results. On September 21, the "Democratic Front" demanded the annulment of the elections and a caretaker government to organize new ones. It also sent a letter to Ambassador Bunker demanding an end to U.S. political intervention in Vietnam and warning specifically against U.S. intervention to have the elections validated by the Assembly.[60]

Confronted with a government which had been elected by fraudulent means, University student leaders were driven for the first time to oppose the continuation of the war itself. On September 23, the Presidents of the Executive Committees of the Student organizations at Saigon, Van Hanh and Can Tho Universities, addressed an open letter to President Johnson and the American people which began by noting that U.S. intervention in Vietnamese politics had "led the Vietnamese People to believe that the Americans are replacing the French Colonialists." [61] On September 30, 500 students protested in front of the Assembly Hall against the rigged elections and, after they were informed that the Assembly's election committee had voted 16 to 2 to throw out the results, stormed the government's huge election scoreboard and began tearing it down.[62] Two days later, when students tried to move toward the Assembly to demonstrate, they were cut off by police and beaten. Many students were arrested and drafted immediately into the army, including the Chairman of the Student Union, Ho Hun Nhut, and two other student leaders, who tried to hold a press conference in the Student Union compound to protest "terroristic and oppressive police measures".[63] Rather than fight for the Saigon government, Nhut and several others defected to the N.L.F. at the onset of the 1968 Tet offensive and emerged the following May as Chairman of the "Saigon Students Committee for Peace", which was explicitly aligned with the National Liberation Front.[64]

It is significant that it was only after the 1967 Presidential elections that the Front was able to attract the first significant group from Saigon's intelligentsia to leave the city and join them since the Front was founded in 1960. One member of the "Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces" which emerged after the Tet Offensive had been on the "Council of Notables" appointed by the first post-Diem military junta; another had been Saigon's superintendent of primary schools for two years; a third was a well-known woman doctor. And two other former officers of the Saigon Student Union (one of whom had worked closely with Americans on social service projects) also joined the Alliance.[65]

The bitterness felt among Buddhists, students, and intellectuals over the rigged election was certainly a major contributing factor to the narrowing base of political support for the military regime in the following two years. Far from increasing its legitimacy in the eyes of the population, the Presidential election merely debased the electoral process itself and increased the cynicism of Vietnamese toward their government and toward the war itself. As the opinion surveys conducted by the U.S. mission indicated, by the end of 1967, most Vietnamese did not believe that the power to make war and peace lay with the Saigon regime. They believed that the Americans were prolonging the war, either to test military techniques and weapons or for economic reasons.[66]

Given this background, the policy of maintaining the present Saigon regime in power can hardly be viewed as consistent with self-determination. The invocation of that principle on behalf of the present U.S. negotiating position is bound to be viewed by most Vietnamese as merely a signal of bad faith.

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[58] *Tieng Vang* (Saigon), September 14, 1967.
[59] *Dan Chung* (Saigon), September 14, 1967.
[60] *Dan Tien* (Saigon), September 23, 1967; *Song* (Saigon) September 22, 1967.
[61] English translation of the original text.
[62] *Tieng Vang*, October 2, 1967.
[63] *Saigon Post*, October 8, 1967; *Washington Post*, October 7, 1967.
[64] *Xay Dung* (Saigon), May 31, 1968; *Washington Post*, June 26, 1968.
[65] *Washington Star*, May 12, 1968; *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1967; Robert Shaplen, "Letter From Saigon," *The New Yorker*, June 29, 1968.
[66] *New York Times*, December 6, 1967.

Memorandum on the Justification of Our Vietnam Policy

(By Charles A. Weil)

I am a retired business man, student of, and writer on geostrategy, which I define as relating foreign policy to strategic capabilities as affected by geography.

I am author of the first and only book published to defend American military presence in Vietnam *exclusively* from the geostrategic, national security, aspect. This statement is a synopsis of that book, "Curtains Over Vietnam", the basic conclusions of which no top level military professional could criticize, not even General Shoup; that military access to South Vietnam is absolutely indispensable to the U.S., global balance of power policy and American security.

It would not be surprising if its members, along with so many intellectuals, were predisposed against my views, since there is not, I believe, a single book other than my "Curtains Over Vietnam" that presents the geostrategic, national security stake of this country in Southeast Asia as it does.

I can't know whether its considerations were ever presented in closed hearings to this committee. I am certain they have never been elicited in open hearings to educate the public and break through the "paper curtain", the conspiracy of silence of our academic media complex. No wonder the war is unpopular. It has never been convincingly explained.

My conclusions stand or fall on whether or not a forced landing is, and *always be*, feasible on a shore defended by a power with nuclear capabilities; whether or not such a forced landing would be deterred.

Every other consideration is sham, immaterial, irrelevant or transcended.

President Johnson declared the key to Vietnam was really our own security. President Nixon said the same. But neither gave reasons for their bare allegations, reasons I am about to propound that not a single top level military expert consulted disagrees with. And only the military are qualified to judge.

The main thrust and novelty of my testimony is the disclosure of a suppressed geostrategic reason for Vietnam's importance to security, to a power equilibrium; the indispensability of an independent South Vietnam, access to which cannot be denied in a contingency, by conventional or tactical nuclear capabilities of a potential enemy such as China and/or Russia.

Splitting the atom also split the global equilibrium into two interlocking parts with two different strategies; the conventional traditional balance of power and strategy, and the nuclear balance and strategy, super-imposed on the former, and a public opinion split from stem to stern.

There is no experience at all with the latter. It is therefore doubtful whether we can successfully relate Vietnam *directly* to the atomic balance (or balance of terror or mutual deterrence).

But we still can, and have to, relate the conventional equilibrium to the nuclear; to preserve the former, so as not to involve ineluctable resort to the latter *in extremis*, or surrender if the conventional balance be irretrievably upset in favor of the bloc, as Chou en Lai said it would have been by what he though was the effect of the 1954 Geneva parley. For to such conventional equilibrium, Southeast Asia was, and continues to be, an integral and vital geostrategic element.

The conceptual confusion as to global equilibrium and failure to distinguish between its two parts and strategies brought confusion of strategic terms that has rent our public opinion as involved misapplications of the untried *a priori* methods of nuclear strategy to conventional warfare; such as flexible response, escalation, and graduated deterrence; that simply don't apply to conventional war and strategy. It produced the misapprehensions as to Vietnam's importance and the strategy indispensable to its preservation that split the country.

For mobility, outflanking, which necessarily involves escalation, are indispensable to conventional strategy, especially of seapower.

The Vietnam conflict is a global power balance, preventive war according to high administration statements. They are confirmed by geography and the "real politik" that involved us in three prior overseas wars since we became, what Theodore Roosevelt said in 1910, "the balancer of the whole world." It is to preserve the "precarious balance" between the maritime, or insular world and the continental heartland of Eurasia.

The conventional strategy of such a world balancer, or insular linchpin as successfully proved by Great Britain was, has been, and is for us, today as Liddell Hart described it,

> "Seaborne expeditions against the enemy's vulnerable extremities."

And as Gneisenau advised England against Napoleon, on many fronts to

"Force him to have his armies run from one end of his empire to the other" However, such multiple fronts, exploiting the mobility of seapower requires the capability of landing expeditionary forces on such extremities that have been, and are generally, *peninsulas* for many reasons, logistical and tactical, defensive and offensive, as in World War II.

That necessitated, therefore, the independence of many widely dispersed nations with parallel vital interests, on continental littorals with peninsulas, for allies and *contingency* beachheads in depth. Such prerequisites are all the more urgent if the potentially continental coercer has nuclear capabilities it could not resist using against the concentrated, vulnerable target of a seaborne landing force, like Eisenhower's 4,000 vessels in Normandy; especially when it lacks conventional and logistic capabilities, as is the case with China.

There are twenty-three peninsulas in Europe available to seapower to preserve the balance or contain a continental coercer there as, France was under Louis XIV and Napoleon; Germany under William II and Hitler; and now Russia. But against Russia and/or China in East Asia there are only five peninsulas: Korea, Liaotung, Shantung in the North, and Luichow and Southeast Asia in the South.

The three first are all too near each other and our Korean beachhead, to China's Manchurian arsenal, and to the terminus of Russia's Trans Siberian railroad. By law of supply and demand, each Asian peninsula is strategically worth more than any of the twenty-three European salients into the laws of seapower, such as France, Spain, Italy or Denmark, attack on any one of which would bring us into instant war.

The independence of peninsula beachheads for a maritime linchpin is a consideration I have never seen in print, in all the verbiage on Vietnam, except as attributed to foreign statesmen and military men, and my own books, significantly not reviewed in a single newspaper or mass circulation periodical.

The Russians and Chinese are not only aware of the above U.S. grand strategy but have repeatedly avowed objectives to thwart it by driving American forces off the Eurasian landmass.

So, our lack of candor fools no one but our own public and that of nations with parallel vital interests, and only handicaps effective implementation of our conventional strategy to forestall conquest eventually or strategic nuclear warfare as only alternatives.

South Vietnam is not only on a peninsula with potential access to China, but a position from which the strategic straits of Malacca can be attacked or defended. It is far from Korea, China's Manchurian arsenal, the terminus of Russia's Trans-Siberian railroad and has excellent harbors for landing personnel and materiel. It is peninsular in character, logistically, with good roads running North-South but few widely separated East-West communications through mountainous defiles, vulnerable and easily blocked.

Vietnam could well be our last clear chance if the domino theory proves right. Better safe than sorry; better hedge our bets.

Offshore islands; Japan, Taiwan and Indonesia; won't do if only because not on the mainland, necessitating forced landings, perhaps impossible against China's growing nuclear capabilities.

Thailand is an inadequate springboard since it does not provide access to China because of mountains and lack of roads to China and the South China Sea. Alone, it is difficult to defend from Laos.

Malaya is too far from China, and can easily be defended from the North, not from the South.

However, Laos is the key to Vietnam, according to President Kennedy an General Westmoreland. It touches all countries of the peninsula and has no value at all except strategic, providing the only means of access for materiel and personnel from China and North Vietnam to the South via the Ho Chi Minh trails.

The 1962 treaty made it a buffer state. Instead, the enemy is using it as communications zone in violation of that treaty. If such violations cannot be stopped by diplomacy, they have to be stopped by military action. Since bombing can't do it, only ground action can save Vietnam. If Vietnam is a key to our security, Laos is *the* key to Vietnam.

The flow of personnel and materiel through Laos must therefore be stopped at all costs, short of strategic nuclear war. No peninsular campaign has been waged and won in modern warfare without a defended line and protected flanks to bar communications and supplies. No guerrilla war has ever been lost where the guer-

rillas have been effectively cut off from replacement of men and supplies by a defended line or sea blockade.

Such 120 mile Laotian line is well within the capabilities of South Vietnam and allies and would compel the enemy to fight the kind of war we can fight and support and the kind they can't. They are too far away, too poor industrially, and have inadequate access roads though they are starting to build some.

Many objections have been raised, none of which have an iota of merit, that within the restricted compass of this expose can be dealt with, if raised on cross examination, I am prepared for. Each and every such objection can however be demolished. Most are sham, immaterial and irrelevant or transcended by the priority of national survival over any and every other consideration.

Now we are threatened by avowed enemies with control of an indispensable piece of real estate, with the reasons for preventing it, having been suppressed by our academic media-complex whose paper curtain would have the iron and/or bamboo descend over it.

No general circulation newspaper would publish such reasons even in letters to editors. No trade book publisher would publish my book setting them forth. No general circulation periodical would publish such an article. No one would even publish a review of my book. No TV or radio station would allow such reasons to be broadcast or of the existence of such a book with such reasons.

No wonder the war is unpopular. No wonder intellectuals, who only know what they can read, protest against it. No wonder the campus unrest. No wonder Mr. Nixon ignores a public opinion deliberately kept in ignorance by that paper curtain.

I also deeply deplore not having been accorded a personal appearance and subjected to cross examination, as I also wrote Senator Fulbright with copy to Senator Javits. For this statement is only a synopsis of a 155 page book in which I may well have overlooked or ineptly expressed some point on which some committee member might well have sought clarification.

Secondly it is most probable that in the scurry it will only be filed and forgotten, not even read by all members of this committee whose opinion it might have served to influence.

Finally it raises the presumption that such cross examination would not have impaired the validity of its thesis.

Difference in Figures on Refugees Moving South

The Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20, 1954, provided in article 14(d) for the movement of civilians from either "zone" (i.e., North Viet-Nam or South Viet-Nam) to the other during the period authorized for the regroupment of military forces (specified elsewhere as 300 days).

During this period, which lasted from July, 1954 through May, 1955, an estimated 850,000 to 900,000 residents of North Viet-Nam moved to the South. (An unknown but much smaller number of persons moved from South to North.) The historian Joseph W. Buttinger, who himself uses the estimate of "nearly 900,000 persons", states that a principal reason for the lack of any precise number of refugees is that the files of the South Vietnamese Refugee Commissariat were burned in a fire during fighting in Saigon in the spring of 1955.[1]

There is a substantial and well-organized Northern Catholic community in South Viet-Nam *today*, which by most estimates—taking into account the large Catholic component of the original refugee group and their descendants, who share many of the same political and ideological points of view—numbers well over a million persons, perhaps as many as a million and a half. The total Roman Catholic population of South Viet-Nam today—ethnic Northerners and ethnic Southerners alike—is believed to number about two million persons.

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[1] Buttinger, *Viet-Nam: A Dragon Embattled* (New York: Praeger 1967), Volume II, pp. 900 and 1116-1117.

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

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
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